Executive Capacity
#22Key Findings
With a modernizing state struggling to manage popular discontent, Chile falls into the middle ranks (rank 22) with regard to executive capacity. Its score in this area has declined by 0.2 points relative to 2014.
Specialist units in ministries engage in strategic planning. The government office has sufficient capacities to evaluate line-ministry proposals, and collaborates in their development. Informal coordination plays an important role. Government communication was frequently incoherent or inconsistent during the October 2019 protests, and during the early phases of the pandemic in 2020.
RIAs regularly address fiscal impact, but not environmental or social issues. Ex post evaluation requirements have recently been strengthened. The government’s frequent consultation with civil society is skewed toward economic interests, which have considerable influence over the development of some regulations. However, agencies subsequently tend to enforce regulations without bias.
The Piñera administration fulfilled few of its original goals due to the massive protests followed by the pandemic. Education and primary healthcare standards in poor regions are improving, but a huge gap remains to be closed. An ongoing decentralization program giving greater power and funding flexibility to newly elected regional governors is intended to address these and other structural weaknesses.
Specialist units in ministries engage in strategic planning. The government office has sufficient capacities to evaluate line-ministry proposals, and collaborates in their development. Informal coordination plays an important role. Government communication was frequently incoherent or inconsistent during the October 2019 protests, and during the early phases of the pandemic in 2020.
RIAs regularly address fiscal impact, but not environmental or social issues. Ex post evaluation requirements have recently been strengthened. The government’s frequent consultation with civil society is skewed toward economic interests, which have considerable influence over the development of some regulations. However, agencies subsequently tend to enforce regulations without bias.
The Piñera administration fulfilled few of its original goals due to the massive protests followed by the pandemic. Education and primary healthcare standards in poor regions are improving, but a huge gap remains to be closed. An ongoing decentralization program giving greater power and funding flexibility to newly elected regional governors is intended to address these and other structural weaknesses.
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How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
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In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
The president has the ability to ask for and ensure strategic planning, whether through formal or informal channels. Line ministries, most notably the Ministry of Finance, and the president’s advisory ministry (Secretaría General de la Presidencia, Segpres), have considerable influence in strategic planning processes. Meetings between strategic planning staff and the head of government are held frequently. However, no long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions is necessarily presented – these are either limited in scope or depth of impact depending on the topic. Strategic planning, policy-planning and regulatory reforms, budget planning, and ex ante evaluation of government policies and public-investment programs are carried out by specialist units and departments inside the various ministries. While there is no explicit multi-year budget planning process in place in Chile, this takes place implicitly due to the fiscal rule that (by law) links overall government expenditure to forward-looking estimates of long-term government revenue, based on growth trends and copper-price projections. These forecasts are provided in a transparent way by specialist budgetary commissions comprised of academic and private sector experts (mostly professional economists).
Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?
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In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
Technocratic institutions and practices play an important role in government decision-making. Experts from academia, NGOs, partisan think tanks and the private sector are very influential in the preparation of government (presidential) programs and the development of policy-reform proposals by presidential or ministerial technical commissions. These technical commissions, which are charged with proposing policy reforms in specific areas (education, pension, social and wage policies, minimum wage policy, fiscal rule, etc.) or for singular policy challenges (e.g., corruption), tend to have significant impact on government legislation. Commissions are largely comprised of experts, and to a minor extent of representatives of interested parties, and cover a wide political spectrum. This kind of technical input into the policymaking process belongs to the technocratic tradition in Chilean politics. As a political practice, this can be described as institutionalized, as both the former and the current party coalition followed this tradition. The main policies of government programs tend to be elaborated and accompanied by expert commissions. Some reform initiatives in the education and environmental sectors, for example, have been accelerated or even blocked due to ideological differences within the commissions dealing with the issue. Experts (economists and lawyers in particular) are a key factor in drafting the reform proposals submitted to the president or to ministers.
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Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?
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The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
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The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
The president’s advisory ministry (Ministerio Secretaría General de la Presidencia, Segpres) and the Government or Cabinet Office (Ministerio Secretaría General de Gobierno, Segegob) have the necessary instruments and capacities at their disposal to monitor and evaluate the policy content of line-ministry proposals. Nevertheless, channels of evaluation and advice are not fully institutionalized, and may change with each new head of state.
To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?
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There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
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The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
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Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
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Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
The Government or Cabinet Office and line ministries have a strong tendency to coordinate activity, and in practice the president or Government Office and the Ministry of Finance are nearly always involved in the preparation of policy proposals. No serving minister would ignore the president’s opinion in the preparation and elaboration of a policy proposal.
How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?
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The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
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Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
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There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
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There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
Ministerial or cabinet committees are not necessarily central when it comes to decision-making on policy matters. Depending on the topic, ministerial committees are more or less involved in preparing cabinet proposals, especially those of relatively significant strategic or financial importance. These proposals are normally coordinated effectively.
How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?
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Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
Ministry staff and civil servants do not always play a dominant role in the drafting of policy proposals before those proposals reach ministerial committees. Depending on the ministry and the importance of the proposal, officials and civil servants are more or less effectively involved in the preparation and coordination process. Ministry staff and civil servants can request technical support in particular subject-matter areas from the Library of the National Congress of Chile (BCN).
Citations:
Library of the National Congress of Chile (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, BCN), https://www.bcn.cl/portal, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Citations:
Library of the National Congress of Chile (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, BCN), https://www.bcn.cl/portal, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Informal coordination plays an important role in settling issues so that the cabinet can focus on strategic-policy debates. Existing informal mechanisms might be characterized as “formal informality,” as informal coordination mechanisms are de facto as institutionalized as formal ones in daily political practice.
How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?
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The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
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The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
The president’s advisory ministry (Ministerio Secretaría General de la Presidencia, Segpres) and the Division for Digital Government support line ministries and respective services with digitalization, facilitating instruments and providing advice regarding the implementation of digital services. The implementation of the Digital Agenda 2020, released in 2015, has been continued by the current government of Sebastián Piñera. In general, and especially in comparison with other Latin American countries, the level of digitalization regarding public information and services in Chile is quite advanced.
Chile is trying to follow OECD recommendations to ensure consistency in the use of technology as an enabler for open government. To achieve this, public institutions have increasingly adopted digital tools and open-government agendas.
As indicated on the official government website, 70% of all administrative procedures (including both procedures between different public entities and state-to-citizen procedures) could be carried out digitally by the end of 2021. In addition, an online platform with the objective of strengthening communication between the Congress and citizens was established in June 2020. The platform provides updates on the progress of draft laws, public consultations and voting results.
Citations:
On The implementation of the Digital Agenda 2020:
Chilean Government, http://www.agendadigital.gob.cl, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Digital Government (Gobierno Digital), https://digital.gob.cl, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Chilean Virtual Congress website, https://congresovirtual.cl, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Digital Government in Chile, Strengthening the Institutional and Governance Framework, 2016, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/digital-government-in-chile_9789264258013-en, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Chile is trying to follow OECD recommendations to ensure consistency in the use of technology as an enabler for open government. To achieve this, public institutions have increasingly adopted digital tools and open-government agendas.
As indicated on the official government website, 70% of all administrative procedures (including both procedures between different public entities and state-to-citizen procedures) could be carried out digitally by the end of 2021. In addition, an online platform with the objective of strengthening communication between the Congress and citizens was established in June 2020. The platform provides updates on the progress of draft laws, public consultations and voting results.
Citations:
On The implementation of the Digital Agenda 2020:
Chilean Government, http://www.agendadigital.gob.cl, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Digital Government (Gobierno Digital), https://digital.gob.cl, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Chilean Virtual Congress website, https://congresovirtual.cl, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Digital Government in Chile, Strengthening the Institutional and Governance Framework, 2016, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/digital-government-in-chile_9789264258013-en, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
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To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?
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RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
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RIA are not applied or do not exist.
The OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021 notes that Chile has made important improvements to its regulatory management tools in recent years. All newly proposed laws must be accompanied by a report summarizing their predicted fiscal impact and the financial implications for the government budget. This report is always prepared by the fiscal department of the corresponding ministry. Chile also has a constitutional restriction on policy proposals that imply budget changes. Legally, there is no obligation to present a report concerning potential socioeconomic impacts that do not implicate the state budgets, but political practice shows that those aspects are normally also considered.
Furthermore, there are supervisory bodies (Superintendencias) that monitor enterprises within specific sectors and produce evaluations and reports.
In a strictly legal sense, these supervisory bodies do not have the specific objective of evaluating the impact of new regulations or proposed modifications to the legal framework. Nevertheless, the evaluation of possible impacts tends to be one result of their work. Chile currently features the following supervisory bodies:
• Supervisory Board for Social Security (Superintendencia de Seguridad Social)
• Supervisory Board for Electricity and Fuels (Superintendencia de Electricidad y Combustibles)
• Supervisory Board for Health Services (Superintendencia de Servicios Sanitarios)
• Supervisory Board for Health (Superintendencia de Salud)
• Supervisory Board for Casinos (Superintendencia de Casinos de Juegos)
• Supervisory Board for Pensions (Superintendencia de Pensiones)
• Supervisory Board for the Environment (Superintendencia del Medio Ambiente)
• Supervisory Board for Education (Superintendencia de Educación)
• Supervisory Board for Bankruptcy and Re-entrepreneurship (Superintendencia de Insolvencia y Reemprendimiento)
• Supervisory Board for Financial Markets (Comisión para el Mercado Financiero)
• Supervisory Board for Higher Education (Superintendencia de Educación Superior)
In some areas, the line ministries serve as the oversight body for regulatory impact assessments (RIAs) reviews.
In January 2018, the former Supervisory Board for Securities and Insurance was transformed into the Steering Committee for the Financial Market (Consejo de la Comisión para el Mercado Financiero), and given a wider scope of responsibilities. Additionally, the Supervisory Board for Higher Education was created in the same year.
In addition, as indicated by the OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021, a presidential instruction from 2019 introduced new requirements for ex post evaluation. “Subordinate regulations for which a high impact RIA was conducted are now required to be evaluated four years after their enactment. In addition, each ministry publishes on their website a list of existing regulations for the public to provide comments and feedback for potential review” (OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021, p. 226).
Citations:
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021”, 2021, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/oecd-regulatory-policy-outlook-2021_38b0fdb1-en, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Reviews of Regulatory Reform
Evaluation Report: Regulatory Impact Assessment (Chile)”, 2017, https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/regulatory-impact-assessment-in-chile.htm, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Regulatory Policy in Chile: Government Capacity to Ensure High-Quality Regulation”, 2016, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/regulatory-policy-in-chile_9789264254596-en, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Furthermore, there are supervisory bodies (Superintendencias) that monitor enterprises within specific sectors and produce evaluations and reports.
In a strictly legal sense, these supervisory bodies do not have the specific objective of evaluating the impact of new regulations or proposed modifications to the legal framework. Nevertheless, the evaluation of possible impacts tends to be one result of their work. Chile currently features the following supervisory bodies:
• Supervisory Board for Social Security (Superintendencia de Seguridad Social)
• Supervisory Board for Electricity and Fuels (Superintendencia de Electricidad y Combustibles)
• Supervisory Board for Health Services (Superintendencia de Servicios Sanitarios)
• Supervisory Board for Health (Superintendencia de Salud)
• Supervisory Board for Casinos (Superintendencia de Casinos de Juegos)
• Supervisory Board for Pensions (Superintendencia de Pensiones)
• Supervisory Board for the Environment (Superintendencia del Medio Ambiente)
• Supervisory Board for Education (Superintendencia de Educación)
• Supervisory Board for Bankruptcy and Re-entrepreneurship (Superintendencia de Insolvencia y Reemprendimiento)
• Supervisory Board for Financial Markets (Comisión para el Mercado Financiero)
• Supervisory Board for Higher Education (Superintendencia de Educación Superior)
In some areas, the line ministries serve as the oversight body for regulatory impact assessments (RIAs) reviews.
In January 2018, the former Supervisory Board for Securities and Insurance was transformed into the Steering Committee for the Financial Market (Consejo de la Comisión para el Mercado Financiero), and given a wider scope of responsibilities. Additionally, the Supervisory Board for Higher Education was created in the same year.
In addition, as indicated by the OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021, a presidential instruction from 2019 introduced new requirements for ex post evaluation. “Subordinate regulations for which a high impact RIA was conducted are now required to be evaluated four years after their enactment. In addition, each ministry publishes on their website a list of existing regulations for the public to provide comments and feedback for potential review” (OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021, p. 226).
Citations:
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021”, 2021, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/oecd-regulatory-policy-outlook-2021_38b0fdb1-en, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Reviews of Regulatory Reform
Evaluation Report: Regulatory Impact Assessment (Chile)”, 2017, https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/regulatory-impact-assessment-in-chile.htm, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Regulatory Policy in Chile: Government Capacity to Ensure High-Quality Regulation”, 2016, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/regulatory-policy-in-chile_9789264254596-en, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?
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RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
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The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
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The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
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RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
Given the partly informal and non-institutionalized character of instruments used for regulatory impact assessments, reports do not necessarily specify the purpose of and the need for a regulation. Furthermore, they do not tend to analyze alternative options. Depending on the topic, stakeholders may play a certain role in the RIA process, but this does not entail a high degree of relevance within the political process over the medium or long term. As stated in Regulatory Impact Assessment published by the OECD in 2017, there is no standardized practice for regulatory consultations, for instance with regard to the length, scope, timing and procedural mechanisms. RIA assessments are not routinely evaluated by independent bodies.
As indicated by the OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021, since 2019 “public consultations are also required for major regulatory proposals for which a high impact RIA is to be conducted. Chile makes voluntary guidelines on consultation mechanisms available to regulators and links to ministries’ consultation portals are listed on a central website. In order to continue improving stakeholder engagement practices, Chile needs to ensure that these recent requirements are systematically implemented in practice, including involving stakeholders earlier in the decision-making process, and not only when there is already a draft regulation” (OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021, p. 226).
Citations:
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021”, 2021, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/oecd-regulatory-policy-outlook-2021_38b0fdb1-en, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Reviews of Regulatory Reform
Evaluation Report: Regulatory ImpactAssessment (Chile)”, 2017, https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/regulatory-impact-assessment-in-chile.htm, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Regulatory Policy in Chile: Government Capacity to Ensure High-Quality Regulation”, 2016, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/regulatory-policy-in-chile_9789264254596-en, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
As indicated by the OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021, since 2019 “public consultations are also required for major regulatory proposals for which a high impact RIA is to be conducted. Chile makes voluntary guidelines on consultation mechanisms available to regulators and links to ministries’ consultation portals are listed on a central website. In order to continue improving stakeholder engagement practices, Chile needs to ensure that these recent requirements are systematically implemented in practice, including involving stakeholders earlier in the decision-making process, and not only when there is already a draft regulation” (OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021, p. 226).
Citations:
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021”, 2021, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/oecd-regulatory-policy-outlook-2021_38b0fdb1-en, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Reviews of Regulatory Reform
Evaluation Report: Regulatory ImpactAssessment (Chile)”, 2017, https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/regulatory-impact-assessment-in-chile.htm, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Regulatory Policy in Chile: Government Capacity to Ensure High-Quality Regulation”, 2016, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/regulatory-policy-in-chile_9789264254596-en, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?
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Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
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Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
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Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
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Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
RIAs do not necessarily analyze a regulation’s impact on sustainability in the broad sense. Short-, medium- and long-term analysis tends to focus exclusively on economic rather than ecological or social issues. Some exploratory efforts have been made to include wider and standardized sustainability checks within the RIA framework in the future.
Citations:
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021”, 2021, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/oecd-regulatory-policy-outlook-2021_38b0fdb1-en, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Reviews of Regulatory Reform
Evaluation Report: Regulatory Impact Assessment (Chile)”, 2017, https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/regulatory-impact-assessment-in-chile.htm, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Regulatory Policy in Chile: Government Capacity to Ensure High-Quality Regulation”, 2016, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/regulatory-policy-in-chile_9789264254596-en, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Citations:
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021”, 2021, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/oecd-regulatory-policy-outlook-2021_38b0fdb1-en, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Reviews of Regulatory Reform
Evaluation Report: Regulatory Impact Assessment (Chile)”, 2017, https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/regulatory-impact-assessment-in-chile.htm, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Regulatory Policy in Chile: Government Capacity to Ensure High-Quality Regulation”, 2016, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/regulatory-policy-in-chile_9789264254596-en, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?
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Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
Since 1997, the Ministry of Finance’s Budget Office (Dirección de Presupuestos, DIPRES) has had the power to assign specific budgets to line ministries for the contracting of external consultants to carry out ex post evaluations of their government programs (Evaluación de Programas Gubernamentales, EPG). Programs or institutions to be evaluated are agreed on with the Congress annually, with the instruction coming via ministerial decree. The evaluation results are normally made publicly and freely available.
Citations:
Evaluation of government programs:
Budget Office (Dirección de Presupuesto, DIPRES), Evaluación de Programas Gubernamentales (EPG), http://www.dipres.gob.cl/598/w3-article-111762.html
Budget Office (Dirección de Presupuesto, DIPRES),”Evaluación Focalizada de Ámbito EFA”, October 2016, http://www.dipres.gob.cl/598/w3-article-154357.html, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Citations:
Evaluation of government programs:
Budget Office (Dirección de Presupuesto, DIPRES), Evaluación de Programas Gubernamentales (EPG), http://www.dipres.gob.cl/598/w3-article-111762.html
Budget Office (Dirección de Presupuesto, DIPRES),”Evaluación Focalizada de Ámbito EFA”, October 2016, http://www.dipres.gob.cl/598/w3-article-154357.html, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
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Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?
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The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
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The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
Frequent consultations with civil society groups and particularly stakeholder organizations take place. However, consultations tend to be inclined toward economic-interest groups. By contrast, unions and environmental organizations are often underrepresented. Online surveys have been implemented with the aim of gauging opinions within the non-institutionalized public. The president’s advisory ministry (Secretaría General de la Presidencia, Segpres) is primarily responsible for initiating and monitoring consultations. Depending on the issue, sectoral institutions can also be involved. The ad hoc advisory commissions represent another means of societal consultation, as they include interest-group representatives, experts and other stakeholders.
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To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?
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Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
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Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
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Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
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Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
Each new government designs its own communication policy. As a result, strategic communication often tends to be rather haphazard at the beginning of a presidential term, but improves as the administration gains experience. During the period under review, the government’s communication and coherence regarding public announcements worsened significantly. Several announcements were perceived by the public as contributing to and accelerating the generalized discontent and social crisis. Incoherence and lapses in the field of government communication were particularly noticeable during the October 2019 protests and the initial phase of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. For instance, in announcing the curfew, President Piñera announced that “we are at war,” a statement that he withdrew two days later and followed up with a public apology. Furthermore, the then-serving health minister publicly declared that the government had been unaware of the overcrowded housing conditions experienced by a large population of vulnerable families, especially in the Santiago Metropolitan Region. As a political response to this questionable management, President Piñera decided to appoint a new minister of health in June 2020, at the peak of the pandemic.
Citations:
El Mostrador, “En medio de la pandemia del Covid-19, Mañalich reconoce que en Santiago “hay un nivel de pobreza y hacinamiento del cual yo no tenía conciencia”, 28 May 2020, https://www.elmostrador.cl/dia/2020/05/28/en-medio-de-la-pandemia-del-covid-19-manalich-reconoce-que-en-santiago-hay-un-nivel-de-pobreza-y-hacinamiento-del-cual-yo-no-tenia-conciencia, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Centro de Investigación Periodística (CIPER), “Ensayando la comunicación de crisis en plena crisis”, 1 April 2020, https://www.ciperchile.cl/2020/04/01/ensayando-la-comunicacion-de-crisis-en-plena-crisis, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Centro de Investigación Periodística (CIPER), “Piñera, el discurso político como una cartera de inversiones”, 12 December 2019, https://www.ciperchile.cl/2019/12/12/pinera-el-discurso-politico-como-una-cartera-de-inversiones, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Citations:
El Mostrador, “En medio de la pandemia del Covid-19, Mañalich reconoce que en Santiago “hay un nivel de pobreza y hacinamiento del cual yo no tenía conciencia”, 28 May 2020, https://www.elmostrador.cl/dia/2020/05/28/en-medio-de-la-pandemia-del-covid-19-manalich-reconoce-que-en-santiago-hay-un-nivel-de-pobreza-y-hacinamiento-del-cual-yo-no-tenia-conciencia, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Centro de Investigación Periodística (CIPER), “Ensayando la comunicación de crisis en plena crisis”, 1 April 2020, https://www.ciperchile.cl/2020/04/01/ensayando-la-comunicacion-de-crisis-en-plena-crisis, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Centro de Investigación Periodística (CIPER), “Piñera, el discurso político como una cartera de inversiones”, 12 December 2019, https://www.ciperchile.cl/2019/12/12/pinera-el-discurso-politico-como-una-cartera-de-inversiones, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Graph View
To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?
10
9
9
The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
5
4
3
4
3
The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
2
1
1
The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
Implementation performance varies widely, ranging from excellent in areas where benchmarks and oversight mechanisms are strictly enforced (i.e., the general government budget) to weak in less rigidly monitored areas (i.e., implementation of some sectoral reforms such as Transantiago, the Santiago transport system). In general terms, far-reaching reforms that would require constitutional change and thus support by at least three-fifths of the national deputies and senators have not been considered as a part of government programs. Thus, this high hurdle has not proved to be a practical obstacle in the achievement of governments’ core policy objectives.
Due to the mass protests and strikes of October 2019, the government under President Piñera had to adjust its program and policy objectives significantly in order to restore social order and peace. This situation has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which forced the government to reallocate resources and redefine priorities.
The website of the Intelligent Citizenship Foundation (Fundación Ciudadanía Inteligente) reviews the balance of compliance between the Piñera government’s second-year legislative promises and the announcements made during the social mobilizations in Chile. By the end of the period under review, the rate of compliance was indicated as only 37% (the percentage indicates the average progress made by all the promises contained in the government program).
Citations:
Independent initiative to measure and assess implementation of the government program:
Intelligent Citizenship Foundation (Ciudadanía Inteligente), https://ciudadaniai.org, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Intelligent Citizenship Foundation (Ciudadanía Inteligente), “Del deicho al hecho. Cuánto cumple el gobierno”, https://deldichoalhecho.cl, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Due to the mass protests and strikes of October 2019, the government under President Piñera had to adjust its program and policy objectives significantly in order to restore social order and peace. This situation has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which forced the government to reallocate resources and redefine priorities.
The website of the Intelligent Citizenship Foundation (Fundación Ciudadanía Inteligente) reviews the balance of compliance between the Piñera government’s second-year legislative promises and the announcements made during the social mobilizations in Chile. By the end of the period under review, the rate of compliance was indicated as only 37% (the percentage indicates the average progress made by all the promises contained in the government program).
Citations:
Independent initiative to measure and assess implementation of the government program:
Intelligent Citizenship Foundation (Ciudadanía Inteligente), https://ciudadaniai.org, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Intelligent Citizenship Foundation (Ciudadanía Inteligente), “Del deicho al hecho. Cuánto cumple el gobierno”, https://deldichoalhecho.cl, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?
10
9
9
The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
8
7
6
7
6
The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
5
4
3
4
3
The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
2
1
1
The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
The president annually evaluates his or her ministers’ policy performance. In a commission consisting of the president’s advisory ministry (Secretaría General de la Presidencia, Segpres) and budgetary units of the government, ministers have to present their sectoral priorities, and if necessary, arrangements and modifications are made to ensure alignment with the government program.
How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
5
4
3
4
3
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
2
1
1
The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
The president’s advisory ministry (Secretaría General de la Presidencia, Segpres) and the respective budgetary units of the government monitor the line ministries (especially within the annual performance evaluation). If necessary, arrangements and modifications are made in order to ensure effective alignment with the government program. Monitoring of effectiveness seems to have improved slightly since 2011.
How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
8
7
6
7
6
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
5
4
3
4
3
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
2
1
1
The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
To a certain extent, high positions in government agencies are filled not via political appointments but through the government’s civil service department (Alta Dirección Pública, ADP), based on candidates’ technical capacity and experience. Clear goals are identified by the directors of executive agencies and the corresponding ministries. Exhaustive evaluations of the system and of personnel choices are performed annually by the minister, the civil service and the president’s advisory ministry (Secretaría General de la Presidencia, Segpres). In addition, the Ministry of Finance’s budget office monitors decentralized agencies and public enterprises from a budgetary perspective very tightly and effectively. Nevertheless, the changes in government in 2014 and 2018 showed that the selection of candidates through the ADP is in fact only moderately institutionalized, as there is still an understanding that a successful candidate is a “government officer” rather than a “state officer.” The monitoring of bureaucratic activities and executive agencies, especially at the subnational level, tends to be distorted by this effect.
To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
8
7
6
7
6
The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
2
1
1
The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
Chile’s central government exercises strong control over municipal and regional budgets, and accounts for a significant proportion of local revenue. Currently, about 18% of the federal government’s budget is redistributed to the regional and local level (OECD average is about 45%). The assignment of originally regionally held duties to the municipal level has not necessarily implied a corresponding allocation of sufficient new funding.
Municipal programs are monitored relatively closely by the central government, although spending overruns do sometimes occur, resulting in local-government debt. The quality of services (e.g., the public health and education systems) provided by less wealthy municipalities are sometimes below average as some municipalities are unable to raise the income required to effectively provide the services themselves. This challenge is characteristic of Chile’s centralized state structure and must be regarded as a structural problem.
In 2021, regional mayors (Intendentes Regionales) were replaced by regional governors (Gobernadores Regionales). The latter are now directly elected by the people, which enables citizens to hold them accountable for promises made in their electoral campaigns. They are responsible for regional and urban planning, the administration of the National Fund for Regional Development (Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Regional, FNDR), and implementation of social and economic policies at the regional level. Additionally, three new regional divisions were created by Law 21,074: Industrial Advancement (Fomento e Industria), Human Development, and Infrastructure and Transport.
Citations:
On Chile´s decentralization process and the election of Regional Governors:
Undersecretariat of Regional and Administrative Development (Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Regional y Administrativo, Subdere), https://www.descentralizachile.cl/conoces-las-funciones-de-un-gobernador-regional-descubre-todo-los-detalles, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Fundación Chile Descentralizado, https://chiledescentralizado.cl, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Final Report of the Commission on Decentralization:
Fundación Chile Descentralizado, “Informe final – Comisión Asesora Presidencial”, 7 October 2014, https://chiledescentralizado.cl/documentos, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
On Law No 21,074 – Strenghening the Regionalization of the Country:
Library of the National Congress of Chile (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, BCN), https://www.bcn.cl/leychile/navegar?idNorma=1115064, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
On Subnational Finance:
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), https://www.oecd.org/regional/regionaldevelopment/mlgsngpublicfinance.htm, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Making Decentralisation Work in Chile”, September 2017, https://www.oecd.org/chile/making-decentralisation-work-in-chile-9789264279049-en.htm, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Municipal programs are monitored relatively closely by the central government, although spending overruns do sometimes occur, resulting in local-government debt. The quality of services (e.g., the public health and education systems) provided by less wealthy municipalities are sometimes below average as some municipalities are unable to raise the income required to effectively provide the services themselves. This challenge is characteristic of Chile’s centralized state structure and must be regarded as a structural problem.
In 2021, regional mayors (Intendentes Regionales) were replaced by regional governors (Gobernadores Regionales). The latter are now directly elected by the people, which enables citizens to hold them accountable for promises made in their electoral campaigns. They are responsible for regional and urban planning, the administration of the National Fund for Regional Development (Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Regional, FNDR), and implementation of social and economic policies at the regional level. Additionally, three new regional divisions were created by Law 21,074: Industrial Advancement (Fomento e Industria), Human Development, and Infrastructure and Transport.
Citations:
On Chile´s decentralization process and the election of Regional Governors:
Undersecretariat of Regional and Administrative Development (Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Regional y Administrativo, Subdere), https://www.descentralizachile.cl/conoces-las-funciones-de-un-gobernador-regional-descubre-todo-los-detalles, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Fundación Chile Descentralizado, https://chiledescentralizado.cl, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Final Report of the Commission on Decentralization:
Fundación Chile Descentralizado, “Informe final – Comisión Asesora Presidencial”, 7 October 2014, https://chiledescentralizado.cl/documentos, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
On Law No 21,074 – Strenghening the Regionalization of the Country:
Library of the National Congress of Chile (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, BCN), https://www.bcn.cl/leychile/navegar?idNorma=1115064, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
On Subnational Finance:
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), https://www.oecd.org/regional/regionaldevelopment/mlgsngpublicfinance.htm, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Making Decentralisation Work in Chile”, September 2017, https://www.oecd.org/chile/making-decentralisation-work-in-chile-9789264279049-en.htm, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
2
1
1
The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
Chile is a centrally organized state, rather than a federal state. This represents a structural problem given the wide range of differences between the various regions with respect to geography, level of development and density of population. Nevertheless, local governments legally enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy concerning mandates and tasks that do not touch on constitutional issues and can be executed within the allocated budget. Furthermore, the government has tended to devolve responsibilities to local governments (i.e., in the domain of urban regulation). In comparison to the local or municipal levels, regional governments enjoy a relatively high degree of budget autonomy.
In January 2018, a law (Ley No. 21,074) was enacted that enhances the regionalization of the state (Ley para el Fortalecimiento de la regionalización en Chile). This can be seen as an important step in the context of the ongoing decentralization process. Since July 2021, regional governors have been directly elected and are therefore politically independent from the national government. A regional presidential delegate, serving as representative of the national government, is responsible for the coordination, supervision and oversight of public services operating in the region that depend on or are related to a ministry. These delegates exercise their respective functions in accordance with the orders and instructions of the president.
Citations:
On decentralization:
Fundación Chile Descentralizado, https://chiledescentralizado.cl, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
On Law Nr. 21,074:
Library of the National Congress of Chile (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, BCN): https://www.bcn.cl/leychile/navegar?idNorma=1115064, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Regional Governments:
Undersecretary of Regional and Administrative Development (Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Regional y Administrativo), http://www.subdere.gob.cl/autoridades-nacionales/gobernadores-regionales, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Making Decentralisation Work in Chile”, September 2017, https://www.oecd.org/chile/making-decentralisation-work-in-chile-9789264279049-en.htm, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
In January 2018, a law (Ley No. 21,074) was enacted that enhances the regionalization of the state (Ley para el Fortalecimiento de la regionalización en Chile). This can be seen as an important step in the context of the ongoing decentralization process. Since July 2021, regional governors have been directly elected and are therefore politically independent from the national government. A regional presidential delegate, serving as representative of the national government, is responsible for the coordination, supervision and oversight of public services operating in the region that depend on or are related to a ministry. These delegates exercise their respective functions in accordance with the orders and instructions of the president.
Citations:
On decentralization:
Fundación Chile Descentralizado, https://chiledescentralizado.cl, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
On Law Nr. 21,074:
Library of the National Congress of Chile (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, BCN): https://www.bcn.cl/leychile/navegar?idNorma=1115064, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Regional Governments:
Undersecretary of Regional and Administrative Development (Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Regional y Administrativo), http://www.subdere.gob.cl/autoridades-nacionales/gobernadores-regionales, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Making Decentralisation Work in Chile”, September 2017, https://www.oecd.org/chile/making-decentralisation-work-in-chile-9789264279049-en.htm, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?
10
9
9
Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
2
1
1
Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
Due to the different financing structures at the regional and municipal levels, the national government can guarantee services at an adequate standard only at the regional level. The central government has clearly failed to establish nationally upheld standards at the municipal level. Relatively poor municipalities and those in rural regions often lack the capacity and economic resources to meet national standards for public services, especially in the fields of healthcare and education. This segregation is also evident in Santiago itself, where public schools in richer districts clearly tend to show higher standards and better results than public schools from poorer districts. The same is true of public health institutions. In comparison to previous years, a slight improvement can be noticed in the field of education and primary healthcare. Nevertheless, there is still a huge gap to be closed.
Citations:
On disparities between rural and urban schools:
Centro de Investigación Periodística (CIPER),“ ¿Por qué las escuelas rurales deberían reabrir?, 1 September 2020, https://www.ciperchile.cl/2020/09/01/por-que-las-escuelas-rurales-deberian-reabrir, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Example of an infrastructure governance analysis:
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Brechas y estándares de gobernanza de la infraestructura Pública en Chile”, May 2017, https://www.oecd.org/gov/brechas-y-estandares-de-gobernanza-de-la-infraestructura-publica-en-chile-9789264286948-es.htmhttps://tribunalambiental.cl, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Citations:
On disparities between rural and urban schools:
Centro de Investigación Periodística (CIPER),“ ¿Por qué las escuelas rurales deberían reabrir?, 1 September 2020, https://www.ciperchile.cl/2020/09/01/por-que-las-escuelas-rurales-deberian-reabrir, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Example of an infrastructure governance analysis:
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Brechas y estándares de gobernanza de la infraestructura Pública en Chile”, May 2017, https://www.oecd.org/gov/brechas-y-estandares-de-gobernanza-de-la-infraestructura-publica-en-chile-9789264286948-es.htmhttps://tribunalambiental.cl, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?
10
9
9
Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
8
7
6
7
6
Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
5
4
3
4
3
Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
2
1
1
Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
Some regulations are highly influenced by economic-interest groups, especially regulations affecting the productive sectors (e.g., fishing, agriculture and the mining industry). However, once enacted, government agencies usually enforce regulations effectively and without bias. Therefore, it’s more a question of how regulations are designed than a question of their enforcement.
Graph View
To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?
10
9
9
The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
8
7
6
7
6
In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
2
1
1
The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
In general terms, the reform of domestic governing structures tends to be driven by national fiscal policy concerns, which means that any innovation implying financial changes (such as a budget augmentation for a certain ministry or for a department within a ministry) is very difficult or even impossible to realize. Changes concerning topics that might be of future interest and do not directly affect current political challenges – for example, the expansion of a department’s staff or the creation of a new unit dedicated to topics of possible future interest – are driven more by fiscal or political reasons and political cycles than by international or supranational developments. However, Law No. 20,600 of 2012 established environmental tribunals (Tribunales Ambientales) in three regions of the country (north, central and south). The creation of the Ministry of Science, Technology, Knowledge and Innovation (Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología, Conocimiento e Innovación, MICITEC) in 2018, as well as the reconfiguration of some supervisory boards, can be seen as a domestic adaptation responding to international and supranational developments. The planned creation of the Agency for Personal Data Protection (Agencia de Protección de Datos Personales) represents another step in line with international and supranational developments.
Citations:
On the Environmental Tribunals, https://tribunalambiental.cl, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
On the Ministry of Science, Technology, Knowledge and Innovation (Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología, Conocimiento e Innovación, MICITEC), https://www.minciencia.gob.cl, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Citations:
On the Environmental Tribunals, https://tribunalambiental.cl, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
On the Ministry of Science, Technology, Knowledge and Innovation (Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología, Conocimiento e Innovación, MICITEC), https://www.minciencia.gob.cl, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?
10
9
9
The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
2
1
1
The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
The government is endowed with the institutional capacity to contribute actively to international efforts to foster the provision of global public goods. The government actively participates in the international coordination of joint reform initiatives. This is underlined by the fact that Chile represents one of the most active countries in Latin America with regard to international policymaking initiatives. However, the impacts of national policies on these global challenges are not always systematically assessed and then incorporated into the formulation, coordination and monitoring of policies across government.
Graph View
To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?
10
9
9
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
5
4
3
4
3
The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
2
1
1
There is no monitoring.
Ministries are required to establish sectoral goals that are evaluated annually. Reports are presented on a quarterly basis but do not focus directly on the adequacy of institutional arrangements. For example, while the accomplishment of ministerial goals is evaluated, the overall adequacy of the ministry is not. Although the Ministry of Finance assesses the adequacy of institutional arrangements in the case of new law proposals, there is no specific institution assigned to monitor pre-existing institutional arrangements. Furthermore, to a certain degree, changes in institutional arrangements tend to be influenced by personnel criteria and are not driven by an effort to introduce long-run strategic structural change. Ministry portfolios are subject to sporadic monitoring while procedures and work formats are subject to regular monitoring.
To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?
10
9
9
The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
8
7
6
7
6
The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
2
1
1
The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
In recent years, some improvements in strategic capacity have been made by modifying institutional arrangements. For example, in 2012 the erstwhile Ministry for Planning and Co-operation (Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación, Mideplan) was transformed into the Ministry of Social Development and Family (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social y Familia, MDS), with some minor institutional changes that increased its strategic capacity, and the Ministry of Science, Technology, Knowledge and Innovation was created in 2018. In September 2021, President Piñera signed a law creating the Ministry of Public Security (Ministerio de Seguridad Pública), including the Agency for Cybersecurity, as part of the modernization of the country’s state security and citizen protection apparatus. Furthermore, the reorganization of complementary institutions such as environmental tribunals (Tribunales Ambientales) and the reconfiguration of supervisory boards (Superintendencias) over the past decade has improved capacity in these areas. However, in general terms, attempts to alter institutional arrangements tend to encounter substantial bureaucratic obstacles.
Citations:
Chilean Government on the creation of the Ministry of Public Security, https://www.gob.cl/noticias/presidente-pinera-firma-proyecto-de-ley-que-crea-el-ministerio-de-seguridad-publica-este-sistema-debe-poner-las-personas-sus-libertades-y-sus-derechos-en-el-centro-de-sus-prioridades, last accessed: 13 January 2022.
Citations:
Chilean Government on the creation of the Ministry of Public Security, https://www.gob.cl/noticias/presidente-pinera-firma-proyecto-de-ley-que-crea-el-ministerio-de-seguridad-publica-este-sistema-debe-poner-las-personas-sus-libertades-y-sus-derechos-en-el-centro-de-sus-prioridades, last accessed: 13 January 2022.