Executive Accountability
#40Key Findings
With few checks on the powerful prime minister’s power, Hungary falls into the bottom ranks (rank 40) with respect to executive accountability. Its score on this measure has declined by 1.3 points relative to 2014.
The state-controlled media offers little analysis of government decisions. Instead, pro-government outlets constantly attack the opposition as traitors. The prospect of voting the Fidesz party out of power in the 2022 parliamentary elections reinvigorated many citizens’ interest in politics.
Parliamentarians do not have sufficient resources, and oversight powers are in practice flawed. The audit office, while retaining some independence, has done little to monitor the government’s opaque finances, and has not protested the flow of funds to oligarchs. Neither the ombudsman nor the data protection authority has served as a check on the government.
The governing Fidesz party is highly centralized, while opposition parties have become increasingly democratic. Business associations have proved largely loyal to the government. Trade unions have been more critical, but are small. The government has set up a broad, well-financed network of false, pro-government civil society associations and foundations.
The state-controlled media offers little analysis of government decisions. Instead, pro-government outlets constantly attack the opposition as traitors. The prospect of voting the Fidesz party out of power in the 2022 parliamentary elections reinvigorated many citizens’ interest in politics.
Parliamentarians do not have sufficient resources, and oversight powers are in practice flawed. The audit office, while retaining some independence, has done little to monitor the government’s opaque finances, and has not protested the flow of funds to oligarchs. Neither the ombudsman nor the data protection authority has served as a check on the government.
The governing Fidesz party is highly centralized, while opposition parties have become increasingly democratic. Business associations have proved largely loyal to the government. Trade unions have been more critical, but are small. The government has set up a broad, well-financed network of false, pro-government civil society associations and foundations.
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To what extent are citizens informed of public policies?
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Most citizens are well-informed of a broad range of public policies.
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Many citizens are well-informed of individual public policies.
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Few citizens are well-informed of public policies; most citizens have only a rudimental knowledge of public policies.
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Most citizens are not aware of public policies.
Citizens’ policy knowledge has suffered from the government’s biased information policies and the lack of transparency that characterizes Hungarian policymaking. The failure of the democratic opposition in the 2018 parliamentary elections initially led to political apathy. Since the municipal elections in October 2019, however, the political interest of many citizens has increased. Fidesz-fatigue has nurtured a thirst for independent news. The primaries held by the opposition parties and the real prospect of voting the Orbán government out of office in the April 2022 elections has increased political mobilization.
Does the government publish data and information in a way that strengthens citizens’ capacity to hold the government accountable?
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The government publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
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The government most of the time publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
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The government publishes data in a limited and not timely or user-friendly way.
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The government publishes (almost) no relevant data.
The Hungarian government is certainly not an open government, since access to relevant information is very difficult even for members of parliament and much more for ordinary citizens. Hungary quit the Open Government Partnership in late 2016 because the Hungarian government had been heavily criticized for its lack of transparency and its treatment of NGOs in this forum. In December 2016, the Orbán government approved a White Paper on National Data policy that called for strengthening efforts to make public sector information available as open data. As it stands, the datasets available at the central open data portal www.kozadat.hu are limited and difficult to use. The lack of transparency was a major issue in the municipal elections in October 2019. The Hungarian government has provided information on the COVID-19 pandemic in a very selective manner. Vital data on case numbers by regions and municipalities have not been published in a consistent and reliable manner.
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Do members of parliament have adequate personnel and structural resources to monitor government activity effectively?
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring all government activity effectively.
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring a government’s major activities.
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
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The resources provided to the members of parliament are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
The Hungarian parliament has a good library and even a small research section. The members of parliament are provided some funds for professional advice. However, since these funds are apportioned according to the share of seats in parliament, the democratic opposition parties receive only a small amount of money. This has made it difficult for the opposition to monitor the government’s hectic legislative activity. However, the key obstacle to effective monitoring of the government is not the lack of resources but the behavior of the Fidesz majority in parliament and its committees.
Citations:
Nikolenyi, C. (2020): The Decline of the Hungarian Legislature since 2010, in: I. Khmelko, F. Stapenhurst, M. Mezey (eds.), Strong Executives and Weak Parliaments: Legislative Decline in the 21st Century. London/ New York: Routledge.
Citations:
Nikolenyi, C. (2020): The Decline of the Hungarian Legislature since 2010, in: I. Khmelko, F. Stapenhurst, M. Mezey (eds.), Strong Executives and Weak Parliaments: Legislative Decline in the 21st Century. London/ New York: Routledge.
Are parliamentary committees able to ask for government documents?
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Parliamentary committees may ask for most or all government documents; they are normally delivered in full and within an appropriate time frame.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are slightly limited; some important documents are not delivered or are delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are considerably limited; most important documents are not delivered or delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
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Parliamentary committees may not request government documents.
Traditionally, parliamentary committees in Hungary enjoyed far-reaching access to government documents. However, the new standing orders of the Hungarian parliament, as adopted under the 2012 Act on Parliament, do not regulate the access of parliamentary committees to public documents. The Orbán governments have used their parliamentary majority to restrict access to public documents, even for discussion within parliamentary committees.
Are parliamentary committees able to summon ministers for hearings?
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Parliamentary committees may summon ministers. Ministers regularly follow invitations and are obliged to answer questions.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are slightly limited; ministers occasionally refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are considerably limited; ministers frequently refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
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Parliamentary committees may not summon ministers.
The standing orders of the Hungarian parliament stipulate that ministers have to report personally to the parliamentary committee(s) concerned with their issue area at least once a year. However, they do not guarantee parliamentary committees the right to summon ministers for other hearings as well. Moreover, ministerial hearings suffer from heavy time restrictions, with individual members of parliament having only two minutes to speak. Overall, the number of interpellations is sinking. In 2013, 267 interpellations took place, while there were 219 in 2017 and only 150 in 2021. The number is sinking both in governmental and opposition-induced cases, which shows that even the opposition is losing trust in the instrument.
Citations:
Országgyülés Hivatala: Összehasonlító sztatisztikai adatok 2013, 2017, 2021 évek, p. 11; https://www.parlament.hu/documents/10181/56582/%C3%96sszehasonl%C3%ADt%C3%B3+adatok+az+Orsz%C3%A1ggy%C5%B1l%C3%A9s+2013.%2C+2017.%2C+2021.+%C3%A9ves+munk%C3%A1j%C3%A1r%C3%B3l.pdf/8a9904c0-8aec-9371-95ed-063e451efed4?t=1640083243221
Citations:
Országgyülés Hivatala: Összehasonlító sztatisztikai adatok 2013, 2017, 2021 évek, p. 11; https://www.parlament.hu/documents/10181/56582/%C3%96sszehasonl%C3%ADt%C3%B3+adatok+az+Orsz%C3%A1ggy%C5%B1l%C3%A9s+2013.%2C+2017.%2C+2021.+%C3%A9ves+munk%C3%A1j%C3%A1r%C3%B3l.pdf/8a9904c0-8aec-9371-95ed-063e451efed4?t=1640083243221
Are parliamentary committees able to summon experts for committee meetings?
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Parliamentary committees may summon experts.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are slightly limited.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are considerably limited.
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Parliamentary committees may not summon experts.
According to the standing orders of the Hungarian parliament, all parliamentary party groups can invite experts, and the sessions of the committees are open to the public. In practice, however, Fidesz’s overwhelming majority and the hectic pace of legislation have reduced the involvement of experts to a mere formality. While the rights are there and there are few legal obstacles to the summoning of experts, the consultation of experts does not play a major role in the policymaking process.
Are the task areas and structures of parliamentary committees suited to monitor ministries effectively?
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The match between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are well-suited to the effective monitoring of ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are largely suited to the monitoring ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are partially suited to the monitoring of ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are not at all suited to the monitoring of ministries.
Ever since the 2010 reduction in the number of ministries, there has been a strong mismatch between the task areas of ministries and committees. The fact that ministries have been covered by several committees has complicated the monitoring of ministries. Moreover, the real decision-making centers, the Prime Minister’s Office and the Cabinet Office are not covered by any parliamentary committee at all.
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To what extent do media in your country analyze the rationale and impact of public policies?
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A clear majority of mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies.
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About one-half of the mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies. The rest produces a mix of infotainment and quality information content.
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A clear minority of mass media brands focuses on high-quality information content analyzing public policies. Several mass media brands produce superficial infotainment content only.
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All mass media brands are dominated by superficial infotainment content.
Fidesz’s increasing control over the media has gone hand in hand with a decline in the quality of media reporting. There is relatively little in-depth analysis of government decisions in the state-controlled public media, or in those private outlets close to Fidesz. Instead, the pro-government media have waged a permanent war against the opposition, accusing the opposition of being traitors to the nation. This war has included the systemic “personality killing” of all kinds of actors on the opposition side. Since 2017, the government-controlled media has lost about 300 court cases for publishing fake news about opposition actors, while independent media outlets have lost only seven court cases for criticizing the Orbán regime.
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How inclusive and open are the major parties in their internal decision-making processes?
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The party allows all party members and supporters to participate in its decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and agendas of issues are open.
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The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, all party members have the opportunity to participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are rather open.
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The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, a number of elected delegates participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are largely controlled by the party leadership.
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A number of party leaders participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are fully controlled and drafted by the party leadership.
After the 2010 elections, the former party system collapsed, and a new party system characterized by the co-existence of Fidesz and a plethora of smaller opposition parties emerged. In the 2014 and 2018 elections, the fragmentation of the opposition facilitated the victory of Fidesz. Since the 2018 elections, the six major opposition parties – the Democratic Coalition (DK), Jobbik, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), Dialogue (P), Politics Can Be Different (LMP) and Momentum – have intensified their cooperation. At the end of 2020, they agreed to hold primaries for both the prime ministerial candidate and the candidates for all 106 National Assembly districts. These primaries have led to an activation of party members, and have expanded the say of party members and supporters in decision-making. In contrast, Fidesz is still characterized by very centralized internal decision-making. Only a few party members, sometimes even the prime minister alone, make decisions on personnel and issues.
To what extent are economic interest associations (e.g., employers, industry, labor) capable of formulating relevant policies?
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Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
Domestic business associations, especially the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, have been capable of formulating relevant policies, but have proved loyal to the government. The trade unions have recently adopted a much more critical position toward the government. However, as their membership is small (somewhat below 10%) and they suffer from fragmentation, they are weak and lack the resources to conduct thorough policy analysis.
To what extent are non-economic interest associations capable of formulating relevant policies?
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Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
The Orbán governments have created a big, lavishly financed pro-government network of fake civil society associations and foundations. In public life they have presented themselves as independent and autonomous organizations, although they clearly support government positions and provide a democratic façade for the government. A series of scandals have arisen as it has become clear that these organizations have received financing from state-owned enterprises. By contrast, Hungary’s genuine civil society has suffered from decreasing financial support and increasing legal restrictions. This has clearly infringed upon their capacity to formulate relevant policies. Nonetheless, a number of interest associations with extensive expertise exist.
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Does there exist an independent and effective audit office?
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There exists an effective and independent audit office.
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There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is slightly limited.
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There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
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There does not exist an independent and effective audit office.
The Hungarian State Audit Office (ÁSZ) is accountable only to the parliament. The Orbán government has used its parliamentary majority to take control of this body by appointing a former Fidesz parliamentarian to head the institution, and also by replacing other top officials. In its campaign for the 2018 and 2019 elections, the government instrumentalized the ÁSZ by bringing it to investigate the finances of some opposition parties, so as to decrease their campaign capacity. The ÁSZ has done little to monitor the government’s often opaque financial activities and has not protested the channeling of state funds to oligarchs close to Fidesz. Compared to other state institutions, however, the ÁSZ still has a relatively large amount of independence.
Does there exist an independent and effective ombuds office?
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There exists an effective and independent ombuds office.
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There exists an effective and independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is slightly limited.
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There exists an independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is considerably limited.
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There does not exist an effective and independent ombuds office.
Hungary has an ombudsman for basic human rights, elected by parliament. Under his lead, two vice-ombudspersons deal with the rights of national minorities and with future generations. In 2020, a special board dealing with complaints about the police has been established within the Ombudsman’s Office. The Ombudsman’s Office (Alapvető Jogok Biztosának Hivatala, AJBH) has been rather busy in small individual legal affairs, but it has not confronted the government about serious violations of civil and political rights. Unlike their much-respected predecessors, the two ombudsmen elected by Fidesz-controlled parliaments since 2010, László Székely and Ákos Kozma, have not served as effective checks on the government and have not become important public figures. While the COVID-19 pandemic has led to an avalanche of complaints, including those regarding the restricted choice among vaccines and about the troubles of going abroad because of missing or delayed vaccination documents, the advocacy role of the AJBH has remained limited.
Is there an independent authority in place that effectively holds government offices accountable for handling issues of data protection and privacy?
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An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
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An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is slightly limited.
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A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are strongly limited.
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There is no effective and independent data protection office.
The National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság, NAIH) is responsible for supervising and defending the right to the protection of personal data and freedom of information under the Act CXII of 2011. So far, the office has not played a major role in the public debate, and there is still little experience with the new European regulation in the field. The NAIH has challenged the government in some COVID-19 related cases. For instance, it has criticized the fact that the sensitive data required to register for a vaccination are collected and saved not by the government, but by a Fidesz-friendly firm (IdomSoft Zrt). However, the NAIH has failed to speak out against the misuse of public data for the use of Fidesz’s election campaigns and has not addressed the Pegasus surveillance scandal.