Social Policies
#34Key Findings
With a number of weaknesses and inefficiencies in its safety nets, Greece scores relatively poorly (rank 34) with regard to social policies. Its score on this measure has improved by 0.8 points relative to 2014.
The government expanded the primary healthcare workforce and doubled ICU bed quantities during the pandemic. Healthcare system performance was good in 2020, but declined in 2021. The share of children at risk of poverty or exclusion is high, largely due to the high level of unemployment. The long-term exclusion of young people from the labor market is a serious challenge.
Public education spending is skewed toward the tertiary level, but is often misspent. Secondary school outcomes have declined. Pre-primary education is now compulsory beginning at age four. Childcare burdens typically fall to women. Family support has improved over time, but female labor force participation rates remain low.
Considerable social attention is paid to pensioners. Pensions keep most senior citizens out of poverty, but the old-age dependency rate is high, and the system is not sustainable. The number of incoming refugees fell in 2020 and 2021, but Greece has remained unable to manage the inflows. Social integration has never been a focus of Greek migration policy.
The government expanded the primary healthcare workforce and doubled ICU bed quantities during the pandemic. Healthcare system performance was good in 2020, but declined in 2021. The share of children at risk of poverty or exclusion is high, largely due to the high level of unemployment. The long-term exclusion of young people from the labor market is a serious challenge.
Public education spending is skewed toward the tertiary level, but is often misspent. Secondary school outcomes have declined. Pre-primary education is now compulsory beginning at age four. Childcare burdens typically fall to women. Family support has improved over time, but female labor force participation rates remain low.
Considerable social attention is paid to pensioners. Pensions keep most senior citizens out of poverty, but the old-age dependency rate is high, and the system is not sustainable. The number of incoming refugees fell in 2020 and 2021, but Greece has remained unable to manage the inflows. Social integration has never been a focus of Greek migration policy.
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To what extent does education policy deliver high-quality, equitable and efficient education and training?
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9
9
Education policy fully achieves the criteria.
8
7
6
7
6
Education policy largely achieves the criteria.
5
4
3
4
3
Education policy partially achieves the criteria.
2
1
1
Education policy does not achieve the criteria at all.
In Greece, the education system is extremely top-heavy, with the Ministry of Education exercising a “hands-on” type of management over all levels of education and schools, including the distribution of public resources to schools and universities. Pre-primary education in Greece has become compulsory for all four-year-old children since 2018, while enrollment in schools is compulsory for all children in the 5–15 age group.
The Greek state spends less on education than other EU member states, 4% of GDP in Greece compared to an EU-27 average of 4.7% (Eurostat data for 2019). However, public funds are misspent. For example, the allocation of teachers in public schools and professors in university departments is often uneven, university libraries are under-resourced, and housing for students is far from adequate. The distribution of infrastructure among university departments is generally unequal, and academic and administrative staff are underpaid.
Despite the above problems with universities, higher education is more generously supported than other levels of education. While public spending is lower than the EU average in primary and secondary education, it is slightly higher than the EU average in tertiary education.
This discrepancy is explained by the very high demand for university education. Greece performs relatively well with regard to tertiary attainment: one-third of Greeks in the age group 25–64 have a university degree. This is the result of many factors, including the Greek population’s fascination with obtaining a university-level degree, often regardless of department or school. Traditionally, the symbolic value and social status accompanying a university degree are high, while success in passing the competitive entrance examinations to universities is considered a major achievement. University entrance examinations are written, very competitive and traditionally require memorization rather than critical-thinking. They are conducted every June on a nationwide scale through a centralized examination mechanism. As a result, teaching and learning in high schools is oriented toward the requirements of exam preparation. Pupils enroll in the country’s fee-supported private cramming schools, where they are taught more systematically than in high schools.
Greece is a laggard with regard to upper-secondary attainment and its PISA results. In other words, while primary schools and universities may not show an outstanding performance, they function somewhat better than Greek high schools. Greece’s PISA test performance did not show any significant improvement in the last decade. In fact, Greek children performed worse in all three categories in the 2019 PISA compared to the previous survey in 2015.
Tertiary institutions are nominally autonomous, but the Ministry of Education is responsible for their funding, as well as for the allocation of teaching posts per university and the distribution of students across undergraduate programs. Since the mid-1990s, governments have promoted a policy of enlarging university access, primarily through establishing new universities and departments.
Obtaining a high school diploma (rather than a vocational-school qualification) is an aim sought by almost all pupils who tend to avoid vocational high schools and prefer general education high schools as graduating from the latter provides easier access to tertiary education. However, such access is not equitable, as students from middle- and upper-class backgrounds are more likely to pass the national entrance examinations. Moreover, to the extent their parents can afford it, Greek high school pupils receive extensive private tutoring in the cramming schools noted above. This reflects a cultural contradiction. While tertiary education is an entirely public sector activity (i.e., university students do not pay tuition fees or textbook costs, and private universities are officially banned), success in entering universities largely depends on private tutoring.
The quality of education in primary and secondary schools is very uneven, as private schools are better resourced and staffed than state schools. In the latter, until the change of government in 2019, the curricula of taught subjects were outdated, teachers completely rejected performance review and access to digital resources was limited. While in 2020–2021 there was progress on these fronts, state schools still suffer from understaffing and a lack of material resources (e.g., laboratories and libraries). Distance-learning became necessary in 2020–2021 because of the COVID-19 pandemic, which led to the closure of schools and impacted negatively on the quality of education. Meanwhile, the quality of vocational training (in technical and professional high schools) is very low – a trend has persisted for decades.
Similarly, the quality of education across Greek universities is very uneven. However, most former polytechnics, which were given university status by a law passed in 2018, without any prior performance review, are at a considerably lower level.
In 2021, arguing that Greek universities have long been plagued by violence, the new government passed a bill that aims to create a special police force to guard university campuses. It seems that public opinion supported the reform. However, the new law proved controversial, provoking mass student demonstrations.
In summary, Greece’s education system is one of the most centralized among OECD countries, with shifting education policies depending on the government in power or even the minister in office. The pandemic crisis of 2020–2021 has further exacerbated problems in the quality of education. However, after the change in government in 2019, there were positive developments, such as the subsidized distribution of laptops or tablets to pupils, the drafting of new curricula for all subjects taught in primary and secondary education, and, belatedly, the start of performance evaluation of school units and teaching personnel.
Citations:
Information on the performance of Greece’s educational system is based on data provided on this SGI platform.
Data on public expenditure on education is drawn on Eurostat, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/images/9/95/Total_general_government_expenditure_on_education%2C_2019%2C_%25_of_GDP.png
Data on the school performance of pupils is drawn on PISA / OECD 2015 Results http://www.oecd.org/pisa/
The Greek state spends less on education than other EU member states, 4% of GDP in Greece compared to an EU-27 average of 4.7% (Eurostat data for 2019). However, public funds are misspent. For example, the allocation of teachers in public schools and professors in university departments is often uneven, university libraries are under-resourced, and housing for students is far from adequate. The distribution of infrastructure among university departments is generally unequal, and academic and administrative staff are underpaid.
Despite the above problems with universities, higher education is more generously supported than other levels of education. While public spending is lower than the EU average in primary and secondary education, it is slightly higher than the EU average in tertiary education.
This discrepancy is explained by the very high demand for university education. Greece performs relatively well with regard to tertiary attainment: one-third of Greeks in the age group 25–64 have a university degree. This is the result of many factors, including the Greek population’s fascination with obtaining a university-level degree, often regardless of department or school. Traditionally, the symbolic value and social status accompanying a university degree are high, while success in passing the competitive entrance examinations to universities is considered a major achievement. University entrance examinations are written, very competitive and traditionally require memorization rather than critical-thinking. They are conducted every June on a nationwide scale through a centralized examination mechanism. As a result, teaching and learning in high schools is oriented toward the requirements of exam preparation. Pupils enroll in the country’s fee-supported private cramming schools, where they are taught more systematically than in high schools.
Greece is a laggard with regard to upper-secondary attainment and its PISA results. In other words, while primary schools and universities may not show an outstanding performance, they function somewhat better than Greek high schools. Greece’s PISA test performance did not show any significant improvement in the last decade. In fact, Greek children performed worse in all three categories in the 2019 PISA compared to the previous survey in 2015.
Tertiary institutions are nominally autonomous, but the Ministry of Education is responsible for their funding, as well as for the allocation of teaching posts per university and the distribution of students across undergraduate programs. Since the mid-1990s, governments have promoted a policy of enlarging university access, primarily through establishing new universities and departments.
Obtaining a high school diploma (rather than a vocational-school qualification) is an aim sought by almost all pupils who tend to avoid vocational high schools and prefer general education high schools as graduating from the latter provides easier access to tertiary education. However, such access is not equitable, as students from middle- and upper-class backgrounds are more likely to pass the national entrance examinations. Moreover, to the extent their parents can afford it, Greek high school pupils receive extensive private tutoring in the cramming schools noted above. This reflects a cultural contradiction. While tertiary education is an entirely public sector activity (i.e., university students do not pay tuition fees or textbook costs, and private universities are officially banned), success in entering universities largely depends on private tutoring.
The quality of education in primary and secondary schools is very uneven, as private schools are better resourced and staffed than state schools. In the latter, until the change of government in 2019, the curricula of taught subjects were outdated, teachers completely rejected performance review and access to digital resources was limited. While in 2020–2021 there was progress on these fronts, state schools still suffer from understaffing and a lack of material resources (e.g., laboratories and libraries). Distance-learning became necessary in 2020–2021 because of the COVID-19 pandemic, which led to the closure of schools and impacted negatively on the quality of education. Meanwhile, the quality of vocational training (in technical and professional high schools) is very low – a trend has persisted for decades.
Similarly, the quality of education across Greek universities is very uneven. However, most former polytechnics, which were given university status by a law passed in 2018, without any prior performance review, are at a considerably lower level.
In 2021, arguing that Greek universities have long been plagued by violence, the new government passed a bill that aims to create a special police force to guard university campuses. It seems that public opinion supported the reform. However, the new law proved controversial, provoking mass student demonstrations.
In summary, Greece’s education system is one of the most centralized among OECD countries, with shifting education policies depending on the government in power or even the minister in office. The pandemic crisis of 2020–2021 has further exacerbated problems in the quality of education. However, after the change in government in 2019, there were positive developments, such as the subsidized distribution of laptops or tablets to pupils, the drafting of new curricula for all subjects taught in primary and secondary education, and, belatedly, the start of performance evaluation of school units and teaching personnel.
Citations:
Information on the performance of Greece’s educational system is based on data provided on this SGI platform.
Data on public expenditure on education is drawn on Eurostat, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/images/9/95/Total_general_government_expenditure_on_education%2C_2019%2C_%25_of_GDP.png
Data on the school performance of pupils is drawn on PISA / OECD 2015 Results http://www.oecd.org/pisa/
Graph View
To what extent does social policy prevent exclusion and decoupling from society?
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9
9
Policies very effectively enable societal inclusion and ensure equal opportunities.
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7
6
For the most part, policies enable societal inclusion effectively and ensure equal opportunities.
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3
4
3
For the most part, policies fail to prevent societal exclusion effectively and ensure equal opportunities.
2
1
1
Policies exacerbate unequal opportunities and exclusion from society.
Though Greece is not ranked among the worst-performing EU members states with regard to income inequality or poverty, the size of social exclusion and the extent of child poverty are rather unusual for an EU member state. In 2020, social exclusion affected 27.5% of Greeks (EU-27 average: 22%). The proportion of children at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2021 was close to 27%, compared to an EU average of 21% (Eurostat data for 2021). Life satisfaction is among the worst in the OECD, too.
Poverty and social exclusion mostly result from unemployment, which remains an acute problem in Greece. The unemployment rate dropped from 26.5% in 2014 to 17.6% in 2020, but is still the highest in the EU-27 (7.1% in 2020). Youth unemployment is at 29.3% and also figures as the highest in the European Union (EU-27 12.5% in 2020).
Besides these negative outcomes from the economic crisis of the previous decade, a deeper challenge is the long-term exclusion of young people from the labor market, to which they remain outsiders. The share of people aged 20 to 24 who are not in education, employment or training (NEET) stands at 19.5% and is among the worst in the EU-28.
Meanwhile, typical government measures include the distribution of ad hoc social assistance benefits to old-age pensioners (above all other categories of the population), low-income groups and the unemployed, a practice sustained during the COVID-19 crisis in 2020–2021. The government usually hires poor and unemployed people in the public sector on temporary, five-month contracts. They are preferred over other candidates for such temporary public sector jobs.
Most long-term unemployed people lose their skills and are unable to find new jobs. They are thus driven into poverty and social exclusion, or leave the country. Young people were hit particularly hard by the economic crisis of the previous decade and the COVID-19 crisis.
In the period under review, the implementation of the guaranteed minimum income (GMI) scheme was a positive development. It undoubtedly represents a major improvement over all previous programs. The GMI scheme consists of the following three interconnected pillars: (a) income support amounting to €200/month for a single member household with an additional €100 for each additional adult and €50 per child; (b) complementary social services, for instance, food pantries and discounted utility rates; and (c) services to help support recipients find employment. However, this third pillar was launched only in April 2021. Moreover, complementary measures to fight unemployment (a major cause of rising poverty), such as participation in vocational education and training (VET), remain modest.
There were some recent improvements in social inclusion policy. In March 2021, the government launched the Child Guarantee program, in association with UNICEF. It is a pilot program that aims to guarantee access to quality social services for children in need. And in June 2021, the government launched a deinstitutionalization strategy for people with disabilities. It is aimed at supporting children with disabilities, adults with disabilities and older people with support needs.
To sum up, as in the recent past, welfare measures in the period under review were focused more strongly on old-age pensioners than on the unemployed or the socially excluded. Despite improvements in social policy in 2020–2021, the poor and socially excluded count on kin or family networks to fill in the gaps of a still inchoate social policy. Better-targeted benefits could make growth more inclusive.
Citations:
Data on the GNI coefficient and NEET share in the age group 20-24 is provided by the SGI dataset on this platform.
Eurostat data on risk of poverty or social exclusion: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/edn-20211015-1#:~:text=In%202020%2C%20there%20were%2096.5,data%20published%20by%20Eurostat%20today.
Eurostat data on unemployment: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tps00203/default/table?lang=en
Eurostat data on youth unemployment:https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=yth_empl_100&lang=en
Eurostat data on child poverty and social exclusion:
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/ddn-20211028-1
The GMI scheme of Greece is presented in a brief World Bank paper available at https://blogs.worldbank.org/jobs/how-active-labor-market-programs-can-support-guaranteed-minimum-income-recipients
The new strategy for the disabled is summarized at: https://easpd.eu/press-releases-detail/greece-launches-new-strategy-for-deinstitutionalisation/
Poverty and social exclusion mostly result from unemployment, which remains an acute problem in Greece. The unemployment rate dropped from 26.5% in 2014 to 17.6% in 2020, but is still the highest in the EU-27 (7.1% in 2020). Youth unemployment is at 29.3% and also figures as the highest in the European Union (EU-27 12.5% in 2020).
Besides these negative outcomes from the economic crisis of the previous decade, a deeper challenge is the long-term exclusion of young people from the labor market, to which they remain outsiders. The share of people aged 20 to 24 who are not in education, employment or training (NEET) stands at 19.5% and is among the worst in the EU-28.
Meanwhile, typical government measures include the distribution of ad hoc social assistance benefits to old-age pensioners (above all other categories of the population), low-income groups and the unemployed, a practice sustained during the COVID-19 crisis in 2020–2021. The government usually hires poor and unemployed people in the public sector on temporary, five-month contracts. They are preferred over other candidates for such temporary public sector jobs.
Most long-term unemployed people lose their skills and are unable to find new jobs. They are thus driven into poverty and social exclusion, or leave the country. Young people were hit particularly hard by the economic crisis of the previous decade and the COVID-19 crisis.
In the period under review, the implementation of the guaranteed minimum income (GMI) scheme was a positive development. It undoubtedly represents a major improvement over all previous programs. The GMI scheme consists of the following three interconnected pillars: (a) income support amounting to €200/month for a single member household with an additional €100 for each additional adult and €50 per child; (b) complementary social services, for instance, food pantries and discounted utility rates; and (c) services to help support recipients find employment. However, this third pillar was launched only in April 2021. Moreover, complementary measures to fight unemployment (a major cause of rising poverty), such as participation in vocational education and training (VET), remain modest.
There were some recent improvements in social inclusion policy. In March 2021, the government launched the Child Guarantee program, in association with UNICEF. It is a pilot program that aims to guarantee access to quality social services for children in need. And in June 2021, the government launched a deinstitutionalization strategy for people with disabilities. It is aimed at supporting children with disabilities, adults with disabilities and older people with support needs.
To sum up, as in the recent past, welfare measures in the period under review were focused more strongly on old-age pensioners than on the unemployed or the socially excluded. Despite improvements in social policy in 2020–2021, the poor and socially excluded count on kin or family networks to fill in the gaps of a still inchoate social policy. Better-targeted benefits could make growth more inclusive.
Citations:
Data on the GNI coefficient and NEET share in the age group 20-24 is provided by the SGI dataset on this platform.
Eurostat data on risk of poverty or social exclusion: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/edn-20211015-1#:~:text=In%202020%2C%20there%20were%2096.5,data%20published%20by%20Eurostat%20today.
Eurostat data on unemployment: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tps00203/default/table?lang=en
Eurostat data on youth unemployment:https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=yth_empl_100&lang=en
Eurostat data on child poverty and social exclusion:
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/ddn-20211028-1
The GMI scheme of Greece is presented in a brief World Bank paper available at https://blogs.worldbank.org/jobs/how-active-labor-market-programs-can-support-guaranteed-minimum-income-recipients
The new strategy for the disabled is summarized at: https://easpd.eu/press-releases-detail/greece-launches-new-strategy-for-deinstitutionalisation/
Graph View
To what extent do health care policies provide high-quality, inclusive and cost-efficient health care?
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Health care policy achieves the criteria fully.
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7
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Health care policy achieves the criteria largely.
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3
4
3
Health care policy achieves the criteria partly.
2
1
1
Health care policy does not achieve the criteria at all.
Since the onset of the pandemic crisis in Greece, spending on public healthcare has increased. In 2019, Greece spent $2,238 per capita on healthcare – more than one-third less than the OECD average. Also in 2019, healthcare expenditure amounted to 7.8% of GDP (EU-27 average: 9.9%). Greece trailed behind other EU member states on healthcare spending as a result of massive cuts during the economic crisis of 2010–2018. Moreover, only 59% of health spending was publicly funded. Private spending, meaning out-of-pocket expenses (which were rarely taxed), stood at 35% and was more than double the EU average.
Public spending on healthcare is often above targeted expenditure because of mismanagement of the public procurement of medical equipment and supplies by public hospitals, and pressure exerted by pharmaceutical companies and private healthcare providers on healthcare practitioners and public hospitals. In order to counter this trend during the economic crisis, the government introduced a “claw back” requirement. The government collected from healthcare providers all funds spent over the legislated ceiling for public spending on pharmaceuticals and other healthcare services. This practice was continued in 2020–2021, despite arrears from previous years.
Private spending is fueled by the supply of healthcare practitioners and the availability of private diagnostic centers. In 2019, Greece had 6.1 practicing physicians per 1,000 people, the highest such ratio in OECD. However, there were only 3.3 practicing nurses per 1,000 people – around 40% of the OECD average of 8.8. These outcomes result from the country’s haphazard medical school system. There were eight state medical schools in the country, producing hundreds of doctors every year. At the same time, Greece faced a chronic lack of nurses (a low-status, low-paid job) and a similar lack of medical personnel in rural or remote areas, as most doctors prefer to work in the hospitals of the two largest cities, Athens and Thessaloniki. Moreover, Greece had one of the EU-27’s highest shares of MRI units and medical scanners per one million people.
In addition, in the period under review as in the past, the distribution of the 131 public hospitals across Greece remained highly uneven, resulting from a patronage-based selection process that determines where hospitals should be built.
Seeking to balance the oversupply of private medical services and the uneven structure of the public hospital system, in 2017, the government legislated a system of local public healthcare units (TOMY). The new system should have marked a major improvement over the past, moving in the right direction by requiring that practicing doctors become family doctors (i.e., general practitioners responsible for a few thousand insured citizens each). Implementation of the new system started slowly in 2018–2019, but was halted thereafter due to the change of government and the limited interest of doctors. Specialized doctors (of whom Greece has an oversupply) had no incentive to provide primary healthcare under the newly established terms of the program and were reluctant to enroll in a system that would tie them to predetermined levels of compensation. Meanwhile, patients continued to trust their own usual private practice doctors, to whom they pay out-of-pocket fees. In 2020 and 2021, the government increased the primary healthcare workforce, but newly hired doctors and nurses were largely channeled toward public hospitals, which in the period under review faced the challenge of treating COVID-19 patients. In order to meet the demands presented by the COVID-19 pandemic, Greece doubled its intensive care unit bed capacity and occupancy rates never exceeded full capacity.
In 2020, the government imposed two strict lockdowns to prevent the spread of COVID-19 through the population and started a nationwide program of vaccination. By the end of 2021, the proportion of fully vaccinated people reached a ceiling of 66% of the population, while only 35% had received a booster (third dose). A total of over 21,000 COVID-19-related deaths occurred in 2020–2021 – close to the EU average.
In general, the country performed relatively well during first waves of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, but underperformed in 2021. Meanwhile, while clientelistic structures in the provision of healthcare remained intact, there was a high volume of unrecorded and untaxed transactions between patients and doctors as well as a differential in healthcare access based on the purchasing power of households.
Citations:
Eurostat data on public healthcare spending for 2020 is available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Healthcare_expenditure_statistics
European Commission / OECD, State of Health in the EU: Greece Country Health Profile 2021 available at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/greece-country-health-profile-2021_4ab8ea73-en
Data on out-of-pocket expenses on health and on the number of doctors is available on this SGI platform.
Τhe law establishing the local healthcare units (known as TOMY, see Law 4486/2017) was passed in August 2017.
EU comparative data on Covid-19-related cases and deaths is available at https://qap.ecdc.europa.eu/public/extensions/COVID-19/COVID-19.html#global-overview-tab
Comparative data on vaccinations is available at https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations?country=GRC
Comparative OECD data: OECD, Health at a Glance: Europe 2020 available at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/health-at-a-glance-europe-2020_82129230-en
Public spending on healthcare is often above targeted expenditure because of mismanagement of the public procurement of medical equipment and supplies by public hospitals, and pressure exerted by pharmaceutical companies and private healthcare providers on healthcare practitioners and public hospitals. In order to counter this trend during the economic crisis, the government introduced a “claw back” requirement. The government collected from healthcare providers all funds spent over the legislated ceiling for public spending on pharmaceuticals and other healthcare services. This practice was continued in 2020–2021, despite arrears from previous years.
Private spending is fueled by the supply of healthcare practitioners and the availability of private diagnostic centers. In 2019, Greece had 6.1 practicing physicians per 1,000 people, the highest such ratio in OECD. However, there were only 3.3 practicing nurses per 1,000 people – around 40% of the OECD average of 8.8. These outcomes result from the country’s haphazard medical school system. There were eight state medical schools in the country, producing hundreds of doctors every year. At the same time, Greece faced a chronic lack of nurses (a low-status, low-paid job) and a similar lack of medical personnel in rural or remote areas, as most doctors prefer to work in the hospitals of the two largest cities, Athens and Thessaloniki. Moreover, Greece had one of the EU-27’s highest shares of MRI units and medical scanners per one million people.
In addition, in the period under review as in the past, the distribution of the 131 public hospitals across Greece remained highly uneven, resulting from a patronage-based selection process that determines where hospitals should be built.
Seeking to balance the oversupply of private medical services and the uneven structure of the public hospital system, in 2017, the government legislated a system of local public healthcare units (TOMY). The new system should have marked a major improvement over the past, moving in the right direction by requiring that practicing doctors become family doctors (i.e., general practitioners responsible for a few thousand insured citizens each). Implementation of the new system started slowly in 2018–2019, but was halted thereafter due to the change of government and the limited interest of doctors. Specialized doctors (of whom Greece has an oversupply) had no incentive to provide primary healthcare under the newly established terms of the program and were reluctant to enroll in a system that would tie them to predetermined levels of compensation. Meanwhile, patients continued to trust their own usual private practice doctors, to whom they pay out-of-pocket fees. In 2020 and 2021, the government increased the primary healthcare workforce, but newly hired doctors and nurses were largely channeled toward public hospitals, which in the period under review faced the challenge of treating COVID-19 patients. In order to meet the demands presented by the COVID-19 pandemic, Greece doubled its intensive care unit bed capacity and occupancy rates never exceeded full capacity.
In 2020, the government imposed two strict lockdowns to prevent the spread of COVID-19 through the population and started a nationwide program of vaccination. By the end of 2021, the proportion of fully vaccinated people reached a ceiling of 66% of the population, while only 35% had received a booster (third dose). A total of over 21,000 COVID-19-related deaths occurred in 2020–2021 – close to the EU average.
In general, the country performed relatively well during first waves of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, but underperformed in 2021. Meanwhile, while clientelistic structures in the provision of healthcare remained intact, there was a high volume of unrecorded and untaxed transactions between patients and doctors as well as a differential in healthcare access based on the purchasing power of households.
Citations:
Eurostat data on public healthcare spending for 2020 is available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Healthcare_expenditure_statistics
European Commission / OECD, State of Health in the EU: Greece Country Health Profile 2021 available at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/greece-country-health-profile-2021_4ab8ea73-en
Data on out-of-pocket expenses on health and on the number of doctors is available on this SGI platform.
Τhe law establishing the local healthcare units (known as TOMY, see Law 4486/2017) was passed in August 2017.
EU comparative data on Covid-19-related cases and deaths is available at https://qap.ecdc.europa.eu/public/extensions/COVID-19/COVID-19.html#global-overview-tab
Comparative data on vaccinations is available at https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations?country=GRC
Comparative OECD data: OECD, Health at a Glance: Europe 2020 available at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/health-at-a-glance-europe-2020_82129230-en
Graph View
To what extent do family support policies enable women to combine parenting with participation in the labor market?
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Family support policies effectively enable women to combine parenting with employment.
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Family support policies provide some support for women who want to combine parenting and employment.
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Family support policies provide only few opportunities for women who want to combine parenting and employment.
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1
Family support policies force most women to opt for either parenting or employment.
Greece has one of the strongest traditions of family ties in Europe. In both urban and rural areas, grandparents often look after preschool children if both parents work, families care for their elderly or disabled at home, parents help around the house and feed the younger generation, sometimes long after children become adults.
Traditionally, the burden of caring for the very old and the very young within households, falls on the shoulders of women. In the context of that tradition, female labor force participation in Greece is among the lowest in the OECD. Thus, women who stay at home taking care of family members may not contribute to the family incomes. If a family is poor, this condition negatively affects child poverty levels, which remains a serious challenge for Greece.
Instead of focusing on the poor and children, the bulk of social attention is focused on pensioners, often regardless of their income level. However, since 2017, the government has distributed a guaranteed minimum income (GMI) to the poorest Greek families. It also established a child allowance, which is distributed to families with an annual income up to €15,000.
After the change in government in 2019, the new government combined the GMI and the child allowance with a housing benefit and an additional allowance of €2,000 per each new born child, which was distributed in 2020 and 2021. These policy measures are implemented through the state agency OPEKA. Moreover, in the same period, the government increased tax breaks for all families with children regardless of family income and tax breaks targeted at families with three or more children. The government’s aim was to support poor families, but also to help curb the demographic decline of the Greek population. In 2020, the government amended the relevant legislation to include permanent residents among the family allowance beneficiaries.
While family support has improved over time, for a poor family, the best option would be for the mother to enter the labor force and, in particular, to become a public sector worker. Notably, a young mother employed in the public sector receives much better support than a mother who is self-employed or is employed in the private sector. Female public sector workers are guaranteed their jobs following maternity leave. They are also granted maternity leave without fear that, on returning to work, they may be allocated to a subordinate job or suffer a wage cut, as is sometimes the case for women employed in the private sector.
Although the Greek state has made family support more comprehensive over time, it still depends on EU funding for the provision of nursery services offered by the local government. Many low-income families benefit from European Social Fund (ESF) projects, which finance Greece’s municipal nurseries.
In summary, in the period under review, the Greek state started streamlining a policy to reconcile work and family life, but still depends on the traditional behavior and structure of the Greek family, as well as on funding from the European Union.
Citations:
Data on child poverty, enrollment in preschool services for children up to five years old, fertility rate and female participation rate is provided by the SGI database on this platform.
The relevant legislation are Laws 4512/2018 and 4659/2020.
The latest information on the new child allowance, distributed by the government, through the OPEKA organization, is available (in Greek) at Translation-Verification@britishcouncil.gr
Traditionally, the burden of caring for the very old and the very young within households, falls on the shoulders of women. In the context of that tradition, female labor force participation in Greece is among the lowest in the OECD. Thus, women who stay at home taking care of family members may not contribute to the family incomes. If a family is poor, this condition negatively affects child poverty levels, which remains a serious challenge for Greece.
Instead of focusing on the poor and children, the bulk of social attention is focused on pensioners, often regardless of their income level. However, since 2017, the government has distributed a guaranteed minimum income (GMI) to the poorest Greek families. It also established a child allowance, which is distributed to families with an annual income up to €15,000.
After the change in government in 2019, the new government combined the GMI and the child allowance with a housing benefit and an additional allowance of €2,000 per each new born child, which was distributed in 2020 and 2021. These policy measures are implemented through the state agency OPEKA. Moreover, in the same period, the government increased tax breaks for all families with children regardless of family income and tax breaks targeted at families with three or more children. The government’s aim was to support poor families, but also to help curb the demographic decline of the Greek population. In 2020, the government amended the relevant legislation to include permanent residents among the family allowance beneficiaries.
While family support has improved over time, for a poor family, the best option would be for the mother to enter the labor force and, in particular, to become a public sector worker. Notably, a young mother employed in the public sector receives much better support than a mother who is self-employed or is employed in the private sector. Female public sector workers are guaranteed their jobs following maternity leave. They are also granted maternity leave without fear that, on returning to work, they may be allocated to a subordinate job or suffer a wage cut, as is sometimes the case for women employed in the private sector.
Although the Greek state has made family support more comprehensive over time, it still depends on EU funding for the provision of nursery services offered by the local government. Many low-income families benefit from European Social Fund (ESF) projects, which finance Greece’s municipal nurseries.
In summary, in the period under review, the Greek state started streamlining a policy to reconcile work and family life, but still depends on the traditional behavior and structure of the Greek family, as well as on funding from the European Union.
Citations:
Data on child poverty, enrollment in preschool services for children up to five years old, fertility rate and female participation rate is provided by the SGI database on this platform.
The relevant legislation are Laws 4512/2018 and 4659/2020.
The latest information on the new child allowance, distributed by the government, through the OPEKA organization, is available (in Greek) at Translation-Verification@britishcouncil.gr
Graph View
To what extent does pension policy realize goals of poverty prevention, intergenerational equity and fiscal sustainability?
10
9
9
Pension policy achieves the objectives fully.
8
7
6
7
6
Pension policy achieves the objectives largely.
5
4
3
4
3
Pension policy achieves the objectives partly.
2
1
1
Pension policy does not achieve the objectives at all.
Greece has one of the worst age dependency ratios among OECD countries, but – even though it does not have a well-resourced welfare state – it has managed to keep most senior citizens out of poverty. And that despite the fact that a minority of older citizens are employed, while early retirement was practiced for a long time. This paradoxical situation is the result of the long-term preference of successive governments to prioritize pensions over other fields of social protection (e.g., to protect against health, family, poverty, housing and unemployment risks).
The pension age is currently at 67 for both men and women with at least 4,500 days of contributions (equivalent to 15 years). Insured persons with a contribution record of 12,000 working days (40 years) can retire with a full pension benefit at the age of 62. Pension benefits are subject to general taxation rules. Pensioners also pay 6% contributions on their pension for healthcare.
In 2019, just after exiting the last Economic Adjustment Program, which was meant to consolidate public finances, Greece spent 16% of GDP on pensions – the highest percentage share in the European Union, on a par with Italy (EU-27 average: 12.7%). Pensions have become a major policy issue, because Greece – along with Italy and Germany – has the largest share of the total population over 65 in the whole of the European Union (21.8% of the total population).
Yet, Greece’s pay-as-you-go system, according to which the working population contributes to pension funds so that old-age pensioners can obtain their pensions, is unsustainable with regard to both main and auxiliary pensions.
The Greek pension system, which comprises a main plus one or more auxiliary pensions for every beneficiary, was based on a multitude of occupational pension funds until 2017. Thereafter, a nationwide integrated social insurance agency (the EFKA) supplanted the occupational funds, but did not become operational until the end of the previous decade. It still suffers from administrative inefficiencies, evident in the long backlogs in issuing pension awards.
In 2016, a major pension reform law instituted the EFKA, established a system of defined-benefit pension plans and introduced a basic pension financed by general tax revenue. According to the law, the main pension is now made up of a national basic pension, financed by the state budget, and a “redistributive” pension calculated on the basis of the average reference wage over a whole working life, the length of contributions and the replacement rate. After the change in government in 2019, the new government kept the same system of main pensions (with some amendments), but sought to reform the chaotic system of auxiliary pensions, which had been struggling financially for a very long time, even before the economic crisis.
Ιn 2021, the government introduced a major change to auxiliary pensions. For all those who join the labor market from 2022 onward, a new system based on individual accounts has been established. Those who are under 35 years old may voluntarily join the new system, while older workers will remain with the old system. The new one is a fully funded defined contributions system. Individual contributions will be made to the newly established, state-run Hellenic Auxiliary Pensions Defined Contribution Fund (TEKA). Contributors to the new fund may choose among low, medium and high-risk-rated investment funds. It is too early to assess the TEKA system.
However, recent IMF research points out that, despite improvements in 2017–2020, Greece’s pension system falls short of convincing beneficiaries to build long contribution histories. In other words, to stop evading social security contributions, it has not helped improve the fiscal policy mix and foster higher economic growth, and it has not made burden-sharing across generations more equitable and fair.
Indeed, pension policy does not meet intergenerational equity requirements. Existing arrangements primarily serve the interests of middle- and old-age groups at the expense of younger generations of workers. This is a constant pattern running parallel to the periodic trimming of pensions.
The pension system is periodically challenged not only by fiscal constraints, but also by rear battles of vested interest groups, which in the pre-reform period used to enjoy higher than average pensions. For instance, the country’s supreme administrative court has struck down several aspects of the reform pertaining to low replacement rates and to pension cuts. The government periodically has to reimburse occupational groups, which have won such legal battles. All in all, Greece’s pension system remains unsustainable.
Citations:
Data on share of old people who work, old-age dependency ratio and senior citizen poverty is drawn on the SGI data set, available on this platform.
Data on pension expenditure is drawn on Eurostat, available at https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=tps00103&lang=en
The pension reform law was Law 4387/2016. It has been amended many times since 2016.
The new law on auxiliary pensions is Law 4826/2021.
IMF research on the Greek pension system: Alvar Kangur, Niki Kalavrezou, and Daehaeng Kim (2021), “Reforming the Greek Pension System,” IMF Working Paper, WP/21/188, July 2021.
OECD, Pensions at a Glance 2021 – Country Profiles 2021
The pension age is currently at 67 for both men and women with at least 4,500 days of contributions (equivalent to 15 years). Insured persons with a contribution record of 12,000 working days (40 years) can retire with a full pension benefit at the age of 62. Pension benefits are subject to general taxation rules. Pensioners also pay 6% contributions on their pension for healthcare.
In 2019, just after exiting the last Economic Adjustment Program, which was meant to consolidate public finances, Greece spent 16% of GDP on pensions – the highest percentage share in the European Union, on a par with Italy (EU-27 average: 12.7%). Pensions have become a major policy issue, because Greece – along with Italy and Germany – has the largest share of the total population over 65 in the whole of the European Union (21.8% of the total population).
Yet, Greece’s pay-as-you-go system, according to which the working population contributes to pension funds so that old-age pensioners can obtain their pensions, is unsustainable with regard to both main and auxiliary pensions.
The Greek pension system, which comprises a main plus one or more auxiliary pensions for every beneficiary, was based on a multitude of occupational pension funds until 2017. Thereafter, a nationwide integrated social insurance agency (the EFKA) supplanted the occupational funds, but did not become operational until the end of the previous decade. It still suffers from administrative inefficiencies, evident in the long backlogs in issuing pension awards.
In 2016, a major pension reform law instituted the EFKA, established a system of defined-benefit pension plans and introduced a basic pension financed by general tax revenue. According to the law, the main pension is now made up of a national basic pension, financed by the state budget, and a “redistributive” pension calculated on the basis of the average reference wage over a whole working life, the length of contributions and the replacement rate. After the change in government in 2019, the new government kept the same system of main pensions (with some amendments), but sought to reform the chaotic system of auxiliary pensions, which had been struggling financially for a very long time, even before the economic crisis.
Ιn 2021, the government introduced a major change to auxiliary pensions. For all those who join the labor market from 2022 onward, a new system based on individual accounts has been established. Those who are under 35 years old may voluntarily join the new system, while older workers will remain with the old system. The new one is a fully funded defined contributions system. Individual contributions will be made to the newly established, state-run Hellenic Auxiliary Pensions Defined Contribution Fund (TEKA). Contributors to the new fund may choose among low, medium and high-risk-rated investment funds. It is too early to assess the TEKA system.
However, recent IMF research points out that, despite improvements in 2017–2020, Greece’s pension system falls short of convincing beneficiaries to build long contribution histories. In other words, to stop evading social security contributions, it has not helped improve the fiscal policy mix and foster higher economic growth, and it has not made burden-sharing across generations more equitable and fair.
Indeed, pension policy does not meet intergenerational equity requirements. Existing arrangements primarily serve the interests of middle- and old-age groups at the expense of younger generations of workers. This is a constant pattern running parallel to the periodic trimming of pensions.
The pension system is periodically challenged not only by fiscal constraints, but also by rear battles of vested interest groups, which in the pre-reform period used to enjoy higher than average pensions. For instance, the country’s supreme administrative court has struck down several aspects of the reform pertaining to low replacement rates and to pension cuts. The government periodically has to reimburse occupational groups, which have won such legal battles. All in all, Greece’s pension system remains unsustainable.
Citations:
Data on share of old people who work, old-age dependency ratio and senior citizen poverty is drawn on the SGI data set, available on this platform.
Data on pension expenditure is drawn on Eurostat, available at https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=tps00103&lang=en
The pension reform law was Law 4387/2016. It has been amended many times since 2016.
The new law on auxiliary pensions is Law 4826/2021.
IMF research on the Greek pension system: Alvar Kangur, Niki Kalavrezou, and Daehaeng Kim (2021), “Reforming the Greek Pension System,” IMF Working Paper, WP/21/188, July 2021.
OECD, Pensions at a Glance 2021 – Country Profiles 2021
Graph View
How effectively do policies support the integration of migrants into society?
10
9
9
Cultural, education and social policies effectively support the integration of migrants into society.
8
7
6
7
6
Cultural, education and social policies seek to integrate migrants into society, but have failed to do so effectively.
5
4
3
4
3
Cultural, education and social policies do not focus on integrating migrants into society.
2
1
1
Cultural, education and social policies segregate migrant communities from the majority society.
The number of refugees and migrants arriving on the Greek Aegean Islands in 2020 and 2021 has reached its lowest level since the start of the so-called refugee crisis in 2015/6. According to the UNHCR, 4,109 people crossed from Turkey to the Greek islands in 2021. This compares to 9,714 in 2020 and just under 60,000 in 2019. After the change of government in 2019, there was a government policy shift. The shift amounted to preventing illegal immigration, particularly in the northeast of the country, where Greece shares a land border with Turkey. Human rights organizations have repeatedly criticized the Greek coast guard of illegally pushing migrants back to Turkey. The Greek government, however, has denied these claims.
The Migration and Social Integration Code, adopted in 2014 and amended in 2021, is currently the basic law regulating integration in Greece, regulating residence permits and access to the labor market. Two national strategies for the integration of third-country nationals had been launched in 2013 and 2018, respectively, before being replaced by the current national strategy, adopted in July 2019, after the change in government.
While the numbers of migrants and refugees have dramatically fallen, Greece has remained unable to properly manage the inflows of people fleeing war-torn and poverty-stricken regions of the Middle East and Africa. Many stayed for long periods of time at reception and identification centers (RICs) on the Greek islands facing Turkey, such as Lesbos, Chios and Samos.
Arriving migrants and refugees continue to find themselves stranded on the islands for a long time before their asylum applications are processed. Migrants and refugees used to live under squalid conditions in “hot spots,” such as at the Moria camp on Lesbos, which used to house 13,000 people. After a destructive fire in September 2020, that camp was closed. Then, the New Democracy government built new, better equipped camps on the same island and on Samos island. The government also gradually moved many asylum-seekers away from the islands.
In the period under review, migrants and refugees, who were not temporarily hosted in the RICs, were housed in camps on mainland Greece, in private hotels and apartments rented on their behalf by the Greek state. There were two government housing programs, the ESTIA (Emergency Support for Integration and Accommodation) and the HELIOS (Hellenic Integration Support for Beneficiaries of International Protection). However, in 2020–2021, mainland camps were in remote places, with grossly inadequate public transportation. Movement restrictions, imposed to avoid the spread of COVID-19 within the population, worsened the social isolation of migrants and refugees.
Meanwhile, EU authorities and NGOs have continued to provide significant support, as the situation has overwhelmed local Greek authorities. However, this valuable support to desperate people arriving on Greece’s shores in small boats does not extend to their educational and social integration. The integration of migrants into the education system has been functional to a certain extent at the primary and secondary level. It is also obvious that the vast majority of children who live in reception and identification centers (RICs) do not receive proper schooling.
The integration of migrants and refugees into the labor market remains problematic. Migrants and refugees mostly work in the shadow economy, for example, in the agricultural and construction sectors where they find low-paid and uninsured temporary jobs. A law passed after the change in government in 2019 requires a six-month waiting period for asylum-seekers before they apply for work permits. Other difficulties migrants and refugees encounter are obtaining tax registration numbers, enrolling in the social security system (the EFKA agency) and opening a bank account. In all these instances, they often come across language barriers, delays and the uncooperative stance of public sector workers.
Briefly, social integration has never been a strong focus of Greek migration policy. With the exception of Albanians, who probably constitute more than half of all migrants in Greece and first came to the country in the early 1990s, the country’s migrants – including migrants from Asia and Africa – face significant barriers to integrating into Greek society. With regard to cultural integration, it is telling that an official mosque for Muslims in Athens was finally opened only in June 2019.
In summary, significant challenges in terms of policy efficiency remain and policy setbacks are now obvious. Greece must reduce human suffering inside refugee camps. By now this has grown to become a problem that obviously cannot be managed individually by the Greek state. The problem will remain unresolved as long as a more comprehensive and better resourced integration policy is formulated by national and EU authorities, as inflows of migrants and refugees into the European Union will not cease in the foreseeable future.
Citations:
Legislation on migrants and refugees has been codified by law 4251/2014 and amended by Law 4825/2021.
Information on social integration of migrants and refugees in Greece is available at: N. Leivaditi, A. Ilias, E. Papatzani and E. Petracou (2020), “Integration Policies, Practices and Experiences. Country Report: Greece,” EU’s Horizon program 2020 “RESPOND – Multilevel Governance of Migration and Beyond,” University of the Aegean, June 2020.
UNCHR data on migration flows into Greece is available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179
Greece’s national strategy on the social integration of migrants and refugees is available (in Greek) at https://migration.gov.gr/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/%CE%926.-%CE%95%CE%B8%CE%BD%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AE-%CE%A3%CF%84%CF%81%CE%B1%CF%84%CE%B7%CE%B3%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AE-2019.pdf
The reorganization of the Directorate of Social Integration at the Ministry of Migration and Asylum was effected through Presidential Decree 106/2020. The Directorate’s website is available at
https://migration.gov.gr/en/migration-policy/integration/i-ypiresia/
The Migration and Social Integration Code, adopted in 2014 and amended in 2021, is currently the basic law regulating integration in Greece, regulating residence permits and access to the labor market. Two national strategies for the integration of third-country nationals had been launched in 2013 and 2018, respectively, before being replaced by the current national strategy, adopted in July 2019, after the change in government.
While the numbers of migrants and refugees have dramatically fallen, Greece has remained unable to properly manage the inflows of people fleeing war-torn and poverty-stricken regions of the Middle East and Africa. Many stayed for long periods of time at reception and identification centers (RICs) on the Greek islands facing Turkey, such as Lesbos, Chios and Samos.
Arriving migrants and refugees continue to find themselves stranded on the islands for a long time before their asylum applications are processed. Migrants and refugees used to live under squalid conditions in “hot spots,” such as at the Moria camp on Lesbos, which used to house 13,000 people. After a destructive fire in September 2020, that camp was closed. Then, the New Democracy government built new, better equipped camps on the same island and on Samos island. The government also gradually moved many asylum-seekers away from the islands.
In the period under review, migrants and refugees, who were not temporarily hosted in the RICs, were housed in camps on mainland Greece, in private hotels and apartments rented on their behalf by the Greek state. There were two government housing programs, the ESTIA (Emergency Support for Integration and Accommodation) and the HELIOS (Hellenic Integration Support for Beneficiaries of International Protection). However, in 2020–2021, mainland camps were in remote places, with grossly inadequate public transportation. Movement restrictions, imposed to avoid the spread of COVID-19 within the population, worsened the social isolation of migrants and refugees.
Meanwhile, EU authorities and NGOs have continued to provide significant support, as the situation has overwhelmed local Greek authorities. However, this valuable support to desperate people arriving on Greece’s shores in small boats does not extend to their educational and social integration. The integration of migrants into the education system has been functional to a certain extent at the primary and secondary level. It is also obvious that the vast majority of children who live in reception and identification centers (RICs) do not receive proper schooling.
The integration of migrants and refugees into the labor market remains problematic. Migrants and refugees mostly work in the shadow economy, for example, in the agricultural and construction sectors where they find low-paid and uninsured temporary jobs. A law passed after the change in government in 2019 requires a six-month waiting period for asylum-seekers before they apply for work permits. Other difficulties migrants and refugees encounter are obtaining tax registration numbers, enrolling in the social security system (the EFKA agency) and opening a bank account. In all these instances, they often come across language barriers, delays and the uncooperative stance of public sector workers.
Briefly, social integration has never been a strong focus of Greek migration policy. With the exception of Albanians, who probably constitute more than half of all migrants in Greece and first came to the country in the early 1990s, the country’s migrants – including migrants from Asia and Africa – face significant barriers to integrating into Greek society. With regard to cultural integration, it is telling that an official mosque for Muslims in Athens was finally opened only in June 2019.
In summary, significant challenges in terms of policy efficiency remain and policy setbacks are now obvious. Greece must reduce human suffering inside refugee camps. By now this has grown to become a problem that obviously cannot be managed individually by the Greek state. The problem will remain unresolved as long as a more comprehensive and better resourced integration policy is formulated by national and EU authorities, as inflows of migrants and refugees into the European Union will not cease in the foreseeable future.
Citations:
Legislation on migrants and refugees has been codified by law 4251/2014 and amended by Law 4825/2021.
Information on social integration of migrants and refugees in Greece is available at: N. Leivaditi, A. Ilias, E. Papatzani and E. Petracou (2020), “Integration Policies, Practices and Experiences. Country Report: Greece,” EU’s Horizon program 2020 “RESPOND – Multilevel Governance of Migration and Beyond,” University of the Aegean, June 2020.
UNCHR data on migration flows into Greece is available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179
Greece’s national strategy on the social integration of migrants and refugees is available (in Greek) at https://migration.gov.gr/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/%CE%926.-%CE%95%CE%B8%CE%BD%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AE-%CE%A3%CF%84%CF%81%CE%B1%CF%84%CE%B7%CE%B3%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AE-2019.pdf
The reorganization of the Directorate of Social Integration at the Ministry of Migration and Asylum was effected through Presidential Decree 106/2020. The Directorate’s website is available at
https://migration.gov.gr/en/migration-policy/integration/i-ypiresia/
Graph View
How effectively does internal security policy protect citizens against security risks?
10
9
9
Internal security policy protects citizens against security risks very effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
Internal security policy protects citizens against security risks more or less effectively.
5
4
3
4
3
Internal security policy does not effectively protect citizens against security risks.
2
1
1
Internal security policy exacerbates the security risks.
In Greece, there was an overall increase in crimes between 2013 and 2019, with over 2,000 crimes per 1,000 population per year (data of the Hellenic Statistical Authority). Partly owing to movement restrictions, imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic, criminality declined in 2020–2021. Moreover, according to the Minister of Public Order, compared to 2018–2019, criminality declined by 30% in the last trimester of 2021.
The decline in crime may be attributed to several converging factors. First, family ties remain strong in Greece, and were further strengthened during the economic and pandemic crisis. Thus, the unemployed and poor relied on family members for social protection. Second, with the exception of a few regions (e.g., the island of Crete), the circulation of firearms is very small and restricted. Third, compared to previous years, in 2020–2021, police were very visible in city centers, patrolling the streets.
The decrease may also be partially explained by the relatively high levels of government expenditure on public order and safety (constituting over 2% of GDP, among the highest such levels in the EU-27. EU-27 average: 1.7%). Expenditure was primarily channeled to sustain a large police force.
Feelings of personal insecurity may be attributed to the fact that trust in the police is comparatively low. In many encounters, protesters have been hostile to the police. Active anarchist groups regularly attack policemen during demonstrations and police stations, too. Police also respond violently, sometimes exceeding the limits prescribed by law.
The police have not offered sufficient protection to refugees and migrants against attacks by racist groups. The trial and imprisonment of the leadership of the neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn in Οctober 2020 led to the demise of that anti-migrant party. In the past, Golden Dawn had put the safety of refugees and migrants at risk. Moreover, compared to the period up to 2019, in the period under review, violent riots in central Athens and Thessaloniki were less frequent.
In summary, in the period under review, safety increased. Compared to the pre-2019 period, public order was gradually restored. Nevertheless, there was broad public uneasiness regarding security in Greek city centers. Crimes against private property were frequent, while there was sporadic violent activity by uncontrolled left-wing radical political groups.
Citations:
Data on the ratio of crimes per 1,000 population is drawn on the official data base of the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT): https://www.statistics.gr/el/statistics/-/publication/SJU03/- (data on criminal justice)
Data on trust toward police, is drawn on the SGI statistical data available on this platform.
Data on government expenditure on public order and safety is available from Eurostat,
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Government_expenditure_on_public_order_and_safety#:~:text=At%20the%20level%20of%20the,stood%20at%201.7%20%25%20of%20GDP.&text=Around%200.3%20%25%20of%20GDP%20was,operations)%20and%20’prisons’.
The decline in crime may be attributed to several converging factors. First, family ties remain strong in Greece, and were further strengthened during the economic and pandemic crisis. Thus, the unemployed and poor relied on family members for social protection. Second, with the exception of a few regions (e.g., the island of Crete), the circulation of firearms is very small and restricted. Third, compared to previous years, in 2020–2021, police were very visible in city centers, patrolling the streets.
The decrease may also be partially explained by the relatively high levels of government expenditure on public order and safety (constituting over 2% of GDP, among the highest such levels in the EU-27. EU-27 average: 1.7%). Expenditure was primarily channeled to sustain a large police force.
Feelings of personal insecurity may be attributed to the fact that trust in the police is comparatively low. In many encounters, protesters have been hostile to the police. Active anarchist groups regularly attack policemen during demonstrations and police stations, too. Police also respond violently, sometimes exceeding the limits prescribed by law.
The police have not offered sufficient protection to refugees and migrants against attacks by racist groups. The trial and imprisonment of the leadership of the neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn in Οctober 2020 led to the demise of that anti-migrant party. In the past, Golden Dawn had put the safety of refugees and migrants at risk. Moreover, compared to the period up to 2019, in the period under review, violent riots in central Athens and Thessaloniki were less frequent.
In summary, in the period under review, safety increased. Compared to the pre-2019 period, public order was gradually restored. Nevertheless, there was broad public uneasiness regarding security in Greek city centers. Crimes against private property were frequent, while there was sporadic violent activity by uncontrolled left-wing radical political groups.
Citations:
Data on the ratio of crimes per 1,000 population is drawn on the official data base of the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT): https://www.statistics.gr/el/statistics/-/publication/SJU03/- (data on criminal justice)
Data on trust toward police, is drawn on the SGI statistical data available on this platform.
Data on government expenditure on public order and safety is available from Eurostat,
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Government_expenditure_on_public_order_and_safety#:~:text=At%20the%20level%20of%20the,stood%20at%201.7%20%25%20of%20GDP.&text=Around%200.3%20%25%20of%20GDP%20was,operations)%20and%20’prisons’.
Graph View
To what extent does the government demonstrate an active and coherent commitment to promoting equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries?
10
9
9
The government actively and coherently engages in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries. It frequently demonstrates initiative and responsibility, and acts as an agenda-setter.
8
7
6
7
6
The government actively engages in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries. However, some of its measures or policies lack coherence.
5
4
3
4
3
The government shows limited engagement in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries. Many of its measures or policies lack coherence.
2
1
1
The government does not contribute (and often undermines) efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries.
Until the onset of the economic crisis, Greece was active in assisting less developed countries. Since the crisis began, the country has focused on managing its own domestic problems. Cuts in public sector expenditure significantly impacted on Greece’s official development assistance (ODA). The refugee crisis also affected the distribution of resources. In 2019 and 2020, Greece’s ODA as a share of GNI stood at 0.13%, which was the lowest among OECD countries (along with the Czech Republic). While Greece continued to meet its multilateral commitments, including to European institutions (mainly the European Development Fund), bilateral ODA was limited to expenditure on in-country refugee costs. In general, the Greek government has shown very little interest in engaging in international efforts to help developing countries, and has not demonstrated any initiative, assumed responsibility or acted as an agenda-setter within the international framework. However, it has supported all relevant EU and UN initiatives.
Citations:
Data on Official Development Assistance is provided by Tables available by OECD/DAC at https://w3.unece.org/SDG/en/Indicator?id=72DAC
Citations:
Data on Official Development Assistance is provided by Tables available by OECD/DAC at https://w3.unece.org/SDG/en/Indicator?id=72DAC