Executive Capacity
#34Key Findings
Having shown significant deterioration in recent years, Poland scores relatively poorly (rank 34) in the area of executive capacity. Its score on this measure has declined by 2.6 points since 2014.
Policymaking under the PiS government has been guided by party leader Jarosław Kaczyński. The Chancellery’s gatekeeping role has declined, with Kaczyński performing an informal coordination role, recently from a position as deputy prime minister. Bills are often submitted by individual legislators rather than ministries, as this allows a swifter process that can be controlled by PIS leaders.
RIAs and consultation mechanisms are often bypassed by relying on fast-track legislation. Consultation tends to be formal, with the government’s clear majority having reduced the need to win over social actors. As conflicts within the governing coalition have increased, communication has become less coherent, and government effectiveness overall has declined.
Rifts within the government itself have diminished the effectiveness of monitoring. Kaczyński’s official entry into the government was motivated in part to keep increasingly assertive ministers in line. Numerous reforms have shifted costs to subnational governments without budgetary support. The PiS has tried to restrict the powers of local governments run by opposition parties.
Policymaking under the PiS government has been guided by party leader Jarosław Kaczyński. The Chancellery’s gatekeeping role has declined, with Kaczyński performing an informal coordination role, recently from a position as deputy prime minister. Bills are often submitted by individual legislators rather than ministries, as this allows a swifter process that can be controlled by PIS leaders.
RIAs and consultation mechanisms are often bypassed by relying on fast-track legislation. Consultation tends to be formal, with the government’s clear majority having reduced the need to win over social actors. As conflicts within the governing coalition have increased, communication has become less coherent, and government effectiveness overall has declined.
Rifts within the government itself have diminished the effectiveness of monitoring. Kaczyński’s official entry into the government was motivated in part to keep increasingly assertive ministers in line. Numerous reforms have shifted costs to subnational governments without budgetary support. The PiS has tried to restrict the powers of local governments run by opposition parties.
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How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?
10
9
9
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
8
7
6
7
6
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
5
4
3
4
3
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
2
1
1
In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
Motivated by EU demands and by the objective of improving the country’s absorption and use of EU funds, the planning capacities of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister (Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów, KPRM) were expanded following EU accession. When Mateusz Morawiecki became prime minister in December 2017, the Center for Strategic Analysis was created in the Chancellery. Beginning with the 2016 Strategy for Responsible Development, the PiS government has presented various medium- and long-term reform programs. While planning capacities have existed, however, policymaking under the PiS government has ultimately been guided by the visions and inspirations of PiS party leader Jarosław Kaczyński.
Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?
10
9
9
In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
8
7
6
7
6
For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
2
1
1
The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
Under the PiS government, policymaking has been ideologically driven rather than evidence based. While the government does consult with experts, these consultations are selective and not very transparent. The government listens to Ordo Iuris, an anti-choice group of conservative lawyers, but refuses to consult experts on climate change. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the government set up a COVID-19 advisory council, but has increasingly ignored its recommendations. This marginalization led 13 out of 17 council members to resign in January 2022. The government’s ideological approach has led many experts who once showed some sympathy for PiS to break with the party.
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Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?
10
9
9
The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
5
4
3
4
3
The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
2
1
1
The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
While the Chancellery of the Prime Minister is well-staffed and evaluates most draft bills, its policy expertise has declined under the PiS government, as the main criterion for staff employment is political obedience, not expertise or professionalism.
To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?
10
9
9
There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
5
4
3
4
3
Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
2
1
1
Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
Under the PiS government, the Chancellery of the Prime Minister has kept its enhanced formal involvement in preparing policy proposals by the line ministries. Inside the Chancellery, the Legislative Process Coordination Department is the most crucial coordination point. It edits the final versions of bills, while the Government Work Programming Department considers the timeline of the government’s program and monitors drafts from the ministries. Since the 2015 change in government, however, the actual gatekeeping role of the Chancellery has declined. First, a large amount of coordination has been done informally by Jarosław Kaczyński. Second, under the PiS government, many bills are formally submitted by individual members of parliament rather than by ministries. This procedure allows for a swifter legislative process with fewer consultation requirements so that the PiS leadership can more effectively control lawmaking.
How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?
10
9
9
The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
8
7
6
7
6
Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
5
4
3
4
3
There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
2
1
1
There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
The number and role of cabinet committees under the PiS government have been limited. Conflicts among ministries are ultimately resolved not by cabinet committees but by PiS leader Kaczyński and his immediate circle, including Prime Minister Morawiecki. Since Kaczyński joined the cabinet as deputy prime minister in October 2020, he has been head of the newly created Committee of the Council of Ministers for National Security and Defense Affairs, a position that has given him formal oversight of the justice, defense and interior ministries.
How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?
10
9
9
Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
8
7
6
7
6
Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
5
4
3
4
3
There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
2
1
1
There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
Senior ministry officials play a substantial role in interministerial coordination. All meetings of the Council of Ministers, the Polish cabinet, are prepared by the Council of Ministers’ Permanent Committee, which is made up of deputy ministers from the ministries. The Committee for European Affairs, which is in charge of EU coordination, also relies strongly on coordination by top civil servants. In contrast, bureaucratic coordination at lower levels of the hierarchy is still relatively limited, even though the joint administration of EU funds has helped intensify interministerial exchange. Changes in personnel have always secured the dominance of the government over administration.
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
10
9
9
Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
8
7
6
7
6
In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
2
1
1
Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Informal mechanisms of coordination have played an essential role under the PiS government. PiS Chairman Jarosław Kaczyński makes many important decisions himself, and government ministers’ standing strongly depends upon their relationship with him. Kaczyński initially served as the gray eminence behind the scenes, but officially entered the government in October 2020 as deputy prime minister. Prime Minister Morawiecki’s informal power has grown, but still highly depends on his personal relationship with Kaczyński.
How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?
10
9
9
The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
8
7
6
7
6
The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
5
4
3
4
3
The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
2
1
1
The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
The PiS government has been eager to increase digitalization in the country and use digital technologies to support interministerial coordination (European Commission 2021). On entering office, the PiS government established a separate Ministry of Digital Affairs. In the course of the government reshuffle in October 2020, when the number of ministries was reduced from 20 to 14, the ministry was merged with the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, which since then has continued its mission and pending activities with regard to digital development. Despite some shortcomings, the ministry succeeded in improving internet access and the use of digital technologies in public administration and the government.
Citations:
European Commission (2021): Digital Public Administration factsheet 2021. Poland. Brussels (https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/collection/nifo-national-interoperability-framework-observatory/digital-public-administration-factsheets-2021).
Citations:
European Commission (2021): Digital Public Administration factsheet 2021. Poland. Brussels (https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/collection/nifo-national-interoperability-framework-observatory/digital-public-administration-factsheets-2021).
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To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?
10
9
9
RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
8
7
6
7
6
RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
5
4
3
4
3
RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
2
1
1
RIA are not applied or do not exist.
Poland had a relatively well-established system of regulatory impact assessment (RIA) when the PiS government came to power. The PiS government has slightly amended this system. In 2018, the requirement for assessing the impact of economic laws on SMEs was strengthened by the Law for Entrepreneurs Act. Since its creation in 2018, the Center for Strategic Analysis in the Chancellery of the Prime Minister has been in charge of overseeing RIAs (OECD 2021). However, the PiS government has not taken RIAs seriously. It has bypassed RIAs by relying strongly on fast-track legislation and legislative initiatives submitted by individual members of the Sejm. Between 2017 and 2020, 217 out of 603 bills were submitted by members of parliament.
Citations:
OECD (2021): Poland. Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance 2021. Paris (https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/poland-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdf).
Citations:
OECD (2021): Poland. Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance 2021. Paris (https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/poland-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdf).
Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?
10
9
9
RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
8
7
6
7
6
The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
5
4
3
4
3
The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
2
1
1
RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
The quality of the RIA process has strongly declined under the PiS government. Legally, stakeholders are required to be involved, and results must be publicized and communicated; however, such efforts have become rather selective. The quality of individual RIAs is evaluated by the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, not by an independent body.
Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?
10
9
9
Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
8
7
6
7
6
Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
5
4
3
4
3
Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
2
1
1
Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
Although Article 5 of Poland’s constitution enshrines the principle of sustainable development and the state’s responsibility to protect the environment, sustainability checks are not an integral part of regulatory impact assessments. The PiS government has been less concerned with issues of sustainability than were its predecessors.
To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?
10
9
9
Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
2
1
1
Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
According to the RIA rules, ex post evaluations can be requested by the Council of Ministers and subsidiary bodies; since 2019 by the Center for Strategic Analysis or the Ombudsman for SMEs; and since 2020 by the president of the Government Legislative Center. By the end of 2020, no evaluation had been conducted according to these recent procedures (OECD 2021: 2). In general, primary laws and subordinate regulations are rarely evaluated. Even when such procedures are carried out, the review’s outcome is not used to improve the quality of laws.
Citations:
OECD (2021): Poland. Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance 2021. Paris (https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/poland-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdf).
Citations:
OECD (2021): Poland. Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance 2021. Paris (https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/poland-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdf).
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Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?
10
9
9
The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
8
7
6
7
6
The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
2
1
1
The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
The Polish government is obliged by law to consult all parties affected by the proposed legislation. In addition, there is a Council of Social Dialogue, composed of trade unions and employers, whose members are appointed by the president. Consultations both inside and outside the Council have been largely formal. The government’s clear majority in parliament has reduced the need to win over social actors since the government also perceives many of them as enemies. Public consultation has been bypassed by introducing legislative initiatives through members of parliament since such initiatives do not require regular consultation mechanisms and therefore exclude experts and the public.
Moreover, the quick passage of major laws has reduced the time available for meaningful consultation. Unlike the employers’ associations and other trade unions, the NSZZ Solidarność trade union has enjoyed a special relationship with the government. Several of its representatives were given positions in the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Affairs, and it has supported controversial reforms such as pension reform. Frequently, even NSZZ Solidarność has complained about the government’s lack of responsiveness. In stark contrast to the trends at the national level, many municipalities have expanded public consultation, for example, by introducing participatory-budgeting processes.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Anti-Crisis Shield and many other laws were not consulted in advance (Szarfenberg 2020). The legislation even empowered the prime minister to dismiss members of the Council for Social Dialogue (Rogalewski 2020). Controversies over the appointment of new members of the council, following the cabinet reshuffle in October 2020, led to the resignation of the trade union NSZZ Solidarność. Entrepreneurs and employers’ associations were also critical of the government’s ignorance. A more inclusive approach respecting advice was taken for the vaccination roll-out.
Citations:
Rogalewski, A. (2020): How Law and Justice (mis)used the pandemic to dismantle social dialogue in Poland, in: Social Europe, April 21 (https://socialeurope.eu/how-law-and-justice-misused-the-pandemic-todismantle-social-dialogue-in-poland).
Szarfenberg, R. (2020): COVID-19 socioeconomic responses in Poland. European Social Policy Network, ESPN Flash Report 2020/29, Brussels: European Commission.
Moreover, the quick passage of major laws has reduced the time available for meaningful consultation. Unlike the employers’ associations and other trade unions, the NSZZ Solidarność trade union has enjoyed a special relationship with the government. Several of its representatives were given positions in the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Affairs, and it has supported controversial reforms such as pension reform. Frequently, even NSZZ Solidarność has complained about the government’s lack of responsiveness. In stark contrast to the trends at the national level, many municipalities have expanded public consultation, for example, by introducing participatory-budgeting processes.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Anti-Crisis Shield and many other laws were not consulted in advance (Szarfenberg 2020). The legislation even empowered the prime minister to dismiss members of the Council for Social Dialogue (Rogalewski 2020). Controversies over the appointment of new members of the council, following the cabinet reshuffle in October 2020, led to the resignation of the trade union NSZZ Solidarność. Entrepreneurs and employers’ associations were also critical of the government’s ignorance. A more inclusive approach respecting advice was taken for the vaccination roll-out.
Citations:
Rogalewski, A. (2020): How Law and Justice (mis)used the pandemic to dismantle social dialogue in Poland, in: Social Europe, April 21 (https://socialeurope.eu/how-law-and-justice-misused-the-pandemic-todismantle-social-dialogue-in-poland).
Szarfenberg, R. (2020): COVID-19 socioeconomic responses in Poland. European Social Policy Network, ESPN Flash Report 2020/29, Brussels: European Commission.
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To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?
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9
9
Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
8
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6
7
6
Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
5
4
3
4
3
Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
2
1
1
Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
Ministerial communication is coordinated by the Government Information Center, a department of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister. It regularly reports on government activities and connects to other ministries’ press departments. However, information provided by ministries has tended to be selective and highly propagandistic. As conflicts within the governing coalition have increased, government communication has become less coherent. Justice Minister Zbigniew Ziobro (Solidarna Polska) has often clashed with Jarosław Gowin (Porozumienie), first minister of science and higher education, later minister of economic development, labor and technology, and Prime Minister Morawiecki. In the case of the “Polish Deal,” numerous open conflicts among ministers have erupted.
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To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?
10
9
9
The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
5
4
3
4
3
The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
2
1
1
The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
During the 2015–2019 term, the PiS government has been quite effective in implementing its policy objectives. Favored by its absolute majority in parliament and PiS’s internal discipline, it succeeded in realizing its major campaign pledges, such as the increases in the minimum wage and the family allowance, tax relief for small businesses, the lowering of the retirement age or the reversion to a higher age for entering school, and it realized them rather quickly. Precisely because so many bills have sailed so quickly through parliament, however, the quality of legislation was often very poor, requiring immediate amendments.
Since the 2019 parliamentary elections, the PiS government’s effectiveness has declined, as the rifts within the governing coalition have grown. Due to widespread criticism from both inside and outside the governing coalition, the government eventually had to give up its original plan to hold presidential elections in May 2020. While the government, despite its dependence on independent members of parliament since August 2021, found a parliamentary majority for adopting its “Polish Deal” program, the legislation has suffered from massive internal inconsistencies and frequent amendments. At the end of 2021, President Duda vetoed the government’s controversial legislation on media ownership (“lex TVN”).
Since the 2019 parliamentary elections, the PiS government’s effectiveness has declined, as the rifts within the governing coalition have grown. Due to widespread criticism from both inside and outside the governing coalition, the government eventually had to give up its original plan to hold presidential elections in May 2020. While the government, despite its dependence on independent members of parliament since August 2021, found a parliamentary majority for adopting its “Polish Deal” program, the legislation has suffered from massive internal inconsistencies and frequent amendments. At the end of 2021, President Duda vetoed the government’s controversial legislation on media ownership (“lex TVN”).
To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?
10
9
9
The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
8
7
6
7
6
The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
5
4
3
4
3
The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
2
1
1
The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
For a long time, the PiS government’s need to use specific organizational devices to pressure ministers to stay in line with the government’s program was limited, as the cabinet consisted of a group of people who were more or less hand-picked by PiS party Jarosław Kaczyński, and Kaczyński managed to handle internal debates and power struggles. Since the 2019 parliamentary elections, the situation has changed. In particular, ministers Ziobro and Gowin, both leading PiS’s smaller coalition partners, have become more assertive. To foster ministerial compliance, Kaczyński has entered the government as vice-prime minister following a major reshuffle in autumn 2020.
How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
5
4
3
4
3
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
2
1
1
The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
Ministries are obliged to keep the Chancellery of the Prime Minister informed about legislative progress regularly. The Center for Strategic Analysis helps Prime Minister Morawiecki and PiS party leader, and since October 2021 Deputy Prime Minister Kaczyński to monitor line ministries’ implementation activities. However, as PiS’s coalition partners have become more assertive and rifts within the government have increased, monitoring has become less effective.
How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
8
7
6
7
6
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
5
4
3
4
3
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
2
1
1
The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
There is a large number of executive agencies in Poland. Agencies report to ministries, and ministries have special units responsible for monitoring agencies’ activities and auditing their finances. Under the PiS government, the leadership of state agencies has become highly politicized, with many of these positions being filled by party representatives or allies. As a consequence of the new civil service act that came into effect in January 2016, all employment contracts of previous directors turned invalid, and the positions were no longer filled by open competition but by personal appointment. An earlier provision was canceled, requiring directors of state institutions to have not been members of a political party for five years before assuming a leading position in state administration. Thus, compliance between ministries and administration has become easier, but the administration has also become dependent on the political will of the majority. The increase in oversight has led to a decline in professionalism, and an erosion of checks and balances. The PiS government has privileged some agencies. The Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), which helped the government to push through its national-conservative agenda, for instance, received a record financial contribution in 2020.
To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
8
7
6
7
6
The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
2
1
1
The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
Since 1999, Poland has supported three tiers of subnational governments: municipalities, districts and regions. Since 2015 and even more so since the municipal elections in October 2018, the relationship between the central government and the majority of local governments has been tense, as the majority of larger cities are controlled by opposition parties. Several reforms have shifted costs to the subnational governments or have deprived them of much needed money. Despite their strong role in healthcare and education, municipalities received little budgetary support from the central government during the COVID-19 pandemic. While the Local Investment Fund of July 2020 provided PLN 12 billion (€2.68 million) of non-refundable support for infrastructure, education and digitalization, the money came late and the process was opaque. Subnational governments’ fiscal problems have been exacerbated by a decrease in the availability of EU funds at the local level.
There were discussions between 12 of Poland’s larger cities about suing the government due to the government’s failure to ensure adequate task funding. And in the course of the debate on the rule of law instrument for the EU recovery fund and the budget in general, several municipalities wrote a letter to the European Commission in December 2020 in which they distanced themselves from their government’s veto position (Zalan 2020). In summer 2021, the Association of Polish Cities strongly criticized the tax changes envisaged in the government’s “Polish Deal,” arguing that the changes would impose substantial revenue losses on municipalities.
Citations:
Zalan, E. (2020): Warsaw and Budapest seek EU funds despite national veto, in: EUobserver, December 8 (https://euobserver.com/economic/150304).
There were discussions between 12 of Poland’s larger cities about suing the government due to the government’s failure to ensure adequate task funding. And in the course of the debate on the rule of law instrument for the EU recovery fund and the budget in general, several municipalities wrote a letter to the European Commission in December 2020 in which they distanced themselves from their government’s veto position (Zalan 2020). In summer 2021, the Association of Polish Cities strongly criticized the tax changes envisaged in the government’s “Polish Deal,” arguing that the changes would impose substantial revenue losses on municipalities.
Citations:
Zalan, E. (2020): Warsaw and Budapest seek EU funds despite national veto, in: EUobserver, December 8 (https://euobserver.com/economic/150304).
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
2
1
1
The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
Despite the existing level of decentralization in Poland, the PiS government has perceived local governments as a bastion of the opposition. A view that was reinforced by the 2018 local election results. Thus, the PiS government has tried to restrict local government powers. It has restricted rather than encouraged locally adopted responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, and has complicated the cooperation of Polish and German regions and municipalities regarding cross-border commuters and healthcare. Moreover, the central government has distributed funding and support not on merit, but has selectively supported PiS-leaning municipalities. Since the higher courts – which could normally be called on in cases of conflict between national and local or regional levels of government – are politically loyal to the government, representatives of the municipalities are unlikely to win judicial support.
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?
10
9
9
Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
2
1
1
Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
Institutionally, the regions have a centrally appointed head of regional administration (voivode) who is responsible for ensuring that national policies are implemented and that state institutions operating in the region perform their functions properly. The politicization of the civil service under the PiS government has reduced the fulfillment of these standards by reducing professionalism within the regional administrations. Conflicts between the voivode and locally elected representatives, who often have other political priorities, have increased. Moreover, the financial problems of regional and local governments, which have been aggravated by the central government, make it more difficult to achieve high public service standards. Additional investment in infrastructure might help to mediate these problems, but they are rather directed primarily toward the more undeveloped eastern parts of Poland, which are regions in which people tend to vote for PiS.
To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?
10
9
9
Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
8
7
6
7
6
Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
5
4
3
4
3
Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
2
1
1
Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
Decision-making and the enforcement of decisions generally follow lines of political affiliation within the current Polish government. As government agencies do not act independently, but instead follow the responsible ministry and the party line, it is difficult for outside interests opposing the government to win a hearing. Thus, their attempts to influence government agencies are rarely fruitful, while economic interest groups that are close to the government have more success. For this reason, while government agencies do not act in a strictly unbiased manner, they can be effective in implementing the decisions the government wants to be enforced.
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To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?
10
9
9
The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
8
7
6
7
6
In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
2
1
1
The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
Poland’s government structures have been adapted to international and supranational developments, most notably because of NATO and EU membership. Before the PiS government came to power, Poland enjoyed a good reputation within the European Union, and its growing influence showed that adaptation had been successful. The PiS government has been more inward-looking, and has not only been much more reluctant to adopt domestic government structures to international requirements (and EU requirements in particular), but states that adaptation is unnecessary. It even opposes further EU harmonization and argues that more national independence is favorable in recent years.
To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?
10
9
9
The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
2
1
1
The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
With the PiS government, Poland’s international orientation has changed. Steps leading toward deeper integration have been contested and PiS has been more critical than its predecessors of Germany’s role in the European Union. Because of this intransigence, Poland’s reputation and standing within the European Union have suffered. While Prime Minister Morawiecki has been more urbane than his predecessors, the government’s basic approach toward the European Union has not changed. Poland wants to play an active role within NATO and has tried to establish a closer bilateral relationship with the United States, which has also been perceived as a form of side-diplomacy outside the usual channels. This has received only half-hearted responses from both the Trump and Biden administrations. Within the Visegrád group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) collaboration is closer and more collective – a tendency that also stretches to other countries in the region – although differing attitudes toward Russia are a source of division between these countries. Regarding climate change measures and energy policy, the government also stresses national interests, which follow the coal industry’s interests, but slowly seems to be making a policy shift. While Poland blocked any progress at the European Council summit in June 2019 on the issue of becoming CO2 neutral by 2050, the government is now adapting its course to become more environmentally friendly. However, Poland did not coordinate its actions with other EU member states or EU agencies such as Frontex during the COVID-19 pandemic or during the Belarus border crisis in autumn and winter 2021/22.
Citations:
Bayer, L., Z. Wanat (2020): Hungary and Poland block EU coronavirus recovery package, in: Politico, November 16 (https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-and-poland-block-progress-on-e1-8-trillionpackage/).
Citations:
Bayer, L., Z. Wanat (2020): Hungary and Poland block EU coronavirus recovery package, in: Politico, November 16 (https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-and-poland-block-progress-on-e1-8-trillionpackage/).
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To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?
10
9
9
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
5
4
3
4
3
The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
2
1
1
There is no monitoring.
The PiS government has not monitored the institutional arrangements of government in a systematic and regular way. Its goal is not to improve or professionalize institutions but to increase political power and employ personnel that follow the party line.
To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?
10
9
9
The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
8
7
6
7
6
The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
2
1
1
The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
Upon entering office, the PiS government has changed the institutional arrangements of governing. It has changed the portfolios of ministries several times, set up new cabinet committees, overhauled the Civil Service Act and strengthened the position of central government vis-à-vis subnational governments. However, the strategic capacity of the PiS government has primarily rested on its political power: its majority in parliament, its strong party discipline and the uncontested role of party leader Jarosław Kaczyński. No reforms have been introduced to improve strategic capacity through an open involvement of, for example, scientific expertise.