Executive Capacity
#19Key Findings
After a strong government response to the COVID-19 crisis, Australia falls into the middle ranks (rank 19) in the sphere of executive capacity. Its score on this measure has declined by 0.6 points relative to 2014.
The government office coordinates policy development, working closely with line ministries. The government reacted to the pandemic with swift and major policies, which it had no problem implementing. The lack of a Senate majority hampered the passage of other major policies.
RIAs are generally required at the federal and state levels, though these often lack transparency and do not explicitly address long-term sustainability. A new consultation process will give Indigenous voices greater input into decision-making processes, but has been criticized as insufficiently ambitious.
While many tasks are constitutionally delegated to states and territories, funding is often inadequate. While regulations tend to be enforced in an unbiased manner, their creation process is often heavily influenced by powerful interests. A new “regulator of the regulators” authority is being created to address this issue.
The government office coordinates policy development, working closely with line ministries. The government reacted to the pandemic with swift and major policies, which it had no problem implementing. The lack of a Senate majority hampered the passage of other major policies.
RIAs are generally required at the federal and state levels, though these often lack transparency and do not explicitly address long-term sustainability. A new consultation process will give Indigenous voices greater input into decision-making processes, but has been criticized as insufficiently ambitious.
While many tasks are constitutionally delegated to states and territories, funding is often inadequate. While regulations tend to be enforced in an unbiased manner, their creation process is often heavily influenced by powerful interests. A new “regulator of the regulators” authority is being created to address this issue.
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How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
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In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
Probably the most important government body for encouraging long-term strategic policy development is the Productivity Commission, which notionally provides advice to government on microeconomic policy, but which increasingly is asked to provide advice in other policy areas. The Productivity Commission conducts reviews and inquiries as directed by government, and also independently produces research reports. All advice and reports are released publicly in a timely fashion.
Within the federal public service, extensive use is made of committees to undertake strategic planning, and the activities of these committees generally peak immediately before and after the transition to a new government, and in the pre-budget period. The public service also maintains a single department, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, with the aim of coordinating and directing strategic planning across the government as a whole.
The geopolitical challenge Australia is confronted with has resulted in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet taking a more active role.
Citations:
http://www.blackincbooks.com/books/dog-days
http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/paul-keating-australia-lacks-a-foreign-policy-to-negotiate-the-rise-of-china-20160830-gr4y70.html
Productivity Commission: https://www.pc.gov.au/
https://www.pc.gov.au/research/ongoing/trade-assistance
https://www.pc.gov.au/research/completed/rising-protectionism
Within the federal public service, extensive use is made of committees to undertake strategic planning, and the activities of these committees generally peak immediately before and after the transition to a new government, and in the pre-budget period. The public service also maintains a single department, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, with the aim of coordinating and directing strategic planning across the government as a whole.
The geopolitical challenge Australia is confronted with has resulted in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet taking a more active role.
Citations:
http://www.blackincbooks.com/books/dog-days
http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/paul-keating-australia-lacks-a-foreign-policy-to-negotiate-the-rise-of-china-20160830-gr4y70.html
Productivity Commission: https://www.pc.gov.au/
https://www.pc.gov.au/research/ongoing/trade-assistance
https://www.pc.gov.au/research/completed/rising-protectionism
Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?
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In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
The federal government has always made extensive use of scientific and specialist scholarly advice, particularly in areas such as health and medicine, and science and technology.
Since the late 1990s, and particularly since 2007, the federal government has funded a range of specialist centers and institutes aimed at undertaking fundamental research and planning, the findings from which feed into government policy. Examples include government support for regulation and compliance centers at the Australian National University, with the Regulatory Institutions Network (RegNet), and the establishment of the Australia and New Zealand School of Government, which is a postgraduate faculty set up by the Australian and New Zealand governments, and by the state governments in New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria.
Despite these formal mechanisms, academic influence on government decision-making is relatively limited, particularly in the economic- and social-policy domains. Australian governments accept advice on technical issues, but much less so on political and economic issues. The notable exception is the Productivity Commission, which draws on expert advice when conducting inquiries and reviews.
Since the late 1990s, and particularly since 2007, the federal government has funded a range of specialist centers and institutes aimed at undertaking fundamental research and planning, the findings from which feed into government policy. Examples include government support for regulation and compliance centers at the Australian National University, with the Regulatory Institutions Network (RegNet), and the establishment of the Australia and New Zealand School of Government, which is a postgraduate faculty set up by the Australian and New Zealand governments, and by the state governments in New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria.
Despite these formal mechanisms, academic influence on government decision-making is relatively limited, particularly in the economic- and social-policy domains. Australian governments accept advice on technical issues, but much less so on political and economic issues. The notable exception is the Productivity Commission, which draws on expert advice when conducting inquiries and reviews.
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Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?
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The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
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The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet is responsible for policy coordination, and as such evaluates and provides advice on major proposals from federal ministries. The department has significant resources, and has authority to draw from, and consult with, appropriate sources across the entire government system.
Citations:
https://www.pmc.gov.au/who-we-are
Citations:
https://www.pmc.gov.au/who-we-are
To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?
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There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
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The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
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Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
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Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PMC) is always involved at an early stage in assisting with the development and drafting of any significant government policy and the resulting legislation. The PMC and the other relevant department must agree on a policy before it can be tabled in cabinet or considered by the relevant minister or ministers.
How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?
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The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
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Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
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There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
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There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
Committees serve a purpose in dealing with various matters, which include: highly sensitive issues, for example revenue or security matters; relatively routine issues, for example a government’s weekly parliamentary program; business that is labor intensive or requires detailed consideration by a smaller group of ministers, for example the expenditure review that takes place before the annual budget, or oversight of the government’s initiatives in relation to a sustainable environment. The prime minister usually establishes a number of standing committees of the cabinet (e.g., expenditure review, national security, parliamentary business). Additional committees, including ad hoc committees, may be set up from time to time for particular purposes, such as handling a national disaster.
Citations:
https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint
Citations:
https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint
How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?
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Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
There is generally a high level of coordination between federal ministry public servants. In most cases, ministries must coordinate with the Department of Finance and the Treasury, since they are responsible for finding the resources for any new policy developments, and such developments must feed into the government’s spending and budget cycle. Where there are legal implications, there must be coordination with the attorney-general’s department. Departments least likely to coordinate their activities across the government portfolio are Defense and Foreign Affairs and Trade, since their activities have the fewest implications across other portfolios.
Coordination is especially effective when the political leadership is driving proposals, but less effective on policy matters initiated at the level of the minister or department, in part reflecting greater uncertainty among civil servants as to the support for the proposal from the political leadership. It also reflects differences in policy priorities and culture across departments, as well as inherent competition between departments for power, relevance and resources.
Coordination is especially effective when the political leadership is driving proposals, but less effective on policy matters initiated at the level of the minister or department, in part reflecting greater uncertainty among civil servants as to the support for the proposal from the political leadership. It also reflects differences in policy priorities and culture across departments, as well as inherent competition between departments for power, relevance and resources.
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Information coordination procedures exist at the level of the party, where informal consultations on policies take place on a regular basis to make sure that the party leadership supports the government’s direction. This occurs regardless of which party is in office. The federal system and the division of responsibilities between the federal government and the state and territory governments means that informal coordination is always an important component of any policy that may involve the states. These procedures are ad hoc, and take place at two levels, among ministers from different jurisdictions, and at the level of senior public servants.
How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?
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The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
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The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
Government departments and agencies have historically developed information systems independently to meet their own particular needs. There has, however, been growing emphasis on interoperability, recognizing the efficiency gains in implementing policy and more generally running government, and the benefits of cross-agency data sharing. Notable in this regard is the Digital Transformation Agency, which was established in 2015 to help government departments and agencies undergo digital transformation, and now has central oversight of the government’s ICT agenda.
Common standards for data security have been developed by the Australian Signals Directorate, although not all agencies are (yet) fully compliant with these standards.
Citations:
Digital Transformation Agency: https://www.dta.gov.au/
Information Security Manual: https://cyber.gov.au/government/publications/australian-government-information-security-manual-ism/
Common standards for data security have been developed by the Australian Signals Directorate, although not all agencies are (yet) fully compliant with these standards.
Citations:
Digital Transformation Agency: https://www.dta.gov.au/
Information Security Manual: https://cyber.gov.au/government/publications/australian-government-information-security-manual-ism/
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To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?
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RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
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RIA are not applied or do not exist.
The federal government and the state and territory governments require the preparation of regulation impact statements (RIS) for significant regulatory proposals. An RIS provides a formal assessment of the costs and benefits of a regulatory proposal and alternative options for that proposal, followed by a recommendation supporting the most effective and efficient option. RISs are thus not assessments of the socioeconomic impacts of regulatory proposals, although such impacts are implicitly taken into account as part of the process. In recent years, while 75% to 85% of all Australian government proposals with “significant” impacts were subject to an RIS, this proportion was lower for proposals with “highly significant” impacts.
Since many government functions and responsibilities are shared between the federal government and the states, these shared activities are coordinated through the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), which is the body that brings the federal and state governments together to decide policy. The procedures for the preparation of RIS proposals differ between the federal government and the COAG. Most states and territories have their own requirements for RISs that apply where a regulation will have effect in only a single state or territory. At the federal level, RISs are managed by the Office of Best Practice Regulation, which is part of the Department of Finance and Deregulation.
Citations:
Productivity Commission, ‘Regulatory Impact Analysis: Benchmarking,’ Research Report, November 2012: http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/120675/ria-benchmarking.pdf
http://www.oecd.org/publications/oecd-regulatory-policy-outlook-2015-9789264238770-en.htm
https://www.pmc.gov.au/regulation/developing-regulation-impact-statement
https://ris.pmc.gov.au/
Since many government functions and responsibilities are shared between the federal government and the states, these shared activities are coordinated through the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), which is the body that brings the federal and state governments together to decide policy. The procedures for the preparation of RIS proposals differ between the federal government and the COAG. Most states and territories have their own requirements for RISs that apply where a regulation will have effect in only a single state or territory. At the federal level, RISs are managed by the Office of Best Practice Regulation, which is part of the Department of Finance and Deregulation.
Citations:
Productivity Commission, ‘Regulatory Impact Analysis: Benchmarking,’ Research Report, November 2012: http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/120675/ria-benchmarking.pdf
http://www.oecd.org/publications/oecd-regulatory-policy-outlook-2015-9789264238770-en.htm
https://www.pmc.gov.au/regulation/developing-regulation-impact-statement
https://ris.pmc.gov.au/
Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?
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RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
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The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
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The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
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RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
The preparation of a RIS follows a standard procedure in which policymakers gather the information that will enable them to evaluate the extent to which the proposed regulatory changes will result in a net benefit to the community. The Office of Best Practice Regulation (OBPR) within the Department of Finance and Deregulation, which administers both the federal government and the COAG regulation requirements, seeks a range of information about any new regulation. The level of information required is commensurate with the magnitude of the problem that is being addressed, and the size of the potential impact of the proposal. The OBPR uses a number of “adequacy criteria” to assess whether a RIS contains the appropriate levels of information and analysis.
In 2012, the Productivity Commission, at the request of the Australian government, produced a report assessing the performance of jurisdictions’ regulatory impact analysis processes, including those at the level of the COAG, and identifying best practices. Findings of major concern from the report include the following: a number of proposals with highly significant impacts were either exempted from RIA processes or were not rigorously analyzed; public consultation on policy development was often perfunctory or occurred only after development of draft legislation; and public transparency – that is, informing stakeholders about revisions to policy proposals and providing information used in decision-making, or providing reasons for not subjecting proposals to impact analysis – was a glaring weakness in most Australian RIA processes. Furthermore, a major problem in implementing RIA requirements was that the policy decisions often occurred prior to commencement of the RIA process. However, the commission concluded that the regulatory impact analysis process was worth retaining despite unclear benefits.
Citations:
Productivity Commission, ‘Regulatory Impact Analysis: Benchmarking,’ Research Report, November 2012: http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/120675/ria-benchmarking.pdf
http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/Breakout-session-2-Rosalyn%20Bell-RIA-Australia%27s-experience.pdf
https://www.pmc.gov.au/regulation/regulation-impact-analysis-training
In 2012, the Productivity Commission, at the request of the Australian government, produced a report assessing the performance of jurisdictions’ regulatory impact analysis processes, including those at the level of the COAG, and identifying best practices. Findings of major concern from the report include the following: a number of proposals with highly significant impacts were either exempted from RIA processes or were not rigorously analyzed; public consultation on policy development was often perfunctory or occurred only after development of draft legislation; and public transparency – that is, informing stakeholders about revisions to policy proposals and providing information used in decision-making, or providing reasons for not subjecting proposals to impact analysis – was a glaring weakness in most Australian RIA processes. Furthermore, a major problem in implementing RIA requirements was that the policy decisions often occurred prior to commencement of the RIA process. However, the commission concluded that the regulatory impact analysis process was worth retaining despite unclear benefits.
Citations:
Productivity Commission, ‘Regulatory Impact Analysis: Benchmarking,’ Research Report, November 2012: http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/120675/ria-benchmarking.pdf
http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/Breakout-session-2-Rosalyn%20Bell-RIA-Australia%27s-experience.pdf
https://www.pmc.gov.au/regulation/regulation-impact-analysis-training
Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?
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Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
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Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
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Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
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Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
Sustainability checks are not an explicitly integrated component of RIAs in Australia. Australia has not formally adopted a sustainability strategy.
Citations:
http://sustainabilityindex.com.au/
Citations:
http://sustainabilityindex.com.au/
To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?
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Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
Ex post evaluation of public policies is not a mandated or standard part of policy implementation in Australia. However, Australia was ranked first in ex post evaluation in the OECD Government at a Glance database. While an effective evaluation system is in place, the effect on the revision of policies or creation of new policies has so far been limited. Periodically, policies are announced with explicit accommodation for their evaluation, but this is the exception rather than the norm. In general, evaluation is more likely to occur for policies developed at the departmental or agency level (as opposed to the top level of government) or for policies that are not politically important/sensitive.
For policies that are evaluated, the quality of evaluation is variable, and rarely is the “gold standard” of a randomized controlled trial used.
Citations:
https://de.slideshare.net/OECD-GOV/effective-ex-post-evaluation-purpose-and-challenges
For policies that are evaluated, the quality of evaluation is variable, and rarely is the “gold standard” of a randomized controlled trial used.
Citations:
https://de.slideshare.net/OECD-GOV/effective-ex-post-evaluation-purpose-and-challenges
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Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?
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The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
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The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
The degree of societal consultation on policy development varies depending on the issue, the party in government and numerous contextual factors. The key groups often consulted are trade unions and business advocacy groups, but other special interests – religious groups, environmental organizations and pro-family groups, for example – also have advocacy groups that are sometimes brought into discussions about policy. Traditionally, Labor governments have been more likely to consult with trade unions, while coalition governments have been more likely to consult with business groups. However, governments of both persuasions have engaged in extensive consultation on some policies while ignoring consultation on others.
One significant development was a proposal put forward by the Morrison government in December 2021, following a two-year consultation process, which would give indigenous people a more direct channel through which to speak to policymakers. Under the proposal, two levels of advisory bodies, which will weigh in on legislation and policies affecting Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, will be established. This structure will be legislated rather than put to a referendum, and will therefore not be enshrined in the constitution, as many indigenous people have advocated. Other indigenous people have argued that still more substantive change is required, including a formal treaty with First Nations people. Both of these options have been ruled out by the coalition government. The opposition Labor Party does not support the proposed model.
Citations:
https://www.pc.gov.au/about/core-functions/inquiries-and-studies
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-12-17/indigenous-voice-to-parliament/100708186
https://www2.deloitte.com/au/en/pages/operations/solutions/social-impact-not-for-profit-consulting.html
One significant development was a proposal put forward by the Morrison government in December 2021, following a two-year consultation process, which would give indigenous people a more direct channel through which to speak to policymakers. Under the proposal, two levels of advisory bodies, which will weigh in on legislation and policies affecting Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, will be established. This structure will be legislated rather than put to a referendum, and will therefore not be enshrined in the constitution, as many indigenous people have advocated. Other indigenous people have argued that still more substantive change is required, including a formal treaty with First Nations people. Both of these options have been ruled out by the coalition government. The opposition Labor Party does not support the proposed model.
Citations:
https://www.pc.gov.au/about/core-functions/inquiries-and-studies
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-12-17/indigenous-voice-to-parliament/100708186
https://www2.deloitte.com/au/en/pages/operations/solutions/social-impact-not-for-profit-consulting.html
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To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?
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Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
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Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
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Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
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Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
Australian governments have traditionally made considerable efforts to align their policy priorities with the messages that they communicate to the public. A number of factors have helped in these efforts: a tradition of very strong discipline across all the major political parties (perhaps the strongest among the Westminster democracies); a tradition of suppressing dissent within the parties (often by the threat of deselection at the next election); strong adherence to the Westminster doctrine of collective cabinet responsibility; and an activist mass media and political opposition that seeks to exploit any apparent policy divisions within the government.
Governments were relatively unstable between 2007 and the onset of the pandemic, rendering coherent policy communication more difficult. In a range of policy fields (e.g., economic policy, foreign policy and climate change policy), governments have been unable to publicly communicate a coherent policy agenda. However, since the arrival of the pandemic, the Morrison government has been able to return to the previous more coherent communication policy pattern.
Citations:
http://theconversation.com/is-the-morrison-government-authoritarian-populist-with-a-punitive-bent-126032
Governments were relatively unstable between 2007 and the onset of the pandemic, rendering coherent policy communication more difficult. In a range of policy fields (e.g., economic policy, foreign policy and climate change policy), governments have been unable to publicly communicate a coherent policy agenda. However, since the arrival of the pandemic, the Morrison government has been able to return to the previous more coherent communication policy pattern.
Citations:
http://theconversation.com/is-the-morrison-government-authoritarian-populist-with-a-punitive-bent-126032
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To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?
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The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
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The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
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The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
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The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
In May 2019, the Liberal-National Party coalition government was reelected, despite pre-election opinion polls predicting a win for the opposition Labor Party. The victory was such a surprise to the coalition that it had a very limited policy agenda prepared, essentially consisting of income-tax cuts that for the most part will not arrive until after the next election. However, the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic saw swift and major policy responses, both in terms of income supports and public health measures, all of which the government had no difficulty implementing.
That said, the government’s lack of a majority in the Senate is a real constraint, which has to date frustrated its attempts to implement industrial relations reforms and religious discrimination laws.
That said, the government’s lack of a majority in the Senate is a real constraint, which has to date frustrated its attempts to implement industrial relations reforms and religious discrimination laws.
To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?
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The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
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The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
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The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
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The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
Strong party discipline and adherence to the Westminster doctrine of cabinet collective responsibility ensure that ministers have strong incentives to implement the government’s program, rather than follow their own self-interest. It is unheard of for ministers to not implement the government’s policy agenda and it is accepted practice that a member of cabinet who cannot publicly support the government’s policies will resign from cabinet.
Cabinet discipline has perhaps been somewhat weaker in recent years, but this has never manifested in a failure to implement the government’s policy agenda.
Citations:
Pat Weller, Prime ministers, in: Brian Galligan; Winsome Roberts, The Oxford Companion to Australian Politics, Sydney: Oxford University Press 2007, S. 460 – 463.
Cabinet discipline has perhaps been somewhat weaker in recent years, but this has never manifested in a failure to implement the government’s policy agenda.
Citations:
Pat Weller, Prime ministers, in: Brian Galligan; Winsome Roberts, The Oxford Companion to Australian Politics, Sydney: Oxford University Press 2007, S. 460 – 463.
How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?
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The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
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The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
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4
3
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
2
1
1
The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
There is strong central oversight of the federal ministries by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, which reports directly to the prime minister. The federal public service, while independent of the government, is strongly motivated to support the government’s program. Underpinning the effectiveness of oversight is the government’s ability to dissolve, merge or reconfigure ministries at any time. Thus, a non-compliant ministry is unlikely to survive.
How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
8
7
6
7
6
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
5
4
3
4
3
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
2
1
1
The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
The performance of ministries in monitoring the activities of executive agencies varies, in part due to differences in the degree of independence granted to agencies. For example, central bank independence is core to the credibility of monetary policy and is legislatively protected, which constrains parliament’s capacity to monitor the agency. This notwithstanding, the general pattern over recent years has been one of increasing accountability of the 170-plus statutory authorities and officeholders to the relevant federal minister. The most notable concrete indicator of this trend is that in 2002, the Australian government commissioned the Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders (the Uhrig Review). The objective of the review was to identify issues surrounding existing governance arrangements and provide options for the government to improve the performance and get the best from statutory authorities, their office holders and their accountability frameworks. The review was completed in 2004 and a number of the recommendations have since been adopted, including the requirement for ministers to issue Statements of Expectations to statutory authorities and the establishment of governance boards for statutory authorities.
To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
8
7
6
7
6
The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
2
1
1
The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
Tasks are delegated to the states and territories not by choice, but by constitutional requirement, yet the states and territories are highly reliant on the federal government to finance the myriad services they provide, including primary, secondary and vocational education, policing, justice systems, public transport, roads and many health services. This dependence has been a source of much conflict, and many would argue it has led to inadequate provision of public services.
The federal government’s commitment to pass all revenue raised by a broad-based consumption tax introduced in 2000 on to states only marginally reduced the tension between the two levels of government. Certainly, it has not helped that prices in education and healthcare have risen faster than general price levels in recent years, while the proportion of household expenditure subject to the consumption tax has declined from 65% in 2001-02 to 59% in 2018-19.
In response, the Labor government serving early in the last decade attempted to address underfunding of healthcare and education, reaching funding agreements on healthcare with most jurisdictions in 2011 and making progress on agreements for school funding in early 2013. The coalition governments serving since that time have not shown the same commitment to increasing health and education funding, and indeed have indicated an intention to scale back federal funding. The notable exception is for the National Disability Insurance Scheme, which has had its funding secured by a 0.5% increase of the Medicare Levy (levied on taxable income) as of July 2019.
Citations:
Parliamentary Budget Office reports on trends in taxation:
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Budget_Office/Publications/Research_reports/Trends_affecting_the_sustainability_of_Commonwealth_taxes
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Budget_Office/Publications/Research_reports/Structural_Trends_in_GST
Report on National Disability Insurance Scheme:
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1617/Quick_Guides/NDIS
https://federalfinancialrelations.gov.au/
The federal government’s commitment to pass all revenue raised by a broad-based consumption tax introduced in 2000 on to states only marginally reduced the tension between the two levels of government. Certainly, it has not helped that prices in education and healthcare have risen faster than general price levels in recent years, while the proportion of household expenditure subject to the consumption tax has declined from 65% in 2001-02 to 59% in 2018-19.
In response, the Labor government serving early in the last decade attempted to address underfunding of healthcare and education, reaching funding agreements on healthcare with most jurisdictions in 2011 and making progress on agreements for school funding in early 2013. The coalition governments serving since that time have not shown the same commitment to increasing health and education funding, and indeed have indicated an intention to scale back federal funding. The notable exception is for the National Disability Insurance Scheme, which has had its funding secured by a 0.5% increase of the Medicare Levy (levied on taxable income) as of July 2019.
Citations:
Parliamentary Budget Office reports on trends in taxation:
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Budget_Office/Publications/Research_reports/Trends_affecting_the_sustainability_of_Commonwealth_taxes
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Budget_Office/Publications/Research_reports/Structural_Trends_in_GST
Report on National Disability Insurance Scheme:
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1617/Quick_Guides/NDIS
https://federalfinancialrelations.gov.au/
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
2
1
1
The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
The responsibilities of the Commonwealth and of the states and territories are clearly laid out in the Australian constitution. However, they have been subject to judicial review over the course of the past century, which has resulted in the increasing centralization of executive power. In turn, the policies of the major political parties have been to increase this centralization in the interests of fiscal and administrative efficiency. Given the restrictions of the Australian constitution, the federal-state relationship is suboptimal, but not as problematic as some state representatives suggest. The states and territories have sought legal redress through the courts on occasions when they have felt that their authority has been diminished by the federal government. On a number of occasions, the federal government has also used its superior financial position to coerce state governments to relinquish powers or adopt policies favored by the federal government, which has had the effect of subverting their constitutional scope for discretion.
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?
10
9
9
Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
2
1
1
Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
The federal government has a strong commitment to providing uniform national services, and it makes considerable effort to ensure that program delivery, particularly in health and education, is as uniform as possible across the country. This attempt at uniformity is necessarily complicated by differences in sizes of states and population distribution, and by resistance from state governments keen to preserve their independence. Variation in funding levels according to need (as determined by an independent statutory authority, the Commonwealth Grants Commission) helps to ensure uniformity. Moreover, contingent funding is regularly used by the federal government to achieve uniformity in minimum standards.
To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?
10
9
9
Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
8
7
6
7
6
Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
5
4
3
4
3
Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
2
1
1
Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
With some notable exceptions, the enforcement of regulations is generally effective and unbiased. Exceptions arise in certain industries with large companies, such as in the banking sector, where there is clear evidence of so-called regulatory capture and the regulator does not fully enforce the regulations. More problematic in the Australian context is that the regulations themselves (particularly those specific to an industry) are heavily influenced by powerful vested interests, be they financial institutions, mining companies, property developers or other large companies. The Australian government is addressing the issue by creating a regulator of the regulators, the Financial Regulator Assessment Authority.
Citations:
https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/watching-the-industry-watchdogs-20180601-p4zito.html
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2022/02/combatting-regulatory-capture-australias-new-financial-regulator
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2021A00063
Citations:
https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/watching-the-industry-watchdogs-20180601-p4zito.html
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2022/02/combatting-regulatory-capture-australias-new-financial-regulator
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2021A00063
Graph View
To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?
10
9
9
The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
8
7
6
7
6
In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
2
1
1
The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
Most government structures are essentially driven by domestic imperatives and are largely insensitive to international and supranational developments. The key government structures of Australia have not changed since the federation of the colonies. Indeed, only a few international events have persuaded Australian governments in recent times to adapt domestic structures. The major exception is in relation to the treaties and conventions to which Australia is a signatory, particularly in the areas of human rights, anti-discrimination and transnational crime, where Australia has been a regional leader. Australian society has been reluctant to support a change in political structures and has resisted doing so when asked in referendums, for example with regard to proposed constitutional changes.
Australian society has demonstrated a willingness to ignore international pressure, such as international criticism of its humanitarian migration policy or high levels of carbon emissions.
The establishment of the Department of Home Affairs in December 2017, which was intended to bring together all of the government’s national-security, border-control and law-enforcement agencies, marked one recent example when the government felt the need to adapt its structures to international developments. The new agency took over responsibility for national security, the law-enforcement and emergency-management functions previously held by the Attorney-General’s Department, the transport-security functions previously held by the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, the counterterrorism and cybersecurity functions of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the multicultural-affairs functions of the Department of Social Services, and the entirety of the responsibilities held by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection.
Citations:
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1718/Quick_Guides/HomeAffairs
http://www.aec.gov.au/elections/referendums/Referendum_Dates_and_Results.htm
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/immigration/un-human-rights-review-slams-australias-asylum-seeker-policies/news-story/29a4c5e8b0ecf94a327f7fe822dfec07?nk=7466221ea84d656a7525406f82e23bf2-1481452755
Australian society has demonstrated a willingness to ignore international pressure, such as international criticism of its humanitarian migration policy or high levels of carbon emissions.
The establishment of the Department of Home Affairs in December 2017, which was intended to bring together all of the government’s national-security, border-control and law-enforcement agencies, marked one recent example when the government felt the need to adapt its structures to international developments. The new agency took over responsibility for national security, the law-enforcement and emergency-management functions previously held by the Attorney-General’s Department, the transport-security functions previously held by the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, the counterterrorism and cybersecurity functions of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the multicultural-affairs functions of the Department of Social Services, and the entirety of the responsibilities held by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection.
Citations:
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1718/Quick_Guides/HomeAffairs
http://www.aec.gov.au/elections/referendums/Referendum_Dates_and_Results.htm
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/immigration/un-human-rights-review-slams-australias-asylum-seeker-policies/news-story/29a4c5e8b0ecf94a327f7fe822dfec07?nk=7466221ea84d656a7525406f82e23bf2-1481452755
To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?
10
9
9
The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
2
1
1
The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
Australia’s comparatively small population and economy, isolated geographic location and status as a South Pacific regional power has tended to work against the country’s ability to influence global reform efforts. Nonetheless, there is a governmental culture of seeking to participate in international forums or organizations, including those focused on reform. Primary emphasis tends to be on the Asia-Pacific region, although Australia is also a strong advocate of reducing trade barriers for agricultural products worldwide.
Australia’s international reputation has suffered considerably in the last two decades. Previously, Australia had been a very active player in international forums, for instance in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. However, the Howard and Abbott governments failed to make constructive contributions to international forums. For example, the Abbott government permitted the G-20 summit in November 2014 to become an anti-Putin event. By contrast, Labor governments such as Kevin Rudd’s have been overly ambitious. Rudd’s plans for an Asia-Pacific Community were hastily developed and criticized by his own government’s adviser. Prime Minister Turnbull steered a much more cooperative course over his term in office, but Scott Morrison has reverted to a stance that emphasizes Australia’s narrowly defined economic and political interests. Geopolitical conflicts have further reduced the range of options available to Australia’s middle power diplomacy.
Citations:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/13/tony-abbott-says-he-will-shirtfront-vladimir-putin-over-downing-of-mh17
http://www.smh.com.au/national/rudds-man-criticized-hasty-asiapacific-community-plan-20101223-196ln.html
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/commentisfree/2018/jun/19/are-trumps-shenanigans-turning-us-off-international-relations
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-12-04/scott-morrison-defends-australias-climate-change-action/11549260
Australia’s international reputation has suffered considerably in the last two decades. Previously, Australia had been a very active player in international forums, for instance in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. However, the Howard and Abbott governments failed to make constructive contributions to international forums. For example, the Abbott government permitted the G-20 summit in November 2014 to become an anti-Putin event. By contrast, Labor governments such as Kevin Rudd’s have been overly ambitious. Rudd’s plans for an Asia-Pacific Community were hastily developed and criticized by his own government’s adviser. Prime Minister Turnbull steered a much more cooperative course over his term in office, but Scott Morrison has reverted to a stance that emphasizes Australia’s narrowly defined economic and political interests. Geopolitical conflicts have further reduced the range of options available to Australia’s middle power diplomacy.
Citations:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/13/tony-abbott-says-he-will-shirtfront-vladimir-putin-over-downing-of-mh17
http://www.smh.com.au/national/rudds-man-criticized-hasty-asiapacific-community-plan-20101223-196ln.html
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/commentisfree/2018/jun/19/are-trumps-shenanigans-turning-us-off-international-relations
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-12-04/scott-morrison-defends-australias-climate-change-action/11549260
Graph View
To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?
10
9
9
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
5
4
3
4
3
The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
2
1
1
There is no monitoring.
There is little in the way of formal processes to indicate that institutional arrangements are monitored regularly, but such monitoring does occur occasionally. Institutional arrangements do periodically change, often manifesting as rearrangements and renaming of departments. Ad hoc reviews are also conducted, such as the 2004 Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders. In some key areas such as migration, Australian authorities carefully monitor the impact of policies, and rapidly change policy direction if appropriate.
To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?
10
9
9
The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
8
7
6
7
6
The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
2
1
1
The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
Australia largely accepts and implements recommendations from formal government reviews. Past investigations have covered all aspects of government including finance, taxation, social welfare, defense, security and the environment. There have been frequent structural changes to the main federal government departments, sometimes in response to changing demands and responsibilities, but sometimes simply for political reasons that serve no strategic purpose and may indeed be strategically detrimental. For example, the main department that is responsible for healthcare has changed its name at least five times in the past two decades in response to changes in its responsibilities. Of course, the change of name alone is insufficient. For instance, there has also been a long debate on the need to improve the country’s infrastructure, but implementation in this area has been lackluster.