Quality of Democracy
#38Key Findings
With a number of evident weaknesses, Romania falls into the bottom ranks internationally (rank 38) with regard to democracy quality. Its score on this measure has declined by 0.3 points since 2014.
Political parties routinely circumvent campaign financing laws. Key media outlets are owned by businesspeople with political interests. A pandemic-era decree allows authorities to block access to websites disseminating false COVID-19 information. Defamation lawsuits are increasingly being used to silence investigative journalism.
Civil rights are generally respected. Protests continued during the pandemic, often against lockdown rules. Roma and LGBTQ+ people face considerable discrimination. A controversial recent law bans schools from discussing conceptual differences between gender and biological sex.
A prosecutorial body ostensibly focused on judicial corruption has drawn considerable international criticism for interfering with judicial independence. Corruption is still widespread. The main anticorruption institution is underfunded. A number of high-profile political figures have been prosecuted for corruption offenses.
Political parties routinely circumvent campaign financing laws. Key media outlets are owned by businesspeople with political interests. A pandemic-era decree allows authorities to block access to websites disseminating false COVID-19 information. Defamation lawsuits are increasingly being used to silence investigative journalism.
Civil rights are generally respected. Protests continued during the pandemic, often against lockdown rules. Roma and LGBTQ+ people face considerable discrimination. A controversial recent law bans schools from discussing conceptual differences between gender and biological sex.
A prosecutorial body ostensibly focused on judicial corruption has drawn considerable international criticism for interfering with judicial independence. Corruption is still widespread. The main anticorruption institution is underfunded. A number of high-profile political figures have been prosecuted for corruption offenses.
Graph View
Graph View
How fair are procedures for registering candidates and parties?
10
9
9
Legal regulations provide for a fair registration procedure for all elections; candidates and parties are not discriminated against.
8
7
6
7
6
A few restrictions on election procedures discriminate against a small number of candidates and parties.
5
4
3
4
3
Some unreasonable restrictions on election procedures exist that discriminate against many candidates and parties.
2
1
1
Discriminating registration procedures for elections are widespread and prevent a large number of potential candidates or parties from participating.
There have been no substantial developments in candidacy procedures that would have had an impact on the 2020 or 2021 parliamentary and local elections in Romania. Like most parliamentary systems, political parties put forward their candidate for respective ridings, while other individuals are permitted to run as independents. In the 2020 local elections, there were 18 candidates on the ballot for the Bucharest mayoral race, with five of those candidates running as independents. Candidates are finalized by the Central Election Bureau in advance of the election.
Freedom House’s 2021 report noted that Romania’s electoral laws and frameworks generally provide for fair and competitive elections. This is supported by the Central Election Bureau, which includes judges and political representatives, as well as the Permanent Electoral Authority, which manages voter registration, campaign finance and logistics. The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe observers who monitored the 2020 parliamentary elections noted the complexity of the legal framework.
Freedom House’s 2021 report noted that Romania’s electoral laws and frameworks generally provide for fair and competitive elections. This is supported by the Central Election Bureau, which includes judges and political representatives, as well as the Permanent Electoral Authority, which manages voter registration, campaign finance and logistics. The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe observers who monitored the 2020 parliamentary elections noted the complexity of the legal framework.
To what extent do candidates and parties have fair access to the media and other means of communication?
10
9
9
All candidates and parties have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. All major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of the range of different political positions.
8
7
6
7
6
Candidates and parties have largely equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. The major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of different political positions.
5
4
3
4
3
Candidates and parties often do not have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. While the major media outlets represent a partisan political bias, the media system as a whole provides fair coverage of different political positions.
2
1
1
Candidates and parties lack equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communications. The major media outlets are biased in favor of certain political groups or views and discriminate against others.
While parts of the Romanian political environment are relatively free and pluralistic, key outlets continue to be controlled by business individuals with political interests. Owners’ priorities distort coverage and can result in more favorable coverage for certain candidates. The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe observers of the 2020 parliamentary elections noted that television channels either did not devote significant airtime to polls or offered extensive coverage to public officials and President Iohannis of the National Liberal Party (PNL). Further, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, President Iohannis issued a decree that allowed authorities to restrict access to webpages or websites that disseminated purportedly false COVID-19 information during the state of emergency. While tackling misinformation related to the pandemic has been an important challenge for governments around the world, observers raised concerns that users had no avenue to appeal the removal of content. The exercise of this power demonstrated the government’s continued ability to participate in media censorship, which could have repercussions during the election process.
To what extent do all citizens have the opportunity to exercise their right of participation in national elections?
10
9
9
All adult citizens can participate in national elections. All eligible voters are registered if they wish to be. There are no discriminations observable in the exercise of the right to vote. There are no disincentives to voting.
8
7
6
7
6
The procedures for the registration of voters and voting are for the most part effective, impartial and nondiscriminatory. Citizens can appeal to courts if they feel being discriminated. Disincentives to voting generally do not constitute genuine obstacles.
5
4
3
4
3
While the procedures for the registration of voters and voting are de jure non-discriminatory, isolated cases of discrimination occur in practice. For some citizens, disincentives to voting constitute significant obstacles.
2
1
1
The procedures for the registration of voters or voting have systemic discriminatory effects. De facto, a substantial number of adult citizens are excluded from national elections.
Romanians enjoy relatively free and open access to the right to vote across the country. In September 2020, 19 million registered voters participated in elections for more than 43,000 local officials across the country, including council presidents and mayors. Just a couple of months later in December 2020, voters again went to the polls for a parliamentary election. While the right to vote is broadly available to eligible adults, only 31.84% of the eligible population voted. This is down from 39.49% in 2016 and represents a collapse in public confidence in the political class, its institutions and the government more broadly.
Parliamentary elections were held on 5 and 6 December 2020. On 17 January 2021, the think-tank Expert Forum published a report on the poll. While the authorities’ efforts to enable quarantined and isolated voters to vote were more visible than they were for the subsequent local elections, there were problems with using the special ballot box and protective masks. The report also indicated that the transparency of the process was significantly diminished due to the fact that the meetings of constituency electoral offices were not public.
Citations:
Raport De Monitorizare Raport final privind observarea alegerilor parlamentare 5-6 decembrie 2020 – FiecareVot” [Monitoring Report Final report on the observation of the parliamentary elections 5-6 December 2020 – EveryVote], Expert Forum, 17 January 2021, https://expertforum.ro/raport-parlamentare-2020/
“AEP: Aproape 3.400 de acţiuni de control la competitorii electorali realizate în 2019 şi 2020” [AEP: Nearly 3,400 control actions on electoral contestants carried out in 2019 and 2020], Agerpres, 2 August 2021, https://www.agerpres.ro/politica/2021/08/02/aep-aproape-3-400-de-actiuni-de-control-la-competitorii-electorali-realizate-in-2019-si-2020–757268
Parliamentary elections were held on 5 and 6 December 2020. On 17 January 2021, the think-tank Expert Forum published a report on the poll. While the authorities’ efforts to enable quarantined and isolated voters to vote were more visible than they were for the subsequent local elections, there were problems with using the special ballot box and protective masks. The report also indicated that the transparency of the process was significantly diminished due to the fact that the meetings of constituency electoral offices were not public.
Citations:
Raport De Monitorizare Raport final privind observarea alegerilor parlamentare 5-6 decembrie 2020 – FiecareVot” [Monitoring Report Final report on the observation of the parliamentary elections 5-6 December 2020 – EveryVote], Expert Forum, 17 January 2021, https://expertforum.ro/raport-parlamentare-2020/
“AEP: Aproape 3.400 de acţiuni de control la competitorii electorali realizate în 2019 şi 2020” [AEP: Nearly 3,400 control actions on electoral contestants carried out in 2019 and 2020], Agerpres, 2 August 2021, https://www.agerpres.ro/politica/2021/08/02/aep-aproape-3-400-de-actiuni-de-control-la-competitorii-electorali-realizate-in-2019-si-2020–757268
To what extent is private and public party financing and electoral campaign financing transparent, effectively monitored and in case of infringement of rules subject to proportionate and dissuasive sanction?
10
9
9
The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and provides for independent monitoring to that respect. Effective measures to prevent evasion are effectively in place and infringements subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.
8
7
6
7
6
The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and provides for independent monitoring. Although infringements are subject to proportionate sanctions, some, although few, loopholes and options for circumvention still exist.
5
4
3
4
3
The state provides that donations to political parties shall be published. Party financing is subject to some degree of independent monitoring but monitoring either proves regularly ineffective or proportionate sanctions in case of infringement do not follow.
2
1
1
The rules for party and campaign financing do not effectively enforce the obligation to make the donations public. Party and campaign financing is neither monitored independently nor, in case of infringements, subject to proportionate sanctions.
Updates to anti-corruption policies in 2015 have strengthened Romania’s party financing framework to promote transparency. While no additional updates to the party financing framework were advanced in 2020 or 2021, a notable development was the prosecution of Iona Basescu, daughter of former President Traian Basescu, and a former minister, Elena Udrea, for their roles in illegally financing the former president’s 2009 presidential campaign, which resulted in his election for a second term. Ms. Basescu was sentenced to five years in prison for incitement to embezzle and money laundering, while Ms. Udrea was sentenced to eight years for instigating bribe taking and money laundering. The high-profile case represents a commitment by the courts to ensure party financing rules are respected.
In 2021, the Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP) reported that it had carried out no less than 3,396 control actions between 2019 and 2020 on election candidates, political parties, and natural or legal persons. This covered the 2020 local elections, as well as the European Parliament elections and a national referendum held in 2019. While all the parties have been sanctioned with fines and confiscation of sums ranging between €600 and €13,000, the PNL received cumulatively the highest sanction, receiving an estimated €90,000 in fines, for expenditure issues pertaining to the election campaign.
On September 7, the government allocated RON 90 million (approx. €18.2 million) in party subsidies from the state budget, despite previously promising to cut the subsidy granted to parties. Since parties had spent only half of the subsidies they received in the first six months of the year, this sudden increase in subsidies was probably meant to boost Cîțu’s chances of winning the PNL leadership. Moreover, the PNL and PSD were the biggest beneficiaries of this subsidy.
Citations:
AEP: Aproape 3.400 de acţiuni de control la competitorii electorali realizate în 2019 şi 2020” [AEP: Nearly 3,400 control actions on electoral contestants carried out in 2019 and 2020], Agerpres, 2 August 2021 https://wwwb.agerpres.ro/politica/2021/08/02/aep-aproape-3-400-de-actiuni-de-control-la-competitorii-electorali-realizate-in-2019-si-2020–757268
Mihai Roman, “Premierul Cîțu a mai dat 90 de milioane de lei partidelor politice în plină criză, deși promisese că le taie subvențiile” [Prime Minister Cîțu gave another 90 million lei to political parties in the midst of the crisis, even though he promised to cut their subsidies], G4Media, 7 September 2021,
https://www.g4media.ro/premierul-citu-a-mai-dat-90-de-milioane-de-lei-la-partidele-politice-in-plina-criza-desi-promisese-ca-le-taie-subventiile.html
In 2021, the Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP) reported that it had carried out no less than 3,396 control actions between 2019 and 2020 on election candidates, political parties, and natural or legal persons. This covered the 2020 local elections, as well as the European Parliament elections and a national referendum held in 2019. While all the parties have been sanctioned with fines and confiscation of sums ranging between €600 and €13,000, the PNL received cumulatively the highest sanction, receiving an estimated €90,000 in fines, for expenditure issues pertaining to the election campaign.
On September 7, the government allocated RON 90 million (approx. €18.2 million) in party subsidies from the state budget, despite previously promising to cut the subsidy granted to parties. Since parties had spent only half of the subsidies they received in the first six months of the year, this sudden increase in subsidies was probably meant to boost Cîțu’s chances of winning the PNL leadership. Moreover, the PNL and PSD were the biggest beneficiaries of this subsidy.
Citations:
AEP: Aproape 3.400 de acţiuni de control la competitorii electorali realizate în 2019 şi 2020” [AEP: Nearly 3,400 control actions on electoral contestants carried out in 2019 and 2020], Agerpres, 2 August 2021 https://wwwb.agerpres.ro/politica/2021/08/02/aep-aproape-3-400-de-actiuni-de-control-la-competitorii-electorali-realizate-in-2019-si-2020–757268
Mihai Roman, “Premierul Cîțu a mai dat 90 de milioane de lei partidelor politice în plină criză, deși promisese că le taie subvențiile” [Prime Minister Cîțu gave another 90 million lei to political parties in the midst of the crisis, even though he promised to cut their subsidies], G4Media, 7 September 2021,
https://www.g4media.ro/premierul-citu-a-mai-dat-90-de-milioane-de-lei-la-partidele-politice-in-plina-criza-desi-promisese-ca-le-taie-subventiile.html
Do citizens have the opportunity to take binding political decisions when they want to do so?
10
9
9
Citizens have the effective opportunity to actively propose and take binding decisions on issues of importance to them through popular initiatives and referendums. The set of eligible issues is extensive, and includes national, regional, and local issues.
8
7
6
7
6
Citizens have the effective opportunity to take binding decisions on issues of importance to them through either popular initiatives or referendums. The set of eligible issues covers at least two levels of government.
5
4
3
4
3
Citizens have the effective opportunity to vote on issues of importance to them through a legally binding measure. The set of eligible issues is limited to one level of government.
2
1
1
Citizens have no effective opportunity to vote on issues of importance to them through a legally binding measure.
According to the constitution, national referendums are required automatically for any revision to the constitution (as happened in 1991 and 2003) and following the impeachment of the president (as in 2007 and 2012). In addition, the president can (after consultation with parliament) call for referendums on matters of national interest, as in the case of the 2007 electoral system referendum and the 2009 referendum on parliamentary reform. For referendum results to be legally binding, turnout needs to exceed 30%. At the national level, citizens do not have the right to initiate a referendum. However, if more than 500,000 citizens support a change to the constitution, parliament can approve a revision, which then must pass a nationwide referendum. Citizens can initiate referendums at the county level, but such initiatives are subject to approval by the County Council and are rare. No national referendums were undertaken during the period under review.
Graph View
To what extent are the media independent from government?
10
9
9
Public and private media are independent from government influence; their independence is institutionally protected and fully respected by the incumbent government.
8
7
6
7
6
The incumbent government largely respects the independence of media. However, there are occasional attempts to exert influence.
5
4
3
4
3
The incumbent government seeks to ensure its political objectives indirectly by influencing the personnel policies, organizational framework or financial resources of public media, and/or the licensing regime/market access for private media.
2
1
1
Major media outlets are frequently influenced by the incumbent government promoting its partisan political objectives. To ensure pro-government media reporting, governmental actors exert direct political pressure and violate existing rules of media regulation or change them to benefit their interests.
Overall, Romania enjoys a relatively free media environment and ranks 48 out of 180 countries worldwide regarding press freedom, according to the 2020 Reporters Without Borders Ranking. However, journalists often report subtle obstructions by authorities intended to impede their work and the government exercises outsized influence on the content of media coverage. This was exacerbated during the COVID-19 pandemic, which saw a collapse in private advertising revenue around the world, including in Romania. This loss in revenue left private media outlets dependent on government for funding, which, according to the Freedom House 2020 report, presented an opportunity to the authorities to gain editorial access through publicly funded advertising.
Across the country, there have been increasing signs that lawsuits are being strategically used against public participation. For example, politicians, church officials and businessmen with links to the state have sued well-established newsrooms of investigative journalists (e.g., Recorder, RISE and Libertatea) to stifle legitimate criticism through the abuse of existing laws (most notably, defamation).
Citations:
Prysiazhniuk, M. (2019): Threatened from the Inside: Why State Disinformation Is the Main Concern in Romania. Visegrad Insight, October 22 (https://visegradinsight.eu/threatened-from-the-inside/).
Reporters without Borders (2018): Romania’s press freedom in free fall as its takes over EU presidency, December 29 (https://rsf.org/en/news/romanias-press-freedom-free-fall-its-takes-over-eu-presidency).
Across the country, there have been increasing signs that lawsuits are being strategically used against public participation. For example, politicians, church officials and businessmen with links to the state have sued well-established newsrooms of investigative journalists (e.g., Recorder, RISE and Libertatea) to stifle legitimate criticism through the abuse of existing laws (most notably, defamation).
Citations:
Prysiazhniuk, M. (2019): Threatened from the Inside: Why State Disinformation Is the Main Concern in Romania. Visegrad Insight, October 22 (https://visegradinsight.eu/threatened-from-the-inside/).
Reporters without Borders (2018): Romania’s press freedom in free fall as its takes over EU presidency, December 29 (https://rsf.org/en/news/romanias-press-freedom-free-fall-its-takes-over-eu-presidency).
To what extent are the media characterized by an ownership structure that ensures a pluralism of opinions?
10
9
9
Diversified ownership structures characterize both the electronic and print media market, providing a well-balanced pluralism of opinions. Effective anti-monopoly policies and impartial, open public media guarantee a pluralism of opinions.
8
7
6
7
6
Diversified ownership structures prevail in the electronic and print media market. Public media compensate for deficiencies or biases in private media reporting by representing a wider range of opinions.
5
4
3
4
3
Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize either the electronic or the print media market. Important opinions are represented but there are no or only weak institutional guarantees against the predominance of certain opinions.
2
1
1
Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize both the electronic and the print media market. Few companies dominate the media, most programs are biased, and there is evidence that certain opinions are not published or are marginalized.
Incomplete transparency of media ownership in Romania continues to favor business individuals who exploit the media environment to advance their own agendas and provide favorable coverage to their preferred candidates. The 2021 Media Pluralism Monitor notes concerns over a lack of specific safeguards for editorial independence and professional norms, which poses a high risk to media pluralism and is further exploited by gaps in legislation related to ownership disclosure requirements. The Media Pluralism Monitor also notes that discretionary distribution of state advertising funds can be used by state authorities to interfere with media, notably at the local level. This phenomenon has been compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted in a collapse in private advertising revenue for media companies and therefore increased dependence on state funds.
In a positive development, EuroNews announced in early 2021 that it would be launching a Romanian news channel in partnership with Universitatea Politehnica din București (Bucharest Polytechnic University). The center-left outlet is one of the largest independent news channels in Europe, and will deliver local, regional, national and international news on TV and digital platforms across the country. The outlet will also have journalists and correspondents in Romania. The entrance of EuroNews into the Romanian market marks a positive step in media pluralism and independence.
Citations:
Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (2021): Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era, Florence: EUI, https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/71959/romania_results_mpm_2021_cmpf.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
In a positive development, EuroNews announced in early 2021 that it would be launching a Romanian news channel in partnership with Universitatea Politehnica din București (Bucharest Polytechnic University). The center-left outlet is one of the largest independent news channels in Europe, and will deliver local, regional, national and international news on TV and digital platforms across the country. The outlet will also have journalists and correspondents in Romania. The entrance of EuroNews into the Romanian market marks a positive step in media pluralism and independence.
Citations:
Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (2021): Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era, Florence: EUI, https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/71959/romania_results_mpm_2021_cmpf.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
To what extent can citizens obtain official information?
10
9
9
Legal regulations guarantee free and easy access to official information, contain few, reasonable restrictions, and there are effective mechanisms of appeal and oversight enabling citizens to access information.
8
7
6
7
6
Access to official information is regulated by law. Most restrictions are justified, but access is sometimes complicated by bureaucratic procedures. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms permit citizens to enforce their right of access.
5
4
3
4
3
Access to official information is partially regulated by law, but complicated by bureaucratic procedures and some poorly justified restrictions. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms are often ineffective.
2
1
1
Access to official information is not regulated by law; there are many restrictions of access, bureaucratic procedures and no or ineffective mechanisms of enforcement.
Law 544/2001, known as the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), ensures citizens’ access to public information. Its remit creates obligations for all central and local state institutions, as well as public companies for which the state is the majority shareholder. Along with ministries, central agencies and local governments, public universities, hospitals, and many off-budget central and local public companies have to comply with the terms of law 544. However, actual enforcement differs from the terms of the existing legislation. Authorities often try to withhold information or to restrict access through cumbersome or obstructive administrative mechanisms. Privacy and secrecy considerations, be they real or pretended, often trump the transparency principle.
The COVID-19 pandemic restricted the ability of Romanians to access official information in a timely manner. While citizens have the legal right to obtain public information and can petition government agencies, during the pandemic agencies were not obligated to respect the normal time limit for responding to requests for information. Additionally, pandemic-related information was sometimes withheld by authorities. In March 2020, the Ministry of Internal Affairs ordered local prefects not to publish the number of COVID-19 tests performed or the number of positive results, though this has since been made public again. In September 2020, the Centre for Independent Journalism noted that healthcare staff were often prohibited from discussing the pandemic with media outlets.
The COVID-19 pandemic restricted the ability of Romanians to access official information in a timely manner. While citizens have the legal right to obtain public information and can petition government agencies, during the pandemic agencies were not obligated to respect the normal time limit for responding to requests for information. Additionally, pandemic-related information was sometimes withheld by authorities. In March 2020, the Ministry of Internal Affairs ordered local prefects not to publish the number of COVID-19 tests performed or the number of positive results, though this has since been made public again. In September 2020, the Centre for Independent Journalism noted that healthcare staff were often prohibited from discussing the pandemic with media outlets.
Graph View
To what extent does the state respect and protect civil rights and how effectively are citizens protected by courts against infringements of their rights?
10
9
9
All state institutions respect and effectively protect civil rights. Citizens are effectively protected by courts against infringements of their rights. Infringements present an extreme exception.
8
7
6
7
6
The state respects and protects rights, with few infringements. Courts provide protection.
5
4
3
4
3
Despite formal protection, frequent infringements of civil rights occur and court protection often proves ineffective.
2
1
1
State institutions respect civil rights only formally, and civil rights are frequently violated. Court protection is not effective.
Civil rights are guaranteed by the constitution and are generally respected in practice. Romania responded to a European Court of Human Rights decision by adopting a new civil procedure order, which came into effect in February 2013. However, court protection has continued to suffer as a result of long and unpredictable proceedings. There is no equal access to the law since well-positioned individuals, including politicians, are given preference by the courts. More specific concerns have been raised concerning the disproportionate use of preventive detention (often in conflagration of European legal standards), the poor conditions in Romanian prisons, and the large-scale surveillance activities of the Romanian Intelligence Service. NGO legislation introduced by the governing coalition in 2017 has weakened civil rights watchdog organizations.
To what extent does the state concede and protect political liberties?
10
9
9
All state institutions concede and effectively protect political liberties.
8
7
6
7
6
All state institutions for the most part concede and protect political liberties. There are only few infringements.
5
4
3
4
3
State institutions concede political liberties but infringements occur regularly in practice.
2
1
1
Political liberties are unsatisfactory codified and frequently violated.
Romanians continue to exercise their political liberties through well-attended public demonstrations and assemblies. In June 2020, a coalition of academics, students and human rights groups pushed back against Law 617/2019, which looked to ban all educational institutions from “propagating theories and opinions on gender identity according to which gender is a separate concept from biological sex.” Both the University of Bucharest and the Babes-Bolyai University issued strong statements opposing the law, and a petition from the National Alliance of Student Organizations and the National Council of Students called on President Iohannis to block the law. Demonstrators also protested outside the Ministry of Health following the third fire in a hospital in as many months, while smaller demonstrations took place throughout the country as well.
Romanians also exercised their right to protest throughout the pandemic, opposing the government’s lockdown measures, despite health-related restrictions on public gatherings. In March 2020, several hundred protestors gathered and additional demonstrations have taken place throughout the pandemic. The Romanian government bent to public pressure, easing lockdown restrictions throughout the country, despite having some of the lowest vaccination rates in Europe and, as of late 2021, some of the highest infection and death rates in the world. In general, Romanians enjoy a well-respected right to political demonstration and civil liberties, with freedom of assembly guaranteed in the constitution.
Citations:
European Commission, “COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2021 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Romania Accompanying the COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2021 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union,” SWD(2021) 724 final, Brussels, 20 July 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/def ault/files/2021_rolr_country_chapte r_romania_en.pdf
Romanians also exercised their right to protest throughout the pandemic, opposing the government’s lockdown measures, despite health-related restrictions on public gatherings. In March 2020, several hundred protestors gathered and additional demonstrations have taken place throughout the pandemic. The Romanian government bent to public pressure, easing lockdown restrictions throughout the country, despite having some of the lowest vaccination rates in Europe and, as of late 2021, some of the highest infection and death rates in the world. In general, Romanians enjoy a well-respected right to political demonstration and civil liberties, with freedom of assembly guaranteed in the constitution.
Citations:
European Commission, “COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2021 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Romania Accompanying the COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2021 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union,” SWD(2021) 724 final, Brussels, 20 July 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/def ault/files/2021_rolr_country_chapte r_romania_en.pdf
How effectively does the state protect against different forms of discrimination?
10
9
9
State institutions effectively protect against and actively prevent discrimination. Cases of discrimination are extremely rare.
8
7
6
7
6
State anti-discrimination protections are moderately successful. Few cases of discrimination are observed.
5
4
3
4
3
State anti-discrimination efforts show limited success. Many cases of discrimination can be observed.
2
1
1
The state does not offer effective protection against discrimination. Discrimination is widespread in the public sector and in society.
Romania continues to struggle with non-discrimination and protection of marginalized persons within the law. In 2020, the country adopted Law 671/2019, banning all educational institutions from “propagating theories and opinions on gender identity according to which gender is a separate concept from biological sex.” This comes just two years after a referendum limiting the definition of family to exclude LGBTQ+ couples narrowly failed after it did not meet the required voter turnout threshold. In 2020, Romania ranked 38th out of 49 European countries for LGBTQ+ equality laws and policies by the International Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex Association European region.
In addition, Romania lacks a policy to encourage female participation in politics and women continue to be underrepresented in the parliament. Following the 2020 parliamentary elections, women held just 18.5% of lower-house seats and 18.4% of Senate seats, with only one female minister appointed in the new government. Members of the Roma minority also continue to face health and political disparities with few legal protections.
In January 2021, the Law on measures for Preventing and Combating Anti-Gypsyism entered into force. This is an important development for the protection of the Roma ethnic minority. According to the law, “anti-gypsyism” means both the perception of Roma expressed as hatred against them, as well as verbal or physical manifestations motivated by hatred against Roma, their property, institutions, traditions and language.
Citations:
Reid, G. (2018): Cynical Romanian Referendum Tries to Redefine ‘Family’. Human Rights Watch, October 3 (https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/10/03/cynical-romanian-referendum-tries-redefine-family).
“Legea privind unele masuri pentru prevenirea si combaterea antițigănismului, promulgata” [Law on some measures to prevent and combat anti-gypsyism promulgated], Agerpres.ro, 4 January 2021,
https://www.agerpres.ro/politic/2 021/01/04/legea-privind-unele-masur i-pentru-prevenirea-si-combaterea-a ntitiganismului-promulgata–637144
In addition, Romania lacks a policy to encourage female participation in politics and women continue to be underrepresented in the parliament. Following the 2020 parliamentary elections, women held just 18.5% of lower-house seats and 18.4% of Senate seats, with only one female minister appointed in the new government. Members of the Roma minority also continue to face health and political disparities with few legal protections.
In January 2021, the Law on measures for Preventing and Combating Anti-Gypsyism entered into force. This is an important development for the protection of the Roma ethnic minority. According to the law, “anti-gypsyism” means both the perception of Roma expressed as hatred against them, as well as verbal or physical manifestations motivated by hatred against Roma, their property, institutions, traditions and language.
Citations:
Reid, G. (2018): Cynical Romanian Referendum Tries to Redefine ‘Family’. Human Rights Watch, October 3 (https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/10/03/cynical-romanian-referendum-tries-redefine-family).
“Legea privind unele masuri pentru prevenirea si combaterea antițigănismului, promulgata” [Law on some measures to prevent and combat anti-gypsyism promulgated], Agerpres.ro, 4 January 2021,
https://www.agerpres.ro/politic/2 021/01/04/legea-privind-unele-masur i-pentru-prevenirea-si-combaterea-a ntitiganismului-promulgata–637144
Graph View
To what extent do government and administration act on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions to provide legal certainty?
10
9
9
Government and administration act predictably, on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions. Legal regulations are consistent and transparent, ensuring legal certainty.
8
7
6
7
6
Government and administration rarely make unpredictable decisions. Legal regulations are consistent, but leave a large scope of discretion to the government or administration.
5
4
3
4
3
Government and administration sometimes make unpredictable decisions that go beyond given legal bases or do not conform to existing legal regulations. Some legal regulations are inconsistent and contradictory.
2
1
1
Government and administration often make unpredictable decisions that lack a legal basis or ignore existing legal regulations. Legal regulations are inconsistent, full of loopholes and contradict each other.
The 2021 EU Rule of Law report indicated favorable trends in Romania’s commitment to reforming its legislative and judicial frameworks, and its political environment to favor the rule of law.
While parliamentary and legislative activity was limited due to parliamentary elections, and the pandemic in 2020 and 2021, the Constitutional Court retains an active role in reviewing legislative activities to ensure legal frameworks are consistent with the Romanian constitution. In 2020, a significant ruling by the Constitutional Court found that the government’s emergency ordinance that established fines for non-compliance with the restrictions during the pandemic was unconstitutional, leading to an exodus of patients from government-mandated quarantines. By July 2020, the health minister had estimated that up to 30,000 people might have left isolation, quarantine or medical surveillance. While the court’s decision may have impeded the government’s ability to respond effectively to the pandemic, which continued to ravage the country at the end of 2021, the government’s respect for abiding by the order reflects positively on trends in legal certainty.
In addition, since the May 2019 referendum, which limited the government’s ability to issue emergency ordinances (a practice that was criticized for circumventing normal legislative procedures), there have been very few cases of emergency ordinances being used. Further, the number of emergency procedures concerning the justice laws, criminal code and criminal procedure code, the legal framework on integrity, and the fight against corruption has significantly decreased since the 2019 EU Commission Cooperation and Verification Mechanism report. This shift introduces enhanced stability into political and legislative procedures, and has a positive impact on legal certainty.
Citations:
European Commission (2021): Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Progress in Romania under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism. COM(2021) 370 final, Brussels (https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/progress-report-romania-2019-com-2019-393_en).
European Commission: 2021 Rule of Law Report. Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Romania, Brussels 20 July 2021 SWD(2021) 724 final
While parliamentary and legislative activity was limited due to parliamentary elections, and the pandemic in 2020 and 2021, the Constitutional Court retains an active role in reviewing legislative activities to ensure legal frameworks are consistent with the Romanian constitution. In 2020, a significant ruling by the Constitutional Court found that the government’s emergency ordinance that established fines for non-compliance with the restrictions during the pandemic was unconstitutional, leading to an exodus of patients from government-mandated quarantines. By July 2020, the health minister had estimated that up to 30,000 people might have left isolation, quarantine or medical surveillance. While the court’s decision may have impeded the government’s ability to respond effectively to the pandemic, which continued to ravage the country at the end of 2021, the government’s respect for abiding by the order reflects positively on trends in legal certainty.
In addition, since the May 2019 referendum, which limited the government’s ability to issue emergency ordinances (a practice that was criticized for circumventing normal legislative procedures), there have been very few cases of emergency ordinances being used. Further, the number of emergency procedures concerning the justice laws, criminal code and criminal procedure code, the legal framework on integrity, and the fight against corruption has significantly decreased since the 2019 EU Commission Cooperation and Verification Mechanism report. This shift introduces enhanced stability into political and legislative procedures, and has a positive impact on legal certainty.
Citations:
European Commission (2021): Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Progress in Romania under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism. COM(2021) 370 final, Brussels (https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/progress-report-romania-2019-com-2019-393_en).
European Commission: 2021 Rule of Law Report. Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Romania, Brussels 20 July 2021 SWD(2021) 724 final
To what extent do independent courts control whether government and administration act in conformity with the law?
10
9
9
Independent courts effectively review executive action and ensure that the government and administration act in conformity with the law.
8
7
6
7
6
Independent courts usually manage to control whether the government and administration act in conformity with the law.
5
4
3
4
3
Courts are independent, but often fail to ensure legal compliance.
2
1
1
Courts are biased for or against the incumbent government and lack effective control.
Both domestic and international (European) courts have weighed in on Romanian legislative processes through 2020 and 2021, in addition to regular activities by the Romanian Constitutional Court to review legislation and ensure compliance with existing legal frameworks. In 2017–19, the governing majority amended the laws on the status of judges and prosecutors, judicial organization, and the self-governing body of the judiciary (Superior Council of Magistracy). This reform created, among other things, the special prosecutorial Section for the Investigation of Offenses in the Judiciary (SIIJ).
The European Union monitors judicial reforms and anti-corruption policies in Romania under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) in order to check whether Romania complies with commitments agreed in its EU Accession Treaty from 2004. Driven by the interest in ending the CVM, several governments have sought to support an independent judiciary and to respect judicial review procedures.
The European Commission has set several objectives that need to be met for the CVM to be closed. These include dismantling the SIIJ, disciplinary, civil and criminal liability regimes for judges and prosecutors, and increasing accountability over the appointment and dismissal of judicial inspection management and senior prosecutors.
The dismantling of the SIIJ is of particular concern, as it has been observed to impede the independence of the judiciary by placing undue pressure on prosecutors, which can intervene with high-level corruption cases. While the justice minister drafted a proposal to disband SIIJ in 2020, parliament later rejected the draft initiative introduced by a group of members of parliament to dismantle the section. In early 2021, the government drafted a new law to abolish the SIIJ, which was shared with the Superior Council of Magistrates (SCM) for its opinion. The SCM issued a negative opinion, arguing it needs additional guarantees to protect magistrates from potentially abusive corruption investigations. However, the government did not follow on the SCM’s opinion and adopted the draft law on 18 February 2021 through normal process. During the Chamber of Deputies reviews in March, provisions were added that were meant to “protect magistrates against abusive corruption investigations,” proposing that a request for approval should first pass through the SCM. This additional step brought criticism from civil society and the judiciary, and from the SCM, saying that it equated to new a form of immunity and could limit the accountability of magistrates. The draft law was sent to the Venice Commission for review and the SIIJ remains in effect at the end of 2021. The abolishment of the SIIJ in order to increase the protection of prosecutorial and judicial independence would be a positive advancement in ensuring independent and thorough judicial review in Romania.
In May 2021, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that the CVM objectives have direct effect, and are binding on government and courts. These rulings were opposed by the Romanian Constitutional Court (RCC) in June 2021. The RCC claimed that EU law does not have primacy over the Romanian constitution. Thus, domestic courts would not be entitled to disregard laws they considered to be in violation of EU law or to check whether laws declared as constitutional would conform to EU law. According to the RCC, courts would not have to respect and apply CVM obligations, and the SIIJ would conform to Romania’s constitutional rule of law provisions. Reacting to this decision, in December 2021, the CJEU reaffirmed the primacy of EU law over national law, including national constitutional law.
Citations:
European Commission (2021): Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Progress in Romania under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism. COM(2021) 370 final, Brussels (https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/progress-report-romania-2019-com-2019-393_en).
Selejan-Gutan, Bianca: Who’s Afraid of the „Big Bad Court”?, VerfBlog, 2022/1/10, https://verfassungsblog.de/whos-afraid-of-the-big-bad-court/, DOI: 10.17176/20220110-195203-0.
Bianca Selejan-Gutan
Tănăsescu, Elena-Simina; Selejan-Gutan, Bianca: A Tale of Primacy: The ECJ Ruling on Judicial Independence in Romania, VerfBlog, 2021/6/02, https://verfassungsblog.de/a-tale-of-primacy/, DOI: 10.17176/20210602-123929-0.
European Commission: 2021 Rule of Law Report. Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Romania, Brussels 20 July 2021 SWD(2021) 724 final
The European Union monitors judicial reforms and anti-corruption policies in Romania under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) in order to check whether Romania complies with commitments agreed in its EU Accession Treaty from 2004. Driven by the interest in ending the CVM, several governments have sought to support an independent judiciary and to respect judicial review procedures.
The European Commission has set several objectives that need to be met for the CVM to be closed. These include dismantling the SIIJ, disciplinary, civil and criminal liability regimes for judges and prosecutors, and increasing accountability over the appointment and dismissal of judicial inspection management and senior prosecutors.
The dismantling of the SIIJ is of particular concern, as it has been observed to impede the independence of the judiciary by placing undue pressure on prosecutors, which can intervene with high-level corruption cases. While the justice minister drafted a proposal to disband SIIJ in 2020, parliament later rejected the draft initiative introduced by a group of members of parliament to dismantle the section. In early 2021, the government drafted a new law to abolish the SIIJ, which was shared with the Superior Council of Magistrates (SCM) for its opinion. The SCM issued a negative opinion, arguing it needs additional guarantees to protect magistrates from potentially abusive corruption investigations. However, the government did not follow on the SCM’s opinion and adopted the draft law on 18 February 2021 through normal process. During the Chamber of Deputies reviews in March, provisions were added that were meant to “protect magistrates against abusive corruption investigations,” proposing that a request for approval should first pass through the SCM. This additional step brought criticism from civil society and the judiciary, and from the SCM, saying that it equated to new a form of immunity and could limit the accountability of magistrates. The draft law was sent to the Venice Commission for review and the SIIJ remains in effect at the end of 2021. The abolishment of the SIIJ in order to increase the protection of prosecutorial and judicial independence would be a positive advancement in ensuring independent and thorough judicial review in Romania.
In May 2021, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that the CVM objectives have direct effect, and are binding on government and courts. These rulings were opposed by the Romanian Constitutional Court (RCC) in June 2021. The RCC claimed that EU law does not have primacy over the Romanian constitution. Thus, domestic courts would not be entitled to disregard laws they considered to be in violation of EU law or to check whether laws declared as constitutional would conform to EU law. According to the RCC, courts would not have to respect and apply CVM obligations, and the SIIJ would conform to Romania’s constitutional rule of law provisions. Reacting to this decision, in December 2021, the CJEU reaffirmed the primacy of EU law over national law, including national constitutional law.
Citations:
European Commission (2021): Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Progress in Romania under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism. COM(2021) 370 final, Brussels (https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/progress-report-romania-2019-com-2019-393_en).
Selejan-Gutan, Bianca: Who’s Afraid of the „Big Bad Court”?, VerfBlog, 2022/1/10, https://verfassungsblog.de/whos-afraid-of-the-big-bad-court/, DOI: 10.17176/20220110-195203-0.
Bianca Selejan-Gutan
Tănăsescu, Elena-Simina; Selejan-Gutan, Bianca: A Tale of Primacy: The ECJ Ruling on Judicial Independence in Romania, VerfBlog, 2021/6/02, https://verfassungsblog.de/a-tale-of-primacy/, DOI: 10.17176/20210602-123929-0.
European Commission: 2021 Rule of Law Report. Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Romania, Brussels 20 July 2021 SWD(2021) 724 final
To what extent does the process of appointing (supreme or constitutional court) justices guarantee the independence of the judiciary?
10
9
9
Justices are appointed in a cooperative appointment process with special majority requirements.
8
7
6
7
6
Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies with special majority requirements or in a cooperative selection process without special majority requirements.
5
4
3
4
3
Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies without special majority requirements.
2
1
1
All judges are appointed exclusively by a single body irrespective of other institutions.
There have been no substantial changes in the legal framework with respect to the appointment of justices since the regressive judicial reform packages of 2018 and 2019. Accordingly, two main themes arise when assessing this topic: inefficiency in the appointment process; and reduced transparency and accountability, perceived or otherwise, in the appointment of prosecutors.
In terms of appointments in 2020 and 2021, the Romanian justice system continues to struggle under a human resources deficit with 10% of judicial and 16% of prosecutor positions vacant as of December 2020. These vacancies can partially be explained by the fact that there were no new competitions to recruit magistrates in 2020 following a Constitutional Court ruling that declared the requirement for the Superior Council of Magistrates (SCM) to approve regulations of the organization and conduct of competitions for admission to the judiciary unconstitutional, creating a legal void which prevented the implementation of new processes. However, as part of a package of justice reforms proposed by the government in September 2020, in January 2021 the government proposed two accelerated, more specific legislative amendments, which outlined temporary measures on admission to the judiciary. The amendments were adopted by parliament on 3 February 2021, though some provisions were found to be unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court on 17 March 2021. The amendments will allow for competitions to take place in 2021 and 2022, easing the human resources deficit.
With respect to high-level appointments, in early 2020, the justice minister increased transparency in selection procedures to appoint new leadership to the country’s prosecution services (DNA), in addition to a new prosecutor general and a chief prosecutor for the Directorate for the Investigation of Organized Crime and Terrorism (DIICOT). While the new DNA chief was appointed following a positive opinion from the Superior Council of Magistrates (SCM), both the prosecutor general and the chief prosecutor for the DIICOT were appointed following negative opinions. In response, the justice minister stressed the advisory nature of the SCM, noting that their opinions were not binding on government. As a result, the Section for Prosecutors of the SCM reported that they were subject to pressure from the contentious special prosecution unit for investigating crimes within the judicial system (SIIJ), which has been criticized for pressuring judges and prosecutors to change the course of some high-level corruption cases. These challenges were in addition to instances in 2020 where the minister of justice disregarded the opinion of the SCM concerning deputy management posts. The same year, the DIICOT appointee resigned after her husband was convicted of illegally accessing a computer system.
By September 2021, the Justice Ministry had announced that 11 bids had been filed for vacant management positions at the Attorney General’s Office, DNA and DIICOT. The selection process took place at the justice minister’s headquarters, with the list of prosecutors who met the requirements for the selection process and the candidates who were invited to the interview process headed by the justice minister shared publicly.
Additionally, the high-profile rulings of both the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU 2021) and the European Court of Human Rights (2020) further highlights the inconsistencies in the appointment process in Romania. The 2021 CJEU ruling considered provisions in Romania’s controversial justice laws in light of Articles 2 and 19(1) of the Treaty of the European Union, and of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism decision, in particular with regards to the SIIJ and the interim appointments to management positions within the judicial inspectorate, as well as the personal liability of judges as a result of judicial error. The court recalled that an EU member state cannot amend its legislation, particularly as it regards the organization of justice in such a way as to bring about a reduction in the protection of the value of the rule of law. This has increased pressure on Romania to amend its controversial judicial reforms.
The 2020 European Court of Human Rights also found Romania in violation of European convention when it concluded that Romania had violated the right to a fair trial and freedom of expression enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights following 2018 dismissal of chief DNA prosecutor Laura Kovesi. The ruling drew attention to the growing importance attached to the intervention of an authority independent of the executive and the legislative branch in respect of decisions affecting the appointment and dismissal of prosecutors.
Citations:
European Commission (2021): Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Progress in Romania under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism. COM(2021) 370 final, Brussels (https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/progress-report-romania-2019-com-2019-393_en).
In terms of appointments in 2020 and 2021, the Romanian justice system continues to struggle under a human resources deficit with 10% of judicial and 16% of prosecutor positions vacant as of December 2020. These vacancies can partially be explained by the fact that there were no new competitions to recruit magistrates in 2020 following a Constitutional Court ruling that declared the requirement for the Superior Council of Magistrates (SCM) to approve regulations of the organization and conduct of competitions for admission to the judiciary unconstitutional, creating a legal void which prevented the implementation of new processes. However, as part of a package of justice reforms proposed by the government in September 2020, in January 2021 the government proposed two accelerated, more specific legislative amendments, which outlined temporary measures on admission to the judiciary. The amendments were adopted by parliament on 3 February 2021, though some provisions were found to be unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court on 17 March 2021. The amendments will allow for competitions to take place in 2021 and 2022, easing the human resources deficit.
With respect to high-level appointments, in early 2020, the justice minister increased transparency in selection procedures to appoint new leadership to the country’s prosecution services (DNA), in addition to a new prosecutor general and a chief prosecutor for the Directorate for the Investigation of Organized Crime and Terrorism (DIICOT). While the new DNA chief was appointed following a positive opinion from the Superior Council of Magistrates (SCM), both the prosecutor general and the chief prosecutor for the DIICOT were appointed following negative opinions. In response, the justice minister stressed the advisory nature of the SCM, noting that their opinions were not binding on government. As a result, the Section for Prosecutors of the SCM reported that they were subject to pressure from the contentious special prosecution unit for investigating crimes within the judicial system (SIIJ), which has been criticized for pressuring judges and prosecutors to change the course of some high-level corruption cases. These challenges were in addition to instances in 2020 where the minister of justice disregarded the opinion of the SCM concerning deputy management posts. The same year, the DIICOT appointee resigned after her husband was convicted of illegally accessing a computer system.
By September 2021, the Justice Ministry had announced that 11 bids had been filed for vacant management positions at the Attorney General’s Office, DNA and DIICOT. The selection process took place at the justice minister’s headquarters, with the list of prosecutors who met the requirements for the selection process and the candidates who were invited to the interview process headed by the justice minister shared publicly.
Additionally, the high-profile rulings of both the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU 2021) and the European Court of Human Rights (2020) further highlights the inconsistencies in the appointment process in Romania. The 2021 CJEU ruling considered provisions in Romania’s controversial justice laws in light of Articles 2 and 19(1) of the Treaty of the European Union, and of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism decision, in particular with regards to the SIIJ and the interim appointments to management positions within the judicial inspectorate, as well as the personal liability of judges as a result of judicial error. The court recalled that an EU member state cannot amend its legislation, particularly as it regards the organization of justice in such a way as to bring about a reduction in the protection of the value of the rule of law. This has increased pressure on Romania to amend its controversial judicial reforms.
The 2020 European Court of Human Rights also found Romania in violation of European convention when it concluded that Romania had violated the right to a fair trial and freedom of expression enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights following 2018 dismissal of chief DNA prosecutor Laura Kovesi. The ruling drew attention to the growing importance attached to the intervention of an authority independent of the executive and the legislative branch in respect of decisions affecting the appointment and dismissal of prosecutors.
Citations:
European Commission (2021): Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Progress in Romania under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism. COM(2021) 370 final, Brussels (https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/progress-report-romania-2019-com-2019-393_en).
To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?
10
9
9
Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
8
7
6
7
6
Most integrity mechanisms function effectively and provide disincentives for public officeholders willing to abuse their positions.
5
4
3
4
3
Some integrity mechanisms function, but do not effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
2
1
1
Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.
High levels of corruption continue to persist throughout Romania. The Transparency International Corruption Index issued Romania a score of 44 out of 100 in its 2020 index, with the country ranking 19th in the European Union. However, despite lingering high-level corruption, and a perception at the local level and within the business community that corruption is widespread throughout the country, 2020 and 2021 saw some positive advancements in terms of progress in lifting the European Commission’s Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) and implementing anti-corruption strategies.
With respect to the CVM, progress in reversing the damaging legislative amendments to the justice laws between 2017 and 2019 led the European Commission to support Romania’s argument for listing the CVM at the end of 2021. This is supported by legislative amendments working their way through the parliamentary process, which would abolish the SIIJ, increase the professional independence of prosecutors, remove the early retirement scheme for magistrates, modify the provisions on the civil liability of magistrates, remove restrictions on freedom of expression for magistrates, and amend the procedures for appointing and removing senior management prosecutors. These legislative amendments have been described within Romania as a “new coat” for the judiciary and the European Commission has expressed support for the proactive participation of Romanian authorities throughout the CVM process. The European Commission’s 2020 Rule of Law report also notes that legislative and institutional anti-corruption frameworks are broadly in place, with the Ministry of Justice coordinating the implementation of National Anti-Corruption Strategy.
However, institutional challenges and high-level corruption continue to overshadow the Romanian political environment. In 2021, DNA prosecutors requested approval for a criminal probe into former Prime Minister Tariceanu for accepting bribes in 2007–2008. President Iohannis sent the justice minister a request for a criminal investigation of the former environment minister for bribery and embezzlement, and both the daughter of former President Basescu and his former tourism minister were sentenced to prison for their roles in illegally financing his 2009 presidential campaign. In addition, Cristian Popescu Piedone was elected in September 2021 as mayor of Bucharest’s fifth borough, despite being sentenced to eight years in prison on charges of abuse of power in connection to the 2015 Colectiv nightclub fire.
Politically, in October 2021, the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) accused the ruling National Liberal Party (PNL) of offering bribes to members of parliament in exchange for abstaining from a no-confidence vote, which ultimately failed due to the lack of quorum. The AUR claimed that members of parliament were offered lucrative positions for associates or relatives at state-owned energy companies in return for boycotting the vote. Just a month earlier, the USR-PLUS party withdrew its support from the government after then-Prime Minister Florin Cîțu asked the president to remove Stelian Ion, the justice minister and a member of USR-PLUS, after Ion blocked an investment program that would provide RON 10 billion in funding to upgrade local government infrastructure. Opponents say the investment project was an attempt to buy political support using public funds of local mayors ahead of a party leadership campaign. In response, USR-PLUS called on the prime minister to resign and claimed that the proposed infrastructure scheme would allow wealthy individuals to access easy financing without the checks of EU-funded projects, a claim supported by non-governmental organizations based on the outcomes of previous programs. The USR-PLUS, in an effort to unseat Ludovic Orban as party chief, also accused Cîțu of using the scheme to garner support for his then-upcoming leadership campaign.
Political shenanigans at this level contribute to persistent perceptions of corruption throughout the country. Transparency International’s 2020 index reports that 83% of Romanian respondents consider corruption to be widespread in the country, while 64% of respondents report that they feel personally affected by corruption in their daily lives.
The country’s principle anti-corruption institution, the DNA, reported a lack of sufficient resources to carry out its activities “under good conditions,” after receiving just RON 6 million in the first budget of 2021 instead of the RON 30 million it had requested. However, the DNA indicated that it was hopeful that it would receive additional funding in subsequent budget revisions throughout the year. More positively, Anti-Corruption Directorate General officers were trained by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation via webinars, and studied best practices in preventing and combating corruption, discussed ways to improve the legislative framework, and developed new approaches and partnerships in the global fight against corruption. However, this represents a minor step in equipping the country’s anti-corruption apparatus.
Citations:
European Commission (2021): Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Progress in Romania under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism. COM(2021) 370 final, Brussels (https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/progress-report-romania-2019-com-2019-393_en).
With respect to the CVM, progress in reversing the damaging legislative amendments to the justice laws between 2017 and 2019 led the European Commission to support Romania’s argument for listing the CVM at the end of 2021. This is supported by legislative amendments working their way through the parliamentary process, which would abolish the SIIJ, increase the professional independence of prosecutors, remove the early retirement scheme for magistrates, modify the provisions on the civil liability of magistrates, remove restrictions on freedom of expression for magistrates, and amend the procedures for appointing and removing senior management prosecutors. These legislative amendments have been described within Romania as a “new coat” for the judiciary and the European Commission has expressed support for the proactive participation of Romanian authorities throughout the CVM process. The European Commission’s 2020 Rule of Law report also notes that legislative and institutional anti-corruption frameworks are broadly in place, with the Ministry of Justice coordinating the implementation of National Anti-Corruption Strategy.
However, institutional challenges and high-level corruption continue to overshadow the Romanian political environment. In 2021, DNA prosecutors requested approval for a criminal probe into former Prime Minister Tariceanu for accepting bribes in 2007–2008. President Iohannis sent the justice minister a request for a criminal investigation of the former environment minister for bribery and embezzlement, and both the daughter of former President Basescu and his former tourism minister were sentenced to prison for their roles in illegally financing his 2009 presidential campaign. In addition, Cristian Popescu Piedone was elected in September 2021 as mayor of Bucharest’s fifth borough, despite being sentenced to eight years in prison on charges of abuse of power in connection to the 2015 Colectiv nightclub fire.
Politically, in October 2021, the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) accused the ruling National Liberal Party (PNL) of offering bribes to members of parliament in exchange for abstaining from a no-confidence vote, which ultimately failed due to the lack of quorum. The AUR claimed that members of parliament were offered lucrative positions for associates or relatives at state-owned energy companies in return for boycotting the vote. Just a month earlier, the USR-PLUS party withdrew its support from the government after then-Prime Minister Florin Cîțu asked the president to remove Stelian Ion, the justice minister and a member of USR-PLUS, after Ion blocked an investment program that would provide RON 10 billion in funding to upgrade local government infrastructure. Opponents say the investment project was an attempt to buy political support using public funds of local mayors ahead of a party leadership campaign. In response, USR-PLUS called on the prime minister to resign and claimed that the proposed infrastructure scheme would allow wealthy individuals to access easy financing without the checks of EU-funded projects, a claim supported by non-governmental organizations based on the outcomes of previous programs. The USR-PLUS, in an effort to unseat Ludovic Orban as party chief, also accused Cîțu of using the scheme to garner support for his then-upcoming leadership campaign.
Political shenanigans at this level contribute to persistent perceptions of corruption throughout the country. Transparency International’s 2020 index reports that 83% of Romanian respondents consider corruption to be widespread in the country, while 64% of respondents report that they feel personally affected by corruption in their daily lives.
The country’s principle anti-corruption institution, the DNA, reported a lack of sufficient resources to carry out its activities “under good conditions,” after receiving just RON 6 million in the first budget of 2021 instead of the RON 30 million it had requested. However, the DNA indicated that it was hopeful that it would receive additional funding in subsequent budget revisions throughout the year. More positively, Anti-Corruption Directorate General officers were trained by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation via webinars, and studied best practices in preventing and combating corruption, discussed ways to improve the legislative framework, and developed new approaches and partnerships in the global fight against corruption. However, this represents a minor step in equipping the country’s anti-corruption apparatus.
Citations:
European Commission (2021): Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Progress in Romania under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism. COM(2021) 370 final, Brussels (https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/progress-report-romania-2019-com-2019-393_en).