Quality of Democracy
#28Key Findings
Showing distinct setbacks in recent years, the Netherlands falls into the lower-middle ranks (rank 28) with respect to democratic quality. Its score on this measure has declined by 1.1 point relative to 2014.
Political parties are largely funded through membership contributions and government subsidies. Donors contributing more than €4,500 must be identified, and foreign donations can come only from other EU countries. Criticism by right-wing politicians has recently led to attacks on journalists, who have engaged in self-censorship as a result.
Civil rights are generally protected. Protests against pandemic policies turned uncharacteristically chaotic, leading to violence between protesters and police. Racial profiling has been approved by the courts. Anti-Muslim opinion is a concern. Internet-based threats and active discrimination against Jews, Muslims, Afro-Dutch citizens and women are rising.
The massive expansion of the drug-trafficking industry, along with the normalization of drug use, has led to corruption among customs workers and harbor workers, and well beyond into regular society. An increasingly realistic diagnosis of the problem is improving anti-corruption policy. Legal experts argue that recent legislative practices have undermined rule-of-law protections.
Political parties are largely funded through membership contributions and government subsidies. Donors contributing more than €4,500 must be identified, and foreign donations can come only from other EU countries. Criticism by right-wing politicians has recently led to attacks on journalists, who have engaged in self-censorship as a result.
Civil rights are generally protected. Protests against pandemic policies turned uncharacteristically chaotic, leading to violence between protesters and police. Racial profiling has been approved by the courts. Anti-Muslim opinion is a concern. Internet-based threats and active discrimination against Jews, Muslims, Afro-Dutch citizens and women are rising.
The massive expansion of the drug-trafficking industry, along with the normalization of drug use, has led to corruption among customs workers and harbor workers, and well beyond into regular society. An increasingly realistic diagnosis of the problem is improving anti-corruption policy. Legal experts argue that recent legislative practices have undermined rule-of-law protections.
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How fair are procedures for registering candidates and parties?
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Legal regulations provide for a fair registration procedure for all elections; candidates and parties are not discriminated against.
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A few restrictions on election procedures discriminate against a small number of candidates and parties.
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Some unreasonable restrictions on election procedures exist that discriminate against many candidates and parties.
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Discriminating registration procedures for elections are widespread and prevent a large number of potential candidates or parties from participating.
With a score of 80 out of 100 points the Netherlands ranked 8 out of 158 countries in the March 2018 Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index, after Denmark (score 86), Finland, Norway, Iceland, Sweden, Germany and Costa Rica. Its highest scores are in the areas of electoral laws and electoral procedures; somewhat lower scores are in the areas of voter registration and party and candidacy registration. In 2019, this index ranked the Netherlands at seventh place, with 61 out of 70 points, after all the Nordic countries and Germany. Based on data from Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer – EU 2021 on perceptions of electoral integrity, the Netherlands fell at fourth place (after Finland, Sweden and Denmark).
The country’s electoral law and articles 53 through 56 of the constitution detail the basic procedures for free elections at the European, national, provincial and municipal levels. The independence of the Election Council (Kiesraad) responsible for supervising elections is stipulated by law.
All Dutch citizens residing in the Netherlands are equally entitled to run for election, although some restrictions apply in cases where the candidate suffers from a mental disorder, a court order has deprived the individual of eligibility for election, or a candidate’s party name is believed to endanger public order. Anyone possessing citizenship – even minors – can start a political party with minimal legal but considerable financial constraints. Some argue that party-membership and party-caucus rules strongly diminish formal equality with regard to electoral-system accessibility. Political parties with elected members receive state money (subsidies and other benefits), while qualifying as a new party necessitates payment of a considerable entry fee.
Citations:
P. Norris et al., March 2018. Corruption and Coercion: the Year in Elections, 2017
Transparency International, People see low political integrity throughout EU (transparency.org)
P. Norris, M. Grömping, 2019, Perception of Electoral Integrity
https://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/artikel/2304406-nederland-is-het-wilde-westen-van-de-partijfinanciering
https://www.trouw.nl/politiek/politicoloog-krouwel-giften-aan-politieke-partijen-werken-corruptie-in-de-hand~b48994ba/
https://www.trouw.nl/politiek/de-cda-ruzie-laat-zien-dat-er-regels-voor-partijfinanciering-nodig-zijn-dit-is-toegestane-corruptie~b76f7ca7/
https://www.nporadio1.nl/fragmenten/de-nieuws-bv/a9b142f4-12ca-447e-98f7-9883847a5177/2021-06-18-bijna-alles-mag-bij-partijfinanciering
The country’s electoral law and articles 53 through 56 of the constitution detail the basic procedures for free elections at the European, national, provincial and municipal levels. The independence of the Election Council (Kiesraad) responsible for supervising elections is stipulated by law.
All Dutch citizens residing in the Netherlands are equally entitled to run for election, although some restrictions apply in cases where the candidate suffers from a mental disorder, a court order has deprived the individual of eligibility for election, or a candidate’s party name is believed to endanger public order. Anyone possessing citizenship – even minors – can start a political party with minimal legal but considerable financial constraints. Some argue that party-membership and party-caucus rules strongly diminish formal equality with regard to electoral-system accessibility. Political parties with elected members receive state money (subsidies and other benefits), while qualifying as a new party necessitates payment of a considerable entry fee.
Citations:
P. Norris et al., March 2018. Corruption and Coercion: the Year in Elections, 2017
Transparency International, People see low political integrity throughout EU (transparency.org)
P. Norris, M. Grömping, 2019, Perception of Electoral Integrity
https://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/artikel/2304406-nederland-is-het-wilde-westen-van-de-partijfinanciering
https://www.trouw.nl/politiek/politicoloog-krouwel-giften-aan-politieke-partijen-werken-corruptie-in-de-hand~b48994ba/
https://www.trouw.nl/politiek/de-cda-ruzie-laat-zien-dat-er-regels-voor-partijfinanciering-nodig-zijn-dit-is-toegestane-corruptie~b76f7ca7/
https://www.nporadio1.nl/fragmenten/de-nieuws-bv/a9b142f4-12ca-447e-98f7-9883847a5177/2021-06-18-bijna-alles-mag-bij-partijfinanciering
To what extent do candidates and parties have fair access to the media and other means of communication?
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All candidates and parties have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. All major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of the range of different political positions.
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Candidates and parties have largely equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. The major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of different political positions.
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Candidates and parties often do not have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. While the major media outlets represent a partisan political bias, the media system as a whole provides fair coverage of different political positions.
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Candidates and parties lack equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communications. The major media outlets are biased in favor of certain political groups or views and discriminate against others.
The Media Law (Article 39g) requires that political parties with one or more seats in either chamber of the States General be allotted time on the national broadcasting stations (radio, television) during the parliamentary term, provided that they participate in nationwide elections. The Commission for the Media ensures that political parties are given equal media access free from government influence or interference (Article 11.3). The commission is also responsible for allotting national broadcasting time to political parties participating in European elections.
Broadcasting time is denied only to parties that have been fined for breaches of Dutch anti-discrimination legislation. The public prosecutor has brought group insult and inciting to discrimination charges against Geert Wilders, the leading member of parliament representing the Party for Freedom (PVV). The charge was upheld (minus the aspect of inciting to discrimination) by the Supreme Court, but no legal punishment was ordered; nor were disadvantaged parties accorded the right of compensation. In this way, the PVV kept its free airtime on national Dutch broadcasting channels. Commercial media outlets decide themselves how much attention to pay to political parties and candidates. Since 2004, state subsidies for participating in elections have been granted only to parties already represented in the States General. Whether this practice constitutes a form of unequal treatment for newcomers is currently a matter of discussion.
However, media access these days also means access to social media (Twitter, blogs, YouTube), especially when competing for younger voters (18 – 35 age group). Dutch political parties have together spent more than €200,000 on Facebook advertisements in the run-up to the European Parliament elections in 2019. Public debate on topics of this nature is only beginning, inspired by issues such as the general financing of political parties, access to social media by new political parties, movements with strong but undisclosed financial support, and foreign interference in national elections. Even in the Netherlands, some parts of society are turning against media reporting, and are threatening journalists. Public media broadcasting equipment (vans, cars) have removed their logos for fear of damages through attacks by inimical individuals, bands or crowds.
Citations:
NU.nl, 3 November 2019. Politieke partijen gaven 200.000 euro uit aan Facebook-advertenties
Adformatie, 1 nNovember 2016. VVD strijdt ook ‘achter Facebook’ en boekt meeste succes op social media (Adformatie.nl, accessed 3 November, 2019)
de Rechtspraak, 9 December 2016 Wilders schuldig aan groepsbelediging en aanzetten tot discriminatie
Openbaar Ministerie, Strafzaak Wilders (afgesloten 6 Juli 2021)
Villamedia Website over Journalistiek, 15 October 2020. NOS verwijderd logo’s vanwege bedreigingen van journalisten
De Telegraaf, 22 November 2021. Omroep Brabant verwijdert logo’s van wagens: ‘Knieval voor geweld’.
Broadcasting time is denied only to parties that have been fined for breaches of Dutch anti-discrimination legislation. The public prosecutor has brought group insult and inciting to discrimination charges against Geert Wilders, the leading member of parliament representing the Party for Freedom (PVV). The charge was upheld (minus the aspect of inciting to discrimination) by the Supreme Court, but no legal punishment was ordered; nor were disadvantaged parties accorded the right of compensation. In this way, the PVV kept its free airtime on national Dutch broadcasting channels. Commercial media outlets decide themselves how much attention to pay to political parties and candidates. Since 2004, state subsidies for participating in elections have been granted only to parties already represented in the States General. Whether this practice constitutes a form of unequal treatment for newcomers is currently a matter of discussion.
However, media access these days also means access to social media (Twitter, blogs, YouTube), especially when competing for younger voters (18 – 35 age group). Dutch political parties have together spent more than €200,000 on Facebook advertisements in the run-up to the European Parliament elections in 2019. Public debate on topics of this nature is only beginning, inspired by issues such as the general financing of political parties, access to social media by new political parties, movements with strong but undisclosed financial support, and foreign interference in national elections. Even in the Netherlands, some parts of society are turning against media reporting, and are threatening journalists. Public media broadcasting equipment (vans, cars) have removed their logos for fear of damages through attacks by inimical individuals, bands or crowds.
Citations:
NU.nl, 3 November 2019. Politieke partijen gaven 200.000 euro uit aan Facebook-advertenties
Adformatie, 1 nNovember 2016. VVD strijdt ook ‘achter Facebook’ en boekt meeste succes op social media (Adformatie.nl, accessed 3 November, 2019)
de Rechtspraak, 9 December 2016 Wilders schuldig aan groepsbelediging en aanzetten tot discriminatie
Openbaar Ministerie, Strafzaak Wilders (afgesloten 6 Juli 2021)
Villamedia Website over Journalistiek, 15 October 2020. NOS verwijderd logo’s vanwege bedreigingen van journalisten
De Telegraaf, 22 November 2021. Omroep Brabant verwijdert logo’s van wagens: ‘Knieval voor geweld’.
To what extent do all citizens have the opportunity to exercise their right of participation in national elections?
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All adult citizens can participate in national elections. All eligible voters are registered if they wish to be. There are no discriminations observable in the exercise of the right to vote. There are no disincentives to voting.
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The procedures for the registration of voters and voting are for the most part effective, impartial and nondiscriminatory. Citizens can appeal to courts if they feel being discriminated. Disincentives to voting generally do not constitute genuine obstacles.
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While the procedures for the registration of voters and voting are de jure non-discriminatory, isolated cases of discrimination occur in practice. For some citizens, disincentives to voting constitute significant obstacles.
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The procedures for the registration of voters or voting have systemic discriminatory effects. De facto, a substantial number of adult citizens are excluded from national elections.
Voter registration is passive and based on the unified population register maintained by municipalities. Voters residing abroad who wish to receive the ballot are required to actively register. Up to 1 million citizens reside outside of the Netherlands, but only some 80,000 requested to be registered for the upcoming elections.
Contrary to other civil rights, the right to vote in national, provincial or water board elections is restricted to 13 million citizens with Dutch nationality of 18 years and older (as of election day). For local elections, voting rights apply to all registered as legal residents for at least five years and to all EU nationals residing in the Netherlands. Convicts have the right to vote by authorization only; as part of their conviction, some may be denied voting rights for two to five years over and above their prison terms. Since the elections in 2010, each voter is obliged to show a legally approved ID in addition to a voting card. Legally approved IDs include either a (non-expired) passport or driver’s license.
Characteristic of the high level of trust in election procedures in the Netherlands is the fact that the law regulates complaints and appeals regarding specific parts of the electoral process, such as voter registration, registration of party names, candidate registration and election day proceedings, but there are no specific rules or regulations permitting judicial appeals to other crucial aspects, including campaign finance, campaigning and challenges to the election results.
After the national elections held during the pandemic on 17 March 2021, which entailed special health measures such as postal voting inside the country and social distancing, several changes in the voting procedure have been considered. Proposals have included a change making voting possible over the course of several days, limiting the number of proxy vote authorizations, and adapting ballot design to the increase in the number of political parties on the ballot.
Citations:
art J24 Kieswet: http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0004627/AfdelingII/HoofdstukJ/6/ArtikelJ24/geldigheidsdatum_24-05-2013
art 1 Wet op Indentificatieplicht:
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0006297/geldigheidsdatum_24-05-2013#HoofdstukI_Artikel1
OSCE, Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, The Netherlands, Parliamentary Elections March 17 2021, ODHIRNeeds Assessment Report 19-22 January 2021
NRC, ten Velde, 13 October 2021 Nieuw stembiljet, extra stemdagen
Contrary to other civil rights, the right to vote in national, provincial or water board elections is restricted to 13 million citizens with Dutch nationality of 18 years and older (as of election day). For local elections, voting rights apply to all registered as legal residents for at least five years and to all EU nationals residing in the Netherlands. Convicts have the right to vote by authorization only; as part of their conviction, some may be denied voting rights for two to five years over and above their prison terms. Since the elections in 2010, each voter is obliged to show a legally approved ID in addition to a voting card. Legally approved IDs include either a (non-expired) passport or driver’s license.
Characteristic of the high level of trust in election procedures in the Netherlands is the fact that the law regulates complaints and appeals regarding specific parts of the electoral process, such as voter registration, registration of party names, candidate registration and election day proceedings, but there are no specific rules or regulations permitting judicial appeals to other crucial aspects, including campaign finance, campaigning and challenges to the election results.
After the national elections held during the pandemic on 17 March 2021, which entailed special health measures such as postal voting inside the country and social distancing, several changes in the voting procedure have been considered. Proposals have included a change making voting possible over the course of several days, limiting the number of proxy vote authorizations, and adapting ballot design to the increase in the number of political parties on the ballot.
Citations:
art J24 Kieswet: http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0004627/AfdelingII/HoofdstukJ/6/ArtikelJ24/geldigheidsdatum_24-05-2013
art 1 Wet op Indentificatieplicht:
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0006297/geldigheidsdatum_24-05-2013#HoofdstukI_Artikel1
OSCE, Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, The Netherlands, Parliamentary Elections March 17 2021, ODHIRNeeds Assessment Report 19-22 January 2021
NRC, ten Velde, 13 October 2021 Nieuw stembiljet, extra stemdagen
To what extent is private and public party financing and electoral campaign financing transparent, effectively monitored and in case of infringement of rules subject to proportionate and dissuasive sanction?
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The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and provides for independent monitoring to that respect. Effective measures to prevent evasion are effectively in place and infringements subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.
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The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and provides for independent monitoring. Although infringements are subject to proportionate sanctions, some, although few, loopholes and options for circumvention still exist.
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The state provides that donations to political parties shall be published. Party financing is subject to some degree of independent monitoring but monitoring either proves regularly ineffective or proportionate sanctions in case of infringement do not follow.
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The rules for party and campaign financing do not effectively enforce the obligation to make the donations public. Party and campaign financing is neither monitored independently nor, in case of infringements, subject to proportionate sanctions.
The Dutch government spends less money than its counterparts in most other European countries on financing political parties, at €1 per voter (compared to €9.70 for Iceland). Based on GRECO estimates, Dutch political parties are also less reliant on government money (receiving between 35% and 50% of their funding from this source) than are most other European political parties, with the exception of those in Germany.
Until about a decade ago, political-party finances were not a contested issue in Dutch politics. Party funds come largely through membership contributions (40% – 50%), a “party tax” applied to elected members’ salaries, event revenues and donations, and government subsidies. However, relatively new parties like the Pim Fortuyn List (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF) and the Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV), as well as Forum for Democracy, have received substantial gifts from businesses and/or foreign sources, while the Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij, SP) has made its parliamentarians completely financially dependent on the party leadership by demanding that their salaries be donated in full to the party.
As government transparency became a political issue, these glaring opacities in the Dutch “non-system” of party financing were flagged by the Council of Europe and the Group of Countries against Corruption (GRECO) – resulting in increasing pressures to change the law. Political expediency caused many delays, but the Rutte I Council of Ministers introduced a bill on the financing of political parties in 2011, which was signed into law in 2013. GRECO has also addressed the procedure for monitoring party finances (particularly when the rules are improved), noting that this task should rest not with a minister or political figure, but with an independent body.
The 2013 law eradicates many – but not all – of the earlier loopholes. Political parties are obliged to register gifts starting at €1,000, and at €4,500 they are obliged to publish the name and address of the donor. This rule has been opposed by the PVV as an infringement of the right to anonymously support a political party. Direct provision of services and facilities to political parties is also regulated. Non-compliance will be better monitored. The scope of the law does not yet extend to provincial or local political parties. The law’s possible discrimination against newcomer political parties remains an unresolved issue.
In 2018, an ad hoc advisory commission evaluated the 2013 law. It argued that anonymous donations (especially from foreign donors) should be prohibited, and that the threshold and conditions for non-disclosure should be changed in favor of greater transparency. It additionally recommended that state subsidization should in the future be based on the number of party members rather than the number of parliamentary seats, with the aim of strengthening political parties’ societal roots. Furthermore, it said that provincial and local political parties should be brought within the scope of the law. The government only partially followed the commission’s advice. Foreign donations were limited to within-EU donations, but the idea of privileging membership numbers more than the number of seats held was put on hold. Recently, an alleged corruption case involving aldermen in the municipal government of The Hague has placed the issue back on the political agenda, particularly given concerns about growing criminal influences within local governments.
Citations:
Parlement & Politiek, Partijfinanciering, 2016 (parlement.com, consulted November 9 2016
I. van Biezen, 2017. De financiering van politieke partijen – een internationale vergelijking (kennisopenbaarbestuur.nl, accessed 3 November 2019)
NRC Handelsblad, 26 January 2019. Kabinet: verbod op partijfinanciering van buiten de EU.
Nieuwsuur, 2 October, 2019. ‘Nederland is het Wilde Westen van de partijfinanciering’
Follow The Money (FTM), Dossier De financiering van onze politieke partijen
Until about a decade ago, political-party finances were not a contested issue in Dutch politics. Party funds come largely through membership contributions (40% – 50%), a “party tax” applied to elected members’ salaries, event revenues and donations, and government subsidies. However, relatively new parties like the Pim Fortuyn List (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF) and the Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV), as well as Forum for Democracy, have received substantial gifts from businesses and/or foreign sources, while the Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij, SP) has made its parliamentarians completely financially dependent on the party leadership by demanding that their salaries be donated in full to the party.
As government transparency became a political issue, these glaring opacities in the Dutch “non-system” of party financing were flagged by the Council of Europe and the Group of Countries against Corruption (GRECO) – resulting in increasing pressures to change the law. Political expediency caused many delays, but the Rutte I Council of Ministers introduced a bill on the financing of political parties in 2011, which was signed into law in 2013. GRECO has also addressed the procedure for monitoring party finances (particularly when the rules are improved), noting that this task should rest not with a minister or political figure, but with an independent body.
The 2013 law eradicates many – but not all – of the earlier loopholes. Political parties are obliged to register gifts starting at €1,000, and at €4,500 they are obliged to publish the name and address of the donor. This rule has been opposed by the PVV as an infringement of the right to anonymously support a political party. Direct provision of services and facilities to political parties is also regulated. Non-compliance will be better monitored. The scope of the law does not yet extend to provincial or local political parties. The law’s possible discrimination against newcomer political parties remains an unresolved issue.
In 2018, an ad hoc advisory commission evaluated the 2013 law. It argued that anonymous donations (especially from foreign donors) should be prohibited, and that the threshold and conditions for non-disclosure should be changed in favor of greater transparency. It additionally recommended that state subsidization should in the future be based on the number of party members rather than the number of parliamentary seats, with the aim of strengthening political parties’ societal roots. Furthermore, it said that provincial and local political parties should be brought within the scope of the law. The government only partially followed the commission’s advice. Foreign donations were limited to within-EU donations, but the idea of privileging membership numbers more than the number of seats held was put on hold. Recently, an alleged corruption case involving aldermen in the municipal government of The Hague has placed the issue back on the political agenda, particularly given concerns about growing criminal influences within local governments.
Citations:
Parlement & Politiek, Partijfinanciering, 2016 (parlement.com, consulted November 9 2016
I. van Biezen, 2017. De financiering van politieke partijen – een internationale vergelijking (kennisopenbaarbestuur.nl, accessed 3 November 2019)
NRC Handelsblad, 26 January 2019. Kabinet: verbod op partijfinanciering van buiten de EU.
Nieuwsuur, 2 October, 2019. ‘Nederland is het Wilde Westen van de partijfinanciering’
Follow The Money (FTM), Dossier De financiering van onze politieke partijen
Do citizens have the opportunity to take binding political decisions when they want to do so?
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Citizens have the effective opportunity to actively propose and take binding decisions on issues of importance to them through popular initiatives and referendums. The set of eligible issues is extensive, and includes national, regional, and local issues.
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Citizens have the effective opportunity to take binding decisions on issues of importance to them through either popular initiatives or referendums. The set of eligible issues covers at least two levels of government.
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Citizens have the effective opportunity to vote on issues of importance to them through a legally binding measure. The set of eligible issues is limited to one level of government.
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Citizens have no effective opportunity to vote on issues of importance to them through a legally binding measure.
Binding popular initiatives and referendums are unlawful both nationally and subnationally, as they are considered to be incompatible with the representative system. At the municipal level, many experimental referendum ordinances have been approved since the 1990s, but the national government has prohibited several ordinances that gave citizens too much binding influence on either the political agenda or the outcome of political decision-making. In 2016, a large number of municipal government mayors, aldermen, councilors, scientists and businessmen initiated “Code Orange” for “civocracy,” (“citizen power”) which aims to involve citizens more in local governance through “citizen pacts” (“burgerakkoord”). The citizen pacts are intended to replace and/or complement the traditional “coalition pacts” between local political parties, which normally are the basis for policymaking. After the 2018 elections experiments in citizen pacts are being conducted. Though all the experiments are struggling with the practical aspects of integrating citizen pacts into the legal framework and normal division of labor of local forms of representative democracy.
At national level, the issue has been on the political agenda since the 1980s. Under pressure from new populist political parties, the Dutch government organized a consultative referendum on the new European Constitution in 2005, using an ad hoc temporary law. With turnout of 63.3% of the eligible electorate, this constitution was rejected by a clear majority of 61.5%, sending shockwaves through all EU member states and institutions. In September 2014, a bill for an advisory referendum on laws and treaties passed the Senate, and was implemented on 1 July 2015. This law allows for non-binding referendums on petitions that gain 10,000 signatories within a four-week period. Subsequently, another 300,000 citizens are needed to sign up in support of the initial request within a six weeks period.
Geen Peil, an ad hoc anti-EU organization, successfully mobilized enough votes for an advisory referendum on the provisional EU association treaty with Ukraine, which was signed by the Dutch government. With a mere 32.3% voter turnout, the no-vote (61%) was valid nevertheless, and the government was obliged to renegotiate the deal at EU level. In March 2018, in another consultative referendum, Dutch voters rejected a proposed Law on the Intelligence and Security Services (Wet op de Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdiensten) by a narrow margin (49.44% against, 46.53% for and 4% undecided). This result forced the government to reconsider some parts of the law. The unpleasant referendum campaigns and their contested outcomes prompted the Rutte III government to abolish the consultative referendum as one of its first regulatory decisions. Nevertheless, the Remkes Commission for State-Legitimacy Reforms (Staatkundige Hervorming) states that Dutch democracy suffers from a “representation deficit” defined by demography, educational attainment, wealth and professional background. Among many other reform proposals, the Remkes Commission has seriously considered putting the issue of a binding referendum back the political agenda. To date, only one political party (D66) has adopted this advice, using the issue as an element of the party’s 2020 election campaign.
Citations:
R. Hoppe (2010/11), Institutional constraints and practical problems in deliberative and participatory policymaking, in Policy & Politics, Vol. 39, Nr. 2, 163-183 (online 19 August 2010, DOI: 10.1332/030557310X519650)
NOS, Nee-stem in Oekraïne-referendum blijft zonder gevolgen, 2 October 2016 (nog.nl, consulted 9 November 2016)
VNG, Code Oranje voor verandering politieke democratie, 26 October 2016 (eng.nl, consulted 9 November 2016)
M. Chavannes, Wat je stem wel en niet zegt bij het referendum, De Correspondent, 16 March 2018
Nieuwsuur, Commissie Remkes pleit voor invoering bindend referendum (https://nos.nl/l/x/2237616?social=m, accessed 25 October 2018
At national level, the issue has been on the political agenda since the 1980s. Under pressure from new populist political parties, the Dutch government organized a consultative referendum on the new European Constitution in 2005, using an ad hoc temporary law. With turnout of 63.3% of the eligible electorate, this constitution was rejected by a clear majority of 61.5%, sending shockwaves through all EU member states and institutions. In September 2014, a bill for an advisory referendum on laws and treaties passed the Senate, and was implemented on 1 July 2015. This law allows for non-binding referendums on petitions that gain 10,000 signatories within a four-week period. Subsequently, another 300,000 citizens are needed to sign up in support of the initial request within a six weeks period.
Geen Peil, an ad hoc anti-EU organization, successfully mobilized enough votes for an advisory referendum on the provisional EU association treaty with Ukraine, which was signed by the Dutch government. With a mere 32.3% voter turnout, the no-vote (61%) was valid nevertheless, and the government was obliged to renegotiate the deal at EU level. In March 2018, in another consultative referendum, Dutch voters rejected a proposed Law on the Intelligence and Security Services (Wet op de Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdiensten) by a narrow margin (49.44% against, 46.53% for and 4% undecided). This result forced the government to reconsider some parts of the law. The unpleasant referendum campaigns and their contested outcomes prompted the Rutte III government to abolish the consultative referendum as one of its first regulatory decisions. Nevertheless, the Remkes Commission for State-Legitimacy Reforms (Staatkundige Hervorming) states that Dutch democracy suffers from a “representation deficit” defined by demography, educational attainment, wealth and professional background. Among many other reform proposals, the Remkes Commission has seriously considered putting the issue of a binding referendum back the political agenda. To date, only one political party (D66) has adopted this advice, using the issue as an element of the party’s 2020 election campaign.
Citations:
R. Hoppe (2010/11), Institutional constraints and practical problems in deliberative and participatory policymaking, in Policy & Politics, Vol. 39, Nr. 2, 163-183 (online 19 August 2010, DOI: 10.1332/030557310X519650)
NOS, Nee-stem in Oekraïne-referendum blijft zonder gevolgen, 2 October 2016 (nog.nl, consulted 9 November 2016)
VNG, Code Oranje voor verandering politieke democratie, 26 October 2016 (eng.nl, consulted 9 November 2016)
M. Chavannes, Wat je stem wel en niet zegt bij het referendum, De Correspondent, 16 March 2018
Nieuwsuur, Commissie Remkes pleit voor invoering bindend referendum (https://nos.nl/l/x/2237616?social=m, accessed 25 October 2018
Graph View
To what extent are the media independent from government?
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Public and private media are independent from government influence; their independence is institutionally protected and fully respected by the incumbent government.
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7
6
The incumbent government largely respects the independence of media. However, there are occasional attempts to exert influence.
5
4
3
4
3
The incumbent government seeks to ensure its political objectives indirectly by influencing the personnel policies, organizational framework or financial resources of public media, and/or the licensing regime/market access for private media.
2
1
1
Major media outlets are frequently influenced by the incumbent government promoting its partisan political objectives. To ensure pro-government media reporting, governmental actors exert direct political pressure and violate existing rules of media regulation or change them to benefit their interests.
The freedoms of the press/media and of expression are formally guaranteed by the constitution (Article 7). The Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index 2021 ranked the Netherlands at sixth place, one rank lower than previously. The somewhat lower ranking results from the fact that despite accepting an Open Government Law in both houses of parliament in 2021, the government, hampered by the coronavirus crisis, hasn’t improved the media’s access to state-held information, with the result that documents requested by journalists often arrive late and are incomplete, with entire pages or lengthy passages erased or redacted. Mass data collection by the government has sometimes violated the privacy of journalists and their right to protect their sources.
Even parliament has fallen victim to active blocking of access to government information. According to one high-profile professor of public law, over the last decade the Rutte governments have incompletely or misinformed parliament 43 times; that is, about 10 times more frequently than the governments in power during the 2001-2010 period. Paradoxically, in the follow-up to the childcare benefits scandal, where for several years the tax authorities and the government actively blocked information to the press and to parliament, SMS messages by the prime minister were made public for the very first time.
Another factor is that right-wing populist politicians attack the mainstream media and journalists as messengers of so-called fake news and as “enemies of the people,” questioning the legitimacy of the traditional media and restricting targeted journalists’ access to political meetings. In this way, they legitimize and encourage interference with the work of journalists. Such sometimes violent interference has become much more common, making public broadcasting organizations remove logos from their equipment. Some individual journalists from local media have been visited at their homes by these people, with attackers throwing stones through windows or inserting Molotov cocktails into their houses through mailboxes. As a consequence, Dutch journalists practice precautionary self-censorship on sensitive issues such as immigration, race, Islam and national culture and character. However, by international standards, journalists in the Netherlands are free from governmental interference. For example, their right to protect their sources is usually formally upheld even when called upon as witnesses in criminal cases.
Public-broadcast programming is produced by a variety of civil organizations, some reflecting political and/or religious denominations with roots in the era of pillarization, others representing more contemporary societal and cultural groups. These independent organizations get allocated TV and radio time that is relative to their membership numbers. However, broadcasting corporations are required to comply with government regulations laid down in the new Media Law. This new law abolished the monopoly of the incumbent public-broadcasting corporations and aims to boost competition by giving access to program providers from outside the official broadcasting corporations. A directing (not just coordinating) National Public Broadcasting Organization (NPO) was established, with a government-nominated supervisory board, which tests and allocates broadcasting time. This board has never functioned well, due to internal disagreements. The new law states that public broadcasting should concern information, culture and education, while pure entertainment should be left to private broadcasters. In practice this has led to blurred boundaries between “information” and “infotainment.” Critics have argued that younger people and non-Dutch population groups are not well served by the public broadcasting system. Currently, public broadcasting is both privately funded through advertisements and publicly funded. Regional broadcasters have been subject to budget cuts, which forces them to collaborate to survive. Influenced by a new EU guideline, a new more comprehensive Media Law has sought to harmonize regulations for commercial advertising through traditional linear public and private broadcasting through radio and TV, and those for non-linear, digital platforms and streaming services like YouTube and Netflix.
Citations:
Reporters Without Borders, 2021. Netherlands
NRC, Nieber, 18 January 2021. ‘Overheid deelt liever geen stukken’
NRC, De Koning en Hofman, 17 June 2021. Voor het eerst sms’jes van premier Rutte openbaar gemaakt.
Trouw, Julen, 5 October 2021. Wet Open Overheid eindelijk aangenomen, komt nieuwe bestuurscultuur ook een stapje dichterbij?
W. Voermans, 2021. Het land moet bestuurd worden. Machiavelli in de polder, pp. 175-6
Even parliament has fallen victim to active blocking of access to government information. According to one high-profile professor of public law, over the last decade the Rutte governments have incompletely or misinformed parliament 43 times; that is, about 10 times more frequently than the governments in power during the 2001-2010 period. Paradoxically, in the follow-up to the childcare benefits scandal, where for several years the tax authorities and the government actively blocked information to the press and to parliament, SMS messages by the prime minister were made public for the very first time.
Another factor is that right-wing populist politicians attack the mainstream media and journalists as messengers of so-called fake news and as “enemies of the people,” questioning the legitimacy of the traditional media and restricting targeted journalists’ access to political meetings. In this way, they legitimize and encourage interference with the work of journalists. Such sometimes violent interference has become much more common, making public broadcasting organizations remove logos from their equipment. Some individual journalists from local media have been visited at their homes by these people, with attackers throwing stones through windows or inserting Molotov cocktails into their houses through mailboxes. As a consequence, Dutch journalists practice precautionary self-censorship on sensitive issues such as immigration, race, Islam and national culture and character. However, by international standards, journalists in the Netherlands are free from governmental interference. For example, their right to protect their sources is usually formally upheld even when called upon as witnesses in criminal cases.
Public-broadcast programming is produced by a variety of civil organizations, some reflecting political and/or religious denominations with roots in the era of pillarization, others representing more contemporary societal and cultural groups. These independent organizations get allocated TV and radio time that is relative to their membership numbers. However, broadcasting corporations are required to comply with government regulations laid down in the new Media Law. This new law abolished the monopoly of the incumbent public-broadcasting corporations and aims to boost competition by giving access to program providers from outside the official broadcasting corporations. A directing (not just coordinating) National Public Broadcasting Organization (NPO) was established, with a government-nominated supervisory board, which tests and allocates broadcasting time. This board has never functioned well, due to internal disagreements. The new law states that public broadcasting should concern information, culture and education, while pure entertainment should be left to private broadcasters. In practice this has led to blurred boundaries between “information” and “infotainment.” Critics have argued that younger people and non-Dutch population groups are not well served by the public broadcasting system. Currently, public broadcasting is both privately funded through advertisements and publicly funded. Regional broadcasters have been subject to budget cuts, which forces them to collaborate to survive. Influenced by a new EU guideline, a new more comprehensive Media Law has sought to harmonize regulations for commercial advertising through traditional linear public and private broadcasting through radio and TV, and those for non-linear, digital platforms and streaming services like YouTube and Netflix.
Citations:
Reporters Without Borders, 2021. Netherlands
NRC, Nieber, 18 January 2021. ‘Overheid deelt liever geen stukken’
NRC, De Koning en Hofman, 17 June 2021. Voor het eerst sms’jes van premier Rutte openbaar gemaakt.
Trouw, Julen, 5 October 2021. Wet Open Overheid eindelijk aangenomen, komt nieuwe bestuurscultuur ook een stapje dichterbij?
W. Voermans, 2021. Het land moet bestuurd worden. Machiavelli in de polder, pp. 175-6
To what extent are the media characterized by an ownership structure that ensures a pluralism of opinions?
10
9
9
Diversified ownership structures characterize both the electronic and print media market, providing a well-balanced pluralism of opinions. Effective anti-monopoly policies and impartial, open public media guarantee a pluralism of opinions.
8
7
6
7
6
Diversified ownership structures prevail in the electronic and print media market. Public media compensate for deficiencies or biases in private media reporting by representing a wider range of opinions.
5
4
3
4
3
Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize either the electronic or the print media market. Important opinions are represented but there are no or only weak institutional guarantees against the predominance of certain opinions.
2
1
1
Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize both the electronic and the print media market. Few companies dominate the media, most programs are biased, and there is evidence that certain opinions are not published or are marginalized.
The Dutch media landscape is very pluralistic but nonetheless subject to a gradual narrowing of media ownership, internationalization and rapid commercialization. On the other hand, availability of (foreign and national) web-based TV and radio has increased tremendously. The Dutch media landscape is still characterized by one of the world’s highest newspaper-readership rates. Innovations in newspaper media include tabloids, Sunday editions, and new-media editions (online, mobile phone, etc.). On a regional level, the one-paper-city model is now dominant; there are even several cities lacking local papers altogether. Nevertheless, there is also an increasing sense of news fatigue among younger citizens in particular, many of whom are increasingly avoiding the news.
The degree of ownership concentration in the print media is high. Three publishers control 90% of the paid newspapers circulated, and foreign ownership of print media outlets is growing. As the circulation of traditional magazines decreases, publishers are launching new titles to attract readers. There are currently at least 8,000 different magazine titles available for Dutch readers. Print outlets – both newspapers and magazines – carry a high share of advertising, but this is declining. There are several public and private television and radio stations at the national, regional and local levels. The three public channels continue to lose viewers. The Netherlands also shows one of Europe’s highest rates of cable TV penetration (about 95%). However, online access to news and entertainment has increased due to the prevalence of smartphones, widespread availability of Wi-Fi, and paid news and entertainment sources. Though the issue of ownership concentration also affects the social media and internet search engines. Internet usage rates in the Netherlands are high and many people are connected through broadband (almost 50% of Dutch households). Ten million Dutch residents use the internet on a regular basis, amounting to almost 95.5% of the population aged over six years old. For both print and digital media, users usually trust news reports and do not worry excessively about the issue of fake news, although a clear majority believe that technology and media companies ought to provide better information about and more opportunities for identifying fake news. The government also has a responsibility according to many internet users.
In the European Union’s Media Pluralism Monitor 2020, the Netherlands was characterized as being low risk in the domains of basic protection, political independence and social inclusiveness (especially the use of sign language for the deaf). However, the country was characterized as being medium risk in the area of market plurality, especially media viability. In 2020, even before the COVID-19 outbreak, the share of Dutch people who paid for online news increased from 11% in 2019 to 14% in 2020. The lockdown led to a temporary increase of the reach of television, radio and news media. At the same time, revenues decreased due to lower incomes from advertisements. There is also high risk for concentration of cross-media ownership, as there are no legal restrictions at all and transparency of ownership is low. Consequently, a typical person’s media sources are likely to be controlled by the same, one owner. This requires better regulation of media mergers.
In 2020, a substantial reduction of media pluralism took place. With the acquisition of Sanoma by DPG Media – the owner of newspapers such as AD and De Volkskrant, along with a large number of regional papers – the commercial media market is now dominated by only two publishers, both Belgian. Next to DPG Media, Mediahuis, who own the newspapers De Telegraaf and NRC also increased concentration by acquiring the NDC mediagroep. The Netherlands has thus entered a level of media ownership concentration that raises important questions with regard to media pluralism.
Citations:
P. Bakker, 30 jaar kranten in Nederland: consolidatie en monopolievorming, in mediamonitor.nl., consulted 5 November 2014
EUI/Robert Schumann Center, Media Pluralism Index 2020, Klein, June 2021. Country Report: The Netherlands
Media Pluralism Monitor 2017 – Results, Netherlands, October 2017 (monitor.cmpf.eui.eu, consulted 13 October 2017)
Irene Costera Meijer and Tim Groot Kormelink, The Netherlands in Reuters Institute
Digital News Report 2021. https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2021/netherlands
https://www.cvdm.nl/actueel/covid-19-zorgt-voor-toename-nieuwsgebruik-interesse-en-vertrouwen
The degree of ownership concentration in the print media is high. Three publishers control 90% of the paid newspapers circulated, and foreign ownership of print media outlets is growing. As the circulation of traditional magazines decreases, publishers are launching new titles to attract readers. There are currently at least 8,000 different magazine titles available for Dutch readers. Print outlets – both newspapers and magazines – carry a high share of advertising, but this is declining. There are several public and private television and radio stations at the national, regional and local levels. The three public channels continue to lose viewers. The Netherlands also shows one of Europe’s highest rates of cable TV penetration (about 95%). However, online access to news and entertainment has increased due to the prevalence of smartphones, widespread availability of Wi-Fi, and paid news and entertainment sources. Though the issue of ownership concentration also affects the social media and internet search engines. Internet usage rates in the Netherlands are high and many people are connected through broadband (almost 50% of Dutch households). Ten million Dutch residents use the internet on a regular basis, amounting to almost 95.5% of the population aged over six years old. For both print and digital media, users usually trust news reports and do not worry excessively about the issue of fake news, although a clear majority believe that technology and media companies ought to provide better information about and more opportunities for identifying fake news. The government also has a responsibility according to many internet users.
In the European Union’s Media Pluralism Monitor 2020, the Netherlands was characterized as being low risk in the domains of basic protection, political independence and social inclusiveness (especially the use of sign language for the deaf). However, the country was characterized as being medium risk in the area of market plurality, especially media viability. In 2020, even before the COVID-19 outbreak, the share of Dutch people who paid for online news increased from 11% in 2019 to 14% in 2020. The lockdown led to a temporary increase of the reach of television, radio and news media. At the same time, revenues decreased due to lower incomes from advertisements. There is also high risk for concentration of cross-media ownership, as there are no legal restrictions at all and transparency of ownership is low. Consequently, a typical person’s media sources are likely to be controlled by the same, one owner. This requires better regulation of media mergers.
In 2020, a substantial reduction of media pluralism took place. With the acquisition of Sanoma by DPG Media – the owner of newspapers such as AD and De Volkskrant, along with a large number of regional papers – the commercial media market is now dominated by only two publishers, both Belgian. Next to DPG Media, Mediahuis, who own the newspapers De Telegraaf and NRC also increased concentration by acquiring the NDC mediagroep. The Netherlands has thus entered a level of media ownership concentration that raises important questions with regard to media pluralism.
Citations:
P. Bakker, 30 jaar kranten in Nederland: consolidatie en monopolievorming, in mediamonitor.nl., consulted 5 November 2014
EUI/Robert Schumann Center, Media Pluralism Index 2020, Klein, June 2021. Country Report: The Netherlands
Media Pluralism Monitor 2017 – Results, Netherlands, October 2017 (monitor.cmpf.eui.eu, consulted 13 October 2017)
Irene Costera Meijer and Tim Groot Kormelink, The Netherlands in Reuters Institute
Digital News Report 2021. https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2021/netherlands
https://www.cvdm.nl/actueel/covid-19-zorgt-voor-toename-nieuwsgebruik-interesse-en-vertrouwen
To what extent can citizens obtain official information?
10
9
9
Legal regulations guarantee free and easy access to official information, contain few, reasonable restrictions, and there are effective mechanisms of appeal and oversight enabling citizens to access information.
8
7
6
7
6
Access to official information is regulated by law. Most restrictions are justified, but access is sometimes complicated by bureaucratic procedures. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms permit citizens to enforce their right of access.
5
4
3
4
3
Access to official information is partially regulated by law, but complicated by bureaucratic procedures and some poorly justified restrictions. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms are often ineffective.
2
1
1
Access to official information is not regulated by law; there are many restrictions of access, bureaucratic procedures and no or ineffective mechanisms of enforcement.
The Government Information (Public Access) Act (WOB) 1991 governs both active and passive public access to information. Under the WOB, any person can demand information related to “administrative matters” if it is contained in “documents” held by public authorities or companies carrying out work for a public authority. Information must be withheld, however, if it would endanger the unity of the Crown, damage the security of the state, or particularly if it relates to information on companies and manufacturing processes that were provided in confidence. Information can also be withheld “if its importance does not outweigh” the imperatives of international relations and the economic or financial interest of the state.
Between 2010 and 2012, access to government information became a politically contested issue. In practice, the law was used more and more to justify withholding of information to citizens and journalists in the name of “state interest,” which usually referred to the desire to retain the confidentiality of intra-government consultation. In December 2020, the issue politically exploded when the Commission Van Dam, a parliamentary investigation commission on the childcare premium scandal, explicitly accused government of withholding information for many years. Focusing on Minister-resident Rutte as the main culprit, the government (non)information strategy was subsequently called the Rutte doctrine. Under this strategy, the information shared with parliament (and the media) was restricted to that relating to post-factum responsibility and accountability for policy decisions. Far less or no information was shared about the process of decision-making, about how decisions were reached or about how judgments were made by whom, on which scenarios and following what lobbying efforts. After the government collectively stepped down on 15 January 2021, the so-called Rutte doctrine became a major topic of discussion in a public and political debate over a new administrative culture, in which government promised to be much more proactive and transparent in sharing information with parliament and the media.
Meanwhile, this new information regime acquired a legal basis in a new Law on Open Government (Wet open overheid, Woo) to be effective in 2022. All administrative bodies are obliged to proactively publish certain categories of information on a national Platform for Open Government Information. As under the older law, every citizen (but in practice generally journalists) may request specified items of information. Every administrative body will have a contact person tasked with helping citizens look for the information they demand. In addition, there will be a special advisory body on publicity and information to help government apply the new law and mediate in conflicts between government and the media.
Citations:
Your citations
VNG, z.d., Wet open overheid (vangrealisatie.nl, accessed 4 November 2019)
Stibbe, 27 March 2019. Ook WhatsApp – en SMS-berichten op privé telefoons vallen onder de Wet openbaar bestuur (Stibbe B.V., accessed 4 November 2019)
Verslag – Parlementaire ondervragingscommissie Kinderopvangtoeslag Ongekend onrecht
35 510 Parlementaire ondervraging Kinderopvangtoeslag
17 december 2020
G. Entoven, 2011. Hoe vertellen we het de Kamer? Een empirisch onderzoek naar de informatierelatie tussen regering en parlement, dissertatie Universiteit van Tiburg. Delft: Eburon
W. Voermans, 2021. Het land moet bestuurd worden. Macchiavelli in de polder, Amsterdam: Prometheus
Nrc.next, Rutten, 21 January 2021. De Rutte-doctrine: catchphrase die de ergernis van de Kamer verwoordt
Rijksoverheid, 5 October 2021. Eerste Kamer stemt in met Wet open overheid (Woo)
Between 2010 and 2012, access to government information became a politically contested issue. In practice, the law was used more and more to justify withholding of information to citizens and journalists in the name of “state interest,” which usually referred to the desire to retain the confidentiality of intra-government consultation. In December 2020, the issue politically exploded when the Commission Van Dam, a parliamentary investigation commission on the childcare premium scandal, explicitly accused government of withholding information for many years. Focusing on Minister-resident Rutte as the main culprit, the government (non)information strategy was subsequently called the Rutte doctrine. Under this strategy, the information shared with parliament (and the media) was restricted to that relating to post-factum responsibility and accountability for policy decisions. Far less or no information was shared about the process of decision-making, about how decisions were reached or about how judgments were made by whom, on which scenarios and following what lobbying efforts. After the government collectively stepped down on 15 January 2021, the so-called Rutte doctrine became a major topic of discussion in a public and political debate over a new administrative culture, in which government promised to be much more proactive and transparent in sharing information with parliament and the media.
Meanwhile, this new information regime acquired a legal basis in a new Law on Open Government (Wet open overheid, Woo) to be effective in 2022. All administrative bodies are obliged to proactively publish certain categories of information on a national Platform for Open Government Information. As under the older law, every citizen (but in practice generally journalists) may request specified items of information. Every administrative body will have a contact person tasked with helping citizens look for the information they demand. In addition, there will be a special advisory body on publicity and information to help government apply the new law and mediate in conflicts between government and the media.
Citations:
Your citations
VNG, z.d., Wet open overheid (vangrealisatie.nl, accessed 4 November 2019)
Stibbe, 27 March 2019. Ook WhatsApp – en SMS-berichten op privé telefoons vallen onder de Wet openbaar bestuur (Stibbe B.V., accessed 4 November 2019)
Verslag – Parlementaire ondervragingscommissie Kinderopvangtoeslag Ongekend onrecht
35 510 Parlementaire ondervraging Kinderopvangtoeslag
17 december 2020
G. Entoven, 2011. Hoe vertellen we het de Kamer? Een empirisch onderzoek naar de informatierelatie tussen regering en parlement, dissertatie Universiteit van Tiburg. Delft: Eburon
W. Voermans, 2021. Het land moet bestuurd worden. Macchiavelli in de polder, Amsterdam: Prometheus
Nrc.next, Rutten, 21 January 2021. De Rutte-doctrine: catchphrase die de ergernis van de Kamer verwoordt
Rijksoverheid, 5 October 2021. Eerste Kamer stemt in met Wet open overheid (Woo)
Graph View
To what extent does the state respect and protect civil rights and how effectively are citizens protected by courts against infringements of their rights?
10
9
9
All state institutions respect and effectively protect civil rights. Citizens are effectively protected by courts against infringements of their rights. Infringements present an extreme exception.
8
7
6
7
6
The state respects and protects rights, with few infringements. Courts provide protection.
5
4
3
4
3
Despite formal protection, frequent infringements of civil rights occur and court protection often proves ineffective.
2
1
1
State institutions respect civil rights only formally, and civil rights are frequently violated. Court protection is not effective.
The Netherlands formally guarantees and protects individual liberties, and all state institutions formally respect and – most of the time – effectively protect civil rights. The Netherlands publicly exposes abuses and reports them to the UN Human Rights Council or the European Union. It cooperates with the monitoring organizations of all international laws and treaties concerning civil liberties signed by the Dutch government.
However, there are developments worthy of grave concern. The right to privacy of every citizen tops the list of preoccupations. Dutch citizens are more at risk than ever of having their personal data abused or improperly used. In addition, current policies regarding rightful government infringement of civil rights are shifting from legally well-delineated areas like anti-crime and terrorism measures toward less clearly defined areas involving the prevention of risky behavior in areas such as healthcare and travel (coronavirus demonstrations). Increased monitoring and digital surveillance technologies disproportionally target those most dependent on state support, creating inequalities in policing and fraud control. After U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Philip Alston criticized the Dutch government (and parliament) for its use of an algorithmic system (Systeem Risico Indicatie) to detect social-benefits fraud, a new law (Wet Gegevensverwerking Samenwerkingsverbanden) even aims to expand the system to link data from across all government and many private databases to generate an individual fraud-risk profile. This law awaits approval in the Senate. Most recently it was discovered that the tax authorities used a secret list (Fraude Signalering Voorziening) of some 250,000 people suspected of possible tax fraud, without informing them that they had been listed as potential “frauds.” Being listed implied that citizens could be excluded from regular public support for debt restructuring and repayment, insurance contracts, and loans (like mortgages).
Human Rights Watch has criticized recent Dutch legislation restricting the number of locations for hosting asylum-seekers, as well as the long wait times for asylum decisions and family-reunion procedures. The Council of State was criticized for failing to sufficiently uphold the rights of asylum-seekers in appeals to government decisions. On the other hand, the Dutch government withdrew a bill that would have criminalized illegal residence, allowing authorities to put those lacking residence permits in jail. There were concerns about racial profiling by police officers and white Dutch citizens interfering in protests against the traditional “Black Pete” (“Zwarte Piet”) figure in traditional St. Nicholas festivities. However, Frisian pro-Black Pete activists – who stopped anti-racist protesters by blocking a highway – were condemned for disturbing the public order, with this verdict upheld in a higher appeals court. But public ambiguity around racial profiling remains after a judge decided in a case brought by Amnesty International to allow military police officers at the border (e.g., Schiphol Airport) to use racial profiling in surveilling incoming “strangers.”
Citations:
NRC, Heck, 10 November 2021. Datawet pakt boef, maar wellicht ook burger
Human Rights Watch. World Report| 2019. Events of 2018 (hrw.org., consulted 3 November 2019)
NRC, Boonman, 22 September 2021. Rechtbank: marechaussee mag etnisch profiren bij vreemdelingentoezicht
RTL Nieuws, Taakstraffen geëist tegen snelwegblokkeerders: ‘Het draait niet om Zwarte Piet’ (rolnieuws.nl, accessed 25 October 2018)
https://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/bestuur-en-organisatie/nieuws/algoritmes-kunnen-grondrechten-flink-aantasten.9595151.lynkx
However, there are developments worthy of grave concern. The right to privacy of every citizen tops the list of preoccupations. Dutch citizens are more at risk than ever of having their personal data abused or improperly used. In addition, current policies regarding rightful government infringement of civil rights are shifting from legally well-delineated areas like anti-crime and terrorism measures toward less clearly defined areas involving the prevention of risky behavior in areas such as healthcare and travel (coronavirus demonstrations). Increased monitoring and digital surveillance technologies disproportionally target those most dependent on state support, creating inequalities in policing and fraud control. After U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Philip Alston criticized the Dutch government (and parliament) for its use of an algorithmic system (Systeem Risico Indicatie) to detect social-benefits fraud, a new law (Wet Gegevensverwerking Samenwerkingsverbanden) even aims to expand the system to link data from across all government and many private databases to generate an individual fraud-risk profile. This law awaits approval in the Senate. Most recently it was discovered that the tax authorities used a secret list (Fraude Signalering Voorziening) of some 250,000 people suspected of possible tax fraud, without informing them that they had been listed as potential “frauds.” Being listed implied that citizens could be excluded from regular public support for debt restructuring and repayment, insurance contracts, and loans (like mortgages).
Human Rights Watch has criticized recent Dutch legislation restricting the number of locations for hosting asylum-seekers, as well as the long wait times for asylum decisions and family-reunion procedures. The Council of State was criticized for failing to sufficiently uphold the rights of asylum-seekers in appeals to government decisions. On the other hand, the Dutch government withdrew a bill that would have criminalized illegal residence, allowing authorities to put those lacking residence permits in jail. There were concerns about racial profiling by police officers and white Dutch citizens interfering in protests against the traditional “Black Pete” (“Zwarte Piet”) figure in traditional St. Nicholas festivities. However, Frisian pro-Black Pete activists – who stopped anti-racist protesters by blocking a highway – were condemned for disturbing the public order, with this verdict upheld in a higher appeals court. But public ambiguity around racial profiling remains after a judge decided in a case brought by Amnesty International to allow military police officers at the border (e.g., Schiphol Airport) to use racial profiling in surveilling incoming “strangers.”
Citations:
NRC, Heck, 10 November 2021. Datawet pakt boef, maar wellicht ook burger
Human Rights Watch. World Report| 2019. Events of 2018 (hrw.org., consulted 3 November 2019)
NRC, Boonman, 22 September 2021. Rechtbank: marechaussee mag etnisch profiren bij vreemdelingentoezicht
RTL Nieuws, Taakstraffen geëist tegen snelwegblokkeerders: ‘Het draait niet om Zwarte Piet’ (rolnieuws.nl, accessed 25 October 2018)
https://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/bestuur-en-organisatie/nieuws/algoritmes-kunnen-grondrechten-flink-aantasten.9595151.lynkx
To what extent does the state concede and protect political liberties?
10
9
9
All state institutions concede and effectively protect political liberties.
8
7
6
7
6
All state institutions for the most part concede and protect political liberties. There are only few infringements.
5
4
3
4
3
State institutions concede political liberties but infringements occur regularly in practice.
2
1
1
Political liberties are unsatisfactory codified and frequently violated.
All the usual political liberties (of assembly, association, movement, religion, speech, press, thought, unreasonable searches/seizures and suffrage) are guaranteed by the constitution. The Netherlands is a signatory to all pertinent major international treaties (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, European Convention on Human Rights). All relevant ranking institutions, such as The Economist’s Intelligence Unit Democracy Index and the Freedom House ranking of political liberties, consistently list the Netherlands as one of the top 10 most free countries in the world.
However, as everywhere else, the coronavirus crisis triggered numerous tensions between the government’s constitutional task (Article 23, Dutch Constitution) of protecting and furthering public health and political liberties such as the freedom of assembly and demonstrations, the freedom of movement (lockdown, travel within and between countries), freedom of religion (number of attendees at religious services), the right to privacy (limits on visits to institutions of care for the elderly, number of visitors per day per household), access to the judiciary (limits on the number of court cases due to social distancing rules), etc. Across the board, legal specialists and the general public have judged that the tension between public health and political liberties was managed reasonably well by the government, within the limits created by necessity and the proportionality of the measures.
However, the freedom of assembly and demonstration in particular came under considerable pressure. The number and size of demonstrations is changing over time due to the influence of social media. Such tools enable the rapid mobilization of large numbers of protesters, while the polarized and radicalized messages in social media have resulted in a so-called cancel culture that undermines the freedom of thought and speech. The number of demonstrations in the Netherlands has doubled over the last five years. As the duration of the crisis increased, and public dissatisfaction with and protest against coronavirus policies rose (especially because of announcement of the evening curfew), this trend became even stronger. Uncharacteristic for this country, demonstrations ended in mass chaos, destruction of property, and violence between protesters and police in a significant number of cases.
Citations:
Freedom House, Freedom in the world 2021, Netherlands (freedom house.org, consulted 16 December 2021)
College voor Rechten van de Mens, n.d., Dossier: Coronavirus en mensenrechten
Elseviers Weekblad, 21 Janury 2021. De Haan, Demonstreren in coronatijd? Ook dan gelden maatregelen.
Trouw, Pols,27 February 2021. Van klimaatmars tot coronaprotest: Nederlanders gaan steeds vaker de straat op
However, as everywhere else, the coronavirus crisis triggered numerous tensions between the government’s constitutional task (Article 23, Dutch Constitution) of protecting and furthering public health and political liberties such as the freedom of assembly and demonstrations, the freedom of movement (lockdown, travel within and between countries), freedom of religion (number of attendees at religious services), the right to privacy (limits on visits to institutions of care for the elderly, number of visitors per day per household), access to the judiciary (limits on the number of court cases due to social distancing rules), etc. Across the board, legal specialists and the general public have judged that the tension between public health and political liberties was managed reasonably well by the government, within the limits created by necessity and the proportionality of the measures.
However, the freedom of assembly and demonstration in particular came under considerable pressure. The number and size of demonstrations is changing over time due to the influence of social media. Such tools enable the rapid mobilization of large numbers of protesters, while the polarized and radicalized messages in social media have resulted in a so-called cancel culture that undermines the freedom of thought and speech. The number of demonstrations in the Netherlands has doubled over the last five years. As the duration of the crisis increased, and public dissatisfaction with and protest against coronavirus policies rose (especially because of announcement of the evening curfew), this trend became even stronger. Uncharacteristic for this country, demonstrations ended in mass chaos, destruction of property, and violence between protesters and police in a significant number of cases.
Citations:
Freedom House, Freedom in the world 2021, Netherlands (freedom house.org, consulted 16 December 2021)
College voor Rechten van de Mens, n.d., Dossier: Coronavirus en mensenrechten
Elseviers Weekblad, 21 Janury 2021. De Haan, Demonstreren in coronatijd? Ook dan gelden maatregelen.
Trouw, Pols,27 February 2021. Van klimaatmars tot coronaprotest: Nederlanders gaan steeds vaker de straat op
How effectively does the state protect against different forms of discrimination?
10
9
9
State institutions effectively protect against and actively prevent discrimination. Cases of discrimination are extremely rare.
8
7
6
7
6
State anti-discrimination protections are moderately successful. Few cases of discrimination are observed.
5
4
3
4
3
State anti-discrimination efforts show limited success. Many cases of discrimination can be observed.
2
1
1
The state does not offer effective protection against discrimination. Discrimination is widespread in the public sector and in society.
The Netherlands is party to all the important international anti-discrimination agreements. A non-discrimination clause addressing religion, worldviews, political convictions, race, sex and “any other grounds for discrimination” is contained in Article 1 of the Dutch constitution. An individual can invoke Article 1 in relation to acts carried out by the government, private institutions or another individual. The constitutional framework has been specified by several acts that also refer to the EC Directives on equal treatment. Since 1994, a General Law on Equal Treatment (Algemene Wet Gelijke Behandeling) has prohibited distinctions to be drawn between people on the basis of race or nationality. The law applies to all housing, healthcare, cultural and educational institutions. Thus, in hiring and firing decisions, race and nationality may not be taken into account, for example. The Dutch penal code also contains articles that prohibit insulting minorities and engaging in hate-mongering.
In sum, there is a high degree of formal protection. A recent expert report criticized Dutch anti-discrimination sanctions as “ineffective,” and as neither “dissuasive” nor “proportionate.” There are signals that discrimination is practiced by Dutch police, in the labor and housing markets, in the medical world, in the media, and in public and political debate. PVV-leader Geert Wilders was convicted of discriminating against the group of Moroccans; but the trial took three years, and although he was deemed guilty, he was not punished.
In 2018, more than a quarter of the Dutch population reported being subject to some form of discrimination in a survey by the Social Cultural Planning Bureau (SCP). Dutch of Moroccan, Turkish, Antillean and Surinamese descent experience discrimination with particular frequency; 30% of these respondents reported being surveilled as a matter of policy, where the average for the entire population is 3%.
In terms of policy, the Dutch government does not pursue affirmative action to tackle inequality and facilitate non-discrimination. Generally, the government relies on “soft law” measures as a preferred policy instrument to curb discrimination. There are more and more doubts about state policies’ effectiveness. Depending on the pressures created by significant (international) events (e.g., Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, terrorist attacks and public debates about #MeToo and after the Black Lives Matter demonstrations in the United States, discussions about Dutch colonialism/slavery), an increase can be seen in visible discriminatory actions, internet-based threats and insults targeting Jews, Muslims, Afro-Dutch citizens and women. Especially worrisome is the broad-based and well above the European average negative climate of opinion and stereotyping of Muslims. Growing awareness of employer’s discriminating against young people with migrant backgrounds in job application processes forced new national and local-government initiatives. According to recent survey research, the Dutch population is seriously worried about the intolerant and discriminatory dominant approach to diversity at present.
Citations:
B. van der Ent, 2019. Discriminiatie op de arbeidsmarkt, in Sociologie, 4,1:25-57
NRC Next, 25 September 2019. Politiechef die discriminatie aankaartte, is naar huis gestuurd. ((NRC.nl, accessed 3 November 2019)
Volkskrant, Frijters, 21 May 2021. Discriminatie in Nederland: veel bewustzijn, stigens aantal strafzaken
SCP, 2019. Perceived discrimination in the NL
De Correspondent, Mulder and Bol, 10 June 2020. Institutioneel racosme in Nederland: wat het is, waar het zit, en wat je eraan kunt doen
B. van der Ent, 2019. Discriminiatie op de arbeidsmarkt, in Sociologie, 4,1:25-57
In sum, there is a high degree of formal protection. A recent expert report criticized Dutch anti-discrimination sanctions as “ineffective,” and as neither “dissuasive” nor “proportionate.” There are signals that discrimination is practiced by Dutch police, in the labor and housing markets, in the medical world, in the media, and in public and political debate. PVV-leader Geert Wilders was convicted of discriminating against the group of Moroccans; but the trial took three years, and although he was deemed guilty, he was not punished.
In 2018, more than a quarter of the Dutch population reported being subject to some form of discrimination in a survey by the Social Cultural Planning Bureau (SCP). Dutch of Moroccan, Turkish, Antillean and Surinamese descent experience discrimination with particular frequency; 30% of these respondents reported being surveilled as a matter of policy, where the average for the entire population is 3%.
In terms of policy, the Dutch government does not pursue affirmative action to tackle inequality and facilitate non-discrimination. Generally, the government relies on “soft law” measures as a preferred policy instrument to curb discrimination. There are more and more doubts about state policies’ effectiveness. Depending on the pressures created by significant (international) events (e.g., Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, terrorist attacks and public debates about #MeToo and after the Black Lives Matter demonstrations in the United States, discussions about Dutch colonialism/slavery), an increase can be seen in visible discriminatory actions, internet-based threats and insults targeting Jews, Muslims, Afro-Dutch citizens and women. Especially worrisome is the broad-based and well above the European average negative climate of opinion and stereotyping of Muslims. Growing awareness of employer’s discriminating against young people with migrant backgrounds in job application processes forced new national and local-government initiatives. According to recent survey research, the Dutch population is seriously worried about the intolerant and discriminatory dominant approach to diversity at present.
Citations:
B. van der Ent, 2019. Discriminiatie op de arbeidsmarkt, in Sociologie, 4,1:25-57
NRC Next, 25 September 2019. Politiechef die discriminatie aankaartte, is naar huis gestuurd. ((NRC.nl, accessed 3 November 2019)
Volkskrant, Frijters, 21 May 2021. Discriminatie in Nederland: veel bewustzijn, stigens aantal strafzaken
SCP, 2019. Perceived discrimination in the NL
De Correspondent, Mulder and Bol, 10 June 2020. Institutioneel racosme in Nederland: wat het is, waar het zit, en wat je eraan kunt doen
B. van der Ent, 2019. Discriminiatie op de arbeidsmarkt, in Sociologie, 4,1:25-57
Graph View
To what extent do government and administration act on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions to provide legal certainty?
10
9
9
Government and administration act predictably, on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions. Legal regulations are consistent and transparent, ensuring legal certainty.
8
7
6
7
6
Government and administration rarely make unpredictable decisions. Legal regulations are consistent, but leave a large scope of discretion to the government or administration.
5
4
3
4
3
Government and administration sometimes make unpredictable decisions that go beyond given legal bases or do not conform to existing legal regulations. Some legal regulations are inconsistent and contradictory.
2
1
1
Government and administration often make unpredictable decisions that lack a legal basis or ignore existing legal regulations. Legal regulations are inconsistent, full of loopholes and contradict each other.
Dutch governments and administrative authorities have allegedly to a great extent internalized legality and legal certainty on all levels in their decisions and actions in civil, penal and administrative law. In the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2021, the Netherlands was again ranked sixth out of 129 countries. However, the no more than slight decline in its score since 2016 curiously ignores the dominant opinion in politics, civil society and legal academic circles in the country itself.
In a “stress test” examining the state’s performance on rule-of-law issues in 2015, former ombudsman Alex Brenninkmeijer argued after a comprehensive review that particularly in legislation, but also within the administrative and judicial systems, safeguards for compliance with rule-of-law requirements were no longer sufficiently in place. The trend was to bypass new legislative measures’ rule-of-law implications with an appeal to the “primacy of politics” or simply “democracy,” and instead await possible appeals to European and other international legal bodies during policy implementation. As one commentator aptly observed: rule-of-law considerations have become a mere footnote to desirable policies proposed by the government and rubberstamped by coalition political parties in parliament. Many of the recent scandals (the childcare benefits scandal; the mess around earthquake damages compensation in the former gas-producing areas of the province of Groningen; the illegal collection and linking of large data sets about citizens by the police, anti-terrorism organizations, and the military) boil down to violations of fundamental human and citizen rights or of legal rules, and to an obstinate perseverance in implementing merciless and badly designed laws.
This mood or attitude exploded into political crisis when the childcare benefit affair came to light during the fall of 2020, eventually causing the entire Rutte III government to step down in January 2021. The childcare benefit affair is a policy catastrophe demonstrating that over the past decade, all branches of government have been complicit in negligence and indifference to rule-of-law considerations in public policy. Parliament insisted on an “all-or-nothing” fraud hunt, disregarding signals from whistleblowers in the tax services, and neglecting warnings from lawyers and a deputy minister that strict law enforcement would make many eligible and deserving families suffer because of a small number of rule-breakers. In the end it was clear that tax authorities had legally stopped tax benefits for thousands of families, and required huge recovery payments sometimes amounting to many years of benefits received for trivial errors like spelling mistakes, errors in birth dates and response deadlines that had been missed by just a few days. The large repayment sums demanded pushed poor and frequently second-generation Dutch families into debt and poverty, often leading to the loss of housing, divorce and even loss of parental custody. Because judges and the Supreme Court routinely ruled in favor of the tax authorities in the cases brought against them, a parliamentary investigation concluded that the judiciary had for too long been looking the other way. It took the foreign eyes of the Council of Europe’s international rule-of-law inspectorate, in a report on Dutch practice by the Venice Commission, to humble the Dutch parliament into admitting that it was its own insistence on hardline fraud control that had initiated and maintained a process with a catastrophic outcome.
Many other serious concerns about the state of the judiciary as a branch of government have also been raised in recent years. In an exceptional move, lawyers, judges and prosecutors recently wrote a joint letter to the government expressing their “fear for the future of the judiciary branch.” The chair of the Council of Jurisprudence, a body established in 2002 as an independent advisory commission sitting between the Ministry of Justice, parliament and the judiciary, publicly admitted that the judiciary as constituted was outdated for a modern, rapidly changing society. Citizens and businesses alike stated that judicial procedures were too expensive, too complex, too time-consuming and too uncertain in their outcome. Indeed, the penal code required a complete modernizing overhaul. Meanwhile, the digitalization of routine judicial procedures has been a failure, and has cost the government dearly.
Judging by the coalition agreement for the Rutte IV government, reform of the judiciary is finally high on the political agenda. Not for nothing does the agreement open with an entire chapter on rule-of-law issues. The new government has promised to overhaul legislation, implementation practices and case law in order to prevent another childcare benefit scandal. Improved implementation institutions will be more reliable, just and serviceable, it says. The state will not rely on impersonal algorithms alone to render mass decisions on benefits in social security policies. Respect for general principles of “decent” governance (beginselen van behoorlijk bestuur) like appropriateness and proportionality will be strengthened, and the people implementing policies will be granted more discretionary power. An inspectorate for algorithms (Algoritmetoezichthouder) and an equivalent of the U.S. Taxpayers Advocate Service will be set up. More money will be available for police forces in their combat with organized crime, especially the illegal drugs trade.
Citations:
Worljusticeproject.org. The Netherlands, 2021
A. Brenninkmeijer, Stresstest rechtsstaat Nederland, in Nederlands Juristenblad, 16, 24 April 2015, pp. 1046-1055
Orde van Advocaten, Nieuwsberichten, 10 maart 2021, Staatkundige hervorming vormt een terugkerend thema
Jesse Frederik, De Correspondent, 2021. Zo hadden we het niet bedoeld. De tragedie achter de toeslagenaffaire.
Ellen Pasman, Kafka in de rechtsstaat. De gevolgen van een leesfout: de toeslagenaffaire ontleed. Amsterdam, Prometheus, 2021.
NRC-H, Jensma, 30 October 2021, Opinie uit Europa: Kamer is zelf schuldig aan ‘Toeslagen’
Ministerie van Financiën, Staatssecretaris Vijlbrief, 21 March 2021.
Betreft Overzicht van wetten waar de Belastingdienst zich niet aan gehouden heeft
De Correspondent, Chavannes, ca. 20 November 2021, Geen wonder dat de burgers afhaken bij een overheid die regelmatig de eigen wet overtreedt
NRC-H, Jensma, 18 December 2021. Rutte IV herstelt de rechtshulp en wil grondwet aan de rechter vrijgeven
In a “stress test” examining the state’s performance on rule-of-law issues in 2015, former ombudsman Alex Brenninkmeijer argued after a comprehensive review that particularly in legislation, but also within the administrative and judicial systems, safeguards for compliance with rule-of-law requirements were no longer sufficiently in place. The trend was to bypass new legislative measures’ rule-of-law implications with an appeal to the “primacy of politics” or simply “democracy,” and instead await possible appeals to European and other international legal bodies during policy implementation. As one commentator aptly observed: rule-of-law considerations have become a mere footnote to desirable policies proposed by the government and rubberstamped by coalition political parties in parliament. Many of the recent scandals (the childcare benefits scandal; the mess around earthquake damages compensation in the former gas-producing areas of the province of Groningen; the illegal collection and linking of large data sets about citizens by the police, anti-terrorism organizations, and the military) boil down to violations of fundamental human and citizen rights or of legal rules, and to an obstinate perseverance in implementing merciless and badly designed laws.
This mood or attitude exploded into political crisis when the childcare benefit affair came to light during the fall of 2020, eventually causing the entire Rutte III government to step down in January 2021. The childcare benefit affair is a policy catastrophe demonstrating that over the past decade, all branches of government have been complicit in negligence and indifference to rule-of-law considerations in public policy. Parliament insisted on an “all-or-nothing” fraud hunt, disregarding signals from whistleblowers in the tax services, and neglecting warnings from lawyers and a deputy minister that strict law enforcement would make many eligible and deserving families suffer because of a small number of rule-breakers. In the end it was clear that tax authorities had legally stopped tax benefits for thousands of families, and required huge recovery payments sometimes amounting to many years of benefits received for trivial errors like spelling mistakes, errors in birth dates and response deadlines that had been missed by just a few days. The large repayment sums demanded pushed poor and frequently second-generation Dutch families into debt and poverty, often leading to the loss of housing, divorce and even loss of parental custody. Because judges and the Supreme Court routinely ruled in favor of the tax authorities in the cases brought against them, a parliamentary investigation concluded that the judiciary had for too long been looking the other way. It took the foreign eyes of the Council of Europe’s international rule-of-law inspectorate, in a report on Dutch practice by the Venice Commission, to humble the Dutch parliament into admitting that it was its own insistence on hardline fraud control that had initiated and maintained a process with a catastrophic outcome.
Many other serious concerns about the state of the judiciary as a branch of government have also been raised in recent years. In an exceptional move, lawyers, judges and prosecutors recently wrote a joint letter to the government expressing their “fear for the future of the judiciary branch.” The chair of the Council of Jurisprudence, a body established in 2002 as an independent advisory commission sitting between the Ministry of Justice, parliament and the judiciary, publicly admitted that the judiciary as constituted was outdated for a modern, rapidly changing society. Citizens and businesses alike stated that judicial procedures were too expensive, too complex, too time-consuming and too uncertain in their outcome. Indeed, the penal code required a complete modernizing overhaul. Meanwhile, the digitalization of routine judicial procedures has been a failure, and has cost the government dearly.
Judging by the coalition agreement for the Rutte IV government, reform of the judiciary is finally high on the political agenda. Not for nothing does the agreement open with an entire chapter on rule-of-law issues. The new government has promised to overhaul legislation, implementation practices and case law in order to prevent another childcare benefit scandal. Improved implementation institutions will be more reliable, just and serviceable, it says. The state will not rely on impersonal algorithms alone to render mass decisions on benefits in social security policies. Respect for general principles of “decent” governance (beginselen van behoorlijk bestuur) like appropriateness and proportionality will be strengthened, and the people implementing policies will be granted more discretionary power. An inspectorate for algorithms (Algoritmetoezichthouder) and an equivalent of the U.S. Taxpayers Advocate Service will be set up. More money will be available for police forces in their combat with organized crime, especially the illegal drugs trade.
Citations:
Worljusticeproject.org. The Netherlands, 2021
A. Brenninkmeijer, Stresstest rechtsstaat Nederland, in Nederlands Juristenblad, 16, 24 April 2015, pp. 1046-1055
Orde van Advocaten, Nieuwsberichten, 10 maart 2021, Staatkundige hervorming vormt een terugkerend thema
Jesse Frederik, De Correspondent, 2021. Zo hadden we het niet bedoeld. De tragedie achter de toeslagenaffaire.
Ellen Pasman, Kafka in de rechtsstaat. De gevolgen van een leesfout: de toeslagenaffaire ontleed. Amsterdam, Prometheus, 2021.
NRC-H, Jensma, 30 October 2021, Opinie uit Europa: Kamer is zelf schuldig aan ‘Toeslagen’
Ministerie van Financiën, Staatssecretaris Vijlbrief, 21 March 2021.
Betreft Overzicht van wetten waar de Belastingdienst zich niet aan gehouden heeft
De Correspondent, Chavannes, ca. 20 November 2021, Geen wonder dat de burgers afhaken bij een overheid die regelmatig de eigen wet overtreedt
NRC-H, Jensma, 18 December 2021. Rutte IV herstelt de rechtshulp en wil grondwet aan de rechter vrijgeven
To what extent do independent courts control whether government and administration act in conformity with the law?
10
9
9
Independent courts effectively review executive action and ensure that the government and administration act in conformity with the law.
8
7
6
7
6
Independent courts usually manage to control whether the government and administration act in conformity with the law.
5
4
3
4
3
Courts are independent, but often fail to ensure legal compliance.
2
1
1
Courts are biased for or against the incumbent government and lack effective control.
Judicial review for civil and criminal law in the Netherlands involves a closed system of appeals with the Supreme Court as the final authority. Unlike the U.S. and German Supreme Court, the Dutch one is barred from judging parliamentary laws in terms of their conformity to the constitution. This is supposed to be a task for parliament itself, especially the Senate as a chamber of deliberation and reflection. Partially making up for this lack of a constitutional conformity review is the fact that parliament is supposed to check that new legislation conforms with EU and other international law to which the country is signatory. However, this task is often neglected or, given the political mood over the last decade, deliberately disparaged; this has helped prompt strong criticism of the quality of parliamentary legislative work.
Offering further testimony to the fact the Dutch governmental system is not about the separation of powers, but rather about mutual checks and balances between the three branches of government, is the fact that the intensity of judicial review of executive actions has peaked since 2015. This attracted international attention when a Dutch appeals court upheld a landmark climate change ruling, confirmed in a Supreme Court verdict in 2019, instructing the Rutte government to raise its greenhouse-gas reduction goal of 17% to at least 25%. Meanwhile in 2019, another such Supreme Court ruling ordered the government to tighten its nitrogen emission rules, leading to an immediate cessation in the issuance of many new licenses for farming, road construction and housing construction activities. Even the private sector has not escaped the larger scope of judicial review: In May 2021, Shell was legally obliged to halve its CO2 emission in the next nine years. The ensuing deep policy paralysis still awaits a political settlement even after the new coalition agreement of December 2021. These events have initiated a new debate on the proper relations between politics/policy and the judiciary/legal system; some believe that legal activism (or even dikastocracy) is infringing the primacy of politics and its sovereignty. This offers further evidence of the practice of checks and balances; the judiciary itself came under increasing political and civil society scrutiny, both with regard to the degree to which it is truly independent of politics and in its internal functioning.
In 2017, a deputy minister of legal affairs openly admitted that he had reduced the provision of state-supported legal assistance (fees for pro deo social lawyers) to ordinary citizens in order to achieve more punitive court sentences. Only the new coalition agreement of December 2021 turned this decision around, by providing more state resources to social lawyers. And in the context of anti-drugs and crime-control policy, police, mayors and fiscal authorities often “harass” suspects rather than initiating legal procedures, which are perceived as a time-consuming nuisance with zero practical impact. Judges have voiced concerns as to the quality of the work performed by lawyers, and thus directly about professional practices and indirectly about the legal-education system. The reputation of the public prosecution service (Openbaar Ministerie, OM) too has come under public scrutiny. It has been criticized striking mega-deals (such as fines) with corporations and banks, which in light of a neoliberal efficiency analysis are presumably deemed more efficient than conducting full-fledged trials responding to legally sanctionable financial or managerial misconduct. Evidence has shown that OM staffers lacking the proper professional accreditation have rendered decisions on thousands of criminal cases with insufficient evidence. The prosecution service’s degree of independence from the government has also come under public and journalistic scrutiny, and integrity problems within the organization itself have hampered its proper functioning.
Whereas the Supreme Court is part of the judiciary and is supposedly “independent” of politics, administrative appeals and review are allocated to three high councils of state (Hoge Colleges van Staat), which are subsumed under the executive, and thus not fully independent of politics: the Council of State (serves as an advisor to the government on all legislative affairs and is the highest court of appeal in matters of administrative law); the General Audit Chamber (reviews legality of government spending and its policy effectiveness and efficiency); and the ombudsman for research into the conduct of administration regarding individual citizens in particular. Members are nominated by the Council of Ministers and appointed for life (excepting the ombudsman, who serves only six years) by the States General. Appointments have not to date been politically contentious. In international comparison, the Council of State holds a rather unique position. It advises government in its legislative capacity, and it also acts as an administrative judge of last appeal involving the same laws. This situation is only partly remedied by a division of labor between an advisory chamber and a judiciary chamber.
Some observers defend this structure, arguing that only an entity with detailed and intimate knowledge of the practical difficulties associated with policy implementation (uitvoering) and law enforcement (handhaving) can offer sound advice to the government. The ruling on climate goals and nitrogen emissions appear to support this evaluation. However, the child benefits scandal and other cases involving illegal data collection and sharing about citizen behavior demonstrate that the judiciary often, due to executive organizations’ (like the tax authorities, or the Integration and Naturalization Service (IND)) willful or practically incomplete disclosure of information, lacks detailed information about implementation practices. Regarding the childcare benefits affair, the Administrative Court’s highest judge recently apologized that the courts had stuck to a strict law enforcement “groove” far too long, attributing this state of affairs to a “political climate” of pressing for “zero tolerance” and “strict, stricter, strictest.” In addition, fragmented legislation – for example, citizens had to appeal consecutive and interdependent tax decisions one by one – hampered judges’ ability to gain a clear overall view of the situation, the judge added. The Supreme Court was also charged with making rulings that were too “executive friendly” when dealing with information from refugees and foreigners, for politically inspired reasons. However, new EU directives have been able to offer more leverage to lower court judges.
Citations:
Andeweg, R.B. and G.A. Irwin (2014), Governance and Politics of the Netherlands. Houdmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan (pages 203-2011).
The Guardian, 9 October 2018. Dutch appeals court upholds landmark climate-change ruling.
NRC Next, 22 February 2019. OM wil strenger zijn met schikkingen (NRC.nl, accessed 4 November 2019)
Binnenlands Bestuur, Burgemeesters eisen rol /crimefighter’ op, 12 January 2018 (binnenlandsbestuur.nl, accessed 28 October 2018)
Pieter Tops and Jan Tromp, 2016. De achterkant van Nederland.Leven onder de radar van de wet, Balans
RTL Nieuws, 30 July 2019. OM wil af van hoofdofficieren met geheime relatie en onderzoekt mogelijk strafbare feiten (rtlnieuw.nl, accessed 4 November 2019)
NR Handelsblad, 12 March 2019. Hoe de kritiek op onterechte straffen werd weggepoetst. (NRC.nl, accessed 4 November 2019)
NRC-H, Alonso en Derix, 20 November 2021. We zaten te lang in de strenge groef
NRC-H, Sillevis Smitt, 22 June 2021, Vreemdelingenrechters zoeken steun tegen strenge Raad van State
NRC-H, Jensma, 2 October 2021. Het is tijd om aan rechten als objectieve wetenschap te gaan twijfelen.
Volkskrant,, Weijer and Hotse Smit, 26 May 2021. Historische uitspraak in klimaatzaak: Shell moet CO2-uitstoot drastisch verminderen.
Offering further testimony to the fact the Dutch governmental system is not about the separation of powers, but rather about mutual checks and balances between the three branches of government, is the fact that the intensity of judicial review of executive actions has peaked since 2015. This attracted international attention when a Dutch appeals court upheld a landmark climate change ruling, confirmed in a Supreme Court verdict in 2019, instructing the Rutte government to raise its greenhouse-gas reduction goal of 17% to at least 25%. Meanwhile in 2019, another such Supreme Court ruling ordered the government to tighten its nitrogen emission rules, leading to an immediate cessation in the issuance of many new licenses for farming, road construction and housing construction activities. Even the private sector has not escaped the larger scope of judicial review: In May 2021, Shell was legally obliged to halve its CO2 emission in the next nine years. The ensuing deep policy paralysis still awaits a political settlement even after the new coalition agreement of December 2021. These events have initiated a new debate on the proper relations between politics/policy and the judiciary/legal system; some believe that legal activism (or even dikastocracy) is infringing the primacy of politics and its sovereignty. This offers further evidence of the practice of checks and balances; the judiciary itself came under increasing political and civil society scrutiny, both with regard to the degree to which it is truly independent of politics and in its internal functioning.
In 2017, a deputy minister of legal affairs openly admitted that he had reduced the provision of state-supported legal assistance (fees for pro deo social lawyers) to ordinary citizens in order to achieve more punitive court sentences. Only the new coalition agreement of December 2021 turned this decision around, by providing more state resources to social lawyers. And in the context of anti-drugs and crime-control policy, police, mayors and fiscal authorities often “harass” suspects rather than initiating legal procedures, which are perceived as a time-consuming nuisance with zero practical impact. Judges have voiced concerns as to the quality of the work performed by lawyers, and thus directly about professional practices and indirectly about the legal-education system. The reputation of the public prosecution service (Openbaar Ministerie, OM) too has come under public scrutiny. It has been criticized striking mega-deals (such as fines) with corporations and banks, which in light of a neoliberal efficiency analysis are presumably deemed more efficient than conducting full-fledged trials responding to legally sanctionable financial or managerial misconduct. Evidence has shown that OM staffers lacking the proper professional accreditation have rendered decisions on thousands of criminal cases with insufficient evidence. The prosecution service’s degree of independence from the government has also come under public and journalistic scrutiny, and integrity problems within the organization itself have hampered its proper functioning.
Whereas the Supreme Court is part of the judiciary and is supposedly “independent” of politics, administrative appeals and review are allocated to three high councils of state (Hoge Colleges van Staat), which are subsumed under the executive, and thus not fully independent of politics: the Council of State (serves as an advisor to the government on all legislative affairs and is the highest court of appeal in matters of administrative law); the General Audit Chamber (reviews legality of government spending and its policy effectiveness and efficiency); and the ombudsman for research into the conduct of administration regarding individual citizens in particular. Members are nominated by the Council of Ministers and appointed for life (excepting the ombudsman, who serves only six years) by the States General. Appointments have not to date been politically contentious. In international comparison, the Council of State holds a rather unique position. It advises government in its legislative capacity, and it also acts as an administrative judge of last appeal involving the same laws. This situation is only partly remedied by a division of labor between an advisory chamber and a judiciary chamber.
Some observers defend this structure, arguing that only an entity with detailed and intimate knowledge of the practical difficulties associated with policy implementation (uitvoering) and law enforcement (handhaving) can offer sound advice to the government. The ruling on climate goals and nitrogen emissions appear to support this evaluation. However, the child benefits scandal and other cases involving illegal data collection and sharing about citizen behavior demonstrate that the judiciary often, due to executive organizations’ (like the tax authorities, or the Integration and Naturalization Service (IND)) willful or practically incomplete disclosure of information, lacks detailed information about implementation practices. Regarding the childcare benefits affair, the Administrative Court’s highest judge recently apologized that the courts had stuck to a strict law enforcement “groove” far too long, attributing this state of affairs to a “political climate” of pressing for “zero tolerance” and “strict, stricter, strictest.” In addition, fragmented legislation – for example, citizens had to appeal consecutive and interdependent tax decisions one by one – hampered judges’ ability to gain a clear overall view of the situation, the judge added. The Supreme Court was also charged with making rulings that were too “executive friendly” when dealing with information from refugees and foreigners, for politically inspired reasons. However, new EU directives have been able to offer more leverage to lower court judges.
Citations:
Andeweg, R.B. and G.A. Irwin (2014), Governance and Politics of the Netherlands. Houdmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan (pages 203-2011).
The Guardian, 9 October 2018. Dutch appeals court upholds landmark climate-change ruling.
NRC Next, 22 February 2019. OM wil strenger zijn met schikkingen (NRC.nl, accessed 4 November 2019)
Binnenlands Bestuur, Burgemeesters eisen rol /crimefighter’ op, 12 January 2018 (binnenlandsbestuur.nl, accessed 28 October 2018)
Pieter Tops and Jan Tromp, 2016. De achterkant van Nederland.Leven onder de radar van de wet, Balans
RTL Nieuws, 30 July 2019. OM wil af van hoofdofficieren met geheime relatie en onderzoekt mogelijk strafbare feiten (rtlnieuw.nl, accessed 4 November 2019)
NR Handelsblad, 12 March 2019. Hoe de kritiek op onterechte straffen werd weggepoetst. (NRC.nl, accessed 4 November 2019)
NRC-H, Alonso en Derix, 20 November 2021. We zaten te lang in de strenge groef
NRC-H, Sillevis Smitt, 22 June 2021, Vreemdelingenrechters zoeken steun tegen strenge Raad van State
NRC-H, Jensma, 2 October 2021. Het is tijd om aan rechten als objectieve wetenschap te gaan twijfelen.
Volkskrant,, Weijer and Hotse Smit, 26 May 2021. Historische uitspraak in klimaatzaak: Shell moet CO2-uitstoot drastisch verminderen.
To what extent does the process of appointing (supreme or constitutional court) justices guarantee the independence of the judiciary?
10
9
9
Justices are appointed in a cooperative appointment process with special majority requirements.
8
7
6
7
6
Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies with special majority requirements or in a cooperative selection process without special majority requirements.
5
4
3
4
3
Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies without special majority requirements.
2
1
1
All judges are appointed exclusively by a single body irrespective of other institutions.
Justices, both in civil/criminal and in administrative courts, are appointed by different, though primarily legal and political bodies in formally cooperative selection processes without special majority requirements. In the case of lower-level criminal and civil courts, indirect political influence by the executive is possible through the Council for the Judiciary (Raad voor de Rechtspraak). Its members are appointed by the minister for justice and safety; council members choose the administrators and directors (bestuursleden) of lower courts, who in turn provide (or fail to provide) opportunities for individual judges.
The Netherlands’ highest court, the Council of State, is subject to relatively strong political influence, mainly expressed through the appointment of former politicians. This may explain why the council sides with government most of the time; as shown in instances such as appeals of the tax authorities’ decisions in the childcare benefits scandal, or appeals of decisions made by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in immigration cases. Only state counselors working in the Administrative Jurisdiction Division (as opposed to the Legislative Advisory Division) are required to hold an academic degree in law. Appointments to the Supreme Court are for life (judges generally retire at 70). Only Geert Wilders, parliamentarian for the right-wing populist Party for Freedom (PVV), has proposed (in 2011) a reform creating a five-year term instead. At this moment the appointment procedure for High (Supreme) Court judges combines peer- and political selection. A selection committee made up of High Court members draws up a list of six candidates that are recommended to the Parliament’s Second House. The House then picks three of them in order of preference and invites the highest-ranking judge for a non-public hearing. If the candidate passes this selection hurdle, the minister of justice proposes him or her for appointment by the government.
Reforms that would limit the influence of the executive and the legislature in the appointment of Supreme Court judges and members of the Council of the Judiciary have not been formally approved. In the case of appointments for lower court judges, the new procedure lends more weight to peer selection by giving local court administrators and sitting judges a stronger voice in selecting additional and new single judges. For the Supreme Court, the selection committee will consist of one member of Parliament (appointed by all other members of parliament), one member of the Supreme Court (appointed by its president), and another legal expert appointed jointly by the parliament and the Hight Court. This tripartite committee would make a binding selection, and the candidate would then be appointed by the government. This reform will require a change of the constitution, and will take several more years to come in force.
Citations:
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2020 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union Brussels, 30 September 2020
De Volkskrant, “Worden in andere EU-landen ook rechters door politici benoemd, zoals Polen beweert? Nou nee,” 23 July 2017
De Correspondent, Chavannes, 3 March 2021. De benoeming van rechters in Nederland is niet onafhankelijker dan in Polen of Hongarije
NRC Next, 8 March 2011. Wilders pareert kritiek op plan tijdelijke benoeming rechters (nrs.nl, accessed 4 November 2019)
Mr., 2 March 2021. Rechters krijgen meer zeggenschap over benoeming gerechtsbestuurders
NRC Next, 8 March 2011. Wilders pareert kritiek op plan tijdelijke benoeming rechters (nrs.nl, accessed 4 November 2019)
The Netherlands’ highest court, the Council of State, is subject to relatively strong political influence, mainly expressed through the appointment of former politicians. This may explain why the council sides with government most of the time; as shown in instances such as appeals of the tax authorities’ decisions in the childcare benefits scandal, or appeals of decisions made by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in immigration cases. Only state counselors working in the Administrative Jurisdiction Division (as opposed to the Legislative Advisory Division) are required to hold an academic degree in law. Appointments to the Supreme Court are for life (judges generally retire at 70). Only Geert Wilders, parliamentarian for the right-wing populist Party for Freedom (PVV), has proposed (in 2011) a reform creating a five-year term instead. At this moment the appointment procedure for High (Supreme) Court judges combines peer- and political selection. A selection committee made up of High Court members draws up a list of six candidates that are recommended to the Parliament’s Second House. The House then picks three of them in order of preference and invites the highest-ranking judge for a non-public hearing. If the candidate passes this selection hurdle, the minister of justice proposes him or her for appointment by the government.
Reforms that would limit the influence of the executive and the legislature in the appointment of Supreme Court judges and members of the Council of the Judiciary have not been formally approved. In the case of appointments for lower court judges, the new procedure lends more weight to peer selection by giving local court administrators and sitting judges a stronger voice in selecting additional and new single judges. For the Supreme Court, the selection committee will consist of one member of Parliament (appointed by all other members of parliament), one member of the Supreme Court (appointed by its president), and another legal expert appointed jointly by the parliament and the Hight Court. This tripartite committee would make a binding selection, and the candidate would then be appointed by the government. This reform will require a change of the constitution, and will take several more years to come in force.
Citations:
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2020 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union Brussels, 30 September 2020
De Volkskrant, “Worden in andere EU-landen ook rechters door politici benoemd, zoals Polen beweert? Nou nee,” 23 July 2017
De Correspondent, Chavannes, 3 March 2021. De benoeming van rechters in Nederland is niet onafhankelijker dan in Polen of Hongarije
NRC Next, 8 March 2011. Wilders pareert kritiek op plan tijdelijke benoeming rechters (nrs.nl, accessed 4 November 2019)
Mr., 2 March 2021. Rechters krijgen meer zeggenschap over benoeming gerechtsbestuurders
NRC Next, 8 March 2011. Wilders pareert kritiek op plan tijdelijke benoeming rechters (nrs.nl, accessed 4 November 2019)
To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?
10
9
9
Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
8
7
6
7
6
Most integrity mechanisms function effectively and provide disincentives for public officeholders willing to abuse their positions.
5
4
3
4
3
Some integrity mechanisms function, but do not effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
2
1
1
Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.
The Netherlands is considered a relatively corruption-free country, both in the international rankings of perceptions of corruption and in its own self-conception. The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index ranks the Netherlands at fourth place in Europe and eighth globally with regard to low levels of perceived corruption. In a Eurobarometer study, 71% of Dutch respondents believe corruption is widespread, yet, in spite of reading daily about corruption cases in the media, only 4% believe it affects their daily lives. Also, 60% have high confidence in the effectiveness of public authorities in fighting corruption. This contrasts strikingly with the opinions of professional corruption fighters, who publicly doubt the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures as being too little and too late.
Probably due to this hubristic self-image among the people and politicians, Dutch anti-corruption policy was until recently underdeveloped, if not outright naïve. It focused on petty corruption and minor integrity issues in the public sector. But this is no longer the case. Authorities have realized that the Netherlands shows tendencies of becoming a narcostate: drug use has been normalized among the population, and has created a highly profitable market. The country produces synthetic drugs and cannabis, and large amounts of cocaine enter through Dutch (Rotterdam, Vlissingen) and Belgian harbor cities (Antwerp). The illegal drug production and trafficking has led to the distribution of drugs labs all over the country, especially in less populated rural areas, as well as to more (lethal) violence in the streets due to drug organizations fighting among each other. It has also meant an increase in corruption, not only among customs officers and other harbor workers, but also in areas involving gambling, hospitality, sports/health centers and other infrastructural services, much of this a result of the massive amounts of money earned in drug trafficking. There are small local governments whose budgets are dwarfed by the amount of money earned in drugs trafficking within their borders.
The marketing of drugs is facilitated by underfunding and neglect of youth care policy in certain city quarters, where disadvantaged youths are easy to recruit as drugs runners or for other similar jobs. Organized crime thrives on conditions of pauperization and exploitation, where younger people, lacking proper education and job opportunities, choose criminal careers because they feel they have nothing to lose. It is believed that most leading criminals in the so-called mocro-mafia started their careers this way. Apart from investing in sophisticated crime fighting investigation equipment, like tools to hack criminal communication channels, better youth care services in the larger cities are badly needed. The Netherlands’ highly favorable business climate and its flexible financial system have also proven to be fertile ground for corruption, as they attract criminal activities in the form of front companies engaging in money laundering and other illegal activities. By linking corruption fighting to a more realistic diagnosis of its causes, Dutch anti-corruption policy is coming of age.
Several other problems also have been highlighted by national and international watchdogs, including integrity violations within police forces with respect to leaking information and having connections with organized crime. In some cases, similar problems have also been identified with respect to local politicians.
On the national level, the country has seen high profile cases of people abusing access to high level (party) officials and ministers. For example, Sywert van der Liendsen used his connections to obtain business deals relating to medical protection materials and allegedly defrauded the government of millions of euros.
Citations:
Transparency International: 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI),
January 28, 2021
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2020 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union Brussels, 30 September 2020
Het Parool, Kieft en Van Unen, 28 September 2019. Schrijver ‘Gomorra’: Nederland heeft dit aan zichzelf te wijten.
Trouw, Spapens, 6 October 2021. Nederland is nog geen narcostaat, maar daadkracht tegen drugscriminelen is nodig
Additional references:
Heuvel, J.H.J. van den, L.W.J.C. Huberts & E.R. Muller (Red.) 2012. Integriteit: Integriteit en integriteitsbeleid in Nederland. Deventer: Kluwer
de Koning, B., 2018. Vriendjespolitiek. Fraude and corruptie in Nederland, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam
https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/1680931c9d
Probably due to this hubristic self-image among the people and politicians, Dutch anti-corruption policy was until recently underdeveloped, if not outright naïve. It focused on petty corruption and minor integrity issues in the public sector. But this is no longer the case. Authorities have realized that the Netherlands shows tendencies of becoming a narcostate: drug use has been normalized among the population, and has created a highly profitable market. The country produces synthetic drugs and cannabis, and large amounts of cocaine enter through Dutch (Rotterdam, Vlissingen) and Belgian harbor cities (Antwerp). The illegal drug production and trafficking has led to the distribution of drugs labs all over the country, especially in less populated rural areas, as well as to more (lethal) violence in the streets due to drug organizations fighting among each other. It has also meant an increase in corruption, not only among customs officers and other harbor workers, but also in areas involving gambling, hospitality, sports/health centers and other infrastructural services, much of this a result of the massive amounts of money earned in drug trafficking. There are small local governments whose budgets are dwarfed by the amount of money earned in drugs trafficking within their borders.
The marketing of drugs is facilitated by underfunding and neglect of youth care policy in certain city quarters, where disadvantaged youths are easy to recruit as drugs runners or for other similar jobs. Organized crime thrives on conditions of pauperization and exploitation, where younger people, lacking proper education and job opportunities, choose criminal careers because they feel they have nothing to lose. It is believed that most leading criminals in the so-called mocro-mafia started their careers this way. Apart from investing in sophisticated crime fighting investigation equipment, like tools to hack criminal communication channels, better youth care services in the larger cities are badly needed. The Netherlands’ highly favorable business climate and its flexible financial system have also proven to be fertile ground for corruption, as they attract criminal activities in the form of front companies engaging in money laundering and other illegal activities. By linking corruption fighting to a more realistic diagnosis of its causes, Dutch anti-corruption policy is coming of age.
Several other problems also have been highlighted by national and international watchdogs, including integrity violations within police forces with respect to leaking information and having connections with organized crime. In some cases, similar problems have also been identified with respect to local politicians.
On the national level, the country has seen high profile cases of people abusing access to high level (party) officials and ministers. For example, Sywert van der Liendsen used his connections to obtain business deals relating to medical protection materials and allegedly defrauded the government of millions of euros.
Citations:
Transparency International: 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI),
January 28, 2021
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2020 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union Brussels, 30 September 2020
Het Parool, Kieft en Van Unen, 28 September 2019. Schrijver ‘Gomorra’: Nederland heeft dit aan zichzelf te wijten.
Trouw, Spapens, 6 October 2021. Nederland is nog geen narcostaat, maar daadkracht tegen drugscriminelen is nodig
Additional references:
Heuvel, J.H.J. van den, L.W.J.C. Huberts & E.R. Muller (Red.) 2012. Integriteit: Integriteit en integriteitsbeleid in Nederland. Deventer: Kluwer
de Koning, B., 2018. Vriendjespolitiek. Fraude and corruptie in Nederland, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam
https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/1680931c9d