Executive Capacity
#6Key Findings
Canada’s highly skilled, comparatively powerful government office brings the country into the top ranks worldwide in terms of executive capacity (rank 6). Its score in this area has improved by 0.4 points relative to 2014.
Planning capacity is robust. Draft bills are vetted by central policy and finance-oriented agencies with highly skilled analysts possessing sectoral expertise. Expert advice took on new prominence during the pandemic, as did informal consultation between the federal and provincial governments. A recently passed impact assessment act has considerably expanded the scope of such reviews.
Consultation with external stakeholders is generally robust and wide-ranging, though work with Indigenous communities remains uneven. Communication practices have generally been strong. The government pivoted quickly to public health policy during the pandemic, with great success, although carbon-reduction commitments remain unfulfilled.
The quality of regulatory enforcement is generally high. Provinces have broad policy discretion. Federal transfers help fund provincial services, but rising costs have put significant pressure on healthcare programs. The country has taken a leading role in resettling Afghans following the Taliban’s takeover.
Planning capacity is robust. Draft bills are vetted by central policy and finance-oriented agencies with highly skilled analysts possessing sectoral expertise. Expert advice took on new prominence during the pandemic, as did informal consultation between the federal and provincial governments. A recently passed impact assessment act has considerably expanded the scope of such reviews.
Consultation with external stakeholders is generally robust and wide-ranging, though work with Indigenous communities remains uneven. Communication practices have generally been strong. The government pivoted quickly to public health policy during the pandemic, with great success, although carbon-reduction commitments remain unfulfilled.
The quality of regulatory enforcement is generally high. Provinces have broad policy discretion. Federal transfers help fund provincial services, but rising costs have put significant pressure on healthcare programs. The country has taken a leading role in resettling Afghans following the Taliban’s takeover.
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How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
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In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
Neither the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) nor the Privy Council Office (PCO) has an official strategic planning unit that is specifically dedicated to medium and longer-term scenarios. In 1997, Policy Horizons Canada was established under the PCO with a mandate to provide analysis and help the federal public service anticipate emerging policy challenges and opportunities. Its budget is small, however, and this unit has not reported through the PCO since 2007.
In practice, however, central agencies and particularly PCO and the Department of Finance have expert capacity dedicated to planning and priorities, both in policy agenda-setting and rollout. Budgets typically consider five-year horizons and various medium-term scenarios in setting the fiscal framework; planning initiatives are undertaken in lead-up to Speeches from the Throne; and larger initiatives such as innovation and skills are examples of efforts at more medium-term visioning. Given the authority and influence vested in these central agencies, the planning capacity of the government of Canada is as strong as that of other Western countries.
The current Trudeau government has also made ample use of special advisory groups to provide information and consultations on a number of policy areas (e.g., economic growth, cultural policy and issues relating to young people).
In practice, however, central agencies and particularly PCO and the Department of Finance have expert capacity dedicated to planning and priorities, both in policy agenda-setting and rollout. Budgets typically consider five-year horizons and various medium-term scenarios in setting the fiscal framework; planning initiatives are undertaken in lead-up to Speeches from the Throne; and larger initiatives such as innovation and skills are examples of efforts at more medium-term visioning. Given the authority and influence vested in these central agencies, the planning capacity of the government of Canada is as strong as that of other Western countries.
The current Trudeau government has also made ample use of special advisory groups to provide information and consultations on a number of policy areas (e.g., economic growth, cultural policy and issues relating to young people).
Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?
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In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
Canadian government departments and agencies effectively tap into expertise of academics and other experts outside the government in multiple ways. Many government departments and agencies have advisory committees, which can have considerable influence but rarely a dominant role in policymaking.
Most recently, in response to COVID-19, such expert counsel has become more prominent. The federal government has struck an Industry Strategy Council tasked with advising on economic growth and competitiveness. Also established has been the COVID-19 Vaccine Task Force to advise on vaccine candidates and development, especially since the country lacks domestic supply. Moreover, the existing National Advisory Committee on Immunization has played a critical role throughout the pandemic. Mona Nemer, named Canada’s new Chief Science Adviser in September 2017, continues to provide advice on issues related to science and government policies that support it, including evidence-based decision-making and open government science fully available to the public.
Citations:
Innovation, Science and Economic Development 2020. “Minister Bains announces new Industry Strategy Council,” 8 May 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/innovation-science-economic-development/news/2020/05/minister-bains-announces-new-industry-strategy-council.html.
National Research Council Canada. “COVID-19 Vaccine Task Force,” 22 September 2020, https://nrc.canada.ca/en/corporate/covid-19-vaccine-task-force.
Office of the Chief Science Adviser of Canada, Annual Report of the Chief Science Adviser of Canada, 2020, https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/063.nsf/eng/h_98146.html
Most recently, in response to COVID-19, such expert counsel has become more prominent. The federal government has struck an Industry Strategy Council tasked with advising on economic growth and competitiveness. Also established has been the COVID-19 Vaccine Task Force to advise on vaccine candidates and development, especially since the country lacks domestic supply. Moreover, the existing National Advisory Committee on Immunization has played a critical role throughout the pandemic. Mona Nemer, named Canada’s new Chief Science Adviser in September 2017, continues to provide advice on issues related to science and government policies that support it, including evidence-based decision-making and open government science fully available to the public.
Citations:
Innovation, Science and Economic Development 2020. “Minister Bains announces new Industry Strategy Council,” 8 May 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/innovation-science-economic-development/news/2020/05/minister-bains-announces-new-industry-strategy-council.html.
National Research Council Canada. “COVID-19 Vaccine Task Force,” 22 September 2020, https://nrc.canada.ca/en/corporate/covid-19-vaccine-task-force.
Office of the Chief Science Adviser of Canada, Annual Report of the Chief Science Adviser of Canada, 2020, https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/063.nsf/eng/h_98146.html
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Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?
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The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
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The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
Draft bills are vetted primarily by the Privy Council Office and to a lesser extent by Finance Canada and the Treasury Board. These central agencies are highly prestigious and central-agency experience is extremely important for advancement to senior levels within the federal public service. Consequently, central-agency staff members are highly skilled and possess the comprehensive sectoral-policy expertise needed for the regular and independent evaluation of draft bills based on the government’s strategic and budgetary priorities.
To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?
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There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
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The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
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Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
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Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
Line departments and central agencies have interrelated and complementary capacities for the coordination of policy proposals, with ultimate authority lying with central agencies. Thus, line ministries in Canada have a responsibility to involve the Privy Council Office which supports the prime minister and his cabinet in the preparation of policy proposals. Financing of policy initiatives and program design are also vetted by Finance Canada and the Treasury Board respectively.
How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?
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The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
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Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
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There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
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There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
Cabinet committees have both the legal and de facto power to prepare cabinet meetings in such a way as to allow the cabinet to focus on vital issues. The de facto power to sort out issues before they go to cabinet belongs to senior officials in the Privy Council Office and, should it be required, the Prime Minister’s Office, not to cabinet committees. Still, this allows the cabinet to focus on strategic policy issues.
How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?
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Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
Many policy proposals are coordinated by line ministries with other line ministries. However, due to issues of departmental mandates and authorities, this process is generally not as effective as the central-agency coordination process. On certain issues, the line department may be unwilling to recognize the role or expertise of other line departments, or have fundamental differences of perspectives on the issue, and hence may fail to consult sufficiently and/or coordinate a policy proposal with others.
For policy proposals going forward to cabinet, line departments are, however, required to undertake the necessary consultations to ensure the proposal has been considered by other relevant ministries. Central agencies perform a critical oversight and steering role in this process. Moreover, during the pandemic a wide array of programming was rolled out quickly to respond both to urgent economic and health needs, necessitating close coordination among line departments as well with central agencies. This response is indicative of the coordination undertaken both horizontally among ministries as well from a central perspective.
For policy proposals going forward to cabinet, line departments are, however, required to undertake the necessary consultations to ensure the proposal has been considered by other relevant ministries. Central agencies perform a critical oversight and steering role in this process. Moreover, during the pandemic a wide array of programming was rolled out quickly to respond both to urgent economic and health needs, necessitating close coordination among line departments as well with central agencies. This response is indicative of the coordination undertaken both horizontally among ministries as well from a central perspective.
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Canada’s federal system has no formal provisions that deal specifically with federal-provincial coordination. Pressing federal-provincial issues and other matters that require intergovernmental discussions are usually addressed in the First Ministers’ Conference, which includes the prime minister, provincial premiers and territorial leaders, along with their officials. These meetings are called by the prime minister and have typically been held annually, but there is no formal schedule. The lack of any requirement for the conference to be held regularly has been a cause for concern, as it is critical for first ministers and the prime minister to engage in face-to-face discussions or negotiations, given the many policy areas that demand federal-provincial coordination.
During the pandemic, however, the mechanisms for federal-provincial-territorial (F/P/T) coordination were activated on a relatively sustained basis as the country grappled with the crisis, including economic shocks, procurement shortages, vaccine rollout and acute shortages within the healthcare system. As a result the period since March of 2020 has been one of the most active periods of F/P/T consultations, at times with First Ministers’ calls occurring on a weekly basis.
During the pandemic, however, the mechanisms for federal-provincial-territorial (F/P/T) coordination were activated on a relatively sustained basis as the country grappled with the crisis, including economic shocks, procurement shortages, vaccine rollout and acute shortages within the healthcare system. As a result the period since March of 2020 has been one of the most active periods of F/P/T consultations, at times with First Ministers’ calls occurring on a weekly basis.
How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?
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The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
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The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
The effective control exercised by cabinet over the ministries mostly obviates the need for elaborate technical means of coordination. That said, the government created Shared Services Canada (SSC) in 2011, which is mandated to provide a unified IT infrastructure for the federal government that is modern, secure and reliable. SSC delivers email, data center, network and workplace technology device services to all government departments and agencies in a consolidated and standardized manner. The common IT program and platform naturally enables improved and secure information, and data sharing across all government agencies.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the consolidation of IT infrastructure through SSC has not gone smoothly, and the department has been criticized for slow service delivery and for putting some federal agencies at risk. The federal government has been unsuccessful in the implementation of two major digital technologies, the Phoenix payroll system and the government-wide Canada.ca email reorganization. A recent PBO report stated that a functional pay system would not be operational until 2023 and costs for revamping the system could tally to CAD 2.6 billion. These failures cast serious doubt on the ability of the federal government to make effective use of digital technologies.
However, as the pandemic has shown, government services were able to support the move to virtual work by federal government employees, as well as the enormous demands placed on the system given the rollout of new programming. A fuller evaluation of this period will be needed going forward.
Citations:
Shared Services Canada, Departmental Results Report: 2019-2020, 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/shared-services/corporate/publications/departmental-results-report-2019-20.html.
Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, Costs Associated with Replacing the Federal Pay System, May 16 2019, https://www.pbo-dpb.gc.ca/web/default/files/Documents/
Reports/2019/Federal-pay-system-Phoenix/Costs_Associated_with_Replacing_
the_Federal_Pay_System_EN.pdf.
Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat 2018/19: Digital Operations Strategic Plan: 2018-2022, https://www.canada.ca/en/government/system/digital-government/digital-operations-strategic-plan-2018-2022.html#ToC8.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the consolidation of IT infrastructure through SSC has not gone smoothly, and the department has been criticized for slow service delivery and for putting some federal agencies at risk. The federal government has been unsuccessful in the implementation of two major digital technologies, the Phoenix payroll system and the government-wide Canada.ca email reorganization. A recent PBO report stated that a functional pay system would not be operational until 2023 and costs for revamping the system could tally to CAD 2.6 billion. These failures cast serious doubt on the ability of the federal government to make effective use of digital technologies.
However, as the pandemic has shown, government services were able to support the move to virtual work by federal government employees, as well as the enormous demands placed on the system given the rollout of new programming. A fuller evaluation of this period will be needed going forward.
Citations:
Shared Services Canada, Departmental Results Report: 2019-2020, 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/shared-services/corporate/publications/departmental-results-report-2019-20.html.
Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, Costs Associated with Replacing the Federal Pay System, May 16 2019, https://www.pbo-dpb.gc.ca/web/default/files/Documents/
Reports/2019/Federal-pay-system-Phoenix/Costs_Associated_with_Replacing_
the_Federal_Pay_System_EN.pdf.
Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat 2018/19: Digital Operations Strategic Plan: 2018-2022, https://www.canada.ca/en/government/system/digital-government/digital-operations-strategic-plan-2018-2022.html#ToC8.
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To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?
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RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
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RIA are not applied or do not exist.
On 28 August 2019, the Impact Assessment Act (IIA), which created the new Impact Assessment Agency of Canada and repealed the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act of 2012, came into force.
The IIA implements many recommendations of an expert panel established in 2016 to review the federal approach to project assessment. The IIA is not uncontroversial, however. Although environmental groups have acknowledged that the IAA represents an improvement over the much-criticized Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, they have expressed strong concerns that the scope of projects to which it applies is too limited. The new IIA has also been the source of intense frustration in Western Canada. Many worry it will devastate an oil industry already struggling with constrained pipeline capacity.
The Impact Assessment Agency established under the new Act continues the functions of regulatory impact assessments which were conducted under the previous legislation. The Agency is authorized to conduct assessments, undertake research, monitor compliance, engage in consultations and “promote harmonization“ of assessments with other levels of government.
Citations:
Impact Assessment Act (S.C. 2019, c. 28, s. 1), full document available at https://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/I-2.75/index.html
The IIA implements many recommendations of an expert panel established in 2016 to review the federal approach to project assessment. The IIA is not uncontroversial, however. Although environmental groups have acknowledged that the IAA represents an improvement over the much-criticized Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, they have expressed strong concerns that the scope of projects to which it applies is too limited. The new IIA has also been the source of intense frustration in Western Canada. Many worry it will devastate an oil industry already struggling with constrained pipeline capacity.
The Impact Assessment Agency established under the new Act continues the functions of regulatory impact assessments which were conducted under the previous legislation. The Agency is authorized to conduct assessments, undertake research, monitor compliance, engage in consultations and “promote harmonization“ of assessments with other levels of government.
Citations:
Impact Assessment Act (S.C. 2019, c. 28, s. 1), full document available at https://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/I-2.75/index.html
Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?
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RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
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The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
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The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
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RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
The quality of regulatory impact assessment in Canada has arguably improved under the new Impact Assessment Act, passed in 2019. The new legislation expands assessments beyond the environmental effects of a designated project to include impacts on social and health systems, on the economy, and on Indigenous peoples, in each case considering current and future generations. A determination of whether a designated project should go ahead requires a consideration of whether it is in the public interest, of how it impacts on sustainability, and whether it will facilitate or hamper the federal government’s climate change commitments. The IAA established the new Impact Assessment Agency of Canada, which is now responsible for conducting RIAs. Additionally, it increases the scope of public participation in the conduct of RIAs, beginning with a new early-planning phase, and is aimed at significantly increasing participation by Indigenous groups and expanding consideration of the impact a project may have on Indigenous groups and peoples.
RIA results are accessible under Freedom of Information provisions. However, there is little evaluation of the quality of RIAs by independent bodies.
RIA results are accessible under Freedom of Information provisions. However, there is little evaluation of the quality of RIAs by independent bodies.
Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?
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Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
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Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
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Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
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Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
Canada does not have a formally adopted sustainability strategy. In a sense, this is not surprising, as there are different types of sustainability (environmental, economic, social). There is also no consensus – legislatively based – as to what sustainability means or to how it should be measured. To be sure, many RIAs address sustainability issues, but the methodologies used differ widely. That noted, however, the new legislation of the Impact Assessment Act has broadened assessments considerably (including future generations)and generally RIAs do consider short-term, medium and longer-term implications of projects, as for example with issues of erosion in biodiversity.
Citations:
https://www.canada.ca/en/impact-assessment-agency/services/policy-guidance/practitioners-guide-impact-assessment-act.html
Citations:
https://www.canada.ca/en/impact-assessment-agency/services/policy-guidance/practitioners-guide-impact-assessment-act.html
To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?
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Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
As with other aspects of Canada’s RIA regime, ex post evaluation differs between laws and regulations. While laws are not subject to systematic ex post evaluation, departments and agencies are expected to regularly review existing regulations to assess their impacts and develop refinements.
In 2016, the Treasury Board of Canada introduced a new “Policy on Results.” Evaluations of programs, policies and priorities under the policy is to be a “systematic and neutral analysis of evidence related to relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of policies and programs.” Those evaluations can be done through the Treasury Boards’ resource alignment reviews and internally by departments themselves.
In 2018, the federal government introduced the Canadian Gender Budgeting Act (S.C. 2018, c.27, s.13) which provided for government policies, programs and services to take into account “gender” and “diversity” both in their design and impacts. As a result, Treasury Board has put in place gender-based plus analysis which requires departments to annually report on the impacts of policies and programs in terms of their access and inclusiveness.
In practice, it is frequently the Office of the Auditor General of Canada (OAG) that evaluates government programs and initiatives ex post. The OAG is formally charged with so-called performance audits, which aim to provide an independent, objective and systematic assessment of whether government programs are being run with due regard for the economy, efficiency and environmental impact. The OAG has considerable discretion regarding which programs it will examine, and takes requests from parliamentary committees, members of parliament, citizens, civic groups and other parties to conduct audits in specific areas. These audits generally undertake an extensive analysis of the issues under consideration. The OAG conducts between 25 and 30 performance audits each year, publishing the results.
Citations:
Government of Canada, “Integrating Gender-Based Analysis Plus into Evaluation: A Primer,” 30 September 2019, https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/audit-evaluation/evaluation-government-canada/gba-primer.html.
Treasury Board of Canada, Cabinet Directive on Regulation, ttps://www.canada.ca/
en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/federal-regulatory-management/guidelines-tools/cabinet-directive-regulation.html.
Treasury Board of Canada, Policy on Results, https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=31300.
In 2016, the Treasury Board of Canada introduced a new “Policy on Results.” Evaluations of programs, policies and priorities under the policy is to be a “systematic and neutral analysis of evidence related to relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of policies and programs.” Those evaluations can be done through the Treasury Boards’ resource alignment reviews and internally by departments themselves.
In 2018, the federal government introduced the Canadian Gender Budgeting Act (S.C. 2018, c.27, s.13) which provided for government policies, programs and services to take into account “gender” and “diversity” both in their design and impacts. As a result, Treasury Board has put in place gender-based plus analysis which requires departments to annually report on the impacts of policies and programs in terms of their access and inclusiveness.
In practice, it is frequently the Office of the Auditor General of Canada (OAG) that evaluates government programs and initiatives ex post. The OAG is formally charged with so-called performance audits, which aim to provide an independent, objective and systematic assessment of whether government programs are being run with due regard for the economy, efficiency and environmental impact. The OAG has considerable discretion regarding which programs it will examine, and takes requests from parliamentary committees, members of parliament, citizens, civic groups and other parties to conduct audits in specific areas. These audits generally undertake an extensive analysis of the issues under consideration. The OAG conducts between 25 and 30 performance audits each year, publishing the results.
Citations:
Government of Canada, “Integrating Gender-Based Analysis Plus into Evaluation: A Primer,” 30 September 2019, https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/audit-evaluation/evaluation-government-canada/gba-primer.html.
Treasury Board of Canada, Cabinet Directive on Regulation, ttps://www.canada.ca/
en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/federal-regulatory-management/guidelines-tools/cabinet-directive-regulation.html.
Treasury Board of Canada, Policy on Results, https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=31300.
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Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?
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The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
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The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
The Canadian government holds consultations with economic and social actors on many issues. These consultations are motivated more by the desire to obtain meaningful input from Canadians than by a desire to sell a particular policy to the population, as this is typically done through other means. The most important consultations relate to the preparation of the annual budget. While the importance of trade unions in the consultation process has fallen significantly in recent years, this is not necessarily the case for other groups.
The duty to consult and accommodate Canada’s Indigenous peoples as laid down in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 has always been part of the legal and constitutional relationship between Canada and its Indigenous population. Two 2004 Supreme Court decisions (Haida Nation v British Columbia and Taku River Tinglit First Nation v British Columbia) state that the Crown has a duty to consult and, if appropriate, to accommodate Indigenous peoples in relation to actions that could adversely affect their rights. However, many First Nations leaders allege that there is a general and persistent lack of meaningful consultation at both the federal and the provincial level.
Since coming to power in 2015, the Liberal government has organized public consultations and engaged with a large number of stakeholders across many policy areas including innovation, childcare, and so-called pharma-care (drug insurance).
The duty to consult and accommodate Canada’s Indigenous peoples as laid down in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 has always been part of the legal and constitutional relationship between Canada and its Indigenous population. Two 2004 Supreme Court decisions (Haida Nation v British Columbia and Taku River Tinglit First Nation v British Columbia) state that the Crown has a duty to consult and, if appropriate, to accommodate Indigenous peoples in relation to actions that could adversely affect their rights. However, many First Nations leaders allege that there is a general and persistent lack of meaningful consultation at both the federal and the provincial level.
Since coming to power in 2015, the Liberal government has organized public consultations and engaged with a large number of stakeholders across many policy areas including innovation, childcare, and so-called pharma-care (drug insurance).
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To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?
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Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
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Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
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Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
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Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
The Liberal government’s communication policies are more open than those of its Conservative predecessors. Ministers are responsible for coordinating communications between their departments, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and the Privy Council Office (PCO). However, the Prime Minister’s Office has not fully relinquished its control over ministers and departments. The PMO’s objective is still to deliver coherent messages to the public. The prime minister conducted regular televised briefings during the pandemic.
Both the PCO and PMO are typically highly successful in coordinating communication from all departments – both from a political and administrative perspective. This was particularly borne out during the pandemic when messaging around health and safety measures, as well as around government programming was critical.
Both the PCO and PMO are typically highly successful in coordinating communication from all departments – both from a political and administrative perspective. This was particularly borne out during the pandemic when messaging around health and safety measures, as well as around government programming was critical.
Graph View
To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?
10
9
9
The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
5
4
3
4
3
The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
2
1
1
The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
The current Liberal administration, elected as a minority government both in 2019 and again in 2021, has had to pivot quickly in response to the pandemic and the health crisis, business closures and unemployment which that brought. However, in quick succession in the spring of 2020, the government rolled out programs designed to support businesses, keep workers on the payroll and support those whose incomes had been impacted, primary among these being the Canada Emergency Response Benefit and the Canada Emergency Wage Subsidy. The Office of the Auditor General has found that CERB and CEWS were designed extremely rapidly, considered a wide array of relevant parameters and modifications were undertaken as needed “in real time.” However, as the programming was premised on post-payment controls, substantive audits will need to be undertaken going forward.
With respect to election promises made by the current federal administration, the government has made progress on day care, mandated vaccinations for federally-regulated domains and invested CAD 4 billion in water infrastructure for Indigenous communities. However previous commitments on reduction of carbon emissions remain a challenge and, as the OECD has commented, Indigenous peoples remain “underprivileged” on key socioeconomic indicators such as income, employment, housing and health.
Many socioeconomic problems targeted by public policy are complex phenomena only partly amenable to public policy action. In addition, many of the programs funded by Canada’s federal government – including healthcare, post-secondary education, social services and the integration of immigrants – are implemented by provincial governments and require provincial cooperation to achieve federal policy objectives. However, in terms of responsiveness to the pandemic, the government reacted quickly to the crisis and indeed undertook historic measures in a very short time-frame.
Citations:
Liberal Party of Canada, Forward. For Everyone. 2021, https://liberal.ca/our-platform/.
OECD, Economic Surveys: Canada 2021, 2021, Paris: OECD Publishing.
Office of the Auditor General of Canada, COVID-19 Pandemic, Report 6, Canada Emergency Response Benefit, https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_
202103_01_e_43783.html
Office of the Auditor General of Canada, COVID-19 Pandemic, Report 7, Canada Emergency Wage Subsidy, 2021, https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/
parl_oag_202103_02_e_43784.html.
Wernick, Michael (2021) Governing in Canada: A Guide to the Tradecraft of Politics, On Point Press.
With respect to election promises made by the current federal administration, the government has made progress on day care, mandated vaccinations for federally-regulated domains and invested CAD 4 billion in water infrastructure for Indigenous communities. However previous commitments on reduction of carbon emissions remain a challenge and, as the OECD has commented, Indigenous peoples remain “underprivileged” on key socioeconomic indicators such as income, employment, housing and health.
Many socioeconomic problems targeted by public policy are complex phenomena only partly amenable to public policy action. In addition, many of the programs funded by Canada’s federal government – including healthcare, post-secondary education, social services and the integration of immigrants – are implemented by provincial governments and require provincial cooperation to achieve federal policy objectives. However, in terms of responsiveness to the pandemic, the government reacted quickly to the crisis and indeed undertook historic measures in a very short time-frame.
Citations:
Liberal Party of Canada, Forward. For Everyone. 2021, https://liberal.ca/our-platform/.
OECD, Economic Surveys: Canada 2021, 2021, Paris: OECD Publishing.
Office of the Auditor General of Canada, COVID-19 Pandemic, Report 6, Canada Emergency Response Benefit, https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_
202103_01_e_43783.html
Office of the Auditor General of Canada, COVID-19 Pandemic, Report 7, Canada Emergency Wage Subsidy, 2021, https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/
parl_oag_202103_02_e_43784.html.
Wernick, Michael (2021) Governing in Canada: A Guide to the Tradecraft of Politics, On Point Press.
To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?
10
9
9
The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
8
7
6
7
6
The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
5
4
3
4
3
The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
2
1
1
The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
In the Canadian system, the prime minister, in consultation with political staff, forms the cabinet and appoints his or her ministers, who serve on a discretionary basis. At the beginning of every mandate, ministers are sent a mandate letter by the PMO. They then work to implement the agenda outlined in this mandate letter, and are evaluated accordingly.
Any cabinet minister who is perceived by the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) to be a political liability will have a short career.
Deputy ministers (DMs) are tasked with ensuring implementation of the government’s priorities and supporting their respective Ministers and their portfolios. Deputies are appointed by the Prime Minister on the advice of the clerk of the Privy Council Office and are selected on a non-partisan basis through a vetting process, usually after an extensive career in public service in differing types of operational and policy roles.
Citations:
Government of Canada, “Guidance for Deputy Ministers,” https://www.sac-isc.gc.ca/eng/1614387410146/1614387435325.
Any cabinet minister who is perceived by the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) to be a political liability will have a short career.
Deputy ministers (DMs) are tasked with ensuring implementation of the government’s priorities and supporting their respective Ministers and their portfolios. Deputies are appointed by the Prime Minister on the advice of the clerk of the Privy Council Office and are selected on a non-partisan basis through a vetting process, usually after an extensive career in public service in differing types of operational and policy roles.
Citations:
Government of Canada, “Guidance for Deputy Ministers,” https://www.sac-isc.gc.ca/eng/1614387410146/1614387435325.
How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
5
4
3
4
3
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
2
1
1
The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
When appointed to a portfolio, a minister receives a mandate letter from the prime minister, while a deputy minister receives one from the clerk of the Privy Council. The importance of mandate letters depends on changing political and economic circumstances. In the case of the current government, ministers’ mandate letters detail priorities for their departments as seen from the center. The minister is subsequently evaluated on his or her success in achieving the objectives set out in the mandate letter. This procedure results in the PCO continually monitoring line-department activities to ensure they are in line with the mandate letter.
The current Liberal government has, for the first time, made public the mandate letters. The media and the general public are now in a position to better monitor the activities of ministers to assess the degree to which they achieve the tasks set out in the mandate letters.
The current Liberal government has, for the first time, made public the mandate letters. The media and the general public are now in a position to better monitor the activities of ministers to assess the degree to which they achieve the tasks set out in the mandate letters.
How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
8
7
6
7
6
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
5
4
3
4
3
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
2
1
1
The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
There are specific government procedures for monitoring both Crown Corporations and Special Operating Agencies. Both these entities fall under the Federal Accountability Act, thus have appropriate fiscal stewardship. In the case of Crown Corporations, these corporations and their mandates are established through legislation and they operate both on a “commercial” model as well public policy goals. Special Operating Agencies, while having some independence, operate under the auspices of their respective ministries with a specific mandate and public policy goals.
Citations:
Government of Canada, “Overview of federal organizations and interests,”
https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/reporting-government-spending/inventory-government-organizations/overview-institutional-forms-definitions.html
Citations:
Government of Canada, “Overview of federal organizations and interests,”
https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/reporting-government-spending/inventory-government-organizations/overview-institutional-forms-definitions.html
To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
8
7
6
7
6
The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
2
1
1
The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
Canadian provinces deliver key public services, notably healthcare and education. Their share of government spending has risen dramatically over recent decades and now accounts for roughly 78%, compared to an OECD average of 32% (2016 data).
Canada’s federal government enables provinces to fulfill nearly all of their tasks adequately. The federal government transfers funds earmarked for healthcare through the Canada Health Transfer (CHT) and for education, social assistance, and child services through the Canada Social Transfer (CST). In addition, Canada has an Equalization program, which provides payments to provinces whose fiscal capacity falls under the national average in order to bring these provinces to that average. The CHT is the object of almost constant debate. Population aging and the pandemic have put tremendous long-term pressures on provincial healthcare systems. Provincial Premiers have pressed the federal government to cover 35% of all healthcare costs. The federal contribution is currently 22%.
Citations:
Béland, Daniel, André Lecours, Gregory Marchildon, Haizhen Mou and Rose Olfert, Fiscal Federalism and Equalization Policy in Canada. Political and Economic Dimensions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017).
Canada’s federal government enables provinces to fulfill nearly all of their tasks adequately. The federal government transfers funds earmarked for healthcare through the Canada Health Transfer (CHT) and for education, social assistance, and child services through the Canada Social Transfer (CST). In addition, Canada has an Equalization program, which provides payments to provinces whose fiscal capacity falls under the national average in order to bring these provinces to that average. The CHT is the object of almost constant debate. Population aging and the pandemic have put tremendous long-term pressures on provincial healthcare systems. Provincial Premiers have pressed the federal government to cover 35% of all healthcare costs. The federal contribution is currently 22%.
Citations:
Béland, Daniel, André Lecours, Gregory Marchildon, Haizhen Mou and Rose Olfert, Fiscal Federalism and Equalization Policy in Canada. Political and Economic Dimensions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017).
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
2
1
1
The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
Canada is, by all measures, one of the most decentralized federations in the world (Dardanelli et al., 2019). The division of power in the federation is such that provincial governments have exclusive autonomy to legislate and to implement policy in their constitutionally-assigned fields of jurisdiction. Provinces exercise the entirety of their constitutional autonomy, and any attempt by the federal government to direct policy in provincial fields of jurisdiction meets with staunch resistance, first and foremost from Québec but also from Alberta and from some other provinces. The resistance faced also depends on the timing of measures and the policy sector (Lecours, 2019).
Citations:
Dardanelli, Paolo, et al. 2019. “Dynamic De/centralization in Federations: Comparative Conclusions,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 49, no.1, 194-219.
Lecours, André. 2019. “Dynamic De/centralization in Canada, 1867-2010,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol.49, no.1, 57-83.
Citations:
Dardanelli, Paolo, et al. 2019. “Dynamic De/centralization in Federations: Comparative Conclusions,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 49, no.1, 194-219.
Lecours, André. 2019. “Dynamic De/centralization in Canada, 1867-2010,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol.49, no.1, 57-83.
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?
10
9
9
Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
2
1
1
Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
There are very few national standards for public service delivery in Canada, as provincial governments have extensive freedom to determine their policy objectives, instruments, designs, etc… When the federal government transfers funds to the provinces, it could have some practical leverage to establish standards but much of the time chooses not to use this leverage. National standards are often opposed by provinces (always by Québec), which means they involve a political struggle the federal government might not win. In the area of healthcare, provincial governments formally have to conform to the five principles of the 1984 Canada Health Act (care must be available to all eligible residents of Canada, comprehensive in coverage, accessible without financial or other barriers, portable within the country and during travel abroad, and publicly administered) but funds from the Canada Health Transfer (CHT) are rarely withheld. The Canada Social Transfer (CST) that supports, among other things, social assistance in provinces comes with the “low bar” condition that provincial governments do not exclude potential recipients on the grounds that they have just moved to the province.
To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?
10
9
9
Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
8
7
6
7
6
Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
5
4
3
4
3
Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
2
1
1
Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
The quality of regulatory enforcement in Canada is generally high. While regulatory agencies occasionally face resource constraints, these are not usually the result of interest group lobbying. Interest groups in Canada tend to focus on obtaining leniencies during the creation of regulations rather than after regulations are promulgated.
One notable exception is the regulatory oversight and environmental assessment review of major infrastructure projects, where final decisions are in the hands of the ministry or cabinet. In many instances, stakeholders have complained that government approval did not follow the rules and regulations set out by law. Two recent high-profile cases highlight the issue: both the Enbridge west coast oil-port proposal (under former prime minister Harper) and the Trans-Mountain pipeline expansion (under current prime minister Trudeau) obtained positive recommendations from the National Energy Board, all required federal and provincial environmental-assessment certificates, and final ministerial approval. Yet, federal courts ultimately struck down both approvals.
The government recently reformed its impact assessment legislation, creating a new Impact Assessment Agency to centralize federal evaluations of major projects. It additionally created a new Canadian Energy Regulator to oversee Canada’s interprovincial and international pipelines and powerlines. These bodies have respectively replaced the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency and the National Energy Board.
One notable exception is the regulatory oversight and environmental assessment review of major infrastructure projects, where final decisions are in the hands of the ministry or cabinet. In many instances, stakeholders have complained that government approval did not follow the rules and regulations set out by law. Two recent high-profile cases highlight the issue: both the Enbridge west coast oil-port proposal (under former prime minister Harper) and the Trans-Mountain pipeline expansion (under current prime minister Trudeau) obtained positive recommendations from the National Energy Board, all required federal and provincial environmental-assessment certificates, and final ministerial approval. Yet, federal courts ultimately struck down both approvals.
The government recently reformed its impact assessment legislation, creating a new Impact Assessment Agency to centralize federal evaluations of major projects. It additionally created a new Canadian Energy Regulator to oversee Canada’s interprovincial and international pipelines and powerlines. These bodies have respectively replaced the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency and the National Energy Board.
Graph View
To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?
10
9
9
The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
8
7
6
7
6
In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
2
1
1
The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
Organizational change is constantly taking place within the federal government and some of this change reflects international developments. However, unlike countries in the European Union, Canada is not a member of a supranational organization that might necessitate adjustments in organizational structures and reporting relationships. One area that has seen change is international affairs. There is now Global Affairs Canada which has three ministers: 1) Foreign Affairs, 2) International Trade, Export Promotion, Small Business and Economic Development and 3) International Development. This new structure (integrated yet differentiated) allows for distinct but coordinated treatments of diplomacy, international trade, and aid/cooperation.
To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?
10
9
9
The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
2
1
1
The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
Canada’s government has the capacity to provide global public goods in coordination with other actors. Indeed, it has done so throughout its history. Prime Minister Trudeau has repeatedly sought to carve out an active role for Canada in international bodies such as the United Nations. The government has reaffirmed its commitment to be a strong voice on the international stage. While the government did submit Canada’s candidacy to serve on the UN Security Council in 2021-2022, that did not prove to be successful.
With respect to the Afghan crisis and the return of the Taliban, Canada has committed to settling 40,000 Afghans in Canada and has been working with international partners toward that end. To date, however, progress on that front has been minimal, with just over 4000 Afghans having been settled in the country and with substantial criticism that the process for application to Canada was slow in the face of the enormity of the crisis.
Citations:
Government of Canada, “First charter flight of privately sponsored Afghan refugees arrives in Canada, 2 December 2021, https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2021/12/first-charter-flight-of-privately-sponsored-afghan-refugees-arrives-in-canada.html.
Government of Canada, “Supporting Afghan nationals: About the special programs,” 12 December 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/refugees/afghanistan/special-measures.html.
With respect to the Afghan crisis and the return of the Taliban, Canada has committed to settling 40,000 Afghans in Canada and has been working with international partners toward that end. To date, however, progress on that front has been minimal, with just over 4000 Afghans having been settled in the country and with substantial criticism that the process for application to Canada was slow in the face of the enormity of the crisis.
Citations:
Government of Canada, “First charter flight of privately sponsored Afghan refugees arrives in Canada, 2 December 2021, https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2021/12/first-charter-flight-of-privately-sponsored-afghan-refugees-arrives-in-canada.html.
Government of Canada, “Supporting Afghan nationals: About the special programs,” 12 December 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/refugees/afghanistan/special-measures.html.
Graph View
To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?
10
9
9
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
5
4
3
4
3
The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
2
1
1
There is no monitoring.
Government structures are constantly changing in Canada, but there are few procedural structures in place to (self-) monitor whether current arrangements are appropriate or whether change has resulted in improvement. Instead, changes are initiated at the will of the government in power, with little ex post evaluation. In the case of the recent merger of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade with the Canadian International Development Agency, for example, the government offered no details about the nature of the amalgamation, nor about the cost savings it was intended to realize.
The current government, which won its previous mandate in part based on the promise of transparency and fairness, has since established a number of independent committees tasked with monitoring certain government processes. For example, in an effort to reduce partisanship in lawmaking, it created an independent advisory board that will aid in the selection of senators, and created the Independent Advisory Board to oversee appointments to the Supreme Court. While the government has acted upon such advice as in recent appointments to the Senate, it remains too early to gauge the long-term impact of these committees.
Citations:
David Zussmann (2013), Mergers and successful transitions, Canadian Government Executive, Volume 19 Issue 5.
Prime Minister of Canada, “The Prime Minister announces the appointment of Senators,” 29 July 2021, https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2021/07/29/prime-minister-announces-appointment-senators.
The current government, which won its previous mandate in part based on the promise of transparency and fairness, has since established a number of independent committees tasked with monitoring certain government processes. For example, in an effort to reduce partisanship in lawmaking, it created an independent advisory board that will aid in the selection of senators, and created the Independent Advisory Board to oversee appointments to the Supreme Court. While the government has acted upon such advice as in recent appointments to the Senate, it remains too early to gauge the long-term impact of these committees.
Citations:
David Zussmann (2013), Mergers and successful transitions, Canadian Government Executive, Volume 19 Issue 5.
Prime Minister of Canada, “The Prime Minister announces the appointment of Senators,” 29 July 2021, https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2021/07/29/prime-minister-announces-appointment-senators.
To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?
10
9
9
The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
8
7
6
7
6
The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
2
1
1
The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
There is little public evidence that changes in institutional arrangements have significantly improved the strategic-governance capacity of Canada’s federal government. For example, there has been no comprehensive evaluation of Service Canada, a delivery platform for government services established in the 2000s.
The frequency of departmental reorganizations has diminished in recent years. However, in 2017, the Liberal government split Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada into two departments, the Department of Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs, and the Department of Indigenous Services. The two departments respectively focus on renewing a nation-to-nation relationship and improving the quality of services available.
Recently, there has been progress made on certain aspects of Indigenous services, including the lifting of boil water advisories in Indigenous communities and investment in water infrastructure. However, given the ongoing challenges in basic infrastructural needs of Indigenous peoples (water, housing, environmental protection) and slow progress on reconciliation issues, it is unclear how these institutional changes have served these larger needs.
Citations:
Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada. Highlights from the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, posted at http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100014597/1100100014637
The frequency of departmental reorganizations has diminished in recent years. However, in 2017, the Liberal government split Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada into two departments, the Department of Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs, and the Department of Indigenous Services. The two departments respectively focus on renewing a nation-to-nation relationship and improving the quality of services available.
Recently, there has been progress made on certain aspects of Indigenous services, including the lifting of boil water advisories in Indigenous communities and investment in water infrastructure. However, given the ongoing challenges in basic infrastructural needs of Indigenous peoples (water, housing, environmental protection) and slow progress on reconciliation issues, it is unclear how these institutional changes have served these larger needs.
Citations:
Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada. Highlights from the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, posted at http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100014597/1100100014637