Executive Capacity
#35Key Findings
Hampered by instability, Bulgaria receives comparatively low rankings (rank 35) in the area of executive capacity. Its score on this measure has fallen by 0.4 points relative to its 2014 level.
Executive capabilities have been weakened by repeated short-lived coalitions and caretaker governments. Under the Petkov government that took office in 2021, the prime minister and finance minister took a greater oversight role in policy development. The prime minster was responsible for coordination among coalition parties.
RIAs are largely formalistic when performed. The frequency of public consultation increased substantially under the Petkov government. An expansion of public hearings was intended to improve communications, but messaging around the state budget remained inconsistent. Successive governments have failed to rein in the prosecutor general or depoliticize the judiciary.
The Petkov government increased funding for municipal governments. COVID-19 regulations were enforced in certain localities and against certain ethnic groups (especially Roma) in ways that violated rights. Bulgaria isolated itself international due to its position vis-à-vis North Macedonia. A diversity of opinion in the governing coalition regarding Russia complicated the country’s international relations.
Executive capabilities have been weakened by repeated short-lived coalitions and caretaker governments. Under the Petkov government that took office in 2021, the prime minister and finance minister took a greater oversight role in policy development. The prime minster was responsible for coordination among coalition parties.
RIAs are largely formalistic when performed. The frequency of public consultation increased substantially under the Petkov government. An expansion of public hearings was intended to improve communications, but messaging around the state budget remained inconsistent. Successive governments have failed to rein in the prosecutor general or depoliticize the judiciary.
The Petkov government increased funding for municipal governments. COVID-19 regulations were enforced in certain localities and against certain ethnic groups (especially Roma) in ways that violated rights. Bulgaria isolated itself international due to its position vis-à-vis North Macedonia. A diversity of opinion in the governing coalition regarding Russia complicated the country’s international relations.
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How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
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1
In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
In Bulgaria, systematic strategic planning is considered most important with regard to meeting EU membership requirements and preparing strategies and programs within the EU framework. These include the convergence program, the reform program as a part of the European Union’s 2020 strategy, and concrete strategical considerations in setting priorities for EU funds absorption. Under the macroeconomic imbalances procedure of the European Union, which categorizes Bulgaria as a country with imbalances, Bulgaria is obliged to integrate specific European Commission recommendations into the development of its policy strategies.
There are national strategies for security, energy, governance and the development of water resources, development of scientific research, Roma integration, physical education and sport. These strategies have been prepared in coordination with various ministries and on the basis of extensive discussions with the relevant expert communities. They are overseen by the line ministries and parliamentary committees responsible for these policy areas. Presently, the Council of Ministers’ portal for public consultations lists 160 “active” strategic documents relating to the national level. More than 20 of them were updated or created in 2019, and six have a time horizon that extends beyond 2025.
The deadlines for hearing and adopting strategies expired at the end of 2020 and within the first three months of 2021. The new seven-year strategies are weak, as they do not provide robust assessments of the previous period’s outcomes; the strategies are also overburdened by details that make it difficult to follow the trajectory of implementation; and, most importantly, they fail to evaluate which objectives have been met thus far and why.
To make matters worse, work on the strategies effectively came to a halt during the elections. The only strategic work performed by the caretaker governments has been on the Recovery and Resilience Plan, which was commented on by the European Commission in December. At the time of this writing (January 2022), the government is making amendments to the plan while other strategies have been put aside for the time being.
Citations:
Strategic documents at the national level (a list of documents in Bulgarian), available at: http://strategy.bg/StrategicDocumentsHandler.ashx?lang=1&type=1
There are national strategies for security, energy, governance and the development of water resources, development of scientific research, Roma integration, physical education and sport. These strategies have been prepared in coordination with various ministries and on the basis of extensive discussions with the relevant expert communities. They are overseen by the line ministries and parliamentary committees responsible for these policy areas. Presently, the Council of Ministers’ portal for public consultations lists 160 “active” strategic documents relating to the national level. More than 20 of them were updated or created in 2019, and six have a time horizon that extends beyond 2025.
The deadlines for hearing and adopting strategies expired at the end of 2020 and within the first three months of 2021. The new seven-year strategies are weak, as they do not provide robust assessments of the previous period’s outcomes; the strategies are also overburdened by details that make it difficult to follow the trajectory of implementation; and, most importantly, they fail to evaluate which objectives have been met thus far and why.
To make matters worse, work on the strategies effectively came to a halt during the elections. The only strategic work performed by the caretaker governments has been on the Recovery and Resilience Plan, which was commented on by the European Commission in December. At the time of this writing (January 2022), the government is making amendments to the plan while other strategies have been put aside for the time being.
Citations:
Strategic documents at the national level (a list of documents in Bulgarian), available at: http://strategy.bg/StrategicDocumentsHandler.ashx?lang=1&type=1
Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?
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In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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1
The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
In Bulgaria, there are various ways to consult stakeholders and experts, including a special online portal at the Council of Ministers and more than 70 advisory councils. The government has also begun seeking out expertise by forming public councils linked to specific ministries. Representatives of academia and research institutes are traditionally included in the process on an ad hoc basis.
Apart from opinions for strategies in the fields of social inclusion, poverty, jobs and social policy, no other strategies received any attention in 2021. The three versions of the Recovery and Resilience Plan were widely discussed too, but very few promising proposals were taken by the government drafters.
Amendments to the state budget of 2021 and the provisional framework for the 2022 budget were also extensively discussed by the Fiscal Council and independent experts. There is currently little indication which suggestions will be included.
Citations:
Council of Ministers, public consultations portal: www.strategy.bg
Council of Ministers, advisory councils portal: saveti.government.bg
Apart from opinions for strategies in the fields of social inclusion, poverty, jobs and social policy, no other strategies received any attention in 2021. The three versions of the Recovery and Resilience Plan were widely discussed too, but very few promising proposals were taken by the government drafters.
Amendments to the state budget of 2021 and the provisional framework for the 2022 budget were also extensively discussed by the Fiscal Council and independent experts. There is currently little indication which suggestions will be included.
Citations:
Council of Ministers, public consultations portal: www.strategy.bg
Council of Ministers, advisory councils portal: saveti.government.bg
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Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?
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The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
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The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
The official government office in Bulgaria, the Administration of the Council of Ministers, plays a mainly administrative role. It prepares cabinet meetings, but has very limited capacity for in-depth evaluation of the policy content of line-ministry proposals. The prime minister’s own political-cabinet staff is relatively small and has little expertise to evaluate the policy content of line-ministry proposals.
The 2021 elections changed the style in which coordination is conducted. Focused more on dialogue, coordination now involves more extensive public hearings and the policies of the newly elected government are expected to draw upon unprecedented coalition agreement details.
Different ministries are chaired by different political parties. Political coordination is a task for the prime minister.
The circulation of draft bills and executive consultation is a fairly established process. The current Prime Minister’s Office will potentially pay more attention to impact assessment procedures and summaries before publishing drafts for public discussion.
The 2021 elections changed the style in which coordination is conducted. Focused more on dialogue, coordination now involves more extensive public hearings and the policies of the newly elected government are expected to draw upon unprecedented coalition agreement details.
Different ministries are chaired by different political parties. Political coordination is a task for the prime minister.
The circulation of draft bills and executive consultation is a fairly established process. The current Prime Minister’s Office will potentially pay more attention to impact assessment procedures and summaries before publishing drafts for public discussion.
To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?
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There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
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The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
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Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
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Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
Line ministries tend to prepare policy proposals independently and introduce them to the prime minister and the Council of Ministers when they are completed. The prime minister and the Administration of the Council of Ministers are consulted when proposals cross ministerial lines, or are incompatible with other proposed or existing legislation. Even in such cases, the involvement of the administration tends to focus mainly on technical and drafting issues and formal legal considerations. There are no official procedures for consulting the prime minister during the preparation of policy proposals. Since the Petkov government had split ministerial portfolios along political party lines, conflicting visions and policy designs soon became visible, especially between the ministries of economy, agriculture, regional development and social policy.
How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?
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The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
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Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
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There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
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There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
No cabinet or ministerial committees coordinate proposals for cabinet meetings in Bulgaria. There are many cross-cutting advisory councils that include several ministers or high-ranking representatives of different ministries and have some coordinating functions. These might thus be seen as functional equivalents to ministerial or cabinet committees. The role of the councils, which often feature rather broad membership, is quite limited in substantive terms. Inasmuch as there are individual members from various ministries who sit on a number of such committees, their personal involvement may ensure some level of coordination between proposals.
Formally and informally, in effect of the nature of the four-party coalition government, this tradition is subject to change, and to include more oversight on behalf of the ministers and the prime ministers.
Formally and informally, in effect of the nature of the four-party coalition government, this tradition is subject to change, and to include more oversight on behalf of the ministers and the prime ministers.
How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?
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Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
Some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials and civil servants takes place, but the relevant issues are usually resolved at the political level. Within the ministries, a departmentalist culture has prevailed, characterized by a high segmentation / insulation of ministries and little interministerial coordination on the level of senior civil servants.
The organizational structure of the December 2021 cabinet was intended to change this culture. One element of the new structure has been an intended closer oversight on the part of the prime minister and the finance minister, who is also a deputy prime minister.
The organizational structure of the December 2021 cabinet was intended to change this culture. One element of the new structure has been an intended closer oversight on the part of the prime minister and the finance minister, who is also a deputy prime minister.
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Given the tendency of the Bulgarian political system to produce coalition governments, informal coordination mechanisms have played a vital role in interministerial coordination. The rules of coordination between government coalition parties or parties supporting the government are traditionally not communicated to the public. In 2019, informal coordination within the governing coalition was complicated by the fact that the junior partner, a coalition of three nationalistic parties, had de facto fallen apart, with its three leaders engaging in severe and public attacks on one another. This forced Prime Minister Borissov to rely on purely ad hoc tactics in every specific decision-making context.
Prime Minister Petkov has a similar style but his informal coordination is likely to be based on groups of experts with a European background, while the overall informality will be somewhat reduced by coalition partners’ party bureaucracies and policy advisors
Prime Minister Petkov has a similar style but his informal coordination is likely to be based on groups of experts with a European background, while the overall informality will be somewhat reduced by coalition partners’ party bureaucracies and policy advisors
How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?
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The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
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The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
The 2014 – 2020 e-government strategy and the State e-Government Agency, established in 2016, aim to improve interministerial communication through the use of digital technologies. The necessary infrastructure for electronic document flows and communication between ministries exists and is increasingly used.
A minister of digitalization was created in 2021. The individual appointed to the position has experience working with the executive as a former advisor to the government. The section on digitalization within the Recovery and Resilience Plan is well written and the process seems to have the proper budgetary support.
A minister of digitalization was created in 2021. The individual appointed to the position has experience working with the executive as a former advisor to the government. The section on digitalization within the Recovery and Resilience Plan is well written and the process seems to have the proper budgetary support.
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To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?
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RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
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RIA are not applied or do not exist.
RIA practice in Bulgaria can be traced back to central planning practices that started in 1971. The respective law (on normative acts) remained in force until 2004, and a updated RIA procedures were added in 2007.
Changes in the legal framework for RIA in 2016 improved the quality of RIA. However, ministries still take a largely formal approach, and the level of understanding and experience on the part of ministerial experts responsible for preparing the assessments is improving but deficient.
Assessments for legislative proposals sponsored by individual members of parliament continued to be of poor quality until the end of 2020. The newly elected parliament amended its rules to include obligatory RIAs on individual members of parliament’s draft bill, and this requirement is likely to work.
Changes in the legal framework for RIA in 2016 improved the quality of RIA. However, ministries still take a largely formal approach, and the level of understanding and experience on the part of ministerial experts responsible for preparing the assessments is improving but deficient.
Assessments for legislative proposals sponsored by individual members of parliament continued to be of poor quality until the end of 2020. The newly elected parliament amended its rules to include obligatory RIAs on individual members of parliament’s draft bill, and this requirement is likely to work.
Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?
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RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
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The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
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The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
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RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
With the exception of the assessment of budgetary and environmental impacts of proposed legislation, RIAs are largely formal in nature. Once a proposed draft has entered the phase of public consultation, civil society and academic actors are able to offer their own assessments, which are subsequently filed with the proposal and made available to the public online.
The legal framework for impact assessments was reformed in 2016. The methodology used both for acts of parliament and Council of Ministers decisions has been completed and published. In 2018, 22 full assessments were performed for newly proposed laws in parliament, double the amount conducted in 2017. However, the overall number of full and partial assessments together decreased by 16% from 410 to 345 in 2018. The number declined by another 15% from 2019 to 2020. The 2020 IA Report concludes that this is the worst year since the first report in 2017.
The situation worsened further in 2018-2020, when roughly 50% of the bills were submitted to the legislature with no RIA summary, and 60% of the legislative act were amendments to already adopted laws.
The regulatory process did not improve in 2021.
Citations:
Administration of the Council of Ministers (2019): Impact assessment: annual report for 2018 (in Bulgarian). Sofia (http://strategy.bg/FileHandler.ashx?fileId=16640).
Administration of the Council of Ministers (2021): Impact assessment: annual report for 2020. https://strategy.bg/Publications/View.aspx?lang=bg-BG&categoryId=&Id=330&y=&m=&d=
Institute for Public Administration (2018): Methodology for ex ante impact assessment of normative acts and programs (in Bulgarian). Sofia (https://www.ipa.government.bg/sites/default/files/metodika_korektura_all.pdf).
The legal framework for impact assessments was reformed in 2016. The methodology used both for acts of parliament and Council of Ministers decisions has been completed and published. In 2018, 22 full assessments were performed for newly proposed laws in parliament, double the amount conducted in 2017. However, the overall number of full and partial assessments together decreased by 16% from 410 to 345 in 2018. The number declined by another 15% from 2019 to 2020. The 2020 IA Report concludes that this is the worst year since the first report in 2017.
The situation worsened further in 2018-2020, when roughly 50% of the bills were submitted to the legislature with no RIA summary, and 60% of the legislative act were amendments to already adopted laws.
The regulatory process did not improve in 2021.
Citations:
Administration of the Council of Ministers (2019): Impact assessment: annual report for 2018 (in Bulgarian). Sofia (http://strategy.bg/FileHandler.ashx?fileId=16640).
Administration of the Council of Ministers (2021): Impact assessment: annual report for 2020. https://strategy.bg/Publications/View.aspx?lang=bg-BG&categoryId=&Id=330&y=&m=&d=
Institute for Public Administration (2018): Methodology for ex ante impact assessment of normative acts and programs (in Bulgarian). Sofia (https://www.ipa.government.bg/sites/default/files/metodika_korektura_all.pdf).
Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?
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Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
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Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
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Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
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Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
Most of the regulatory impact assessments in Bulgaria are merely formal, with the exception of those involving budgetary and environmental issues. Bulgaria has a Fiscal Council, which assesses the fiscal sustainability of proposed regulations and policies. Environmental checks focus mostly on issues of pollution and wilderness protection, and less on greenhouse gas emissions. Other economic and social impacts are generally addressed superficially, and the input of non-government actors in the public-consultation process, although formally sought, has little visible impact.
Sustainability checks and sunset procedures are required, but are formal in nature and are not carried out in practice.
Sustainability checks and sunset procedures are required, but are formal in nature and are not carried out in practice.
To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?
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Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
The rules for impact assessments in Bulgaria established in 2016 require an ex post evaluation of policies and their effects within five years of their implementation. By the end of the review period in 2021, only two such evaluations had been published through the government’s public-consultation portal.
In 2020-2021, the legislative process was often motivated by COVID-19 considerations and almost exclusively referred to the state of emergency situation. Ministerial executive orders were evaluated only by the next cabinet.
In 2020-2021, the legislative process was often motivated by COVID-19 considerations and almost exclusively referred to the state of emergency situation. Ministerial executive orders were evaluated only by the next cabinet.
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Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?
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The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
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The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
Various interests are generally represented and involved in consultations in Bulgaria’s policymaking process. The National Council for Tripartite Cooperation, which includes representatives of the government, trade unions and employer associations, is traditionally integrated into many decisions. Over the years, this council has evolved into a major forum not only for advice and consultation, but also for the negotiation of various policies and the adoption of specific proposals that are later formally confirmed by the legislature. Other societal actors, including minority organizations, environmental and other interest groups are represented in the more than 70 advisory councils at different levels of government. In practice, however, their influence on decisions is limited. The legislative process also includes a period for public consultation on proposals, but this step is in many cases either too short to allow for in-depth analysis and discussion, or is simply skipped. An increasing number of government agencies are making their deliberations open to the general public as a default policy.
In 2021, the government substantially increased the number of consultations.
In 2021, the government substantially increased the number of consultations.
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To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?
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Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
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Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
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Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
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Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
Government communication in Bulgaria exhibits a relatively low degree of coherence. The various ministries’ communication activities are not centrally coordinated, so it is easy for the media to identify inconsistencies and contradictions in the information they release and the positions taken. This tends to be more pronounced under coalition governments in which the various ministries are headed by representatives of different parties.
Public announcements and communications were often intended to hide rather than highlight and explain the true intentions behind proposed regulations and policies.
The expansion of public decisions and hearings in 2021 and 2022 has been intended to improve communication. In some cases, these measures have achieved a better level of coherence in areas such as judicial reform. However, communication and arguments in the area of the 2022 state budget have been rather inconsistent.
Public announcements and communications were often intended to hide rather than highlight and explain the true intentions behind proposed regulations and policies.
The expansion of public decisions and hearings in 2021 and 2022 has been intended to improve communication. In some cases, these measures have achieved a better level of coherence in areas such as judicial reform. However, communication and arguments in the area of the 2022 state budget have been rather inconsistent.
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To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?
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The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
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The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
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The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
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The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
Bulgarian governments avoid setting policy-performance benchmarks that are available to the public. The main exceptions are within the area of macroeconomic policy, especially regarding the budget and compliance with the high-profile requirements of EU membership. While the government has succeeded in controlling the fiscal deficit and public debt, it has not been successful in its long-standing objective of joining the Schengen Area. It has been partially successful in the objective of exiting the EU’s macroeconomic imbalances procedure, since these are no longer regarded as being excessive. Another important policy objective – integration into the euro area and the European banking union – has been furthered somewhat, with the government’s negotiations with its EU partners successfully producing a clear roadmap outlining key measures to be introduced.
There have been several test cases in 2021 and 2022, the most important being the Recovery and Resilience Plan and the Plan to Join the Eurozone. In both instances, the new government demonstrated some capacity to work consistently in targeting its stated objectives.
Government-body budgeting in Bulgaria remains primarily based on historical expenditures, and does not involve programmatic elements, which would necessitate benchmarking and measurement.
The Borisov government and its two successive caretaker governments have failed to limit the powers of the prosecutor general, to depoliticize the Supreme Judicial Council and to effectively prosecute high-level political corruption.
There have been several test cases in 2021 and 2022, the most important being the Recovery and Resilience Plan and the Plan to Join the Eurozone. In both instances, the new government demonstrated some capacity to work consistently in targeting its stated objectives.
Government-body budgeting in Bulgaria remains primarily based on historical expenditures, and does not involve programmatic elements, which would necessitate benchmarking and measurement.
The Borisov government and its two successive caretaker governments have failed to limit the powers of the prosecutor general, to depoliticize the Supreme Judicial Council and to effectively prosecute high-level political corruption.
To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?
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The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
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The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
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The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
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The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
The prime minister does not have significant legal powers over the other ministers. The constitution defines the Council of Ministers as a collective body presided over by the prime minister. The position of the prime minister thus strongly depends on the officeholder’s informal political authority and ability to appoint and dismiss deputy ministers.
The construction of the 2021 coalition government assigns a very substantial oversight role to the prime minister. The fact that the finance minister is a deputy prime minister also promises better coordination. At the time of this writing (January 2022), it remains unclear whether this new model will be implemented with success.
The construction of the 2021 coalition government assigns a very substantial oversight role to the prime minister. The fact that the finance minister is a deputy prime minister also promises better coordination. At the time of this writing (January 2022), it remains unclear whether this new model will be implemented with success.
How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?
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The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
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The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
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The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
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The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
The Council of Ministers’ administration typically lacks the capacity to monitor the implementation activities of the line ministries.
The 2021 government has announced that it plans to reduce the number of public servants by 8%, which is a potentially reachable but risky goal in terms of the administrative capacity to monitor ministries.
The chief secretary of the Council of Ministers’ administration and the specialized directorates of the administration can exercise oversight of most of the line ministries’ policy activities, especially in the areas financed through EU funds.
The chief secretary and the directorates also provide some administrative support to the prime minister and the head of his political cabinet, who exercise more direct control over the ministries on a political basis. The exercise of control tends to be informal, through the party apparatuses, and the strictness with which control is applied seems to be a function of the political context, especially under a coalition government.
The 2021 government has announced that it plans to reduce the number of public servants by 8%, which is a potentially reachable but risky goal in terms of the administrative capacity to monitor ministries.
The chief secretary of the Council of Ministers’ administration and the specialized directorates of the administration can exercise oversight of most of the line ministries’ policy activities, especially in the areas financed through EU funds.
The chief secretary and the directorates also provide some administrative support to the prime minister and the head of his political cabinet, who exercise more direct control over the ministries on a political basis. The exercise of control tends to be informal, through the party apparatuses, and the strictness with which control is applied seems to be a function of the political context, especially under a coalition government.
How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
8
7
6
7
6
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
5
4
3
4
3
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
2
1
1
The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
Ministries’ capacity to monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies and executive agencies within their task areas is quite limited in institutional terms. For example, a serious shortcoming was revealed in 2019 with the Ministry of Finance’s failure to monitor the revenue agency’s implementation of personal-data protection policies. Insofar as monitoring takes place, it generally focuses only on high-priority areas (e.g., the absorption of EU funds), and tends to rely on informal rather than formal mechanisms.
Under coalition governments, monitoring is further limited by the practice of dividing government, bureaucratic and agency appointments between coalition partners. Consequently, ministers from one party are impeded from effectively monitoring agency heads from another party.
Under coalition governments, monitoring is further limited by the practice of dividing government, bureaucratic and agency appointments between coalition partners. Consequently, ministers from one party are impeded from effectively monitoring agency heads from another party.
To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
8
7
6
7
6
The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
2
1
1
The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
One of the promises of the governing coalition formed at the end of 2021 was that they would consider 2% of the 10% income taxes to remain at the disposal of the municipal government where the income was produced in the first place.
As of today, local governments in Bulgaria receive most of their revenues from the central government and have a very limited revenue base of their own. Municipalities receive funding from the central government in three ways: a portion of the revenues from some general taxes are designated for municipal budgets; the central government subsidizes municipal budgets; and the central government delegates some tasks (mostly responsibility for managing schools and hospitals) to municipalities, transferring the associated financing to them (known as delegated budgets).
The National Association of Municipalities claims that the central government routinely leaves delegated functions underfunded. There have also been allegations that the central government favors municipalities headed by the parties governing at the national level.
Currently, all revenues, except for municipal taxes, are to be sent to the central government, which means mayors must request transfers. No changes are currently under discussion, as the reform mentioned above is intended to address the problem.
As of today, local governments in Bulgaria receive most of their revenues from the central government and have a very limited revenue base of their own. Municipalities receive funding from the central government in three ways: a portion of the revenues from some general taxes are designated for municipal budgets; the central government subsidizes municipal budgets; and the central government delegates some tasks (mostly responsibility for managing schools and hospitals) to municipalities, transferring the associated financing to them (known as delegated budgets).
The National Association of Municipalities claims that the central government routinely leaves delegated functions underfunded. There have also been allegations that the central government favors municipalities headed by the parties governing at the national level.
Currently, all revenues, except for municipal taxes, are to be sent to the central government, which means mayors must request transfers. No changes are currently under discussion, as the reform mentioned above is intended to address the problem.
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
2
1
1
The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
Bulgaria is a unitary state with two levels of government – national and municipal. The constitution vests municipalities with a relatively broad set of powers and competencies, and the law generally respects this independence. However, in reality most Bulgarian municipalities are financially dependent on central government transfers, because their own revenue base is inadequate.
In 2016, the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works adopted a new decentralization strategy for the next 10 years. Compared to its largely ineffective predecessor, it has a broader scope and covers not only fiscal matters, but the functions of different tiers of government as well. The strategy was accompanied by an implementation program for the 2016 – 2019 period. Its implementation was meant to be monitored by a newly created council on the decentralization of state government. However, this council has existed only on paper. No evaluation of the implementation program has been published thus far, and in 2021, no new implementation program for the coming years had been published.
The expiration of various municipal development in 2021 meant that new seven-year plans were to be drafted and adopted by the end of the year; this process is still underway.
Citations:
OECD (2021): Decentralisation and Regionalisation in Bulgaria, https://doi.org/10.1787/b5ab8109-en
https://read.oecd.org/10.1787/b5ab8109-en?format=read#page17
In 2016, the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works adopted a new decentralization strategy for the next 10 years. Compared to its largely ineffective predecessor, it has a broader scope and covers not only fiscal matters, but the functions of different tiers of government as well. The strategy was accompanied by an implementation program for the 2016 – 2019 period. Its implementation was meant to be monitored by a newly created council on the decentralization of state government. However, this council has existed only on paper. No evaluation of the implementation program has been published thus far, and in 2021, no new implementation program for the coming years had been published.
The expiration of various municipal development in 2021 meant that new seven-year plans were to be drafted and adopted by the end of the year; this process is still underway.
Citations:
OECD (2021): Decentralisation and Regionalisation in Bulgaria, https://doi.org/10.1787/b5ab8109-en
https://read.oecd.org/10.1787/b5ab8109-en?format=read#page17
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?
10
9
9
Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
2
1
1
Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
In Bulgaria, the effectiveness of national-government oversight and compliance with national standards in the decentralized provision of public services differ among functional spheres. For example, education is provided by local schools with standards upheld relatively objectively and effectively through external evaluation and regional and local inspection. However, in the sphere of environmental, waste-management and forestry standards, as well as in the local healthcare sector, monitoring is uneven, and some localities have much lower standards than others. The extent to which different municipalities’ regulations are compliant with regulatory standards set in national law also varies.
To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?
10
9
9
Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
8
7
6
7
6
Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
5
4
3
4
3
Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
2
1
1
Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
Government regulatory enforcement in Bulgaria is biased and uneven. On numerous occasions over recent years, government agencies have enforced regulations inconsistently for different actors, favoring specific vested interests and penalizing potential competitors to these vested interests. Examples include biases in the implementation of the competition-protection framework in banking and non-bank financial supervision, public procurement, post-privatization monitoring, and the energy and media sectors. In 2019, scandals involving prominent political figures’ real-estate deals made it clear that building-permit regulations in Sofia are implemented very unevenly. In 2021, a non-competitive process for large procurement orders was applied; the investigation of cash payments totaling more than BGN 20 million are still underway.
In 2020, COVID-19 emergency regulations were enforced in certain localities and among specific ethnic groups, including Roma, in ways that blatantly violated privacy and other rights. The regulations themselves were of poor quality.
In 2020, COVID-19 emergency regulations were enforced in certain localities and among specific ethnic groups, including Roma, in ways that blatantly violated privacy and other rights. The regulations themselves were of poor quality.
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To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?
10
9
9
The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
8
7
6
7
6
In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
2
1
1
The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
The year 2021 is likely to mark some progress in domestic coordination, and in the coordination of the country’s policy stance vis-a-vis North Macedonia’s and Albania’s accession to the European Union – a stance that remains difficult for EU outsiders to understand.
The diversity of opinions within the government regarding Russia complicates matters, as does the president’s obvious intent to play a central role in international and NATO affairs.
EU and NATO membership imposes a clear necessity on the Bulgarian government to be able to respond to and adopt changes based on international and supranational developments. Beyond changes in recent years related to this, the primary governmental structures and their methods of operation have remained largely unchanged.
One area in which organizational changes related to supranational developments seem to be leading to improvement is the implementation of EU-funded programs and mechanisms; this is particularly evident in areas such as transportation and environmental-protection infrastructure, and less so with regard to agricultural subsidies and judicial reform.
In 2017, the government adapted to its upcoming presidency of the Council of the European Union by creating a Ministry of the Bulgarian Presidency. Its operation was deemed successful and by all standards it was a success, and at the end of 2018 the ministry was dissolved, indicating that the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances remained.
A next challenge will be the adaptation of government structures to upcoming changes in the EU funding framework, both in terms of EU earmarked revenues and post-COVID-19 recovery transfers.
The diversity of opinions within the government regarding Russia complicates matters, as does the president’s obvious intent to play a central role in international and NATO affairs.
EU and NATO membership imposes a clear necessity on the Bulgarian government to be able to respond to and adopt changes based on international and supranational developments. Beyond changes in recent years related to this, the primary governmental structures and their methods of operation have remained largely unchanged.
One area in which organizational changes related to supranational developments seem to be leading to improvement is the implementation of EU-funded programs and mechanisms; this is particularly evident in areas such as transportation and environmental-protection infrastructure, and less so with regard to agricultural subsidies and judicial reform.
In 2017, the government adapted to its upcoming presidency of the Council of the European Union by creating a Ministry of the Bulgarian Presidency. Its operation was deemed successful and by all standards it was a success, and at the end of 2018 the ministry was dissolved, indicating that the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances remained.
A next challenge will be the adaptation of government structures to upcoming changes in the EU funding framework, both in terms of EU earmarked revenues and post-COVID-19 recovery transfers.
To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?
10
9
9
The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
2
1
1
The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
Government bodies in Bulgaria have the capacity to correspond and coordinate with international institutions, and to participate in international processes and initiatives. Yet Bulgaria is still primarily reactive in terms of international efforts to foster the provision of global public goods and its level of commitment to such causes remains relatively low. Factors contributing to this situation include insufficient capacity, political cautiousness with regard to international commitments and, recently, an increase in xenophobia as represented by portions of the governing coalition.
More often than not, Bulgaria tends to take part in international efforts but waits for the international community to formulate policies, set goals and benchmarks. It then does its best to implement those domestically. Inasmuch as there is coordination and assessment going on, it is for these reactive purposes.
In 2021, Bulgaria’s position vis-à-vis North Macedonia resulted in an unintended form of self-isolation.
More often than not, Bulgaria tends to take part in international efforts but waits for the international community to formulate policies, set goals and benchmarks. It then does its best to implement those domestically. Inasmuch as there is coordination and assessment going on, it is for these reactive purposes.
In 2021, Bulgaria’s position vis-à-vis North Macedonia resulted in an unintended form of self-isolation.
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To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?
10
9
9
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
5
4
3
4
3
The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
2
1
1
There is no monitoring.
During the period under review, there were no formal ex ante mechanisms for monitoring whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate. Efforts to reflect on the structure of governance and institutional arrangements take place only after the fact, that is, when a problem becomes serious enough or a crisis emerges and are generally driven by public pressure or pressure from some other government body.
Coordination within the government and amendments to the parliamentary rules of procedure are likely to correct this deficiencies.
The governing coalition formed at the end of 2021 committed itself to reforming the anti-corruption agency. On January 14, 2022, the chairman of the agency (the former prosecutor general) resigned, thus making way for a reform of this institution.
The improved access to public information and restored independence of the media are forcing the government to better organize the monitoring process.
Coordination within the government and amendments to the parliamentary rules of procedure are likely to correct this deficiencies.
The governing coalition formed at the end of 2021 committed itself to reforming the anti-corruption agency. On January 14, 2022, the chairman of the agency (the former prosecutor general) resigned, thus making way for a reform of this institution.
The improved access to public information and restored independence of the media are forcing the government to better organize the monitoring process.
To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?
10
9
9
The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
8
7
6
7
6
The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
2
1
1
The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
Bulgarian government bodies do have the capacity to reform, both in the case of reforms initiated from within and reforms originating externally. It is becoming customary for ministries to publish their medium-term plans as a part of the annual budget procedure. However, even when reforms in different spheres are seriously contemplated, reform proposals are still rarely connected with strategic thinking about changes in the institutional arrangements of governance.