Social Policies
#38Key Findings
Reflecting the state’s increasingly centrist ideology, Hungary’s social policies place it in the bottom ranks (rank 38) in international comparison. Its score on this measure has improved by 0.4 points relative to 2014.
The government reacted to the pandemic by placing the healthcare sector on a near-militarized, highly centralized footing, often ignoring the objections of hospital directors. The state focused on vaccines to combat COVID-19 while eschewing masking obligations and social distancing. Infection and death rates have been consequently high.
School systems were not prepared for online learning, and communication about school closures and quarantine provisions was chaotic. The government has substantially extended its political control of the higher-education sector. Major social benefits have been cut, and COVID-19 aid tended to help the middle classes rather than the poor.
The government rhetorically supports families, but does little to help women combine childcare and careers. Public spending on pensions is low, but discretionary increases arrive during election seasons. The Orbán government actively seeks to keep migrants aside from ethnic Hungarians out of the country. No integration strategy exists, and even access to education for immigrant children is restricted.
The government reacted to the pandemic by placing the healthcare sector on a near-militarized, highly centralized footing, often ignoring the objections of hospital directors. The state focused on vaccines to combat COVID-19 while eschewing masking obligations and social distancing. Infection and death rates have been consequently high.
School systems were not prepared for online learning, and communication about school closures and quarantine provisions was chaotic. The government has substantially extended its political control of the higher-education sector. Major social benefits have been cut, and COVID-19 aid tended to help the middle classes rather than the poor.
The government rhetorically supports families, but does little to help women combine childcare and careers. Public spending on pensions is low, but discretionary increases arrive during election seasons. The Orbán government actively seeks to keep migrants aside from ethnic Hungarians out of the country. No integration strategy exists, and even access to education for immigrant children is restricted.
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To what extent does education policy deliver high-quality, equitable and efficient education and training?
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Education policy fully achieves the criteria.
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Education policy largely achieves the criteria.
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Education policy partially achieves the criteria.
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Education policy does not achieve the criteria at all.
Since the second Orbán government assumed office in 2010, the education system has undergone major changes. Government spending on education fell from an already low level of 4.6% of GDP in 2010 to 3.8% in 2020. At the same time, competencies and monitoring duties have been centralized, private and religious schools have been strengthened, and secondary education has been restructured with a view to strengthening vocational education. Education outcomes are below the EU average, show wide disparities and the education system obstructs social mobility. The salaries of teachers are still low compared to other tertiary education graduates. The regular PISA surveys have shown a marked decline in the quality of education in Hungary. Foreign language learning in primary schools has been stagnate for a decade and especially smaller languages are chosen less often. At the same time, the content of school textbooks has been increasingly influenced by ideology. Pupils are educated in a nationalistic fashion, which celebrates the greatness of the Hungarian people and their “historic suffering,” while often denying historical facts. This ideological infiltration begins at kindergarten level, and is a common feature in primary and secondary education. While the quality of public education has drastically declined, the children of the “royal court” have attended expensive private schools that remain out of the financial reach of average citizens.
Education received a serious blow during the COVID-19 pandemic. COVID-19 deepened tensions in the educational, psychological, social and political dimensions. The setback in the educational dimension resulted from the much lower efficiency of the online education and the frequent interruptions to educational courses due to infections. Psychologically, COVID-19 could have been even more damaging due to individual’s lack of personal contact with peer groups, larger families and society, which are necessary for the socialization of young people. Socially, COVID-19 weakened the role and position of teachers, and led to conflicts between underpaid teachers, underfinanced educational institutions, wider society and the government. Finally, COVID-19 created political controversies over the budget and the curriculum between the teachers’ associations, and central and sometimes local governments. While these tensions have been observed in other countries as well, they have been especially strong in Hungary where government communication about school closures and quarantine provisions was chaotic, and little progress with digital learning has been made.
Instead of addressing the pressing educational challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, the government has continued to increase its grip on universities. In September 2020, it appointed a board of trustees over the heads of the prestigious University of Theatre and Film Arts (SZFE), prompting massive protests both inside and outside Hungary. In December 2020, the government also complemented the “privatization” of universities by adopting a constitutional amendment that makes future changes to the operation of the new “private” foundations, which run the newly privatized universities and research organizations, dependent on a two-thirds majority in parliament, thereby cementing the influence of Fidesz over these foundations, even if the opposition wins the next election (Kazai 2020). The Orbán government has also pressed ahead with its project of establishing a network of educational institutes as schools for party propaganda training. These institutes are designed to socialize selected candidates from the younger generation to become Fidesz activists and to cultivate them for government posts. The Mathias Corvinus College (MCC) has been the main actor in this field, it has recently received huge amounts of financial support from the government, while the public education system remains underfinanced, particularly given the current crisis management needs. MCC benefits from a large presence in the capital and major cities, and has been provided a special training center at lake Balaton in Révfülöp.
Citations:
Kazai, V. Z. (2020): Power Grab in Times of Emergency, in: Verfassungsblog, November 12 (https://verfassungsblog.de/power-grab-in-times-of-emergency/).
Education received a serious blow during the COVID-19 pandemic. COVID-19 deepened tensions in the educational, psychological, social and political dimensions. The setback in the educational dimension resulted from the much lower efficiency of the online education and the frequent interruptions to educational courses due to infections. Psychologically, COVID-19 could have been even more damaging due to individual’s lack of personal contact with peer groups, larger families and society, which are necessary for the socialization of young people. Socially, COVID-19 weakened the role and position of teachers, and led to conflicts between underpaid teachers, underfinanced educational institutions, wider society and the government. Finally, COVID-19 created political controversies over the budget and the curriculum between the teachers’ associations, and central and sometimes local governments. While these tensions have been observed in other countries as well, they have been especially strong in Hungary where government communication about school closures and quarantine provisions was chaotic, and little progress with digital learning has been made.
Instead of addressing the pressing educational challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, the government has continued to increase its grip on universities. In September 2020, it appointed a board of trustees over the heads of the prestigious University of Theatre and Film Arts (SZFE), prompting massive protests both inside and outside Hungary. In December 2020, the government also complemented the “privatization” of universities by adopting a constitutional amendment that makes future changes to the operation of the new “private” foundations, which run the newly privatized universities and research organizations, dependent on a two-thirds majority in parliament, thereby cementing the influence of Fidesz over these foundations, even if the opposition wins the next election (Kazai 2020). The Orbán government has also pressed ahead with its project of establishing a network of educational institutes as schools for party propaganda training. These institutes are designed to socialize selected candidates from the younger generation to become Fidesz activists and to cultivate them for government posts. The Mathias Corvinus College (MCC) has been the main actor in this field, it has recently received huge amounts of financial support from the government, while the public education system remains underfinanced, particularly given the current crisis management needs. MCC benefits from a large presence in the capital and major cities, and has been provided a special training center at lake Balaton in Révfülöp.
Citations:
Kazai, V. Z. (2020): Power Grab in Times of Emergency, in: Verfassungsblog, November 12 (https://verfassungsblog.de/power-grab-in-times-of-emergency/).
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To what extent does social policy prevent exclusion and decoupling from society?
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Policies very effectively enable societal inclusion and ensure equal opportunities.
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For the most part, policies enable societal inclusion effectively and ensure equal opportunities.
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For the most part, policies fail to prevent societal exclusion effectively and ensure equal opportunities.
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Policies exacerbate unequal opportunities and exclusion from society.
The basic social message of the Orbán governments has always been that they would fight for upward mobility of “hard working people” in Hungarian society, representing the interests of both the middle class and low-income earners. However, despite strong economic growth between 2013 and 2019, both “vertical” inequalities among income strata and “horizontal” inequalities among regions have remained high. Under the Orbán governments, major social benefits have been cut, while the better-off have benefited from tax reductions (Szikra 2019). Wage growth has been lower than that observed in other Visegrád countries, and the share of Hungarians that can achieve a way of life similar to that in developed EU member states has stagnated. As a result, there has been a “soft” social exclusion in form of the emigration of more than half a million Hungarians to the West
While the Orbán government has supported employees and pensioners during the COVID-19 pandemic, it has done relatively little for the non-standard employed, the unemployed and the poor. The adopted moratoria for mortgage payments and credit payments in general and the accompanying interest rate cap have been of greater support to the middle classes than the poor. Despite the substantial increase in unemployment, the government has kept unemployment benefits low and has not extended the maximum period (Aidukaite et al. 2021). In September 2020, half of the 323,000 unemployed did not receive any support from the government (Györy et al. 2021: 64). Nor has the government sought to combat digital inequality, which will exacerbate the urban/rural and the rich/ poor divide, as well as the exclusion of the Roma. As a result, there has been a broad feeling among the Hungarian population that the Orbán government’s crisis management has neglected the vital problems of the losers of the COVID-19 pandemic (Tóth/ Hudacskó 2020).
Citations:
Aidukaite, J., S. Saxonberg, D. Szelewa, D. Szikra (2021): Social policy in the face of a global pandemic: Policy responses to the COVID-19 crisis in Central and Eastern Europe, in: Social Policy & Administration 55(2): 358-373 (https://doi.org/10.1111/spol.12704).
Györi, G. et al. (2021): Hungarian Politics in 2020. Budapest: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung/ Policy Solutions (http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/budapest/17181.pdf).
Szikra, D. (2018): Welfare for the Wealthy: The Social Policy of the Orbán-regime, 2010-2017. Budapest: Friedrich-Ebert Foundation (http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bu eros/budapest/14209.pdf).
Tóth, I.G., S. Hudacskó (2020): A koronavírus társadalmi hatásai a közvélemény kutatások tükrében (The social effects of the coronavirus in the mirror of the public opinion surveys), in: T. Kolosi et al. (eds), Társadalmi Riport 2020 (Social Report 2020). Budapest: TÁRKI, 553-573.
While the Orbán government has supported employees and pensioners during the COVID-19 pandemic, it has done relatively little for the non-standard employed, the unemployed and the poor. The adopted moratoria for mortgage payments and credit payments in general and the accompanying interest rate cap have been of greater support to the middle classes than the poor. Despite the substantial increase in unemployment, the government has kept unemployment benefits low and has not extended the maximum period (Aidukaite et al. 2021). In September 2020, half of the 323,000 unemployed did not receive any support from the government (Györy et al. 2021: 64). Nor has the government sought to combat digital inequality, which will exacerbate the urban/rural and the rich/ poor divide, as well as the exclusion of the Roma. As a result, there has been a broad feeling among the Hungarian population that the Orbán government’s crisis management has neglected the vital problems of the losers of the COVID-19 pandemic (Tóth/ Hudacskó 2020).
Citations:
Aidukaite, J., S. Saxonberg, D. Szelewa, D. Szikra (2021): Social policy in the face of a global pandemic: Policy responses to the COVID-19 crisis in Central and Eastern Europe, in: Social Policy & Administration 55(2): 358-373 (https://doi.org/10.1111/spol.12704).
Györi, G. et al. (2021): Hungarian Politics in 2020. Budapest: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung/ Policy Solutions (http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/budapest/17181.pdf).
Szikra, D. (2018): Welfare for the Wealthy: The Social Policy of the Orbán-regime, 2010-2017. Budapest: Friedrich-Ebert Foundation (http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bu eros/budapest/14209.pdf).
Tóth, I.G., S. Hudacskó (2020): A koronavírus társadalmi hatásai a közvélemény kutatások tükrében (The social effects of the coronavirus in the mirror of the public opinion surveys), in: T. Kolosi et al. (eds), Társadalmi Riport 2020 (Social Report 2020). Budapest: TÁRKI, 553-573.
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To what extent do health care policies provide high-quality, inclusive and cost-efficient health care?
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Health care policy achieves the criteria fully.
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Health care policy achieves the criteria largely.
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Health care policy achieves the criteria partly.
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Health care policy does not achieve the criteria at all.
Health outcomes in Hungary lag behind most other EU member states due to both the low performance of healthcare provision and unhealthy lifestyles. Life expectancy in Hungary is lower than in most of the country’s EU neighbors, and disparities across gender and socioeconomic groups are substantial. Hungary has one of the highest avoidable death rates in the European Union. Healthcare has suffered from a limited healthcare budget, which is one of the lowest in the OECD with spending per capita at around 50% of the EU average. A large number of medical doctors and nurses have emigrated to the West in search of better salaries. At the same time, the healthcare system remains excessively hospital-centric, and lacks a sufficient focus on primary care and prevention. Even very small hospitals are maintained, although they cannot operate efficiently – the fear of public protests against the centralization of hospitals prevents necessary reform. Those who can afford it have sought treatment from the growing number of private healthcare institutions. Private medical institutions have been growing under the Orbán regime, as their high profitability has made them a good business opportunity for Fidesz oligarchs. This shift has also provided medical staff – both physicians and assistants – a major opportunity to earn extra income in addition to their poorly paid positions in state-run hospitals. But even for the less well-off, out-of-pocket payments have been high.
Despite a few announced reforms, healthcare was low on the priority list for the fourth Orbán government before the COVID-19 pandemic. Policymaking has suffered from the absence of a separate ministry tasked with addressing healthcare issues and the fact that the Hungarian Medical Chamber (Magyar Orvosi Kamara, MOK) has been loyal to the government rather than to the profession. When the COVID-19 pandemic hit, the government first reacted by introducing a number of emergency measures. It hectically sought to secure equipment and ended up buying too much equipment at overpriced rates. When the number of infections rose, the government sought to increase the number of available hospital beds and to boost capacities for care. In April 2020, Minister of Human Resources Miklós Kásler instructed hospitals to free up 60% of their beds (about 36,000 out of 60,000) for treating coronavirus patients almost overnight. Whereas in retrospect this measure appears vastly exaggerated, at the height of the first wave of the pandemic, this was obviously hard to know. However, the way the government carried out this policy tells a great deal about the nature of the Hungarian government and the state of the Hungarian healthcare system. The government simply ignored the opposition voiced by hospital directors and the patients who were sent home. In many cases, non-COVID-19 patients were discharged without adequate alternative care and others were required to share already-full rooms with other patients. The centralization, if not militarization of healthcare continued in the second half of 2020. The Medical Service Act, which entered into force on 18 November 2020, transformed the governance of healthcare (Albert 2021). The newly created National Hospital Chief Directorate (Országos Kórházi Főigazgatóság, Okfö) has become the ruling center of all medical institutions. Hospital directors have as a result lost their main decision-making powers, primarily on budgeting and employment matters. While public sector physicians have seen a strong increase in their wages, they have also been provided a new, almost military employment status. This allows Okfö and/or hospital directors to send them to work for other hospitals on short notice, and limits their opportunity to operate their own private practices and take a part-time job in the private healthcare sector. General practitioners, pediatricians and dentists working in primary care who are normally self-employed and not covered by the new law, as well as nurses, have called for pay increases similar to that of doctors in the public sector. The tremendous pressure of the COVID-19 pandemic on the weak and terribly underfinanced healthcare system has led to exhaustion among medical staff and has further accelerated the country’s brain-drain problem. From 2019 to 2020, the number of practicing doctors fell sharply from 41,282 to 37,188.
Since the end of 2020, the government’s measures against the COVID-19 pandemic have largely focused on fostering vaccination. However, the government has lacked a clear vaccination strategy, and has not complemented vaccination efforts with mask obligations, social distancing and contact-tracing. As a result, infection and death numbers have been high, with the poorer strata having been hit most strongly.
Citations:
Albert, F. (2021): Hungary reforms its healthcare system: a useful step forward but which raises some concerns. European Social Policy Network, ESPN Flash Report 2021/14, Brussels: European Commission.
Despite a few announced reforms, healthcare was low on the priority list for the fourth Orbán government before the COVID-19 pandemic. Policymaking has suffered from the absence of a separate ministry tasked with addressing healthcare issues and the fact that the Hungarian Medical Chamber (Magyar Orvosi Kamara, MOK) has been loyal to the government rather than to the profession. When the COVID-19 pandemic hit, the government first reacted by introducing a number of emergency measures. It hectically sought to secure equipment and ended up buying too much equipment at overpriced rates. When the number of infections rose, the government sought to increase the number of available hospital beds and to boost capacities for care. In April 2020, Minister of Human Resources Miklós Kásler instructed hospitals to free up 60% of their beds (about 36,000 out of 60,000) for treating coronavirus patients almost overnight. Whereas in retrospect this measure appears vastly exaggerated, at the height of the first wave of the pandemic, this was obviously hard to know. However, the way the government carried out this policy tells a great deal about the nature of the Hungarian government and the state of the Hungarian healthcare system. The government simply ignored the opposition voiced by hospital directors and the patients who were sent home. In many cases, non-COVID-19 patients were discharged without adequate alternative care and others were required to share already-full rooms with other patients. The centralization, if not militarization of healthcare continued in the second half of 2020. The Medical Service Act, which entered into force on 18 November 2020, transformed the governance of healthcare (Albert 2021). The newly created National Hospital Chief Directorate (Országos Kórházi Főigazgatóság, Okfö) has become the ruling center of all medical institutions. Hospital directors have as a result lost their main decision-making powers, primarily on budgeting and employment matters. While public sector physicians have seen a strong increase in their wages, they have also been provided a new, almost military employment status. This allows Okfö and/or hospital directors to send them to work for other hospitals on short notice, and limits their opportunity to operate their own private practices and take a part-time job in the private healthcare sector. General practitioners, pediatricians and dentists working in primary care who are normally self-employed and not covered by the new law, as well as nurses, have called for pay increases similar to that of doctors in the public sector. The tremendous pressure of the COVID-19 pandemic on the weak and terribly underfinanced healthcare system has led to exhaustion among medical staff and has further accelerated the country’s brain-drain problem. From 2019 to 2020, the number of practicing doctors fell sharply from 41,282 to 37,188.
Since the end of 2020, the government’s measures against the COVID-19 pandemic have largely focused on fostering vaccination. However, the government has lacked a clear vaccination strategy, and has not complemented vaccination efforts with mask obligations, social distancing and contact-tracing. As a result, infection and death numbers have been high, with the poorer strata having been hit most strongly.
Citations:
Albert, F. (2021): Hungary reforms its healthcare system: a useful step forward but which raises some concerns. European Social Policy Network, ESPN Flash Report 2021/14, Brussels: European Commission.
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To what extent do family support policies enable women to combine parenting with participation in the labor market?
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Family support policies effectively enable women to combine parenting with employment.
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Family support policies provide some support for women who want to combine parenting and employment.
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Family support policies provide only few opportunities for women who want to combine parenting and employment.
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Family support policies force most women to opt for either parenting or employment.
The Orbán governments have placed strong emphasis on family policy in a wide sense, but have done little to enable women to combine childcare and career. Most of the government’s measures have been financial, providing help for families with respect to buying real estate or even bigger cars for families with many children. By contrast, few measures (most notably a measure that allows grandparents to take “parental” leave) have helped young parents to combine work and family duties. The background of these measures is a decline in the size of Hungary’s population, and the refusal of the government to balance low birth rates and brain drain with immigration. The measures so far have not stopped this trend and have favored high income decennials over poorer ones. As recent data shows, it is only the highest income groups that keep family size stable (Vida 2021).
In terms of political communication, support for and protection of families has figured prominently on the Fidesz agenda for some time. Katalin Novák, state secretary for families and youth in the Ministry of Human Capacities (EMMI) since 2014, became family minister without portfolio in October 2020. After her nomination to the office of Hungarian president in late 2021, her responsibilities were transferred to the Prime Minister’s Office. The Orbán government’s family policy has emphasized traditional Christian values. It has produced a political hysteria around the danger of gender issues for Hungarian families, supposedly against the alleged Western practice of trans-operations on young children. The Orbán government has presented these controversies as the main reason for the clash with the European Union over the recovery funds.
Citations:
Vida, C. (2021): Jövedelmi tizedek, avagy a hazai családpolitika hatásai a háztartások létszámának alakulására, in: Magyar Közgazdasági Társaság, December 15 (http://fejlodesgazdasagtan.hu/2021/12/15/jovedelmi-tizedek-avagy-a-hazai-csaladpolitika-hatasai-a-haztartasok-letszamanak-alakulasara/).
In terms of political communication, support for and protection of families has figured prominently on the Fidesz agenda for some time. Katalin Novák, state secretary for families and youth in the Ministry of Human Capacities (EMMI) since 2014, became family minister without portfolio in October 2020. After her nomination to the office of Hungarian president in late 2021, her responsibilities were transferred to the Prime Minister’s Office. The Orbán government’s family policy has emphasized traditional Christian values. It has produced a political hysteria around the danger of gender issues for Hungarian families, supposedly against the alleged Western practice of trans-operations on young children. The Orbán government has presented these controversies as the main reason for the clash with the European Union over the recovery funds.
Citations:
Vida, C. (2021): Jövedelmi tizedek, avagy a hazai családpolitika hatásai a háztartások létszámának alakulására, in: Magyar Közgazdasági Társaság, December 15 (http://fejlodesgazdasagtan.hu/2021/12/15/jovedelmi-tizedek-avagy-a-hazai-csaladpolitika-hatasai-a-haztartasok-letszamanak-alakulasara/).
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To what extent does pension policy realize goals of poverty prevention, intergenerational equity and fiscal sustainability?
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Pension policy achieves the objectives fully.
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Pension policy achieves the objectives largely.
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Pension policy achieves the objectives partly.
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Pension policy does not achieve the objectives at all.
Hungary introduced a three-pillar pension system along World Bank guidelines in 1997 that featured a strong mandatory, fully funded second pillar. Upon coming to office, the second Orbán government abolished this second pillar and confiscated its assets. It also shifted disability pensions to the social assistance scheme, eliminated some early-retirement options and did not reverse the shift from Swiss indexation (which adjusts outstanding pensions by the average of the price and wage indices) to price indexation, as it had been introduced by the previous government in the context of the great recession. While limiting pension growth and undermining trust in the reliability of pension policy, these measures have improved the financial situation of the public pension scheme. Public spending on pensions has fallen from 11% of GDP in 2010 to 8% in 2020.
The growing gap between the growth in wages and pensions has made pensioners one of the most disadvantaged groups under the Orbán governments. The Fidesz government has sought to limit the electoral fallout by introducing discretionary increases in pensions before elections. In 2020, it adopted a gradual re-introduction of the 13th month pension, which was widely perceived as a campaign goody in preparation of the 2022 parliamentary elections (Gál 2020). At the end of 2021, it announced a greater than planned boost in pensions for 2022.
Citations:
Gál, R.I. (2020): Hungary re-introduces the 13th month pension as part of its response to COVID-19. European Social Policy Network, ESPN Flash Report 2020/37, Brussels: European Commission.
The growing gap between the growth in wages and pensions has made pensioners one of the most disadvantaged groups under the Orbán governments. The Fidesz government has sought to limit the electoral fallout by introducing discretionary increases in pensions before elections. In 2020, it adopted a gradual re-introduction of the 13th month pension, which was widely perceived as a campaign goody in preparation of the 2022 parliamentary elections (Gál 2020). At the end of 2021, it announced a greater than planned boost in pensions for 2022.
Citations:
Gál, R.I. (2020): Hungary re-introduces the 13th month pension as part of its response to COVID-19. European Social Policy Network, ESPN Flash Report 2020/37, Brussels: European Commission.
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How effectively do policies support the integration of migrants into society?
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Cultural, education and social policies effectively support the integration of migrants into society.
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Cultural, education and social policies seek to integrate migrants into society, but have failed to do so effectively.
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Cultural, education and social policies do not focus on integrating migrants into society.
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Cultural, education and social policies segregate migrant communities from the majority society.
Migration is a highly polarizing issue in Hungary and is one cornerstone of the Orbán government’s othering narrative, which takes Islam and the European Union as two “them” poles. While the Orbán government has favored the migration of ethnic Hungarians, it has sought to keep refugees and other migrants out. Instead of fostering their integration, it has campaigned against them. Hungary does not support the Global Compact on Refugees. In February 2021, a government degree regulating the entry of migrants to Hungary was modified with the intention of widening the competencies of the police and customs officers to reject the entry of asylum-seekers and other migrants to Hungary. As a result, only 117 asylum-seekers were registered in Hungary in 2020 (UNHCR 2021). Integration into Hungarian society is a huge challenge for migrants (Hungarian Helsinki Committee 2021). There is no integration strategy, access to education for immigrant children is restricted, rules against domestic violence do not apply to foreign victims, and NGOs in the field do not have access to EU funds.
Citations:
Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2021): Universal periodic review of Hungary 2021. Budapest (https://helsinki.hu/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2021/10/UPR2021_Hungary_Refugees.pdf).
UNHCR (2021): Fact Sheet Hungary. Geneva (https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/Bi-annual%20fact%20sheet%202021%2002%20Hungary.pdf).
Citations:
Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2021): Universal periodic review of Hungary 2021. Budapest (https://helsinki.hu/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2021/10/UPR2021_Hungary_Refugees.pdf).
UNHCR (2021): Fact Sheet Hungary. Geneva (https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/Bi-annual%20fact%20sheet%202021%2002%20Hungary.pdf).
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How effectively does internal security policy protect citizens against security risks?
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Internal security policy protects citizens against security risks very effectively.
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Internal security policy protects citizens against security risks more or less effectively.
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Internal security policy does not effectively protect citizens against security risks.
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Internal security policy exacerbates the security risks.
Despite the social disturbances during the COVID-19 pandemic, including the closure of many SMEs, unemployment and impoverishment, public order has been maintained at the usual level. Both Budapest (the only big city) and the entire country have remained safe. The number of crimes committed registered by the Hungarian Statistical Office decreased from 199,830 in 2018 to 165,648 in 2019 to a long-time low of 162,416 in 2020. There are, however, some regional differences in the decline of crimes committed. The highest drop was recorded in the capital city of Budapest. In the countryside, numbers are a bit better in the west of the country than in the east. This fits with economic performance data for Hungary, with Budapest and the western part of the country developing much faster than the east.
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To what extent does the government demonstrate an active and coherent commitment to promoting equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries?
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The government actively and coherently engages in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries. It frequently demonstrates initiative and responsibility, and acts as an agenda-setter.
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The government actively engages in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries. However, some of its measures or policies lack coherence.
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The government shows limited engagement in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries. Many of its measures or policies lack coherence.
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The government does not contribute (and often undermines) efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries.
Hungary pays relatively little policy attention to developing countries and joined the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee only in 2016. However, the government adopted a new development strategy in 2019 (Hungarian Government 2019) and has gradually increased its development assistance. ODA amounted to 0.27% of GDP in 2020, less than the average for DAC countries, but substantially above the share in 2010 (0.09%). Although the Hungarian development policy targets areas in the Middle East and in Africa, the major focus is on Europe, especially the western Balkans.
Citations:
Hungarian Government (2019): A Magyar Kormány Nemzetközi Fejlesztési Együttműködési Stratégiája a 2020 és 2025 közötti időszakra NEFE2025. Budapest (https://nefe.kormany.hu/download/7/8d/82000/NEFE2025%20-%20Strat%C3%A9gia.pdf).
Citations:
Hungarian Government (2019): A Magyar Kormány Nemzetközi Fejlesztési Együttműködési Stratégiája a 2020 és 2025 közötti időszakra NEFE2025. Budapest (https://nefe.kormany.hu/download/7/8d/82000/NEFE2025%20-%20Strat%C3%A9gia.pdf).