France

France has a comparatively positive record in sustainable governance. Its CO2-weak energy mix and its leading role in international climate negotiations make it a critical actor in global action against climate change. This being said, France faces considerable challenges and is not always well equipped to respond to them.

The main challenge concerns public acceptance of climate and environmental policies. The Yellow Vest Movement of 2018 – 2019 is still on everyone’s mind. Even if the French public is generally supportive of environmental protection, the willingness to accept income losses or competitive declines is limited. Especially in the context of higher inflation since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, purchasing power has become a highly sensitive political issue.

Climate change denial is not very prominent in the French public sphere. However, arguments that effectively serve to delay the climate transition are being aired more regularly. Right-wing movements and even elements of the government party have sometimes been tempted to resort to these types of arguments. The right and especially the far right are downplaying climate change, possibly creating electoral pressure on government parties.

In an exceedingly majoritarian political system, even small voter movements may have a strong impact on electoral outcomes. This has created a strong majoritarian culture in French politics that makes cooperation unlikely. Governmental offers of cooperation are usually seen as a synonym for complying with the government’s preferred policy position. On the side of the opposition, this tends to produce a wholesale rejection of anything coming from the government, and a self-confinement to systematic opposition, even on issues where agreement would be possible or desirable.

Another problem linked to the majoritarian culture is that intermediate powers (i.e., local or regional actors, interest groups, professional organizations, civil society associations) are seldom involved in the policymaking process. This has led to a “top down” decision-making and government style, with only limited amounts of social concertation. In turn, the fact that civil society and socioeconomic organizations have little voice in the process leads to staunch opposition, regularly produces huge mobilization movements in the streets, and alienates large parts of the population from the political class. This problem of insufficient social concertation has been discussed for a long time. Although various attempts to adopt a more inclusive decision-making style have been made, they have typically been tactical or half-hearted rather than sustained.

A more structural problem concerns the lack of transparency. The existence of numerous privileges and exceptions to existing rules – including the absence of regulations on private jets or the watering of golf fields – creates frustration and even resentment. It tends to undermine public trust and makes it more difficult to achieve sustainable outcomes. Ultimately, much of this relates to the way the financial burden of climate transition will be distributed. Environmental policies can have a disproportionately negative impact on certain groups of people, such as low-income communities and marginalized groups. This can exacerbate social inequalities, which may in turn fuel political resentment.

Several directions should be explored to improve sustainable governance. These all rely on the assumption that most obstacles to sustainable governance are due to the country’s excessively majoritarian politics.

A more proportional electoral system:

This would essentially entail a reform of the electoral system in the direction of more proportional representation. In time, this would help reduce the systematic rejection of government proposals by the opposition and vice versa. This would also reduce the temptation by presidents to unilaterally announce and force through their political agenda. The exact details of this reform would require discussion, as the two-round electoral system is deeply anchored in French politics. A good blueprint could be the electoral system for the European Parliament election, which relies on regional proportional-representation lists, even if the variance in regional populations will influence the degree of proportionality.

A modified electoral calendar:

An additional reform to achieve the same goal could consist of making the presidential and legislative elections coincide. Currently, legislative elections take place six to eight weeks after the second round for the presidential contest. This change would put the two elections on an equal footing, thus increasing the relative value of legislative elections and avoiding a situation in which legislative elections simply confirm the results of presidential elections.

Better impact assessment and policy evaluation:

The majoritarian character of French politics often results in a situation in which the executive disregards expert opinions and scientific evidence. Similarly, erratic changes, such as the temporary elimination of mathematics as a compulsory subject in the baccalauréat, can be costly both in the short and long run. A more professionalized policy-evaluation process – possibly by a state-funded independent national evaluation institute – would help shield policymaking from short-term electoral influences. This seems particularly important with regard to climate change and the environment in general.

Stronger and more regular integration of civil society organizations in the policymaking process:

A general commitment to the systematic consultation of concerned CSOs when launching new legislative projects could also help to repair the negative effects of solitary top-down executive policymaking processes and would help lend legitimacy to the results of legislation. There have been promising attempts in the past, such as the “Larcher bill” calling for the systematic integration of employers’ organizations and trade unions in social and labor policy processes, but these have largely been disregarded by the Macron administration since 2017.

All these directions proposed are based on the assumption that changing the rules would trigger behavioral changes among all actors concerned, including the government, administration, political parties and CSOs – and that this in turn would lead to less confrontation and polarization, and more dialogue, negotiation and readiness for compromise. Yet this effect is far from guaranteed; any change will require an ongoing process of social learning, and progress will take time.

Grossman, Emiliano. 2019. “France’s Yellow Vests–Symptom of a Chronic Disease.” Political Insight 10 (1): 30-34.
Grossman, Emiliano, and Nicolas Sauger. 2017. Pourquoi détestons-nous autant nos politiques?. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
CHERTIER, Dominique-Jean. “Pour une modernisation du dialogue social : rapport au Premier Ministre.” Retrieved 8 February 2024 from https://www.centre-inffo.fr/IMG/pdf/Rapport_Chertier.pdf
Rouban, Luc. 2018. “La double fracture du dialogue social.” https://www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/sites/sciencespo.fr.cevipof/files/Dialogue_social_Luc_Rouban_note1-5.pdf