Executive Capacity
#31Key Findings
With a number of significant governance weaknesses, Belgium scores relatively poorly (rank 31) in terms of executive capacity. Its score on this measure has declined by 0.3 points since 2014.
Although the coalition government in power during the review period had little political coherence, a regularized meeting between coalition members generally helped coordinate policy creation and implementation. The prime minister’s office contains a policy-steering unit that evaluates and coordinates the most important proposals.
The COVID-19 crisis gave new weight to bodies bringing together representatives of federal, regional and community ministers. Expert advice has also gained influence. Communication during the pandemic was frequently contradictory, undermining public support for government decisions. The state’s handling of the pandemic featured repeated cycles of success and challenges.
Regulatory impact assessments are generally little more than formalities, but some regulators are taking them increasingly seriously. Ex post evaluation often actively seeks to justify policies. Consultation with outside stakeholders is common. The Wallonia region in particular suffers from chronic underfunding.
Although the coalition government in power during the review period had little political coherence, a regularized meeting between coalition members generally helped coordinate policy creation and implementation. The prime minister’s office contains a policy-steering unit that evaluates and coordinates the most important proposals.
The COVID-19 crisis gave new weight to bodies bringing together representatives of federal, regional and community ministers. Expert advice has also gained influence. Communication during the pandemic was frequently contradictory, undermining public support for government decisions. The state’s handling of the pandemic featured repeated cycles of success and challenges.
Regulatory impact assessments are generally little more than formalities, but some regulators are taking them increasingly seriously. Ex post evaluation often actively seeks to justify policies. Consultation with outside stakeholders is common. The Wallonia region in particular suffers from chronic underfunding.
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Graph View
How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?
10
9
9
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
8
7
6
7
6
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
5
4
3
4
3
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
2
1
1
In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
Each minister (or secretary of state) works closely with a team of collaborators in each ministerial cabinet. Each cabinet is usually large, with as many as 30 to 40 senior staff and experts. Meetings take place often, and the team designs policies in line both with the minister’s objectives and the government agreement. The minister and the advisory team are then responsible for drafting bill projects which are then submitted to the government in weekly meetings.
In terms of long-term planning, the knowledge accumulated by a minister’s collaborators can be lost at the end of a legislative period, as the ministerial team changes with the minister. Moreover, the frequency of staff rotation is generally high. In contrast, public administration is run by civil servants with longer tenures of office, but these groups do not generally take part in strategic ministerial decisions. Long-term planning (beyond a legislative term) is therefore made difficult. The main rationale for relying on the minister’s team instead of civil servants is that the former are the minister’s (and the party’s) close aides and tend to be more flexible in terms of working hours and availability for emergency situations.
The federal Planning Bureau (Bureau du Plan/Planbureau) does play a role in providing longer strategic planning options, but in general it is the ministerial cabinets that are the main movers of legislative efforts.
In terms of long-term planning, the knowledge accumulated by a minister’s collaborators can be lost at the end of a legislative period, as the ministerial team changes with the minister. Moreover, the frequency of staff rotation is generally high. In contrast, public administration is run by civil servants with longer tenures of office, but these groups do not generally take part in strategic ministerial decisions. Long-term planning (beyond a legislative term) is therefore made difficult. The main rationale for relying on the minister’s team instead of civil servants is that the former are the minister’s (and the party’s) close aides and tend to be more flexible in terms of working hours and availability for emergency situations.
The federal Planning Bureau (Bureau du Plan/Planbureau) does play a role in providing longer strategic planning options, but in general it is the ministerial cabinets that are the main movers of legislative efforts.
Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?
10
9
9
In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
8
7
6
7
6
For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
2
1
1
The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
Consultation with non-governmental academic experts depends on the subject matter; their actual influence on eventual decisions is most of the time quite limited, and certainly marginal when compared to the influence of experts who work full-time for the ministers’ or state secretaries’ “cabinet” (or office, see below). The government and/or the parliament do consult full-time academic experts with independent views, but rarely in a systematic way (this is left to the initiative of parliamentary committees), and not necessarily to enable genuine scientific debate. However, in Belgium’s neo-corporatist system, representatives of the social partners (employers’ organizations and trade unions) are systematically summoned for participation when a strategic decision is to be made on socioeconomic issues. In other politically sensitive areas (e.g., tax reform) academic and international expertise has had very limited influence.
The management of the health crisis required a different approach, with new, improvised procedures. The government summoned an advisory group of non-governmental academic experts in virology, epidemiology and economic crisis management, among other fields. They initiated systematic meetings and reports, initially in a chaotic manner. The head of the team has subsequently described how unclear their mission was, and discovered only after the fact that she could potentially be held personally liable for some of the damage created by the COVID-19 crisis. Only in subsequent updates of the group were the procedures and responsibilities clarified.
The multiple iterations of this newfound approach to working with experts led to an alphabet soup of expert groups. These groups were given guidance in their missions and everyday functioning by their respective ministers. At the onset of the crisis, the government activated the National Security Council (NSC), a structure designed to closely monitor and provide advice in the event of major crises and national emergencies. Most relevant were its Risk Assessment Group (RAG) and Risk Management Group (RMG) components, which were combined in an emergency “medical cluster.” To assess the potential economic impact of the epidemic, another NSC expert group, the Economic Risk Management Group (ERMG), was also created. Later on, a fourth expert group was installed, the Group of Experts for the Exit Strategy (GEES), focusing on concrete strategies for exiting the first lockdown. As the idea that the crisis was not temporary became more prevalent, the GEES was replaced by the GEMS: the Group of Experts in Management Strategy, which continues to advise the government with regular reports on the evolution of the public health situation and suggests possible measures that could be taken.
Citations:
https://vsse.be/fr/notre-fonctionnement/cadre-legal-et-administratif/le-conseil-national-de-securite
https://www.vocabulairepolitique.be/conseil-national-de-securite/
https://plus.lesoir.be/342853/article/2020-12-10/coronavirus-voici-le-casting-du-nouveau-groupe-dexperts-qui-conseillera-le
https://plus.lesoir.be/343730/article/2020-12-15/coronavirus-le-gems-succede-au-gees
The management of the health crisis required a different approach, with new, improvised procedures. The government summoned an advisory group of non-governmental academic experts in virology, epidemiology and economic crisis management, among other fields. They initiated systematic meetings and reports, initially in a chaotic manner. The head of the team has subsequently described how unclear their mission was, and discovered only after the fact that she could potentially be held personally liable for some of the damage created by the COVID-19 crisis. Only in subsequent updates of the group were the procedures and responsibilities clarified.
The multiple iterations of this newfound approach to working with experts led to an alphabet soup of expert groups. These groups were given guidance in their missions and everyday functioning by their respective ministers. At the onset of the crisis, the government activated the National Security Council (NSC), a structure designed to closely monitor and provide advice in the event of major crises and national emergencies. Most relevant were its Risk Assessment Group (RAG) and Risk Management Group (RMG) components, which were combined in an emergency “medical cluster.” To assess the potential economic impact of the epidemic, another NSC expert group, the Economic Risk Management Group (ERMG), was also created. Later on, a fourth expert group was installed, the Group of Experts for the Exit Strategy (GEES), focusing on concrete strategies for exiting the first lockdown. As the idea that the crisis was not temporary became more prevalent, the GEES was replaced by the GEMS: the Group of Experts in Management Strategy, which continues to advise the government with regular reports on the evolution of the public health situation and suggests possible measures that could be taken.
Citations:
https://vsse.be/fr/notre-fonctionnement/cadre-legal-et-administratif/le-conseil-national-de-securite
https://www.vocabulairepolitique.be/conseil-national-de-securite/
https://plus.lesoir.be/342853/article/2020-12-10/coronavirus-voici-le-casting-du-nouveau-groupe-dexperts-qui-conseillera-le
https://plus.lesoir.be/343730/article/2020-12-15/coronavirus-le-gems-succede-au-gees
Graph View
Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?
10
9
9
The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
5
4
3
4
3
The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
2
1
1
The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
The Prime Minister’s Office contains a “strategic cell” that helps the prime minister evaluate and steer policy across all levels. Typically, this oversight function is shared with deputy prime ministers (one per coalition party, apart from the prime minister’s party) in a regular meeting called the “Kern” (core). Each of the advisers and experts in the cell specializes in one field. They assess only the most important issues, as the relatively small size of the team limits its ability to deal with all issues at hand. The fact that governments are always coalitions (comprising at least four parties) also gives a central role to party advisers of the corresponding minister in the lawmaking process.
To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?
10
9
9
There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
5
4
3
4
3
Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
2
1
1
Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
Before implementation, each government project is submitted to the ministers’ council, which meets weekly. The council is composed of a secretariat that scrutinizes each proposal before it is debated and prepares the ministers’ council agenda, along with 14 line ministers and the prime minister, who debate each proposal. Decisions are made on the basis of political consensus, not of majority vote.
Either directly or through the council’s secretariat, the prime minister can block any item presented and either return it for redrafting or turn it down completely. This may be because a project does not fit the government agreement or conflicts with one of the coalition parties’ agenda, but can be for any other reason as well. All government members must by contrast defend accepted projects on a collegial basis.
The COVID-19 crisis has somewhat changed this way of working, or at least for matters related to management of the crisis. In particular, even though it was agreed that the policy measures and the overall strategy are in the hands of the federal authorities, policies must be agreed and coordinated with federated entities (regions and communities). The latter also have their own ministers of health, as health policy prerogatives are shared between the federal, regional and community levels. To avoid the lack of coordination that can be particularly detrimental during a health crisis, decisions are therefore made collectively, first within the National Security Council (NSC), and then within the “concertation committee” (comité de concertation/overlegcomité); this model came into use once the sense of unique urgency had passed, and reflects the legal basis of the latter as opposed to the former (although it lacks constitutional recognition).
Both bodies existed before the crisis. The first one, the NSC, was initially created within the federal government to manage and coordinate Belgium’s security and intelligence policy. The concertation committee (comité de concertation, or CoDeCo), for its part, has existed since 1980 as a body bringing together federal, regional and community ministers. Its original role was to anticipate or resolve conflicts of interest and some of the conflicts of competence that may arise between the different authorities of the Belgian federal state. The two bodies, each in turn, became increasingly important with the health crisis, and are now central to all decision-making related to it, as the collegial process allows, at the very least, for a basis of agreement regarding the decisions taken made. This collegiality is nonetheless undermined at times by the fact that the concertation committee has to address measures impacting regions or communities whose ministers are not present at the meeting. This can lead to contradictory communications (see also “Policy Communication”) and an impression of amateurism in the management of the crisis.
Citations:
http://www.premier.be/fr/conseil-des-ministres
https://www.vocabulairepolitique.be/comite-de-concertation/
https://www.vocabulairepolitique.be/conseil-national-de-securite/
https://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_un-comite-de-concertation-coronavirus-ce-vendredi-qui-sera-autour-de-la-table-infographie?id=10609975
Either directly or through the council’s secretariat, the prime minister can block any item presented and either return it for redrafting or turn it down completely. This may be because a project does not fit the government agreement or conflicts with one of the coalition parties’ agenda, but can be for any other reason as well. All government members must by contrast defend accepted projects on a collegial basis.
The COVID-19 crisis has somewhat changed this way of working, or at least for matters related to management of the crisis. In particular, even though it was agreed that the policy measures and the overall strategy are in the hands of the federal authorities, policies must be agreed and coordinated with federated entities (regions and communities). The latter also have their own ministers of health, as health policy prerogatives are shared between the federal, regional and community levels. To avoid the lack of coordination that can be particularly detrimental during a health crisis, decisions are therefore made collectively, first within the National Security Council (NSC), and then within the “concertation committee” (comité de concertation/overlegcomité); this model came into use once the sense of unique urgency had passed, and reflects the legal basis of the latter as opposed to the former (although it lacks constitutional recognition).
Both bodies existed before the crisis. The first one, the NSC, was initially created within the federal government to manage and coordinate Belgium’s security and intelligence policy. The concertation committee (comité de concertation, or CoDeCo), for its part, has existed since 1980 as a body bringing together federal, regional and community ministers. Its original role was to anticipate or resolve conflicts of interest and some of the conflicts of competence that may arise between the different authorities of the Belgian federal state. The two bodies, each in turn, became increasingly important with the health crisis, and are now central to all decision-making related to it, as the collegial process allows, at the very least, for a basis of agreement regarding the decisions taken made. This collegiality is nonetheless undermined at times by the fact that the concertation committee has to address measures impacting regions or communities whose ministers are not present at the meeting. This can lead to contradictory communications (see also “Policy Communication”) and an impression of amateurism in the management of the crisis.
Citations:
http://www.premier.be/fr/conseil-des-ministres
https://www.vocabulairepolitique.be/comite-de-concertation/
https://www.vocabulairepolitique.be/conseil-national-de-securite/
https://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_un-comite-de-concertation-coronavirus-ce-vendredi-qui-sera-autour-de-la-table-infographie?id=10609975
How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?
10
9
9
The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
8
7
6
7
6
Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
5
4
3
4
3
There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
2
1
1
There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
The Council of Ministers (Conseil des ministres/Raad van ministers), which is one of the central components of the government, meets every week. Each minister is responsible for drafting a proposal, which gets submitted to the council. The council’s secretariat then checks whether the proposal can be debated, asking a number of questions: Is it complete and technically sound? Does it conflict with other past decisions? Is it contained in the governmental agreement? Proposals are debated by ministers only if they pass this first filter, a process that allows them to focus on the strategic aspects of the issue. However, the most important strategic considerations are mainly political.
Before reaching the Council of Ministers, projects are always discussed beforehand in formal or informal cabinet committee meetings that include experts and senior officers from the relevant ministerial cabinets. Most negotiation is performed at that stage and, if necessary, further fine-tuned in the actual Council of Ministers meeting. In the case of particularly important or sensitive policy issues, for instance the issue of nuclear power plants’ future, the process can take longer. In some instances, this may involve repeated shuttling between the Council of Ministers or its restricted version (the Kern), where the actual negotiations take place, and the inter-cabinet ministerial working groups responsible for preparing the discussion by clarifying the technical and legal issues.
Citations:
https://www.belgium.be/en/about_belgium/government/federal_authorities/federal_government/strategic_cells_and_secretariats_government_members
https://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_sortie-du-nucleaire-toujours-pas-d-accord-au-sein-du-gouvernement-federal?id=10902076
Before reaching the Council of Ministers, projects are always discussed beforehand in formal or informal cabinet committee meetings that include experts and senior officers from the relevant ministerial cabinets. Most negotiation is performed at that stage and, if necessary, further fine-tuned in the actual Council of Ministers meeting. In the case of particularly important or sensitive policy issues, for instance the issue of nuclear power plants’ future, the process can take longer. In some instances, this may involve repeated shuttling between the Council of Ministers or its restricted version (the Kern), where the actual negotiations take place, and the inter-cabinet ministerial working groups responsible for preparing the discussion by clarifying the technical and legal issues.
Citations:
https://www.belgium.be/en/about_belgium/government/federal_authorities/federal_government/strategic_cells_and_secretariats_government_members
https://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_sortie-du-nucleaire-toujours-pas-d-accord-au-sein-du-gouvernement-federal?id=10902076
How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?
10
9
9
Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
8
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6
7
6
Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
5
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3
4
3
There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
2
1
1
There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
While ministries are not significantly involved in preparing cabinet meetings, each minister has a large team of close collaborators and advisers (the ministerial cabinet) to prepare projects, which are first submitted to the minister, and then to the Council of Ministers. For some decisions, responsibilities are shared among several ministers, a situation that happens regularly. In this case, ministerial teams must coordinate their actions in cabinet committee meetings before being able to submit a proposal to receive the approval of each minister. Proposals may be submitted to the ministers’ council only at this stage.
The bottom line is that top civil servants do not play a significant role – in most cases, they are at best informed of ongoing discussions and are simply asked to deliver data and information.
The bottom line is that top civil servants do not play a significant role – in most cases, they are at best informed of ongoing discussions and are simply asked to deliver data and information.
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
10
9
9
Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
8
7
6
7
6
In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
2
1
1
Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Belgian governments are typically broad coalition governments, and informal coordination mechanisms are necessary to their operations.
The central unit of coordination – the inner cabinet or “Kern” – is comprised of deputy prime ministers (one from each coalition party), and the prime minister. The Kern meets regularly to negotiate any strategic decision not foreseen in the governmental agreement which arises due to changing circumstances or specific difficulties within the coalition. Further down the line, party leaders and party whips ensure policy coordination with other ministers, secretaries of states and members of parliament. This kind of coordination relies heavily on strong linkages between each deputy prime minister and his or her respective party leader, and on the ability of both to impose the compromises reached within the Kern to their respective ministers/secretaries of state and parliamentary groups. This is most frequently the case, as strong party discipline normally prevails.
However, the functional logic of the Kern was shattered under the previous government when the N-VA, the (nationalist) right-wing conservative member of the former coalition, decided to withdraw from the government following the decision of the former prime minister to participate in a conference held in Morocco and vote to endorse the U.N. Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. The N-VA opposed that compact.
Even though tensions are not as high in the current government, dissension is increasingly visible. This was evidenced by the recent internal debates around nuclear energy and the inability of the Kern to reach a clear agreement. As noted under “Implementation,” shortly after the announcement of an agreement on the nuclear energy issue, the opposing parties in the negotiations (the Greens advocating a strict nuclear phase-out and the French-speaking Liberals in support of maintaining the facilities) each announced the victory of their respective positions. The truth seems to be that the decision was postponed, since several issues crucial to the decision remain unresolved (for instance, the gas power plant which is supposed to replace the closed nuclear power plants is still awaiting a permit, which has been blocked by a N-VA minister of the Flemish government).
In general, the political parties are increasingly often promoting their own positions rather than government projects or the government agreement, and some increasingly rely on public threats rather than in-Kern dialogue. The recent crisis concerning the regulation of undocumented migrants, following a hunger strike by some of them, is a one example of this. The secretary of state for asylum and migration, a member of the CD&V (the Flemish Christian Democrats), refused to negotiate on a potential change of regularization criteria or a massive regularization as took place in 2000 under the Verhofstadt cabinet. With some hunger strikers reaching critical health situations, the party presidents of the Greens and the francophone Socialists threatened to leave the government if any of the strikers died. The strike ended following half-hearted promises from the secretary of state. However, as of the time of writing, the crisis appeared likely to resurface, as the secretary of state had returned to his strong positions, and most of the applications submitted by undocumented migrants had been rejected. Another example could be the recent contradictory messages issued by different coalition parties concerning the “agreement” on a nuclear phase-out plan as discussed under “Coherent Communication.”
Citations:
On the nuclear “agreement” :
https://www.lesoir.be/414286/article/2021-12-23/un-accord-nucleaire-pour-ne-presque-rien-decider
On the undocumented migrants crisis:
https://www.lesoir.be/385250/article/2021-07-21/vers-la-fin-de-la-greve-des-sans-papiers-ou-pas
https://www.lesoir.be/384880/article/2021-07-19/la-greve-des-sans-papiers-menace-demporter-la-vivaldi
https://www.lesoir.be/404370/article/2021-11-03/sans-papiers-sammy-mahdi-appele-sexpliquer-dans-une-vivaldi-agitee
https://www.lesoir.be/406125/article/2021-11-12/regularisation-des-sans-papiers-une-video-du-dg-de-loffice-des-etrangers-remet
The central unit of coordination – the inner cabinet or “Kern” – is comprised of deputy prime ministers (one from each coalition party), and the prime minister. The Kern meets regularly to negotiate any strategic decision not foreseen in the governmental agreement which arises due to changing circumstances or specific difficulties within the coalition. Further down the line, party leaders and party whips ensure policy coordination with other ministers, secretaries of states and members of parliament. This kind of coordination relies heavily on strong linkages between each deputy prime minister and his or her respective party leader, and on the ability of both to impose the compromises reached within the Kern to their respective ministers/secretaries of state and parliamentary groups. This is most frequently the case, as strong party discipline normally prevails.
However, the functional logic of the Kern was shattered under the previous government when the N-VA, the (nationalist) right-wing conservative member of the former coalition, decided to withdraw from the government following the decision of the former prime minister to participate in a conference held in Morocco and vote to endorse the U.N. Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. The N-VA opposed that compact.
Even though tensions are not as high in the current government, dissension is increasingly visible. This was evidenced by the recent internal debates around nuclear energy and the inability of the Kern to reach a clear agreement. As noted under “Implementation,” shortly after the announcement of an agreement on the nuclear energy issue, the opposing parties in the negotiations (the Greens advocating a strict nuclear phase-out and the French-speaking Liberals in support of maintaining the facilities) each announced the victory of their respective positions. The truth seems to be that the decision was postponed, since several issues crucial to the decision remain unresolved (for instance, the gas power plant which is supposed to replace the closed nuclear power plants is still awaiting a permit, which has been blocked by a N-VA minister of the Flemish government).
In general, the political parties are increasingly often promoting their own positions rather than government projects or the government agreement, and some increasingly rely on public threats rather than in-Kern dialogue. The recent crisis concerning the regulation of undocumented migrants, following a hunger strike by some of them, is a one example of this. The secretary of state for asylum and migration, a member of the CD&V (the Flemish Christian Democrats), refused to negotiate on a potential change of regularization criteria or a massive regularization as took place in 2000 under the Verhofstadt cabinet. With some hunger strikers reaching critical health situations, the party presidents of the Greens and the francophone Socialists threatened to leave the government if any of the strikers died. The strike ended following half-hearted promises from the secretary of state. However, as of the time of writing, the crisis appeared likely to resurface, as the secretary of state had returned to his strong positions, and most of the applications submitted by undocumented migrants had been rejected. Another example could be the recent contradictory messages issued by different coalition parties concerning the “agreement” on a nuclear phase-out plan as discussed under “Coherent Communication.”
Citations:
On the nuclear “agreement” :
https://www.lesoir.be/414286/article/2021-12-23/un-accord-nucleaire-pour-ne-presque-rien-decider
On the undocumented migrants crisis:
https://www.lesoir.be/385250/article/2021-07-21/vers-la-fin-de-la-greve-des-sans-papiers-ou-pas
https://www.lesoir.be/384880/article/2021-07-19/la-greve-des-sans-papiers-menace-demporter-la-vivaldi
https://www.lesoir.be/404370/article/2021-11-03/sans-papiers-sammy-mahdi-appele-sexpliquer-dans-une-vivaldi-agitee
https://www.lesoir.be/406125/article/2021-11-12/regularisation-des-sans-papiers-une-video-du-dg-de-loffice-des-etrangers-remet
How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?
10
9
9
The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
8
7
6
7
6
The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
5
4
3
4
3
The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
2
1
1
The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
The Federal Public Service for Information & Communication Technology (FEDICT) is responsible for defining and implementing an e-governance strategy. However, this agency focuses primarily on government-to-citizen (G2C) and government-to-business (G2B) communication, while government-to-government (G2G) interactions seem to be largely overlooked. Furthermore, the federal structure of the state does not help the sharing common IT programs or platforms, as every government level is responsible for its own digital infrastructure.
Overall, there is still much to improve, as Belgium is faring increasingly poorly in international comparison. The U.N. E-Government Survey 2020 ranked Belgium 41st out of 193 U.N. member countries in its E-Government Development Index (EGDI – a 22-position drop in comparison with four years earlier), making it the 26th country among the 33 European countries.
Citations:
https://d9db56472fd41226d193-1e5e0d4b7948acaf6080b0dce0b35ed5.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/events/forum/2004/panel_handouts/fedict.pdf
https://digitaldashboard.belgium.be/fr
https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/Portals/egovkb/Documents/un/2020-Survey/2020%20UN%20E-Government%20Survey%20(Full%20Report).pdf
Overall, there is still much to improve, as Belgium is faring increasingly poorly in international comparison. The U.N. E-Government Survey 2020 ranked Belgium 41st out of 193 U.N. member countries in its E-Government Development Index (EGDI – a 22-position drop in comparison with four years earlier), making it the 26th country among the 33 European countries.
Citations:
https://d9db56472fd41226d193-1e5e0d4b7948acaf6080b0dce0b35ed5.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/events/forum/2004/panel_handouts/fedict.pdf
https://digitaldashboard.belgium.be/fr
https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/Portals/egovkb/Documents/un/2020-Survey/2020%20UN%20E-Government%20Survey%20(Full%20Report).pdf
Graph View
To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?
10
9
9
RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
8
7
6
7
6
RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
5
4
3
4
3
RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
2
1
1
RIA are not applied or do not exist.
There are few formal RIA procedures, and when these do exist, they are generally treated only as a formality, being invoked only at the end of the decision-making process, once decisions have already been reached. Authorities thus typically “fly blind,” with unexpected policy outcomes far from unusual.
For example, with regard to carbon emissions, energy experts recommended making improvements to house insulation in order to reduce energy demand. Instead, the various governments (especially regional) heavily subsidized solar panels, which were politically more appealing. In the absence of a proper RIA, the ex post measure of success was the rate of adoption (subsidy pick up) and volume of green-energy production. It took years for the various operators to admit that the cost overruns were unmanageable, and they ultimately had to freeze subsidies suddenly and partially renege on previous commitments.
The situation appears to have been improved following some key regulatory decisions. In 2018, the telecommunication regulator proceeded with a 97-page impact evaluation into the possibility of allowing for a fourth mobile phone operator. The regulator’s report summarized an extensive body of literature and analyzed a significant set of case studies to examine the pros and cons of this decision – a clear improvement over past performance. However, such an RIA-compliant methodology is still not being applied in a systematic manner in the various policy domains.
As mentioned elsewhere, the management of the health crisis has seen consultation with non-governmental academic experts become more systematic, as expert groups routinely report to consultation committees on the evolution of the health situation and indicating potential measures to be taken. Nonetheless, given the very short time frame for producing such reports, RIA methodological standards are seldom met.
Citations:
https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/Impact-assessment-in-Belgium-June-2015%20fr.pdf (see end)
https://soc.kuleuven.be/web/files/11/72/ICW_wp_2009.pdf
From https://www.law.kuleuven.be/home/algemeen/agenda20152016/doctoraatsverdediging-sven-sobrie :
“In our neighboring countries, it is not unusual for important legal reforms to be preceded by ex ante impact assessments. The OECD, too, has for years been stressing the importance of quantitative Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA). In comparison, the Belgian legislator flies blind, by creating and passing laws based on not much more than gut feeling, modifying them afterwards at best. This should change.”
https://www.ibpt.be/public/files/fr/22539/Etude%20d%27impact%20march%C3%A9%20mobile%20FR_120718.pdf
For example, with regard to carbon emissions, energy experts recommended making improvements to house insulation in order to reduce energy demand. Instead, the various governments (especially regional) heavily subsidized solar panels, which were politically more appealing. In the absence of a proper RIA, the ex post measure of success was the rate of adoption (subsidy pick up) and volume of green-energy production. It took years for the various operators to admit that the cost overruns were unmanageable, and they ultimately had to freeze subsidies suddenly and partially renege on previous commitments.
The situation appears to have been improved following some key regulatory decisions. In 2018, the telecommunication regulator proceeded with a 97-page impact evaluation into the possibility of allowing for a fourth mobile phone operator. The regulator’s report summarized an extensive body of literature and analyzed a significant set of case studies to examine the pros and cons of this decision – a clear improvement over past performance. However, such an RIA-compliant methodology is still not being applied in a systematic manner in the various policy domains.
As mentioned elsewhere, the management of the health crisis has seen consultation with non-governmental academic experts become more systematic, as expert groups routinely report to consultation committees on the evolution of the health situation and indicating potential measures to be taken. Nonetheless, given the very short time frame for producing such reports, RIA methodological standards are seldom met.
Citations:
https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/Impact-assessment-in-Belgium-June-2015%20fr.pdf (see end)
https://soc.kuleuven.be/web/files/11/72/ICW_wp_2009.pdf
From https://www.law.kuleuven.be/home/algemeen/agenda20152016/doctoraatsverdediging-sven-sobrie :
“In our neighboring countries, it is not unusual for important legal reforms to be preceded by ex ante impact assessments. The OECD, too, has for years been stressing the importance of quantitative Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA). In comparison, the Belgian legislator flies blind, by creating and passing laws based on not much more than gut feeling, modifying them afterwards at best. This should change.”
https://www.ibpt.be/public/files/fr/22539/Etude%20d%27impact%20march%C3%A9%20mobile%20FR_120718.pdf
Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?
10
9
9
RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
8
7
6
7
6
The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
5
4
3
4
3
The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
2
1
1
RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
Regulatory impact assessments are compulsory, but seem to be treated as a formality for many important government decisions. There are however interesting and valuable exceptions, such as for the possibility of adding a fourth mobile phone operator in Belgium.
Citations:
http://www.lesoir.be/1351413/article/actualite/regions/bruxelles/2016-10-25/un-organe-controle-independant-pour-decider-des-orientations-stib
Citations:
http://www.lesoir.be/1351413/article/actualite/regions/bruxelles/2016-10-25/un-organe-controle-independant-pour-decider-des-orientations-stib
Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?
10
9
9
Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
8
7
6
7
6
Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
5
4
3
4
3
Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
2
1
1
Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
Regulatory impact assessments are compulsory, but seem to be treated as a formality for many important government decisions. There are however interesting and valuable exceptions, such as for the possibility of adding a fourth mobile phone operator in Belgium.
To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?
10
9
9
Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
2
1
1
Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
The typical strategy is to pick the data that justify the decisions that have been made. For instance, Brussels changed its speed limit from 50 to 30 kph in 2021, and the regional government claimed that accident figures have dropped substantially. However, these are most likely attributable to the COVID-19 lockdowns since, due to a lack of speed controls, the actual driving speed in the city has barely changed.
This approach has led to counterproductive decisions in the areas of, for example, education, energy conservation, subsidies for solar panels and immigration. There may be some scattered ex post evaluations undertaken on the initiative of individual line ministries, but these evaluations have no direct impact on the revision of existing policies since they are not seriously considered by ministerial cabinets, where all strategic policy choices are initiated and arbitrated. The management of the health crisis, however, increased the use of expert panels for a short-term monitoring of impact but not systematic ex post evaluation.
This approach has led to counterproductive decisions in the areas of, for example, education, energy conservation, subsidies for solar panels and immigration. There may be some scattered ex post evaluations undertaken on the initiative of individual line ministries, but these evaluations have no direct impact on the revision of existing policies since they are not seriously considered by ministerial cabinets, where all strategic policy choices are initiated and arbitrated. The management of the health crisis, however, increased the use of expert panels for a short-term monitoring of impact but not systematic ex post evaluation.
Graph View
Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?
10
9
9
The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
8
7
6
7
6
The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
2
1
1
The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
Belgium’s socioeconomic model is one of consensual (neo-corporatist) socioeconomic policymaking, whereby the governments consult established stakeholders, in particular workers’ and employers’ representatives, in order to facilitate policy acceptance. Such consultations have also become institutionalized in other fields through the creation of specific consultative bodies, for instance the Federal Council for Sustainable Development, which includes representatives of environmental organizations.
Unionization rates are still very high in Belgium, with trade union density at 49.1% in 2019 (OECD data). This is one of the highest such rates in the OECD, after most Nordic countries and on par with Norway. However, recent technological change with regard to services platforms (Uber and its peers), the internationalization of the economy, trade agreements such as CETA, and efforts by the previous (right-wing) government to reduce the power of workers’ unions have progressively eroded unions’ influence (unionization stood at 57% in the beginning of the 2000s and was still at 55% in 2012), modifying the government’s hands-off tradition of letting workers’ and employers’ unions negotiate wage arrangements. Arguably, some of this culture of consensus had previously stalled important but necessary reforms. Nevertheless, the previous government’s strategy has come as a cultural shock.
Citations:
https://plus.lesoir.be/art/d-20190515-3TYHK4
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20190918_04615735
https://references.lesoir.be/article/pourquoi-le-syndicalisme-progresse-t-il-en-belgique/
Unionization rates: https://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=TUD&lang=fr
Unionization rates are still very high in Belgium, with trade union density at 49.1% in 2019 (OECD data). This is one of the highest such rates in the OECD, after most Nordic countries and on par with Norway. However, recent technological change with regard to services platforms (Uber and its peers), the internationalization of the economy, trade agreements such as CETA, and efforts by the previous (right-wing) government to reduce the power of workers’ unions have progressively eroded unions’ influence (unionization stood at 57% in the beginning of the 2000s and was still at 55% in 2012), modifying the government’s hands-off tradition of letting workers’ and employers’ unions negotiate wage arrangements. Arguably, some of this culture of consensus had previously stalled important but necessary reforms. Nevertheless, the previous government’s strategy has come as a cultural shock.
Citations:
https://plus.lesoir.be/art/d-20190515-3TYHK4
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20190918_04615735
https://references.lesoir.be/article/pourquoi-le-syndicalisme-progresse-t-il-en-belgique/
Unionization rates: https://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=TUD&lang=fr
Graph View
To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?
10
9
9
Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
8
7
6
7
6
Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
5
4
3
4
3
Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
2
1
1
Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
Throughout the coronavirus pandemic, and despite the genuine attempts at regular consultation and collegial and informed decision-making regarding public health measures, government communication has regularly been filled with contradictions and dissenting voices, even from within single parties. The reason is clearly the fact that each measure may – or not – target specific sectors, and hence interest groups. Each minister or legislator caters to a different constituency, and their preferences are often misaligned. In particular, some party leaders – including those from the federal coalition – regularly announced softer measures shortly after the announcement of restrictive measures by the federal government, sometimes either explicitly or implicitly blaming another party (i.e., Flemings or Francophones) for the measures taken. The more complicated the measures, or the more likely they were to be unpopular, and the more accusatory the tone.
The contradictory messages and flip-flopping negatively affected citizens’ support for government decisions. At the end of December 2021, with the omicron wave looming, the government for instance decided to shut down theaters and other cultural activities. This decision immediately triggered a revolt in the cultural sector and in the press. Health experts advising the government ended up alleging that such measures had been taken only because policymakers had not dared to impose stricter measures affecting restaurants. In light of the opposition even the ministers who had voted for the closure played the blame game, and majority members of parliament questioned the prime minister in the House of Representatives, asking him to reconsider the decision.
This lack of coherent communication goes well beyond public health measures, however. Dissension was just as blatant following the government’s announcement of an agreement to phase out nuclear power plants. This took place despite the fact that the phase out had been approved back in 2003, and was part of the government-formation agreement. In this case, the blame game was initiated by G-L Bouchez, the president of the French right-of-center party MR, who lobbied in favor of maintaining nuclear power, and was opposed by the socialists and the Greens, who reemphasized the government agreement. The compromise has been to approve a motion that both parties could interpret (or rather publicly claim) as leaning in their favor. This regular indecision, nearing populism, undermined government effectiveness and the various parties’ reputations.
Citations:
https://www.lesoir.be/414245/article/2021-12-23/la-chambre-les-partis-de-la-vivaldi-interpellent-de-croo-et-critiquent-les
https://www.lesoir.be/414678/article/2021-12-27/benedicte-linard-ministre-de-la-culture-ce-nest-pas-mon-role-de-demander-au
https://www.lesoir.be/414652/article/2021-12-26/mesures-anticovid-la-desobeissance-civile-soutenue-par-les-autres-pouvoirs
https://www.lesoir.be/414324/article/2021-12-23/codeco-nucleaire-experts-la-rupture-lincomprehension
https://www.lesoir.be/414286/article/2021-12-23/un-accord-nucleaire-pour-ne-presque-rien-decider
The contradictory messages and flip-flopping negatively affected citizens’ support for government decisions. At the end of December 2021, with the omicron wave looming, the government for instance decided to shut down theaters and other cultural activities. This decision immediately triggered a revolt in the cultural sector and in the press. Health experts advising the government ended up alleging that such measures had been taken only because policymakers had not dared to impose stricter measures affecting restaurants. In light of the opposition even the ministers who had voted for the closure played the blame game, and majority members of parliament questioned the prime minister in the House of Representatives, asking him to reconsider the decision.
This lack of coherent communication goes well beyond public health measures, however. Dissension was just as blatant following the government’s announcement of an agreement to phase out nuclear power plants. This took place despite the fact that the phase out had been approved back in 2003, and was part of the government-formation agreement. In this case, the blame game was initiated by G-L Bouchez, the president of the French right-of-center party MR, who lobbied in favor of maintaining nuclear power, and was opposed by the socialists and the Greens, who reemphasized the government agreement. The compromise has been to approve a motion that both parties could interpret (or rather publicly claim) as leaning in their favor. This regular indecision, nearing populism, undermined government effectiveness and the various parties’ reputations.
Citations:
https://www.lesoir.be/414245/article/2021-12-23/la-chambre-les-partis-de-la-vivaldi-interpellent-de-croo-et-critiquent-les
https://www.lesoir.be/414678/article/2021-12-27/benedicte-linard-ministre-de-la-culture-ce-nest-pas-mon-role-de-demander-au
https://www.lesoir.be/414652/article/2021-12-26/mesures-anticovid-la-desobeissance-civile-soutenue-par-les-autres-pouvoirs
https://www.lesoir.be/414324/article/2021-12-23/codeco-nucleaire-experts-la-rupture-lincomprehension
https://www.lesoir.be/414286/article/2021-12-23/un-accord-nucleaire-pour-ne-presque-rien-decider
Graph View
To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?
10
9
9
The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
5
4
3
4
3
The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
2
1
1
The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
The continuation and resurgence of the health crisis (with the third and fourth waves) has somewhat slowed progress on longer-term issues and commitments made in the government agreement (e.g., green transition, tax reform, nuclear phase out). Even if there have been some advances (e.g., increase in minimum pension, extension of parental leave, reform of sexual criminal law, right to vote at 16 in European Parliament elections, reform of company cars, tax on securities accounts) they are often perceived as marginal and the government does not seem able to make strong decisions on major or “difficult” issues such as the exit from nuclear power or on tax reform, mainly due to the brittleness and ideological diversity of its coalition.
Regarding the measures taken to contain the coronavirus pandemic, the country went through different phases, with varying degrees of effectiveness. This led pundits to describe the government’s crisis management as a roller coaster (or even as “zeroes,” in the words of F. Dehousse in his December 2021 op-ed). At the beginning of 2021, the newly formed De Croo I cabinet inherited a complicated health situation, to say the least, since Belgium had (on paper at least) twice broken the world record for COVID-19 mortality in 2020. This poor performance was partly due to the previous government’s indecision, but also had broader causes. Belgium is a densely populated international hub, home to European institutions. Most of its territory in fact constitutes a large conurbation with connected urban and suburban areas, and there is also a lot of commuting to and from neighboring hubs in the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany (the Aachen area) and the north of France (the whole Lille area).
The new government and its strong new federal health minister then imposed strict measures, which, even though they were sometimes criticized by certain elected officials within the majority coalition after they were taken collectively (see also “Interministerial Coordination” and “Policy Communication”), had noticeable effects. So much so that, six months later, the country was making a remarkable recovery. The coronavirus appeared to be under control, and the vaccination rate was one of the highest in Europe.
However, the government, in order to pass its restrictive measures, communicated widely on the forthcoming exit of the crisis thanks to the vaccine solution. The prime minister even said in the media that “the epidemic is becoming an epidemic of the unvaccinated.” This message was given such a strong focus that the non-pharmacological measures of prevention such as social distancing or mask wearing were relegated to the second rank. This has been evidenced, among other factors, by the naming of the “COVID Safe Ticket,” the certification that a person has been vaccinated, received a negative test or has recovered from the coronavirus. Belgium is not the only country to introduce such a measure, but its description and the use of the word “safe” has been subject to criticism for suggesting the absence of risk. The fall of 2021 ended up being characterized by the return of the epidemic in a fourth wave. For its part, the government had lost its unity, and was no longer able to issue clear rules or hold a coherent discourse, being partly betrayed by its own communication during the summer.
The government’s actions were of course complicated by the emergence of the new variants (delta, quickly followed by omicron) that hit all European countries hard. And despite the bungling government performance, at the turn of 2021/22, Belgium’s reproduction rate was still well below that of neighboring countries (the Netherlands had to implement a strong lockdown due to its lack of earlier measures, for instance). The good vaccination rate, among the highest in Europe, as well as the solid start of the booster campaign, together with the fact that earlier measures delayed the omicron wave by a few weeks could partially restore popular support for the government’s less popular measures, and hopefully recover part of its lost effectiveness.
Citations:
https://www.lecho.be/opinions/edito/dans-ce-pays-on-ne-sait-plus-comment-decider/10355714
https://www.lesoir.be/397726/article/2021-09-30/la-vivaldi-un-et-encore-tout-prouver
F. Dehousse (Dec. 2021 oped): https://www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/la-belgique-et-le-coronavirus-le-retour-des-nuls-de-la-gestion-carte-blanche/article-opinion-1507157.html
https://covid-19.sciensano.be/sites/default/files/Covid19/COVID-19_FAQ_ENG_final.pdf
https://cepr.org/sites/default/files/policy_insights/PolicyInsight110.pdf
https://www.rtbf.be/info/societe/detail_cette-epidemie-devient-une-epidemie-des-non-vaccines-les-mots-du-premier-ministre-pourraient-etre-contreproductifs-on-risque-de-raidir-cette-population?id=10844350
https://www.lesoir.be/413306/article/2021-12-19/leurope-panique-face-omicron-la-belgique-dans-lexpectative
Regarding the measures taken to contain the coronavirus pandemic, the country went through different phases, with varying degrees of effectiveness. This led pundits to describe the government’s crisis management as a roller coaster (or even as “zeroes,” in the words of F. Dehousse in his December 2021 op-ed). At the beginning of 2021, the newly formed De Croo I cabinet inherited a complicated health situation, to say the least, since Belgium had (on paper at least) twice broken the world record for COVID-19 mortality in 2020. This poor performance was partly due to the previous government’s indecision, but also had broader causes. Belgium is a densely populated international hub, home to European institutions. Most of its territory in fact constitutes a large conurbation with connected urban and suburban areas, and there is also a lot of commuting to and from neighboring hubs in the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany (the Aachen area) and the north of France (the whole Lille area).
The new government and its strong new federal health minister then imposed strict measures, which, even though they were sometimes criticized by certain elected officials within the majority coalition after they were taken collectively (see also “Interministerial Coordination” and “Policy Communication”), had noticeable effects. So much so that, six months later, the country was making a remarkable recovery. The coronavirus appeared to be under control, and the vaccination rate was one of the highest in Europe.
However, the government, in order to pass its restrictive measures, communicated widely on the forthcoming exit of the crisis thanks to the vaccine solution. The prime minister even said in the media that “the epidemic is becoming an epidemic of the unvaccinated.” This message was given such a strong focus that the non-pharmacological measures of prevention such as social distancing or mask wearing were relegated to the second rank. This has been evidenced, among other factors, by the naming of the “COVID Safe Ticket,” the certification that a person has been vaccinated, received a negative test or has recovered from the coronavirus. Belgium is not the only country to introduce such a measure, but its description and the use of the word “safe” has been subject to criticism for suggesting the absence of risk. The fall of 2021 ended up being characterized by the return of the epidemic in a fourth wave. For its part, the government had lost its unity, and was no longer able to issue clear rules or hold a coherent discourse, being partly betrayed by its own communication during the summer.
The government’s actions were of course complicated by the emergence of the new variants (delta, quickly followed by omicron) that hit all European countries hard. And despite the bungling government performance, at the turn of 2021/22, Belgium’s reproduction rate was still well below that of neighboring countries (the Netherlands had to implement a strong lockdown due to its lack of earlier measures, for instance). The good vaccination rate, among the highest in Europe, as well as the solid start of the booster campaign, together with the fact that earlier measures delayed the omicron wave by a few weeks could partially restore popular support for the government’s less popular measures, and hopefully recover part of its lost effectiveness.
Citations:
https://www.lecho.be/opinions/edito/dans-ce-pays-on-ne-sait-plus-comment-decider/10355714
https://www.lesoir.be/397726/article/2021-09-30/la-vivaldi-un-et-encore-tout-prouver
F. Dehousse (Dec. 2021 oped): https://www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/la-belgique-et-le-coronavirus-le-retour-des-nuls-de-la-gestion-carte-blanche/article-opinion-1507157.html
https://covid-19.sciensano.be/sites/default/files/Covid19/COVID-19_FAQ_ENG_final.pdf
https://cepr.org/sites/default/files/policy_insights/PolicyInsight110.pdf
https://www.rtbf.be/info/societe/detail_cette-epidemie-devient-une-epidemie-des-non-vaccines-les-mots-du-premier-ministre-pourraient-etre-contreproductifs-on-risque-de-raidir-cette-population?id=10844350
https://www.lesoir.be/413306/article/2021-12-19/leurope-panique-face-omicron-la-belgique-dans-lexpectative
To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?
10
9
9
The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
8
7
6
7
6
The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
5
4
3
4
3
The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
2
1
1
The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
One must distinguish de jure powers from the government’s de facto powers to provide incentives to each minister. De jure, the prime minister has little power to exclude ministers from the government. The main architects of government positions are the party presidents who, at the government-formation stage, negotiate for control of the various portfolios and then nominate their people. Every minister’s primary incentive is thus to push his or her own party’s views, rather than the government’s potential view. The same holds for secretaries of state (junior ministers).
That said, this hierarchical structure is actually able to impose strong discipline on each minister when the incentives of party presidents are sufficiently aligned with those of the government. Regular meetings of the Kern and consultations with party presidents in effect ensures the implementation of the government agreement and provides fine tuning whenever new developments make reactions necessary.
The current government was formed as a coalition without much political coherence other than the fear of renewed elections and, with them, the rise of radical parties (far-right nationalists in Flanders and the far left in Wallonia). The appointment of the current prime minister, therefore, did not follow the tradition that the choice should be made by the country’s leading political grouping. He nonetheless enjoys a relatively high level of popularity, placing him in first or second place among political personalities in all three regions in the latest polls. He is further seen as able to remain above the fray and act as a referee, which probably allows him to avoid conflicts with the presidents of other parties in the coalition. However, this has earned him criticism from his own political allies, the right-of-center liberals, for being too accommodating with left-of-center coalition partners.
Citations:
https://www.lesoir.be/397726/article/2021-09-30/la-vivaldi-un-et-encore-tout-prouver
https://www.lesoir.be/411711/article/2021-12-10/grand-barometre-le-ps-decroche-bruxelles-mais-redecolle-en-wallonie
That said, this hierarchical structure is actually able to impose strong discipline on each minister when the incentives of party presidents are sufficiently aligned with those of the government. Regular meetings of the Kern and consultations with party presidents in effect ensures the implementation of the government agreement and provides fine tuning whenever new developments make reactions necessary.
The current government was formed as a coalition without much political coherence other than the fear of renewed elections and, with them, the rise of radical parties (far-right nationalists in Flanders and the far left in Wallonia). The appointment of the current prime minister, therefore, did not follow the tradition that the choice should be made by the country’s leading political grouping. He nonetheless enjoys a relatively high level of popularity, placing him in first or second place among political personalities in all three regions in the latest polls. He is further seen as able to remain above the fray and act as a referee, which probably allows him to avoid conflicts with the presidents of other parties in the coalition. However, this has earned him criticism from his own political allies, the right-of-center liberals, for being too accommodating with left-of-center coalition partners.
Citations:
https://www.lesoir.be/397726/article/2021-09-30/la-vivaldi-un-et-encore-tout-prouver
https://www.lesoir.be/411711/article/2021-12-10/grand-barometre-le-ps-decroche-bruxelles-mais-redecolle-en-wallonie
How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
5
4
3
4
3
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
2
1
1
The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
The hierarchical structures inside ministries is such that the line minister (or ministers, when a ministry’s set of responsibilities are shared by more than one government portfolio) controls the ministry at the political level. The ministry itself is presided over by a general administrator, whose nomination used to be purely political, but is now (at least partly) determined through a competitive exam. The fact that the tenure of the general administrator and the minister are different opens the gate to potential tensions between the minister and the ministry.
How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
8
7
6
7
6
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
5
4
3
4
3
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
2
1
1
The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
Belgium has relatively few agencies that are funded and controlled by the government, but are also formally independent of the government. Agencies of this type include the public radio and television broadcasters, Child Focus, a foundation for missing or sexually exploited children, UNIA (against various forms of discrimination), and local public social-service centers (Centres Publics d’Action Sociale (CPAS) / Openbare Centra voor Maatschappelijk Welzijn (OCMW)). Monitoring of these agencies takes place through several channels. Two are most relevant here. First, a government or party delegate will generally sit on the board. Second, the agency must submit a yearly report to the government. This monitoring mechanism is extremely effective, in part thanks to party discipline.
However, effective monitoring is not synonymous with efficiency. Among other issues, the absence of impact assessment or efficiency monitoring allows public agencies to increase their costs without effective sanctions. Second, as noted in the Corruption Prevention section (D4.4), effective monitoring has been hampered by the outsourcing of many areas of government to ostensibly private entities that are in fact controlled by public officeholders.
The outcome has been a decline in public trust, reflected in lower performances for Belgium in the World Economic Forum’s ratings on issues such as “public trust in politicians,” “diversion of public funds,” “favoritism in decisions of government officials,” and “efficiency of government spending.”
Citations:
http://www.lecho.be/tablet/newspaper_economie_politique/Il_reste_des_centaines_d e_millions_d_euros_d_economies_a_faire_dans_les_services_publics.9776078-7320.ar t?utm_campaign=app&utm_medium=tablet&utm_source=IPAD
WEF: Schwab, Klaus (ed) (2019). The Global Competitiveness Report 2019. World Economic Forum.
However, effective monitoring is not synonymous with efficiency. Among other issues, the absence of impact assessment or efficiency monitoring allows public agencies to increase their costs without effective sanctions. Second, as noted in the Corruption Prevention section (D4.4), effective monitoring has been hampered by the outsourcing of many areas of government to ostensibly private entities that are in fact controlled by public officeholders.
The outcome has been a decline in public trust, reflected in lower performances for Belgium in the World Economic Forum’s ratings on issues such as “public trust in politicians,” “diversion of public funds,” “favoritism in decisions of government officials,” and “efficiency of government spending.”
Citations:
http://www.lecho.be/tablet/newspaper_economie_politique/Il_reste_des_centaines_d e_millions_d_euros_d_economies_a_faire_dans_les_services_publics.9776078-7320.ar t?utm_campaign=app&utm_medium=tablet&utm_source=IPAD
WEF: Schwab, Klaus (ed) (2019). The Global Competitiveness Report 2019. World Economic Forum.
To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
8
7
6
7
6
The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
2
1
1
The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
Over the course of recent decades, Belgium has delegated several sovereign functions of the central government to local entities: to the three regions (Flanders, the Brussels region and Wallonia), to linguistic communities (Flemish, French, and German), and to municipalities (communes/gemeenten; a city may be subdivided into several communes). Due to recurrent political stalemates between the Flemings and the Francophones, the Brussels region is chronically underfunded. This makes it unable to implement its policy with full independence. It depends on cash injections from the other regions or the federal government.
Municipalities are sufficiently funded only in rich areas, as their main source of funding is the personal income tax levied on locals. Reductions in unemployment benefits have also had spillover effects on these municipalities, since they are financially responsible for providing minimum income support to the poor. Meanwhile, the COVID-19 crisis has increased their expenditure (for instance, some of the local contact centers – Centres Publics d’Action Sociale / Openbare Centra voor Maatschappelijk Welzijn – experienced a 49% increase in requests in 2020 in comparison with 2019) and reduced their income (as a series of taxes, such as those on café/restaurant terraces, parking and markets were extremely negatively impacted).
Likewise, the government agreement also implies serious cuts in financial transfers from Flanders to Wallonia in the coming years. But since Wallonia is a post-industrial region still in economic transition, with unemployment levels twice as high as those in Flanders, it is difficult to see Wallonia not continuing to suffer from chronic underfunding. All this has been made even more difficult after the floods that hit Wallonia hard in the summer of 2021 (damages were much less severe in Flanders). In contrast with Germany, where Berlin agreed to cover half of the costs (for a total of €30 billion) following the floods that hit the Rhineland, a much richer region than Wallonia, in Belgium, the federal government proposed a loan of €1.5 billion, rejecting the idea of a transfer as suggested by the secretary of state for recovery, asserting that the current financing law does not allow the federal government to make such a transfer.
The government agreement also envisioned a decentralization of taxation. However, the main sources of state financing (direct taxes and VAT) will remain centrally controlled and collected, with the funds redistributed according to pre-agreed sharing rules. Redistribution issues remain a bone of contention between the main regions and communities, with the health crisis following on the heels of the recent financial crisis having heightened tensions.
Citations:
https://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/societe/le-coronavirus-en-belgique-impacte-fortement-les-cpas-1269600.aspx
https://www.lalibre.be/belgique/politique-belge/2021/09/30/le-federal-navait-quune-solution-pour-aider-la-wallonie-un-pret-et-pas-un-don-DYSMV6OU3JFXFLHGG33S5U3XJ4/
https://www.rtbf.be/info/article/detail_wallonie-inondations-et-solidarite?id=10843102
https://www.lecho.be/economie-politique/belgique/wallonie/la-fin-des-transferts-pas-la-fin-du-monde/10352832.html
https://www.lecho.be/economie-politique/belgique/wallonie/la-wallonie-est-elle-au-bord-de-la-faillite/10352831
Municipalities are sufficiently funded only in rich areas, as their main source of funding is the personal income tax levied on locals. Reductions in unemployment benefits have also had spillover effects on these municipalities, since they are financially responsible for providing minimum income support to the poor. Meanwhile, the COVID-19 crisis has increased their expenditure (for instance, some of the local contact centers – Centres Publics d’Action Sociale / Openbare Centra voor Maatschappelijk Welzijn – experienced a 49% increase in requests in 2020 in comparison with 2019) and reduced their income (as a series of taxes, such as those on café/restaurant terraces, parking and markets were extremely negatively impacted).
Likewise, the government agreement also implies serious cuts in financial transfers from Flanders to Wallonia in the coming years. But since Wallonia is a post-industrial region still in economic transition, with unemployment levels twice as high as those in Flanders, it is difficult to see Wallonia not continuing to suffer from chronic underfunding. All this has been made even more difficult after the floods that hit Wallonia hard in the summer of 2021 (damages were much less severe in Flanders). In contrast with Germany, where Berlin agreed to cover half of the costs (for a total of €30 billion) following the floods that hit the Rhineland, a much richer region than Wallonia, in Belgium, the federal government proposed a loan of €1.5 billion, rejecting the idea of a transfer as suggested by the secretary of state for recovery, asserting that the current financing law does not allow the federal government to make such a transfer.
The government agreement also envisioned a decentralization of taxation. However, the main sources of state financing (direct taxes and VAT) will remain centrally controlled and collected, with the funds redistributed according to pre-agreed sharing rules. Redistribution issues remain a bone of contention between the main regions and communities, with the health crisis following on the heels of the recent financial crisis having heightened tensions.
Citations:
https://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/societe/le-coronavirus-en-belgique-impacte-fortement-les-cpas-1269600.aspx
https://www.lalibre.be/belgique/politique-belge/2021/09/30/le-federal-navait-quune-solution-pour-aider-la-wallonie-un-pret-et-pas-un-don-DYSMV6OU3JFXFLHGG33S5U3XJ4/
https://www.rtbf.be/info/article/detail_wallonie-inondations-et-solidarite?id=10843102
https://www.lecho.be/economie-politique/belgique/wallonie/la-fin-des-transferts-pas-la-fin-du-monde/10352832.html
https://www.lecho.be/economie-politique/belgique/wallonie/la-wallonie-est-elle-au-bord-de-la-faillite/10352831
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
2
1
1
The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
The federal state has no formal authority over regions and communities, because there is no constitutionally regulated hierarchy between the federal and regional/community levels. When compared with other federal systems, this creates major complications. For instance, any single region has the ability to block an international treaty, since it has exactly the same prerogatives as the federal state. This occurred in September and October of 2016, when the Walloon region singlehandedly blocked the signing of a major treaty between the European Union and Canada (CETA). The treaty was only signed after weeks of pressure and tense negotiations.
On some policy dimensions (e.g., spatial planning, transport, education, culture, applied research and local authorities), the regions and communities are actually becoming more powerful than the federal government. The tensions between the country’s linguistic communities, as well as between its geographically defined regions (both the communities and regions have their own political institutions and administrations), have contributed to reinforcing this trend.
However, the new importance gained by bodies such as the consultation committee (“Comité de Concertation”/”Overlegcomité,” aka CoDeCo), which bring together representatives of the different levels (federal and regional/community), could enhance coordination and therefore quell potential tensions between the different levels, at least if the implementation of policies is discussed there beforehand. However, this would require that the body be less instrumentalized by certain parties than has already been the case. Recently, an N-VA minister (a party in power in Flanders, but in the opposition at the national level) who is usually in favor of the relaxation of public health measures summoned a third CoDeCo meeting in slightly more than two weeks with the goal of reinforcing public health measures (one week after having blocked them, and one day after having opposed further tightening). The single, suddenly important point was to ban some indoor recreational activities. It soon became apparent that his hidden agenda was to cancel a giant Santa Claus event in Antwerp, saving the mayor, his party president, from having to do so himself.
Citations:
http://www.lesoir.be/1353096/article/economie/2016-10-27/ceta-belgique-trouve-un-accord
https://www.lesoir.be/410376/article/2021-12-03/le-codeco-quon-nattendait-pas-tourne-la-foire-dempoigne
On some policy dimensions (e.g., spatial planning, transport, education, culture, applied research and local authorities), the regions and communities are actually becoming more powerful than the federal government. The tensions between the country’s linguistic communities, as well as between its geographically defined regions (both the communities and regions have their own political institutions and administrations), have contributed to reinforcing this trend.
However, the new importance gained by bodies such as the consultation committee (“Comité de Concertation”/”Overlegcomité,” aka CoDeCo), which bring together representatives of the different levels (federal and regional/community), could enhance coordination and therefore quell potential tensions between the different levels, at least if the implementation of policies is discussed there beforehand. However, this would require that the body be less instrumentalized by certain parties than has already been the case. Recently, an N-VA minister (a party in power in Flanders, but in the opposition at the national level) who is usually in favor of the relaxation of public health measures summoned a third CoDeCo meeting in slightly more than two weeks with the goal of reinforcing public health measures (one week after having blocked them, and one day after having opposed further tightening). The single, suddenly important point was to ban some indoor recreational activities. It soon became apparent that his hidden agenda was to cancel a giant Santa Claus event in Antwerp, saving the mayor, his party president, from having to do so himself.
Citations:
http://www.lesoir.be/1353096/article/economie/2016-10-27/ceta-belgique-trouve-un-accord
https://www.lesoir.be/410376/article/2021-12-03/le-codeco-quon-nattendait-pas-tourne-la-foire-dempoigne
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?
10
9
9
Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
2
1
1
Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
Formally, the national (federal) government has no authority over regional governments and administrations, but it can impose some standards and policies. Environmental policies, for instance, have been largely regionalized, but environmental standards and norms are set at the European and federal levels. As a result, environmental policy coordination has been deadlocked since 2012. In addition, subnational and local executives have to abide by budgetary constraints set by the federal government.
In general, the federal government does not have the ability to enforce or control more detailed standards with regard to issues such as performance figures. The government can only try to maintain influence through more general (legal or budgetary) levers. Another informal mechanism is party discipline; whenever the same parties are in power at the federal and subnational levels, coordination is facilitated.
On the one hand, significant political misalignment between the regions (mainly right-wing in the north and left-wing in the south) and high fractionalization in the federal parliament did not help coordination. On the other, the COVID-19 crisis called for policy responses designed jointly, and thus led to coordination at levels rarely seen before, mainly through the National Security Council at first, and afterward through the concertation committee.
In general, the federal government does not have the ability to enforce or control more detailed standards with regard to issues such as performance figures. The government can only try to maintain influence through more general (legal or budgetary) levers. Another informal mechanism is party discipline; whenever the same parties are in power at the federal and subnational levels, coordination is facilitated.
On the one hand, significant political misalignment between the regions (mainly right-wing in the north and left-wing in the south) and high fractionalization in the federal parliament did not help coordination. On the other, the COVID-19 crisis called for policy responses designed jointly, and thus led to coordination at levels rarely seen before, mainly through the National Security Council at first, and afterward through the concertation committee.
To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?
10
9
9
Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
8
7
6
7
6
Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
5
4
3
4
3
Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
2
1
1
Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
Belgium’s system of proportional representation easily falls prey to lobbying. Belgium is actually recognized as a neo-corporatist system. When a strategic decision involves key socioeconomic issues, representatives of the “social partners” (i.e., the powerful and well-organized employers’ organizations and trade unions) systematically negotiate a bilateral agreement, which is then passed to the executive for legal implementation.
For this reason, the design of regulations may tend to be biased and at times ineffective, as it is based on a temporary and uneasy compromise between the social partners.
This enforcement was at times challenged during the health crisis given the speedy and restrictive nature of the measures taken. As in other countries, such as Spain, the courts have invalidated certain state decisions, considering their legal basis to be insufficient. More recently, as described under “Policy Communication,” enforcement was hampered by the politicians themselves when several local elected officials, as well as the minister of culture of the French community, announced in the media that they would not take retaliatory measures against cultural venues that decided to remain open despite the decision of the consultation committee to close them. The decision was then voided by the State Council, forcing a new meeting of the consultation committee.
Citations:
https://www.lesoir.be/415020/article/2021-12-28/un-codeco-ce-mercredi-pour-rouvrir-immediatement-les-theatres-et-cinemas
https://www.lesoir.be/364048/article/2021-03-31/coronavirus-la-justice-rappelle-letat-ses-devoirs
https://www.lesoir.be/409639/article/2021-11-30/la-base-legale-du-covid-safe-ticket-se-fissure
For this reason, the design of regulations may tend to be biased and at times ineffective, as it is based on a temporary and uneasy compromise between the social partners.
This enforcement was at times challenged during the health crisis given the speedy and restrictive nature of the measures taken. As in other countries, such as Spain, the courts have invalidated certain state decisions, considering their legal basis to be insufficient. More recently, as described under “Policy Communication,” enforcement was hampered by the politicians themselves when several local elected officials, as well as the minister of culture of the French community, announced in the media that they would not take retaliatory measures against cultural venues that decided to remain open despite the decision of the consultation committee to close them. The decision was then voided by the State Council, forcing a new meeting of the consultation committee.
Citations:
https://www.lesoir.be/415020/article/2021-12-28/un-codeco-ce-mercredi-pour-rouvrir-immediatement-les-theatres-et-cinemas
https://www.lesoir.be/364048/article/2021-03-31/coronavirus-la-justice-rappelle-letat-ses-devoirs
https://www.lesoir.be/409639/article/2021-11-30/la-base-legale-du-covid-safe-ticket-se-fissure
Graph View
To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?
10
9
9
The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
8
7
6
7
6
In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
2
1
1
The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
Belgium is one of the founding states of the European Union and is an active member of many international agreements. In some instances, Belgium has even played a leading role in international agreements (such as banning the production of land mines).
However, Belgium is today regularly criticized for not fully complying with rules agreed upon at the European Union, United Nations or NATO. For instance, critics have taken aim at Belgium’s slower-than-average progress in abiding by EU environmental norms. According to the European Commission, this is mainly because “the country’s environmental governance has been shaped by EU environmental law and policy (top-down process),” while “the regions’ powers in environmental matters have been increasing since the 1980s (reinforcing the bottom-up nature of environmental governance in Belgium).” The commission further stresses that “[t]he lack of a hierarchy of legislative acts reduces the effectiveness and efficiency of environmental policymaking in Belgium.”
Citations:
http://www2.derand.be/livingintranslation/en/Minorities_Convention.php
https: //www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/fcnm-factsheet
European Commission, DG Environment (2019) “The EU Environmental Implementation Review 2019 Country Report – BELGIUM”
However, Belgium is today regularly criticized for not fully complying with rules agreed upon at the European Union, United Nations or NATO. For instance, critics have taken aim at Belgium’s slower-than-average progress in abiding by EU environmental norms. According to the European Commission, this is mainly because “the country’s environmental governance has been shaped by EU environmental law and policy (top-down process),” while “the regions’ powers in environmental matters have been increasing since the 1980s (reinforcing the bottom-up nature of environmental governance in Belgium).” The commission further stresses that “[t]he lack of a hierarchy of legislative acts reduces the effectiveness and efficiency of environmental policymaking in Belgium.”
Citations:
http://www2.derand.be/livingintranslation/en/Minorities_Convention.php
https: //www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/fcnm-factsheet
European Commission, DG Environment (2019) “The EU Environmental Implementation Review 2019 Country Report – BELGIUM”
To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?
10
9
9
The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
2
1
1
The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
Belgium hosts various supranational institutions, including the majority of the offices of the European Union. The country has always displayed enthusiasm toward joint-reform initiatives. This can be illustrated by the large number of Belgian politicians involved in the highest levels of such organizations (e.g., Herman Van Rompuy, a former president of the European Council; Charles Michel, current president of the European Council; Guy Verhofstadt, leader of the liberal group in the European Parliament). Moreover, the country’s small size makes it heavily dependent on international coordination. It therefore supports international reform efforts in areas such as tax systems, carbon-dioxide regulation, and as of 2015, on the European equivalent of the American Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act. However, with regard to implementation, Belgium does not always fulfill its commitments.
Graph View
To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?
10
9
9
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
5
4
3
4
3
The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
2
1
1
There is no monitoring.
In 1993, Belgium became a federal state with one federal government, three regional governments (Flanders, Brussels Capital, Wallonia), three communities (Dutch-, French- and German-speaking, each with a parliament and a government), 10 provinces, and 589 municipalities (following a merger in 1975). The absence of a hierarchy of decision-making powers between the federal and regional/community institutions means that self-monitoring efforts within administrative organizations is limited in practice. It takes a constitutional crisis to trigger a comprehensive process of reflection on institutional functionality. Resulting revisions are typically motivated by pre-existing political agendas rather than by a sound impact evaluation.
There have been six such state reforms from 1970 onwards; the 6th state reform was agreed upon in 2011 and led to the transfer of multiple further competences to the regional and community levels. The federal and regional/community governments nevertheless maintained overlapping competences (as evinced by the fact that there are nine public health ministers) because each state reform was the result of a difficult compromise between those pushing for more devolution and those pushing for reinforced federal competences.
As a consequence, Belgian institutions are far from efficient. The responsibility split between municipalities and regions has not been reoptimized appropriately, particularly in Brussels. Many decisions require interministerial coordination between the federal, regional and community authorities, which makes Belgium almost as complex as Europe. A formal body – the “concertation committee” (comité de concertation/overlegcomité) – has been developed for such coordination. The committee includes federal, regional and community ministers and is supposed to prevent conflicts of interest between the three levels. Very frequently, however, no rational solution emerges.
It is also often the case that major policy initiatives requiring coordination are not even initiated because of a local government acting as a veto player that blocks the entire initiative. There are several examples of this in all policy fields with shared competences, most notably with regard to environmental/climate change and health policies. The unprecedented collaboration observed throughout the COVID-19 crisis, during which the concertation committee took a central decision-making role, could nonetheless give hope that coordination and collaboration will improve in the future. For these hopes to be realized, parties will have to stop instrumentalizing this body as described under “Constitutional Discretion.”
Citations:
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20191108_04707701
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20191104_04699282
https://plus.lesoir.be/130823/article/2017-12-23/francois-bellot-et-alexander-de-croo-pour-une-refederalisation-de-la-mobilite
https://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_climat-tendu-au-comite-de-concertation-pour-l-organisation-de-la-cop26-en-belgique?id=10181671
https://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_etat-federal-et-regions-se-disputent-le-gateau-financier-des-licences-5g?id=10181618
There have been six such state reforms from 1970 onwards; the 6th state reform was agreed upon in 2011 and led to the transfer of multiple further competences to the regional and community levels. The federal and regional/community governments nevertheless maintained overlapping competences (as evinced by the fact that there are nine public health ministers) because each state reform was the result of a difficult compromise between those pushing for more devolution and those pushing for reinforced federal competences.
As a consequence, Belgian institutions are far from efficient. The responsibility split between municipalities and regions has not been reoptimized appropriately, particularly in Brussels. Many decisions require interministerial coordination between the federal, regional and community authorities, which makes Belgium almost as complex as Europe. A formal body – the “concertation committee” (comité de concertation/overlegcomité) – has been developed for such coordination. The committee includes federal, regional and community ministers and is supposed to prevent conflicts of interest between the three levels. Very frequently, however, no rational solution emerges.
It is also often the case that major policy initiatives requiring coordination are not even initiated because of a local government acting as a veto player that blocks the entire initiative. There are several examples of this in all policy fields with shared competences, most notably with regard to environmental/climate change and health policies. The unprecedented collaboration observed throughout the COVID-19 crisis, during which the concertation committee took a central decision-making role, could nonetheless give hope that coordination and collaboration will improve in the future. For these hopes to be realized, parties will have to stop instrumentalizing this body as described under “Constitutional Discretion.”
Citations:
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20191108_04707701
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20191104_04699282
https://plus.lesoir.be/130823/article/2017-12-23/francois-bellot-et-alexander-de-croo-pour-une-refederalisation-de-la-mobilite
https://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_climat-tendu-au-comite-de-concertation-pour-l-organisation-de-la-cop26-en-belgique?id=10181671
https://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_etat-federal-et-regions-se-disputent-le-gateau-financier-des-licences-5g?id=10181618
To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?
10
9
9
The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
8
7
6
7
6
The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
2
1
1
The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
Most reforms are the consequence of bargaining between power levels, with successive political tensions between Flemish, Walloon, Brussels, and francophone interests. Eventually, protracted negotiations typically end up with some type of compromise that rarely improves overall efficiency. Each one of the six successive state reforms from 1970 to 2011 followed this logic.
The main bone of contention is the Brussels capital region (which is restricted to about one-fourth the actual Brussels agglomeration in terms of socioeconomic base, and one-half in terms of population). Its restricted boundaries result in numerous overlapping jurisdictions with Flanders and Wallonia. Moreover, within the Brussels region, competences are split between the 19 municipalities (communes/gemeeten) and the region. This creates another layer of overlaps and gridlocks, particularly with regard to city planning. The creation of a pedestrian zone in the city center, without sufficient coordination with the other municipalities or the region, created major traffic jams. Questions regarding the Brussels airport or the highway “ring” around Brussels are managed by Flanders. The building of a rapid train service to the south (to provide alternative transportation to Walloons commuting to Brussels) requires close administrative follow-up from the Walloon region, which has priorities beyond reducing traffic in Brussels. The large forest in the south of Brussels spans across the Brussels, Flemish and Walloon regions, which makes its management quite cumbersome. As part of the 6th state reform, a bill passed in 2012 created the “Brussels metropolitan community” which in principle would cover the greater Brussels basin (>2 million inhabitants) and would facilitate policy coordination. Due to staunch resistance by some mayors in Flemish communes around Brussels and the reluctance of the N-VA (Flemish nationalists) to engage in such a logic, this legislation has yet to be implemented.
However, as the general process has trended toward decentralization, local efforts have had positive effects and can be seen as an improvement in strategic capacity.
The main bone of contention is the Brussels capital region (which is restricted to about one-fourth the actual Brussels agglomeration in terms of socioeconomic base, and one-half in terms of population). Its restricted boundaries result in numerous overlapping jurisdictions with Flanders and Wallonia. Moreover, within the Brussels region, competences are split between the 19 municipalities (communes/gemeeten) and the region. This creates another layer of overlaps and gridlocks, particularly with regard to city planning. The creation of a pedestrian zone in the city center, without sufficient coordination with the other municipalities or the region, created major traffic jams. Questions regarding the Brussels airport or the highway “ring” around Brussels are managed by Flanders. The building of a rapid train service to the south (to provide alternative transportation to Walloons commuting to Brussels) requires close administrative follow-up from the Walloon region, which has priorities beyond reducing traffic in Brussels. The large forest in the south of Brussels spans across the Brussels, Flemish and Walloon regions, which makes its management quite cumbersome. As part of the 6th state reform, a bill passed in 2012 created the “Brussels metropolitan community” which in principle would cover the greater Brussels basin (>2 million inhabitants) and would facilitate policy coordination. Due to staunch resistance by some mayors in Flemish communes around Brussels and the reluctance of the N-VA (Flemish nationalists) to engage in such a logic, this legislation has yet to be implemented.
However, as the general process has trended toward decentralization, local efforts have had positive effects and can be seen as an improvement in strategic capacity.