Executive Accountability
#16Key Findings
With a mixed set of strengths and weaknesses, Iceland falls into the upper-middle ranks (rank 16) in the area of executive accountability. However, its score on this measure has declined by 0.7 points since 2014.
Parliamentarians have limited resources, but sufficient oversight powers. The audit office and ombudsman are independent and well regarded, with audit-office resources now restored to their pre-crash levels. A data-protection authority deals with cases submitted either by public authorities or private individuals.
Despite a generally well-informed public, voter turnout rates have dropped significantly, particularly among young people, in parallel with a decline in policy interest and trust in politicians. The media provides in-depth information on state policy. The government operates an open consultation website that contains policy information, and where citizens can comment.
Parties use a variety of methods to choose their candidates. Economic organizations are skilled and influential, with a small number of other sophisticated interest organizations also holding strong public profiles. A small group of fishing oligarchs is particularly powerful, influencing policy and helping to keep Iceland out of the EU.
Parliamentarians have limited resources, but sufficient oversight powers. The audit office and ombudsman are independent and well regarded, with audit-office resources now restored to their pre-crash levels. A data-protection authority deals with cases submitted either by public authorities or private individuals.
Despite a generally well-informed public, voter turnout rates have dropped significantly, particularly among young people, in parallel with a decline in policy interest and trust in politicians. The media provides in-depth information on state policy. The government operates an open consultation website that contains policy information, and where citizens can comment.
Parties use a variety of methods to choose their candidates. Economic organizations are skilled and influential, with a small number of other sophisticated interest organizations also holding strong public profiles. A small group of fishing oligarchs is particularly powerful, influencing policy and helping to keep Iceland out of the EU.
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To what extent are citizens informed of public policies?
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Most citizens are well-informed of a broad range of public policies.
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Many citizens are well-informed of individual public policies.
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Few citizens are well-informed of public policies; most citizens have only a rudimental knowledge of public policies.
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Most citizens are not aware of public policies.
Iceland’s citizens are generally well informed about government policy. In local surveys, most citizens demonstrate familiarity with public policies, especially with respect to policies that either interest them or directly affect them. This is truer of domestic policies than of international politics, because the complexity of Iceland’s political landscape is comparatively low. By international standards, it is relatively easy to develop a comprehensive overview of the politics, parties, and policy issues in Iceland. Extensive interpersonal networks among citizens and Iceland’s distance from other countries contribute to the domestic preoccupation of Icelandic politics.
The immediate response to the 2008 economic collapse demonstrates an ability on the part of some voters to quickly adapt to changed circumstances. In voter surveys during the 2007 and 2009 parliamentary elections, the percentage of voters agreeing with the statement that Iceland was mainly governed in accordance with the popular will declined from 64% in 2007 to 31% in 2009. This trend was accentuated by the publication of the scathing Special Investigation Committee report in 2010. Even so, in the 2013 parliamentary elections, the Progressive Party (Framsóknarflokkurinn) made the largest proportionate gains, increasing its vote share from 14.8% to 24.4%. This increase was due to the party’s election pledge to write off up to 20% of homeowners’ mortgage debts at foreign expense. In the same election, the previous governing coalition lost more than half of their combined seats. The cabinet that came to power in 2013 was led by the Progressive Party.
Public debate surrounding two national referendums, in 2009 and 2011, concerning the so-called Icesave dispute, suggests strong public interest in the issue. Similarly, the 2012 national referendum on a new constitution secured a turnout of 49% of the electorate, despite the negative attitude of some of Iceland’s traditional political parties. Declining levels of public trust in politicians and the associated increase in political apathy coincide with a noticeable deterioration in how well-informed citizens are about national and international affairs. At 79%, voter turnout in the parliamentary election of 2016 was the lowest recorded since the beginning of the 20th century. Turnout among people aged 18 to 25 years old is especially low, as is the case in many Western democracies. Most current electoral research indicates that a significant proportion of young people do not vote due to a lack of interest. In the parliamentary elections in 2017 (81.2%) and 2021 (80.1%), voter turnout exceeded 80% again.
Citations:
Önnudóttir, E.H., and Hardarson, Ó. Th. (2009), “Óánægðir lýðræðissinnar: Afstaða Íslendinga til lýðræðis,” (Dissatisfied democrats: The Icelanders’ attitudes toward democracy), in Gudmundsson, H.S., and Ómarsdóttir, S. B. (2009), Rannsóknir í félagsvísindum X. Reykjavík, Háskólaútgáfan.
Eythórsson, G., and Kowalczyk, M. (2013), “Explaining the low voter turnout in Iceland’s 2010 local government elections,” Samtíð. An Icelandic journal of society and culture, Vol. 1.
Eythórsson, G. T., Önnudóttir, E. H., Hardarson, Ó. T., Valgardsson, V. O., Jónsdóttir, G. A., Björnsdóttir, A. E., and Birgisson, H. E. (2014), “Sveitarstjórnarkosningarnar 2014: Hverjar eru ástæður dræmrar kjörsóknar?” (What are the main reasons for the low voter turnout in the Local Government elections in 2014?).
Eythórsson, G. T., and Önnudóttir, E. H. (2017), “Abstainers reasoning for not voting in the Icelandic Local Government Election 2014,” Íslenska þjóðfélagið, Vol. 8, No. 1. http://thjodfelagid.is/index.php/Th/article/view/86. Accessed 4 February 2022.
The immediate response to the 2008 economic collapse demonstrates an ability on the part of some voters to quickly adapt to changed circumstances. In voter surveys during the 2007 and 2009 parliamentary elections, the percentage of voters agreeing with the statement that Iceland was mainly governed in accordance with the popular will declined from 64% in 2007 to 31% in 2009. This trend was accentuated by the publication of the scathing Special Investigation Committee report in 2010. Even so, in the 2013 parliamentary elections, the Progressive Party (Framsóknarflokkurinn) made the largest proportionate gains, increasing its vote share from 14.8% to 24.4%. This increase was due to the party’s election pledge to write off up to 20% of homeowners’ mortgage debts at foreign expense. In the same election, the previous governing coalition lost more than half of their combined seats. The cabinet that came to power in 2013 was led by the Progressive Party.
Public debate surrounding two national referendums, in 2009 and 2011, concerning the so-called Icesave dispute, suggests strong public interest in the issue. Similarly, the 2012 national referendum on a new constitution secured a turnout of 49% of the electorate, despite the negative attitude of some of Iceland’s traditional political parties. Declining levels of public trust in politicians and the associated increase in political apathy coincide with a noticeable deterioration in how well-informed citizens are about national and international affairs. At 79%, voter turnout in the parliamentary election of 2016 was the lowest recorded since the beginning of the 20th century. Turnout among people aged 18 to 25 years old is especially low, as is the case in many Western democracies. Most current electoral research indicates that a significant proportion of young people do not vote due to a lack of interest. In the parliamentary elections in 2017 (81.2%) and 2021 (80.1%), voter turnout exceeded 80% again.
Citations:
Önnudóttir, E.H., and Hardarson, Ó. Th. (2009), “Óánægðir lýðræðissinnar: Afstaða Íslendinga til lýðræðis,” (Dissatisfied democrats: The Icelanders’ attitudes toward democracy), in Gudmundsson, H.S., and Ómarsdóttir, S. B. (2009), Rannsóknir í félagsvísindum X. Reykjavík, Háskólaútgáfan.
Eythórsson, G., and Kowalczyk, M. (2013), “Explaining the low voter turnout in Iceland’s 2010 local government elections,” Samtíð. An Icelandic journal of society and culture, Vol. 1.
Eythórsson, G. T., Önnudóttir, E. H., Hardarson, Ó. T., Valgardsson, V. O., Jónsdóttir, G. A., Björnsdóttir, A. E., and Birgisson, H. E. (2014), “Sveitarstjórnarkosningarnar 2014: Hverjar eru ástæður dræmrar kjörsóknar?” (What are the main reasons for the low voter turnout in the Local Government elections in 2014?).
Eythórsson, G. T., and Önnudóttir, E. H. (2017), “Abstainers reasoning for not voting in the Icelandic Local Government Election 2014,” Íslenska þjóðfélagið, Vol. 8, No. 1. http://thjodfelagid.is/index.php/Th/article/view/86. Accessed 4 February 2022.
Does the government publish data and information in a way that strengthens citizens’ capacity to hold the government accountable?
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The government publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
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The government most of the time publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
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The government publishes data in a limited and not timely or user-friendly way.
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The government publishes (almost) no relevant data.
The government does not systematically or regularly publish data or information that could strengthen the ability of citizens to evaluate or monitor the government. On the contrary, the government is widely seen as seeking to hide information that is readily available to citizens in neighboring countries. For example, the Pension Fund for State Employees has refused to publish the names of those pensioners who receive the largest payments from the fund and the amounts they receive.
The governing board of the central bank, appointed by parliament, does not publish the minutes of its meetings. This makes it impossible to ascertain whether the board has fulfilled its legal obligations to ensure that the central bank follows the law and makes it harder to investigate allegations of legal violations by central bank officials. In October 2008, the central bank lent the private bank Kaupthing €500 million just as Kaupthing was about to fail. The loan was not made in accordance with the bank’s rules and may have violated the law. It is a matter of record that one-third of the loan amount was deposited immediately in an offshore tax haven. Even so, as no minutes of meetings were kept, there is no way to determine whether the governing board of the bank fulfilled its legal obligations, let alone took appropriate measures.
These examples notwithstanding, the government has for some time run an open consultation web portal (Samráðsgátt, samradsgatt.island.is/um-samradsgatt/) to increase transparency, and opportunities for public and stakeholder participation in policymaking. One can find and access drafts of bills, rules, and policy documents via the portal. Everyone can send in comments and suggestions. The extent to which such contributions can affect the actions or intentions of the government is, however, unclear.
Citations:
Samráðsgátt stjórnvalda. https://samradsgatt.island.is/oll-mal/?FilterDate=LatestChanged. Accessed 4 February 2022.
The governing board of the central bank, appointed by parliament, does not publish the minutes of its meetings. This makes it impossible to ascertain whether the board has fulfilled its legal obligations to ensure that the central bank follows the law and makes it harder to investigate allegations of legal violations by central bank officials. In October 2008, the central bank lent the private bank Kaupthing €500 million just as Kaupthing was about to fail. The loan was not made in accordance with the bank’s rules and may have violated the law. It is a matter of record that one-third of the loan amount was deposited immediately in an offshore tax haven. Even so, as no minutes of meetings were kept, there is no way to determine whether the governing board of the bank fulfilled its legal obligations, let alone took appropriate measures.
These examples notwithstanding, the government has for some time run an open consultation web portal (Samráðsgátt, samradsgatt.island.is/um-samradsgatt/) to increase transparency, and opportunities for public and stakeholder participation in policymaking. One can find and access drafts of bills, rules, and policy documents via the portal. Everyone can send in comments and suggestions. The extent to which such contributions can affect the actions or intentions of the government is, however, unclear.
Citations:
Samráðsgátt stjórnvalda. https://samradsgatt.island.is/oll-mal/?FilterDate=LatestChanged. Accessed 4 February 2022.
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Do members of parliament have adequate personnel and structural resources to monitor government activity effectively?
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring all government activity effectively.
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring a government’s major activities.
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
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The resources provided to the members of parliament are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
Parliamentarians have access to experts employed by parliament. While the 21-person Committee Department (Nefndasvið) is tasked with assisting the parliament’s standing committees, individual members can also turn to this department for assistance. However, the limited capacity of the Committee Department, combined with its primary mandate to assist the parliament’s standing committees, restricts its ability to effectively assist more than 50 of the 63 members of parliament. Ministers also have access to resources in their ministries. The Research and Information Office (Rannsókna- og upplýsingaskrifstofa), which has a staff of seven, collects data and other information for members of parliament.
In December 2018, the parliament passed a new budget for 2019, stipulating a substantial increase in the number of parliamentary assistants. At the time of writing in 2021/2022, there has not been an increase in staff numbers.
Citations:
Parliament (Althigi). Lög um breytingu á lögum nr. 88/1995, um þingfararkaup alþingismanna og þingfararkostnað (starfsmenn þingflokka og aðstoðarmenn formanna stjórnmálaflokka). Lög nr. 135 21. desember 2018.
Parliament (Althingi). https://www.althingi.is/um-althingi/skrifstofa-althingis/skipurit-og-hlutverk/. Accessed 10 January 2022.
In December 2018, the parliament passed a new budget for 2019, stipulating a substantial increase in the number of parliamentary assistants. At the time of writing in 2021/2022, there has not been an increase in staff numbers.
Citations:
Parliament (Althigi). Lög um breytingu á lögum nr. 88/1995, um þingfararkaup alþingismanna og þingfararkostnað (starfsmenn þingflokka og aðstoðarmenn formanna stjórnmálaflokka). Lög nr. 135 21. desember 2018.
Parliament (Althingi). https://www.althingi.is/um-althingi/skrifstofa-althingis/skipurit-og-hlutverk/. Accessed 10 January 2022.
Are parliamentary committees able to ask for government documents?
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Parliamentary committees may ask for most or all government documents; they are normally delivered in full and within an appropriate time frame.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are slightly limited; some important documents are not delivered or are delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are considerably limited; most important documents are not delivered or delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
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Parliamentary committees may not request government documents.
The Information Act from 2012 (Upplýsingalög, No. 140/2012) grants standing parliamentary committees the right to request government documents relating to their work, with the exception of classified documents. Exempted documents include minutes, memos, and other documents from cabinet meetings; correspondence between the government and experts for use in court cases; and working documents marked for government use only, excluding those containing a final decision about a case or information that cannot be gathered elsewhere. The government can restrict access to documents if it can make a case that there is an exceptional public security risk, such as national security, international relations, or business agreements. The Committee on Foreign Affairs has a special legal status, which allows it to request government documents that would enable it to fulfill its legal obligations. The chair of the committee and the foreign minister can decide to keep the discussions and decisions of the committee confidential. The Budget Committee can also request the government documents it needs to fulfill its legal obligations.
In a case relating to the most infamous telephone call in Icelandic history, the central bank refused to comply with a parliamentary committee request to release the recording or transcript of a telephone conversation, which took place shortly before the 2008 economic collapse, between the prime minister and the central bank governor. The right of parliamentary committees to request access to information does not secure the right to obtain information.
An internet newspaper, Kjarninn, sued the central bank in 2017 in an attempt to gain access to the coveted recording of the telephone conversation. Then, all of a sudden, a transcript of the recording was published in Morgunblaðið, which is edited by the former central bank governor. According to the transcript of the telephone conversation, the former central bank governor declares to the prime minister that the €500 million loan to Kaupthink Bank just before the financial crash will not be recovered.
In early 2022, the minister of the interior instructed the Directorate of Immigration not to provide parliament with the information that parliament had requested.
Citations:
The Information Act (Upplýsingalög nr. 142/2012)
“Dirctorate of Immigration ignores parliament at minister’s request” (Útlendingastofnun hunsar Alþingi að beiðni ráðuneytis), RÚV 28 January 2022, https://www.ruv.is/frett/2022/01/28/utlendingastofnun-hunsar-althingi-ad-beidni-raduneytis. Accessed 4 February 2022.
In a case relating to the most infamous telephone call in Icelandic history, the central bank refused to comply with a parliamentary committee request to release the recording or transcript of a telephone conversation, which took place shortly before the 2008 economic collapse, between the prime minister and the central bank governor. The right of parliamentary committees to request access to information does not secure the right to obtain information.
An internet newspaper, Kjarninn, sued the central bank in 2017 in an attempt to gain access to the coveted recording of the telephone conversation. Then, all of a sudden, a transcript of the recording was published in Morgunblaðið, which is edited by the former central bank governor. According to the transcript of the telephone conversation, the former central bank governor declares to the prime minister that the €500 million loan to Kaupthink Bank just before the financial crash will not be recovered.
In early 2022, the minister of the interior instructed the Directorate of Immigration not to provide parliament with the information that parliament had requested.
Citations:
The Information Act (Upplýsingalög nr. 142/2012)
“Dirctorate of Immigration ignores parliament at minister’s request” (Útlendingastofnun hunsar Alþingi að beiðni ráðuneytis), RÚV 28 January 2022, https://www.ruv.is/frett/2022/01/28/utlendingastofnun-hunsar-althingi-ad-beidni-raduneytis. Accessed 4 February 2022.
Are parliamentary committees able to summon ministers for hearings?
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Parliamentary committees may summon ministers. Ministers regularly follow invitations and are obliged to answer questions.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are slightly limited; ministers occasionally refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are considerably limited; ministers frequently refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
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Parliamentary committees may not summon ministers.
Parliamentary committees can legally summon ministers for hearings, but seldom do so. The foreign minister is summoned and usually attends meetings of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The relative representation of each party across and within parliamentary committees reflects the relative representation of each party in parliament.
The Special Investigation Committee, appointed by the parliament in December 2008 to investigate the processes that led to the collapse of Iceland’s three main banks, summoned several ministers and ex-ministers during 2009 and 2010.
The most notable example of a prominent politician being held accountable was the 2010 indictment of Prime Minister Geir Haarde by parliament, which led to a trial in 2012 before the High Court of Impeachment. Haarde was found guilty on one count of negligence relating to his tenure as prime minister before the 2008 economic collapse. He was found guilty of neglecting to hold cabinet meetings, during the first months of 2008, on important issues relating to the economic collapse. This obligation is stated in paragraph 17 of the constitution. As a first-time offender, Haarde was not given a custodial sentence. He was Iceland’s ambassador to the United States until 2019, when he was appointed executive director representing the Nordic and Baltic countries at the World Bank.
Citations:
World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/people/g/geir-hilmar-haarde
The Special Investigation Committee, appointed by the parliament in December 2008 to investigate the processes that led to the collapse of Iceland’s three main banks, summoned several ministers and ex-ministers during 2009 and 2010.
The most notable example of a prominent politician being held accountable was the 2010 indictment of Prime Minister Geir Haarde by parliament, which led to a trial in 2012 before the High Court of Impeachment. Haarde was found guilty on one count of negligence relating to his tenure as prime minister before the 2008 economic collapse. He was found guilty of neglecting to hold cabinet meetings, during the first months of 2008, on important issues relating to the economic collapse. This obligation is stated in paragraph 17 of the constitution. As a first-time offender, Haarde was not given a custodial sentence. He was Iceland’s ambassador to the United States until 2019, when he was appointed executive director representing the Nordic and Baltic countries at the World Bank.
Citations:
World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/people/g/geir-hilmar-haarde
Are parliamentary committees able to summon experts for committee meetings?
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Parliamentary committees may summon experts.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are slightly limited.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are considerably limited.
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Parliamentary committees may not summon experts.
Independent experts are frequently asked to appear before standing parliamentary committees. Following the 2008 economic collapse, committees have more frequently summoned experts, particularly lawyers, economists, and finance and banking experts. Furthermore, political scientists and other experts were asked to give advice relating to the drafting of a new constitution. However, no substantive minutes are recorded of expert testimonies before parliamentary meetings. There have been examples documented of experts making outlandish statements in their testimonies.
In November 2018, the constitutional and supervisory committee of parliament summoned several members of parliament to a hearing following a scandal in which six members of parliament were taped in a public bar by an offended bystander using foul and misogynistic language, several of the members of parliament were intoxicated at the time of the incident. With one exception, the summoned members of parliament did not attend the hearing and the hearing was postponed indefinitely.
Citations:
Gylfason, Thorvaldur (2014), “Tvöfalt líf – Allir segjast vera saklausir …,” samtal við Þráin Bertelsson (Double Life – Everyone proclaims innocense …, a conversation with Thráinn Bertelsson), Tímarit Máls og menningar, 4. hefti, https://tmm.forlagid.is/tvofalt-lif/. Accessed 4 February 2022.
In November 2018, the constitutional and supervisory committee of parliament summoned several members of parliament to a hearing following a scandal in which six members of parliament were taped in a public bar by an offended bystander using foul and misogynistic language, several of the members of parliament were intoxicated at the time of the incident. With one exception, the summoned members of parliament did not attend the hearing and the hearing was postponed indefinitely.
Citations:
Gylfason, Thorvaldur (2014), “Tvöfalt líf – Allir segjast vera saklausir …,” samtal við Þráin Bertelsson (Double Life – Everyone proclaims innocense …, a conversation with Thráinn Bertelsson), Tímarit Máls og menningar, 4. hefti, https://tmm.forlagid.is/tvofalt-lif/. Accessed 4 February 2022.
Are the task areas and structures of parliamentary committees suited to monitor ministries effectively?
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The match between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are well-suited to the effective monitoring of ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are largely suited to the monitoring ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are partially suited to the monitoring of ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are not at all suited to the monitoring of ministries.
The coalition negotiations between the Independence Party, the Progressive Party and the Left-Green Movement, following the September 2021 election, included a reorganization of ministries. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Children became the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Labor Market. Some of the former ministry’s responsibilities were assigned to the new Ministry of Education and Children’s Affairs, which was also made responsible for primary and secondary education. The Ministry of Education and Culture Affairs was abolished, and cultural policy was assigned to the Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Culture. At the same time, responsibility for university education was assigned to the new Ministry of Science, Industry and Innovation. Other ministries remained unchanged, except that the Ministry of Communications and Local Government was renamed the Ministry of Infrastructure. This reshuffle further reduced the policy alignment between standing parliamentary committees and ministry responsibilities.
Two of the standing parliamentary committees have a special role vis-à-vis the government. The committee responsible for financial issues and budget preparation has the authority to request information from institutions and companies that ask for budgetary funding. The Committee on Foreign Affairs has advisory status vis-à-vis the government regarding all major international policies and the government is obliged to discuss all major decisions concerning international affairs with the committee.
Parliamentary committees rarely oppose the ministries, as party affiliation of committee members reflects the parliamentary power of the governing parties. Thus, even if the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries nearly coincide, that does not guarantee effective monitoring. Minority members from the opposition can, however, use the committees as a venue to voice their opinions.
Two of the standing parliamentary committees have a special role vis-à-vis the government. The committee responsible for financial issues and budget preparation has the authority to request information from institutions and companies that ask for budgetary funding. The Committee on Foreign Affairs has advisory status vis-à-vis the government regarding all major international policies and the government is obliged to discuss all major decisions concerning international affairs with the committee.
Parliamentary committees rarely oppose the ministries, as party affiliation of committee members reflects the parliamentary power of the governing parties. Thus, even if the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries nearly coincide, that does not guarantee effective monitoring. Minority members from the opposition can, however, use the committees as a venue to voice their opinions.
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To what extent do media in your country analyze the rationale and impact of public policies?
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A clear majority of mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies.
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About one-half of the mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies. The rest produces a mix of infotainment and quality information content.
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A clear minority of mass media brands focuses on high-quality information content analyzing public policies. Several mass media brands produce superficial infotainment content only.
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All mass media brands are dominated by superficial infotainment content.
Iceland’s main TV and radio stations provide fairly substantive in-depth information on government decisions. Radio analysis typically tends to be deeper than that found on television since the small size of the market limits the financial resources of TV stations. However, in-depth analysis on TV increased significantly when the private TV station Hringbraut increased the weight of such analyses in their programs in 2016. In 2018, the TV station was struggling financially and aired sponsored programs. In late 2019, a merger between Hringbraut and the newspaper Fréttablaðið was announced. Further, Fréttablaðið then purchased DV, a smaller newspaper. That will probably strengthen the ability of all three media outlets to undertake in-depth analyses as well as their economic position. Critical analysis of government policies by independent observers, experts, and journalists is a fairly recent phenomenon in Iceland.
The Special Investigation Committee report had a separate chapter on the media before and during the 2008 economic collapse. The report criticized the media for not having been critical enough in their coverage of the Icelandic banks and other financial institutions before the 2008 economic collapse. The report argues, on the basis of content analyses of media coverage of the banks, that the media was too biased toward the banks as was the case, for example, in the United States during the 1920s.
The Special Investigation Committee report had a separate chapter on the media before and during the 2008 economic collapse. The report criticized the media for not having been critical enough in their coverage of the Icelandic banks and other financial institutions before the 2008 economic collapse. The report argues, on the basis of content analyses of media coverage of the banks, that the media was too biased toward the banks as was the case, for example, in the United States during the 1920s.
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How inclusive and open are the major parties in their internal decision-making processes?
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The party allows all party members and supporters to participate in its decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and agendas of issues are open.
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The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, all party members have the opportunity to participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are rather open.
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The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, a number of elected delegates participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are largely controlled by the party leadership.
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A number of party leaders participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are fully controlled and drafted by the party leadership.
In the 2013 parliamentary elections, four out of 15 parties gained more than 10% of the votes. These four parties all hold their national conventions, which are the supreme decision-making forums for the parties, every second year. The conventions issue resolutions on major public policy issues, which oblige the members of parliament of the respective party to abide by these directives. Representatives from the regional and local party units of all parties have the right to participate in party conventions. The number of representatives attending is proportional to the number of party members in each unit. The nomination processes vary slightly among parties. Most parties have a tradition of primary elections in which only party members or declared supporters have the right to vote. The Progressive Party has for long had different rules, under which most constituencies have a constituency board (Kjördæmisráð) that selects candidates to a constituency congress (Kjördæmisþing). The number of representatives of each local party unit is equal to the proportion of each unit’s membership to the total membership of all units. At these congresses, candidates are elected one by one.
Regeneration (Viðreisn) does not hold primary elections. The Pirate Party (Píratapartíið), which has held seats in Althingi since 2013, holds electronic primary elections in every constituency. Further, the Pirate Party uses internet platforms to conduct open debates on many policy issues. The People’s Party (Flokkur fólksins) and the Centre Party (Miðflokkurinn), two parties that gained parliamentary seats for the first time in 2017 and won re-election in 2021, did not have any open selection procedures. Meanwhile, the Pirate Party held electronic primaries countrywide. In the nomination processes for the 2021 elections, the Social Democrats (Samfylkingin) decided to change from primaries to a much more internal nomination method. This led to disputes within the party and cost the party support. The independence Party held primaries in all constituencies in 2021.
Regeneration (Viðreisn) does not hold primary elections. The Pirate Party (Píratapartíið), which has held seats in Althingi since 2013, holds electronic primary elections in every constituency. Further, the Pirate Party uses internet platforms to conduct open debates on many policy issues. The People’s Party (Flokkur fólksins) and the Centre Party (Miðflokkurinn), two parties that gained parliamentary seats for the first time in 2017 and won re-election in 2021, did not have any open selection procedures. Meanwhile, the Pirate Party held electronic primaries countrywide. In the nomination processes for the 2021 elections, the Social Democrats (Samfylkingin) decided to change from primaries to a much more internal nomination method. This led to disputes within the party and cost the party support. The independence Party held primaries in all constituencies in 2021.
To what extent are economic interest associations (e.g., employers, industry, labor) capable of formulating relevant policies?
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9
9
Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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7
6
7
6
Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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3
4
3
Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
2
1
1
Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
The main interest organizations in Iceland continue to have considerable influence on public policymaking and engagement with political parties.
The Confederation of Icelandic Employers (Samtök atvinnulífsins, SA), referred to as the employers’ association, has close, informal ties to the right-wing Independence Party. Likewise, the Icelandic Confederation of Labor (Alþýðusamband Íslands, ASÍ) has close links to the parties on the left, although its formal ties to the Social Democratic Party were severed in 1942. Until its breakup in the 1990s, the cooperative movement, with its strong ties to the agricultural sector, was closely linked to the Progressive Party (Framsókn), which has its origins in the farmers’ movement.
Closely associated with the Confederation of Icelandic Employers is the Iceland Chamber of Commerce, which – despite stating that all was well just before the 2008 collapse – continues to provide advice to the government.
A small group of vessel-owning oligarchs has amassed huge wealth through the discriminatory fisheries management system. They are widely viewed as holding significant political power, which they use to prevent reform of fisheries management, prevent the ratification of the new constitution and keep Iceland out of the European Union.
All major interest organizations have a staff of skilled employees who create research-based policy proposals that are usually well grounded, coherent and in line with the organizations’ goals.
Citations:
Gunnarsson, Styrmir (2009), Umsátrid (The Siege), Veröld, Reykjavík.
The Confederation of Icelandic Employers (Samtök atvinnulífsins, SA), referred to as the employers’ association, has close, informal ties to the right-wing Independence Party. Likewise, the Icelandic Confederation of Labor (Alþýðusamband Íslands, ASÍ) has close links to the parties on the left, although its formal ties to the Social Democratic Party were severed in 1942. Until its breakup in the 1990s, the cooperative movement, with its strong ties to the agricultural sector, was closely linked to the Progressive Party (Framsókn), which has its origins in the farmers’ movement.
Closely associated with the Confederation of Icelandic Employers is the Iceland Chamber of Commerce, which – despite stating that all was well just before the 2008 collapse – continues to provide advice to the government.
A small group of vessel-owning oligarchs has amassed huge wealth through the discriminatory fisheries management system. They are widely viewed as holding significant political power, which they use to prevent reform of fisheries management, prevent the ratification of the new constitution and keep Iceland out of the European Union.
All major interest organizations have a staff of skilled employees who create research-based policy proposals that are usually well grounded, coherent and in line with the organizations’ goals.
Citations:
Gunnarsson, Styrmir (2009), Umsátrid (The Siege), Veröld, Reykjavík.
To what extent are non-economic interest associations capable of formulating relevant policies?
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9
9
Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
2
1
1
Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
Iceland has many active, noneconomic interest organizations in various fields. Although many have a reasonable level of prominence, only a few have the capacity and competence to exert significant influence on public policy. The largest are the Organization of Disabled in Iceland (Öryrkjabandalagið), with 41 associated organizations and a staff of 19, and the Consumers’ Association of Iceland (Neytendasamtökin), with a staff of six today and 7,300 members in 2018 (more recent information is not accessible). The Nature and Wildlife Conservation Organization (Náttúruverndarsamtök Íslands), which had 1,400 members and one member of staff in 2018, is also influential. This group has managed to feature prominently in public debates about hydro and geothermal power plants, and has expressed reservations about further construction of aluminum smelters around the country. Landvernd, the Icelandic Environmental Association with 6,000 members and 16 employees, also has influence.
Citations:
Landvernd, http://landvernd.is/en. Accessed 20th October 2019.
Consumers’ Association of Iceland (Neytendasamtökin), https://ns.is/. Accessed 22 December 2018.
The Organisation of Disabled in Iceland (Öryrkjabandalagið), https://www.obi.is/is/english Accessed 20th October 2019.
Citations:
Landvernd, http://landvernd.is/en. Accessed 20th October 2019.
Consumers’ Association of Iceland (Neytendasamtökin), https://ns.is/. Accessed 22 December 2018.
The Organisation of Disabled in Iceland (Öryrkjabandalagið), https://www.obi.is/is/english Accessed 20th October 2019.
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Does there exist an independent and effective audit office?
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There exists an effective and independent audit office.
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There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is slightly limited.
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There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
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1
There does not exist an independent and effective audit office.
Iceland’s National Audit Office (Ríkisendurskoðun) is fully accountable to parliament. Considering its substantial human and financial resource constraints, the National Audit Office performs its functions quite effectively. These constraints, however, mean that a vast majority of the agencies under its jurisdiction have never been audited. No significant strengthening of the office’s financial resources has occurred for several years, as its staff numbers were reduced from 49 in 2009 to 41 in 2015, a total of 16%. However, the number of staff has been restored to 50.
Citations:
Ársskýrsla Ríkisendurskoðunar 2020 (Annual Report of National Audit Office 2020). https://www.rikisend.is/reskjol/files/Arsskyrslur/Arsskyrsla_2020.pdf. Accessed 7 February 2022.
Citations:
Ársskýrsla Ríkisendurskoðunar 2020 (Annual Report of National Audit Office 2020). https://www.rikisend.is/reskjol/files/Arsskyrslur/Arsskyrsla_2020.pdf. Accessed 7 February 2022.
Does there exist an independent and effective ombuds office?
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9
9
There exists an effective and independent ombuds office.
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There exists an effective and independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is slightly limited.
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3
There exists an independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is considerably limited.
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1
1
There does not exist an effective and independent ombuds office.
The Parliamentary Ombudsman (Umboðsmaður Alþingis), established in 1997, investigates cases both on its own initiative and at the request of citizens and firms. It is independent, efficient, and generally well regarded. The office has 17 staff members, including nine lawyers. In February 2021, Gallup reported that 49% of respondents expressed confidence in the Parliamentary Ombudsman compared with 34% confidence in parliament.
Citations:
The Parliamentary Ombudsman (Umboðsmaður Alþingis), https://www.umbodsmadur.is/um-umbodsmann/starfsmenn. Accessed 28 December 2021.
Gallup, https://www.gallup.is/nidurstodur/thjodarpuls/traust-til-stofnana/ Accessed 29th December 2021.
Citations:
The Parliamentary Ombudsman (Umboðsmaður Alþingis), https://www.umbodsmadur.is/um-umbodsmann/starfsmenn. Accessed 28 December 2021.
Gallup, https://www.gallup.is/nidurstodur/thjodarpuls/traust-til-stofnana/ Accessed 29th December 2021.
Is there an independent authority in place that effectively holds government offices accountable for handling issues of data protection and privacy?
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An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
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An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is slightly limited.
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3
A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are strongly limited.
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There is no effective and independent data protection office.
The Icelandic Data Protection Authority (Persónuvernd) is a state-run authority, which monitors the processing of data to which the Act on Data Protection and the Processing of Personal Data No. 90/2018 apply. The authority deals with specific cases requested by public authorities or private individuals, or on its own initiative.
Citations:
The Icelandic Data Protection Authority (Persónuvernd), https://www.personuvernd.is/personuvernd/. Accessed 29 December 2021.
Citations:
The Icelandic Data Protection Authority (Persónuvernd), https://www.personuvernd.is/personuvernd/. Accessed 29 December 2021.