Quality of Democracy
#31Key Findings
Showing a mixed pattern of strengths and weaknesses, Iceland scores relatively poorly (rank 31) for the quality of its democracy. Its score on this measure has declined by 1.4 points relative to 2014.
Parties receive public and private funding. The established political parties have granted themselves significant budgetary support in recent years, tipping the scales against opponents. Alleged irregularities in the 2021 parliamentary elections led candidates to appeal the election results to the ECHR for the first time in the country’s history.
Civil rights are well protected. Despite robust nondiscrimination laws, some gender and other discrimination persists. Legal certainty is generally robust, though the judicial appointment process has led to a number of recent controversies. Financial corruption is rare, but abuse of office does occur, and links between politicians and banks remain a concern.
A proposed new constitution and voting system were supported by strong majorities in a non-binding public referendum in 2012. However, this was never ratified by parliament. Referenda are called if the president refuses to sign bills. The government has been secretive about releasing potentially compromising information, but is sometimes overturned by an Information Committee.
Parties receive public and private funding. The established political parties have granted themselves significant budgetary support in recent years, tipping the scales against opponents. Alleged irregularities in the 2021 parliamentary elections led candidates to appeal the election results to the ECHR for the first time in the country’s history.
Civil rights are well protected. Despite robust nondiscrimination laws, some gender and other discrimination persists. Legal certainty is generally robust, though the judicial appointment process has led to a number of recent controversies. Financial corruption is rare, but abuse of office does occur, and links between politicians and banks remain a concern.
A proposed new constitution and voting system were supported by strong majorities in a non-binding public referendum in 2012. However, this was never ratified by parliament. Referenda are called if the president refuses to sign bills. The government has been secretive about releasing potentially compromising information, but is sometimes overturned by an Information Committee.
Graph View
Graph View
How fair are procedures for registering candidates and parties?
10
9
9
Legal regulations provide for a fair registration procedure for all elections; candidates and parties are not discriminated against.
8
7
6
7
6
A few restrictions on election procedures discriminate against a small number of candidates and parties.
5
4
3
4
3
Some unreasonable restrictions on election procedures exist that discriminate against many candidates and parties.
2
1
1
Discriminating registration procedures for elections are widespread and prevent a large number of potential candidates or parties from participating.
Most Icelandic citizens aged 18 years or over can run for parliament. Exceptions include Supreme Court justices and adult individuals convicted of a serious felony or sentenced to four months or more in custody. For local elections, with the exception of the minimum age limit, these restrictions do not apply. Citizens of other Nordic countries with three years’ consecutive residence in Iceland can stand as candidates in local elections. The registration process for candidates and parties is transparent and fair.
The minimum 5% share of the national vote required to get so-called leveling seats (jöfnunarþingsæti) in parliament was set in 2000. In addition to this 5% threshold, parties can win a seat by securing a seat in a constituency. This minimum threshold is the same as in Germany, but higher than in the other Nordic countries (Sweden and Norway 4%, Denmark 2%).
A consequence of this system is that many votes fail to directly influence the results. As many as 12% of the votes in 2013 won no parliamentary representation, as they went to parties that failed to win a constituency seat or polled less than 5% of the national vote. This was the largest share of unrepresented votes in Iceland’s modern history due to a record 15 parties running for parliament in 2013. In the 2016 elections, parties that did not reach the 5% threshold received a combined 5.7% of the total vote and 4.7% in the 2021 elections.
Citations:
Bengtsson, Å., Hansen, K. M., Harðarson, Ó. T., Narud, H. M. and Oscarsson, H. (2014), The Nordic Voter. Myths of exceptionalism. Essex. ECPR Press.
Lög um kosningar til Alþingis nr. 24/2000 (Law on parliamentary elections nr. 24/2000).
The minimum 5% share of the national vote required to get so-called leveling seats (jöfnunarþingsæti) in parliament was set in 2000. In addition to this 5% threshold, parties can win a seat by securing a seat in a constituency. This minimum threshold is the same as in Germany, but higher than in the other Nordic countries (Sweden and Norway 4%, Denmark 2%).
A consequence of this system is that many votes fail to directly influence the results. As many as 12% of the votes in 2013 won no parliamentary representation, as they went to parties that failed to win a constituency seat or polled less than 5% of the national vote. This was the largest share of unrepresented votes in Iceland’s modern history due to a record 15 parties running for parliament in 2013. In the 2016 elections, parties that did not reach the 5% threshold received a combined 5.7% of the total vote and 4.7% in the 2021 elections.
Citations:
Bengtsson, Å., Hansen, K. M., Harðarson, Ó. T., Narud, H. M. and Oscarsson, H. (2014), The Nordic Voter. Myths of exceptionalism. Essex. ECPR Press.
Lög um kosningar til Alþingis nr. 24/2000 (Law on parliamentary elections nr. 24/2000).
To what extent do candidates and parties have fair access to the media and other means of communication?
10
9
9
All candidates and parties have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. All major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of the range of different political positions.
8
7
6
7
6
Candidates and parties have largely equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. The major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of different political positions.
5
4
3
4
3
Candidates and parties often do not have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. While the major media outlets represent a partisan political bias, the media system as a whole provides fair coverage of different political positions.
2
1
1
Candidates and parties lack equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communications. The major media outlets are biased in favor of certain political groups or views and discriminate against others.
Formally, all parties or candidates have equal access to media. There are no restrictions based on race, gender, language, or other such demographic factors. However, parties already represented in the national parliament or in local councils have an electoral advantage over new parties or candidates. During the 2017 election campaign, two small parties complained about not being allowed to participate in the traditional party leader debate on state-run TV the night before the election. The parties were told they would not be included in the debate because they were unlikely to secure the 5% of votes necessary to win representation and they were not fielding candidates in every constituency.
The established political parties have granted themselves significant budget support in recent years, filling their coffers and thus tilting the playing field in their favor against their opponents.
The established political parties have granted themselves significant budget support in recent years, filling their coffers and thus tilting the playing field in their favor against their opponents.
To what extent do all citizens have the opportunity to exercise their right of participation in national elections?
10
9
9
All adult citizens can participate in national elections. All eligible voters are registered if they wish to be. There are no discriminations observable in the exercise of the right to vote. There are no disincentives to voting.
8
7
6
7
6
The procedures for the registration of voters and voting are for the most part effective, impartial and nondiscriminatory. Citizens can appeal to courts if they feel being discriminated. Disincentives to voting generally do not constitute genuine obstacles.
5
4
3
4
3
While the procedures for the registration of voters and voting are de jure non-discriminatory, isolated cases of discrimination occur in practice. For some citizens, disincentives to voting constitute significant obstacles.
2
1
1
The procedures for the registration of voters or voting have systemic discriminatory effects. De facto, a substantial number of adult citizens are excluded from national elections.
Iceland’s voting procedure is unrestricted. If an individual is registered as a voter within a constituency, he or she only has to present personal identification to cast a vote. Every person 18 years or older has the right to vote.
To what extent is private and public party financing and electoral campaign financing transparent, effectively monitored and in case of infringement of rules subject to proportionate and dissuasive sanction?
10
9
9
The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and provides for independent monitoring to that respect. Effective measures to prevent evasion are effectively in place and infringements subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.
8
7
6
7
6
The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and provides for independent monitoring. Although infringements are subject to proportionate sanctions, some, although few, loopholes and options for circumvention still exist.
5
4
3
4
3
The state provides that donations to political parties shall be published. Party financing is subject to some degree of independent monitoring but monitoring either proves regularly ineffective or proportionate sanctions in case of infringement do not follow.
2
1
1
The rules for party and campaign financing do not effectively enforce the obligation to make the donations public. Party and campaign financing is neither monitored independently nor, in case of infringements, subject to proportionate sanctions.
The 2006 law regulating the financing of political parties provides three types of public grants. First, an annual grant, proportional to the national vote share in the preceding election, is awarded to any party or independent group with at least one member of parliament or attained at least 2.5% of the national vote in the last election. Second, an annual grant, proportional to the number of seats in parliament, is awarded to all parliamentary parties or independent groups. Third, a grant is awarded to any party or independent group, in a municipality of 500 inhabitants or more, with at least one member in the local council or which attained at least 5% of the vote in the last municipal election. The law also regulates private contributions to political activity. For example, parties are not allowed to accept more than ISK 400,000 (€2,900) from any private actor, company, or individual.
The National Audit Office (Ríkisendurskoðun) monitors party and candidate finances, and publishes annual summaries that include total expenditure and income. Income must be classified by origin, identifying companies or other entities contributing to party finances before and during election periods. Compliance by the parties varies.
Before the 2007 election campaign, political parties reached an agreement that a maximum of ISK 28 million could be spent on TV, radio, and newspaper advertisements. Moreover, there is legal limit on electoral spending. Since 2009, regulation of party finances has been under review, but no final agreement has been reached.
The law on party financing was originally drafted by a committee comprising party representatives, including the chief financial officers of the main political parties. This followed the disclosure by the National Audit Office that, among other things, fishing firms gave 10 times as much money to the Independence Party and the Progressive Party between 2008 and 2011 as to all other parties combined. The Independence Party and the Progressive Party have been and remain particularly generous toward the fishing industry. Similarly, the Special Investigation Committee disclosed that huge loans and contributions were provided by the Icelandic banks to political parties and politicians between 2006 and 2008, on a per capita scale significantly greater than in the United States.
In 2021, eight political parties with seats in the parliament received state contributions totaling ISK 728 million (around €5 million). The amount per party is related to the number of seats.
Citations:
Framlög til stjórnmálaflokka. https://www.stjornarradid.is/verkefni/kosningar/framlog-til-stjornmalaflokka/. Accessed 3 February 2022.
Lög um fjármál stjórnmálasamtaka og frambjóðenda og um upplýsingaskyldu þeirra, nr. 162/2006 (Law on the finances of political organizations and candidates and about their information duties nr. 162/2006).
Lög um breytingu á lögum nr. 162/2006, um fjármál stjórnmálasamtaka og frambjóðenda og um upplýsingaskyldu þeirra nr. 119 21. september 2010.
Kristinsson, G. H. (2007), Íslenska stjórnkerfið. 2. útgáfa. Reykjavík, Háskóli Íslands. (The Icelandic political system, 2nd ed.)
Special Investigation Committee (SIC) (2010), Report of the Special Investigation Committee (SIC), report delivered to Althing, the Icelandic Parliament, on 12 April. See http://www.rna.is/eldri-nefndir/addragandi-og-orsakir-falls-islensku-bankanna-2008/skyrsla-nefndarinnar/english/. Accessed 7 February 2022.
The National Audit Office (Ríkisendurskoðun) monitors party and candidate finances, and publishes annual summaries that include total expenditure and income. Income must be classified by origin, identifying companies or other entities contributing to party finances before and during election periods. Compliance by the parties varies.
Before the 2007 election campaign, political parties reached an agreement that a maximum of ISK 28 million could be spent on TV, radio, and newspaper advertisements. Moreover, there is legal limit on electoral spending. Since 2009, regulation of party finances has been under review, but no final agreement has been reached.
The law on party financing was originally drafted by a committee comprising party representatives, including the chief financial officers of the main political parties. This followed the disclosure by the National Audit Office that, among other things, fishing firms gave 10 times as much money to the Independence Party and the Progressive Party between 2008 and 2011 as to all other parties combined. The Independence Party and the Progressive Party have been and remain particularly generous toward the fishing industry. Similarly, the Special Investigation Committee disclosed that huge loans and contributions were provided by the Icelandic banks to political parties and politicians between 2006 and 2008, on a per capita scale significantly greater than in the United States.
In 2021, eight political parties with seats in the parliament received state contributions totaling ISK 728 million (around €5 million). The amount per party is related to the number of seats.
Citations:
Framlög til stjórnmálaflokka. https://www.stjornarradid.is/verkefni/kosningar/framlog-til-stjornmalaflokka/. Accessed 3 February 2022.
Lög um fjármál stjórnmálasamtaka og frambjóðenda og um upplýsingaskyldu þeirra, nr. 162/2006 (Law on the finances of political organizations and candidates and about their information duties nr. 162/2006).
Lög um breytingu á lögum nr. 162/2006, um fjármál stjórnmálasamtaka og frambjóðenda og um upplýsingaskyldu þeirra nr. 119 21. september 2010.
Kristinsson, G. H. (2007), Íslenska stjórnkerfið. 2. útgáfa. Reykjavík, Háskóli Íslands. (The Icelandic political system, 2nd ed.)
Special Investigation Committee (SIC) (2010), Report of the Special Investigation Committee (SIC), report delivered to Althing, the Icelandic Parliament, on 12 April. See http://www.rna.is/eldri-nefndir/addragandi-og-orsakir-falls-islensku-bankanna-2008/skyrsla-nefndarinnar/english/. Accessed 7 February 2022.
Do citizens have the opportunity to take binding political decisions when they want to do so?
10
9
9
Citizens have the effective opportunity to actively propose and take binding decisions on issues of importance to them through popular initiatives and referendums. The set of eligible issues is extensive, and includes national, regional, and local issues.
8
7
6
7
6
Citizens have the effective opportunity to take binding decisions on issues of importance to them through either popular initiatives or referendums. The set of eligible issues covers at least two levels of government.
5
4
3
4
3
Citizens have the effective opportunity to vote on issues of importance to them through a legally binding measure. The set of eligible issues is limited to one level of government.
2
1
1
Citizens have no effective opportunity to vote on issues of importance to them through a legally binding measure.
Since 1944, the constitutional provision granting the president of Iceland the right to veto legislation has been invoked three times and has twice led to a national referendum.
In 2012, an advisory national referendum on a new constitution was called by parliament. In the referendum, 73% voted in favor of a provision enabling 10% of the electorate to demand a national referendum. This reform would mean that referring legislation passed by parliament to a national referendum would no longer remain the prerogative of the president alone. However, parliament has yet to ratify the constitution bill or use it as a basis for a new one, even though 67% voted in favor of the bill. Proposals for further referendums (e.g., on EU membership negotiations) ring hollow when parliament has yet to respect the outcome of the constitutional referendum of 2012. In 2018, the right-center-left cabinet of Jakobsdóttir – claiming that the authority for changing the constitution rests with the parliament, not the people – announced a three-year process for reviewing limited aspects of the constitution, but nothing happened.
A law on local government affairs was passed by parliament in September 2011. This law contained a new chapter called Consultancy with Citizens (Samráð við íbúa) stipulating local referendums and citizen initiatives. Under its terms, if at least 20% of the population eligible to vote in a municipality demand a referendum, the local authorities are obliged to hold a referendum within a year. However, local councils can decide to increase this threshold to 33% of eligible voters. At the local level, therefore, significant steps have been taken to improve the opportunity for citizen impact between elections.
Citations:
Carrillo, David A. (ed.) (2018), The Icelandic Federalist Papers, Berkeley Public Policy Press 2018.
The New Icelandic Constitution: How Did It Come About? Where Is It?, Iðunn, Reykjavík, 2018.
National Referendum (Þjóðaratkvæði). http://thjodaratkvaedi.is/2010. Accessed 7 February 2022.
The Constitutional Council. http://stjornlagarad.is/english/. Accessed 3 February 2018.
Eythórsson, Grétar Thór & Arnarson, Sveinn (2012), Íslensk sveitarstjórnarmál í brennidepli. Staða sveitarstjórnarstigsins, verkefni, skipan, íbúalýðræði og áhrif efnahagshrunsins. Akureyri. Háskólinn á Akureyri.
Sveitarstjórnarlög nr. 138 28. september 2011.
In 2012, an advisory national referendum on a new constitution was called by parliament. In the referendum, 73% voted in favor of a provision enabling 10% of the electorate to demand a national referendum. This reform would mean that referring legislation passed by parliament to a national referendum would no longer remain the prerogative of the president alone. However, parliament has yet to ratify the constitution bill or use it as a basis for a new one, even though 67% voted in favor of the bill. Proposals for further referendums (e.g., on EU membership negotiations) ring hollow when parliament has yet to respect the outcome of the constitutional referendum of 2012. In 2018, the right-center-left cabinet of Jakobsdóttir – claiming that the authority for changing the constitution rests with the parliament, not the people – announced a three-year process for reviewing limited aspects of the constitution, but nothing happened.
A law on local government affairs was passed by parliament in September 2011. This law contained a new chapter called Consultancy with Citizens (Samráð við íbúa) stipulating local referendums and citizen initiatives. Under its terms, if at least 20% of the population eligible to vote in a municipality demand a referendum, the local authorities are obliged to hold a referendum within a year. However, local councils can decide to increase this threshold to 33% of eligible voters. At the local level, therefore, significant steps have been taken to improve the opportunity for citizen impact between elections.
Citations:
Carrillo, David A. (ed.) (2018), The Icelandic Federalist Papers, Berkeley Public Policy Press 2018.
The New Icelandic Constitution: How Did It Come About? Where Is It?, Iðunn, Reykjavík, 2018.
National Referendum (Þjóðaratkvæði). http://thjodaratkvaedi.is/2010. Accessed 7 February 2022.
The Constitutional Council. http://stjornlagarad.is/english/. Accessed 3 February 2018.
Eythórsson, Grétar Thór & Arnarson, Sveinn (2012), Íslensk sveitarstjórnarmál í brennidepli. Staða sveitarstjórnarstigsins, verkefni, skipan, íbúalýðræði og áhrif efnahagshrunsins. Akureyri. Háskólinn á Akureyri.
Sveitarstjórnarlög nr. 138 28. september 2011.
Graph View
To what extent are the media independent from government?
10
9
9
Public and private media are independent from government influence; their independence is institutionally protected and fully respected by the incumbent government.
8
7
6
7
6
The incumbent government largely respects the independence of media. However, there are occasional attempts to exert influence.
5
4
3
4
3
The incumbent government seeks to ensure its political objectives indirectly by influencing the personnel policies, organizational framework or financial resources of public media, and/or the licensing regime/market access for private media.
2
1
1
Major media outlets are frequently influenced by the incumbent government promoting its partisan political objectives. To ensure pro-government media reporting, governmental actors exert direct political pressure and violate existing rules of media regulation or change them to benefit their interests.
Until privatization in 1986, the state had a monopoly over radio and TV broadcasting. Private stations now play a significant role in the media market.
Some politicians in government have repeatedly accused state-run radio and TV (RÚV) of bias against the government in their news reporting, partly because RÚV played an important role in exposing political scandals. Despite criticism that Iceland lacks a strong, independent media, the position of those seeking to dominate the media has been considerably weakened by the advent of online social media platforms.
There has been a recent exodus of competent news reporters from Iceland’s state-run TV station (RÚV), an apparent consequence of their exposure of wrongdoing by Iceland’s largest fishing firm, Samherji, in Namibia and elsewhere.
In early 2022, the editorial office of a news magazine (Mannlíf) was burglarized in an attempt to eliminate certain sensitive material from its computer system, the first such recorded incident in Iceland.
Citations:
Karlsson, Ragnar (2010): Íslenskur fjölmiðlamarkaður. Framboð, fjölbreytni, samkeppni og samþjöppun. (The Icelandic Media Market. Supply, diversity, competition and concern). An overview prepared for the Ministry of Education and Culture.
Some politicians in government have repeatedly accused state-run radio and TV (RÚV) of bias against the government in their news reporting, partly because RÚV played an important role in exposing political scandals. Despite criticism that Iceland lacks a strong, independent media, the position of those seeking to dominate the media has been considerably weakened by the advent of online social media platforms.
There has been a recent exodus of competent news reporters from Iceland’s state-run TV station (RÚV), an apparent consequence of their exposure of wrongdoing by Iceland’s largest fishing firm, Samherji, in Namibia and elsewhere.
In early 2022, the editorial office of a news magazine (Mannlíf) was burglarized in an attempt to eliminate certain sensitive material from its computer system, the first such recorded incident in Iceland.
Citations:
Karlsson, Ragnar (2010): Íslenskur fjölmiðlamarkaður. Framboð, fjölbreytni, samkeppni og samþjöppun. (The Icelandic Media Market. Supply, diversity, competition and concern). An overview prepared for the Ministry of Education and Culture.
To what extent are the media characterized by an ownership structure that ensures a pluralism of opinions?
10
9
9
Diversified ownership structures characterize both the electronic and print media market, providing a well-balanced pluralism of opinions. Effective anti-monopoly policies and impartial, open public media guarantee a pluralism of opinions.
8
7
6
7
6
Diversified ownership structures prevail in the electronic and print media market. Public media compensate for deficiencies or biases in private media reporting by representing a wider range of opinions.
5
4
3
4
3
Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize either the electronic or the print media market. Important opinions are represented but there are no or only weak institutional guarantees against the predominance of certain opinions.
2
1
1
Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize both the electronic and the print media market. Few companies dominate the media, most programs are biased, and there is evidence that certain opinions are not published or are marginalized.
Media ownership in Iceland can be divided into three blocks, two private ones and one public.
There is one state-owned TV station (RÚV – Sjónvarp) and two state-owned radio channels (RÚV – Rás1 and RÚV – Rás2). There are also four private national TV channels (Stöð2, Sjónvarp Símans, Hringbraut, and N4) and two national private radio channels, separately owned. Until March 2017, the private 365 Media Corporation (365 Miðlar) owned a TV station (Stöð 2), Bylgjan radio station, and Fréttablaðið, the larger of the country’s two daily newspapers. 365 Media Corporation was the largest media actor in Iceland, and had clear connections to a business magnate and former bank owner, who sold his media holdings to another magnate in 2019.
Owners of private media sometimes try to exercise influence over news coverage. Iceland’s second largest daily newspaper is partly owned by fishing magnates, and fights against fisheries policy reforms as well as Iceland’s application for EU membership.
Morgunblaðið, the second largest newspaper, has long been considered the voice of the Independence Party and is owned primarily by several fishing vessel owners. Since 2009, its chief editor has been the former prime minister and Independence Party leader. Other newspapers include DV, Stundin, and Kjarninn.
Given the somewhat broader ownership of TV and radio media combined with several smaller TV broadcasters, radio stations and newspapers, media ownership in Iceland can be considered fairly pluralistic.
There is one state-owned TV station (RÚV – Sjónvarp) and two state-owned radio channels (RÚV – Rás1 and RÚV – Rás2). There are also four private national TV channels (Stöð2, Sjónvarp Símans, Hringbraut, and N4) and two national private radio channels, separately owned. Until March 2017, the private 365 Media Corporation (365 Miðlar) owned a TV station (Stöð 2), Bylgjan radio station, and Fréttablaðið, the larger of the country’s two daily newspapers. 365 Media Corporation was the largest media actor in Iceland, and had clear connections to a business magnate and former bank owner, who sold his media holdings to another magnate in 2019.
Owners of private media sometimes try to exercise influence over news coverage. Iceland’s second largest daily newspaper is partly owned by fishing magnates, and fights against fisheries policy reforms as well as Iceland’s application for EU membership.
Morgunblaðið, the second largest newspaper, has long been considered the voice of the Independence Party and is owned primarily by several fishing vessel owners. Since 2009, its chief editor has been the former prime minister and Independence Party leader. Other newspapers include DV, Stundin, and Kjarninn.
Given the somewhat broader ownership of TV and radio media combined with several smaller TV broadcasters, radio stations and newspapers, media ownership in Iceland can be considered fairly pluralistic.
To what extent can citizens obtain official information?
10
9
9
Legal regulations guarantee free and easy access to official information, contain few, reasonable restrictions, and there are effective mechanisms of appeal and oversight enabling citizens to access information.
8
7
6
7
6
Access to official information is regulated by law. Most restrictions are justified, but access is sometimes complicated by bureaucratic procedures. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms permit citizens to enforce their right of access.
5
4
3
4
3
Access to official information is partially regulated by law, but complicated by bureaucratic procedures and some poorly justified restrictions. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms are often ineffective.
2
1
1
Access to official information is not regulated by law; there are many restrictions of access, bureaucratic procedures and no or ineffective mechanisms of enforcement.
The 1997 Information Act (Upplýsingalög), revised in 2012, aims to guarantee the right of access to official information. Memoranda, working documents, and materials related to the Council of the State (Ríkisráð), cabinet, and ministerial meetings were originally exempted. In 2011, a revision to the Act on the Government of Iceland (Lög um Stjórnarráð Íslands) mandated that the agenda of cabinet meetings be presented to the media and published on the government’s website after each meeting.
Sensitive financial and personal information, as laid out in the Act on Processing and Protection of Personal Data (No. 77/2000), is not accessible unless permission is obtained from the person involved. Access to restricted information is available once the measures associated with the information are complete, after a period of 30 years for general information or 80 years for personal information (as per the National Archives Act, No. 66/1985). Information regarding the security or defense of the state, or international commercial activities, is also exempted from the act. Decisions denying access to information can be appealed to the Information Committee, whose members are appointed by the prime minister. No other government or judicial body can overrule the decisions of the committee (úrskurðarnefnd um upplýsingamál) tasked with enforcing the information act.
Despite these provisions, public access to information can be restricted. For example, the central bank refused a parliamentary committee’s request to see a transcript or hear an audio recording of a fateful telephone conversation between the prime minister and the central bank governor shortly before the 2008 economic collapse.
The government remains quite secretive about potentially compromising information. For example, an official report on Icelanders whose names appear in the Panama Papers was ready well before the October 2016 parliamentary election but was not disclosed to the public until after the election in which all three ministers whose names appeared in the Panama Papers were re-elected to their seats in parliament. There have been several other recent scandals involving information withheld from the public. One such led to the collapse of the government in 2017. Another example is that of the opposition member of parliament who, for the last two years, has tried in vain to obtain an answer from the government to the question of who bought a large number of apartments from which the House Financing Fund had evicted the former owners between 2009 and 2019.
During 2018, an opposition member of parliament from the Pirate Party managed to compel the parliament to disclose information regarding parliament’s reimbursement of members of parliament’s expense claims (e.g., travel costs). Parliament’s failure to ratify the constitution bill, approved in a 2012 national referendum, should be viewed in light of the bill’s provisions on transparency, freedom of information and protections for whistleblowers, reforms that many politicians continue to resist.
The government routinely offers petty excuses, sometimes involving national security, in its attempts to keep inconvenient truths from the public and avoid embarrassment, but such attempts are sometimes overturned by the information committee.
Citations:
Information Act (Upplysingalög). Act no. 50/1996.
Act on Processing and Protection of Personal Data. (Lög um persónuvernd og meðferð persónuupplýsinga) Act no. 77/2000.
Act on the Government of Iceland (Lög um Stjórnarráð Íslands) nr. 115 23. september 2011.
Sensitive financial and personal information, as laid out in the Act on Processing and Protection of Personal Data (No. 77/2000), is not accessible unless permission is obtained from the person involved. Access to restricted information is available once the measures associated with the information are complete, after a period of 30 years for general information or 80 years for personal information (as per the National Archives Act, No. 66/1985). Information regarding the security or defense of the state, or international commercial activities, is also exempted from the act. Decisions denying access to information can be appealed to the Information Committee, whose members are appointed by the prime minister. No other government or judicial body can overrule the decisions of the committee (úrskurðarnefnd um upplýsingamál) tasked with enforcing the information act.
Despite these provisions, public access to information can be restricted. For example, the central bank refused a parliamentary committee’s request to see a transcript or hear an audio recording of a fateful telephone conversation between the prime minister and the central bank governor shortly before the 2008 economic collapse.
The government remains quite secretive about potentially compromising information. For example, an official report on Icelanders whose names appear in the Panama Papers was ready well before the October 2016 parliamentary election but was not disclosed to the public until after the election in which all three ministers whose names appeared in the Panama Papers were re-elected to their seats in parliament. There have been several other recent scandals involving information withheld from the public. One such led to the collapse of the government in 2017. Another example is that of the opposition member of parliament who, for the last two years, has tried in vain to obtain an answer from the government to the question of who bought a large number of apartments from which the House Financing Fund had evicted the former owners between 2009 and 2019.
During 2018, an opposition member of parliament from the Pirate Party managed to compel the parliament to disclose information regarding parliament’s reimbursement of members of parliament’s expense claims (e.g., travel costs). Parliament’s failure to ratify the constitution bill, approved in a 2012 national referendum, should be viewed in light of the bill’s provisions on transparency, freedom of information and protections for whistleblowers, reforms that many politicians continue to resist.
The government routinely offers petty excuses, sometimes involving national security, in its attempts to keep inconvenient truths from the public and avoid embarrassment, but such attempts are sometimes overturned by the information committee.
Citations:
Information Act (Upplysingalög). Act no. 50/1996.
Act on Processing and Protection of Personal Data. (Lög um persónuvernd og meðferð persónuupplýsinga) Act no. 77/2000.
Act on the Government of Iceland (Lög um Stjórnarráð Íslands) nr. 115 23. september 2011.
Graph View
To what extent does the state respect and protect civil rights and how effectively are citizens protected by courts against infringements of their rights?
10
9
9
All state institutions respect and effectively protect civil rights. Citizens are effectively protected by courts against infringements of their rights. Infringements present an extreme exception.
8
7
6
7
6
The state respects and protects rights, with few infringements. Courts provide protection.
5
4
3
4
3
Despite formal protection, frequent infringements of civil rights occur and court protection often proves ineffective.
2
1
1
State institutions respect civil rights only formally, and civil rights are frequently violated. Court protection is not effective.
The Icelandic state fully respects and protects civil rights, and courts effectively protect citizens. Where there is evidence of disregard for civil rights, courts generally rule against the government.
However, there are exceptions to this rule. Most importantly, in 2007, the United Nations Committee on Human Rights (UNCHR) issued a de facto (if not de jure) binding opinion stating that, because of its discriminatory nature, the management system of Iceland’s fisheries constituted a violation of human rights. Furthermore, the UNCHR instructed the government to change the system and to pay damages to those whose rights had been violated. The government responded by promising to pass a new constitution with a provision declaring the country’s natural resources to be the property of the nation. The UNCHR later dropped the case, saying that Iceland’s promise of a new constitution was partly sufficient. However, the parliament has not ratified the new constitution, which was accepted as the basis for a new constitution by 67% of the voters in a national referendum called by parliament in 2012. No progress has been made since then.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has heard several petitions by Icelandic citizens recently that their civil rights have been violated. In almost all cases, the ECHR has ruled in favor of the petitioners, casting doubt on the ability of Icelandic courts to protect civil rights effectively. Following a number of similar ECHR rulings in recent years, Icelandic courts have demonstrated an increased tendency to acquit defendants in politically motivated libel cases. In December 2020, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) confirmed its ruling that Iceland violated Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is meant to ensure a person’s right to a fair trial, in the appointment of judges to the Court of Appeal. The minister of justice’s appointment of four judges to the court breached the procedure established by Icelandic law. The minister failed to give sufficient reasoning for appointing different judges from those that had been selected by a selection committee and resigned from office.
The 2021 parliamentary election led to numerous citizen complaints to parliament. The police levied fines against five members of the electoral board in one of the six constituencies for dereliction of their duties. These fines are yet to be paid, which may result in indictments against the board members. A number of complaints concerning alleged irregularities surrounding the election as well as the vote count were presented to local police as well as to the OSCE, which did not send representatives to observe the election. For the first time in Iceland’s history, disappointed parliamentary candidates have appealed the legitimacy of the election results to the ECHR, claiming that the vote tallying broke the law.
Citations:
https://www.icelandreview.com/politics/minister-of-justices-court-appointments-were-illegal-ruling-upheld-by-echr/
Gylfason, Thorvaldur (2016), “Constitution on Ice,” in Iceland’s Financial Crisis: The Politics of Blame, Protest, and Reconstruction, eds. Valur Ingimundarson, Philipe Urlfalino, and Irma Erlingsdóttir, Routledge, London.
Gylfason, Thorvaldur (2018), “Chain of legitimacy: Constitution making in Iceland,” in Elster, J., R. Gargarella, V. Naresh, and B. E. Rasch (eds.), Constituent Assemblies. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2018.
Iceland Review (2021), Election Supervisors Fined as Investigation Continues, https://www.icelandreview.com/politics/election-supervisors-fined-as-investigation-continues/, 20 October. Accessed 3 February 2022.
Althingi (2021), Erindi og skjöl undirbúningsnefndar fyrir rannsókn kjörbréfa, https://www.althingi.is/thingnefndir/adrar-nefndir/undirbuningsnefnd-fyrir-rannsokn-kjorbrefa/erindi-til-nefndarinnar/. Accessed 3 February 2022.
However, there are exceptions to this rule. Most importantly, in 2007, the United Nations Committee on Human Rights (UNCHR) issued a de facto (if not de jure) binding opinion stating that, because of its discriminatory nature, the management system of Iceland’s fisheries constituted a violation of human rights. Furthermore, the UNCHR instructed the government to change the system and to pay damages to those whose rights had been violated. The government responded by promising to pass a new constitution with a provision declaring the country’s natural resources to be the property of the nation. The UNCHR later dropped the case, saying that Iceland’s promise of a new constitution was partly sufficient. However, the parliament has not ratified the new constitution, which was accepted as the basis for a new constitution by 67% of the voters in a national referendum called by parliament in 2012. No progress has been made since then.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has heard several petitions by Icelandic citizens recently that their civil rights have been violated. In almost all cases, the ECHR has ruled in favor of the petitioners, casting doubt on the ability of Icelandic courts to protect civil rights effectively. Following a number of similar ECHR rulings in recent years, Icelandic courts have demonstrated an increased tendency to acquit defendants in politically motivated libel cases. In December 2020, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) confirmed its ruling that Iceland violated Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is meant to ensure a person’s right to a fair trial, in the appointment of judges to the Court of Appeal. The minister of justice’s appointment of four judges to the court breached the procedure established by Icelandic law. The minister failed to give sufficient reasoning for appointing different judges from those that had been selected by a selection committee and resigned from office.
The 2021 parliamentary election led to numerous citizen complaints to parliament. The police levied fines against five members of the electoral board in one of the six constituencies for dereliction of their duties. These fines are yet to be paid, which may result in indictments against the board members. A number of complaints concerning alleged irregularities surrounding the election as well as the vote count were presented to local police as well as to the OSCE, which did not send representatives to observe the election. For the first time in Iceland’s history, disappointed parliamentary candidates have appealed the legitimacy of the election results to the ECHR, claiming that the vote tallying broke the law.
Citations:
https://www.icelandreview.com/politics/minister-of-justices-court-appointments-were-illegal-ruling-upheld-by-echr/
Gylfason, Thorvaldur (2016), “Constitution on Ice,” in Iceland’s Financial Crisis: The Politics of Blame, Protest, and Reconstruction, eds. Valur Ingimundarson, Philipe Urlfalino, and Irma Erlingsdóttir, Routledge, London.
Gylfason, Thorvaldur (2018), “Chain of legitimacy: Constitution making in Iceland,” in Elster, J., R. Gargarella, V. Naresh, and B. E. Rasch (eds.), Constituent Assemblies. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2018.
Iceland Review (2021), Election Supervisors Fined as Investigation Continues, https://www.icelandreview.com/politics/election-supervisors-fined-as-investigation-continues/, 20 October. Accessed 3 February 2022.
Althingi (2021), Erindi og skjöl undirbúningsnefndar fyrir rannsókn kjörbréfa, https://www.althingi.is/thingnefndir/adrar-nefndir/undirbuningsnefnd-fyrir-rannsokn-kjorbrefa/erindi-til-nefndarinnar/. Accessed 3 February 2022.
To what extent does the state concede and protect political liberties?
10
9
9
All state institutions concede and effectively protect political liberties.
8
7
6
7
6
All state institutions for the most part concede and protect political liberties. There are only few infringements.
5
4
3
4
3
State institutions concede political liberties but infringements occur regularly in practice.
2
1
1
Political liberties are unsatisfactory codified and frequently violated.
The 1944 constitution contains provisions protecting the freedom of the press as well as freedoms of organization and assembly. In the 2017 parliamentary election campaign, five parties declared support for ratifying the constitutional bill proposed by the Constitutional Council in 2011, namely the Social Democrats, the Pirate Party, the Left-Green Movement, Regeneration and Bright Future. The strongest opponent of the constitutional change has been the Independence Party, which – together with the Progressive Party, another party that is reluctant to accept the change – is part of the current cabinet coalition led by the Left-Green Movement. The continued failure of this coalition to ratify the new constitution with its many provisions promoting human rights seems assured.
The failure of parliament, despite four intervening parliamentary elections, to ratify the new constitution approved by 67% of voters in a 2012 national referendum called by parliament can be seen as an affront to political liberties. This is because the new constitution contains several provisions specifically designed to promote human rights, including the non-discriminatory allocation of fishing rights and electoral reform, two of the most contested political issues in Iceland since the 1970s and the 1850s, respectively.
Freedom House demoted Iceland from a freedom score of 100 in 2014 to 94 in 2020 and 2021, scoring Iceland 37 out of 40 for political rights and 57 out of 60 for civil liberties for a total of 94 out of 100.
Citations:
David A. Carrillo (ed.) (2018), The Icelandic Federalist Papers, Ch. 20, Right to Information and Freedom of Expression, Berkeley Public Policy Press.
Freedom House (2022), Iceland, https://freedomhouse.org/country/iceland. Accessed 3 February 2022.
The New Icelandic Constitution: How Did It Come About? Where Is It?, with a forword by Vigdís Finnbogadóttir and introduction by Thorvaldur Gylfason, Iðunn, Reykjavík, 2018.
The failure of parliament, despite four intervening parliamentary elections, to ratify the new constitution approved by 67% of voters in a 2012 national referendum called by parliament can be seen as an affront to political liberties. This is because the new constitution contains several provisions specifically designed to promote human rights, including the non-discriminatory allocation of fishing rights and electoral reform, two of the most contested political issues in Iceland since the 1970s and the 1850s, respectively.
Freedom House demoted Iceland from a freedom score of 100 in 2014 to 94 in 2020 and 2021, scoring Iceland 37 out of 40 for political rights and 57 out of 60 for civil liberties for a total of 94 out of 100.
Citations:
David A. Carrillo (ed.) (2018), The Icelandic Federalist Papers, Ch. 20, Right to Information and Freedom of Expression, Berkeley Public Policy Press.
Freedom House (2022), Iceland, https://freedomhouse.org/country/iceland. Accessed 3 February 2022.
The New Icelandic Constitution: How Did It Come About? Where Is It?, with a forword by Vigdís Finnbogadóttir and introduction by Thorvaldur Gylfason, Iðunn, Reykjavík, 2018.
How effectively does the state protect against different forms of discrimination?
10
9
9
State institutions effectively protect against and actively prevent discrimination. Cases of discrimination are extremely rare.
8
7
6
7
6
State anti-discrimination protections are moderately successful. Few cases of discrimination are observed.
5
4
3
4
3
State anti-discrimination efforts show limited success. Many cases of discrimination can be observed.
2
1
1
The state does not offer effective protection against discrimination. Discrimination is widespread in the public sector and in society.
Iceland’s constitution states that every person shall enjoy equal human rights regardless of gender, religion, opinion, national origin, race, color, property, birth, or other respect. More specific provisions are to be found in the Penal Code, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Equality Act. The Supreme Court has ruled based on those acts and the constitution. The Equality Act states that genders should be accorded equal rights in all areas of society, and that discrimination in terms of work and pay is illegal. The Center for Gender Equality monitors adherence to this law and is obliged to refer all major cases to the courts.
Although equal rights are guaranteed by law, the reality is that discrimination occasionally occurs in Iceland, especially against women, disabled persons, and migrants. In the 2012 presidential elections, blind and physically disabled voters were denied the right to have an assistant of their own choice to help them vote at polling stations. Instead, they had to vote with help from public officials working at the polling stations. Following complaints from the Organization of Disabled in Iceland (Öryrkjabandalagið), the electoral laws were adjusted to allow blind or otherwise physically disabled individuals to independently nominate their own assistant who would be sworn to secrecy. This change applied to the 2013 parliamentary elections.
The government’s non-compliance with the binding opinion of the UNHRC, which ruled in 2007 that the management system of Iceland’s fisheries was discriminatory, signals a less-than-full commitment to non-discrimination.
The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was signed on behalf of the Icelandic government in March 2007. It was not until September 2016 that the Icelandic parliament, Althingi, passed a resolution to enable the government to ratify the convention. At the time of writing in late 2021, this remains to be done.
Citations:
The Penal Code (Almenn hegningarlög no. 19/1940).
The Administrative Procedure Act (Stjórnsýslulög no. 40/1993).
The Gender Equality Act (Lög um jafna stöðu og jafnan rétt kvenna og karla no. 10/2008).
Act on changes on the Act on Parliamentary Elections (Lög um breytingu á lögum um kosningar til Alþingis nr. 24/2000 og lögum um kosningar til sveitarstjórna nr. 5/1998 (aðstoð við kosningu). Lög nr. 111 16. október 2012.
Þingsályktun um fullgildingu samnings Sameinuðu þjóðanna um réttindi fatlaðs fólks. http://www.althingi.is/altext/145/s/1693.html. Accessed 22 December 2018.
Although equal rights are guaranteed by law, the reality is that discrimination occasionally occurs in Iceland, especially against women, disabled persons, and migrants. In the 2012 presidential elections, blind and physically disabled voters were denied the right to have an assistant of their own choice to help them vote at polling stations. Instead, they had to vote with help from public officials working at the polling stations. Following complaints from the Organization of Disabled in Iceland (Öryrkjabandalagið), the electoral laws were adjusted to allow blind or otherwise physically disabled individuals to independently nominate their own assistant who would be sworn to secrecy. This change applied to the 2013 parliamentary elections.
The government’s non-compliance with the binding opinion of the UNHRC, which ruled in 2007 that the management system of Iceland’s fisheries was discriminatory, signals a less-than-full commitment to non-discrimination.
The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was signed on behalf of the Icelandic government in March 2007. It was not until September 2016 that the Icelandic parliament, Althingi, passed a resolution to enable the government to ratify the convention. At the time of writing in late 2021, this remains to be done.
Citations:
The Penal Code (Almenn hegningarlög no. 19/1940).
The Administrative Procedure Act (Stjórnsýslulög no. 40/1993).
The Gender Equality Act (Lög um jafna stöðu og jafnan rétt kvenna og karla no. 10/2008).
Act on changes on the Act on Parliamentary Elections (Lög um breytingu á lögum um kosningar til Alþingis nr. 24/2000 og lögum um kosningar til sveitarstjórna nr. 5/1998 (aðstoð við kosningu). Lög nr. 111 16. október 2012.
Þingsályktun um fullgildingu samnings Sameinuðu þjóðanna um réttindi fatlaðs fólks. http://www.althingi.is/altext/145/s/1693.html. Accessed 22 December 2018.
Graph View
To what extent do government and administration act on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions to provide legal certainty?
10
9
9
Government and administration act predictably, on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions. Legal regulations are consistent and transparent, ensuring legal certainty.
8
7
6
7
6
Government and administration rarely make unpredictable decisions. Legal regulations are consistent, but leave a large scope of discretion to the government or administration.
5
4
3
4
3
Government and administration sometimes make unpredictable decisions that go beyond given legal bases or do not conform to existing legal regulations. Some legal regulations are inconsistent and contradictory.
2
1
1
Government and administration often make unpredictable decisions that lack a legal basis or ignore existing legal regulations. Legal regulations are inconsistent, full of loopholes and contradict each other.
Icelandic state authorities and administration respect the rule of law, and their actions are generally predictable. However, there have been cases in which verdicts by Icelandic courts and government actions have been overruled on appeal by the European Court of Human Rights. There have also been examples of Supreme Court verdicts that have been overruled by the European Court of Justice. Some of these cases concerned journalists’ freedom of speech.
Alleged violations of the law by public officials are less likely to be prosecuted than allegations involving private individuals. Several recent cases involve the decisions of central bank officials during and after the 2008 financial collapse, which were not investigated or prosecuted at the time.
In late 2019, Iceland’s largest fishing firm, Samherji, was accused of paying huge bribes to Namibian ministers and others in order to secure fishing rights in Namibian waters. This was exposed by Wikileaks. This revelation led to the immediate arrest of two ministers and four other individuals in Namibia. In contrast, the reaction of political and judicial authorities in Iceland to this scandal has been more muted than in Namibia. The case remains under investigation and the defendants are still held in police custody in Namibia, where the state prosecutor – having without success asked the Icelandic government to extradite three senior Samherji managers in order for them to be interrogated – has asked Interpol to intervene.
Citations:
European Court of Justice Verdict Against Iceland (Dómur MDE í máli Erlu Hlynsdóttur gegn Íslandi), https://www.innanrikisraduneyti.is/raduneyti/starfssvid/mannrettindi/mannrettindadomstoll-evropu/nr/29388. Accessed 22 December 2018.
Sigmundsdóttir, Alda (2019), “Of political corruption and misdeeds in Iceland and Namibia,” https://aldasigmunds.com/of-political-corruption-and-misdeeds-in-iceland-and-namibia/. Accessed 3 February 2022.
Alleged violations of the law by public officials are less likely to be prosecuted than allegations involving private individuals. Several recent cases involve the decisions of central bank officials during and after the 2008 financial collapse, which were not investigated or prosecuted at the time.
In late 2019, Iceland’s largest fishing firm, Samherji, was accused of paying huge bribes to Namibian ministers and others in order to secure fishing rights in Namibian waters. This was exposed by Wikileaks. This revelation led to the immediate arrest of two ministers and four other individuals in Namibia. In contrast, the reaction of political and judicial authorities in Iceland to this scandal has been more muted than in Namibia. The case remains under investigation and the defendants are still held in police custody in Namibia, where the state prosecutor – having without success asked the Icelandic government to extradite three senior Samherji managers in order for them to be interrogated – has asked Interpol to intervene.
Citations:
European Court of Justice Verdict Against Iceland (Dómur MDE í máli Erlu Hlynsdóttur gegn Íslandi), https://www.innanrikisraduneyti.is/raduneyti/starfssvid/mannrettindi/mannrettindadomstoll-evropu/nr/29388. Accessed 22 December 2018.
Sigmundsdóttir, Alda (2019), “Of political corruption and misdeeds in Iceland and Namibia,” https://aldasigmunds.com/of-political-corruption-and-misdeeds-in-iceland-and-namibia/. Accessed 3 February 2022.
To what extent do independent courts control whether government and administration act in conformity with the law?
10
9
9
Independent courts effectively review executive action and ensure that the government and administration act in conformity with the law.
8
7
6
7
6
Independent courts usually manage to control whether the government and administration act in conformity with the law.
5
4
3
4
3
Courts are independent, but often fail to ensure legal compliance.
2
1
1
Courts are biased for or against the incumbent government and lack effective control.
Iceland’s courts are not generally subject to pressure from either the government or powerful groups and individuals. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to rule on whether the government and public administration have conformed to the law is beyond question. According to opinion polls, public confidence in the judicial system ranged between 50% and 60% before 2008. After falling to about 30% in 2011, it recovered to 39% in 2013, remained around 40% in 2014 and 2015, and climbed to 43% in 2017. Having then fallen to 36% in 2018, the rate peaked in 2019 when Gallup reported it to be 47%. It remained near that level in 2021 at 46%.
Many observers consider the courts biased, as almost all judges attended the same law school and few have attended universities abroad. Two political parties, the Independence Party and the Progressive Party, have maintained control over the Ministry of Justice for 85 out of the 94 years between 1927 and 2021.
In 2017, a sitting Supreme Court justice sued a former justice for libel in a case that awaits a verdict by the Supreme Court. The plaintiff, then chief justice, lost his case at the Supreme Court in 2021. Then, in 2019, the former justice sued another sitting justice over a private land dispute, a case that is still pending. Disputes among justices do not inspire confidence and trust, least of all when they trade accusations of illegal behavior.
Citations:
Gallup (2022), Traust til stofnana (Trust in Institutions), https://www.gallup.is/nidurstodur/thjodarpuls/traust-til-stofnana/. Accessed 3 February 2022.
Gunnlaugsson, Jón Steinar, Með lognið í fangið – um afglöp Hæstaréttar eftir hrun (With the Stream – On the Blunders of the Supreme Court After the Crash), BP útgáfa, Reykjavík, 2017.
Many observers consider the courts biased, as almost all judges attended the same law school and few have attended universities abroad. Two political parties, the Independence Party and the Progressive Party, have maintained control over the Ministry of Justice for 85 out of the 94 years between 1927 and 2021.
In 2017, a sitting Supreme Court justice sued a former justice for libel in a case that awaits a verdict by the Supreme Court. The plaintiff, then chief justice, lost his case at the Supreme Court in 2021. Then, in 2019, the former justice sued another sitting justice over a private land dispute, a case that is still pending. Disputes among justices do not inspire confidence and trust, least of all when they trade accusations of illegal behavior.
Citations:
Gallup (2022), Traust til stofnana (Trust in Institutions), https://www.gallup.is/nidurstodur/thjodarpuls/traust-til-stofnana/. Accessed 3 February 2022.
Gunnlaugsson, Jón Steinar, Með lognið í fangið – um afglöp Hæstaréttar eftir hrun (With the Stream – On the Blunders of the Supreme Court After the Crash), BP útgáfa, Reykjavík, 2017.
To what extent does the process of appointing (supreme or constitutional court) justices guarantee the independence of the judiciary?
10
9
9
Justices are appointed in a cooperative appointment process with special majority requirements.
8
7
6
7
6
Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies with special majority requirements or in a cooperative selection process without special majority requirements.
5
4
3
4
3
Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies without special majority requirements.
2
1
1
All judges are appointed exclusively by a single body irrespective of other institutions.
To date, all Supreme Court and district court judges have been appointed by the ministers of justice or the interior, without any involvement from or oversight by parliament or any other public agency. However, in recent years, all vacancies on the Supreme Court were advertised and the appointment procedure was at least formally transparent. As part of the appointment process, a five-person evaluation committee has been appointed case by case and tasked with recommending a single applicant. A 2010 change to the Act on Courts restricted the minister’s ability to appoint any person not found to be sufficiently qualified by the committee unless such an appointment is approved by the parliament. This was meant to restrain the minister’s authority by introducing external oversight.
A new Act on Courts was passed by parliament in June 2016, authorizing the minister to ask parliament to authorize the appointment of judges other than those recommended by the evaluation committee. The act was criticized, among other things, for taking inadequate steps concerning the minister of the interior’s ability to make judicial appointments subject to significantly weaker restraints than those stipulated in the constitutional bill approved in the 2012 referendum.
In 2009, the European Union expressed concern over the recruitment procedures for judges. The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) has also criticized the process for appointing judges in Iceland. The 2011/2012 constitutional bill proposes that judicial appointments should be approved by the president or a parliamentary majority of two-thirds.
Many appointments to the courts continue to be controversial. In many cases, the scrutiny of Supreme Court candidates seems superficial. A retired Supreme Court justice, whose own appointment was controversial, published a book in 2014 criticizing his former court colleagues for their alleged opposition to his appointment as well as for some of their verdicts that he deemed misguided. He has since directed further attacks at his former colleagues for violating rules regarding conflict of interest, among other things. In one instance, the prime minister whose responsibility it was to appoint a new Supreme Court justice (because the minister of justice was embroiled in a legal battle concerning an earlier judicial appointment) received a letter of recommendation for one of the applicants from a large group of lawyers, a letter that could be traced to the successful applicant’s own personal computer. Among current Supreme Court justices, three are full professors of law at the University of Iceland and one is an associate professor.
In 2017, the minister of justice appointed 15 new judges to a new intermediary court between the district court level and the Supreme Court, including four judges deemed less qualified than other available applicants according to the review committee’s assessment of the applications. Two of the disappointed applicants sued and were awarded damages by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled that the minister of justice broke the law when she bypassed the recommendations of the review committee. In 2019, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the Icelandic state was guilty of breaking the law when 15 judges were appointed to the Landsréttur (a new intermediary court). The minister resigned.
For all but 10 years between 1927 and 2021, control of the Ministry of Justice and the authority to appoint judges alternated between the Independence Party and the Progressive Party.
Citations:
Act on Courts. (Lög um dómstóla nr. 15 – 25 March 1998, revised 7 June 2017).
Gunnlaugsson, Jón Steinar (2014), Í krafti sannfæringar, Forlagið, Reykjavík.
GRECO (2022), Reports on Iceland, https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/home. Accessed 7 February 2022.
Fréttablaðið (2021), Klofinn Hæstiréttur dæmdi Jóni Steinari í vil (Divided Supreme Court rules in Jón Steinar’s favor, 5 February, https://www.frettabladid.is/frettir/klofinn-haestirettur-daemdi-joni-steinari-i-vil/. Accessed 3 February 2022.
“Letter of support composed in the office of Jón Steinar” (Stuðningsbréf samið á skrifstofu Jóns Steinars), DV 25 September 2004, https://timarit.is/files/51173190. Accessed 4 February 2022.
A new Act on Courts was passed by parliament in June 2016, authorizing the minister to ask parliament to authorize the appointment of judges other than those recommended by the evaluation committee. The act was criticized, among other things, for taking inadequate steps concerning the minister of the interior’s ability to make judicial appointments subject to significantly weaker restraints than those stipulated in the constitutional bill approved in the 2012 referendum.
In 2009, the European Union expressed concern over the recruitment procedures for judges. The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) has also criticized the process for appointing judges in Iceland. The 2011/2012 constitutional bill proposes that judicial appointments should be approved by the president or a parliamentary majority of two-thirds.
Many appointments to the courts continue to be controversial. In many cases, the scrutiny of Supreme Court candidates seems superficial. A retired Supreme Court justice, whose own appointment was controversial, published a book in 2014 criticizing his former court colleagues for their alleged opposition to his appointment as well as for some of their verdicts that he deemed misguided. He has since directed further attacks at his former colleagues for violating rules regarding conflict of interest, among other things. In one instance, the prime minister whose responsibility it was to appoint a new Supreme Court justice (because the minister of justice was embroiled in a legal battle concerning an earlier judicial appointment) received a letter of recommendation for one of the applicants from a large group of lawyers, a letter that could be traced to the successful applicant’s own personal computer. Among current Supreme Court justices, three are full professors of law at the University of Iceland and one is an associate professor.
In 2017, the minister of justice appointed 15 new judges to a new intermediary court between the district court level and the Supreme Court, including four judges deemed less qualified than other available applicants according to the review committee’s assessment of the applications. Two of the disappointed applicants sued and were awarded damages by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled that the minister of justice broke the law when she bypassed the recommendations of the review committee. In 2019, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the Icelandic state was guilty of breaking the law when 15 judges were appointed to the Landsréttur (a new intermediary court). The minister resigned.
For all but 10 years between 1927 and 2021, control of the Ministry of Justice and the authority to appoint judges alternated between the Independence Party and the Progressive Party.
Citations:
Act on Courts. (Lög um dómstóla nr. 15 – 25 March 1998, revised 7 June 2017).
Gunnlaugsson, Jón Steinar (2014), Í krafti sannfæringar, Forlagið, Reykjavík.
GRECO (2022), Reports on Iceland, https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/home. Accessed 7 February 2022.
Fréttablaðið (2021), Klofinn Hæstiréttur dæmdi Jóni Steinari í vil (Divided Supreme Court rules in Jón Steinar’s favor, 5 February, https://www.frettabladid.is/frettir/klofinn-haestirettur-daemdi-joni-steinari-i-vil/. Accessed 3 February 2022.
“Letter of support composed in the office of Jón Steinar” (Stuðningsbréf samið á skrifstofu Jóns Steinars), DV 25 September 2004, https://timarit.is/files/51173190. Accessed 4 February 2022.
To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?
10
9
9
Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
8
7
6
7
6
Most integrity mechanisms function effectively and provide disincentives for public officeholders willing to abuse their positions.
5
4
3
4
3
Some integrity mechanisms function, but do not effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
2
1
1
Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.
Rightly or wrongly, financial corruption in politics is not viewed as a serious problem in Iceland, but in-kind corruption – such as granting favors and paying for personal goods with public funds – does occur. Regulatory amendments in 2006, which introduced requirements to disclose sources of political party financing, should reduce such type of corruption in the future.
In very rare cases, politicians are put on trial for corruption. Iceland has no policy framework specifically addressing corruption because historically corruption has been considered a peripheral subject. However, the appointment of unqualified persons to public office, including judges, a form of in-kind corruption, even nepotism, remains a serious concern. Other, subtle forms of in-kind corruption, which are hard to quantify, also exist. Erlingsson and Kristinsson (2016) write that “corruption is rare but still clearly discernible. Less serious types of corruption, such as favoritism in public appointments and failure to disclose information, are more common than more serious forms, such as extortion, bribes and embezzlement. Nonetheless, it should be noted that a sizable minority of experts still believe corruption is common, especially in the case of favoritism and fraud.”
The collapse of the Icelandic banks in 2008 and the subsequent investigation by the Special Investigation Committee (SIC), among other bodies, highlighted the weak attitude of government and public agencies toward the banks, including weak restraints and lax supervision before 2008. Moreover, three of the four main political parties, as well as individual politicians, accepted large donations from the banks and affiliated interests. When the banks crashed, 10 out of the 63 members of parliament owed the banks the equivalent of more than €1 million each. Two of the 10 members of parliament in question still sit in parliament and the cabinet, and one is the finance minister, without having divulged whether or how they settled their debts. Write-offs of bank debt are not made public in Iceland. GRECO has repeatedly highlighted the need for Icelandic members of parliament to disclose all their debts beyond standard mortgage loans. In 2015, GRECO formally complained that Iceland had not responded to any of its recommendations in its 2013 report on Iceland.
In November 2011, parliament passed a law that obliges members of parliament to declare their financial interests, including salaries, means of financial support, assets, and jobs outside parliament. This information is publicly available on the parliament’s website.
According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2021, which measures business corruption, Iceland scored 74 out of 100, where a score of 100 means no corruption. Iceland’s rank has fallen to 13 out of 180 countries, leaving the country well behind the other Nordic countries with scores between 85 and 88. In an assessment of political corruption in 2012, Gallup reported that 67% of Icelandic respondents view corruption as being widespread in government compared with 14% to 15% in Sweden and Denmark. A 2018 poll from the Social Science Research Institute at the University of Iceland shows that 65% of respondents view many or nearly all Icelandic politicians as corrupt.
New information, including emails leaked from one of the failed banks, about corruption surrounding the crash of 2008 and involving a prime minister, came to light in 2017. This information led to a gag order being imposed on the newspaper Stundin shortly before the 2017 election, an order that was lifted in late 2018, long after the election.
Citations:
Erlingsson, Gissur Ó., and Kristinsson, Gunnar H (2016), “Measuring corruption: whose perceptions should we rely on? Evidence from Iceland,” Icelandic Review of Politics and Administration, Vol. 12, Issue 2, 215-236. http://www.irpa.is/article/view/a.2016.12.2.2/pdf. Accessed 3 February 2022.
Erlingsson, Gissur Ó. (2014), CORRUPTION IN LOW CORRUPT COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF SWEDEN. Open lecture given at the University of Akureyri, Iceland 19 September 2014.
Hagsmunaskrá Alþingismanna (Financial disclosures of members of parliament), https://www.althingi.is/altext/cv/is/hagsmunaskra/. Accessed 3 February 2022.
Special Investigation Committee (SIC) (2010), Report of the Special Investigation Commission (SIC), report delivered to parliament 12 April, https://www.rna.is/eldri-nefndir/addragandi-og-orsakir-falls-islensku-bankanna-2008/skyrsla-nefndarinnar/english/. Accessed 3 February 2022.
Rules on registration of parliamentarians financial interests. (Reglur um skráningu á fjárhagslegum hagsmunum alþingismanna og trúnaðarstörfum utan þings. Samþykkt í forsætisnefnd Alþingis 28 nóvember 2011.)
Transparency International, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021. Accessed 3 February 2022.
Gallup (2013), Government Corruption Viewed as Pervasive Worldwide, http://www.gallup.com/poll/165476/government-corruption-viewed-pervasive-worldwide.aspx. Accessed 3 February 2022.
In very rare cases, politicians are put on trial for corruption. Iceland has no policy framework specifically addressing corruption because historically corruption has been considered a peripheral subject. However, the appointment of unqualified persons to public office, including judges, a form of in-kind corruption, even nepotism, remains a serious concern. Other, subtle forms of in-kind corruption, which are hard to quantify, also exist. Erlingsson and Kristinsson (2016) write that “corruption is rare but still clearly discernible. Less serious types of corruption, such as favoritism in public appointments and failure to disclose information, are more common than more serious forms, such as extortion, bribes and embezzlement. Nonetheless, it should be noted that a sizable minority of experts still believe corruption is common, especially in the case of favoritism and fraud.”
The collapse of the Icelandic banks in 2008 and the subsequent investigation by the Special Investigation Committee (SIC), among other bodies, highlighted the weak attitude of government and public agencies toward the banks, including weak restraints and lax supervision before 2008. Moreover, three of the four main political parties, as well as individual politicians, accepted large donations from the banks and affiliated interests. When the banks crashed, 10 out of the 63 members of parliament owed the banks the equivalent of more than €1 million each. Two of the 10 members of parliament in question still sit in parliament and the cabinet, and one is the finance minister, without having divulged whether or how they settled their debts. Write-offs of bank debt are not made public in Iceland. GRECO has repeatedly highlighted the need for Icelandic members of parliament to disclose all their debts beyond standard mortgage loans. In 2015, GRECO formally complained that Iceland had not responded to any of its recommendations in its 2013 report on Iceland.
In November 2011, parliament passed a law that obliges members of parliament to declare their financial interests, including salaries, means of financial support, assets, and jobs outside parliament. This information is publicly available on the parliament’s website.
According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2021, which measures business corruption, Iceland scored 74 out of 100, where a score of 100 means no corruption. Iceland’s rank has fallen to 13 out of 180 countries, leaving the country well behind the other Nordic countries with scores between 85 and 88. In an assessment of political corruption in 2012, Gallup reported that 67% of Icelandic respondents view corruption as being widespread in government compared with 14% to 15% in Sweden and Denmark. A 2018 poll from the Social Science Research Institute at the University of Iceland shows that 65% of respondents view many or nearly all Icelandic politicians as corrupt.
New information, including emails leaked from one of the failed banks, about corruption surrounding the crash of 2008 and involving a prime minister, came to light in 2017. This information led to a gag order being imposed on the newspaper Stundin shortly before the 2017 election, an order that was lifted in late 2018, long after the election.
Citations:
Erlingsson, Gissur Ó., and Kristinsson, Gunnar H (2016), “Measuring corruption: whose perceptions should we rely on? Evidence from Iceland,” Icelandic Review of Politics and Administration, Vol. 12, Issue 2, 215-236. http://www.irpa.is/article/view/a.2016.12.2.2/pdf. Accessed 3 February 2022.
Erlingsson, Gissur Ó. (2014), CORRUPTION IN LOW CORRUPT COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF SWEDEN. Open lecture given at the University of Akureyri, Iceland 19 September 2014.
Hagsmunaskrá Alþingismanna (Financial disclosures of members of parliament), https://www.althingi.is/altext/cv/is/hagsmunaskra/. Accessed 3 February 2022.
Special Investigation Committee (SIC) (2010), Report of the Special Investigation Commission (SIC), report delivered to parliament 12 April, https://www.rna.is/eldri-nefndir/addragandi-og-orsakir-falls-islensku-bankanna-2008/skyrsla-nefndarinnar/english/. Accessed 3 February 2022.
Rules on registration of parliamentarians financial interests. (Reglur um skráningu á fjárhagslegum hagsmunum alþingismanna og trúnaðarstörfum utan þings. Samþykkt í forsætisnefnd Alþingis 28 nóvember 2011.)
Transparency International, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021. Accessed 3 February 2022.
Gallup (2013), Government Corruption Viewed as Pervasive Worldwide, http://www.gallup.com/poll/165476/government-corruption-viewed-pervasive-worldwide.aspx. Accessed 3 February 2022.