Executive Accountability
#14Key Findings
With strong structural legislative-oversight powers, Belgium falls into the upper-middle ranks (rank 14) in the area of executive accountability. Its score in this area has declined by 0.4 points relative to 2014.
Parliament is powerful, with parties and individual members having access to significant resources. Special parliamentary commissions were established to investigate management of the COVID-19 crisis.
The audit and ombuds offices are independent and influential, and regions also maintain ombuds offices. A newly created data-protection authority has been deemed insufficiently independent.
The population has become increasingly active in demanding specific policies from the various government levels. A decline in the coherence of government information has made it more difficult for citizens to identify fake news. The main TV and radio news programs provide considerable high-level content.
Internal political party decisions are largely controlled by party elites. Trade unions and employers’ organizations are sophisticated and work closely with the government, with research expertise even outside their core fields. The largest noneconomic interest groups also influence policy, with some tied to individual political parties.
Parliament is powerful, with parties and individual members having access to significant resources. Special parliamentary commissions were established to investigate management of the COVID-19 crisis.
The audit and ombuds offices are independent and influential, and regions also maintain ombuds offices. A newly created data-protection authority has been deemed insufficiently independent.
The population has become increasingly active in demanding specific policies from the various government levels. A decline in the coherence of government information has made it more difficult for citizens to identify fake news. The main TV and radio news programs provide considerable high-level content.
Internal political party decisions are largely controlled by party elites. Trade unions and employers’ organizations are sophisticated and work closely with the government, with research expertise even outside their core fields. The largest noneconomic interest groups also influence policy, with some tied to individual political parties.
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To what extent are citizens informed of public policies?
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Most citizens are well-informed of a broad range of public policies.
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Many citizens are well-informed of individual public policies.
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Few citizens are well-informed of public policies; most citizens have only a rudimental knowledge of public policies.
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Most citizens are not aware of public policies.
There are few sources of data that allow one to assess the citizenry’s level of information with precision. Furthermore, the web of overlapping competencies between different layers of government reduces accountability. Finally, the trend toward less and less coherent communication, as described under “Policy Communication,” makes it increasingly difficult for citizens to distinguish between true and fake news. Nonetheless, it is quite clear that, over the last year, the population has become considerably more active in demanding specific policies from the various governments in Belgium.
Throughout the COVID-19 crisis, the decisions made by the government in the National Security Council and then the consultation committee were announced and justified in press conferences that included representatives of all relevant country entities, with the goal of projecting unity. While this exercise was justified when there were big announcements to be made that would affect whole areas of life, it became less and less justified when more marginal decisions were taken, drawing criticism from some experts and feeding the perception that these events had become a TV show rather than an instrument of transparency and information.
Citations:
https://www.lesoir.be/371155/article/2021-05-09/des-experts-critiquent-le-comite-de-concertation-un-defile-de-ministres-pour
Throughout the COVID-19 crisis, the decisions made by the government in the National Security Council and then the consultation committee were announced and justified in press conferences that included representatives of all relevant country entities, with the goal of projecting unity. While this exercise was justified when there were big announcements to be made that would affect whole areas of life, it became less and less justified when more marginal decisions were taken, drawing criticism from some experts and feeding the perception that these events had become a TV show rather than an instrument of transparency and information.
Citations:
https://www.lesoir.be/371155/article/2021-05-09/des-experts-critiquent-le-comite-de-concertation-un-defile-de-ministres-pour
Does the government publish data and information in a way that strengthens citizens’ capacity to hold the government accountable?
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The government publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
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The government most of the time publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
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The government publishes data in a limited and not timely or user-friendly way.
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The government publishes (almost) no relevant data.
In 2011, Belgium launched an open data platform with the aim of making government information readily available to citizens; as of late 2021, this platform (Data.Gov.Be) was making more than 13,000 databases accessible, across a broad span of policy sectors. In general, Belgium is comparable to the average European country in terms of open data policy. However, perhaps due to a lack of communication, Belgium continues to lag behind its European counterparts in terms of the use and impact of open data initiatives.
Belgium is ranked 22nd out of 115 countries in the Open Data Barometer Global Report Fourth Edition (2016) and 22nd out of 94 countries in the Global Open Data Index 2016/2017. The Global Open Data Index highlights Belgium’s poor performance regarding the availability of information on government spending, land ownership, election results, draft legislation and national laws.
As a response to the lack of information, Transparencia, a private platform, was created in 2016 with the aim of helping citizens access information held by the government.
Throughout the crisis, the government’s Sciensano (the Belgian equivalent of the CDC in the United States) has published comprehensive data updated on a daily basis, and made data available in a user-friendly way (a PDF report with the main graphs and figures, plus regular press conferences). The public can access detailed information on the number of cases, deaths, hospital occupation rates and so on. This has been true for each region and province, broken down by age group and gender. Epidemiological studies performed by Sciensano are also available. However, following a tradition of secrecy regarding official data, Sciensano held on to its raw data and initially refused to share it even with specialized academics. The ones who were eventually appointed to the government’s response advisory groups eventually obtained it, but only under strict confidentiality conditions, which prevented them from sharing the data with specialized university research groups that could have detected valuable patterns.
Information on the measures taken, the availability of tests and the way contract tracing is performed, as well as more practical information on how and when to wear a mask, for example, is also provided to the citizens on a dedicated website. All this contributed to the population’s quite broad compliance with the measures taken by the government.
Citations:
http://digitaldashboard.belgium.be/sites/default/files/basic-page/files/2018-03/country-factsheet_belgium.pdf
https://index.okfn.org/place/be/
https://opendatabarometer.org/data-explorer/?_year=2015&indicator=ODB&lang=en&open=BEL
https://data.gov.be/fr/info-faq
Private substitute:
https://transparencia.be/help/about
https://www.sudinfo.be/art/1699151/article/2016-10-19/transparencia-une-plate-forme-bruxelloise-pour-obliger-les-autorites-a-plus-de-t
Datastudio:
https://datastudio.google.com/embed/reporting/c14a5cfc-cab7-4812-848c-0369173148ab/page/ZwmOB
information on the measures and others:
https://www.info-coronavirus.be/
Scientists complain about the difficulty to access data:
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20201214_98115880
Coronavirus-dedicated website:
www.info-coronavirus.be
Belgium is ranked 22nd out of 115 countries in the Open Data Barometer Global Report Fourth Edition (2016) and 22nd out of 94 countries in the Global Open Data Index 2016/2017. The Global Open Data Index highlights Belgium’s poor performance regarding the availability of information on government spending, land ownership, election results, draft legislation and national laws.
As a response to the lack of information, Transparencia, a private platform, was created in 2016 with the aim of helping citizens access information held by the government.
Throughout the crisis, the government’s Sciensano (the Belgian equivalent of the CDC in the United States) has published comprehensive data updated on a daily basis, and made data available in a user-friendly way (a PDF report with the main graphs and figures, plus regular press conferences). The public can access detailed information on the number of cases, deaths, hospital occupation rates and so on. This has been true for each region and province, broken down by age group and gender. Epidemiological studies performed by Sciensano are also available. However, following a tradition of secrecy regarding official data, Sciensano held on to its raw data and initially refused to share it even with specialized academics. The ones who were eventually appointed to the government’s response advisory groups eventually obtained it, but only under strict confidentiality conditions, which prevented them from sharing the data with specialized university research groups that could have detected valuable patterns.
Information on the measures taken, the availability of tests and the way contract tracing is performed, as well as more practical information on how and when to wear a mask, for example, is also provided to the citizens on a dedicated website. All this contributed to the population’s quite broad compliance with the measures taken by the government.
Citations:
http://digitaldashboard.belgium.be/sites/default/files/basic-page/files/2018-03/country-factsheet_belgium.pdf
https://index.okfn.org/place/be/
https://opendatabarometer.org/data-explorer/?_year=2015&indicator=ODB&lang=en&open=BEL
https://data.gov.be/fr/info-faq
Private substitute:
https://transparencia.be/help/about
https://www.sudinfo.be/art/1699151/article/2016-10-19/transparencia-une-plate-forme-bruxelloise-pour-obliger-les-autorites-a-plus-de-t
Datastudio:
https://datastudio.google.com/embed/reporting/c14a5cfc-cab7-4812-848c-0369173148ab/page/ZwmOB
information on the measures and others:
https://www.info-coronavirus.be/
Scientists complain about the difficulty to access data:
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20201214_98115880
Coronavirus-dedicated website:
www.info-coronavirus.be
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Do members of parliament have adequate personnel and structural resources to monitor government activity effectively?
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring all government activity effectively.
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring a government’s major activities.
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
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The resources provided to the members of parliament are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
Belgium is a parliamentary democracy. Thanks to Belgium’s strong party system, information flows well between the government and parliament. As party presidents are central figures in any political agreement, they can coordinate action at each level. Individual members of parliament as well as party parliamentary groups are also well-supported by state-funded expert staff and by parliamentary assistants – their overall level of resources is thus high, even though there is often a high level of party discipline in the federal parliament.
In addition, parliament can summon any person, even ministers, to request information. It can initiate special investigations through ad hoc committees, and the Audit Office (Cour des Comptes/Rekenhof), which monitors all Belgian institutions, is a collateral institution of the federal parliament and operates on a nonpartisan basis.
In addition, parliament can summon any person, even ministers, to request information. It can initiate special investigations through ad hoc committees, and the Audit Office (Cour des Comptes/Rekenhof), which monitors all Belgian institutions, is a collateral institution of the federal parliament and operates on a nonpartisan basis.
Are parliamentary committees able to ask for government documents?
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Parliamentary committees may ask for most or all government documents; they are normally delivered in full and within an appropriate time frame.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are slightly limited; some important documents are not delivered or are delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are considerably limited; most important documents are not delivered or delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
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Parliamentary committees may not request government documents.
Parliamentary committees are de facto able to obtain essentially all documents they need, as long as the latter are not deemed highly confidential. The more sensitive areas include domestic and foreign security, in particular regarding the police and intelligence services, for which two special regular parliamentary committees (the so-called P and R committees) have been set up. The members of parliament taking part in these two special committees do have access to classified data and information upon demand, but must follow a very strict code of conduct (which they do in practice). The P committee oversees the law enforcement forces (R stands for police) and the R committee oversees the intelligence services (R stands for Renseignements, which means intelligence).
The powers of such committees become even stronger when they are set up to initiate a parliamentary investigation. However, this often leads to a strategy of not collecting data on sensitive issues in order to avoid having to disclose sensitive information. In response, Cumuleo, an activist group seeking to improve the regulation and oversight of public offices, has denounced several illegal attempts to restrict access to public documents.
This does of course imply that government policymaking takes place somewhat in the dark or with limited oversight.
Citations:
https://www.cumuleo.be/presse/cp/02-09-2019.php
The powers of such committees become even stronger when they are set up to initiate a parliamentary investigation. However, this often leads to a strategy of not collecting data on sensitive issues in order to avoid having to disclose sensitive information. In response, Cumuleo, an activist group seeking to improve the regulation and oversight of public offices, has denounced several illegal attempts to restrict access to public documents.
This does of course imply that government policymaking takes place somewhat in the dark or with limited oversight.
Citations:
https://www.cumuleo.be/presse/cp/02-09-2019.php
Are parliamentary committees able to summon ministers for hearings?
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Parliamentary committees may summon ministers. Ministers regularly follow invitations and are obliged to answer questions.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are slightly limited; ministers occasionally refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are considerably limited; ministers frequently refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
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Parliamentary committees may not summon ministers.
Ministers are regularly summoned to parliamentary committees. The rights of committees are in practice not restricted. This is reinforced by the fact that most members of parliament (majority and opposition alike) have little chance of seeing their individual proposals pass in parliament. Therefore, they concentrate much of their time on written questions (which must be answered by the minister in charge), which can improve a member’s media visibility. However, when the media attention on a topic is intense, one frequently sees prominent ministers replaced by (less prominent) state secretaries (i.e., junior ministers) during questioning.
Parliament also has the ability to establish investigative committee with the power to take all the investigative measures provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure. These commissions have extensive investigatory powers, including the ability to summon ministers. Such commissions were set up by the federal and regional parliaments to investigate the management of the COVID-19 crisis.
Citations:
https://www.robert-schuman.eu/fr/questions-d-europe/0558-le-controle-parlementaire-dans-la-crise-sanitaire
https://www.rtbf.be/info/dossier/epidemie-de-coronavirus/detail_creation-d-une-commission-speciale-coronavirus-a-la-chambre?id=10529914
https://plus.lesoir.be/301051/article/2020-05-15/coronavirus-vers-une-commission-denquete-pour-evaluer-la-gestion-de-la-crise
Parliament also has the ability to establish investigative committee with the power to take all the investigative measures provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure. These commissions have extensive investigatory powers, including the ability to summon ministers. Such commissions were set up by the federal and regional parliaments to investigate the management of the COVID-19 crisis.
Citations:
https://www.robert-schuman.eu/fr/questions-d-europe/0558-le-controle-parlementaire-dans-la-crise-sanitaire
https://www.rtbf.be/info/dossier/epidemie-de-coronavirus/detail_creation-d-une-commission-speciale-coronavirus-a-la-chambre?id=10529914
https://plus.lesoir.be/301051/article/2020-05-15/coronavirus-vers-une-commission-denquete-pour-evaluer-la-gestion-de-la-crise
Are parliamentary committees able to summon experts for committee meetings?
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Parliamentary committees may summon experts.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are slightly limited.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are considerably limited.
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Parliamentary committees may not summon experts.
Experts are regularly invited and questioned in parliamentary committees. The rights of committees do not appear to be restricted. Experts are often called upon, for instance when committees are addressing so-called ethical laws (involving issues such as euthanasia, adoption rights for same-sex couples, religious-related disputes, and so on) or institutional reforms. There are some de facto restrictions as to the range of experts invited, as the decision in principle to query expert advice must be validated by an absolute majority of committee members. This gives a de facto veto power to the majority parties.
The management of the COVID-19 crisis relied heavily on experts’ opinions, and different groups were created to coordinate the inputs. At the onset of the crisis, the government activated the National Security Council (NSC), a structure designed to closely monitor and provide advice in the event of major crises and national emergencies. Most critical in this regard were its Risk Assessment Group (RAG) and Risk Management Group (RMG) components, which collaborated in an emergency “medical cluster.” To assess the potential economic impact of the epidemic, another NSC expert group, the Economic Risk Management Group (ERMG), was created. Later on, a fourth expert group was installed, the Group of Experts for the Exit Strategy (GEES), focusing on concrete strategies for exiting the first lockdown. As the idea that the crisis was not temporary became more prevalent, the GEES was replaced by the GEMS, or the Group of Experts in Management Strategy, which continues to advise the government with regular reports on the evolution of the public health situation and suggests possible measures that could be taken.
Citations:
https://vsse.be/fr/notre-fonctionnement/cadre-legal-et-administratif/le-conseil- national-de-securite
https://www.vocabulairepolitique.be/conseil-national-de- securite/
https://www.lesoir.be/343730/article/2020-12-15/coronavirus-le-gems-succede-au-gees
https://www.lesoir.be/342853/article/2020-12-10/coronavirus-voici-le-casting-du-nouveau-groupe-dexperts-qui-conseillera-le
The management of the COVID-19 crisis relied heavily on experts’ opinions, and different groups were created to coordinate the inputs. At the onset of the crisis, the government activated the National Security Council (NSC), a structure designed to closely monitor and provide advice in the event of major crises and national emergencies. Most critical in this regard were its Risk Assessment Group (RAG) and Risk Management Group (RMG) components, which collaborated in an emergency “medical cluster.” To assess the potential economic impact of the epidemic, another NSC expert group, the Economic Risk Management Group (ERMG), was created. Later on, a fourth expert group was installed, the Group of Experts for the Exit Strategy (GEES), focusing on concrete strategies for exiting the first lockdown. As the idea that the crisis was not temporary became more prevalent, the GEES was replaced by the GEMS, or the Group of Experts in Management Strategy, which continues to advise the government with regular reports on the evolution of the public health situation and suggests possible measures that could be taken.
Citations:
https://vsse.be/fr/notre-fonctionnement/cadre-legal-et-administratif/le-conseil- national-de-securite
https://www.vocabulairepolitique.be/conseil-national-de- securite/
https://www.lesoir.be/343730/article/2020-12-15/coronavirus-le-gems-succede-au-gees
https://www.lesoir.be/342853/article/2020-12-10/coronavirus-voici-le-casting-du-nouveau-groupe-dexperts-qui-conseillera-le
Are the task areas and structures of parliamentary committees suited to monitor ministries effectively?
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The match between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are well-suited to the effective monitoring of ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are largely suited to the monitoring ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are partially suited to the monitoring of ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are not at all suited to the monitoring of ministries.
The number of parliamentary committees in the House of Representatives is slightly larger than the number of ministries. There are 11 permanent committees that address key policy areas largely aligned with ministerial portfolios (e.g., defense, justice, budget or external affairs), while 13 special committees focus on specific topics (e.g., committees on COVID-19 or on Belgium’s colonial past in Congo) or cross-cutting issues (e.g., constitutional reform). Committees are largely able to monitor ministries, but the effectiveness of this monitoring can be underwhelming, as the recent experience regarding nuclear safety and electricity supply has demonstrated.
Citations:
List and functioning of commissions:
https://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/none&language=fr&cfm=/site/wwwcfm/comm/LstCom.cfm
https://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/pri/fiche/fr_12_02.pdf
Citations:
List and functioning of commissions:
https://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/none&language=fr&cfm=/site/wwwcfm/comm/LstCom.cfm
https://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/pri/fiche/fr_12_02.pdf
Graph View
To what extent do media in your country analyze the rationale and impact of public policies?
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A clear majority of mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies.
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About one-half of the mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies. The rest produces a mix of infotainment and quality information content.
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A clear minority of mass media brands focuses on high-quality information content analyzing public policies. Several mass media brands produce superficial infotainment content only.
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All mass media brands are dominated by superficial infotainment content.
The country’s main television-news programs and radio channels, both public and private, and the web-based extensions of these, provide a reasonable level of information, with a greater share of high-quality content and less focus on personalities than in Italy or France, for example.
For the rest, on the one hand, the economic crisis in the media sector is accelerating a trend toward sensational, lower-quality information, as well as a growing inability to conduct in-depth investigations or monitor policymaking, leading to a downward-trending public perception of media quality. On the other hand, the COVID-19 crisis improved media access to government information and the media’s scrutiny of government decisions as the waves of infection progressed. Most mainstream media shifted from an attitude of automatic approval of government decisions in March 2020 to relatively constructive questioning of the consistency of various actions in December 2021. This proactive role has partially extended to other areas of concern, such as corruption in the former Congo colony, tax evasion, bribery and so on.
Citations:
http://www.institut-solidaris.be/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/LaConfianceDansLesMedias.pdf
For the rest, on the one hand, the economic crisis in the media sector is accelerating a trend toward sensational, lower-quality information, as well as a growing inability to conduct in-depth investigations or monitor policymaking, leading to a downward-trending public perception of media quality. On the other hand, the COVID-19 crisis improved media access to government information and the media’s scrutiny of government decisions as the waves of infection progressed. Most mainstream media shifted from an attitude of automatic approval of government decisions in March 2020 to relatively constructive questioning of the consistency of various actions in December 2021. This proactive role has partially extended to other areas of concern, such as corruption in the former Congo colony, tax evasion, bribery and so on.
Citations:
http://www.institut-solidaris.be/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/LaConfianceDansLesMedias.pdf
Graph View
How inclusive and open are the major parties in their internal decision-making processes?
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The party allows all party members and supporters to participate in its decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and agendas of issues are open.
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The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, all party members have the opportunity to participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are rather open.
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The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, a number of elected delegates participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are largely controlled by the party leadership.
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A number of party leaders participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are fully controlled and drafted by the party leadership.
Belgium maintains a multiparty political system, with 12 parties represented in the national parliament. Party organizations come in a broad variety of forms. Due to the high fractionalization of the May 2019 election, only two parties maintained a vote share above 10% at the national level: the conservative, separatist New Flemish Alliance (N-VA, 16%) and the extreme-right, separatist Vlaams Belang (12%). The historically dominant parties, such as the Socialists (respectively 9.5% and 6.7% for the French and Flemish wings), Christian Democrats (respectively 8.9% and 3.7% for the Flemish and French wings), the Liberals (8.5% and 7.5%) and the Greens (6.1% for both wings) all individually fell below 10%.
However, this observation must be qualified by the fact that each party runs only in its own district, mainly Flanders and Brussels for Flemish parties, or Wallonia and Brussels for French-speaking parties. Hence, the actual percentage totals for each given party should be increased by about a 70% ratio for the Flemish parties and by a 130% ratio for the French-speaking parties. The big picture is that the historically dominant party groupings (Socialists, Christian Democrats and Liberals) have been losing ground over the last decades, achieving historically low results in 2019.
Regarding internal selection procedures, Bram Wauters (2013) writes that “all Belgian parties represented in parliament give their members a direct say in the appointment of the party leader, be it at a party conference in which all members can participate and vote or via internal elections granting each member one vote (either by postal or electronic voting, or by arranging polling booths in local party sections).
Many of the parties selected new leaders over the 2019-2021 period. The competitiveness of internal party elections varies widely. In many internal elections, the winner is elected by a crushing majority – and, sometimes, there is only one candidate. But it does happen that some internal elections are highly competitive, and lead to surprising results (among others, the Greens typically have competitive internal elections, and both the Christian Democrats and the Liberals have occasionally tight contests). Overall, the process is thus mostly controlled by the party elites.
Citations:
Electoral results: https://elections2019.belgium.be/fr
Parties asking their voters to validate government agreements: https://plus.lesoir.be/250867/article/2019-10-02/accords-gouvernementaux-wallonie-bruxelles-et-flandre-prennent-un-cap-different
Election in the liberal party: http://www.mr.be/candidatsalapresidence/
https://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_qui-sont-les-quatre-candidats-a-la-presidence-du-mr?id=10337835
Election in the Christian Democratic party: https://www.cdenv.be/wie-zijn-we/voorzittersverkiezingen/kandidaten/
Elections in the socialist parties: https://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_paul-magnette-elu-comme-prevu-nouveau-president-du-ps?id=10345699
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20191108_04707702
Wauters, Bram (2013). “Democratising Party Leadership Selection in Belgium: Motivations and Decision Makers.” Political Studies 62/S1, 62-80, DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.12002.
However, this observation must be qualified by the fact that each party runs only in its own district, mainly Flanders and Brussels for Flemish parties, or Wallonia and Brussels for French-speaking parties. Hence, the actual percentage totals for each given party should be increased by about a 70% ratio for the Flemish parties and by a 130% ratio for the French-speaking parties. The big picture is that the historically dominant party groupings (Socialists, Christian Democrats and Liberals) have been losing ground over the last decades, achieving historically low results in 2019.
Regarding internal selection procedures, Bram Wauters (2013) writes that “all Belgian parties represented in parliament give their members a direct say in the appointment of the party leader, be it at a party conference in which all members can participate and vote or via internal elections granting each member one vote (either by postal or electronic voting, or by arranging polling booths in local party sections).
Many of the parties selected new leaders over the 2019-2021 period. The competitiveness of internal party elections varies widely. In many internal elections, the winner is elected by a crushing majority – and, sometimes, there is only one candidate. But it does happen that some internal elections are highly competitive, and lead to surprising results (among others, the Greens typically have competitive internal elections, and both the Christian Democrats and the Liberals have occasionally tight contests). Overall, the process is thus mostly controlled by the party elites.
Citations:
Electoral results: https://elections2019.belgium.be/fr
Parties asking their voters to validate government agreements: https://plus.lesoir.be/250867/article/2019-10-02/accords-gouvernementaux-wallonie-bruxelles-et-flandre-prennent-un-cap-different
Election in the liberal party: http://www.mr.be/candidatsalapresidence/
https://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_qui-sont-les-quatre-candidats-a-la-presidence-du-mr?id=10337835
Election in the Christian Democratic party: https://www.cdenv.be/wie-zijn-we/voorzittersverkiezingen/kandidaten/
Elections in the socialist parties: https://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_paul-magnette-elu-comme-prevu-nouveau-president-du-ps?id=10345699
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20191108_04707702
Wauters, Bram (2013). “Democratising Party Leadership Selection in Belgium: Motivations and Decision Makers.” Political Studies 62/S1, 62-80, DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.12002.
To what extent are economic interest associations (e.g., employers, industry, labor) capable of formulating relevant policies?
10
9
9
Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
2
1
1
Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
Belgium has a high level of trade union membership and a strong tradition of social consensus implemented through strong and well-organized trade unions and employers’ organizations. For instance, most proposals on wage regulation and employee protection are the result of negotiations between employers’ associations and trade unions. Moreover, the trade unions and employers’ organizations each have their own well-developed study services with technical (e.g., legal and budgetary) expertise, even covering topics outside their traditional focus areas.
When the outcome of negotiations are positive, proposals are validated by the government and translated into law. This continuous mechanism of cooperation forces these actors to present realistic and well-argued demands (budgeted and framed in legal terms), even if some bargaining and bluffing occurs.
However, it has also happened that negotiations have failed to produce a positive result. In particular, pension and minimum wage negotiations have previously been derailed.
It should be noted that, in contrast to political parties, employers’ associations and trade unions are still structured at the national level. However, there are some elements within Belgium’s social organizations that appear resistant to change, given a general conservatism and perceived need to protect the institution.
Citations:
https://plus.lesoir.be/254159/article/2019-10-16/retour-la-case-depart-sans-toucher-au-salaire-minimum
Va-t-on ramener l’âge de la retraite à 65 ans?
https://plus.lesoir.be/224006/article/2019-05-13/va-t-ramener-lage-de-la-retraite-65-ans?referer=%2Farchives%2Frecherche%3Fdatefilter%3Dlastyear%26sort%3Dweight%26word%3Dretraite
La pension à 65 ans recalée
https://plus.lesoir.be/212077/article/2019-03-13/la-pension-65-ans-recalee?referer=%2Farchives%2Frecherche%3Fdatefilter%3Dlastyear%26sort%3Dweight%26word%3Dretraite%2520pension
Il faut centrer le débat sur l’âge légal de la pension
https://plus.lesoir.be/art/d-20190515-3TYHK4?referer=%2Farchives%2Frecherche%3Fdatefilter%3Dlastyear%26sort%3Dweight%26word%3Dretraite%2520pension
La pension à mi-temps passe, les doutes restent
https://plus.lesoir.be/art/d-20190403-3T61XD?referer=%2Farchives%2Frecherche%3Fdatefilter%3Dlastyear%26sort%3Dweight%26word%3Dretraite%2520pension
When the outcome of negotiations are positive, proposals are validated by the government and translated into law. This continuous mechanism of cooperation forces these actors to present realistic and well-argued demands (budgeted and framed in legal terms), even if some bargaining and bluffing occurs.
However, it has also happened that negotiations have failed to produce a positive result. In particular, pension and minimum wage negotiations have previously been derailed.
It should be noted that, in contrast to political parties, employers’ associations and trade unions are still structured at the national level. However, there are some elements within Belgium’s social organizations that appear resistant to change, given a general conservatism and perceived need to protect the institution.
Citations:
https://plus.lesoir.be/254159/article/2019-10-16/retour-la-case-depart-sans-toucher-au-salaire-minimum
Va-t-on ramener l’âge de la retraite à 65 ans?
https://plus.lesoir.be/224006/article/2019-05-13/va-t-ramener-lage-de-la-retraite-65-ans?referer=%2Farchives%2Frecherche%3Fdatefilter%3Dlastyear%26sort%3Dweight%26word%3Dretraite
La pension à 65 ans recalée
https://plus.lesoir.be/212077/article/2019-03-13/la-pension-65-ans-recalee?referer=%2Farchives%2Frecherche%3Fdatefilter%3Dlastyear%26sort%3Dweight%26word%3Dretraite%2520pension
Il faut centrer le débat sur l’âge légal de la pension
https://plus.lesoir.be/art/d-20190515-3TYHK4?referer=%2Farchives%2Frecherche%3Fdatefilter%3Dlastyear%26sort%3Dweight%26word%3Dretraite%2520pension
La pension à mi-temps passe, les doutes restent
https://plus.lesoir.be/art/d-20190403-3T61XD?referer=%2Farchives%2Frecherche%3Fdatefilter%3Dlastyear%26sort%3Dweight%26word%3Dretraite%2520pension
To what extent are non-economic interest associations capable of formulating relevant policies?
10
9
9
Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
2
1
1
Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
There is a wide range of civil society groups with influence on policy formation in Europe, and Belgium performs well in this regard. A broad diversity of noneconomic interest associations, at all levels from local to national, receive state funding, including environmental, cultural, religious/philosophical, sports/leisure and minority (such as individuals with handicaps) groups.
The largest groups can both make proposals and influence policy. Consociationalism also implies that some socially important decisions are made smoothly. The decisions to legalize same-sex marriage in 2003 and euthanasia in 2002 followed intense but quite dispassionate debates. The contrast with France or the United States over similar issues is all the more striking.
The main reason why this can happen is again related to the predominance of political parties. Some groups and associations that receive funding either initially have, or subsequently develop, preferential political relationships with political parties and/or government actors. This means that social groups, associations and (to some extent) some leaders and cadres of publicly funded educational institutions often have long-standing ties to a given political party. It implies that there is a strong incentive for noneconomic interest associations to propose policies, and further to ensure that these proposals are well founded, as there is a high probability that the proposals will somehow enter into the parliamentary debates. In addition, many civil society groups attempt to influence policy via the (all important) ministerial cabinets; this may be efficient in terms of exerting influence over policy formulation, especially when some interpersonal and partisan ties exist.
Obviously, the negative aspect of this structure is its dependence on public funding. On the positive side, some groups are able to coalesce into broader umbrella organizations (e.g., around environmental protection), which are able to hire stable staff with policy expertise and are thus able to intervene in policy debates.
The largest groups can both make proposals and influence policy. Consociationalism also implies that some socially important decisions are made smoothly. The decisions to legalize same-sex marriage in 2003 and euthanasia in 2002 followed intense but quite dispassionate debates. The contrast with France or the United States over similar issues is all the more striking.
The main reason why this can happen is again related to the predominance of political parties. Some groups and associations that receive funding either initially have, or subsequently develop, preferential political relationships with political parties and/or government actors. This means that social groups, associations and (to some extent) some leaders and cadres of publicly funded educational institutions often have long-standing ties to a given political party. It implies that there is a strong incentive for noneconomic interest associations to propose policies, and further to ensure that these proposals are well founded, as there is a high probability that the proposals will somehow enter into the parliamentary debates. In addition, many civil society groups attempt to influence policy via the (all important) ministerial cabinets; this may be efficient in terms of exerting influence over policy formulation, especially when some interpersonal and partisan ties exist.
Obviously, the negative aspect of this structure is its dependence on public funding. On the positive side, some groups are able to coalesce into broader umbrella organizations (e.g., around environmental protection), which are able to hire stable staff with policy expertise and are thus able to intervene in policy debates.
Graph View
Does there exist an independent and effective audit office?
10
9
9
There exists an effective and independent audit office.
8
7
6
7
6
There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is slightly limited.
5
4
3
4
3
There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
2
1
1
There does not exist an independent and effective audit office.
Established by the constitution (Article 180), the Court of Audit (Cour des Comptes/Rekenhof) is a collateral body of the parliament. It exerts external controls on the budgetary, accounting and financial operations of the federal state, the communities, the regions, the public-service institutions that depend upon them, and the provinces. Some public firms, non-profit organizations and “private” (but largely state-funded) organizations such as some universities, are also subject to thorough review. The Court of Audit’s legal powers allow it considerable independence and broad autonomy to fulfill its mandate. The members of the Court of Audit are elected by parliament but then operate in a very autonomous manner. The court’s reports are public and presented to parliament along with the accounts of the state. The body regularly attracts media attention for its critical remarks regarding the management of public entities or services (such as over the roads in Wallonia or the roadwork procurement in the Brussels Capital region).
This happened to a lesser extent during the COVID-19 crisis: the Court of Audit occasionally warned of the costs of the crisis for the social security system (not unexpectedly), but did not try to stop the government from reacting as it did. It also promptly investigated the government’s failed policy of stockpiling surgical and FFP2 masks, but without being particularly critical.
More routinely, it tracked the procurement measures taken by the government during the crisis and commented on the likely public deficits of 2020 and 2021. It was also requested to perform occasional analyses, for example, on how to restructure Belgium’s security services or on how to modify the pricing of GP consultations.
While the Court of Audit appears sufficiently independent, the enforcement of its numerous recommendations remains limited, as can be seen with regard to the public management of roadworks in the Brussels Capital region. Here, it pointed out “major discrepancies between the services actually provided and the services to be provided at the time of the contracts” in 2003. This problem does not appear to be fully solved, as a 2021 report stated that the three major operators “do not always control the deadlines or the costs.”
Citations:
https://www.ccrek.be/EN/Presentation/Presentation.html
https://www.courdescomptes.be/EN/
https://www.ccrek.be/Docs/2021_30_AnnualReport2020_ShortVersion.pdf
https://www.courtofaudit.be/Docs/2021_35_ManagementRoadworksBCR_Abstract.pdf
https://www.ccrek.be/Docs/may_2003_road_infrastr_brssls_abstract.pdf
This happened to a lesser extent during the COVID-19 crisis: the Court of Audit occasionally warned of the costs of the crisis for the social security system (not unexpectedly), but did not try to stop the government from reacting as it did. It also promptly investigated the government’s failed policy of stockpiling surgical and FFP2 masks, but without being particularly critical.
More routinely, it tracked the procurement measures taken by the government during the crisis and commented on the likely public deficits of 2020 and 2021. It was also requested to perform occasional analyses, for example, on how to restructure Belgium’s security services or on how to modify the pricing of GP consultations.
While the Court of Audit appears sufficiently independent, the enforcement of its numerous recommendations remains limited, as can be seen with regard to the public management of roadworks in the Brussels Capital region. Here, it pointed out “major discrepancies between the services actually provided and the services to be provided at the time of the contracts” in 2003. This problem does not appear to be fully solved, as a 2021 report stated that the three major operators “do not always control the deadlines or the costs.”
Citations:
https://www.ccrek.be/EN/Presentation/Presentation.html
https://www.courdescomptes.be/EN/
https://www.ccrek.be/Docs/2021_30_AnnualReport2020_ShortVersion.pdf
https://www.courtofaudit.be/Docs/2021_35_ManagementRoadworksBCR_Abstract.pdf
https://www.ccrek.be/Docs/may_2003_road_infrastr_brssls_abstract.pdf
Does there exist an independent and effective ombuds office?
10
9
9
There exists an effective and independent ombuds office.
8
7
6
7
6
There exists an effective and independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is slightly limited.
5
4
3
4
3
There exists an independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is considerably limited.
2
1
1
There does not exist an effective and independent ombuds office.
The independent federal ombuds office was established in 1995. The goal of the office is to have direct contact with citizens and inform them of the administrative process if need be and collect complaints against the administration. Parliament elects members of the ombuds office, but after their election, ombudsmen are totally independent and autonomous from government. The office makes a public report to parliament every year (7,544 complaints and information demands were addressed in 2020, in comparison with 6,852 in 2019). However, the ombudsman’s role is only informative and deals with facilitation or advocacy; it has no coercive power.
Some difficulties occur when a complaint touches upon an issue which concerns both federal and regional or community authorities. Regional and community authorities have their own ombuds offices, also established in the 1990s and early 2000s, and which have also become fairly active. Hence, some overlap occurs.
Citations:
http://www.federaalombudsman.be/homepage [federal]
https://www.le-mediateur.be/ [Walloon Region + francophone Community]
https://www.vlaanderen.be/vlaamse-ombudsdienst [Flanders]
Some difficulties occur when a complaint touches upon an issue which concerns both federal and regional or community authorities. Regional and community authorities have their own ombuds offices, also established in the 1990s and early 2000s, and which have also become fairly active. Hence, some overlap occurs.
Citations:
http://www.federaalombudsman.be/homepage [federal]
https://www.le-mediateur.be/ [Walloon Region + francophone Community]
https://www.vlaanderen.be/vlaamse-ombudsdienst [Flanders]
Is there an independent authority in place that effectively holds government offices accountable for handling issues of data protection and privacy?
10
9
9
An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
8
7
6
7
6
An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is slightly limited.
5
4
3
4
3
A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are strongly limited.
2
1
1
There is no effective and independent data protection office.
In May 2018, the Belgian federal government instituted the Data Protection Authority (Autorité de protection des données/Gegevensbeschermingsautoriteit). The authority’s mission is to ensure that individual’s privacy is respected when personal data are processed. To improve efficiency, various pre-existing but dispersed authorities and services were regrouped under (and are now coordinated by) the Data Protection Authority. The new authority is accountable to the lower house (House of Representatives) and its board of directors are politically appointed for 6-year terms.
Both its independence and effectiveness have rapidly revealed significant limitations. In October 2019, two members of the Data Protection Authority (DPA) warned the lower house of the body’s inefficiency, mainly due to the conflicts of interest held by several of its members who also hold public offices. Complaints were filed to the European Commission, which took action against Belgium saying that “some members of the Belgian Data Protection Authority cannot currently be considered free of external influence, as they either report to a management committee dependent on the Belgian government, have participated in government projects to trace COVID-19 contacts, or are members of the Information Security Committee.” The Commission gave Belgium until 12 January 2022 to address this issue. Failure to respond would result in a reference of the matter to the European Court of Justice. Belgium thus risked becoming the first state convicted of violating the GDPR.
The problem is in some senses deeply rooted, since the individuals indirectly designated by the European Commission were appointed as DPA members by the lower house of parliament, even though their conflicts of interest were already known. The measures taken as of the time of writing appeared unlikely to satisfy the Commission, as Belgium’s lower house decided in mid-December to revoke the mandate of only one of the three individuals indirectly designated by the Commission’s report (citing serious misconduct) while also, for purposes of regional balance, to revoke the mandate of one of the two whistleblowers (the other had already resigned). The irony is that the European directive aimed at protecting whistleblowers took full effect in Belgium that same week. Further action should include the drafting of a new law on the matter, on which the secretary of state for privacy (Mathieu Michel) had already started working.
Citations:
https://www.autoriteprotectiondonnees.be/ (in French, with more information)
https://www.dataprotectionauthority.be/ (in English, with limited information)
https://www.brusselstimes.com/belgium-all-news/193520/european-commission-questions-independence-of-belgiums-data-protection-authority
https://www.lesoir.be/art/d-20211217-GRJXQZ
Both its independence and effectiveness have rapidly revealed significant limitations. In October 2019, two members of the Data Protection Authority (DPA) warned the lower house of the body’s inefficiency, mainly due to the conflicts of interest held by several of its members who also hold public offices. Complaints were filed to the European Commission, which took action against Belgium saying that “some members of the Belgian Data Protection Authority cannot currently be considered free of external influence, as they either report to a management committee dependent on the Belgian government, have participated in government projects to trace COVID-19 contacts, or are members of the Information Security Committee.” The Commission gave Belgium until 12 January 2022 to address this issue. Failure to respond would result in a reference of the matter to the European Court of Justice. Belgium thus risked becoming the first state convicted of violating the GDPR.
The problem is in some senses deeply rooted, since the individuals indirectly designated by the European Commission were appointed as DPA members by the lower house of parliament, even though their conflicts of interest were already known. The measures taken as of the time of writing appeared unlikely to satisfy the Commission, as Belgium’s lower house decided in mid-December to revoke the mandate of only one of the three individuals indirectly designated by the Commission’s report (citing serious misconduct) while also, for purposes of regional balance, to revoke the mandate of one of the two whistleblowers (the other had already resigned). The irony is that the European directive aimed at protecting whistleblowers took full effect in Belgium that same week. Further action should include the drafting of a new law on the matter, on which the secretary of state for privacy (Mathieu Michel) had already started working.
Citations:
https://www.autoriteprotectiondonnees.be/ (in French, with more information)
https://www.dataprotectionauthority.be/ (in English, with limited information)
https://www.brusselstimes.com/belgium-all-news/193520/european-commission-questions-independence-of-belgiums-data-protection-authority
https://www.lesoir.be/art/d-20211217-GRJXQZ