Executive Capacity
#9Key Findings
With strong federal government performance throughout the pandemic, Germany scores relatively well (rank 9) with respect to executive capacity. Its score on this measure has improved by 0.4 points relative to 2014.
Strategic planning has taken on an increasingly important role, and experts are broadly consulted. The Chancellery has an internal long-term planning unit and a large staff, but ministries have far more resources. While line ministries prepare bills, the most important decision-making body is the coalition committee.
RIAs are mandatory for all laws and regulations. Ex post analyses are widely used in several policy areas, with quality reviewed by an independent body. While the government routinely meets with societal stakeholders, bargaining processes are not highly institutionalized. The previous government achieved a large share of its coalition-agreement goals effectively despite the influence of the pandemic.
Federal government communication was coherent during the COVID-19 crisis, but federal-state action was difficult to harmonize. The federal government compensated municipalities for revenue shortfalls during the crisis. The new government has adjusted ministry responsibilities, upgrading the importance of climate policy.
Strategic planning has taken on an increasingly important role, and experts are broadly consulted. The Chancellery has an internal long-term planning unit and a large staff, but ministries have far more resources. While line ministries prepare bills, the most important decision-making body is the coalition committee.
RIAs are mandatory for all laws and regulations. Ex post analyses are widely used in several policy areas, with quality reviewed by an independent body. While the government routinely meets with societal stakeholders, bargaining processes are not highly institutionalized. The previous government achieved a large share of its coalition-agreement goals effectively despite the influence of the pandemic.
Federal government communication was coherent during the COVID-19 crisis, but federal-state action was difficult to harmonize. The federal government compensated municipalities for revenue shortfalls during the crisis. The new government has adjusted ministry responsibilities, upgrading the importance of climate policy.
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How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
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In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
Since the 2013 coalition agreement, German governments have strengthened strategic planning as a cross-sectoral topic for ministries (Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik 2021). In the last legislative term 2017-2021, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) acted as coordinator in the context of its Foresight (Vorausschau) instrument. A mid-term conference of this initiative collected contributions from various ministries that have increasingly devoted resources to strategic foresight processes over the past ten years. As a result, efforts to consider long-term trends have increased. The Chancellery also now features a strategic foresight group tasked with long-term planning issues. According to experts, this increase in foresight analyses is having an impact on government policies (Bovenschulte et al. 2021).
In the new government’s coalition agreement, strategic foresight is not explicitly mentioned. However, there is an emphasis on forward-looking behavior in various policies (Koalitionsvertrag 2021), though it remains unclear whether this will result in strengthened foresight analysis on the part of government with greater impact on actual policy formulation.
Citations:
Bovenschulte, Marc, Simone Ehrenberg-Silies, Kerstin Goluchowicz, Christoph Bogenstahl (2021): Regierungs-Foresight - Stand und Perspektiven, Working Paper des Instituts für Innovation und Technik in der VDI/VDE-IT, Nr. 59.
Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik (2021): Neue Bundesregierung: Was tut sich bei der Strategischen Vorausschau?, 20. Dezember 2021. https://www.baks.bund.de/de/aktuelles/neue-bundesregierung-was-tut-sich-bei-der-strategischen-vorausschau (accessed: 15 January 2022).
Koalitionsvertrag (2021): Mehr Fortschritt wagen, Bündnis für Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit und Nachhaltigkeit, Koalitionsvertrag zwischen SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen und FDP.
In the new government’s coalition agreement, strategic foresight is not explicitly mentioned. However, there is an emphasis on forward-looking behavior in various policies (Koalitionsvertrag 2021), though it remains unclear whether this will result in strengthened foresight analysis on the part of government with greater impact on actual policy formulation.
Citations:
Bovenschulte, Marc, Simone Ehrenberg-Silies, Kerstin Goluchowicz, Christoph Bogenstahl (2021): Regierungs-Foresight - Stand und Perspektiven, Working Paper des Instituts für Innovation und Technik in der VDI/VDE-IT, Nr. 59.
Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik (2021): Neue Bundesregierung: Was tut sich bei der Strategischen Vorausschau?, 20. Dezember 2021. https://www.baks.bund.de/de/aktuelles/neue-bundesregierung-was-tut-sich-bei-der-strategischen-vorausschau (accessed: 15 January 2022).
Koalitionsvertrag (2021): Mehr Fortschritt wagen, Bündnis für Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit und Nachhaltigkeit, Koalitionsvertrag zwischen SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen und FDP.
Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?
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9
9
In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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6
For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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3
In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
In almost all policy fields, expert commissions advise policymakers on a regular basis. Most of their members are appointed by the government or by individual ministries. The Bundestag also consults regularly with non-governmental experts, which can involve regular expert hearings on specific topics as well as commissions of enquiry (Enquetekommission) on broader issues that continue for several years.
In addition, ad hoc commissions are often created to provide scientific input on major reforms involving complex issues and thus help build consensus. In sum, there are plenty of established and ad hoc expert advisory bodies providing the government expertise and advice. These include, for example, the German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der Gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung), the German Advisory Council on the Environment (Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfragen) and the Commission of Experts for Research and Innovation (Expertenkommission Forschung und Innovation), all of which produce regular reports on current policy issues (Siefken 2019).
In addition, most ministries maintain external, academic or legal advisory bodies. However, the impact of experts often has little visibility, and policymaking is also heavily influenced by party positions. Nevertheless, while advisory reports do not always have an immediate impact, they do have some influence on political debates within the government, the parliament and among the general public, because they are made publicly accessible.
Experts have played a much more influential role in decision-making during the pandemic. The federal and state governments’ decision-making processes have been based on input from scientists and in particular the expertise of the Robert Koch Institut (RKI). The government has also closely monitored objective data on the dynamics of the pandemic when making its decisions. The German Ethics Council attracted considerable attention for its statements regarding the ethical tradeoffs associated with pandemic policies, who was to be prioritized during the vaccine rollout and, more recently, the issue of obligatory vaccinations. Another important body for the sciences and healthcare, particularly in the context of the pandemic, is the German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina. However, some have criticized the Leopoldina, stating that it had delivered its recommendations “on the government’s order” by justifying lockdown measures (Hirschi 2021).
Summing up, scholarly advice is widely available, but political considerations often dominate legislative and executive decision-making. In addition, the engagement of expert commissions or other sources of advice is sometimes used as a means of postponing decisions rather than as a true decision-making aid. However, during the pandemic, the role of experts and their impact on policymaking has increased significantly.
Citations:
Hirschi, Caspar (2021): Weder wissenschaftlich noch demokratisch legitimiert, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19.03.2021, p. 11
Siefken, Sven T. (2019): Expertenkommissionen der Bundesregierung, in: Falk, Svenja et al. (eds), Handbuch Politikberatung, Berlin, p. 145-161
In addition, ad hoc commissions are often created to provide scientific input on major reforms involving complex issues and thus help build consensus. In sum, there are plenty of established and ad hoc expert advisory bodies providing the government expertise and advice. These include, for example, the German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der Gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung), the German Advisory Council on the Environment (Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfragen) and the Commission of Experts for Research and Innovation (Expertenkommission Forschung und Innovation), all of which produce regular reports on current policy issues (Siefken 2019).
In addition, most ministries maintain external, academic or legal advisory bodies. However, the impact of experts often has little visibility, and policymaking is also heavily influenced by party positions. Nevertheless, while advisory reports do not always have an immediate impact, they do have some influence on political debates within the government, the parliament and among the general public, because they are made publicly accessible.
Experts have played a much more influential role in decision-making during the pandemic. The federal and state governments’ decision-making processes have been based on input from scientists and in particular the expertise of the Robert Koch Institut (RKI). The government has also closely monitored objective data on the dynamics of the pandemic when making its decisions. The German Ethics Council attracted considerable attention for its statements regarding the ethical tradeoffs associated with pandemic policies, who was to be prioritized during the vaccine rollout and, more recently, the issue of obligatory vaccinations. Another important body for the sciences and healthcare, particularly in the context of the pandemic, is the German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina. However, some have criticized the Leopoldina, stating that it had delivered its recommendations “on the government’s order” by justifying lockdown measures (Hirschi 2021).
Summing up, scholarly advice is widely available, but political considerations often dominate legislative and executive decision-making. In addition, the engagement of expert commissions or other sources of advice is sometimes used as a means of postponing decisions rather than as a true decision-making aid. However, during the pandemic, the role of experts and their impact on policymaking has increased significantly.
Citations:
Hirschi, Caspar (2021): Weder wissenschaftlich noch demokratisch legitimiert, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19.03.2021, p. 11
Siefken, Sven T. (2019): Expertenkommissionen der Bundesregierung, in: Falk, Svenja et al. (eds), Handbuch Politikberatung, Berlin, p. 145-161
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Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?
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The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
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The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
The German Chancellery has a staff of about 600. Some of its policy units are “mirror units” (Spiegelreferate) that reflect those areas covered by each of the federal ministries. Staff for these units are often seconded from the line ministries. Thus, while there is expertise within the Chancellery, it is still at a disadvantage compared to the line ministries with their much larger resources.
To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?
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There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
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The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
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Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
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Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
The preparation of bills is mainly the prerogative of the line ministries (Ressortprinzip). Over the course of regular policy processes, the Chancellery is generally well informed, but is not strongly involved in ministerial initiatives. Most disputes between ministries and the Chancellery are discussed and resolved in the (often) weekly meetings between the state secretaries and the Chancellery’s staff.
How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?
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The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
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Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
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There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
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There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
As a rule of thumb, the cabinet functions as an institution that formally ratifies policy decisions that have been made elsewhere. In principle, line ministers are responsible for policies within their own jurisdiction. Therefore, they have a strong leeway to pursue their own or their party’s interests, though each ministry must to some extent involve other ministries while drafting bills. Formal cabinet committees do not play an important role in policymaking and are rarely involved in the review or coordination of proposals. One exception is the Federal Security Council, which coordinates security and defense policy and decides, for example, on arms exports.
How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?
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Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
Ex ante coordination between the line ministries’ leading civil servants has not been particularly strong under past German coalition governments. In addition, an entrenched political practice ensures that no ministry makes any proposal that might be postponed or blocked by other ministries. The federal Ministry of Finance must be involved when budgetary resources are concerned, while complicated legal or constitutional issues necessitate the involvement of the federal Ministry of Justice. But generally, every ministry is fully responsible for its own proposed bills. In line with § 17 of the Rules of Procedure of the Federal Government (Geschäftsordnung der Bundesregieurng), all controversial issues are in general already settled before being discussed by the cabinet.
Citations:
No change to last round.
Citations:
No change to last round.
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
There are a number of informal mechanisms by which government policy is coordinated. The most important of these is the coalition committee, which comprises the most important actors (the chancellor, the vice chancellor, the chairpersons of the parliamentary groups and the party chairpersons) within the coalition parties, and is sometimes supplemented by higher bureaucrats and/or party politicians. It is the most important decision-making body with comprehensive impact in the governing process.
The new government has confirmed the role of the coalition committee (Koalitionsvertrag 2021, p. 174) by stipulating that the committee will meet at least once a month to discuss current issues and coordinate further work plans. The committee can be convened at any time at the request of one coalition partner. Given the mutual trust demonstrated by each party involved with the coalition talks and the smooth and rapid nature of the process, it is safe to assume that the coalition committee will effectively contribute to improving interministerial coordination.
Citations:
Koalitionsvertrag (2021): Mehr Fortschritt wagen, Bündnis für Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit und Nachhaltigkeit, Koalitionsvertrag zwischen SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen und FDP.
The new government has confirmed the role of the coalition committee (Koalitionsvertrag 2021, p. 174) by stipulating that the committee will meet at least once a month to discuss current issues and coordinate further work plans. The committee can be convened at any time at the request of one coalition partner. Given the mutual trust demonstrated by each party involved with the coalition talks and the smooth and rapid nature of the process, it is safe to assume that the coalition committee will effectively contribute to improving interministerial coordination.
Citations:
Koalitionsvertrag (2021): Mehr Fortschritt wagen, Bündnis für Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit und Nachhaltigkeit, Koalitionsvertrag zwischen SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen und FDP.
How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?
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The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
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The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
In general, Germany has been slow to adopt e-governance mechanisms. One of the projects to push e-government in federal ministries and agencies is the “E-Akte Bund” (federal e-files) (BMI 2021). The project aims to connect about 100 institutions and some 150,000 employees to the e-file system by 2024. Connecting the Chancellery – with its high-level security needs for classified documents – to the system in the spring of 2022 marked a significant milestone. The use of the e-file system will help facilitate interministerial coordination as it is rolled out within the line ministries.
Citations:
BMI (2021): Start der E-Akte Bund im Bundeskanzleramt, Meldung, Schwerpunktthema: Moderne Verwaltung, Datum: 27.04.2021, https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/kurzmeldungen/DE/2021/04/e-akte-bk-amt.html;jsessionid=3733669ADB476255D39BC732388F2944.1_cid287 (accessed: 15 January 2022).
Citations:
BMI (2021): Start der E-Akte Bund im Bundeskanzleramt, Meldung, Schwerpunktthema: Moderne Verwaltung, Datum: 27.04.2021, https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/kurzmeldungen/DE/2021/04/e-akte-bk-amt.html;jsessionid=3733669ADB476255D39BC732388F2944.1_cid287 (accessed: 15 January 2022).
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To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?
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RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
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RIA are not applied or do not exist.
Germany has a systematic and comprehensive RIA system for ex ante impact assessments. RIAs have been mandatory for all laws and regulations since 2000. In 2016, SMEs also became subject to RIAs through SME test guidelines designed to promote SME-friendly policy development. Germany consistently seeks to reduce the costs of regulation. In 2016, the German government revised its EU ex ante procedure in order to avoid incurring the costs of compliance with EU legislative acts. It also introduced the “one-in, one-out” rule in 2015. The same year, Germany incorporated a behavioral insights team into the Chancellery’s policy planning unit that was designed to keep all federal ministries informed of legislative and administrative processes (OECD 2021).
The National Regulatory Control Council (Normenkontrollrat, NKR) works with a large number of different actors on various levels of the administration. It has stepped up its cooperation with the German states and local authorities, in particular through the development of methodological standards for assessing compliance costs.
Citations:
OECD (2019): Better Regulation Practices across the European Union, OECD.
The National Regulatory Control Council (Normenkontrollrat, NKR) works with a large number of different actors on various levels of the administration. It has stepped up its cooperation with the German states and local authorities, in particular through the development of methodological standards for assessing compliance costs.
Citations:
OECD (2019): Better Regulation Practices across the European Union, OECD.
Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?
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RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
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The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
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The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
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RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
The institutional setting to apply and monitor a unified methodology is well developed. The National Regulatory Control Council (NKR) reviews the quality of all RIAs and provides advice. It also bears some responsibility for ex post evaluation processes. The federal government reports annually to parliament on improved regulation processes and efforts to reduce bureaucracy. The Federal Audit Office and the Parliamentary Advisory Council on Sustainable Development are responsible for evaluating regulatory policy and identifying areas where regulation can be made more effective. Bodies within the Federal Ministries of the Interior and Justice and Consumer Protection examine the legal quality and comprehensibility of legal drafts, and a special unit of linguists provides linguistic advice to all ministries on such issues as simple language (OECD 2021).
The new “one-in one-out” rule, introduced in 2015, is intended to reduce the financial burdens imposed on enterprises. This rule means that all new costs for enterprises and state bureaucracy (the “ins”) have to be compensated for by additional regulations reducing costs by at least the same amount (the “outs”).
The NKR also regularly publishes its expert assessments, project and annual reports and is transparent in communicating its recommendations to the public.
In sum, the NKR’s monitoring and quantification activities have significantly increased awareness of the bureaucratic burdens associated with legislation for companies, private households and the public administration itself.
Citing the desire to strengthen the NKR’s role in the legislative process, the new German government has decided to move the NKR from the Chancellery to the Federal Ministry of Justice. Given that the Ministry of Justice is headed by an FDP minister for whom efficient lawmaking and minimizing bureaucracy are important issues, this decision is in part motivated by partisan interests. The political support for such efforts should remain strong throughout the new legislative term.
Citations:
OECD (2019): Better Regulation Practices across the European Union, OECD.
The new “one-in one-out” rule, introduced in 2015, is intended to reduce the financial burdens imposed on enterprises. This rule means that all new costs for enterprises and state bureaucracy (the “ins”) have to be compensated for by additional regulations reducing costs by at least the same amount (the “outs”).
The NKR also regularly publishes its expert assessments, project and annual reports and is transparent in communicating its recommendations to the public.
In sum, the NKR’s monitoring and quantification activities have significantly increased awareness of the bureaucratic burdens associated with legislation for companies, private households and the public administration itself.
Citing the desire to strengthen the NKR’s role in the legislative process, the new German government has decided to move the NKR from the Chancellery to the Federal Ministry of Justice. Given that the Ministry of Justice is headed by an FDP minister for whom efficient lawmaking and minimizing bureaucracy are important issues, this decision is in part motivated by partisan interests. The political support for such efforts should remain strong throughout the new legislative term.
Citations:
OECD (2019): Better Regulation Practices across the European Union, OECD.
Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?
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9
Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
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Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
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Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
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Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
Germany applies a proven, systematic and well-integrated system of sustainability checks that are an important aspect of its legislative impact assessments. The parliamentary Council for Sustainable Development (Parlamentarischer Beirat für nachhaltige Entwicklung, PBnE) supervises the government’s sustainability strategy through a systematic sustainability impact assessment of draft regulations and directives. The PBnE was established in 2004 and must be reconstituted after every parliamentary election. According to the PBnE audits, the coverage and quality of sustainability checks has strongly improved. Whereas 56% of all checks in 2011 were found to be dissatisfactory, the PBnE approved of 96% of all checks in the last legislative (Bundestag 2021).
Established in 2001, the German Council for Sustainable Development (GCSD) is another important actor in this area. In 2020, Chancellor Merkel appointed 15 members from civil society, industry, the research community and politics for a three-year term. This body is tasked with contributing to the implementation of the National Sustainability Strategy by identifying action areas, developing specific project proposals and increasing awareness of the importance of sustainability issues. The GCSD acts independently in choosing the topics it addresses and the actions to be taken (GCSD 2022).
Citations:
Bundestag (2021): Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung Bericht über die Nachhaltigkeitsprüfung im Rahmen
der Gesetzesfolgenabschätzung, Deutscher Bundestag, 19. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 19/32709, 20.10.2021.
GCSD (2022): German Council for Sustainabile Develpment, https://www.nachhaltigkeitsrat.de/en/the-council/ (accessed: 15 January 2022).
Established in 2001, the German Council for Sustainable Development (GCSD) is another important actor in this area. In 2020, Chancellor Merkel appointed 15 members from civil society, industry, the research community and politics for a three-year term. This body is tasked with contributing to the implementation of the National Sustainability Strategy by identifying action areas, developing specific project proposals and increasing awareness of the importance of sustainability issues. The GCSD acts independently in choosing the topics it addresses and the actions to be taken (GCSD 2022).
Citations:
Bundestag (2021): Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung Bericht über die Nachhaltigkeitsprüfung im Rahmen
der Gesetzesfolgenabschätzung, Deutscher Bundestag, 19. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 19/32709, 20.10.2021.
GCSD (2022): German Council for Sustainabile Develpment, https://www.nachhaltigkeitsrat.de/en/the-council/ (accessed: 15 January 2022).
To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?
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Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
Instituting ex post evaluations of legislation has become more important in Germany. Ex post analyses are widely used in labor market, education and family policy areas. A milestone for ex post labor-market research was the introduction of a legal obligation to evaluate the impact of active labor-market policies in 1998. Since then, important legislation such as labor-market and social security reforms (Hartz reforms), and later the introduction of minimum wages, have undergone far-reaching ex post evaluations (Boockmann et al. 2014).
In 2013, a concept for the systematic evaluation of new regulations was accepted. As a principle, all important laws and regulations for which compliance costs exceed €1 million have to be evaluated three to five years after being introduced. The Committee of State Secretaries delivered a decision in 2019 – the Reduction of Bureaucracy and Better Regulation – that further developed and specified this concept. As a result of the decision, federal ministers are committed to involving states, municipalities and other stakeholders impact assessments and to making the results public. While ministries conduct the ex post evaluations themselves, the quality of the analyses is to be checked by an independent authority. As a result of these requirements, the federal government expects more than 330 ex post evaluations to be conducted in the coming years (Wissenschaftlicher Dienst 2020).
Citations:
Boockmann, B., Buch, C. M., Schnitzer, M. (2014): Evidenzbasierte Wirtschaftspolitik in Deutschland: Defizite und Potentiale, IAW Discussion Paper Nr. 103, April 2014.
Wissenschaftlicher Dienst, Deutscher Bundestag (2020): Sachstand: Zur praktischen Umsetzung und Evaluierung von Gesetzen, WD 3 - 3000 - 298/19.
In 2013, a concept for the systematic evaluation of new regulations was accepted. As a principle, all important laws and regulations for which compliance costs exceed €1 million have to be evaluated three to five years after being introduced. The Committee of State Secretaries delivered a decision in 2019 – the Reduction of Bureaucracy and Better Regulation – that further developed and specified this concept. As a result of the decision, federal ministers are committed to involving states, municipalities and other stakeholders impact assessments and to making the results public. While ministries conduct the ex post evaluations themselves, the quality of the analyses is to be checked by an independent authority. As a result of these requirements, the federal government expects more than 330 ex post evaluations to be conducted in the coming years (Wissenschaftlicher Dienst 2020).
Citations:
Boockmann, B., Buch, C. M., Schnitzer, M. (2014): Evidenzbasierte Wirtschaftspolitik in Deutschland: Defizite und Potentiale, IAW Discussion Paper Nr. 103, April 2014.
Wissenschaftlicher Dienst, Deutscher Bundestag (2020): Sachstand: Zur praktischen Umsetzung und Evaluierung von Gesetzen, WD 3 - 3000 - 298/19.
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Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?
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The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
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1
The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
In general, government representatives meet with societal stakeholders as part of their daily routine. Nevertheless, the last two CDU/CSU-SPD governments have not made use of social pacts or other direct bargaining mechanisms. As under previous governments, ministries and parliamentary committees relied heavily on information provided by interest groups, and took their proposals or demands into account when developing legislation. The impact of civil society actors in general depends on their power, resources and organizational status. Since interests are sometimes mediated through institutionalized corporatist structures, employers’ associations and unions play a privileged role. Experts and interest groups regularly take part in parliamentary committee hearings in the course of the legislative process.
Graph View
To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?
10
9
9
Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
8
7
6
7
6
Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
5
4
3
4
3
Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
2
1
1
Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
In a formal sense, the federal government’s Press and Information Office is the focal point of communication, serving as the conduit for information originating from individual ministries, each of which organizes their own communication processes and strategies. However, this does not guarantee a coherent communication policy, which is a difficult goal for any coalition government. There is a persistent tendency of coalition partners to leverage their profile to the disadvantage of the other government parties. This problem was an issue in the last coalition and, naturally, more so with the approaching election.
During the pandemic, there were few problems with harmonized communication among the federal ministries. However, the federal and state governments proved unable to harmonize their coronavirus responses, which was due in large part to the states’ right of autonomy in determining their policies.
The previous government’s communication on the issue of climate change was by comparison to other issues more coherent. It was also seemingly unified in its communication of new welfare state-related policies such as the basic pension (“Grundrente”), which came on the heels of tough. This suggests a slight improvement over the dramatic controversies that marked the years of the migration crisis.
Having demonstrated strict confidentiality throughout their coalition talks and having signaled a strong sense of unity during their first few months in office, the new government appears to be doing well with regard to coherent communication.
During the pandemic, there were few problems with harmonized communication among the federal ministries. However, the federal and state governments proved unable to harmonize their coronavirus responses, which was due in large part to the states’ right of autonomy in determining their policies.
The previous government’s communication on the issue of climate change was by comparison to other issues more coherent. It was also seemingly unified in its communication of new welfare state-related policies such as the basic pension (“Grundrente”), which came on the heels of tough. This suggests a slight improvement over the dramatic controversies that marked the years of the migration crisis.
Having demonstrated strict confidentiality throughout their coalition talks and having signaled a strong sense of unity during their first few months in office, the new government appears to be doing well with regard to coherent communication.
Graph View
To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?
10
9
9
The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
5
4
3
4
3
The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
2
1
1
The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
The previous German government, a coalition government between the CDU/CSU and SPD, had a very good record in terms of implementing its policy agenda. A total of 73% of the 294 projects agreed upon in its 2018 coalition agreement were fully implemented and another 5% have been partially implemented. This high implementation rate, which includes several key goals like pension reform and a climate change bill, has been acknowledged by voters, as the share of respondents who regard coalition agreements as credible doubled within the two-year span of 2019 to 2021 (Vehrkamp and Matthieß 2021). Given the adverse circumstances brought on by the pandemic and the government’s absorption of much of the economic shock since 2020, this can be seen as indicative of excellent performance. In addition, many experts have deemed the government’s management of the coronavirus crisis to have been successful (see Rüb, Heinemann and Zohlnhöfer 2021).
Citations:
Vehrkamp, Robert and Theres Matthieß (2021): Versprechen gehalten – Schlussbilanz zum
Koalitionsvertrag der GroKo 2018-21, Zukunft der Demokratie, 03.2021.
Rüb, Friedbert, Friedrich Heinemann, and Reimut Zohlnhöfer (2021): Germany Report - Sustainable Governance in the Context of the COVID-19 Crisis, available at https://www.sgi-network.org/docs/2021/country/SGI2021_Germany.pdf
Citations:
Vehrkamp, Robert and Theres Matthieß (2021): Versprechen gehalten – Schlussbilanz zum
Koalitionsvertrag der GroKo 2018-21, Zukunft der Demokratie, 03.2021.
Rüb, Friedbert, Friedrich Heinemann, and Reimut Zohlnhöfer (2021): Germany Report - Sustainable Governance in the Context of the COVID-19 Crisis, available at https://www.sgi-network.org/docs/2021/country/SGI2021_Germany.pdf
To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?
10
9
9
The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
8
7
6
7
6
The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
5
4
3
4
3
The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
2
1
1
The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
In principle, line ministers are responsible for policies that fall under their jurisdiction. Therefore, individual ministers have some leeway to pursue their own or their party’s interests. This leeway is substantial in international comparison. Ministers sometimes pursue interests that therefore clash with the chancellor’s preferences or with coalition agreements. However, the coalition agreement bears considerable political weight and has often proved effective in guiding ministry activities. In terms of budgetary matters, the Minister of Finance is particularly powerful and able – when she/he has the chancellor’s support – to reject financial requests by other ministries.
The new coalition agreement provides for some rules regarding when the coalition committee is to meet and who is to attend the meetings. As in previous coalitions, the committee consists of the chancellor and the vice chancellor, the leaders of parliamentary groups and party leaders (insofar as they are not the persons mentioned above). The coalition committee is informally the most important institution in resolving political disagreements within the government.
As part of the climate package, ministries are to be made responsible for climate reduction targets in the sectors under their responsibility. This is an important example in which the ministries are tasked with fulfilling the government’s overall objectives.
The new coalition agreement provides for some rules regarding when the coalition committee is to meet and who is to attend the meetings. As in previous coalitions, the committee consists of the chancellor and the vice chancellor, the leaders of parliamentary groups and party leaders (insofar as they are not the persons mentioned above). The coalition committee is informally the most important institution in resolving political disagreements within the government.
As part of the climate package, ministries are to be made responsible for climate reduction targets in the sectors under their responsibility. This is an important example in which the ministries are tasked with fulfilling the government’s overall objectives.
How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
5
4
3
4
3
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
2
1
1
The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
According to the Basic Law, ministers are fully responsible for governing their own divisions. However, they are bound to the general government guidelines drawn up by the chancellor or the coalition agreement. Concerning topics of general political interest, the cabinet makes decisions collectively. The internal rules of procedure require line ministers to inform the chancellor’s office about all important issues. However, in some cases, the Chancellery lacks the sectoral expertise to monitor line ministries’ policy proposals effectively.
Citations:
A 6 fits better to the text than the 5. There is clearly monitoring of all line ministries through the Spiegelreferate. Only “of some line ministries” would not be correct.
Citations:
A 6 fits better to the text than the 5. There is clearly monitoring of all line ministries through the Spiegelreferate. Only “of some line ministries” would not be correct.
How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
8
7
6
7
6
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
5
4
3
4
3
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
2
1
1
The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
Executive agencies’ competences and responsibilities are explicitly detailed in law, edicts, statutes and other regulations. Their activities are not only subject to legal, but also to functional supervision, meaning that agencies’ decisions and administrative instructions will be reviewed. However, the ministries have not always made appropriate use of their oversight mechanism. A number of independent agencies, including the Federal Employment Office, the Federal Network Agency, the Bundesbank and others have deliberately been placed beyond the effective control of the federal government. It is important that monitoring agencies maintain organizational independence, so that they may monitor government effectiveness and financial impacts. The National Regulatory Control Council has tried to increase its powers over legislative and bureaucratic processes at federal and state levels.
To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
8
7
6
7
6
The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
2
1
1
The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
The delegation of tasks from the national to the subnational level without commensurate funding has been a sore point of German fiscal federalism. For instance, municipalities suffer under the weight of increasing costs of welfare programs. However, a number of adjustments over the last years have substantially rejuvenated municipalities and states with the federal level increasingly assuming responsibility for the costs of social programs (e.g., for the costs of accommodation and living for the recipients of basic income support).
With respect to the future of the fiscal equalization system, an important compromise regarding the new system (in effect since 2020) was achieved in October 2016. This involves the Länder receiving higher shares of VAT revenues and replacing the currently horizontally structured system (in which wealthier states transfer funds to poorer states) with a system of exclusively vertical equalization payments (from the federal to the state level).
Also, when municipalities were hit hard by plummeting tax revenues during the pandemic, the federal level stepped in by providing generous compensation for shortfalls in municipal revenue.
With respect to the future of the fiscal equalization system, an important compromise regarding the new system (in effect since 2020) was achieved in October 2016. This involves the Länder receiving higher shares of VAT revenues and replacing the currently horizontally structured system (in which wealthier states transfer funds to poorer states) with a system of exclusively vertical equalization payments (from the federal to the state level).
Also, when municipalities were hit hard by plummeting tax revenues during the pandemic, the federal level stepped in by providing generous compensation for shortfalls in municipal revenue.
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
2
1
1
The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
The allocation of tasks and responsibilities between the federal and state governments is defined in the Basic Law. Thus, police functions, cultural tasks, and education, including both schools and universities, are the responsibility of the states. This distribution of tasks is largely respected by the federal government. A far-reaching equalization system and an ongoing shift of tax revenues from the federal to the state level has also been improving the financial capabilities of states to fulfill these tasks (see Task Funding). Moreover, the Basic Law also grants local self-government to the almost 12,000 local governments in Germany. Local governments enjoy autonomy in organizing and carrying out their own affairs.
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?
10
9
9
Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
2
1
1
Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
German federalism impedes the application of national standards because both states and local governments enjoy considerable autonomy. Public services are provided by various levels of government: the federal administration, the administrations of federal states, municipalities, indirect public administrations (institutions subject to public law with specific tasks, particularly in the area of social security), nonpublic and nonprofit institutions (e.g., kindergartens or youth centers), and finally judicial administrations. While some standards have a national character and thus have to be respected at all levels, this is not the case in areas such as education. A certain harmonization of implementation and enforcement is achieved through a process of tight coordination between federal and state governments and particularly among the individual state governments.
To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?
10
9
9
Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
8
7
6
7
6
Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
5
4
3
4
3
Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
2
1
1
Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
Laws and other regulations are usually enforced effectively and without bias. However, law enforcement against vested interest depends on the structure of the respective acts. Detailed and strict laws are difficult to thwart, and administrators and courts are able to enforce them. By contrast, vague and lax laws may be more easily circumvented by vested interests. In general, government and courts are willing and able to enforce their respective regulations, and prevail against vested interests.
Graph View
To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?
10
9
9
The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
8
7
6
7
6
In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
2
1
1
The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
As in other EU member states, EU regulations have a significant impact on German legislation. The country’s legal system is heavily influenced by EU law, but the federal government does not have a central policy unit specifically coordinating and managing EU affairs. Each federal ministry is responsible for all matters within its sectoral purview related to the adoption, implementation and coordination of proposals by the European Commission. All federal ministries have specific EU units, and there are a variety of mechanisms and bodies for interministerial coordination on EU issues (Große Hüttmann 2007). In contrast to the federal government, all federal states have a ministry with explicit responsibility for EU issues. The Länder even determine Germany’s European policy in some areas that are the sole responsibility of the states (Article 23 of the Basic Law). The states consult with each other in a regular conference of ministers of European affairs, which is also attended by federal government and EU Commission representatives.
Thus, some coordination and adaptation is taking place, but federal structures present specific problems in terms of policy learning and adaptability to international and supranational developments. In general, Germany has not made serious attempts in the last years to rigorously adapt government structures to the changing national, international and transnational environment.
Citations:
This is not my field of expertise, maybe the second reviewer has a closer look, I think this old answer would benefit from some more substance.
I added one article:
Große Hüttmann, Martin (2007): Die Koordination der deutschen Europapolitik, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 10/2007, p. 39-45, https://www.bpb.de/shop/zeitschriften/apuz/30626/die-koordination-der-deutschen-europapolitik/ (accessed 13 February 2022).
Thus, some coordination and adaptation is taking place, but federal structures present specific problems in terms of policy learning and adaptability to international and supranational developments. In general, Germany has not made serious attempts in the last years to rigorously adapt government structures to the changing national, international and transnational environment.
Citations:
This is not my field of expertise, maybe the second reviewer has a closer look, I think this old answer would benefit from some more substance.
I added one article:
Große Hüttmann, Martin (2007): Die Koordination der deutschen Europapolitik, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 10/2007, p. 39-45, https://www.bpb.de/shop/zeitschriften/apuz/30626/die-koordination-der-deutschen-europapolitik/ (accessed 13 February 2022).
To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?
10
9
9
The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
2
1
1
The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
The German government actively collaborates in various reform efforts promoted by the EU and other transnational and international organizations. During the years of the euro area debt crisis, the German government played a leading role in organizing and creating stabilization mechanisms. During the period under review, the government cooperated closely with European partners (particularly France), other countries such as the United States, and international organizations in addressing the Crimea crisis and the civil war in eastern Ukraine. Some critics expect Germany to take on a more active role militarily, but this has always been rejected by German politicians with reference to German history. Moreover, Germany has played a significant role in international climate negotiations (see “Global Environmental Policy”). The turn toward a more ambitious climate policy with the coalition agreement of 2021 is not only a reaction to domestic voter preferences, it also mirrors the aim of joining once again the club of the global climate policy forerunners and regain credibility as a promoter of a crucial global public good.
During the pandemic, Germany has been heavily involved with maintaining a global perspective on the crisis and has increased its support to developing countries. The country is a member of and a major donor to the international COVAX vaccination campaign. The German government’s involvement with the EU coronavirus response package “Next Generation EU” also demonstrated its ability to overcome national resistance to the shift toward greater European solidarity.
Generally, Germany is a constructive partner in international reform initiatives and is ready to accept substantial costs and risks in order to realize European and global public goods.
During the pandemic, Germany has been heavily involved with maintaining a global perspective on the crisis and has increased its support to developing countries. The country is a member of and a major donor to the international COVAX vaccination campaign. The German government’s involvement with the EU coronavirus response package “Next Generation EU” also demonstrated its ability to overcome national resistance to the shift toward greater European solidarity.
Generally, Germany is a constructive partner in international reform initiatives and is ready to accept substantial costs and risks in order to realize European and global public goods.
Graph View
To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?
10
9
9
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
5
4
3
4
3
The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
2
1
1
There is no monitoring.
There is neither a particular institution nor a commission that independently and impartially operates as an oversight body with respect to governmental activities. In addition, institutional self-monitoring capacities are still low. However, the creation of the Better Regulation Unit in the Chancellery and the extension of the competences of the National Regulatory Control Council (Normenkontrollrat, NKR) – an independent advisory body – have strengthened self-monitoring capacities. In its most recent report, published in September 2021, the NKR pointed to increasing legislative compliance costs within public administration, not just in the private sector. However, the NKR has no mandate to advise the government on its institutional arrangements.
Citations:
Nationaler Normenkontrollrat (2021): Zukunftsfester Staate - weniger Bürokratie, praxistaugliche Gesetze und leistungsfähige Verwaltung, Jahresbericht 2021.
Citations:
Nationaler Normenkontrollrat (2021): Zukunftsfester Staate - weniger Bürokratie, praxistaugliche Gesetze und leistungsfähige Verwaltung, Jahresbericht 2021.
To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?
10
9
9
The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
8
7
6
7
6
The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
2
1
1
The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
As pointed out above (“Strategic Capacity”), the government has expanded its strategic capacities in recent years. The Federal Ministry of Education and Research acts as coordinator within the Foresight process. It remains to be seen if this process helps improve while creating a shared understanding of strategic planning across the ministries. The new government has adjusted the responsibilities of some ministries. In this context, climate policy has been strategically upgraded. With regard to the cross-cutting issue of digital policies, effective coordination in Germany is still lacking (see Hess/Egle 2022).
As in other countries, strategic capacities and reform efforts are heavily influenced by constitutional and public-governance structures and traditions. The federal system assigns considerable independent authority to the states. In turn, the states are crucial to implementing federal legislation. This creates a complex environment with many institutional veto players across different levels. Institutional and organizational inertia spells for low levels of strategic capacity.
German federalism reforms, which constitute some of the more far-reaching institutional changes of recent years, have started to have an impact on the adaptability of the federal politics. In the last years, several reforms relating to the financial relations between the federal level and the states were adopted.
Citations:
Hess, Thomas and Christoph Egle (2022): Digital Governance in Regierungen: Die Chance von
Dotted Lines, in: ifo Schnelldienst 2/2022, p. 16-20
As in other countries, strategic capacities and reform efforts are heavily influenced by constitutional and public-governance structures and traditions. The federal system assigns considerable independent authority to the states. In turn, the states are crucial to implementing federal legislation. This creates a complex environment with many institutional veto players across different levels. Institutional and organizational inertia spells for low levels of strategic capacity.
German federalism reforms, which constitute some of the more far-reaching institutional changes of recent years, have started to have an impact on the adaptability of the federal politics. In the last years, several reforms relating to the financial relations between the federal level and the states were adopted.
Citations:
Hess, Thomas and Christoph Egle (2022): Digital Governance in Regierungen: Die Chance von
Dotted Lines, in: ifo Schnelldienst 2/2022, p. 16-20