Quality of Democracy
#36Key Findings
With a number of weak spots, Bulgaria falls into the bottom ranks internationally (rank 36) with regard to democracy quality. Its score on this measure has declined by 0.4 points relative to 2014.
The party-financing regime was overhauled in 2019, diminishing state support and giving a greater role to uncapped business-sector donations. Parties are required to submit financial reports and are penalized for irregularities. Observers suspect that parties underreport totals. Electronic voting was introduced in 2021, without reports of problems.
New anti-corruption rules have been put in place. While governments have exerted significant influence over the media in recent years, this pressure has subsided somewhat. Media pluralism has expanded, although a number of small and regional outlets shut down during the pandemic.
The overuse of force by law enforcement, particularly against Roma and protesters, is a serious problem. The Roma minority is marginalized, and the public discourse is increasingly xenophobic. The prosecutor general has acted without accountability, even raiding presidential advisors. NGOs and independent journalists have presented evidence that the officeholder has abused his position.
The party-financing regime was overhauled in 2019, diminishing state support and giving a greater role to uncapped business-sector donations. Parties are required to submit financial reports and are penalized for irregularities. Observers suspect that parties underreport totals. Electronic voting was introduced in 2021, without reports of problems.
New anti-corruption rules have been put in place. While governments have exerted significant influence over the media in recent years, this pressure has subsided somewhat. Media pluralism has expanded, although a number of small and regional outlets shut down during the pandemic.
The overuse of force by law enforcement, particularly against Roma and protesters, is a serious problem. The Roma minority is marginalized, and the public discourse is increasingly xenophobic. The prosecutor general has acted without accountability, even raiding presidential advisors. NGOs and independent journalists have presented evidence that the officeholder has abused his position.
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How fair are procedures for registering candidates and parties?
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Legal regulations provide for a fair registration procedure for all elections; candidates and parties are not discriminated against.
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A few restrictions on election procedures discriminate against a small number of candidates and parties.
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Some unreasonable restrictions on election procedures exist that discriminate against many candidates and parties.
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Discriminating registration procedures for elections are widespread and prevent a large number of potential candidates or parties from participating.
Bulgaria’s present electoral code has been in force since 2014. Registration processes for parties and candidates are fair and transparent. Candidate registration requires a candidate to be registered as a member of a party, coalition of parties or nominating committee. For the registration of parties or nominating committees, a bank deposit and a certain number of citizen signatures are required. Citizens of other countries cannot run for public office, unless they are EU citizens running for office in municipal or European Parliament elections. A constitutional clause prohibits the formation of “ethnically based and religious” parties, but because it cannot be applied retroactively, it has no impact on the existence of parties in place before the first post-Communist elections (June 1990), such as the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) representing Bulgarian Turks and Muslims.
The Bulgarian constitution does not allow Bulgarian citizens with dual citizenship to run as candidates or serve in office, a requirement which runs against international best practices. This became relevant in the case of Prime Minister Kiril Petkov, whose status as a dual citizen of Bulgaria and Canada became the object of a Constitutional Court case in the fall of 2021. Petkov, who had served as minister of the economy under Stefan Yanev’s caretaker government in the summer of 2021 and was elected as prime minister by parliament following the November 2021 elections, renounced his Canadian citizenship in April 2021. However, because the procedure was not formally complete until August 2021, the court retroactively overturned his appointment as minister of the economy, effectively upholding the constitutional ban on citizens with foreign passports running for public office. No changes in this area are anticipated for the near future.
Contrary to best practices and OSCE recommendations, voter registration remains strict with regard to those who fail to meet the registration deadlines.
The Bulgarian constitution does not allow Bulgarian citizens with dual citizenship to run as candidates or serve in office, a requirement which runs against international best practices. This became relevant in the case of Prime Minister Kiril Petkov, whose status as a dual citizen of Bulgaria and Canada became the object of a Constitutional Court case in the fall of 2021. Petkov, who had served as minister of the economy under Stefan Yanev’s caretaker government in the summer of 2021 and was elected as prime minister by parliament following the November 2021 elections, renounced his Canadian citizenship in April 2021. However, because the procedure was not formally complete until August 2021, the court retroactively overturned his appointment as minister of the economy, effectively upholding the constitutional ban on citizens with foreign passports running for public office. No changes in this area are anticipated for the near future.
Contrary to best practices and OSCE recommendations, voter registration remains strict with regard to those who fail to meet the registration deadlines.
To what extent do candidates and parties have fair access to the media and other means of communication?
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All candidates and parties have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. All major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of the range of different political positions.
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Candidates and parties have largely equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. The major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of different political positions.
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Candidates and parties often do not have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. While the major media outlets represent a partisan political bias, the media system as a whole provides fair coverage of different political positions.
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Candidates and parties lack equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communications. The major media outlets are biased in favor of certain political groups or views and discriminate against others.
Media access for candidates and parties differs between publicly and privately run media. The public broadcast media – one TV and one radio station with several channels each – are required by law to provide full and balanced coverage and to set aside presentation time for every candidate and registered party or coalition. With a large number of parties or candidates usually in the running, splitting the time between each is a serious challenge. Between electoral campaigns, parties not already represented in parliament have little access to public media, especially if they are considered to be potentially serious competitors by the incumbent parties.
Candidates with enough resources face no restrictions to access in private media outlets. Most national private TV and radio broadcasters, with the exception of broadcasters with close relationships to (or owned by) political parties and/or leaders, remain relatively objective throughout campaigns.
Most candidates relied heavily on internet media during the four electoral campaigns of 2021.
Citations:
Price, L. T. (2018). “Bear in Mind… and Do Not Bite the Hand That Feeds You”: Institutionalized Self-Censorship and Its Impact on Journalistic Practice in Postcommunist Countries – the Case of Bulgaria. In: Eric Freedman, Robyn S. Goodman, Elanie Steyn (eds.), Critical Perspectives on Journalistic Beliefs and Actions. London/ New York: Routledge, 211-221.
Candidates with enough resources face no restrictions to access in private media outlets. Most national private TV and radio broadcasters, with the exception of broadcasters with close relationships to (or owned by) political parties and/or leaders, remain relatively objective throughout campaigns.
Most candidates relied heavily on internet media during the four electoral campaigns of 2021.
Citations:
Price, L. T. (2018). “Bear in Mind… and Do Not Bite the Hand That Feeds You”: Institutionalized Self-Censorship and Its Impact on Journalistic Practice in Postcommunist Countries – the Case of Bulgaria. In: Eric Freedman, Robyn S. Goodman, Elanie Steyn (eds.), Critical Perspectives on Journalistic Beliefs and Actions. London/ New York: Routledge, 211-221.
To what extent do all citizens have the opportunity to exercise their right of participation in national elections?
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All adult citizens can participate in national elections. All eligible voters are registered if they wish to be. There are no discriminations observable in the exercise of the right to vote. There are no disincentives to voting.
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The procedures for the registration of voters and voting are for the most part effective, impartial and nondiscriminatory. Citizens can appeal to courts if they feel being discriminated. Disincentives to voting generally do not constitute genuine obstacles.
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While the procedures for the registration of voters and voting are de jure non-discriminatory, isolated cases of discrimination occur in practice. For some citizens, disincentives to voting constitute significant obstacles.
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The procedures for the registration of voters or voting have systemic discriminatory effects. De facto, a substantial number of adult citizens are excluded from national elections.
Bulgarian voters are registered by default through voter lists maintained by the municipalities. Voter lists are published in advance of election day, and voters can also check online to see if they are on the lists. Every person who is not included in the voter list at their place of residence can ask to be included, and if not included can appeal to the courts. However, concerns persist as to whether persons without a permanent address (about 1% of the population), most of them Roma, are not registered in voter lists. Bulgarian citizens residing abroad have the right to vote in parliamentary and presidential elections, as well as in national referendums. In May 2021, the electoral code was amended to introduce electronic voting for most voters and to remove the limitations on the total number of polling stations that can be established abroad. There were no reports of irregularities affecting the implementation of electronic voting during the parliamentary elections in November 2021.
Contrary to ECHR recommendations, people serving prison sentences are not allowed to vote. Citizens can obtain permits to vote outside of their permanent place of residence
Citations:
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights: Republic of Bulgaria. Early Parliamentary Elections 11 July 2021. ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 22 October 2021. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/b/502110.pdf
Contrary to ECHR recommendations, people serving prison sentences are not allowed to vote. Citizens can obtain permits to vote outside of their permanent place of residence
Citations:
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights: Republic of Bulgaria. Early Parliamentary Elections 11 July 2021. ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 22 October 2021. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/b/502110.pdf
To what extent is private and public party financing and electoral campaign financing transparent, effectively monitored and in case of infringement of rules subject to proportionate and dissuasive sanction?
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The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and provides for independent monitoring to that respect. Effective measures to prevent evasion are effectively in place and infringements subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.
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The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and provides for independent monitoring. Although infringements are subject to proportionate sanctions, some, although few, loopholes and options for circumvention still exist.
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The state provides that donations to political parties shall be published. Party financing is subject to some degree of independent monitoring but monitoring either proves regularly ineffective or proportionate sanctions in case of infringement do not follow.
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The rules for party and campaign financing do not effectively enforce the obligation to make the donations public. Party and campaign financing is neither monitored independently nor, in case of infringements, subject to proportionate sanctions.
Party financing in Bulgaria is regulated by the Political Parties Act. The party-financing regime was significantly overhauled in 2019, which resulted in decreasing the annual support provided to parties with more than 1% of the vote in the last parliamentary election from BGN 11 to BGN 1 per voter. To compensate for this loss of revenues, the prohibition on donations from businesses was eliminated.
The decline in state subsidies for parties is likely to weaken the parties with high vote shares. The greater reliance on business-sector money is likely to create linkages between parties and business interests.
Party financing is overseen by the Audit Office, and parties are obliged to submit an annual financial report of all their properties as well as an income statement. Reports must also be submitted after each electoral campaign; reports on budgets larger than €25,000 must be certified by an independent auditor.
A recent report on campaign spending during the last parliamentary elections of 2021 finds that one of the smaller parties represented in parliament spent the most on the campaign. Given the transparency associated with this party, it seems plausible that some mainstream parties may be under-reporting how much they spend on their campaigns.
Citations:
https://openparliament.net/2022/02/01/17642/
The decline in state subsidies for parties is likely to weaken the parties with high vote shares. The greater reliance on business-sector money is likely to create linkages between parties and business interests.
Party financing is overseen by the Audit Office, and parties are obliged to submit an annual financial report of all their properties as well as an income statement. Reports must also be submitted after each electoral campaign; reports on budgets larger than €25,000 must be certified by an independent auditor.
A recent report on campaign spending during the last parliamentary elections of 2021 finds that one of the smaller parties represented in parliament spent the most on the campaign. Given the transparency associated with this party, it seems plausible that some mainstream parties may be under-reporting how much they spend on their campaigns.
Citations:
https://openparliament.net/2022/02/01/17642/
Do citizens have the opportunity to take binding political decisions when they want to do so?
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Citizens have the effective opportunity to actively propose and take binding decisions on issues of importance to them through popular initiatives and referendums. The set of eligible issues is extensive, and includes national, regional, and local issues.
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Citizens have the effective opportunity to take binding decisions on issues of importance to them through either popular initiatives or referendums. The set of eligible issues covers at least two levels of government.
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Citizens have the effective opportunity to vote on issues of importance to them through a legally binding measure. The set of eligible issues is limited to one level of government.
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Citizens have no effective opportunity to vote on issues of importance to them through a legally binding measure.
The list of eligible referendums issues is restrictive, fiscal/tax issues cannot be addressed, political and judicial nominations are also excluded. If backers of a referendum collect a minimum of 200,000 signatures in support of the referendum, they can address parliament to call for a referendum. If 400,000 signatures are presented, parliament is obliged to call a referendum but can, within certain limits, edit the questions posed. The outcome of referendums is binding only if voter turnout is higher than in the last general election.
National referendums were held in 2013, 2015 and 2016, turnout levels were not high enough to make the results obligatory for the parliament.
Requirements for local referendums are less stringent than those for national referendums, and 10% of voters with permanent residence in the municipality can make a binding proposal for a referendum. If more than 40% of voters with permanent residence participate, the local referendum is binding for the local government. Three local referendums were held in 2017, and another two in 2019. In one case in 2019, voter turnout was high enough to make the results binding.
National referendums were held in 2013, 2015 and 2016, turnout levels were not high enough to make the results obligatory for the parliament.
Requirements for local referendums are less stringent than those for national referendums, and 10% of voters with permanent residence in the municipality can make a binding proposal for a referendum. If more than 40% of voters with permanent residence participate, the local referendum is binding for the local government. Three local referendums were held in 2017, and another two in 2019. In one case in 2019, voter turnout was high enough to make the results binding.
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To what extent are the media independent from government?
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Public and private media are independent from government influence; their independence is institutionally protected and fully respected by the incumbent government.
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The incumbent government largely respects the independence of media. However, there are occasional attempts to exert influence.
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The incumbent government seeks to ensure its political objectives indirectly by influencing the personnel policies, organizational framework or financial resources of public media, and/or the licensing regime/market access for private media.
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Major media outlets are frequently influenced by the incumbent government promoting its partisan political objectives. To ensure pro-government media reporting, governmental actors exert direct political pressure and violate existing rules of media regulation or change them to benefit their interests.
In legal terms, media are independent of the government. All electronic media – public or private – are subject to licensing by two independent state agencies: the Council for Electronic Media (issuing programming licenses) and the Commission for Regulation of Communications (for radio frequencies and other technological aspects of electronic media). The management of the public Bulgarian National Television and Bulgarian National Radio are elected by the Council for Electronic Media.
In practice, however, media independence has been compromised since 2010-2011, a situation that has only worsened during the review period. After a series of well-known investigative electronic-media journalists lost their positions and on-air exposure over the last two years, the public radio’s leading station was pressured into actually shutting down for several hours with the sole purpose of keeping a particular investigative journalist off the air. This journalist had been asking inconvenient questions about the selection procedure for the new prosecutor general in September 2019. This caused a major crisis, and forced the Council for Electronic Media to fire the recently elected executive director of the radio service. In the process, it became clear that the decision to shut down the broadcast was a result of outside pressure by unrevealed persons.
Different governing parties have either sought or tacitly succeeded in restricting media freedoms, particularly during periods of public discontent and protests. The BSP and MRF did so in 2013-2014, and GERB in 2020. In 2021, six alerts concerning attacks and the harassment of journalists were registered on a Council of Europe platform established to protect journalists.
A major development in the media space has been the growth of non-traditional outlets.
During the 2021 elections, many candidates and journalists used public registries and data in their campaigns. The refusals of some public officials to disclose information publicly ended up being challenged in administrative courts, and the caretaker governments did their best to disclose as much information as possible. Access to information thus seems to have improved somewhat.
Citations:
Access to Information Program (https://www.aip-bg.org/en/)
Council of Europe Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists https://fom.coe.int/accueil
In practice, however, media independence has been compromised since 2010-2011, a situation that has only worsened during the review period. After a series of well-known investigative electronic-media journalists lost their positions and on-air exposure over the last two years, the public radio’s leading station was pressured into actually shutting down for several hours with the sole purpose of keeping a particular investigative journalist off the air. This journalist had been asking inconvenient questions about the selection procedure for the new prosecutor general in September 2019. This caused a major crisis, and forced the Council for Electronic Media to fire the recently elected executive director of the radio service. In the process, it became clear that the decision to shut down the broadcast was a result of outside pressure by unrevealed persons.
Different governing parties have either sought or tacitly succeeded in restricting media freedoms, particularly during periods of public discontent and protests. The BSP and MRF did so in 2013-2014, and GERB in 2020. In 2021, six alerts concerning attacks and the harassment of journalists were registered on a Council of Europe platform established to protect journalists.
A major development in the media space has been the growth of non-traditional outlets.
During the 2021 elections, many candidates and journalists used public registries and data in their campaigns. The refusals of some public officials to disclose information publicly ended up being challenged in administrative courts, and the caretaker governments did their best to disclose as much information as possible. Access to information thus seems to have improved somewhat.
Citations:
Access to Information Program (https://www.aip-bg.org/en/)
Council of Europe Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists https://fom.coe.int/accueil
To what extent are the media characterized by an ownership structure that ensures a pluralism of opinions?
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Diversified ownership structures characterize both the electronic and print media market, providing a well-balanced pluralism of opinions. Effective anti-monopoly policies and impartial, open public media guarantee a pluralism of opinions.
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Diversified ownership structures prevail in the electronic and print media market. Public media compensate for deficiencies or biases in private media reporting by representing a wider range of opinions.
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Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize either the electronic or the print media market. Important opinions are represented but there are no or only weak institutional guarantees against the predominance of certain opinions.
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Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize both the electronic and the print media market. Few companies dominate the media, most programs are biased, and there is evidence that certain opinions are not published or are marginalized.
Media pluralism in Bulgaria is supported by a diversified ownership structure. The sheer plurality of media outlets ensures relatively broad coverage of different points of view. At the same time, however, the ownership structure is often opaque, allowing for hidden interests to operate. That said, at least one well-known de facto owner of print media (Delyan Peevski) has made his ownership official. Pluralism of opinions is greater in the radio and print media than in the TV sector.
In 2021, Mr. Peevski was sanctioned by the U.S. government under the so-called Magnitski Act. Even the media outlets that he effectively owns have made modes attempts to live up to higher standards.
The COVID-19 pandemic has further eroded the financial resources of media, forcing several smaller and regional outlets to shut down. Different media, from TV, radio, new papers and internet outlets, have their own political preferences but the diversity of opinion as well as the respect of facts media and ethics seem to have improved since the ousting of the GERB-led governments in 2021. Public radio and TV outlets have led the way toward facilitating a pluralism of opinions after years of tacit but harsh pressure from the government and politicians.
Citations:
European Commission: 2021 Rule of Law Report. Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, Brussels 20.7.2021 SWD(2021) 703 final
In 2021, Mr. Peevski was sanctioned by the U.S. government under the so-called Magnitski Act. Even the media outlets that he effectively owns have made modes attempts to live up to higher standards.
The COVID-19 pandemic has further eroded the financial resources of media, forcing several smaller and regional outlets to shut down. Different media, from TV, radio, new papers and internet outlets, have their own political preferences but the diversity of opinion as well as the respect of facts media and ethics seem to have improved since the ousting of the GERB-led governments in 2021. Public radio and TV outlets have led the way toward facilitating a pluralism of opinions after years of tacit but harsh pressure from the government and politicians.
Citations:
European Commission: 2021 Rule of Law Report. Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, Brussels 20.7.2021 SWD(2021) 703 final
To what extent can citizens obtain official information?
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Legal regulations guarantee free and easy access to official information, contain few, reasonable restrictions, and there are effective mechanisms of appeal and oversight enabling citizens to access information.
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Access to official information is regulated by law. Most restrictions are justified, but access is sometimes complicated by bureaucratic procedures. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms permit citizens to enforce their right of access.
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Access to official information is partially regulated by law, but complicated by bureaucratic procedures and some poorly justified restrictions. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms are often ineffective.
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Access to official information is not regulated by law; there are many restrictions of access, bureaucratic procedures and no or ineffective mechanisms of enforcement.
Access to government information for citizens is guaranteed by the Bulgarian constitution and regulated by the Access to Public Information Act originally adopted in 2000. It ensures a high level of access for citizens to government information, and refusals to provide information can be appealed in court. Civil society actors and organizations have exercised their right to court appeals, which has fostered robust court activity. In recent years, the amount of government information made freely and promptly available on the internet has increased markedly, so that the need for formal requests for information has declined. The most common excuse for refusing to release information is that interests of third parties may be affected, while confidentiality and classified information considerations come a distant second. This is the conclusion one can derive from the Access to Information Program annual reports
Third-party interests has been the most-cited reason given for not releasing information on the part of the National Electric Company and the state-owned natural gas monopoly, Bulgargas.
Access to public information is typically weak in the area of public procurement. Public procurement regulations were amended over a five-year period (2015-2020) to allow for “in-house,” non-competitive and non-public decisions to be made by the procuring government agency. This practice has been abandoned by the 2021 governments.
Citations:
Access to Information Programme Foundation (2019): Access to information in Bulgaria in 2018. Sofia (http://store.aip-bg.org//publications/ann_rep_bg/2018.pdf).
Global right to information rating: https://www.rti-rating.org/
Third-party interests has been the most-cited reason given for not releasing information on the part of the National Electric Company and the state-owned natural gas monopoly, Bulgargas.
Access to public information is typically weak in the area of public procurement. Public procurement regulations were amended over a five-year period (2015-2020) to allow for “in-house,” non-competitive and non-public decisions to be made by the procuring government agency. This practice has been abandoned by the 2021 governments.
Citations:
Access to Information Programme Foundation (2019): Access to information in Bulgaria in 2018. Sofia (http://store.aip-bg.org//publications/ann_rep_bg/2018.pdf).
Global right to information rating: https://www.rti-rating.org/
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To what extent does the state respect and protect civil rights and how effectively are citizens protected by courts against infringements of their rights?
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All state institutions respect and effectively protect civil rights. Citizens are effectively protected by courts against infringements of their rights. Infringements present an extreme exception.
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The state respects and protects rights, with few infringements. Courts provide protection.
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Despite formal protection, frequent infringements of civil rights occur and court protection often proves ineffective.
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State institutions respect civil rights only formally, and civil rights are frequently violated. Court protection is not effective.
The Bulgarian constitution and legislation provide a comprehensive framework guaranteeing civil rights and their protection. In practice, rights are generally respected by state agencies and citizens have legal recourse in cases involving infringement. Cases are also regularly heard at the European Court of Human Rights. Citizens actively use the administrative-justice process to challenge the actions of state agencies, and the courts regularly side with citizen plaintiffs.
The courts generally uphold efforts to protect property rights, despite recent attempts to amend legislation that would permit violations of property rights go unchecked. Even when the government and public prosecutors took illegal action against former government beneficiaries and their relatives (2019 – early 2021), the courts have upheld the constitutional protection of property rights.
The most frequent and serious rights violations are the overuse of force by law-enforcing government bodies, especially against Roma. The Commission for Protection against Discrimination has observed more frequent complaints about hate speech in media, online publications and social networks. Citizens regularly report failures to investigate and protect rights related to some types of crimes, especially crimes against property.
The courts generally uphold efforts to protect property rights, despite recent attempts to amend legislation that would permit violations of property rights go unchecked. Even when the government and public prosecutors took illegal action against former government beneficiaries and their relatives (2019 – early 2021), the courts have upheld the constitutional protection of property rights.
The most frequent and serious rights violations are the overuse of force by law-enforcing government bodies, especially against Roma. The Commission for Protection against Discrimination has observed more frequent complaints about hate speech in media, online publications and social networks. Citizens regularly report failures to investigate and protect rights related to some types of crimes, especially crimes against property.
To what extent does the state concede and protect political liberties?
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All state institutions concede and effectively protect political liberties.
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All state institutions for the most part concede and protect political liberties. There are only few infringements.
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State institutions concede political liberties but infringements occur regularly in practice.
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Political liberties are unsatisfactory codified and frequently violated.
Political liberties are guaranteed in Bulgaria by the constitution and relevant laws. Bulgarians enjoy the freedom to express themselves, to assemble and organize themselves (also for explicitly political purposes), to practice their religious beliefs and to petition the government. Bulgarians have clearly established rights to speak freely, assemble and protest. The freedom of expression has suffered from the declining independence of the traditional media, but has been strengthened by the opportunities provided by the internet.
In 2020, these rights were confirmed by a number of protests that were allowed to take place without interference, and by the registration of a new party established by popular TV personality Slavi Trifonov.
In 2020, with the prosecutor general’s consent, prosecutors and police investigators illegally videotaped more than a thousand peaceful protesters, many of whom as well as one journalist, were subject to police brutality. In the context of the protest, the prosecutor general himself initiated several investigations of protesters, referring to them as “national traitors.”
Citations:
Vassileva, R. (2019): Framing and Raiding. Bulgaria’s Kafkaesque Prosecutor’s Office,
https://verfassungsblog.de/framing-and-raiding/ 09 June 2021
In 2020, these rights were confirmed by a number of protests that were allowed to take place without interference, and by the registration of a new party established by popular TV personality Slavi Trifonov.
In 2020, with the prosecutor general’s consent, prosecutors and police investigators illegally videotaped more than a thousand peaceful protesters, many of whom as well as one journalist, were subject to police brutality. In the context of the protest, the prosecutor general himself initiated several investigations of protesters, referring to them as “national traitors.”
Citations:
Vassileva, R. (2019): Framing and Raiding. Bulgaria’s Kafkaesque Prosecutor’s Office,
https://verfassungsblog.de/framing-and-raiding/ 09 June 2021
How effectively does the state protect against different forms of discrimination?
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State institutions effectively protect against and actively prevent discrimination. Cases of discrimination are extremely rare.
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State anti-discrimination protections are moderately successful. Few cases of discrimination are observed.
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State anti-discrimination efforts show limited success. Many cases of discrimination can be observed.
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The state does not offer effective protection against discrimination. Discrimination is widespread in the public sector and in society.
The Bulgarian constitution, the 2004 Anti-Discrimination Act and various EU directives aim to provide protection against discrimination. There is a Commission for Protection against Discrimination, and citizens have access to the courts in cases of suspected discrimination. In practice, instances of discrimination can be frequently observed, especially against the highly marginalized Roma minority. There is some labor market discrimination based on gender, sexual orientation, physical and mental ability, and ethnicity. Public discourse has become increasingly xenophobic, as explicitly nationalistic parties serve in the ruling coalition and routinely rely on agitation during election campaigns. The government failed to push through the ratification of the Istanbul Convention, and some portions of it were pronounced unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court.
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To what extent do government and administration act on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions to provide legal certainty?
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Government and administration act predictably, on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions. Legal regulations are consistent and transparent, ensuring legal certainty.
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Government and administration rarely make unpredictable decisions. Legal regulations are consistent, but leave a large scope of discretion to the government or administration.
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Government and administration sometimes make unpredictable decisions that go beyond given legal bases or do not conform to existing legal regulations. Some legal regulations are inconsistent and contradictory.
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Government and administration often make unpredictable decisions that lack a legal basis or ignore existing legal regulations. Legal regulations are inconsistent, full of loopholes and contradict each other.
Bulgaria’s government is legalistic and favors a strict interpretation of the legal code in justifying its actions. Another problem is the legal consistency of the content of the law. Executive action is not only relatively unpredictable, but may be applied ad hoc, thus creating privileges and inequality before the law.
Deficiencies in the area of the rule of law crowd out FDIs. There were attempts led by prosecutors and individual judges to redistribute market and economic influence in 2014, 2016-2017 (against foreign interests) and 2019-2020. These efforts failed, however, thanks to the fact that EU ambassadors, investigative journalists and NGOs targeting corruption made this information public. It is anybody’s guess what the situation was with local companies that have no foreign ambassadors to speak out for them.
In the period from 2015 to 2019, Bulgaria’s prosecutor general, who was able to act without accountability, created and/or gained control over specialized organs of the justice system (i.e., commissions tasked with special investigations, prosecution and forfeiture, anti-corruption efforts and conflict of interests). These “reforms” were ostensibly pursued in an effort to fight high-profile cases of corruption, terrorism and organized crime but, in fact, served instead as an instrument of protection and racketeering.
The situation deteriorated after the election of Ivan Geshev as prosecutor general in December 2019, who has proven to be inefficient, demonstrated clear bias in his interpretation of certain cases, failed to presume innocence until proven guilty in specific cases and has publicly taken issue with the division of powers. In June 2020, prosecutors raided the offices of two advisors to then-President Radev. The prosecutors explained the action as part of their investigation of suspected influence peddling and disclosure of state secrets. Many protesters viewed the raids as attacks carried out by the prosecutor general and motivated by an escalating conflict between Radev and Borissov.
Marking a setback for prosecutorial reform in Bulgara, the Constitutional Court ruled in 2021 against a new law designed to establish accountability and criminal liability for the office of the prosecutor general, stating that the law was in violation of the constitution.
The first months of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 saw increased activity on the part of the prosecutor general. The non-parliamentary opposition, NGOs and independent journalists increased their criticism and disseminated factual evidence of embezzlement, extortion and abuse of public office with the help of individual prosecutors.
Citations:
https://acf.bg/en/osemte-dzhudzheta/
Deficiencies in the area of the rule of law crowd out FDIs. There were attempts led by prosecutors and individual judges to redistribute market and economic influence in 2014, 2016-2017 (against foreign interests) and 2019-2020. These efforts failed, however, thanks to the fact that EU ambassadors, investigative journalists and NGOs targeting corruption made this information public. It is anybody’s guess what the situation was with local companies that have no foreign ambassadors to speak out for them.
In the period from 2015 to 2019, Bulgaria’s prosecutor general, who was able to act without accountability, created and/or gained control over specialized organs of the justice system (i.e., commissions tasked with special investigations, prosecution and forfeiture, anti-corruption efforts and conflict of interests). These “reforms” were ostensibly pursued in an effort to fight high-profile cases of corruption, terrorism and organized crime but, in fact, served instead as an instrument of protection and racketeering.
The situation deteriorated after the election of Ivan Geshev as prosecutor general in December 2019, who has proven to be inefficient, demonstrated clear bias in his interpretation of certain cases, failed to presume innocence until proven guilty in specific cases and has publicly taken issue with the division of powers. In June 2020, prosecutors raided the offices of two advisors to then-President Radev. The prosecutors explained the action as part of their investigation of suspected influence peddling and disclosure of state secrets. Many protesters viewed the raids as attacks carried out by the prosecutor general and motivated by an escalating conflict between Radev and Borissov.
Marking a setback for prosecutorial reform in Bulgara, the Constitutional Court ruled in 2021 against a new law designed to establish accountability and criminal liability for the office of the prosecutor general, stating that the law was in violation of the constitution.
The first months of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 saw increased activity on the part of the prosecutor general. The non-parliamentary opposition, NGOs and independent journalists increased their criticism and disseminated factual evidence of embezzlement, extortion and abuse of public office with the help of individual prosecutors.
Citations:
https://acf.bg/en/osemte-dzhudzheta/
To what extent do independent courts control whether government and administration act in conformity with the law?
10
9
9
Independent courts effectively review executive action and ensure that the government and administration act in conformity with the law.
8
7
6
7
6
Independent courts usually manage to control whether the government and administration act in conformity with the law.
5
4
3
4
3
Courts are independent, but often fail to ensure legal compliance.
2
1
1
Courts are biased for or against the incumbent government and lack effective control.
Courts in Bulgaria are formally independent from other branches of power and have large competencies to review the actions and normative acts of the executive. Court reasoning and decisions are sometimes influenced by outside factors, including informal political pressure and, more importantly, the influence of private sector groups and individuals through corruption and nepotism.
Since 2015, judges have become formally more independent from prosecutors and investigators in the Supreme Judicial Council, although the prosecutor general has had informal leverage to influence Council decisions through different standing committees and Council members from the investigation.
However, despite the formal independence of various committees within the Council, its work remains politicized and its decisions are influenced by the political establishment. The office of the prosecutor general also lacks transparency and accountability. The Council was heavily criticized in 2019 for the highly opaque and non-competitive manner in which it went about appointing a new prosecutor general, which met with public protest.
Despite the fact that judges who decide in favor of the government are promoted more quickly than judges who act independently, the latter continue to act with integrity in observation of the law and legal procedures. However, the judiciary’s ability to act as a check on the executive has been compromised in many ways.
Citations:
European Commission (2019): Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism. COM(2019)498 final, Brussels (https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/progress-report-bulgaria-2019com-2019-498_en).
Vassileva, R. (2019): CVM Here, CVM There: The European Commission in Bulgaria’s Legal Wonderland. Verfassungsblog, June 16 (https://verfassungsblog.de/cvm-here-cvm-there-the-european-commission-in-bulgarias-legal-wonderland/).
Since 2015, judges have become formally more independent from prosecutors and investigators in the Supreme Judicial Council, although the prosecutor general has had informal leverage to influence Council decisions through different standing committees and Council members from the investigation.
However, despite the formal independence of various committees within the Council, its work remains politicized and its decisions are influenced by the political establishment. The office of the prosecutor general also lacks transparency and accountability. The Council was heavily criticized in 2019 for the highly opaque and non-competitive manner in which it went about appointing a new prosecutor general, which met with public protest.
Despite the fact that judges who decide in favor of the government are promoted more quickly than judges who act independently, the latter continue to act with integrity in observation of the law and legal procedures. However, the judiciary’s ability to act as a check on the executive has been compromised in many ways.
Citations:
European Commission (2019): Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism. COM(2019)498 final, Brussels (https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/progress-report-bulgaria-2019com-2019-498_en).
Vassileva, R. (2019): CVM Here, CVM There: The European Commission in Bulgaria’s Legal Wonderland. Verfassungsblog, June 16 (https://verfassungsblog.de/cvm-here-cvm-there-the-european-commission-in-bulgarias-legal-wonderland/).
To what extent does the process of appointing (supreme or constitutional court) justices guarantee the independence of the judiciary?
10
9
9
Justices are appointed in a cooperative appointment process with special majority requirements.
8
7
6
7
6
Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies with special majority requirements or in a cooperative selection process without special majority requirements.
5
4
3
4
3
Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies without special majority requirements.
2
1
1
All judges are appointed exclusively by a single body irrespective of other institutions.
Because there are no special majority requirements specified in the procedures for appointing Constitutional Court justices in Bulgaria, appointments are often a political manner. This is balanced by the fact that three different bodies are involved, and appointments are spread over time. Equal shares of the 12 justices of the Constitutional Court are appointed personally by the president, by the National Assembly with a simple majority, and by a joint plenary of the justices of the two supreme courts (the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court), also with a simple majority. Justices serve nine-year mandates, with four justices being replaced every three years. The most recent election was among 10 candidates.
One of the challenges in 2021 was the uncertainty surrounding the election of the individual to act as chair of the Supreme Court of Cassation by the existing Council, whose members include individuals who are not judges and has a record of engaging in suspicious activity. On 14 January 2022, after six hours of a publicly broadcasted hearing, a female judge with an impeccable reputation was elected to the post. As the first woman in the country to hold this position, her election bodes well for improvements in the appointment and career prospects of junior judges.
One of the challenges in 2021 was the uncertainty surrounding the election of the individual to act as chair of the Supreme Court of Cassation by the existing Council, whose members include individuals who are not judges and has a record of engaging in suspicious activity. On 14 January 2022, after six hours of a publicly broadcasted hearing, a female judge with an impeccable reputation was elected to the post. As the first woman in the country to hold this position, her election bodes well for improvements in the appointment and career prospects of junior judges.
To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?
10
9
9
Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
8
7
6
7
6
Most integrity mechanisms function effectively and provide disincentives for public officeholders willing to abuse their positions.
5
4
3
4
3
Some integrity mechanisms function, but do not effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
2
1
1
Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.
Bulgaria’s formal legal anti-corruption framework is quite extensive, but has not proven very effective.
In line with recommendations by the European Commission and the Council of Europe, new legislation creating a unified anti-corruption agency was adopted by parliament in December 2017. However, the new agency has not been very effective either in bringing cases of high-level corruption to court or in confiscating illegally acquired property. During the period under review, investigative journalists reported on the agency head’s highly dubious practices (personal-property construction in violation of municipal regulations), who was then forced to resign as a result. Meanwhile, well-documented allegations of conflicts of interest and illicit enrichment through real-estate deals on the part of members of the governing elite, including the deputy chair of the senior ruling-coalition party and the minister of justice, were glossed over as two individuals were exonerated. No corruption charges were ever pursued, and the only consequences were ultimately political, as both individuals had to resign from their party and ministerial positions.
It is too early to comment on provisional changes made in 2021, but all members of the governing parties campaigned during the years on the ticket of “zero tolerance to corruption.”
Some gains have been made, particularly with regard to access to information, the fact that the National Revenue Agency has publicly disclosed so-called tax beneficiaries, and the new provisions requiring government to inform the public of decisions being made. The restoration of the media’s independence bodes well for future improvements.
It remains unclear, however, if reforms to public procurement processes and the judiciary will be introduced.
Citations:
Popova, M., V. Post (2018): Prosecuting high-level corruption in Eastern Europe., in: Communist and Post-Communist Studies 51(3), 231-244.
In line with recommendations by the European Commission and the Council of Europe, new legislation creating a unified anti-corruption agency was adopted by parliament in December 2017. However, the new agency has not been very effective either in bringing cases of high-level corruption to court or in confiscating illegally acquired property. During the period under review, investigative journalists reported on the agency head’s highly dubious practices (personal-property construction in violation of municipal regulations), who was then forced to resign as a result. Meanwhile, well-documented allegations of conflicts of interest and illicit enrichment through real-estate deals on the part of members of the governing elite, including the deputy chair of the senior ruling-coalition party and the minister of justice, were glossed over as two individuals were exonerated. No corruption charges were ever pursued, and the only consequences were ultimately political, as both individuals had to resign from their party and ministerial positions.
It is too early to comment on provisional changes made in 2021, but all members of the governing parties campaigned during the years on the ticket of “zero tolerance to corruption.”
Some gains have been made, particularly with regard to access to information, the fact that the National Revenue Agency has publicly disclosed so-called tax beneficiaries, and the new provisions requiring government to inform the public of decisions being made. The restoration of the media’s independence bodes well for future improvements.
It remains unclear, however, if reforms to public procurement processes and the judiciary will be introduced.
Citations:
Popova, M., V. Post (2018): Prosecuting high-level corruption in Eastern Europe., in: Communist and Post-Communist Studies 51(3), 231-244.