Executive Accountability
#39Key Findings
With notable monitoring-mechanism shortcomings, Cyprus falls into the bottom ranks internationally (rank 39) in the area of executive accountability. Its score in this area has improved by 0.9 points since 2014.
Electoral-participation rates have plummeted in recent years, along with interest in politics more generally. Trust in politicians and institutions is low. Media reporting is generally of low quality, with little respect for media ethics rules and an increased dependency on financial interests.
While the House of Representatives has substantially upgraded its resources, formal executive-oversight powers remain moderate. The auditor general efficiently exposes abuses of power, to the point of being recently threatened with prosecution by the president. The ombuds office does not advocate sufficiently on behalf of human rights. The data-protection office does not appear to act proactively.
A past shift toward grassroots-level influence in parties has been reversed. Most economic interests focus narrowly on their sectoral demands. Recent momentum gained by civil-society groups has slowed, with issues such as transparency and combating corruption receiving limited response. Government officials have targeted migrant-rights groups with unsubstantiated accusations.
Electoral-participation rates have plummeted in recent years, along with interest in politics more generally. Trust in politicians and institutions is low. Media reporting is generally of low quality, with little respect for media ethics rules and an increased dependency on financial interests.
While the House of Representatives has substantially upgraded its resources, formal executive-oversight powers remain moderate. The auditor general efficiently exposes abuses of power, to the point of being recently threatened with prosecution by the president. The ombuds office does not advocate sufficiently on behalf of human rights. The data-protection office does not appear to act proactively.
A past shift toward grassroots-level influence in parties has been reversed. Most economic interests focus narrowly on their sectoral demands. Recent momentum gained by civil-society groups has slowed, with issues such as transparency and combating corruption receiving limited response. Government officials have targeted migrant-rights groups with unsubstantiated accusations.
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To what extent are citizens informed of public policies?
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9
Most citizens are well-informed of a broad range of public policies.
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Many citizens are well-informed of individual public policies.
5
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3
Few citizens are well-informed of public policies; most citizens have only a rudimental knowledge of public policies.
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1
Most citizens are not aware of public policies.
The main feature of citizen participation in politics and elections since 2011 has been apathy and alienation. Political discussions remain largely unproductive, primarily consisting of monologues. Turnout in 2021 elections was 66% (down from 90% 15 years ago), while only 25% of young people registered on electoral rolls.
No opinion surveys record levels of information among citizens. However, public opinion surveys show that negative views about each of the main party leaders are between 70% and 76%, while 55% of people hold a negative view of the president (21% hold a positive view). Public trust in institutions in the spring 2021 Eurobarometer survey receded to 27% for the parliament (34% in 2019) and 31% for the government (36% in 2019).
Despite the picture of mistrust, more Cypriots (54% / 63%) than on average in the EU27 (48% / 48%) appear to be informed about and satisfied with the EU response to COVID-19, according to the special European Parliament Eurobarometer, spring 2021. This might be the result of the government’s promotion of the Recovery and Resilience Plan during the campaign for the May 2021 parliamentary elections.
Citations:
1. Special Euroepean Parliament Eurobarometer 95.1, Spring 2021, https://www.cymar.com.cy/en-gb/results/eb95-1.aspx/
No opinion surveys record levels of information among citizens. However, public opinion surveys show that negative views about each of the main party leaders are between 70% and 76%, while 55% of people hold a negative view of the president (21% hold a positive view). Public trust in institutions in the spring 2021 Eurobarometer survey receded to 27% for the parliament (34% in 2019) and 31% for the government (36% in 2019).
Despite the picture of mistrust, more Cypriots (54% / 63%) than on average in the EU27 (48% / 48%) appear to be informed about and satisfied with the EU response to COVID-19, according to the special European Parliament Eurobarometer, spring 2021. This might be the result of the government’s promotion of the Recovery and Resilience Plan during the campaign for the May 2021 parliamentary elections.
Citations:
1. Special Euroepean Parliament Eurobarometer 95.1, Spring 2021, https://www.cymar.com.cy/en-gb/results/eb95-1.aspx/
Does the government publish data and information in a way that strengthens citizens’ capacity to hold the government accountable?
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The government publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
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The government most of the time publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
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The government publishes data in a limited and not timely or user-friendly way.
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1
The government publishes (almost) no relevant data.
The Statistical Service and the Press and Information Office (PIO) systematically publish statistical data and reports, and information on the activities of the president and ministers. Ministries publish information on their work, albeit with significantly differing scope and type of information. The publication of annual activity reports by ministries and departments is often delayed by several years.
A website named EXANDAS, launched in 2019, provides access to government data, an inventory of projects and reforms, political decisions, and policies. The website provides an inventory of all actions undertaken by the government since 2013, but it is difficult to evaluate the progress made, in large part because no dates or timelines are specified with the data and information provided. The lack of comprehensive data and analysis on key policies and activities, in easy and legible forms, does not help citizens to evaluate the government’s work.
Citations:
1. EXANDAS – Report for monitoring the progress of government work (in Greek), https://exandas.presidency.gov.cy/
A website named EXANDAS, launched in 2019, provides access to government data, an inventory of projects and reforms, political decisions, and policies. The website provides an inventory of all actions undertaken by the government since 2013, but it is difficult to evaluate the progress made, in large part because no dates or timelines are specified with the data and information provided. The lack of comprehensive data and analysis on key policies and activities, in easy and legible forms, does not help citizens to evaluate the government’s work.
Citations:
1. EXANDAS – Report for monitoring the progress of government work (in Greek), https://exandas.presidency.gov.cy/
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Do members of parliament have adequate personnel and structural resources to monitor government activity effectively?
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring all government activity effectively.
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring a government’s major activities.
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
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1
The resources provided to the members of parliament are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
The House of Representatives has substantially upgraded its resources. With the recruitment of specialized staff, parliamentary work enjoys expert support, which is not limited to administrative and secretarial services. Research provides the information needed to draft legislation, parliamentary committees comment on and evaluate government draft laws, while legal advice is available to check compliance with the constitution and existing legislation. A European affairs section deals with obligations under EU membership, and an international affairs section assists with relations to other parliaments and international bodies. Communication, technological and archival services complete the spectrum of resources available to the parliament.
The parliament has a rich library, which is open to the public and is in the process of digitizing its assets.
Citations:
1. House of Representatives, The parliament’s services and their functions (in Greek), 2021, http://www.parliament.cy/images/media/assetfile/Odigos.pdf
The parliament has a rich library, which is open to the public and is in the process of digitizing its assets.
Citations:
1. House of Representatives, The parliament’s services and their functions (in Greek), 2021, http://www.parliament.cy/images/media/assetfile/Odigos.pdf
Are parliamentary committees able to ask for government documents?
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9
Parliamentary committees may ask for most or all government documents; they are normally delivered in full and within an appropriate time frame.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are slightly limited; some important documents are not delivered or are delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are considerably limited; most important documents are not delivered or delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
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Parliamentary committees may not request government documents.
The government and the broader public administration have no constitutional obligation to make documents available to the parliament. In practice, in almost all cases, ministers answer questions, and present information and documents to deputies and parliamentary committees. However, for critical issues, they can refuse to do so.
The Law on the Deposition of Data and Information to Parliamentary Committees grants committees the power to summon officials, but not ministers, and request official information and data. An official who attends a committee hearing is obliged to tell the truth and to provide genuine documents. Hiding information or documents may lead to sanctions.
Critically, when invited, attendance is mandatory under the law, except for ministers. There has never been a case of activating this provision against officials or private persons who have refused to appear. This points to the weakness of the law, which affects the House of Representative’s ability to obtain documents; access depends on an official’s willingness to attend a hearing and a minister’s discretionary power to approve the release of documents. Withholding information is possible without risking sanctions.
Citations:
1. Law on the deposition of data and information to the House of Representatives and parliamentary committees 21(I)/1985 http://www.cylaw.org/nomoi/enop/non-ind/1985_1_21/full.html
The Law on the Deposition of Data and Information to Parliamentary Committees grants committees the power to summon officials, but not ministers, and request official information and data. An official who attends a committee hearing is obliged to tell the truth and to provide genuine documents. Hiding information or documents may lead to sanctions.
Critically, when invited, attendance is mandatory under the law, except for ministers. There has never been a case of activating this provision against officials or private persons who have refused to appear. This points to the weakness of the law, which affects the House of Representative’s ability to obtain documents; access depends on an official’s willingness to attend a hearing and a minister’s discretionary power to approve the release of documents. Withholding information is possible without risking sanctions.
Citations:
1. Law on the deposition of data and information to the House of Representatives and parliamentary committees 21(I)/1985 http://www.cylaw.org/nomoi/enop/non-ind/1985_1_21/full.html
Are parliamentary committees able to summon ministers for hearings?
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Parliamentary committees may summon ministers. Ministers regularly follow invitations and are obliged to answer questions.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are slightly limited; ministers occasionally refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are considerably limited; ministers frequently refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
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Parliamentary committees may not summon ministers.
The constitution (Art. 79) stipulates that the president “may address” or “transmit his views” to the House of Representatives or a committee “through the ministers.” Moreover, ministers “may follow the proceedings, […] make a statement to, or inform” the House of Representatives or a committee on issues within their sphere of responsibility. Thus, constitutionally, the parliament has no power to summon executive officials. Α law passed by the parliament in 1985 makes it mandatory for officials, though not ministers, to attend. Although, generally, ministers respond positively to invitations, there have been cases where ministers and other officials have failed or declined invitation to appear themselves or be represented. No attempt has ever been made to activate the law penalizing failures to appear. Thus, since attendance ultimately lies with the discretion of the executive, ministers feel comfortable ignoring invitations when the subject is related to a contentious matter or for other reasons.
Citations:
1. The Constitution of Cyprus, http://www.parliament.cy/easyconsole.cfm/page/download/filename/SYNTAGMA_EN.pdf/foldername/articleFile/mime/pdf/
Citations:
1. The Constitution of Cyprus, http://www.parliament.cy/easyconsole.cfm/page/download/filename/SYNTAGMA_EN.pdf/foldername/articleFile/mime/pdf/
Are parliamentary committees able to summon experts for committee meetings?
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Parliamentary committees may summon experts.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are slightly limited.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are considerably limited.
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Parliamentary committees may not summon experts.
Under the law, parliamentary committees have the power to summon experts. In practice, committees invite interested parties and stakeholders to present their views, but inviting independent experts or seeking their views is exceptionally rare.
Under the law, a person that attends a parliamentary committee meeting has the obligation to provide genuine data and tell the truth.
Citations:
1. Law on the Deposition of Data and Information to the House of Representatives and to Parliamentary Committees, L.21(I)/1985, http://www.cylaw.org/nomoi/enop/non-ind/1985_1_21/full.html (in Greek)
Under the law, a person that attends a parliamentary committee meeting has the obligation to provide genuine data and tell the truth.
Citations:
1. Law on the Deposition of Data and Information to the House of Representatives and to Parliamentary Committees, L.21(I)/1985, http://www.cylaw.org/nomoi/enop/non-ind/1985_1_21/full.html (in Greek)
Are the task areas and structures of parliamentary committees suited to monitor ministries effectively?
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The match between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are well-suited to the effective monitoring of ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are largely suited to the monitoring ministries.
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3
The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are partially suited to the monitoring of ministries.
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1
The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are not at all suited to the monitoring of ministries.
In 2020–2021, the House of Representatives comprises 55 deputies, 16 committees and six ad hoc committees. There is one committee for each of the 11 ministries, while five deal with cross-ministerial matters. According to the latest available activity report of the House of Representatives, during the 2020–2021 session, committees held 550 meetings (compared to 613 in 2019). The Defense Committee held 10 and the Committee for Legal Affairs held 54 meetings.
The proper monitoring of the work of the ministries is critically hindered by three factors: the small number of deputies (56), high membership needed in most committees (nine) and very broad scope of each line-ministry’s competences. Each deputy must participate in at least three committees. Insufficient knowledge and deficient study and preparation is sometimes combined with deputies’ readiness to serve interests promoted by lobbyists.
Citations:
House of Representatives, Activity Report 2020 – 2021 (in Greek)
http://www.parliament.cy/images/media/redirectfile/Apologismos2021-A.pdf
The proper monitoring of the work of the ministries is critically hindered by three factors: the small number of deputies (56), high membership needed in most committees (nine) and very broad scope of each line-ministry’s competences. Each deputy must participate in at least three committees. Insufficient knowledge and deficient study and preparation is sometimes combined with deputies’ readiness to serve interests promoted by lobbyists.
Citations:
House of Representatives, Activity Report 2020 – 2021 (in Greek)
http://www.parliament.cy/images/media/redirectfile/Apologismos2021-A.pdf
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To what extent do media in your country analyze the rationale and impact of public policies?
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A clear majority of mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies.
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About one-half of the mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies. The rest produces a mix of infotainment and quality information content.
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A clear minority of mass media brands focuses on high-quality information content analyzing public policies. Several mass media brands produce superficial infotainment content only.
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All mass media brands are dominated by superficial infotainment content.
General analyses and policy assessment are weak points for the media. Poor issue knowledge, a lack of research, political bias and task overload are the main reasons for this weakness. A lack of respect for media ethics rules and self-censorship, along with increased dependency on financial interests, negatively affect media content.
Coverage of political issues generally offers little insight. Pluralism in public service broadcasting mainly offers mainstream views. Some analysis is the work of very few opinion columnists, while experts are invited by public service television. In 2020 and 2021, issues of corruption, the COVID-19 crisis and elections prevailed in the news, with little analysis on their deeper impacts.
Often, individual columnists question government policies. The main editorial line, however, is biased and demonstrates a leniency vis-a-vis the executive, apparently founded on informal relations with the presidential palace, in exchange for appointing journalists or relatives of media owners and journalists to public office.
Highly polarizing and confrontational rhetoric dominated the 2021 parliamentary elections, with media reproducing information evidently provided by the government. The Cyprus Problem was the framing factor of the elections, with focus shifting from the problem of corrupted leadership to “benefits from disclosures for Turkey” (see source below).
The absence of a media audit body, legislation for online media and transparency of media ownership negatively affect scrutiny and the public’s capacity to properly evaluate the information they receive.
Citations:
1. Cyprus’ Spat With Al-Jazeera Takes on Geopolitical Overtones, 1 September, 2020, https://www.imidaily.com/editors-picks/cyprus-spat-with-al-jazeera-takes-on-geopolitical-overtones/
Coverage of political issues generally offers little insight. Pluralism in public service broadcasting mainly offers mainstream views. Some analysis is the work of very few opinion columnists, while experts are invited by public service television. In 2020 and 2021, issues of corruption, the COVID-19 crisis and elections prevailed in the news, with little analysis on their deeper impacts.
Often, individual columnists question government policies. The main editorial line, however, is biased and demonstrates a leniency vis-a-vis the executive, apparently founded on informal relations with the presidential palace, in exchange for appointing journalists or relatives of media owners and journalists to public office.
Highly polarizing and confrontational rhetoric dominated the 2021 parliamentary elections, with media reproducing information evidently provided by the government. The Cyprus Problem was the framing factor of the elections, with focus shifting from the problem of corrupted leadership to “benefits from disclosures for Turkey” (see source below).
The absence of a media audit body, legislation for online media and transparency of media ownership negatively affect scrutiny and the public’s capacity to properly evaluate the information they receive.
Citations:
1. Cyprus’ Spat With Al-Jazeera Takes on Geopolitical Overtones, 1 September, 2020, https://www.imidaily.com/editors-picks/cyprus-spat-with-al-jazeera-takes-on-geopolitical-overtones/
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How inclusive and open are the major parties in their internal decision-making processes?
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The party allows all party members and supporters to participate in its decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and agendas of issues are open.
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The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, all party members have the opportunity to participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are rather open.
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The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, a number of elected delegates participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are largely controlled by the party leadership.
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1
A number of party leaders participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are fully controlled and drafted by the party leadership.
The adoption of procedures to allow party members (and friends) to elect the party leadership and choose party candidates began in the 1990s. Gradually, party leaders have attempted to bypass procedures or create conditions that negate the need for grassroots members to exercise such powers.
The Democratic Rally (Δημοκρατικός Συναγερμός, DISY) formed, in mid-2020, groups to “produce policies” for the 2021 parliamentary elections. However, no platform of policies was produced for the campaign except a brief two-page text, as in 2019. The presidential candidate for 2018 was nominated by simply approving the already announced candidacy of the incumbent president. In the 2021 parliamentary elections, 10 candidates were nominated by the party chairman, while one surplus candidacy was submitted, requiring election in one constituency. Party officials have priority as candidates. Since 2018, the party leader’s powers have been broader and internal dialogue has been absent.
The Progressive Party of the Working People (Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζομένου Λαού, AKEL) adheres to the principle of democratic centralism. Party members and friends choose candidates, with the final decision in the hands of the party leadership and managed via an opaque procedure. The party congress (1,200 cadres) elects the 105-member Central Committee (CC), which in turn elects the secretary general. AKEL’s presidential candidate is selected by party cells, based on proposals by the CC and a vote by an extraordinary congress. Electoral programs are approved by the party’s leadership.
The Democratic Party (Δημοκρατικό Κόμμα, DIKO) applies a direct vote for its leadership. However, the CC (150 members) nominates the presidential candidate, while regulations set the procedures for the nomination of candidates to other offices. The CC also approves the electoral program.
The Democratic Rally (Δημοκρατικός Συναγερμός, DISY) formed, in mid-2020, groups to “produce policies” for the 2021 parliamentary elections. However, no platform of policies was produced for the campaign except a brief two-page text, as in 2019. The presidential candidate for 2018 was nominated by simply approving the already announced candidacy of the incumbent president. In the 2021 parliamentary elections, 10 candidates were nominated by the party chairman, while one surplus candidacy was submitted, requiring election in one constituency. Party officials have priority as candidates. Since 2018, the party leader’s powers have been broader and internal dialogue has been absent.
The Progressive Party of the Working People (Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζομένου Λαού, AKEL) adheres to the principle of democratic centralism. Party members and friends choose candidates, with the final decision in the hands of the party leadership and managed via an opaque procedure. The party congress (1,200 cadres) elects the 105-member Central Committee (CC), which in turn elects the secretary general. AKEL’s presidential candidate is selected by party cells, based on proposals by the CC and a vote by an extraordinary congress. Electoral programs are approved by the party’s leadership.
The Democratic Party (Δημοκρατικό Κόμμα, DIKO) applies a direct vote for its leadership. However, the CC (150 members) nominates the presidential candidate, while regulations set the procedures for the nomination of candidates to other offices. The CC also approves the electoral program.
To what extent are economic interest associations (e.g., employers, industry, labor) capable of formulating relevant policies?
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Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
Tripartite consultations (comprising the government, employers’ associations and trade unions) are an established tradition in labor relations. The actors participate in order to promote their sectoral interests. They have no research institutes beyond study teams, with limited capacity and scope. The left-wing Pancyprian Federation of Labor (Παγκύπρια Εργατική Ομοσπονδία, PEO) is a rare exception. Its research institute regularly produces and publishes scientific studies on the economy and labor market.
Citations:
1. Hoteliers and unions agree on terms for collective agreement, Cyprus Mail, 28 August 2019, https://cyprus-mail.com/2019/08/28/hoteliers-and-unions-agree-on-terms-for-collective-agreement/
Citations:
1. Hoteliers and unions agree on terms for collective agreement, Cyprus Mail, 28 August 2019, https://cyprus-mail.com/2019/08/28/hoteliers-and-unions-agree-on-terms-for-collective-agreement/
To what extent are non-economic interest associations capable of formulating relevant policies?
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Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
A proliferation of civil society groups is connected, among other factors, with funding opportunities from EU and other organizations. Many are subject-oriented associations, with limited capacity to formulate policy proposals.
The momentum gained in recent years by some groups active and interested in politics, the economy, and social and environmental issues has slowed down. Issues such as promoting transparency and combating corruption, electoral system reform, and protecting the rights of minority groups have received limited response. Despite media attention and quality proposals on such significant subjects, political forces choose to promote sectoral interests, mostly counting on votes. In the last two years, government officials have targeted NGOs and groups supporting migrants’ rights with unsubstantiated accusations.
The activities of associations and in particular of the bicommunal civil society organizations that create spaces for dialogue between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities have been affected by restrictions on movement introduced to tackle COVID-19. The Church of Cyprus continues to assert its presence in society and is promoted by public service television. Its influence has not receded, despite conservative statements and actions by its leadership that do not comply with the spirit of Christianity.
Citations:
1. Bird groups say illegal shooting in Cyprus must stop, Cyprus Mail, 27 September 2019, https://cyprus-mail.com/2019/09/27/bird-groups-so-illegal-shooting-in-cyprus-must-stop/
The momentum gained in recent years by some groups active and interested in politics, the economy, and social and environmental issues has slowed down. Issues such as promoting transparency and combating corruption, electoral system reform, and protecting the rights of minority groups have received limited response. Despite media attention and quality proposals on such significant subjects, political forces choose to promote sectoral interests, mostly counting on votes. In the last two years, government officials have targeted NGOs and groups supporting migrants’ rights with unsubstantiated accusations.
The activities of associations and in particular of the bicommunal civil society organizations that create spaces for dialogue between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities have been affected by restrictions on movement introduced to tackle COVID-19. The Church of Cyprus continues to assert its presence in society and is promoted by public service television. Its influence has not receded, despite conservative statements and actions by its leadership that do not comply with the spirit of Christianity.
Citations:
1. Bird groups say illegal shooting in Cyprus must stop, Cyprus Mail, 27 September 2019, https://cyprus-mail.com/2019/09/27/bird-groups-so-illegal-shooting-in-cyprus-must-stop/
Graph View
Does there exist an independent and effective audit office?
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There exists an effective and independent audit office.
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There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is slightly limited.
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There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
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There does not exist an independent and effective audit office.
The auditor general is a constitutionally independent officer appointed by and reporting to the president, the highest authority in the republic. The terms of the auditor general’s removal are the same as those of a Supreme Court justice. The auditor general presents an annual report to the president, who “shall cause it to be laid” before the parliament. S/he also produces a multitude of reports on specific subjects and on entities of public law. Parliamentary committees invite the auditor general to their hearings. The constitution provides that the audit office shall review “all disbursements and receipts, and audit and inspect all accounts of moneys and other assets administered, and of liabilities incurred, by or under the authority of the republic.” This gives the office oversight authority over all three estates.
In 2020 and 2021, the auditor general faced a strong reaction to his work from the executive and was threatened with sanctions. Despite excessive media exposure and actions that damage the credibility of the institution, the auditor general exerts his powers in a rather efficient way, exposing abuses of power and non-compliance with laws.
Citations:
1. Government accuses audit boss of overstepping his powers, Cyprus Mail, 30 December 2020, https://cyprus-mail.com/2020/12/30/government-accuses-audit-boss-of-overstepping-his-powers-updated/
In 2020 and 2021, the auditor general faced a strong reaction to his work from the executive and was threatened with sanctions. Despite excessive media exposure and actions that damage the credibility of the institution, the auditor general exerts his powers in a rather efficient way, exposing abuses of power and non-compliance with laws.
Citations:
1. Government accuses audit boss of overstepping his powers, Cyprus Mail, 30 December 2020, https://cyprus-mail.com/2020/12/30/government-accuses-audit-boss-of-overstepping-his-powers-updated/
Does there exist an independent and effective ombuds office?
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There exists an effective and independent ombuds office.
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There exists an effective and independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is slightly limited.
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There exists an independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is considerably limited.
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There does not exist an effective and independent ombuds office.
In the absence of any constitutional provision for an ombuds office, the Office of the Commissioner for Administration and Human Rights was established by law L. 3/1991. The ombudsman’s mandate extends to equality and non-discrimination, prevention of torture, forced returns, and disabilities issues. The president of the republic appoints the commissioner upon the recommendation of the Council of Ministers, subject to approval from the parliament. The commissioner presents an annual report to the president, with comments and recommendations. Copies of the report, investigative reports and activity reports are made available to the Council of Ministers and to the parliament.
Excluded from the commissioner’s oversight are the House of Representatives, the president of the republic, the Council of Ministers, individual government ministers, the courts (including the Supreme Court) and other officials.
Opinions and reports sometimes appear to accommodate the behavior of the authorities instead of insisting on the need for full respect for human rights in practice.
Citations:
1. Office of the Commissioner for Administration and Human Rights, Report for 2020 of National Mechanism
for the Prevention of Torture, 2021 http://www.ombudsman.gov.cy/ombudsman/ombudsman.nsf/All/5640AE2B1E22803EC2258784002D2F0D/$file/NPM%20ACTION%20REVIEW%202020.pdf
Excluded from the commissioner’s oversight are the House of Representatives, the president of the republic, the Council of Ministers, individual government ministers, the courts (including the Supreme Court) and other officials.
Opinions and reports sometimes appear to accommodate the behavior of the authorities instead of insisting on the need for full respect for human rights in practice.
Citations:
1. Office of the Commissioner for Administration and Human Rights, Report for 2020 of National Mechanism
for the Prevention of Torture, 2021 http://www.ombudsman.gov.cy/ombudsman/ombudsman.nsf/All/5640AE2B1E22803EC2258784002D2F0D/$file/NPM%20ACTION%20REVIEW%202020.pdf
Is there an independent authority in place that effectively holds government offices accountable for handling issues of data protection and privacy?
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An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
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7
6
An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is slightly limited.
5
4
3
4
3
A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are strongly limited.
2
1
1
There is no effective and independent data protection office.
The Office of the Commissioner for the Protection of Personal Data was established in 2002. Law 125(I)/2018 updated the legislation in accordance with EU regulations and directives. The Council of Ministers appoints the commissioner upon the recommendation of the minister of justice and public order. The qualifications for appointment are those required for a judge of the Supreme Court, a “lawyer of high professional and moral standard.” The commissioner’s authority is extended to both public and private persons, except on processing operations by courts when acting in their judicial capacity. Under the Law on Access to Information, L. 184(I)/2017, the commissioner is also the commissioner for information, who is tasked with monitoring compliance with the law.
Violations of personal data by the authorities, politicians and political parties has always been an issue of concern. However, very few decide to file a complaint. In the latest available report from the commissioner (2019), there is no indication of proactive action.
Citations:
1. Commissioner for the Protection of Personal Data – Activity Report 2019, https://www.dataprotection.gov.cy/dataprotection/dataprotection.nsf/43E41408DE96649BC225869C0045D367/$file/Annual%20Report%202019.pdf
Violations of personal data by the authorities, politicians and political parties has always been an issue of concern. However, very few decide to file a complaint. In the latest available report from the commissioner (2019), there is no indication of proactive action.
Citations:
1. Commissioner for the Protection of Personal Data – Activity Report 2019, https://www.dataprotection.gov.cy/dataprotection/dataprotection.nsf/43E41408DE96649BC225869C0045D367/$file/Annual%20Report%202019.pdf