Executive Capacity
#38Key Findings
Despite the state’s sweeping consolidation of power, Hungary falls into the bottom ranks (rank 38) with regard to executive capacity. Its score on this issue has declined by 0.8 points relative to 2014.
The Prime Minister’s Office and the Cabinet Office act to ensure that policies are in line with the governing party’s ideology. This sometimes creates bottlenecks. Informal decision-making is common, with Prime Minister Orbán guiding virtually all important decisions. The core executive can intervene in ministry policy preparations at any time.
RIAs are only selectively implemented. The government rarely consults with societal actors aside from multinational corporations and the churches. Government communication is coherent, but largely propagandistic. Levels of ministerial compliance are very high, as ministers see themselves as representatives of the government.
Since losing control of many local governments, the governing Fidesz party has sought to disempower municipalities. It has deprived them of major revenue sources and cancelled development projects in opposition-run areas. Oligarchs close to the government are routinely exempted from regulations.
The Prime Minister’s Office and the Cabinet Office act to ensure that policies are in line with the governing party’s ideology. This sometimes creates bottlenecks. Informal decision-making is common, with Prime Minister Orbán guiding virtually all important decisions. The core executive can intervene in ministry policy preparations at any time.
RIAs are only selectively implemented. The government rarely consults with societal actors aside from multinational corporations and the churches. Government communication is coherent, but largely propagandistic. Levels of ministerial compliance are very high, as ministers see themselves as representatives of the government.
Since losing control of many local governments, the governing Fidesz party has sought to disempower municipalities. It has deprived them of major revenue sources and cancelled development projects in opposition-run areas. Oligarchs close to the government are routinely exempted from regulations.
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How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?
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9
9
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
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7
6
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
5
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3
4
3
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
2
1
1
In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
The Orbán governments have subordinated all political actions to the goal of consolidating their power and have reacted to problems and challenges on a day-to-day basis, without reference to an over-reaching plan. The economic and fiscal priorities have frequently shifted. While ministries in general, and the Prime Minister’s Office and the Cabinet Office in particular have grown substantially, not much effort has been invested in building institutional capacities for strategic planning.
Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?
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9
In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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6
For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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3
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3
In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
2
1
1
The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
The Orbán governments have shown no interest in seeking independent and knowledge-based advice and have alienated many leading experts who initially sympathized with them politically. The culture war waged by Fidesz and the growing restrictions placed on academic freedom have further intensified this alienation. The government has invested considerably in creating a network of partisan experts in fake independent institutions that can influence public opinion and has used such institutions to give a voice to government views in the international debates. The reduction of decision-making to an inner circle and abstaining from broad advice evidently leads to groupthink and low quality of decisions, often detached from societal reality.
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Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?
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9
The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
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6
The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
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3
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3
The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
2
1
1
The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
The Orbán governments have steadily expanded the competencies and the resources both of the Prime Minister’s Office and the Cabinet Office. The division of labor between the two offices, both of which are now led by a minister, is somewhat artificial. The Prime Minister’s Office is central in policy coordination and makes sure that policies are as close in line as possible with the prime minister’s policy preferences and Fidesz’s ideological rhetoric. The Cabinet Office, headed by Antal Rogán, is primarily responsible for government communication.
To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?
10
9
9
There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
8
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7
6
The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
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3
4
3
Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
2
1
1
Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
Under the Orbán governments, line ministries have mostly acted as executive agencies that follow priorities set by the core political executive. This is a complete turnaround as compared to most earlier governments in post-communist Hungary, when ministers were more representatives of ministries in the government than representatives of the government in the ministries. Today, orders come from above and ministerial activities are subject to detailed oversight by the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). The PMO makes sure that policies are as close in line as possible with the prime minister’s policy preferences and the ideological rhetoric. However, the pivotal role of the PMO has also meant that it has sometimes become a bottleneck in the process of policymaking. In this structure, the core executive may intervene in the preparation of policy proposals by the ministries at any time.
How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?
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The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
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Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
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3
There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
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1
There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
The Orbán governments have occasionally set up cabinet committees, but such committees have played a subordinate role only in interministerial coordination, as the number of ministries has been limited and as there has been strong coordination from above. During the 2018–2022 parliamentary term, there were three committees: an economic cabinet, a cabinet on strategy and family issues (a mixed shop committee for various issues), and a national security cabinet.
How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?
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9
9
Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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6
Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
5
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3
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3
There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
2
1
1
There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
Due to the limited number of ministries in the Hungarian government and consequently the huge size of many ministries, interministerial coordination has, to some extent, been replaced with intraministerial coordination, especially within the Ministry of Human Resources (EMMI), the largest of the superministries. In some cases, these superministries are black holes where the most important issues disappear, like the COVID-19 crisis management in the Ministry of Interior or EU affairs in the Ministry of Justice. In addition to policy coordination by the Prime Minister’s Office, senior ministry officials meet in order to prepare cabinet meetings.
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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3
In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
2
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1
Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
The strong formal role of Prime Minister Orbán and his Prime Minister’s Office is complemented by informal coordination mechanisms. As the power concentration has further increased in the fourth Orbán government, so has the role of informal decision-making. Orbán regularly brings together officials from his larger circle in order to give instructions. In a way, formal mechanisms only serve to legalize and implement improvised and hastily made decisions by the prime minister.
How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?
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The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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3
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3
The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
2
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1
The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
As the government has sought to enhance the competitiveness of the Hungarian government through technological modernization, the newly created Ministry of Innovation and Technology (ITM) has set more ambitious goals with respect to digitalization. Moreover, the oligarchs around the government have realized new business opportunities and have purchased firms in this field, especially with regard to EU transfers in the next Multinational Financial Framework. However, the use of digital technologies for interministerial coordination has just begun.
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To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?
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RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
2
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1
RIA are not applied or do not exist.
Upon coming to office, the second Orbán government amended the provisions on RIAs. In practice, RIAs have suffered from sluggish and selective implementation (Brenner/ Fazekas 2020; Corruption Research Center 2017; Staroňová 2014). This has not changed following a further amendment to the 2010 Act on Lawmaking in March 2019 (OECD 2021).
Citations:
Brenner, D., M. Fazekas (2020): Legislative Effects of Regulatory Impact Assessment: A Comparative Event History Analysis of Modifications of Law in France, Italy, Hungary and the UK. Government Transparency Institute, Working Paper 2020-3, Budapest (http://www.govtransparency.eu/legislative-effects-of-regulatory-impact-assessment-a-comparative-event-history-analysis-of-modifications-of-law-in-france-italy-hungary-and-the-uk/).
Corruption Research Center (2017): Report on the Quality of Hungarian Legislation – 2011-2016. Budapest.
OECD (2021): Hungary: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance 2021. Paris (https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/hungary-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdf).
Staroňová, K. (2014): L’institutionnalisation des études d’impact en Europe centrale et orientale, in: Revue Française D’ Administration Publique 149(1): 123-143.
Citations:
Brenner, D., M. Fazekas (2020): Legislative Effects of Regulatory Impact Assessment: A Comparative Event History Analysis of Modifications of Law in France, Italy, Hungary and the UK. Government Transparency Institute, Working Paper 2020-3, Budapest (http://www.govtransparency.eu/legislative-effects-of-regulatory-impact-assessment-a-comparative-event-history-analysis-of-modifications-of-law-in-france-italy-hungary-and-the-uk/).
Corruption Research Center (2017): Report on the Quality of Hungarian Legislation – 2011-2016. Budapest.
OECD (2021): Hungary: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance 2021. Paris (https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/hungary-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdf).
Staroňová, K. (2014): L’institutionnalisation des études d’impact en Europe centrale et orientale, in: Revue Française D’ Administration Publique 149(1): 123-143.
Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?
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9
RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
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7
6
The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
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3
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3
The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
2
1
1
RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
The quality of the RIA process in Hungary has been poor (OECD 2021). Substantial stakeholder participation is normally lacking, since the very idea of consultation has been alien to the Orbán governments. There is no independent evaluation of RIAs, and findings are rarely or only partially made available to political actors on the special website for RIAs (hatasvizsgalat.kormany.hu). Likewise, the annual report on RIAs prepared by the Prime Minister’s Office is not publicly available.
Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?
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9
9
Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
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Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
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3
Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
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1
Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
The Hungarian parliament passed a National Sustainability Strategy in March 2013 and afterwards the parliament’s environmental committee was transformed into the Committee of Sustainable Development (consisting of parliamentarians) and supported by the National Sustainability Council. However, the National Sustainability Strategy and RIA processes have not yet been coordinated, and sustainability checks do not play a major role in RIAs.
To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?
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9
Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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3
Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
2
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1
Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
In Hungary, there is a legal framework for carrying out ex post evaluations since 2011. In practice, however, such evaluations are rarely carried out (OECD 2021).
Citations:
OECD (2021): Hungary: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance 2021. Paris (https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/hungary-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdf).
Citations:
OECD (2021): Hungary: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance 2021. Paris (https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/hungary-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdf).
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Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?
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The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
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1
The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
The Orbán governments have only rarely and selectively consulted with societal actors. Trade unions and social and environmental groups have enjoyed little weight in the policy process. The two main exceptions have been the representatives of big multinational firms, upon which the Hungarian economy depends, and the churches, which have cuddled up to the government. In addition, the government has organized so-called national consultations, which are fake referendums based on letters to citizens with misleading and manipulated questions. The real function of these letters is to mobilize Fidesz voters on a permanent basis, in part by making it possible to compose lists of those who have answered these letters.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the government has occasionally consulted societal actors, but has continued to do so selectively and without transparency. In the case of the elderly, a group particularly hard hit by the COVID-19 pandemic, the government has refrained from talking with the traditional interest associations that represent the elderly, but has referred instead to “negotiations” with the Council of the Elderly People, a body consisting of 12 members loyal to Fidesz and chaired by Prime Minister Orbán himself. Violating the European code of conduct on partnerships in the framework of the European Structural and Investment Funds, the Hungarian government also refrained from consulting societal actors in a meaningful way when drawing up its National Recovery Plan for the European Commission (Civilisation Coalition 2021). Instead of uploading the original full-length texts involved with the consultation to the website, it provided summaries without exact numbers and details. Stakeholders were often not informed or were called upon at short notice, and just before public holidays. The end effect was that no real dialogue took place. Likewise, the government did not consult business organizations before adopting its controversial October 2021 decree that gave employers the right to make it compulsory for employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19. The subject of much discussion and interpretation by legal practitioners and commentators, this decree resulted in a substantial chaos and was eventually silently withdrawn by the government.
Citations:
Civilization Coalition (2021): The Hungarian government is set to spend over 51 billion Euro, but forgets to consult with stakeholders. Budapest, February 11 (https://civilizacio.net/en/news-blog/open-letter-consultation).
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the government has occasionally consulted societal actors, but has continued to do so selectively and without transparency. In the case of the elderly, a group particularly hard hit by the COVID-19 pandemic, the government has refrained from talking with the traditional interest associations that represent the elderly, but has referred instead to “negotiations” with the Council of the Elderly People, a body consisting of 12 members loyal to Fidesz and chaired by Prime Minister Orbán himself. Violating the European code of conduct on partnerships in the framework of the European Structural and Investment Funds, the Hungarian government also refrained from consulting societal actors in a meaningful way when drawing up its National Recovery Plan for the European Commission (Civilisation Coalition 2021). Instead of uploading the original full-length texts involved with the consultation to the website, it provided summaries without exact numbers and details. Stakeholders were often not informed or were called upon at short notice, and just before public holidays. The end effect was that no real dialogue took place. Likewise, the government did not consult business organizations before adopting its controversial October 2021 decree that gave employers the right to make it compulsory for employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19. The subject of much discussion and interpretation by legal practitioners and commentators, this decree resulted in a substantial chaos and was eventually silently withdrawn by the government.
Citations:
Civilization Coalition (2021): The Hungarian government is set to spend over 51 billion Euro, but forgets to consult with stakeholders. Budapest, February 11 (https://civilizacio.net/en/news-blog/open-letter-consultation).
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To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?
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Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
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Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
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3
Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
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1
Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
The Orbán government has radically streamlined policy communication. Most Fidesz politicians avoid journalists. At public events, they do not give interviews, but confine themselves to reading out texts written by the Cabinet Office, the government’s central lie factory. The government also seeks to control the agenda by launching new topics to divert public attention away from problems raised in the media that can reflect poorly on Fidesz. Government communication is not designed to communicate information, it is a propaganda instrument aimed at bringing public discourse in line with the prime minister’s and governing party’s will. To achieve this goal, it uses fake news and manipulative strategies.
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To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?
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The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
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6
The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
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3
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3
The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
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1
The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
The Orbán governments have been quite successful in consolidating political power, centralizing policymaking and weakening the remaining checks and balances. At the same time, they have largely failed to meet broader goals such as fostering sustainable economic growth or increasing productivity and innovation in the private sector. The low degree of government efficiency has been illustrated by frequent policy changes in all policy fields and by the lack of coordination of the key policy fields, caused by selection of personnel based on party loyalty, not on merit, and by putting ideology over problem solving. A central problem has been the poor implementation of new bills and regulations. Overhasty policymaking has led to incoherent and contradictory laws and regulations, making things very difficult for local and county administration units.
To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?
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The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
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The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
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3
The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
2
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1
The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
Under the Orbán governments, Orbán’s strong and uncontested position as party leader and prime minister, as well as the strong capacities of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), have ensured a high level of ministerial compliance. Ministers see themselves, and are seen by the PMO, as representatives of the government in the ministries rather than representatives of ministries in the government. The radical reshuffling of the cabinet after the 2018 parliamentary elections has been aimed at raising ministerial compliance by bringing in committed ministers and by sending a strong signal that everyone is replaceable.
How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?
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9
The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
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The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
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3
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
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1
The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
The Prime Minister’s Office has successfully monitored line ministries in all stages of the policy process, enforcing obedience to the political will of the central leadership. As all core executive figures have been Fidesz party stalwarts, control has functioned largely through party discipline.
How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?
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9
The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
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The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
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3
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
2
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1
The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
The Orbán governments have adopted a hands-on approach and have closely monitored government agencies’ implementation activities. They have closely controlled the appointment and activities of the heads and core executives of all state agencies at the national level. The centralization of state administration in county-level government offices has extended the government’s control over all subnational agencies, since they have been concentrated in these county offices. The existing civil service legislation has made it easy to dismiss public employees without justification.
In 2021, the government established the Supervisory Authority for Regulated Activities (SARA). In addition to being in charge of regulating and supervising gaming and the tobacco trade, as well for other concession contracts, the new authority has been responsible for overseeing other government agencies. Its first president, a member of Orbán’s closest personal team, was appointed by the prime minister for nine years and is practically irreplaceable. Thus, the establishment of SARA has been widely interpreted as an attempt by the government to entrench its power with a view to a possible change in government after the 2022 parliamentary elections.
In 2021, the government established the Supervisory Authority for Regulated Activities (SARA). In addition to being in charge of regulating and supervising gaming and the tobacco trade, as well for other concession contracts, the new authority has been responsible for overseeing other government agencies. Its first president, a member of Orbán’s closest personal team, was appointed by the prime minister for nine years and is practically irreplaceable. Thus, the establishment of SARA has been widely interpreted as an attempt by the government to entrench its power with a view to a possible change in government after the 2022 parliamentary elections.
To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?
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9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
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The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
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3
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The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
2
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1
The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
In the 1990s, Hungary reformed its public administration, and established a multilevel structure that provided extensive and meaningful rights in the policymaking process to all levels of administration. Since 2010, the Orbán regime has reversed this trend toward subsidiarity and has created a strict top-down state administration. The transfer of competencies from the subnational to the national level has gone hand in hand with an even stronger reduction in subnational governments’ revenue sources. As a result, the latter have fewer resources for the remaining tasks than before. As financial resources have been curtailed, many municipalities have lacked the financial resources to carry out basic functions. Moreover, central government grants have been discretionary and unpredictable. Municipalities and counties with an influential Fidesz leader have been in a better position to get additional funding; the other have been confronted with the newly introduced “solidarity tax” imposed upon rich municipalities.
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?
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The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
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Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
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The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
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The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
The second Orbán government initiated a far-reaching reform of local governments, which aimed to tackle the persistent problem of inefficient subnational governance. It has established new tiers of state administration at the county and district level that were given some of the functions previously exercised by local and other subnational self-governments. As a result, the autonomy of the latter has decreased. Since Fidesz lost control over Hungary’s major cities, including the capital, and a large proportion of smaller settlements in the municipal elections in October 2019, it has declared war against municipalities and has sought to further disempower them. The Orbán government has instrumentalized the COVID-19 pandemic in continuing this war. Drawing on the state of emergency, it has further curtailed the competencies of the municipalities. It has deprived them of important revenue sources, including the vehicle tax, car parking fees and business taxes, and has prohibited them from raising taxes as a means of coping with the hardships of the pandemic. The government has also canceled a number of local development projects, most of them in opposition-led municipalities, and has misused anti-crisis legislation providing the possibility of “special economic areas” for transferring tax revenues from opposition-led municipalities to Fidesz-controlled counties. Some observers have called the attack on opposition-run municipalities, “the real COVID-19 coup in Hungary” (Györi et al. 2021:31). While the government’s measures have hit opposition-led municipalities most strongly, Fidesz-ruled settlements have also been affected, so that even Fidesz-loyal leaders have protested against the bleeding of local public administration.
Citations:
Györi, G. et al. (2021): Hungarian Politics in 2020. Budapest: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung/ Policy Solutions (http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/budapest/17181.pdf).
Citations:
Györi, G. et al. (2021): Hungarian Politics in 2020. Budapest: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung/ Policy Solutions (http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/budapest/17181.pdf).
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?
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9
Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
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7
6
Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
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3
4
3
Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
2
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1
Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
In Hungary, the quality of subnational public services has suffered as a result of the reorganization of subnational governments, since the state administration’s new subnational tiers have only gradually gained experience in providing services. The provision of those public services that have been left with subnational self-governments has in turn suffered from self-governments’ lack of financial resources and administrative capacities as well as from conflicting legal norms and the complexity of some regulations. The central government has exercised strong control and, as a result, national standards have often been undermined, especially in the fields of healthcare, education and social services. Still, as some administrative tasks were taken over by central deconcentrated authorities and the tasks of smaller villages were bundled with those of smaller cities, national standards have been strengthened to a certain extent.
To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?
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9
9
Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
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Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
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3
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Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
2
1
1
Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
In general, Hungarian government agencies can enforce regulations. However, given the capture of the Hungarian state, agencies have acted with bias when the interests of important oligarchs have been involved. The latter’s special treatment can be illustrated by hundreds of “high public interest” decrees, in which the firms of regime-friendly oligarchs have been exempted from existing regulations, including environmental ones.
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To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?
10
9
9
The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
8
7
6
7
6
In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
2
1
1
The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
Save for ensuring the absorption of EU funds, the Orbán governments have paid little attention to the adaptation of domestic government structures to international and supranational developments. In public, Orbán has stressed Hungarian independence, and has argued that his government is waging a freedom fight for national sovereignty against the European Union. Major institutional reforms have even reduced the fit of domestic government structures with international and supranational developments. The radical reduction in the number of ministries in the third Orbán government, for instance, has created huge problems with regard to EU affairs, as the ministries’ organization no longer matched that of other EU member states or the structure of the European Union’s Council of Ministers. In general, the centralized and erratic policymaking typical of the Orbán governments has been at odds with the more sectoral policymaking at the EU level and in most EU member states.
To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?
10
9
9
The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
2
1
1
The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
Since the beginning of the EU refugee crisis, Prime Minister Orbán has looked for an international role for himself and has increasingly been elevated to one of Europe’s “strong men” in the Fidesz press. He has intensified cooperation within the Visegrád group, especially on migration policy and has boasted about his good relationship with Putin and China (Mészáros 2021). However, all these activities have further undermined his standing with other European leaders and have contributed to a “self-peripheralization” (Hegedüs 2021) of Hungary in the European Union. The Orbán government has sometimes been able to block or to delay agreements, but has lacked the capacity to set the agenda.
Citations:
Hegedüs, D. (2021): Ungarns Selbstperipherisierung in der Europäischen Union: Hintergründe und Aussichten, in: Ellen Bos, Astrid Lorenz (Hrsg.), Das politische System Ungarns: Nationale Demokratieentwicklung, Orbán und die EU. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, S. 191-208.
Mészáros, T. (2021): As Hungary lauds its ‘Eastern Opening’ policy, statistics fail to show benefits, in: Euractive, May 12 (https://www.euractiv.com/section/ec onomy-jobs/news/as-hungary-lauds-it s-eastern-opening-policy-statistics -fail-to-show-benefits/).
Citations:
Hegedüs, D. (2021): Ungarns Selbstperipherisierung in der Europäischen Union: Hintergründe und Aussichten, in: Ellen Bos, Astrid Lorenz (Hrsg.), Das politische System Ungarns: Nationale Demokratieentwicklung, Orbán und die EU. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, S. 191-208.
Mészáros, T. (2021): As Hungary lauds its ‘Eastern Opening’ policy, statistics fail to show benefits, in: Euractive, May 12 (https://www.euractiv.com/section/ec onomy-jobs/news/as-hungary-lauds-it s-eastern-opening-policy-statistics -fail-to-show-benefits/).
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To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?
10
9
9
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
5
4
3
4
3
The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
2
1
1
There is no monitoring.
Under the Orbán governments, there has been no regular formal monitoring of the institutional arrangements of governing. However, there is strong and rather comprehensive oversight of the working of the state apparatus from the top down, measured against the political will of the leadership, and the government has been quick to change any institutional arrangements it has deemed to be politically dangerous.
To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?
10
9
9
The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
8
7
6
7
6
The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
2
1
1
The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
From time to time, Prime Minister Orbán has reorganized the functioning of his government with an open effort to get rid of managing smaller issues and promoting rivalry in the top elite to weaken them, but without improving the strategic capacity of government. The institutional reforms introduced since the 2018 parliamentary elections have not been concerned with government effectiveness but with increasing its concentration of power and managing the fourth Orbán government’s new technocratic modernization project. By creating the new Supervisory Authority for Regulated Activities (SARA), the Orbán government has tried to limit the strategic capacity of a possible opposition-led successor government.