Quality of Democracy
#40Key Findings
Having taking long strides toward illiberalism in recent years, Hungary falls into the bottom ranks (rank 40) with regard to democracy quality. Its score on this measure has declined by 1.8 points since 2014.
Electoral procedures are routinely changed to disadvantage the opposition. The government used the pandemic as an excuse to cut public funding for political parties. Most public and private media are under government control. National referendums are used as a way to mobilize support for the governing party.
The government failed to provide vital public health data during the COVID-19 pandemic. During the pandemic, it passed sweeping laws criminalizing dissemination of “distorted truth” and giving itself the right to override any law.
Government leaders defame opposition activists as traitors, and campaign vitriolically against Muslims, refugees and the LGBTQ+ community. A new law bans the “promotion” of queer or homosexual content in schools. Judicial independence has drastically declined under the Orbán governments, and corruption is widespread, with benefits flowing to government-connected figures.
Electoral procedures are routinely changed to disadvantage the opposition. The government used the pandemic as an excuse to cut public funding for political parties. Most public and private media are under government control. National referendums are used as a way to mobilize support for the governing party.
The government failed to provide vital public health data during the COVID-19 pandemic. During the pandemic, it passed sweeping laws criminalizing dissemination of “distorted truth” and giving itself the right to override any law.
Government leaders defame opposition activists as traitors, and campaign vitriolically against Muslims, refugees and the LGBTQ+ community. A new law bans the “promotion” of queer or homosexual content in schools. Judicial independence has drastically declined under the Orbán governments, and corruption is widespread, with benefits flowing to government-connected figures.
Graph View
Graph View
How fair are procedures for registering candidates and parties?
10
9
9
Legal regulations provide for a fair registration procedure for all elections; candidates and parties are not discriminated against.
8
7
6
7
6
A few restrictions on election procedures discriminate against a small number of candidates and parties.
5
4
3
4
3
Some unreasonable restrictions on election procedures exist that discriminate against many candidates and parties.
2
1
1
Discriminating registration procedures for elections are widespread and prevent a large number of potential candidates or parties from participating.
Each Orbán government, since the first came to office in 2010, has repeatedly changed electoral procedures and skewed them to improve the chances for Fidesz. They have done so without consulting the opposition and often with little notice. For some time, the government has sought to confound voters and to weaken the opposition by favoring a surge in candidacies and phantom parties by lowering and not enforcing registration requirements. Before the 2022 parliamentary elections, the government somehow changed course. At the end of 2020, the Fidesz majority in parliament passed an electoral law reform, which dramatically increased the number of constituencies in which parties must field a candidate in order to participate in the election of the 93 out of 199 members of parliament that are elected in a nationwide proportional contest. Justified as an attempt to reduce the number of shadow parties, this reform aimed to weaken the fragmented parliamentary opposition. As the six main opposition parties succeeded in uniting behind a single candidate in each constituency, it has failed to do so. However, the new provisions have been a major obstacle to the formation of new parties beyond the two main camps, and have been criticized for fostering polarization and limiting pluralism.
To what extent do candidates and parties have fair access to the media and other means of communication?
10
9
9
All candidates and parties have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. All major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of the range of different political positions.
8
7
6
7
6
Candidates and parties have largely equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. The major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of different political positions.
5
4
3
4
3
Candidates and parties often do not have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. While the major media outlets represent a partisan political bias, the media system as a whole provides fair coverage of different political positions.
2
1
1
Candidates and parties lack equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communications. The major media outlets are biased in favor of certain political groups or views and discriminate against others.
Media access is highly uneven. Both the public and the private media are tightly controlled by Fidesz. In the two 2019 election campaigns, the public media ignored the existing formal duties for balanced coverage. The visibility of oppositional parties and candidates in the European Parliament elections – and even more so in the municipal elections – was very low, since the national and local public TV stations did not invite them, and did not organize any public debates. The owners of billboard advertising spaces are closely associated to Fidesz, so that the opposition cannot make itself heard via billboards. During recent campaigns, even the number of smaller posters were substantially reduced, since local authorities limited or banned them, and in many cases posters were either officially removed or removed by Fidesz gangs. Ahead of the 2022 parliamentary elections, human rights envoys from many international organizations have raised strong concerns about the uneven media access (Than 2021; OSCE/ ODIHR 2022).
Citations:
OSCE/ ODIHR (2022): Hungary, Parliamentary Elections and Referendum, 3 April 2022: Interim Report, March 21. Warsaw (https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/hungary/514318).
Than, K. (2021): U.N. expert raises concerns over media freedom in Hungary ahead of 2022 vote, Reuters, November 22 (https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/un-expert-raises-concerns-over-media-freedom-hungary-ahead-2022-vote-2021-11-22/).
Citations:
OSCE/ ODIHR (2022): Hungary, Parliamentary Elections and Referendum, 3 April 2022: Interim Report, March 21. Warsaw (https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/hungary/514318).
Than, K. (2021): U.N. expert raises concerns over media freedom in Hungary ahead of 2022 vote, Reuters, November 22 (https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/un-expert-raises-concerns-over-media-freedom-hungary-ahead-2022-vote-2021-11-22/).
To what extent do all citizens have the opportunity to exercise their right of participation in national elections?
10
9
9
All adult citizens can participate in national elections. All eligible voters are registered if they wish to be. There are no discriminations observable in the exercise of the right to vote. There are no disincentives to voting.
8
7
6
7
6
The procedures for the registration of voters and voting are for the most part effective, impartial and nondiscriminatory. Citizens can appeal to courts if they feel being discriminated. Disincentives to voting generally do not constitute genuine obstacles.
5
4
3
4
3
While the procedures for the registration of voters and voting are de jure non-discriminatory, isolated cases of discrimination occur in practice. For some citizens, disincentives to voting constitute significant obstacles.
2
1
1
The procedures for the registration of voters or voting have systemic discriminatory effects. De facto, a substantial number of adult citizens are excluded from national elections.
Registration and voting procedures for the parliamentary elections in Hungary have been heavily tilted in favor of the governing Fidesz party. This has been a major reason for Fidesz’s victories in the 2014 and 2018 parliamentary elections. The single most important problem has been the unequal treatment of three groups of eligible voters: (1) Hungarians living in Hungary, (2) Hungarians with dual citizenship in neighboring countries and (3) Hungarian citizens working abroad. While the first group can vote without registration, the others have to register beforehand through a complicated procedure. Hungarians living abroad and in possession of dual citizenship – who usually demonstrate a strong political affinity for Fidesz – can vote by mail. In contrast, Hungarian citizens working abroad, who are often opposed to the Orbán government can vote only at diplomatic missions. In order to cast their votes, they often have to travel long distances and to stand in long queues.
Voter registration has suffered from other weaknesses and manipulations. In the past, Fidesz provided many Hungarians with dual citizenship resident in neighboring countries, some of whom are unable to speak Hungarian, with a fake Hungarian address in order to that they may participate in municipal elections, and vote in single-mandate constituencies as well as for party lists during parliamentary elections. This practice has been made easier by a controversial 2021 amendment to the Law on the Records of Citizens’ Personal Data and Address. By changing the definition of address from the place where citizens regularly live to the address used for communication with the state, the new provisions have made it easier for Hungarians living abroad to claim addresses in the country as well for citizens living in Hungary to register strategically in electoral districts with uncertain outcomes (“vox tourism”). The problems with voter registration are further aggravated by the fact that the registration of voters without domicile in Hungary is valid for 10 years. Since there is no list of those who have died – tens of thousands of people by estimation – and no control over the personal identity of those who vote by mail, their names can easily be misused.
Voter registration has suffered from other weaknesses and manipulations. In the past, Fidesz provided many Hungarians with dual citizenship resident in neighboring countries, some of whom are unable to speak Hungarian, with a fake Hungarian address in order to that they may participate in municipal elections, and vote in single-mandate constituencies as well as for party lists during parliamentary elections. This practice has been made easier by a controversial 2021 amendment to the Law on the Records of Citizens’ Personal Data and Address. By changing the definition of address from the place where citizens regularly live to the address used for communication with the state, the new provisions have made it easier for Hungarians living abroad to claim addresses in the country as well for citizens living in Hungary to register strategically in electoral districts with uncertain outcomes (“vox tourism”). The problems with voter registration are further aggravated by the fact that the registration of voters without domicile in Hungary is valid for 10 years. Since there is no list of those who have died – tens of thousands of people by estimation – and no control over the personal identity of those who vote by mail, their names can easily be misused.
To what extent is private and public party financing and electoral campaign financing transparent, effectively monitored and in case of infringement of rules subject to proportionate and dissuasive sanction?
10
9
9
The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and provides for independent monitoring to that respect. Effective measures to prevent evasion are effectively in place and infringements subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.
8
7
6
7
6
The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and provides for independent monitoring. Although infringements are subject to proportionate sanctions, some, although few, loopholes and options for circumvention still exist.
5
4
3
4
3
The state provides that donations to political parties shall be published. Party financing is subject to some degree of independent monitoring but monitoring either proves regularly ineffective or proportionate sanctions in case of infringement do not follow.
2
1
1
The rules for party and campaign financing do not effectively enforce the obligation to make the donations public. Party and campaign financing is neither monitored independently nor, in case of infringements, subject to proportionate sanctions.
The Orbán government has kept the public financing of bigger, parliamentary parties low. An amendment of the law on party financing in 2013, shifted funds toward individual candidates and smaller parties, thus contributing to the large number of candidates in the 2014 and 2018 parliamentary elections. While it has become easier for small parties to enter the political arena, the political landscape has got more fragmented, to the detriment of bigger opposition parties. In June 2020, the government used the COVID-19 pandemic as a pretext for imposing massive cuts on the public funding of political parties. By government decree, 50% of the funds reserved in the central budget for party financing were transferred to the COVID-19 Emergency Fund. Whereas the opposition parties have struggled to raise money from private donors, as the time of tycoons with leftist leanings has passed, Fidesz has been able to circumvent the restrictions on campaign spending by involving formally independent civic associations and by blurring the boundaries between itself and government campaigns.
Do citizens have the opportunity to take binding political decisions when they want to do so?
10
9
9
Citizens have the effective opportunity to actively propose and take binding decisions on issues of importance to them through popular initiatives and referendums. The set of eligible issues is extensive, and includes national, regional, and local issues.
8
7
6
7
6
Citizens have the effective opportunity to take binding decisions on issues of importance to them through either popular initiatives or referendums. The set of eligible issues covers at least two levels of government.
5
4
3
4
3
Citizens have the effective opportunity to vote on issues of importance to them through a legally binding measure. The set of eligible issues is limited to one level of government.
2
1
1
Citizens have no effective opportunity to vote on issues of importance to them through a legally binding measure.
The 2011 constitution, and the 2013 Act on Referendum and Popular Initiative (Act CCXXXVIII/2013) have limited the scope for popular decision-making (Pállinger 2019). While 200,000 eligible citizens can initiate a national referendum, the result of which is binding on parliament, the set of issues exempt from referendums is rather broad and for a referendum to be valid more than 50% of all eligible citizens must participate. The collection of signatures can only begin after the validation of an initiative by the National Election Committee (NVB). The Hungarian constitution does not provide for any mandatory referendums. Parliament can schedule a national referendum on the initiative of the president, the government or citizens.
For the opposition, referendums could have become an important means of mobilizing support and expressing dissent with the Orbán governments. However, the government-controlled NVB has used its discretion to block almost all referendum initiatives by the opposition. The two exceptions that prove the rule are the opposition’s successful “NOlimpia” campaign in 2017 and the initiative for a vote on the proposed Budapest campus of the Shanghai-based Fudan University in 2021 (Inotai 2022). Local referendums took place with an average number of two per year during the 2010s, but were not held during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Given the restrictive stance of the NVB, national referendums have increasingly become an instrument for Orbán governments to mobilize popular support behind the government rather than a means of checks and balances. The “LGBTQ+ referendum” to be held together with the parliamentary elections on 3 April 2022 is one such example. The manipulative questions aim to win voter support for government parties. The government has also continued to carry out its annual “national consultations,” fake referendums that are based on letters to citizens with misleading and manipulated questions.
Citations:
Inotai, E. (2022): Hungary Opposition Cheered by ‘Symbolic Victory’ on Referendum, in: BalkanInsights, January 21 (https://balkaninsight.com/2022/01/21/hungary-opposition-cheered-by-symbolic-victory-on-referendum/).
Pállinger, Z. T. (2019): Direct democracy in an increasingly illiberal setting: the case of the Hungarian national referendum, in: Contemporary Politics 25(1): 62-77 (https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2018.1543924).
For the opposition, referendums could have become an important means of mobilizing support and expressing dissent with the Orbán governments. However, the government-controlled NVB has used its discretion to block almost all referendum initiatives by the opposition. The two exceptions that prove the rule are the opposition’s successful “NOlimpia” campaign in 2017 and the initiative for a vote on the proposed Budapest campus of the Shanghai-based Fudan University in 2021 (Inotai 2022). Local referendums took place with an average number of two per year during the 2010s, but were not held during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Given the restrictive stance of the NVB, national referendums have increasingly become an instrument for Orbán governments to mobilize popular support behind the government rather than a means of checks and balances. The “LGBTQ+ referendum” to be held together with the parliamentary elections on 3 April 2022 is one such example. The manipulative questions aim to win voter support for government parties. The government has also continued to carry out its annual “national consultations,” fake referendums that are based on letters to citizens with misleading and manipulated questions.
Citations:
Inotai, E. (2022): Hungary Opposition Cheered by ‘Symbolic Victory’ on Referendum, in: BalkanInsights, January 21 (https://balkaninsight.com/2022/01/21/hungary-opposition-cheered-by-symbolic-victory-on-referendum/).
Pállinger, Z. T. (2019): Direct democracy in an increasingly illiberal setting: the case of the Hungarian national referendum, in: Contemporary Politics 25(1): 62-77 (https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2018.1543924).
Graph View
To what extent are the media independent from government?
10
9
9
Public and private media are independent from government influence; their independence is institutionally protected and fully respected by the incumbent government.
8
7
6
7
6
The incumbent government largely respects the independence of media. However, there are occasional attempts to exert influence.
5
4
3
4
3
The incumbent government seeks to ensure its political objectives indirectly by influencing the personnel policies, organizational framework or financial resources of public media, and/or the licensing regime/market access for private media.
2
1
1
Major media outlets are frequently influenced by the incumbent government promoting its partisan political objectives. To ensure pro-government media reporting, governmental actors exert direct political pressure and violate existing rules of media regulation or change them to benefit their interests.
Since Fidesz’s return to power in 2010, media freedom in Hungary has been drastically curtailed (Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights 2021). The government has gradually brought the public and large part of the private media under control. Thriving on government advertising, media outlets are used by the government to influence and deceive public opinion (Bátorfy/ Urbán 2020).
This process has continued during the COVID-19 pandemic. In July 2020, the editor-in-chief of the leading news site, Index, was fired by the outlet’s new owner, who has close links to the government. In September 2020, the government-aligned Media Council revoked the license of Klubradio, the last independent radio station – a decision that was criticized by the European Commission as disproportionate and non-transparent, and consequently incompatible with EU law (European Commission 2021). Media freedom has also been limited by the “fake news paragraph” included in the March 2020 Authorization Act (Polyák 2020). It threatens journalists engaged in producing fake news with a prison sentence of up to five years for scaremongering. While the regulation has not produced the avalanche of cases feared by its critics, it has harmed media freedom by inducing self-censorship. While somehow limiting its scope, the Constitutional Court essentially approved the controversial paragraph in a decision in June 2020. Also in June 2020, the Constitutional Court eventually declared legal a controversial 2018 government decree which prevented the Hungarian Competition Authority from examining the centralization of leadership and financing of about 500 media outlets by KESMA, the Central European Press and Media Foundation, a pro-government media conglomerate.
In 2021, it turned out that the government had used Pegasus spyware to track critical journalists in a number of cases. There were also incidences that some critical journalists were no longer invited to press conferences involving the prime minister or individual ministers. In late 2021, the government dismissed the entire leadership of Mediaworks, the news agency of KESMA, in an attempt to bring pro-government media even further in line before the 2022 parliamentary elections.
Citations:
Bátorfy, A., A. Urbán (2020): State advertising as an instrument of transformation of the media market in Hungary, in: East European Politics 36(1): 44-65.
Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights (2021): Memorandum on freedom of expression and media freedom in Hungary. CommDH(2021)10, Strasbourg (https://rm.coe.int/memorandum-on-freedom-of-expression-and-media-freedom-in-hungary/1680a1e67e).
European Commission (2021): Media freedom: The Commission calls on Hungary to comply with EU electronic communications rules. Brussels, December 2 (https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/media-freedom-commission-calls-hungary-comply-eu-electronic-communications-rules).
Polyák, G. (2020): Hungary’s Two Pandemics – COVID-19 and Attacks on Media Freedom. Leipzig: ECPMF (https://www.ecpmf.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Legal-opinion-Hungary_2020.pdf).
This process has continued during the COVID-19 pandemic. In July 2020, the editor-in-chief of the leading news site, Index, was fired by the outlet’s new owner, who has close links to the government. In September 2020, the government-aligned Media Council revoked the license of Klubradio, the last independent radio station – a decision that was criticized by the European Commission as disproportionate and non-transparent, and consequently incompatible with EU law (European Commission 2021). Media freedom has also been limited by the “fake news paragraph” included in the March 2020 Authorization Act (Polyák 2020). It threatens journalists engaged in producing fake news with a prison sentence of up to five years for scaremongering. While the regulation has not produced the avalanche of cases feared by its critics, it has harmed media freedom by inducing self-censorship. While somehow limiting its scope, the Constitutional Court essentially approved the controversial paragraph in a decision in June 2020. Also in June 2020, the Constitutional Court eventually declared legal a controversial 2018 government decree which prevented the Hungarian Competition Authority from examining the centralization of leadership and financing of about 500 media outlets by KESMA, the Central European Press and Media Foundation, a pro-government media conglomerate.
In 2021, it turned out that the government had used Pegasus spyware to track critical journalists in a number of cases. There were also incidences that some critical journalists were no longer invited to press conferences involving the prime minister or individual ministers. In late 2021, the government dismissed the entire leadership of Mediaworks, the news agency of KESMA, in an attempt to bring pro-government media even further in line before the 2022 parliamentary elections.
Citations:
Bátorfy, A., A. Urbán (2020): State advertising as an instrument of transformation of the media market in Hungary, in: East European Politics 36(1): 44-65.
Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights (2021): Memorandum on freedom of expression and media freedom in Hungary. CommDH(2021)10, Strasbourg (https://rm.coe.int/memorandum-on-freedom-of-expression-and-media-freedom-in-hungary/1680a1e67e).
European Commission (2021): Media freedom: The Commission calls on Hungary to comply with EU electronic communications rules. Brussels, December 2 (https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/media-freedom-commission-calls-hungary-comply-eu-electronic-communications-rules).
Polyák, G. (2020): Hungary’s Two Pandemics – COVID-19 and Attacks on Media Freedom. Leipzig: ECPMF (https://www.ecpmf.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Legal-opinion-Hungary_2020.pdf).
To what extent are the media characterized by an ownership structure that ensures a pluralism of opinions?
10
9
9
Diversified ownership structures characterize both the electronic and print media market, providing a well-balanced pluralism of opinions. Effective anti-monopoly policies and impartial, open public media guarantee a pluralism of opinions.
8
7
6
7
6
Diversified ownership structures prevail in the electronic and print media market. Public media compensate for deficiencies or biases in private media reporting by representing a wider range of opinions.
5
4
3
4
3
Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize either the electronic or the print media market. Important opinions are represented but there are no or only weak institutional guarantees against the predominance of certain opinions.
2
1
1
Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize both the electronic and the print media market. Few companies dominate the media, most programs are biased, and there is evidence that certain opinions are not published or are marginalized.
Since the second Orbán government assumed office in 2010, media pluralism in Hungary has suffered both from increasing government control over the public media and a process of concentration of private-media ownership in the hands of companies close to Fidesz. In 2020, for instance, Index.hu, once the country’s most visited news website, got a new, Orbán-friendly owner. There are still some independent media, but they work under very difficult financial and political circumstances and reach only a small part of the overall population. The internet as a source of information away from state-influenced media has become more and more important. But even free information via the internet is increasingly under threat as bots seek to influence the discourse with fake news and defamation campaigns on behalf of the government.
To what extent can citizens obtain official information?
10
9
9
Legal regulations guarantee free and easy access to official information, contain few, reasonable restrictions, and there are effective mechanisms of appeal and oversight enabling citizens to access information.
8
7
6
7
6
Access to official information is regulated by law. Most restrictions are justified, but access is sometimes complicated by bureaucratic procedures. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms permit citizens to enforce their right of access.
5
4
3
4
3
Access to official information is partially regulated by law, but complicated by bureaucratic procedures and some poorly justified restrictions. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms are often ineffective.
2
1
1
Access to official information is not regulated by law; there are many restrictions of access, bureaucratic procedures and no or ineffective mechanisms of enforcement.
While existing law provides for far-reaching access to government information, the Orbán governments have made it increasingly difficult for the public and the media to obtain information. There has been a constant fight between the government and the democratic opposition over access to government data and documents, often fought at the courts. NGOs have worked intensively to claim government information through the courts, and independent media organizations have regularly published categorized government information. Especially contested has been information on public procurement.
The restrictions on access to official information have been a major issue during the COVID-19 pandemic (Kovács 2021). Vital data on case numbers by regions and municipalities has not been published by the government in a consistent and reliable manner, and no estimates of the r-value and no data on intensive care have been provided. Meanwhile, coronavirus and medical staff, and health officials have been legally prohibited from providing pandemic-related information. The March 2020 emergency legislation has made it more difficult for journalist and citizens to request public information on the basis of the Hungarian freedom of information act (Zöldi 2020).
Citations:
Kovács, K. (2021): Hungary and the Pandemic: A Pretext for Expanding Power, in: VerfBlog, March 11 (https://verfassungsblog.de/hungary-and-the-pandemic-a-pretext-for-expanding-power/)
Zöldi, B. (2020): COVID-19 pandemic adds to Hungary’s transparency woes, International Press Institute, October 30 (https://ipi.media/covid-19-pandemic-adds-to-hungarys-transparency-woes/).
The restrictions on access to official information have been a major issue during the COVID-19 pandemic (Kovács 2021). Vital data on case numbers by regions and municipalities has not been published by the government in a consistent and reliable manner, and no estimates of the r-value and no data on intensive care have been provided. Meanwhile, coronavirus and medical staff, and health officials have been legally prohibited from providing pandemic-related information. The March 2020 emergency legislation has made it more difficult for journalist and citizens to request public information on the basis of the Hungarian freedom of information act (Zöldi 2020).
Citations:
Kovács, K. (2021): Hungary and the Pandemic: A Pretext for Expanding Power, in: VerfBlog, March 11 (https://verfassungsblog.de/hungary-and-the-pandemic-a-pretext-for-expanding-power/)
Zöldi, B. (2020): COVID-19 pandemic adds to Hungary’s transparency woes, International Press Institute, October 30 (https://ipi.media/covid-19-pandemic-adds-to-hungarys-transparency-woes/).
Graph View
To what extent does the state respect and protect civil rights and how effectively are citizens protected by courts against infringements of their rights?
10
9
9
All state institutions respect and effectively protect civil rights. Citizens are effectively protected by courts against infringements of their rights. Infringements present an extreme exception.
8
7
6
7
6
The state respects and protects rights, with few infringements. Courts provide protection.
5
4
3
4
3
Despite formal protection, frequent infringements of civil rights occur and court protection often proves ineffective.
2
1
1
State institutions respect civil rights only formally, and civil rights are frequently violated. Court protection is not effective.
The Orbán governments have formally respected civil rights. However, the rule of law has suffered from the government’s politicization of the courts, its failure to protect Roma and other minorities from harassment and hate speech, and its attempts to criminalize the (former) left-wing elite. The Prosecutor General has acted as a shield protecting Fidesz affiliates and initiating fake legal processes against opposition actors, damaging their economic situation and private life.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Orbán government has restricted civil rights. While the temporary travel restrictions and curfews were broadly in line with the European mainstream, the government has also adopted a number of more controversial measures. The so-called Coronavirus Defense Act (also known as the Authorization or Enabling Act), which came into force on 21 March 2020 has inserted two new crimes into the Criminal Code. Anyone who “claims or spreads a distorted truth in relation to the emergency in a way that is suitable for alarming or agitating a large group of people” can be punished with up to five years in prison. In addition, anyone who interferes with the operation of measures that the government takes to fight the pandemic could also face a jail sentence of up to five years. While both provisions have not been invoked on a large scale, they have had an intimidating effect.
The government’s disrespect of civil rights has also been shown by the Pegasus scandal. In July 2021, it turned out that about 300 Hungarian citizens, including journals, lawyers, politicians, former state officials and businesspeople, most of them critical of the government, were targeted by Pegasus spyware between 2018 and 2021. While the government has denied any wrongdoing, there is strong evidence that it has been responsible for the surveillance.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Orbán government has restricted civil rights. While the temporary travel restrictions and curfews were broadly in line with the European mainstream, the government has also adopted a number of more controversial measures. The so-called Coronavirus Defense Act (also known as the Authorization or Enabling Act), which came into force on 21 March 2020 has inserted two new crimes into the Criminal Code. Anyone who “claims or spreads a distorted truth in relation to the emergency in a way that is suitable for alarming or agitating a large group of people” can be punished with up to five years in prison. In addition, anyone who interferes with the operation of measures that the government takes to fight the pandemic could also face a jail sentence of up to five years. While both provisions have not been invoked on a large scale, they have had an intimidating effect.
The government’s disrespect of civil rights has also been shown by the Pegasus scandal. In July 2021, it turned out that about 300 Hungarian citizens, including journals, lawyers, politicians, former state officials and businesspeople, most of them critical of the government, were targeted by Pegasus spyware between 2018 and 2021. While the government has denied any wrongdoing, there is strong evidence that it has been responsible for the surveillance.
To what extent does the state concede and protect political liberties?
10
9
9
All state institutions concede and effectively protect political liberties.
8
7
6
7
6
All state institutions for the most part concede and protect political liberties. There are only few infringements.
5
4
3
4
3
State institutions concede political liberties but infringements occur regularly in practice.
2
1
1
Political liberties are unsatisfactory codified and frequently violated.
While political liberties are guaranteed by the constitution and are formally respected, the Orbán governments have shown little respect for them. Similar to other countries, demonstrations were temporarily banned in 2020 and 2021 in context of the COVID-19 pandemic, even when other forms of public events and gatherings were already permitted. However, Prime Minister Orbán and other Fidesz leaders have defamed opposition activists as traitors to the Hungarian nation and as foreign agents paid by George Soros, similar to Putin’s style. The government has instituted burdensome registration and reporting requirements for NGOs. Moreover, organizations assisting asylum-seekers have been subject to the restrictive 2018 “Stop Soros” legislation. The Hungarian government has reacted slowly to a decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union in June 2020 that Hungary’s 2017 NGO law violates EU law. In November 2011, the Court of Justice of the European Union also ruled against the “Stop Soros” laws.
How effectively does the state protect against different forms of discrimination?
10
9
9
State institutions effectively protect against and actively prevent discrimination. Cases of discrimination are extremely rare.
8
7
6
7
6
State anti-discrimination protections are moderately successful. Few cases of discrimination are observed.
5
4
3
4
3
State anti-discrimination efforts show limited success. Many cases of discrimination can be observed.
2
1
1
The state does not offer effective protection against discrimination. Discrimination is widespread in the public sector and in society.
Hungary has a comprehensive anti-discrimination legal framework in place, but in practice, little is done to enforce it. Fidesz’s traditional family concept corresponds with strong discrimination against women in the areas of employment, career and pay. The failure is even greater regarding the Roma minority. By trying to create a separate school system, the Orbán government has aggravated the segregation in education. The government has continued its campaigns against Muslims, refugees and the LGBTQ+ community. The ninth amendment of the Fundamental Law in December 2020 and concomitant legislation have made the constitutional definition of a family even more traditional, have fixed gender identity at birth and have made it impossible for same-sex couples to adopt children. A controversial 2021 law has banned the “promotion” of queer and homosexual content in schools. The government has also organized a manipulative “LGBTQ+ referendum” to be held together with the parliamentary elections on 2 April 2022. During the EURO 2020 football tournament, the government clashed with UEFA over visible LGBTQ+ support during football matches in Budapest.
Graph View
To what extent do government and administration act on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions to provide legal certainty?
10
9
9
Government and administration act predictably, on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions. Legal regulations are consistent and transparent, ensuring legal certainty.
8
7
6
7
6
Government and administration rarely make unpredictable decisions. Legal regulations are consistent, but leave a large scope of discretion to the government or administration.
5
4
3
4
3
Government and administration sometimes make unpredictable decisions that go beyond given legal bases or do not conform to existing legal regulations. Some legal regulations are inconsistent and contradictory.
2
1
1
Government and administration often make unpredictable decisions that lack a legal basis or ignore existing legal regulations. Legal regulations are inconsistent, full of loopholes and contradict each other.
As in other countries with authoritarian tendencies, the Orbán government believes that the law is subordinate to government policies, with the latter reflecting the “national interest,” which is sacrosanct and exclusively defined by the government majority. As the Orbán governments have taken a voluntarist approach toward lawmaking, legal certainty has suffered from chaotic, rapidly changing legislation. The hasty legislative process has regularly violated the Act on Legislation, which calls for a process of social consultation if the government presents a draft law. Moreover, ever since the 2015 “refugee crisis,” the government has relied on special decree powers (ICJ 2022). On 20 March 2020, the government’s two-third supermajority in parliament adopted the so-called Coronavirus Defense Act (also known as the Authorization or Enabling Act) that came into force the next day. The act gave the government the right to suspend or override any law. In mid-June 2020, the state of emergency, which stirred massive criticism both within and beyond the country’s borders was lifted, but then transformed into a “medical emergency.” In November 2020, parliament then declared a new state of emergency, which was later extended several times. All three states of emergency gave the government more powers than foreseen in the Fundamental Law, the Hungarian constitution, before its ninth amendment in December 2020.
Citations:
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)(2022): A Facade of Legality: COVID-19 and the Exploitation of Emergency Powers in Hungary. Geneva (https://www.icj.org/hungary-authorities-must-halt-abuse-of-emergency-powers-in-hungary-during-covid-19/).
Citations:
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)(2022): A Facade of Legality: COVID-19 and the Exploitation of Emergency Powers in Hungary. Geneva (https://www.icj.org/hungary-authorities-must-halt-abuse-of-emergency-powers-in-hungary-during-covid-19/).
To what extent do independent courts control whether government and administration act in conformity with the law?
10
9
9
Independent courts effectively review executive action and ensure that the government and administration act in conformity with the law.
8
7
6
7
6
Independent courts usually manage to control whether the government and administration act in conformity with the law.
5
4
3
4
3
Courts are independent, but often fail to ensure legal compliance.
2
1
1
Courts are biased for or against the incumbent government and lack effective control.
The Hungarian judiciary performs well in terms of the length of proceedings and has a high level of digitalization. However, its independence has drastically declined under the Orbán governments (European Commission 2021). While the lower courts in most cases still take independent decisions, the Constitutional Court, the Kúria (Curia, previously the Supreme Court), and the National Office of the Judiciary (OBH) have increasingly come under government control and have often been criticized for taking biased decisions. Likewise, Péter Polt, the Chief Public Prosecutor, a former Fidesz politician, has persistently refrained from investigating the corrupt practices of prominent Fidesz oligarchs. As a result of the declining independence and quality of the Hungarian judiciary, trust in the Hungarian legal system among the general public has dropped over time. More and more court proceedings have ended up at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg. Hungary is among the countries generating the most cases, and the Hungarian state often loses these lawsuits.
During the first lockdown, proceedings at ordinary courts were suspended, officially due to fears of spreading the virus. This also meant that ordinary people were no longer able to initiate cases that could get to the Constitutional Court. Under these circumstances, except for some Fidesz-controlled bodies, only one-quarter of members of parliament were able to call on the Constitutional Court, which would have required the far-right and the left to act together. The Constitutional Court has refused many requests for constitutional reviews and has not dared to challenge the Orbán government’s power-grab during the COVID-19 pandemic. In October 2020, the government consolidated its control over the Kúria, as the Fidesz supermajority in parliament elected Zsolt András Varga (a member of the Constitutional Court, who does not have any experience working as an ordinary judge) as its new president, despite the wide and angry reactions this elicited among judges and their professional organizations, and despite the fact that the National Judicial Council has issued a negative opinion.
Citations:
European Commission (2021): 2021 Rule of Law Report. Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary. SWD(2021) 714 final, Brussels (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021SC0714&from=EN).
During the first lockdown, proceedings at ordinary courts were suspended, officially due to fears of spreading the virus. This also meant that ordinary people were no longer able to initiate cases that could get to the Constitutional Court. Under these circumstances, except for some Fidesz-controlled bodies, only one-quarter of members of parliament were able to call on the Constitutional Court, which would have required the far-right and the left to act together. The Constitutional Court has refused many requests for constitutional reviews and has not dared to challenge the Orbán government’s power-grab during the COVID-19 pandemic. In October 2020, the government consolidated its control over the Kúria, as the Fidesz supermajority in parliament elected Zsolt András Varga (a member of the Constitutional Court, who does not have any experience working as an ordinary judge) as its new president, despite the wide and angry reactions this elicited among judges and their professional organizations, and despite the fact that the National Judicial Council has issued a negative opinion.
Citations:
European Commission (2021): 2021 Rule of Law Report. Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary. SWD(2021) 714 final, Brussels (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021SC0714&from=EN).
To what extent does the process of appointing (supreme or constitutional court) justices guarantee the independence of the judiciary?
10
9
9
Justices are appointed in a cooperative appointment process with special majority requirements.
8
7
6
7
6
Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies with special majority requirements or in a cooperative selection process without special majority requirements.
5
4
3
4
3
Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies without special majority requirements.
2
1
1
All judges are appointed exclusively by a single body irrespective of other institutions.
The 2012 constitution left the rules for selecting members of the Constitutional Court untouched. Its justices are still elected by parliament with a two-thirds majority. As Fidesz regained a two-thirds majority in the 2018 parliamentary elections, it had complete control over the appointment of Constitutional Court justices during the 2018–2022 term. In 2020 and 2021, parliament elected two new members of the Constitutional Court, both close to Fidesz, one as a replacement for Zsolt András Varga, who, in a controversial move, had been installed as president of the Kúria (Supreme Court).
To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?
10
9
9
Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
8
7
6
7
6
Most integrity mechanisms function effectively and provide disincentives for public officeholders willing to abuse their positions.
5
4
3
4
3
Some integrity mechanisms function, but do not effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
2
1
1
Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.
Corruption is one of the central problems of Hungary (European Commission 2021: 10-14). Widespread corruption has been a systemic feature of the Orbán governments, with benefits and influence growing through Fidesz informal political-business networks. Members of the Fidesz elite have been involved in a number of large-scale corruption scandals, with many people accumulating substantial wealth in a short period of time. They have enjoyed the protection by parts of the judiciary, as Péter Polt, the chief public prosecutor and a former Fidesz politician, has persistently refrained from investigating the corrupt practices of prominent oligarchs. Hungary has led OLAF’s list of member states where irregularities in the use of EU funding have been known for some time and has conspicuously failed to cooperate with the European Union’s anti-fraud agency. In 2021, the legal anti-corruption framework was further weakened by the narrowing of the application scope for public procurement rules. The government has taken no specific measures to limit corruption in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic during which special procurement rules have applied.
Citations:
European Commission (2021): 2021 Rule of Law Report. Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary. SWD(2021) 714 final, Brussels (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021SC0714&from= EN).
Citations:
European Commission (2021): 2021 Rule of Law Report. Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary. SWD(2021) 714 final, Brussels (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021SC0714&from= EN).