Executive Capacity
#12Key Findings
With a few notable gaps despite generally strong performance, Ireland falls into the upper-middle ranks (rank 12) with regard to executive capacity. Its score on this measure has improved by 0.5 points since 2014.
Strategic planning has improved over the past decade. The Department of the Taoiseach has grown substantially over the years, but most policymaking takes place in the line ministries. Cabinet committees are routinely used for interministerial coordination, with informal coordination taking place beforehand. A detailed annual report tracks items contained in the coalition agreement.
Though RIAs are in principle required for all regulatory changes, the range of such assessments appears narrow in practice. The frequency of budgetary overruns indicates that ex post evaluation of policy is insufficient. The government consults with private-sector workers and employers on pay policies much less today than in the pre-financial-crisis era.
The government’s pandemic-era communication was quite coherent, contributing to the success of crisis management. A new digital strategy has been introduced that will drive digitalization across the government. Regulations tend to be enforced in an unbiased way. Local governments have often lowered property taxes, making it more difficult to fund public services.
Strategic planning has improved over the past decade. The Department of the Taoiseach has grown substantially over the years, but most policymaking takes place in the line ministries. Cabinet committees are routinely used for interministerial coordination, with informal coordination taking place beforehand. A detailed annual report tracks items contained in the coalition agreement.
Though RIAs are in principle required for all regulatory changes, the range of such assessments appears narrow in practice. The frequency of budgetary overruns indicates that ex post evaluation of policy is insufficient. The government consults with private-sector workers and employers on pay policies much less today than in the pre-financial-crisis era.
The government’s pandemic-era communication was quite coherent, contributing to the success of crisis management. A new digital strategy has been introduced that will drive digitalization across the government. Regulations tend to be enforced in an unbiased way. Local governments have often lowered property taxes, making it more difficult to fund public services.
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How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
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3
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
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1
In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
There is some evidence that Irish policymakers improved their strategic-planning capacity since the period in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. The annual reports on successive government programs detail a more coherent strategic approach to policymaking and increased use of advisory bodies. The government has relied heavily on experts over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic to inform policymaking and to justify decisions, especially the chief medical officer and members of the National Public Health Emergency Team (Colfer, 2021).
However, independent advice is not always followed. Popular pressures for increased spending and tax reductions continue to influence government decisions regarding the annual national budget and often reflect the proximity of a general election. Prior to the pandemic, the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council, and the Economic and Social Research Institute urged the government to devote more of the revenue gains arising from economic improvements to reducing the budget deficit quicker, at the expense of lower taxes and increased spending. However, the imposition of limits on mortgage lending, intended to moderate the rise in home prices following the experiences of the housing crash, is a welcome example of unpopular but prudent strategic thinking.
While coalition agreements have been increasingly monitored, especially since the innovations of the 1992 – 1997 coalition government, concerning the much greater use of special advisers and program managers, more recently governments have published annual monitoring reports on the coalition programs. These tend to be very detailed annual reports, some much longer than the original coalition agreement. The 2020 Programme for Government: Our Shared Future document runs to 128 pages with no review published yet within the life of this government (Gov, 2020)
Citations:
Colfer, B. (2020) Herd‐immunity across intangible borders: Public policy responses to COVID‐19 in Ireland and the UK, European Policy Analysis, 06(02) pp 203-225, https://doi.org/10.1002/epa2.1096;
Gov (2020) Programme for Government: Our Shared Future, Department of the Taoiseach, 27 October, available at: https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/7e05d-programme-for-government-our-shared-future/
However, independent advice is not always followed. Popular pressures for increased spending and tax reductions continue to influence government decisions regarding the annual national budget and often reflect the proximity of a general election. Prior to the pandemic, the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council, and the Economic and Social Research Institute urged the government to devote more of the revenue gains arising from economic improvements to reducing the budget deficit quicker, at the expense of lower taxes and increased spending. However, the imposition of limits on mortgage lending, intended to moderate the rise in home prices following the experiences of the housing crash, is a welcome example of unpopular but prudent strategic thinking.
While coalition agreements have been increasingly monitored, especially since the innovations of the 1992 – 1997 coalition government, concerning the much greater use of special advisers and program managers, more recently governments have published annual monitoring reports on the coalition programs. These tend to be very detailed annual reports, some much longer than the original coalition agreement. The 2020 Programme for Government: Our Shared Future document runs to 128 pages with no review published yet within the life of this government (Gov, 2020)
Citations:
Colfer, B. (2020) Herd‐immunity across intangible borders: Public policy responses to COVID‐19 in Ireland and the UK, European Policy Analysis, 06(02) pp 203-225, https://doi.org/10.1002/epa2.1096;
Gov (2020) Programme for Government: Our Shared Future, Department of the Taoiseach, 27 October, available at: https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/7e05d-programme-for-government-our-shared-future/
Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?
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9
In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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3
In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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1
The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
In 2009, Professor Patrick Honohan of Trinity College Dublin was appointed governor of the central bank of Ireland. This marked a break with the tradition that the retiring permanent secretary of the Department of Finance would succeed to the governorship. Following his retirement toward the end of 2015, the government announced the appointment of another academic, Professor Philip Lane of Trinity College Dublin, as his replacement. Following Professor Lane’s appointment as chief economist to the European Central Bank, Professor Lane was replaced as governor of the central bank of Ireland, for a seven-year term starting on 1 September 2019, by Gabriel Makhlouf, a former secretary to the New Zealand Treasury.
The Irish Fiscal Advisory Council (FAC) is an independent statutory body, comprising five experts, mainly drawn from academia. It was established in 2011 as part of a wider reform of Ireland’s budgetary procedures. The FAC is required to “independently assess, and comment publicly on, whether the government is meeting its own stated budgetary targets and objectives.” The claim made by then chairman of the council, Professor John McHale of National University of Ireland, Galway, that the 2016 budget violated the rules of the European Union’s Stability and Growth Pact received much publicity. This assertion, however, was quickly withdrawn following a rebuttal by the minister for finance. Nonetheless, the FAC stuck to its criticism of the 2016 budget as being excessively expansionary. Following his retirement, Professor McHale was replaced as chairman of the by Professor Seamus Coffey of University College Cork. The FAC’s criticism of the government’s excessive reliance on financing brought about by buoyant corporate tax revenues in recent budgets at least provoked a commitment by the minister of finance in the 2020 budget to produce a Fiscal Vulnerabilities Scoping Paper, which would examine corporation tax over-performance and policy options aimed at ensuring the sustainability of the public finances.
Academics have regularly held advisory posts in government ministries, including in the Taoiseach’s Office and at the Department of Finance. Advisers meet regularly with ministers but there is no information on the impact on policymaking of the advice proffered. There is no established pattern of open consultations with panels of non-governmental experts and academics, although some ad hoc arrangements have been made from time to time. As above, the government has relied heavily on experts over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, including the chief medical officer and the National Public Health Emergency Team (Colfer, 2021).
Citations:
Colfer, B. (2020) Herd‐immunity across intangible borders: Public policy responses to COVID‐19 in Ireland and the UK, European Policy Analysis, 06(02) pp 203-225, https://doi.org/10.1002/epa2.1096;
Academics are active in several recently-formed independent blogs that may have some influence on policy maker. These include: http://www.irisheconomy.ie http://www.publicpolicy.ie http://www.politicalreform.ie http://www.nerinstitute.net
The Irish Fiscal Advisory Council (FAC) is an independent statutory body, comprising five experts, mainly drawn from academia. It was established in 2011 as part of a wider reform of Ireland’s budgetary procedures. The FAC is required to “independently assess, and comment publicly on, whether the government is meeting its own stated budgetary targets and objectives.” The claim made by then chairman of the council, Professor John McHale of National University of Ireland, Galway, that the 2016 budget violated the rules of the European Union’s Stability and Growth Pact received much publicity. This assertion, however, was quickly withdrawn following a rebuttal by the minister for finance. Nonetheless, the FAC stuck to its criticism of the 2016 budget as being excessively expansionary. Following his retirement, Professor McHale was replaced as chairman of the by Professor Seamus Coffey of University College Cork. The FAC’s criticism of the government’s excessive reliance on financing brought about by buoyant corporate tax revenues in recent budgets at least provoked a commitment by the minister of finance in the 2020 budget to produce a Fiscal Vulnerabilities Scoping Paper, which would examine corporation tax over-performance and policy options aimed at ensuring the sustainability of the public finances.
Academics have regularly held advisory posts in government ministries, including in the Taoiseach’s Office and at the Department of Finance. Advisers meet regularly with ministers but there is no information on the impact on policymaking of the advice proffered. There is no established pattern of open consultations with panels of non-governmental experts and academics, although some ad hoc arrangements have been made from time to time. As above, the government has relied heavily on experts over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, including the chief medical officer and the National Public Health Emergency Team (Colfer, 2021).
Citations:
Colfer, B. (2020) Herd‐immunity across intangible borders: Public policy responses to COVID‐19 in Ireland and the UK, European Policy Analysis, 06(02) pp 203-225, https://doi.org/10.1002/epa2.1096;
Academics are active in several recently-formed independent blogs that may have some influence on policy maker. These include: http://www.irisheconomy.ie http://www.publicpolicy.ie http://www.politicalreform.ie http://www.nerinstitute.net
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Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?
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The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
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The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
The influence and effectiveness of the Department of the Taoiseach is limited by a dearth of analytical skills. One frequently made criticism has focused on the continued reliance on “generalist” recruitment to the civil service. Recent governments have also been criticized for recruiting too many journalists as policy advisers.
The department is focused on strategic policy issues and the delivery of the Programme for Government. The Department of the Taoiseach has steadily grown over the years from about 30 people in 1977 to 223.8 full-time equivalent staff employed across the department in 2022 (Martin, 2022). The Department of Finance is much larger with over 500 people. The Department of the Taoiseach coordinates policy in specific policy areas (e.g., Northern Ireland, European affairs, and more recently Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic). Nevertheless, most policymaking continues to take place in the line ministries.
An expert group on strengthening civil service accountability and performance reported to government in May 2014. Among the numerous recommendations it made, it proposed the establishment of an accountability board for the civil service, chaired by the taoiseach but including external members. This board would be tasked with reviewing and constructively challenging the performance of senior management as well as monitoring progress on the delivery of agreed-upon priorities. It also recommended that the Irish Civil Service be given an appointed head. An accountability board chaired by the taoiseach with independent members designed to oversee governance across the civil service was established in May 2015 (DPER, 2019). In July 2021, Martin Fraser, the head of the civil service, who is also secretary-general of the Department of the Taoiseach, was appointed ambassador to London and a process to replace him is scheduled to take place in the first half of 2022 (Bray, 2022).
Citations:
Bray, J. (2022) Ireland’s most senior civil servant to become ambassador to London, The Irish Times, 27 July, available at: https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/ireland-s-most-senior-civil-servant-to-become-ambassador-to-london-1.4631099
DPER (2019) Accountability Board, Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, 11 January, available at: https://www.gov.ie/en/collection/a029b7-accountability-board/
Martin, M. (2022) Parliamentary Question, Oral answers (20 contributions) (Question to Taoiseach), Dáil Éireann debate 01 March, available at: https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/question/2022-03-01/1/#:~:text=The%20Taoiseach,-Share&text=At%20present%2C%20there%20are%20223.8,staff%20employed%20across%20the%20Department
Regan, A. & Shayne, M. (2012), ‘The Core Executive: the Department of the Taoiseach and the Challenge of Policy Coordination,’ in Eoin O’Malley and Muiris MacCarthaigh (eds). Governing Ireland: from Cabinet Government to Delegated Governance. Dublin: IPA.
The report of the Independent Panel on Strengthening Civil Service Accountability and Performance is available here: http://www.per.gov.ie/civil-service-accountability-consultation-process/ Niamh Hardiman.
The department is focused on strategic policy issues and the delivery of the Programme for Government. The Department of the Taoiseach has steadily grown over the years from about 30 people in 1977 to 223.8 full-time equivalent staff employed across the department in 2022 (Martin, 2022). The Department of Finance is much larger with over 500 people. The Department of the Taoiseach coordinates policy in specific policy areas (e.g., Northern Ireland, European affairs, and more recently Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic). Nevertheless, most policymaking continues to take place in the line ministries.
An expert group on strengthening civil service accountability and performance reported to government in May 2014. Among the numerous recommendations it made, it proposed the establishment of an accountability board for the civil service, chaired by the taoiseach but including external members. This board would be tasked with reviewing and constructively challenging the performance of senior management as well as monitoring progress on the delivery of agreed-upon priorities. It also recommended that the Irish Civil Service be given an appointed head. An accountability board chaired by the taoiseach with independent members designed to oversee governance across the civil service was established in May 2015 (DPER, 2019). In July 2021, Martin Fraser, the head of the civil service, who is also secretary-general of the Department of the Taoiseach, was appointed ambassador to London and a process to replace him is scheduled to take place in the first half of 2022 (Bray, 2022).
Citations:
Bray, J. (2022) Ireland’s most senior civil servant to become ambassador to London, The Irish Times, 27 July, available at: https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/ireland-s-most-senior-civil-servant-to-become-ambassador-to-london-1.4631099
DPER (2019) Accountability Board, Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, 11 January, available at: https://www.gov.ie/en/collection/a029b7-accountability-board/
Martin, M. (2022) Parliamentary Question, Oral answers (20 contributions) (Question to Taoiseach), Dáil Éireann debate 01 March, available at: https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/question/2022-03-01/1/#:~:text=The%20Taoiseach,-Share&text=At%20present%2C%20there%20are%20223.8,staff%20employed%20across%20the%20Department
Regan, A. & Shayne, M. (2012), ‘The Core Executive: the Department of the Taoiseach and the Challenge of Policy Coordination,’ in Eoin O’Malley and Muiris MacCarthaigh (eds). Governing Ireland: from Cabinet Government to Delegated Governance. Dublin: IPA.
The report of the Independent Panel on Strengthening Civil Service Accountability and Performance is available here: http://www.per.gov.ie/civil-service-accountability-consultation-process/ Niamh Hardiman.
To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?
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There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
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The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
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Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
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Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
The Taoiseach’s Office is involved in legislative and expenditure proposals. The process is highly interactive with much feedback between the line ministries, the Taoiseach’s Office and the Office of the Attorney General. The Department of Finance has considerable input into all proposals with revenue or expenditure implications. Any significant policy items have to be discussed in advance with the Department of the Taoiseach. The Cabinet Handbook lays out detailed procedural rules for the discussion of policy proposals and the drafting of legislation. It is publicly available on the website of the Department of the Taoiseach (Gov, 2006).
As in many countries, the Department of Finance is a lot more than a regular line ministry. For most of the history of the state, it has been the first among equal government ministries. The procedures state:
“As a matter of principle, the sanction of the minister for finance is required for all expenditure. In any proposal for new legislation, it should be made clear that the sanction of the Minister for Finance is required to incur any expenditure under the legislation. Neither the voting of money by Dáil Éireann, nor the inclusion of an allocation in an Estimate constitutes sanction.” (Department of Finance 2008: Public Financial Procedures).
Citations:
Department of Finance (2008)
Government of Ireland (2006)
As in many countries, the Department of Finance is a lot more than a regular line ministry. For most of the history of the state, it has been the first among equal government ministries. The procedures state:
“As a matter of principle, the sanction of the minister for finance is required for all expenditure. In any proposal for new legislation, it should be made clear that the sanction of the Minister for Finance is required to incur any expenditure under the legislation. Neither the voting of money by Dáil Éireann, nor the inclusion of an allocation in an Estimate constitutes sanction.” (Department of Finance 2008: Public Financial Procedures).
Citations:
Department of Finance (2008)
Government of Ireland (2006)
How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?
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The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
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Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
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There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
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There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
Cabinet committees are established by the government and managed by the Department of the Taoiseach. Cabinet committees derive their authority from government. Membership of cabinet committees includes cabinet ministers, ministers of state (junior ministers) and may also include the attorney general.
When a policy area cuts across departmental boundaries or is an urgent priority (e.g., Brexit or the COVID-19 pandemic), a common response is to set up a cabinet committee. The number of committees, and their relative size and composition is at the discretion of the Taoiseach. As such, there is no semi-permanent standing committee structure, as there is in some other countries.
For example, under the 2002 – 2007 government, there were 11 cabinet committees, in the following government there were only six.
This means that many government ministers will serve on multiple cabinet committees, sometimes simultaneously. In 2011, the minister for finance was a member of five out of eight cabinet committees. The essential job of cabinet committees is to coordinate policy initiatives, especially when substantive policy proposals concern multiple different ministries.
In 2022, there are 10 cabinet committees. The most recent addition focuses on COVID-19, while the other committees focus on economic recovery and investment; housing; healthcare; the environment and climate change; social affairs and equality; education; European affairs; Brexit and Northern Ireland, and government coordination (Gov, 2021). The committees range in size from six to 13 members, with the exception being the Government Coordination Committee, which brings together the three heads of the coalition parties and serves as a steering committee for the government program.
Each of the cabinet committees is supported by a group of senior officials from the civil service who meet in advance of the committee to prepare agendas and identify problem areas. It has been reported that, during the 2000s, “cabinet committees were attended not only by cabinet members but also by senior officials and often heads of agencies too” (Hardiman et al. 2012, 116).
In terms of their official composition, members are a mixture of full cabinet ministers and ministers of state. The taoiseach, tánaiste, minister for the environment, minister for finance, and minister for public expenditure and reform are members of each committee.
Cabinet committees are chaired by the taoiseach or a senior official of the Department of the Taoiseach. Cabinet committees generally make policy recommendations, which are followed up by a formal memo to the government.
Citations:
Gov (2021) Cabinet Committees of the 32nd Government, Department of the Taoiseach, 05 January, available at: https://www.gov.ie/en/organisation-information/48fd2-cabinet-committees-of-the-32nd-government/
Hardiman, N., Regan, A., & Shayne, M. ‘The Core Executive: The Department of the Taoiseach and the Challenge of Policy Coordination, in Eoin O’Malley and Muiris MacCarthaigh (eds, 2012), Governing Ireland: From Cabinet Government to Delegated Governance. Dublin: IPA.
For information about Cabinet Committees see: http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Taoiseach_and_Government/Cabinet_Committees
When a policy area cuts across departmental boundaries or is an urgent priority (e.g., Brexit or the COVID-19 pandemic), a common response is to set up a cabinet committee. The number of committees, and their relative size and composition is at the discretion of the Taoiseach. As such, there is no semi-permanent standing committee structure, as there is in some other countries.
For example, under the 2002 – 2007 government, there were 11 cabinet committees, in the following government there were only six.
This means that many government ministers will serve on multiple cabinet committees, sometimes simultaneously. In 2011, the minister for finance was a member of five out of eight cabinet committees. The essential job of cabinet committees is to coordinate policy initiatives, especially when substantive policy proposals concern multiple different ministries.
In 2022, there are 10 cabinet committees. The most recent addition focuses on COVID-19, while the other committees focus on economic recovery and investment; housing; healthcare; the environment and climate change; social affairs and equality; education; European affairs; Brexit and Northern Ireland, and government coordination (Gov, 2021). The committees range in size from six to 13 members, with the exception being the Government Coordination Committee, which brings together the three heads of the coalition parties and serves as a steering committee for the government program.
Each of the cabinet committees is supported by a group of senior officials from the civil service who meet in advance of the committee to prepare agendas and identify problem areas. It has been reported that, during the 2000s, “cabinet committees were attended not only by cabinet members but also by senior officials and often heads of agencies too” (Hardiman et al. 2012, 116).
In terms of their official composition, members are a mixture of full cabinet ministers and ministers of state. The taoiseach, tánaiste, minister for the environment, minister for finance, and minister for public expenditure and reform are members of each committee.
Cabinet committees are chaired by the taoiseach or a senior official of the Department of the Taoiseach. Cabinet committees generally make policy recommendations, which are followed up by a formal memo to the government.
Citations:
Gov (2021) Cabinet Committees of the 32nd Government, Department of the Taoiseach, 05 January, available at: https://www.gov.ie/en/organisation-information/48fd2-cabinet-committees-of-the-32nd-government/
Hardiman, N., Regan, A., & Shayne, M. ‘The Core Executive: The Department of the Taoiseach and the Challenge of Policy Coordination, in Eoin O’Malley and Muiris MacCarthaigh (eds, 2012), Governing Ireland: From Cabinet Government to Delegated Governance. Dublin: IPA.
For information about Cabinet Committees see: http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Taoiseach_and_Government/Cabinet_Committees
How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?
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Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
Responsibility for policy coordination lies with the Department of the Taoiseach). However, to be truly effective in this area the office would require greater analytical expertise across many policy areas than it has at present. Despite much rhetoric about “joined-up government,” the coordination of policy proposals across ministries has traditionally been relatively weak, with conflicting policies pursued in different parts of the civil service. For example, employment creation can take precedence over environmental considerations and local planning processes often do not mesh with national housing policies.
While coordination across government is often an up-hill battle, the development of the cabinet committee system has somewhat improved matters. Hardiman et al (2012, p.120) conclude, “perhaps the most significant organizational change aimed at improving cross-departmental coordination has been the growing reliance on the cabinet committee system.”
Another source of interdepartmental coordination stems from the practice of cabinet and junior ministers each appointing their own “special adviser.” These advisers meet to debate policy proposals: O’Malley and Martin (2018, p265) comment that “the advisers collectively operate in effect as a lower-level cabinet.
Citations:
Hardiman, N., Regan, A., & Shayne, M. ‘The Core Executive: The Department of the Taoiseach and the Challenge of Policy Coordination, in Eoin O’Malley and Muiris MacCarthaigh (eds, 2012), Governing Ireland: From Cabinet Government to Delegated Governance. Dublin: IPA.
O’Malley, E. & Martin, S. ‘The Government and the Taoiseach,’ in John Coakley and Michael Gallagher, Politics in The Republic of Ireland. (Routledge, 2018).
While coordination across government is often an up-hill battle, the development of the cabinet committee system has somewhat improved matters. Hardiman et al (2012, p.120) conclude, “perhaps the most significant organizational change aimed at improving cross-departmental coordination has been the growing reliance on the cabinet committee system.”
Another source of interdepartmental coordination stems from the practice of cabinet and junior ministers each appointing their own “special adviser.” These advisers meet to debate policy proposals: O’Malley and Martin (2018, p265) comment that “the advisers collectively operate in effect as a lower-level cabinet.
Citations:
Hardiman, N., Regan, A., & Shayne, M. ‘The Core Executive: The Department of the Taoiseach and the Challenge of Policy Coordination, in Eoin O’Malley and Muiris MacCarthaigh (eds, 2012), Governing Ireland: From Cabinet Government to Delegated Governance. Dublin: IPA.
O’Malley, E. & Martin, S. ‘The Government and the Taoiseach,’ in John Coakley and Michael Gallagher, Politics in The Republic of Ireland. (Routledge, 2018).
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
All governments in Ireland since 1989 have been coalition governments. The 2016 general election produced a Fine Gael-led minority government with nine independent deputies. This government was dependent on the abstentionism of the main opposition party, Fianna Fáil, in votes relating to confidence and supply. The government in office since 2020 is a novel coalition of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael – who between them have led every government since the foundation of the state, but never in coalition before 2020 – along with the Greens.
The impression conveyed by accounts of cabinet meetings is that the agenda is usually too heavy to allow for long debates on fundamental issues, which tend to be settled in various ways prior to any meeting. On the whole, these informal coordination mechanisms appear to work effectively (see also “Ministerial Bureaucracy” on the importance of ministers’ special advisers).
During the 2011 to 2016 coalition government, the need for tight coordination was greater given that this government had to deal with the economic and financial crisis. The Economic Management Council (EMC) was introduced as a kind of “war cabinet.” It was composed of four key cabinet members: the taoiseach and tánaiste (the two coalition party leaders), and the two key economic portfolios, the minister for finance and the minister for public expenditure (one from each party). The EMC also included these four ministers’ top officials and advisers, about 13 in total. The EMC was an inner cabinet that took key decisions – a level of formal tight coordination not previously seen in Ireland. Partly because the crisis had mainly passed, the EMC was discontinued after the 2016 election.
In May 2020, a cross-party special committee was established to consider and take evidence on the state’s response to the coronavirus pandemic. The committee was chaired by an independent deputy and published its final report in October 2020 (Oir, 2020). Observers raised concerns regarding public comments made by the chair of the committee, who raised doubts about the efficacy of lockdowns and restrictions, and on another occasion described concerns about rising infection rates in Ireland as “hysterical” (Horgan-Jones, 2020).
Citations:
Horgan-Jones, J. (2020) Chair of Covid-19 committee criticised over ‘hysteria’ comment, The Irish Times, August 17, available at: https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/chair-of-covid-19-committee-criticised-over-hysteria-comment-1.4332508
Oir (2020), ‘Final report of the special committee on Covid-19’, Houses of the Oireachtas, October 06, https://data.oireachtas.ie/ie/oireachtas/committee/dail/33/special_committee_on_covid_19_response/reports/2020/2020-10-09_final-report-of-the-special-committee-on-covid-19-response-sccr004_en.pdf
The impression conveyed by accounts of cabinet meetings is that the agenda is usually too heavy to allow for long debates on fundamental issues, which tend to be settled in various ways prior to any meeting. On the whole, these informal coordination mechanisms appear to work effectively (see also “Ministerial Bureaucracy” on the importance of ministers’ special advisers).
During the 2011 to 2016 coalition government, the need for tight coordination was greater given that this government had to deal with the economic and financial crisis. The Economic Management Council (EMC) was introduced as a kind of “war cabinet.” It was composed of four key cabinet members: the taoiseach and tánaiste (the two coalition party leaders), and the two key economic portfolios, the minister for finance and the minister for public expenditure (one from each party). The EMC also included these four ministers’ top officials and advisers, about 13 in total. The EMC was an inner cabinet that took key decisions – a level of formal tight coordination not previously seen in Ireland. Partly because the crisis had mainly passed, the EMC was discontinued after the 2016 election.
In May 2020, a cross-party special committee was established to consider and take evidence on the state’s response to the coronavirus pandemic. The committee was chaired by an independent deputy and published its final report in October 2020 (Oir, 2020). Observers raised concerns regarding public comments made by the chair of the committee, who raised doubts about the efficacy of lockdowns and restrictions, and on another occasion described concerns about rising infection rates in Ireland as “hysterical” (Horgan-Jones, 2020).
Citations:
Horgan-Jones, J. (2020) Chair of Covid-19 committee criticised over ‘hysteria’ comment, The Irish Times, August 17, available at: https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/chair-of-covid-19-committee-criticised-over-hysteria-comment-1.4332508
Oir (2020), ‘Final report of the special committee on Covid-19’, Houses of the Oireachtas, October 06, https://data.oireachtas.ie/ie/oireachtas/committee/dail/33/special_committee_on_covid_19_response/reports/2020/2020-10-09_final-report-of-the-special-committee-on-covid-19-response-sccr004_en.pdf
How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?
10
9
9
The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
8
7
6
7
6
The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
5
4
3
4
3
The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
2
1
1
The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
The government uses digital technologies in most cases and this appears to provide effective interministerial coordination. Throughout 2020 and 2021, “incorporeal” (i.e., remote) cabinet meetings were held online in keeping with prevailing public health and social distancing measures.
Ireland is perceived to lag behind other highly developed EU member states in the effort to digitize government services. In early 2022, a new digital strategy – The Digital Ireland Framework – was introduced with the aim of driving and enabling digital change across Irish economic and social life. It includes elements designed to drive digital transformation within the government, an ambition also served by the Irish plan for distribution of Next Generation EU funds.
Citations:
Government of Ireland (2022) ‘Launch of Harnessing Digital’, 1 February 2022, https://www.gov.ie/en/press-release/3a922-online-launch-of-harnessing-digital-the-digital-ireland-framework/
Ireland is perceived to lag behind other highly developed EU member states in the effort to digitize government services. In early 2022, a new digital strategy – The Digital Ireland Framework – was introduced with the aim of driving and enabling digital change across Irish economic and social life. It includes elements designed to drive digital transformation within the government, an ambition also served by the Irish plan for distribution of Next Generation EU funds.
Citations:
Government of Ireland (2022) ‘Launch of Harnessing Digital’, 1 February 2022, https://www.gov.ie/en/press-release/3a922-online-launch-of-harnessing-digital-the-digital-ireland-framework/
Graph View
To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?
10
9
9
RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
8
7
6
7
6
RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
5
4
3
4
3
RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
2
1
1
RIA are not applied or do not exist.
The 2011 Programme for Government stated, “We will require departments to carry out and publish Regulatory Impact Assessments [RIAs] before government decisions are taken.” In principle, RIAs are used by all government departments. In practice, the range of RIAs completed and published is narrow. The last published list of completed RIAs dates from 2009 (Gov, 2018).
In response to parliamentary questions on the topic in July 2012, the taoiseach responded, “My department will shortly be consulting departments generally about the question of publication of regulatory impact analyses carried out before government decisions are taken.” Despite the reiteration in the Annual Review of the Programme for Government of the requirement that all departments undertake RIAs for regulatory changes, there is little evidence that these are being undertaken and published.
The cancellation and repayment of water charges paid to Irish Water in 2017 constituted a major failure in the areas of regulatory impact assessment, policy coordination and government communication with the public.
In 2021, the OECD pushed Ireland to establish a core body to perform vital oversight and scrutiny functions, such as reviewing the quality of RIAs. There were good examples cited, such as the Department of Business, Enterprise and Innovation’s assessment of the 2018 Copyright and Other Intellectual Property Law Provisions Bill and the Department of Transport’s 2021 assessment for merchant shipping (the Investigation of Marine Casualties Amendment Bill). But the OECD criticized the failure to publish many of the RIAs carried out by government departments (Ferris, 2021).
Citations:
Ferris, T., (2021) ‘OECD scores show Ireland must try harder on regulatory impact assessments’, The Irish Times, 6 December 2021, https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/oecd-scores-show-ireland-must-try-harder-on-regulatory-impact-assessments-1.4747437
The latest available government documentation relating to RIAs is:
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Publications/Publications_Archive/Publications_2011/Revised_RIA_Guidelines_June_2009.pdf Parts of the Independent Assessment of ‘The options for water provision’ are available at http://www.environ.ie/en/Publications/Environment/Water/FileDownLoad,29194,en.pdf
In response to parliamentary questions on the topic in July 2012, the taoiseach responded, “My department will shortly be consulting departments generally about the question of publication of regulatory impact analyses carried out before government decisions are taken.” Despite the reiteration in the Annual Review of the Programme for Government of the requirement that all departments undertake RIAs for regulatory changes, there is little evidence that these are being undertaken and published.
The cancellation and repayment of water charges paid to Irish Water in 2017 constituted a major failure in the areas of regulatory impact assessment, policy coordination and government communication with the public.
In 2021, the OECD pushed Ireland to establish a core body to perform vital oversight and scrutiny functions, such as reviewing the quality of RIAs. There were good examples cited, such as the Department of Business, Enterprise and Innovation’s assessment of the 2018 Copyright and Other Intellectual Property Law Provisions Bill and the Department of Transport’s 2021 assessment for merchant shipping (the Investigation of Marine Casualties Amendment Bill). But the OECD criticized the failure to publish many of the RIAs carried out by government departments (Ferris, 2021).
Citations:
Ferris, T., (2021) ‘OECD scores show Ireland must try harder on regulatory impact assessments’, The Irish Times, 6 December 2021, https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/oecd-scores-show-ireland-must-try-harder-on-regulatory-impact-assessments-1.4747437
The latest available government documentation relating to RIAs is:
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Publications/Publications_Archive/Publications_2011/Revised_RIA_Guidelines_June_2009.pdf Parts of the Independent Assessment of ‘The options for water provision’ are available at http://www.environ.ie/en/Publications/Environment/Water/FileDownLoad,29194,en.pdf
Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?
10
9
9
RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
8
7
6
7
6
The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
5
4
3
4
3
The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
2
1
1
RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
The accessibility and communication of the RIAs that have been performed are poor, and independent quality evaluations are not conducted. RIAs have been required since 2005 for issues that involve changes to the regulatory framework.
The shortcomings and problems that have arisen with regard to the launch of Irish Water illustrate a failure to create transparency and enable participation in the assessment of at least this important project.
The 2021 OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook scored Ireland relatively highly on adoption and methodology, but significantly lower on transparency and oversight. The composite score for Ireland was 2.09 out of four. Given that it is the quality of RIAs that really matters, the Irish performance was perceived to be disappointing (Ferris, 2021; OECD, 2021).
The shortcomings and problems that have arisen with regard to the launch of Irish Water illustrate a failure to create transparency and enable participation in the assessment of at least this important project.
The 2021 OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook scored Ireland relatively highly on adoption and methodology, but significantly lower on transparency and oversight. The composite score for Ireland was 2.09 out of four. Given that it is the quality of RIAs that really matters, the Irish performance was perceived to be disappointing (Ferris, 2021; OECD, 2021).
Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?
10
9
9
Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
8
7
6
7
6
Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
5
4
3
4
3
Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
2
1
1
Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
Some of the suggested sustainability checks are included in the RIA Guidelines published in 2009 (a 97-page document), but there is no explicit mention of “sustainability” in that document and it does not seem that such checks are integrated into the RIA process. There is explicit provision for the inclusion of poverty impact assessments.
A strategic environmental assessment was built into the government’s 2021 Climate Action Plan. It remains to be seen whether it will deliver better and, in particular, more transparent regulatory impact assessment.
Citations:
Government of Ireland (2021) ‘Climate Action Plan 2021’.
A strategic environmental assessment was built into the government’s 2021 Climate Action Plan. It remains to be seen whether it will deliver better and, in particular, more transparent regulatory impact assessment.
Citations:
Government of Ireland (2021) ‘Climate Action Plan 2021’.
To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?
10
9
9
Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
2
1
1
Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
Prior to the pandemic, the extent of overspending in healthcare totaled more than €2 billion over the previous four years, according to the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council. Such budgetary over-runs suggest that there is little ex post evaluation of policy in this significant budgetary area. Each year the government is presented with an over-run that is tacitly accepted and paid for out of buoyant tax revenues. However, if tax revenues fall, the ability of the government to fund such over-runs will create significant political tensions.
Notably, the central bank calculated that the cost of all measures deployed by the government to fight the pandemic in 2020 was €24.6 billion (Conefrey et al 2021), with an Exchequer deficit of €7.5 billion recorded in 2021 (DOF, 2022).
Citations:
Conefrey, T., Hickey, R. & McInerney, N. (2021) COVID-19 and the Public Finances in Ireland, Economic Letter, Vol. 2021, No. 3.
DOF (2022) Exchequer deficit of €7½ billion recorded in 2021: Corporation tax receipts at similar levels to VAT, €13½ billion in Covid related expenditure to support recovery – Ministers Donohoe & McGrath, Department of Finance, 05 January, available at: https://www.gov.ie/en/press-release/badf9-exchequer-deficit-of-712-billion-recorded-in-2021-corporation-tax-receipts-at-similar-levels-to-vat-1312-billion-in-covid-related-expenditure-to-support-recovery-ministers-donohoe-mcgrath/
Notably, the central bank calculated that the cost of all measures deployed by the government to fight the pandemic in 2020 was €24.6 billion (Conefrey et al 2021), with an Exchequer deficit of €7.5 billion recorded in 2021 (DOF, 2022).
Citations:
Conefrey, T., Hickey, R. & McInerney, N. (2021) COVID-19 and the Public Finances in Ireland, Economic Letter, Vol. 2021, No. 3.
DOF (2022) Exchequer deficit of €7½ billion recorded in 2021: Corporation tax receipts at similar levels to VAT, €13½ billion in Covid related expenditure to support recovery – Ministers Donohoe & McGrath, Department of Finance, 05 January, available at: https://www.gov.ie/en/press-release/badf9-exchequer-deficit-of-712-billion-recorded-in-2021-corporation-tax-receipts-at-similar-levels-to-vat-1312-billion-in-covid-related-expenditure-to-support-recovery-ministers-donohoe-mcgrath/
Graph View
Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?
10
9
9
The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
8
7
6
7
6
The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
2
1
1
The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
Tripartite social partnership, involving employers and employee representatives in both the public and private sectors, existed in Ireland from 1987 to 2010. In 2010, social partnership in the private sector became one of the first casualties of the county’s economic crisis. Three public sector agreements on pay and working conditions were negotiated between 2010 and 2013. The cumulative effect of these measures has been significant changes in pay and working conditions in the public sector, and a marked increase in productivity. However, some trade unions, notably in the educational sector, have rejected these proposals and some significant problems remain unresolved.
During 2016, improved economic performance shifted the focus toward containing public expectations that tax and expenditure disciplines would be significantly relaxed. In 2016, these expectations led to a strike by Dublin’s public tramway system workers and a threatened strike by the police force, which resulted in generous settlements. As a result of these settlements, the government would face the dilemma of trying to resist further demands for public sector pay increases.
The government now consults with workers and employers in the private sector on pay policy to a much lesser extent than was the case before 2008. Wage settlements are largely reached through discussion and negotiation between the affected parties.
In acknowledgment of efforts made during the deepest parts of the country’s COVID-19 crisis, in 2021, the government announced a bonus of between €600 and €1,000 to be paid to frontline workers. At the time of writing, this bonus has yet to be paid and there remains a lack of clarity around exactly which groups of workers will be covered by the scheme.
Citations:
The latest public sector agreement is here:
http://www.per.gov.ie/haddington-road-agreement
During 2016, improved economic performance shifted the focus toward containing public expectations that tax and expenditure disciplines would be significantly relaxed. In 2016, these expectations led to a strike by Dublin’s public tramway system workers and a threatened strike by the police force, which resulted in generous settlements. As a result of these settlements, the government would face the dilemma of trying to resist further demands for public sector pay increases.
The government now consults with workers and employers in the private sector on pay policy to a much lesser extent than was the case before 2008. Wage settlements are largely reached through discussion and negotiation between the affected parties.
In acknowledgment of efforts made during the deepest parts of the country’s COVID-19 crisis, in 2021, the government announced a bonus of between €600 and €1,000 to be paid to frontline workers. At the time of writing, this bonus has yet to be paid and there remains a lack of clarity around exactly which groups of workers will be covered by the scheme.
Citations:
The latest public sector agreement is here:
http://www.per.gov.ie/haddington-road-agreement
Graph View
To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?
10
9
9
Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
8
7
6
7
6
Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
5
4
3
4
3
Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
2
1
1
Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
Under the constitution, the government is required to act in a collective fashion and all ministers are collectively responsible for government decisions. This doctrine of collective cabinet responsibility is normally adhered to and creates a clear incentive to follow a closely coordinated communications strategy.
In some controversial policy areas, communication between ministries, as well as between ministries and the government has lacked coherence. Statements regarding healthcare and housing, to give two examples, continue to lack clarity and consistency, with inadequate coordination between the ministry and the government about what is planned and feasible in these areas.
The creation of Irish Water was characterized by a serious lack of transparency and coherence. The government’s attempt to remove Irish Water from the general government sector and have it treated as a commercial state-owned body in the national income accounts was dismissed by a judgment from Eurostat in 2015: “Eurostat considers that Irish Water is a non-market entity controlled by government and should therefore be classified within the government sector.” In 2017, domestic water charges payable to Irish Water were abolished and money already paid to Irish Water was repaid.
The government’s communication with the public throughout the COVID-19 pandemic was widely perceived to have been successful and one of the reasons Ireland managed the crisis comparatively well (Colfer and O’ Brennan, 2021).
Citations:
Colfer and O’ Brennan (2021)
The complex details of the treatment of Irish Water in the national income accounts were discussed in an exchange of views between the Irish Central Statistics Office and Eurostat: see http://www.cso.ie/en/surveysandmethodology/nationalaccounts/classificationdecisions/classificationofirishwater/
In some controversial policy areas, communication between ministries, as well as between ministries and the government has lacked coherence. Statements regarding healthcare and housing, to give two examples, continue to lack clarity and consistency, with inadequate coordination between the ministry and the government about what is planned and feasible in these areas.
The creation of Irish Water was characterized by a serious lack of transparency and coherence. The government’s attempt to remove Irish Water from the general government sector and have it treated as a commercial state-owned body in the national income accounts was dismissed by a judgment from Eurostat in 2015: “Eurostat considers that Irish Water is a non-market entity controlled by government and should therefore be classified within the government sector.” In 2017, domestic water charges payable to Irish Water were abolished and money already paid to Irish Water was repaid.
The government’s communication with the public throughout the COVID-19 pandemic was widely perceived to have been successful and one of the reasons Ireland managed the crisis comparatively well (Colfer and O’ Brennan, 2021).
Citations:
Colfer and O’ Brennan (2021)
The complex details of the treatment of Irish Water in the national income accounts were discussed in an exchange of views between the Irish Central Statistics Office and Eurostat: see http://www.cso.ie/en/surveysandmethodology/nationalaccounts/classificationdecisions/classificationofirishwater/
Graph View
To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?
10
9
9
The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
5
4
3
4
3
The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
2
1
1
The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
One notable and growing trend is the increased use of statutory instruments which clearly empower ministers. It is often the case that a general policy is decided in the Oireachtas, but that the legislative body then delegates the detail and implementation to a minister. This provides the minister with considerable power to shape public policy. The average annual number of statutory instruments in the 1960s was 284; this rose steadily to 445 a year in the 1990s. Between 2010 and 2017, the average annual number rose to 772. In 2020, there were 32 acts of the Oireachtas signed into law and 760 statutory instruments. This trend plays some role in shifting policymaking power from the legislature to the executive.
In May 2016, the incoming minority government agreed to suspend water charges and establish an expert commission on the issue. This resulted in the publication of the Report on the Funding of Domestic Public Water Services in Ireland in November 2016. The report’s two main recommendations were that there should be a constitutional provision for the public ownership of water utilities and that public water services should be funded through taxation. The report also recommended that excessive or wasteful use of water should be discouraged by charging for such use, consistent with the polluter pays principle. As above, at the time of writing, Irish Water plans to introduce household charges for excess water use in 2022, according to the Irish Water Charges Plan (IW, 2021)
Ireland’s aging water and sewage system infrastructure necessitates significant future capital expenditure. While the abolition of domestic water charges reduced pressure on the government from angry members of the public, the government must find an estimated €13 billion for infrastructure improvements in the coming years.
Citations:
Gallagher, M. (2010), “The Oireachtas,’ chpt 7 of John Coakley and Michael Gallagher (eds), Politics in the Republic of Ireland. London: Routledge and PSAI Press.
Irish Water (2021) Irish Water Charges Plan, Irish Water, 01 October, available at: https://www.water.ie/about/our-customer-commitment/20210929-IW-Water-Charges-Plan-.pdf
O’Malley, E. & Martin, S. (2018), ‘The Government and the Taoiseach,’ in John Coakley and Michael Gallagher (eds), Politics in the Republic of Ireland. 6th edition. London: Routledge and PSAI Press.
In May 2016, the incoming minority government agreed to suspend water charges and establish an expert commission on the issue. This resulted in the publication of the Report on the Funding of Domestic Public Water Services in Ireland in November 2016. The report’s two main recommendations were that there should be a constitutional provision for the public ownership of water utilities and that public water services should be funded through taxation. The report also recommended that excessive or wasteful use of water should be discouraged by charging for such use, consistent with the polluter pays principle. As above, at the time of writing, Irish Water plans to introduce household charges for excess water use in 2022, according to the Irish Water Charges Plan (IW, 2021)
Ireland’s aging water and sewage system infrastructure necessitates significant future capital expenditure. While the abolition of domestic water charges reduced pressure on the government from angry members of the public, the government must find an estimated €13 billion for infrastructure improvements in the coming years.
Citations:
Gallagher, M. (2010), “The Oireachtas,’ chpt 7 of John Coakley and Michael Gallagher (eds), Politics in the Republic of Ireland. London: Routledge and PSAI Press.
Irish Water (2021) Irish Water Charges Plan, Irish Water, 01 October, available at: https://www.water.ie/about/our-customer-commitment/20210929-IW-Water-Charges-Plan-.pdf
O’Malley, E. & Martin, S. (2018), ‘The Government and the Taoiseach,’ in John Coakley and Michael Gallagher (eds), Politics in the Republic of Ireland. 6th edition. London: Routledge and PSAI Press.
To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?
10
9
9
The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
8
7
6
7
6
The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
5
4
3
4
3
The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
2
1
1
The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
The current coalition government represents a range of different agendas and priorities. The allocation of ministries between the parties has a significant influence on the overall coherence of government policy. The participation of the Greens in government had an important impact on measures that are intended to address climate change in the government program, for example.
Individual ministries are to a significant degree independent fiefdoms that can be used by individual ministers to pursue their self-interest – including boosting their chances of reelection – rather than any comprehensive government objective. The system requires even senior ministers to spend considerable time and energy in local constituency work, because few are sufficiently distanced from the risk of losing their seat at the next election.
The two ministries with overarching responsibility for coordinating this program are the Department of the Taoiseach and the Department of Finance.
Ministers are not involved in the appointment or promotion of civil servants; at the higher levels of the civil service, appointment is now in the hands of the independent Top Level Appointments Commission. However, a 2014 conflict over the roles of the minister for justice and the commissioner of the Garda Síochána (the police force) led to the resignation of both men, and eventually the departure of the secretary-general of the Department of Justice.
Ministers select their own advisers and consultants and these exercise considerable influence. An increasing trend in recent years has been the appointment of leading journalists as ministerial advisers. For the most part, however, individual ministers do implement government policy. But over time there is a tendency for some to pursue increasingly idiosyncratic goals. The ultimate sanction can be exercised by the taoiseach, who can seek to increase ministerial compliance and government cohesiveness by reshuffling the cabinet.
Individual ministries are to a significant degree independent fiefdoms that can be used by individual ministers to pursue their self-interest – including boosting their chances of reelection – rather than any comprehensive government objective. The system requires even senior ministers to spend considerable time and energy in local constituency work, because few are sufficiently distanced from the risk of losing their seat at the next election.
The two ministries with overarching responsibility for coordinating this program are the Department of the Taoiseach and the Department of Finance.
Ministers are not involved in the appointment or promotion of civil servants; at the higher levels of the civil service, appointment is now in the hands of the independent Top Level Appointments Commission. However, a 2014 conflict over the roles of the minister for justice and the commissioner of the Garda Síochána (the police force) led to the resignation of both men, and eventually the departure of the secretary-general of the Department of Justice.
Ministers select their own advisers and consultants and these exercise considerable influence. An increasing trend in recent years has been the appointment of leading journalists as ministerial advisers. For the most part, however, individual ministers do implement government policy. But over time there is a tendency for some to pursue increasingly idiosyncratic goals. The ultimate sanction can be exercised by the taoiseach, who can seek to increase ministerial compliance and government cohesiveness by reshuffling the cabinet.
How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
5
4
3
4
3
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
2
1
1
The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
The annual budgetary process, and in particular the preparation of expenditure estimates, involves individual ministries submitting preliminary estimates to the Department of Finance. This is the opening of a battle for resources, as the department seeks to reconcile the sum of departmental claims with the total available for public spending. Whereas monitoring and oversight of most line ministry spending and policy implementation have been effective in recent years, the problem of large cost over-runs at the Ministry of Health and confusion about the medium-term strategy for public health are long-standing and unresolved issues. Notably, the Sláintecare strategy is an ongoing, incremental reform of the healthcare service in Ireland, which is designed to deliver equal access to healthcare services for every citizen based on patient need and not ability to pay (Gov, 2018).
Having corrected its excessive deficit in 2015 and 2016, Irish policymakers have since been constrained by the rules of the EU fiscal compact in framing annual budgets. This has limited government flexibility with regard to tax cuts and expenditure increases. However, these constraints have been somewhat offset by revenue buoyancy, which has resulted from unexpectedly rapid economic growth in recent years, particularly associated with high tax receipts from multinational corporations that are present in the country. Freedom of information laws and the media have the potential to provide vital checks on ministerial overreach.
Citations:
Gov (2018) Sláintecare, Government of Ireland, available at: https://www.gov.ie/en/campaigns/slaintecare-implementation-strategy/
Having corrected its excessive deficit in 2015 and 2016, Irish policymakers have since been constrained by the rules of the EU fiscal compact in framing annual budgets. This has limited government flexibility with regard to tax cuts and expenditure increases. However, these constraints have been somewhat offset by revenue buoyancy, which has resulted from unexpectedly rapid economic growth in recent years, particularly associated with high tax receipts from multinational corporations that are present in the country. Freedom of information laws and the media have the potential to provide vital checks on ministerial overreach.
Citations:
Gov (2018) Sláintecare, Government of Ireland, available at: https://www.gov.ie/en/campaigns/slaintecare-implementation-strategy/
How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
8
7
6
7
6
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
5
4
3
4
3
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
2
1
1
The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
The number of government agencies has been steadily increasing. In 1950, there were around 130 agencies. By 2010, there were more than 350 agencies (see MacCarthaigh, 2012). In 2022, there are 213 agencies alongside 18 government departments (IPSC, 2022).
O’Malley and Martin (2018, 261) note that “the Irish experience had been criticised even before the economic crisis by the OECD, which noted that ‘in Ireland, the objectives of agentification are unclear, mixed and not prioritized,’ resulting in sub-optimal governance structures” (OECD, 2008: 298).
The Health Services Executive (HSE) is the government agency responsible for providing public healthcare. It is the largest semi-autonomous bureaucracy in the country. It was formed by the amalgamation of local health boards in 2005, when the current taoiseach, Michael Martin, was minister for health. It remains difficult to identify the savings that were promised due to this rationalization. On the other hand, cost over-runs and low delivery standards have been a persistent feature of the agency. In 2022, the minister of health is expected to propose the reintroduction of regional health areas, which had been abolished following the establishment of the HSE.
In other areas, the autonomy of executive agencies has yielded mixed results, and the monitoring of these agencies is not sufficiently close to ensure that government policy is being implemented efficiently.
The Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General (OCAG) is responsible for auditing and reporting on the accounts of all public bodies, ensuring that funds are applied for the purposes intended, and evaluating the effectiveness of operations. The OCAG does not regularly monitor all executive agencies. It seems to select those where it knows or suspects that problems have arisen. Its mission statement says it “selects issues for examination which are important in the context of the management of public funds.” Its reports contain details of overspending and inefficiencies, and make recommendations for improving financial administration within the public sector.
In summary, a system of monitoring executive agencies is in place, but high-profile cases in recent years show that it all too often discovers failings and shortcomings after they have occurred and has not been very effective in averting them.
Citations:
IPSC (2022) Government Agencies and Useful Links, available at: http://www.pointofsinglecontact.ie/browse-by-sector/government-agencies/#:~:text=There%20are%20currently%2018%20Government%20Departments%20%2D%20linked%20below.
OCAG reports on the accounts of the public services are available here: http://www.audgen.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?fn=/documents/annualreports/2013/Report/En/ReportIndex.htm https://www.audit.gov.ie/en/about-us/our%20work/reports/
A list of special reports on value for money in the public sector is available here: http://audgen.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=-1&CatID=5&UserLang=EN&m=13
O’Malley and Martin (2018, 261) note that “the Irish experience had been criticised even before the economic crisis by the OECD, which noted that ‘in Ireland, the objectives of agentification are unclear, mixed and not prioritized,’ resulting in sub-optimal governance structures” (OECD, 2008: 298).
The Health Services Executive (HSE) is the government agency responsible for providing public healthcare. It is the largest semi-autonomous bureaucracy in the country. It was formed by the amalgamation of local health boards in 2005, when the current taoiseach, Michael Martin, was minister for health. It remains difficult to identify the savings that were promised due to this rationalization. On the other hand, cost over-runs and low delivery standards have been a persistent feature of the agency. In 2022, the minister of health is expected to propose the reintroduction of regional health areas, which had been abolished following the establishment of the HSE.
In other areas, the autonomy of executive agencies has yielded mixed results, and the monitoring of these agencies is not sufficiently close to ensure that government policy is being implemented efficiently.
The Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General (OCAG) is responsible for auditing and reporting on the accounts of all public bodies, ensuring that funds are applied for the purposes intended, and evaluating the effectiveness of operations. The OCAG does not regularly monitor all executive agencies. It seems to select those where it knows or suspects that problems have arisen. Its mission statement says it “selects issues for examination which are important in the context of the management of public funds.” Its reports contain details of overspending and inefficiencies, and make recommendations for improving financial administration within the public sector.
In summary, a system of monitoring executive agencies is in place, but high-profile cases in recent years show that it all too often discovers failings and shortcomings after they have occurred and has not been very effective in averting them.
Citations:
IPSC (2022) Government Agencies and Useful Links, available at: http://www.pointofsinglecontact.ie/browse-by-sector/government-agencies/#:~:text=There%20are%20currently%2018%20Government%20Departments%20%2D%20linked%20below.
OCAG reports on the accounts of the public services are available here: http://www.audgen.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?fn=/documents/annualreports/2013/Report/En/ReportIndex.htm https://www.audit.gov.ie/en/about-us/our%20work/reports/
A list of special reports on value for money in the public sector is available here: http://audgen.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=-1&CatID=5&UserLang=EN&m=13
To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
8
7
6
7
6
The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
2
1
1
The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
To take one example, a primary motivation for the creation of Irish Water in 2013 was the removal of responsibility for the provision of water services from local governments, many of which had failed to provide a reliable supply of high-quality water services to their populations and had seriously under-invested in water infrastructure over the years, perhaps largely due to inadequate funding from central government. Due to strong populist reaction, the funding mechanism for Irish Water, namely the imposition of household water charges, was strongly resisted. As a result, this funding mechanism was abolished and household water charges were repaid in 2017. The water initiative paralleled the 2005 decision to remove the provision of public-health services from regional health boards, centralizing this power instead in the Health Services Executive (HSE). As we have seen, this has not resulted in a smoothly functioning healthcare delivery system.
The functions and services that remain the responsibility of subnational units of government are funded both by central government and from local resources. In 2020, 36% of local government funding came from central government, 30% from commercial rates, 27% came from “goods and services” (e.g., from housing rents, waste charges, parking charges and planning applications), and 7% from local property tax rates (Gov, 2020).
While the introduction of the local property tax raised the proportion of funds coming from local sources, subnational units of government remain heavily dependent on central government for resources. This dependence is proportionately greater in the case of smaller and poorer local units.
In 2015, 80% of receipts from the local property tax (LPT), which was introduced in 2013, were to be retained locally to fund vital public services, while the remaining 20% were to be redistributed to provide top-up funding to certain local authorities that have lower property-tax bases due to variance in property values. The Local Property Tax Exchequer Receipts for 2021 amounted to €359.3 million. Local authorities can vary the basic LPT rate on residential properties in their area by up to 15% via what is known as the local adjustment factor (CI, 2021). In practice, most local councils have opted to decrease rather than increase local rates of LPT, which has led to continuing problems in funding local government.
Citations:
CI (2021) Local Property Tax, Citizens Information, available at: https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/money_and_tax/tax/housing_taxes_and_reliefs/local_property_tax.html
Gov (2020) Local Authority Budgets 2020, Prepared by the Department of Housing, Planning and Local Government, available at: https://assets.gov.ie/111383/5d1f6426-1e13-46ad-bb92-da5a71b827a3.pdf
https://www.revenue.ie/en/corporate/information-about-revenue/statistics/local-property tax/index.aspx
The functions and services that remain the responsibility of subnational units of government are funded both by central government and from local resources. In 2020, 36% of local government funding came from central government, 30% from commercial rates, 27% came from “goods and services” (e.g., from housing rents, waste charges, parking charges and planning applications), and 7% from local property tax rates (Gov, 2020).
While the introduction of the local property tax raised the proportion of funds coming from local sources, subnational units of government remain heavily dependent on central government for resources. This dependence is proportionately greater in the case of smaller and poorer local units.
In 2015, 80% of receipts from the local property tax (LPT), which was introduced in 2013, were to be retained locally to fund vital public services, while the remaining 20% were to be redistributed to provide top-up funding to certain local authorities that have lower property-tax bases due to variance in property values. The Local Property Tax Exchequer Receipts for 2021 amounted to €359.3 million. Local authorities can vary the basic LPT rate on residential properties in their area by up to 15% via what is known as the local adjustment factor (CI, 2021). In practice, most local councils have opted to decrease rather than increase local rates of LPT, which has led to continuing problems in funding local government.
Citations:
CI (2021) Local Property Tax, Citizens Information, available at: https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/money_and_tax/tax/housing_taxes_and_reliefs/local_property_tax.html
Gov (2020) Local Authority Budgets 2020, Prepared by the Department of Housing, Planning and Local Government, available at: https://assets.gov.ie/111383/5d1f6426-1e13-46ad-bb92-da5a71b827a3.pdf
https://www.revenue.ie/en/corporate/information-about-revenue/statistics/local-property tax/index.aspx
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
2
1
1
The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
Ireland is a unitary state, without a significant degree of autonomous local or regional self-government. Article 28a of the constitution simply states: “The state recognizes the role of local government in providing a forum for the democratic representation of local communities, in exercising and performing at local level powers and functions conferred by law and in promoting by its initiatives the interests of such communities.”
In keeping with its weak constitutional foundation, the role of subnational government is viewed by the electorate as confined to a narrow range of functions. Most of the units of local government – the cities and counties – are small, and many have weak economic bases.
The role of subnational units of government has been progressively reduced, most notably by the removal of their responsibility for the provision of health and water services (respectively in 2005 and 2014). However, the government decided in 2015 that local authorities that stand to receive more income from the LPT than they received from the Local Government Fund will be entitled to use a certain portion of that additional funding for their own discretionary purposes as part of their normal budgetary process.
While the Local Government Reform Act 2014 introduced some important changes in the structure of local government (merging three pairs of city/county councils and replacing town councils with municipal districts), it did not radically alter the structure or functions of local government. The act also replaced the existing regional authorities with three new Regional Assemblies that are tasked with preparing Regional Spatial and Economic Strategies by 2016. Local Community Development Committees have also been established. It remains to be seen if these developments will significantly increase subnational implementation autonomy. John Coakley describes the 2014 act as “the ultimate stage in the centralization of the Irish local government system” (2018, p21).
Citations:
Coakley, J. (2018), ‘The foundations of statehood,’ in in John Coakley and Michael Gallagher (eds), Politics in the Republic of Ireland. 6th edition. London: Routledge and PSAI Press.
In keeping with its weak constitutional foundation, the role of subnational government is viewed by the electorate as confined to a narrow range of functions. Most of the units of local government – the cities and counties – are small, and many have weak economic bases.
The role of subnational units of government has been progressively reduced, most notably by the removal of their responsibility for the provision of health and water services (respectively in 2005 and 2014). However, the government decided in 2015 that local authorities that stand to receive more income from the LPT than they received from the Local Government Fund will be entitled to use a certain portion of that additional funding for their own discretionary purposes as part of their normal budgetary process.
While the Local Government Reform Act 2014 introduced some important changes in the structure of local government (merging three pairs of city/county councils and replacing town councils with municipal districts), it did not radically alter the structure or functions of local government. The act also replaced the existing regional authorities with three new Regional Assemblies that are tasked with preparing Regional Spatial and Economic Strategies by 2016. Local Community Development Committees have also been established. It remains to be seen if these developments will significantly increase subnational implementation autonomy. John Coakley describes the 2014 act as “the ultimate stage in the centralization of the Irish local government system” (2018, p21).
Citations:
Coakley, J. (2018), ‘The foundations of statehood,’ in in John Coakley and Michael Gallagher (eds), Politics in the Republic of Ireland. 6th edition. London: Routledge and PSAI Press.
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?
10
9
9
Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
2
1
1
Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
Most of the main public services (health, social welfare, education, public transport, building and maintaining the primary national road network, and, since 2014, the provision of water services) are provided by the central government or national public utility companies; there is little scope for subnational governments to influence standards.
The attainment of national (or, more usually, EU) levels of public services is prescribed and monitored in other areas where local government plays a greater role, notably environmental services and standards.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) plays a key role in enforcing standards across the country. The Office of Environmental Enforcement supervises the environmental protection activities of local authorities by auditing their performance, providing advice and guidance, and in some cases giving binding directions. The EPA can assist the public in bringing prosecutions against local authorities found to be in breach of significant legislation. In other areas – the provision of social housing, maintenance of local roads and other such issues – the attainment of national standards is largely constrained by the resources made available by the central government. There is significant variation between local providers in these areas. In 2022, the deficiencies in social housing and the need to address the shortcomings in the country’s housing supply remains extremely prominent in national public discourse.
The attainment of national (or, more usually, EU) levels of public services is prescribed and monitored in other areas where local government plays a greater role, notably environmental services and standards.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) plays a key role in enforcing standards across the country. The Office of Environmental Enforcement supervises the environmental protection activities of local authorities by auditing their performance, providing advice and guidance, and in some cases giving binding directions. The EPA can assist the public in bringing prosecutions against local authorities found to be in breach of significant legislation. In other areas – the provision of social housing, maintenance of local roads and other such issues – the attainment of national standards is largely constrained by the resources made available by the central government. There is significant variation between local providers in these areas. In 2022, the deficiencies in social housing and the need to address the shortcomings in the country’s housing supply remains extremely prominent in national public discourse.
To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?
10
9
9
Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
8
7
6
7
6
Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
5
4
3
4
3
Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
2
1
1
Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
Government agencies do attempt to enforce regulations effectively and without bias. This was borne out in October 2018, when Denis Naughten, then minister of communications, was asked to resign for having met a stakeholder of a company that was bidding for the National Broadband Plan contract.
There has been significant growth in political lobbying in Ireland. In general, lobbyists claim that they are simply providing advice about how the policymaking process works, but – given that many lobby firms hire ex-ministers, members of parliament and some journalists – transparency advocates believe it is important to have a statutory register of lobbying to guard against corruption. The Regulation of Lobbying Act was passed in 2015. The act provides for an extensive web-based register for lobbying. In its first year of operation 1,100 people registered and there were also almost 1,500 returns by lobbyists. The database is searchable and provides a lot of information on who the lobbyist was, whom they lobbied, what was the content of their lobbying and what the intended outcome of their lobbying was. “All this is radically new in the Irish context. The lobbying register clearly provides citizens with far more information on the lobbying process than ever before – an important step in the promotion of open and transparent policymaking” (Murphy 2018, 290).
The Office of Lobbying Regulation was also set up (within the Standards of Public Office Commission). Its job is to ensure that the Lobbying Act is enforced. It is independent of government, industry and the other sectional interests.
Citations:
Murphy, G. (2018) ‘The Policymaking Process,’ in John Coakley and Michael Gallagher (eds) Politics in the Republic of Ireland.
There has been significant growth in political lobbying in Ireland. In general, lobbyists claim that they are simply providing advice about how the policymaking process works, but – given that many lobby firms hire ex-ministers, members of parliament and some journalists – transparency advocates believe it is important to have a statutory register of lobbying to guard against corruption. The Regulation of Lobbying Act was passed in 2015. The act provides for an extensive web-based register for lobbying. In its first year of operation 1,100 people registered and there were also almost 1,500 returns by lobbyists. The database is searchable and provides a lot of information on who the lobbyist was, whom they lobbied, what was the content of their lobbying and what the intended outcome of their lobbying was. “All this is radically new in the Irish context. The lobbying register clearly provides citizens with far more information on the lobbying process than ever before – an important step in the promotion of open and transparent policymaking” (Murphy 2018, 290).
The Office of Lobbying Regulation was also set up (within the Standards of Public Office Commission). Its job is to ensure that the Lobbying Act is enforced. It is independent of government, industry and the other sectional interests.
Citations:
Murphy, G. (2018) ‘The Policymaking Process,’ in John Coakley and Michael Gallagher (eds) Politics in the Republic of Ireland.
Graph View
To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?
10
9
9
The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
8
7
6
7
6
In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
2
1
1
The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
The key influence in this area is Ireland’s membership in the European Union and, in the financial area, of the euro zone. In the almost 50 years since Ireland became a member of the European Economic Community in 1973, the country has adapted institutions at all levels of government to allow the country to function effectively within the European Union. The Europeanization of both institutions and the policymaking process has changed the country profoundly. Having successfully implemented the 2010 bailout agreement with the Troika, Ireland has remained committed to adhering to the EU rules of economic governance contained in the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance and the fiscal procedures contained in the European Semester. The unexpectedly strong economic performance since 2013 has greatly facilitated compliance with these obligations. Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, Ireland has walked in step with its EU peers when introducing emergency measures, and limiting economic and social activity. Ireland participated fully in the European Union’s vaccine strategy with the rest of the European Union, and data and information from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) has featured prominently in public discourse and in policymaking.
Citations:
For a discussion of the framework of Ireland’s economic governance see Tutty, M. (2014) Reforming European Economic Governance, IIEA papers, available at: https://historyiiea.com/product/reforming-european-economic-governance/
Citations:
For a discussion of the framework of Ireland’s economic governance see Tutty, M. (2014) Reforming European Economic Governance, IIEA papers, available at: https://historyiiea.com/product/reforming-european-economic-governance/
To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?
10
9
9
The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
2
1
1
The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
The country contributes to international efforts to foster the provision of global public goods primarily through its active participation in European policymaking institutions. Irish government structures have been progressively altered to support this capacity. In 2020, Ireland secured a seat on the U.N. Security Council for the 2021–2022 term.
In this role, Ireland has sought to assume leadership roles in relation to women, peace and security, climate and security, Iran and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Somalia, among other areas. These roles reflect Ireland’s existing foreign policy priorities and strengths (DFA, 2021).
Ireland has continued to maintain a relatively high level of overseas development assistance since the onset of the economic crisis more than a decade ago (0.42% of GNI in 2021). It also continues to play an active part in the development of the European response to climate change. The Irish and Kenyan ambassadors co-facilitated the final intergovernmental negotiations that led to the adoption of the United Nation’s Global Goals (Sustainable Development Goals) in 2015, for example, and the Irish government participated fully in the COP26 U.N. Climate Change Conference in Glasgow in October–November 2021 (see “Global Environmental Policy”).
Citations:
DFA (2021) Ireland’s Priorities for the UN Security Council, 2021-2022, Department of Foreign Affairs, 22 January, available at: https://www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/speeches/speeches-archive/2021/january/irelands-priorities-for-the-un-security-council-2021-2022.php
For an account of Ireland’s role in negotiating the Sustainable Development Goals see https://www.irishaid.ie/what-we-do/post-2015-negotiations/ireland’s-special-role
In this role, Ireland has sought to assume leadership roles in relation to women, peace and security, climate and security, Iran and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Somalia, among other areas. These roles reflect Ireland’s existing foreign policy priorities and strengths (DFA, 2021).
Ireland has continued to maintain a relatively high level of overseas development assistance since the onset of the economic crisis more than a decade ago (0.42% of GNI in 2021). It also continues to play an active part in the development of the European response to climate change. The Irish and Kenyan ambassadors co-facilitated the final intergovernmental negotiations that led to the adoption of the United Nation’s Global Goals (Sustainable Development Goals) in 2015, for example, and the Irish government participated fully in the COP26 U.N. Climate Change Conference in Glasgow in October–November 2021 (see “Global Environmental Policy”).
Citations:
DFA (2021) Ireland’s Priorities for the UN Security Council, 2021-2022, Department of Foreign Affairs, 22 January, available at: https://www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/speeches/speeches-archive/2021/january/irelands-priorities-for-the-un-security-council-2021-2022.php
For an account of Ireland’s role in negotiating the Sustainable Development Goals see https://www.irishaid.ie/what-we-do/post-2015-negotiations/ireland’s-special-role
Graph View
To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?
10
9
9
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
5
4
3
4
3
The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
2
1
1
There is no monitoring.
The present government has a mandate for institutional reform and has made some progress in implementing its program. Specific examples have been discussed in relation to other SGI criteria.
To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?
10
9
9
The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
8
7
6
7
6
The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
2
1
1
The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
Radical change was called for in the wake of the dramatic policy and governance failures that contributed to the severity of the post-2008 economic and social crisis. However, the specific reforms implemented have been relatively limited. Nonetheless, some improvements in strategic capacity introduced during the period of the Troika agreement have been retained. Reform of the legal system was strongly recommended by the Troika, but little has happened in this sphere in the decade or more since.
Institutional arrangements for supervising and regulating the financial-services sector have been overhauled to address shortcomings that contributed to the crisis. The Department of Finance has been restructured and strengthened, a Fiscal Advisory Council was established, and a parliamentary inquiry into the banking crisis was established in 2014 and reported in early 2016.
Since 2016, following a recommendation from the Constitutional Convention, members of Dáil Éireann elected the ceann comhairle (speaker of the house) directly by secret ballot for the first time. All parliamentary committees have been established and committee chairs appointed using the D’Hondt system. Under the system, four of the 13 current core Oireachtas committees are chaired by opposition members (Eolas, 2020).
Institutional arrangements for supervising and regulating the financial-services sector have been overhauled to address shortcomings that contributed to the crisis. The Department of Finance has been restructured and strengthened, a Fiscal Advisory Council was established, and a parliamentary inquiry into the banking crisis was established in 2014 and reported in early 2016.
Since 2016, following a recommendation from the Constitutional Convention, members of Dáil Éireann elected the ceann comhairle (speaker of the house) directly by secret ballot for the first time. All parliamentary committees have been established and committee chairs appointed using the D’Hondt system. Under the system, four of the 13 current core Oireachtas committees are chaired by opposition members (Eolas, 2020).