Executive Capacity
#21Key Findings
Despite its strong government office, Israel falls into the middle ranks (rank 21) with respect to executive capacity. Its score on this measure is unchanged relative to its 2014 level.
Strategic planning and implementation for major issues in Israel are very centralized under the PMO. Draft legislation is developed within ministries, but the PMO is typically involved. Ministerial committees and informal coordination mechanisms are both influential. However, ministries often act territorially, and information sharing is difficult.
A recently implemented RIA program is showing positive signs, but lacks binding guidelines. Public consultation has expanded, but government consultation with specific groups is not transparent, and is often clientelist. Communication during the pandemic was highly uncoordinated, undermining the legitimacy of the measures implemented.
While vaccine and testing programs were very strong during the pandemic, other responses proved far less efficient. Regulations are generally enforced without bias, but there have been numerous investigations into instances in which policy was allegedly slanted toward specific interests. Economic gaps between local governments mean that rich cities can accomplish far more than poor ones.
Strategic planning and implementation for major issues in Israel are very centralized under the PMO. Draft legislation is developed within ministries, but the PMO is typically involved. Ministerial committees and informal coordination mechanisms are both influential. However, ministries often act territorially, and information sharing is difficult.
A recently implemented RIA program is showing positive signs, but lacks binding guidelines. Public consultation has expanded, but government consultation with specific groups is not transparent, and is often clientelist. Communication during the pandemic was highly uncoordinated, undermining the legitimacy of the measures implemented.
While vaccine and testing programs were very strong during the pandemic, other responses proved far less efficient. Regulations are generally enforced without bias, but there have been numerous investigations into instances in which policy was allegedly slanted toward specific interests. Economic gaps between local governments mean that rich cities can accomplish far more than poor ones.
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How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?
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9
9
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
8
7
6
7
6
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
5
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3
4
3
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
2
1
1
In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
Strategic planning units are located under the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), and include the National Economic Council, the National Security Council (NSC) and the Policy Planning Department. Strategic planning and implementation for major issues in Israel are very centralized under the PMO. A recent example is the national handling of the COVID-19 crisis by the NSC instead of the National Emergency Management Authority (NEMA), the designated crisis preparedness and response coordination authority.
In general, the most prominent step taken by the PMO in terms of efforts to foster strategic planning has been the annual publication of the Governmental Plan Book. The book offers a review of the Israeli government’s strategic planning units. Since 2019, the PMO has described its updated version of the book as the continuation of the government’s efforts to translate government policy into measurable and comparable goals across all policy fields and government offices.
Citations:
“A guide for government planning,” The department for policy planning, September 2010 (Hebrew)
Arlozorov, Merav, “Serious, Ambitious, and Improving: Some Good Words on Netanyahu’s Government,” The Marker, 5.3.2017, https://www.themarker.com/news/1.3903271
Cross-Sector round Table, Ministry of Education, 2018 (Hebrew), http://sheatufim.org.il/subject/cross-sector/education/
The Government ICT Authority 2019-2021 Strategic Plan, 2019, (Hebrew):
https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/strategic_plan_19/en/STRATIGY-%20ICT%20AUTHORITY%20-%20ENGLISH.pdf
“Policy departments – auxiliary tool for navigation,” the Reut institute 11.6.2008.
Policy Planning round tables, PMO office, June 2016 (Hebrew), http://www.pmo.gov.il/policyplanning/shituf/Pages/roundtable.aspx (Hebrew)
Round Tables: why did we stop them?, Tuvanot (Insight), 2019, https://www.insights.us/blog_he/renewal-at-insights-us
Round Tables in the PMO, Sheatufim, 2019 https://sheatufim.org.il/subject/cross-sector/pmo/
In general, the most prominent step taken by the PMO in terms of efforts to foster strategic planning has been the annual publication of the Governmental Plan Book. The book offers a review of the Israeli government’s strategic planning units. Since 2019, the PMO has described its updated version of the book as the continuation of the government’s efforts to translate government policy into measurable and comparable goals across all policy fields and government offices.
Citations:
“A guide for government planning,” The department for policy planning, September 2010 (Hebrew)
Arlozorov, Merav, “Serious, Ambitious, and Improving: Some Good Words on Netanyahu’s Government,” The Marker, 5.3.2017, https://www.themarker.com/news/1.3903271
Cross-Sector round Table, Ministry of Education, 2018 (Hebrew), http://sheatufim.org.il/subject/cross-sector/education/
The Government ICT Authority 2019-2021 Strategic Plan, 2019, (Hebrew):
https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/strategic_plan_19/en/STRATIGY-%20ICT%20AUTHORITY%20-%20ENGLISH.pdf
“Policy departments – auxiliary tool for navigation,” the Reut institute 11.6.2008.
Policy Planning round tables, PMO office, June 2016 (Hebrew), http://www.pmo.gov.il/policyplanning/shituf/Pages/roundtable.aspx (Hebrew)
Round Tables: why did we stop them?, Tuvanot (Insight), 2019, https://www.insights.us/blog_he/renewal-at-insights-us
Round Tables in the PMO, Sheatufim, 2019 https://sheatufim.org.il/subject/cross-sector/pmo/
Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?
10
9
9
In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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7
6
7
6
For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
5
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3
4
3
In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
2
1
1
The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
The government has several means of interacting with experts and academics, which are generally guided by the Instructions for Public Participation Guide (PMO 2017). Overall, experts can sit on independent public committees to examine the causes and consequences of a specific event or incident. They can also serve in permanent committees that consult with the government on a regular basis, such as the National Economic Council in the PMO, or be summoned by parliamentary committees to present opinions or to offer a different perspective on a certain issue. In addition, think tanks and research institutes act as brokers between the academic world and politics, advocating and offering information on current events and policy issues. A recent example is the national plan for climate change adaptation. As part of planning for the implementation of this plan in 2019 – 2020, the government sought advice from various experts and NGOs.
On security and other issues such as foreign policy, the government tends to consult experts from the military rather than academics. Ministers often appoint an external advisory committee to assist with specific issues, and also often consult informally with academic experts, primarily to receive guidance that is not influenced by political interests. In addition, the government consults with professionals via policy-planning roundtables, digital forums and Q&A platforms.
Citations:
Blockchain Technology Takes Hold in Israel: Expert Take, Cointelegraph, 2018 (Hebrew):
https://cointelegraph.com/news/blockchain-technology-takes-hold-in-israel-expert-take
“Conclusions of the committee for the examination of the fiscal policy with respect to oil and gas resources in Israel,” State of Israel official publication, 2011 (Hebrew): http://www.financeisrael.mof.gov.il/FinanceIsrael/Docs/En/publications/02_Full_Report_Nonincluding_Appendixes.pdf
Hever, Shir, “The Privatization of Security,” 2012, Van Leer Institute
OECD (2015), “Scientific Advice for Policy Making: The Role and Responsibility of Expert Bodies and Individual Scientists,” OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers, No. 21, OECD Publishing, Paris.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5js33l1jcpwb-en
Government decision number 2025 on rural development, 2015 (Hebrew): https://www.gov.il/he/Departments/policies/2014_des2025
Government Decision number 4079, “Israel’s preparations for adaptation to climate change: implementation of the recommendations to the government for a strategy and a national action plan,” 2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.gov.il/he/Departments/policies/dec4079_2018
PMO Office 2017, Instructions for Public Participation, 2017 (Hebrew): http://www.pmo.gov.il/policyplanning/shituf/Documents/all%20web.pdf
The Ministry of Environment, Climate Change Adaptation plan, 2019,
http://www.sviva.gov.il/subjectsEnv/ClimateChange/AdaptationKnowledgeCenter/Pages/default.aspx#GovXParagraphTitle2
On security and other issues such as foreign policy, the government tends to consult experts from the military rather than academics. Ministers often appoint an external advisory committee to assist with specific issues, and also often consult informally with academic experts, primarily to receive guidance that is not influenced by political interests. In addition, the government consults with professionals via policy-planning roundtables, digital forums and Q&A platforms.
Citations:
Blockchain Technology Takes Hold in Israel: Expert Take, Cointelegraph, 2018 (Hebrew):
https://cointelegraph.com/news/blockchain-technology-takes-hold-in-israel-expert-take
“Conclusions of the committee for the examination of the fiscal policy with respect to oil and gas resources in Israel,” State of Israel official publication, 2011 (Hebrew): http://www.financeisrael.mof.gov.il/FinanceIsrael/Docs/En/publications/02_Full_Report_Nonincluding_Appendixes.pdf
Hever, Shir, “The Privatization of Security,” 2012, Van Leer Institute
OECD (2015), “Scientific Advice for Policy Making: The Role and Responsibility of Expert Bodies and Individual Scientists,” OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers, No. 21, OECD Publishing, Paris.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5js33l1jcpwb-en
Government decision number 2025 on rural development, 2015 (Hebrew): https://www.gov.il/he/Departments/policies/2014_des2025
Government Decision number 4079, “Israel’s preparations for adaptation to climate change: implementation of the recommendations to the government for a strategy and a national action plan,” 2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.gov.il/he/Departments/policies/dec4079_2018
PMO Office 2017, Instructions for Public Participation, 2017 (Hebrew): http://www.pmo.gov.il/policyplanning/shituf/Documents/all%20web.pdf
The Ministry of Environment, Climate Change Adaptation plan, 2019,
http://www.sviva.gov.il/subjectsEnv/ClimateChange/AdaptationKnowledgeCenter/Pages/default.aspx#GovXParagraphTitle2
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Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?
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9
9
The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
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7
6
The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
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3
4
3
The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
2
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1
The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) need for a staff of independent and professional analysts originally led to the establishment of the National Economic Council, the National Security Council and the Policy-Planning Department that advises the prime minister directly. The 2012 Kochik committee viewed these as positive but insufficient steps and recommended that the PMO’s consulting mechanism be strengthened.
Recent changes have shifted this system. The PMO’s planning reforms have de facto given it the capacity to guide and advise other ministries regarding their policy proposals and bills.
The PMO also has the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills through Regulatory Impact Assessments. This is a part of a broader policy to reduce the so-called regulatory burden. Following a 2014 government decision, the PMO has delegates in government ministries who manage regulations affecting each ministry. This mechanism also allows for closer supervision of laws and the work of government offices.
Citations:
Arian, Asher, “Politics in Israel: The Second Republic,” 2nd Edition 2005 (Hebrew).
Reducing the Regulatory Burden Discussing the decision of the Ministerial Committee on Social and Economic Affairs no, 39, September 2014, http://www.pmo.gov.il/policyplanning/Regulation/Documents/dec2118.pdf
“Reduction of Regulatory Burden Book,”PMO Office, March 2018 (Hebrew): http://go.ynet.co.il/pic/calcala/regulation.pdf
“The committee to investigate the prime minister’s headquarter,” Official report (April 2012) (Hebrew).
Recent changes have shifted this system. The PMO’s planning reforms have de facto given it the capacity to guide and advise other ministries regarding their policy proposals and bills.
The PMO also has the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills through Regulatory Impact Assessments. This is a part of a broader policy to reduce the so-called regulatory burden. Following a 2014 government decision, the PMO has delegates in government ministries who manage regulations affecting each ministry. This mechanism also allows for closer supervision of laws and the work of government offices.
Citations:
Arian, Asher, “Politics in Israel: The Second Republic,” 2nd Edition 2005 (Hebrew).
Reducing the Regulatory Burden Discussing the decision of the Ministerial Committee on Social and Economic Affairs no, 39, September 2014, http://www.pmo.gov.il/policyplanning/Regulation/Documents/dec2118.pdf
“Reduction of Regulatory Burden Book,”PMO Office, March 2018 (Hebrew): http://go.ynet.co.il/pic/calcala/regulation.pdf
“The committee to investigate the prime minister’s headquarter,” Official report (April 2012) (Hebrew).
To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?
10
9
9
There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
5
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3
4
3
Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
2
1
1
Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
Line ministers involve the PMO in the preparation of policy proposals which require legislative and/or budgetary changes, especially when there are disagreements between the relevant line ministry, and the Ministry of Finance and/or the Ministry of Justice, which are involved in any budgetary and legislative change.
Citations:
Barnea, Shlomit and Ofer Kenig, “Political nominations in the executive branch,” IDI website June 2011 (Hebrew)
Reducing the Regulatory Burden Discussing the decision of the Ministerial Committee on Social and Economic Affairs no, 39, September 2014 (Hebrew): http://www.pmo.gov.il/policyplanning/Regulation/Documents/dec2118.pdf
“Government bill amendment 868 from 12.8.2012,” PMO official website: http://www.pmo.gov.il/Secretary/sederyom/Pages/seder120812.aspx (Hebrew)
Weisman, Lilach, “Expansion of the prime minister’s authorities was approved; We must stop the madness,” Globes website 12.8.2012: http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000773448 (Hebrew)
Citations:
Barnea, Shlomit and Ofer Kenig, “Political nominations in the executive branch,” IDI website June 2011 (Hebrew)
Reducing the Regulatory Burden Discussing the decision of the Ministerial Committee on Social and Economic Affairs no, 39, September 2014 (Hebrew): http://www.pmo.gov.il/policyplanning/Regulation/Documents/dec2118.pdf
“Government bill amendment 868 from 12.8.2012,” PMO official website: http://www.pmo.gov.il/Secretary/sederyom/Pages/seder120812.aspx (Hebrew)
Weisman, Lilach, “Expansion of the prime minister’s authorities was approved; We must stop the madness,” Globes website 12.8.2012: http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000773448 (Hebrew)
How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?
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9
The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
8
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6
7
6
Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
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3
There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
2
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1
There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
The government is authorized to appoint cabinet committees (called ministerial committees) to handle different policy issues and is obligated to appoint certain committees such as the State Security Cabinet, which is in charge of foreign and security policy, and the ministerial committee for legislation. Currently, there are 23 ministerial committees on a wide range of topics. According to past studies, 50% of governmental decisions between 2009 and 2015 were first approved by a ministerial committee. The impact of ministerial committees on cabinet proposals and operations varies. The permanent committees are considered pivotal to government work. Some of the ad hoc committees are also influential, while others reflect a more symbolic status.
Citations:
Cabinet committees and their authorities,” the ministry of Justice website 24.6.1996 (Hebrew)
Data proves: Ayelet Shaked is the real prime minister of the State of Israel, June 2018,
https://www.haaretz.co.il/blogs/tomeravital/BLOG-1.6200567
Friedberg, Chen, “The Knesset’s Committees – Foretold Failure?,” The Ben-Gurion Law Proposal –Amendments of ‘Basic Law: The Government,’ 2015
‘Decade of Ministerial Committees – comparative study’ – January 2016,
Citizens’ Empowerment in Israel (Hebrew): http://www.ceci.org.il/sites/citizens/UserContent/files/knowledge/govfunction/MinisterCommittees.pdf
“Ministerial Commitees.” PMO’s website (12.11.2015), http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/GovernmentSecretariat/Pages/MinisterialCommittees.aspx
Much housing, little health: the priorities of the government are revealed, The Marker, 2017,
https://www.themarker.com/news/1.3263480
Research Institute for the Study of Israel & Zionism (January 2010) (Hebrew)
“The guidelines for government work,” PMO’s website (Hebrew)
Working Plan Book 2017-18, PMO Office, March 2017: http://www.plans.gov.il/pdf2017/ (Hebrew)
The Ministerial Committee on Legislation postponed the discussion by 40% of the bills, Calcalist, May 2015,
https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3688732,00.html
‘Transparency in the Ministerial Committee for Legislation’ – February 2016, The Socia Guard,Transparency in the Ministerial Legislative Committee, (Hebrew) http://fs.knesset.gov.il/%5C20%5CCommittees%5C20_cs_bg_325109.pdf
Citations:
Cabinet committees and their authorities,” the ministry of Justice website 24.6.1996 (Hebrew)
Data proves: Ayelet Shaked is the real prime minister of the State of Israel, June 2018,
https://www.haaretz.co.il/blogs/tomeravital/BLOG-1.6200567
Friedberg, Chen, “The Knesset’s Committees – Foretold Failure?,” The Ben-Gurion Law Proposal –Amendments of ‘Basic Law: The Government,’ 2015
‘Decade of Ministerial Committees – comparative study’ – January 2016,
Citizens’ Empowerment in Israel (Hebrew): http://www.ceci.org.il/sites/citizens/UserContent/files/knowledge/govfunction/MinisterCommittees.pdf
“Ministerial Commitees.” PMO’s website (12.11.2015), http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/GovernmentSecretariat/Pages/MinisterialCommittees.aspx
Much housing, little health: the priorities of the government are revealed, The Marker, 2017,
https://www.themarker.com/news/1.3263480
Research Institute for the Study of Israel & Zionism (January 2010) (Hebrew)
“The guidelines for government work,” PMO’s website (Hebrew)
Working Plan Book 2017-18, PMO Office, March 2017: http://www.plans.gov.il/pdf2017/ (Hebrew)
The Ministerial Committee on Legislation postponed the discussion by 40% of the bills, Calcalist, May 2015,
https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3688732,00.html
‘Transparency in the Ministerial Committee for Legislation’ – February 2016, The Socia Guard,Transparency in the Ministerial Legislative Committee, (Hebrew) http://fs.knesset.gov.il/%5C20%5CCommittees%5C20_cs_bg_325109.pdf
How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?
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9
9
Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
8
7
6
7
6
Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
5
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3
4
3
There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
2
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1
There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
The government seeks to improve interministerial cooperation in order to overcome bureaucratic entanglements and political power struggles. In so doing, it has introduced roundtable meetings, director generals and vice-director generals of ministries coordination forums, guidelines, and digital information platforms. However, experts say that ministries are essentially territorial in nature, and information sharing between ministries is difficult at best.
This lack of communication partially results from the government’s highly centralized budget process, which is controlled by the Ministry of Finance, as this process makes public servants defensive of limited and strictly supervised resources. In 2016, a report by the State Comptroller suggested that the lack of communication regarding foreign affairs is a result of the transfer of duties from away from main ministries such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to other ministries. The report also asserted that interministerial disagreements are delaying the publication of regulations necessary for the implementation of laws.
More so, it seems that in some cases various ministries are responsible for the same topic or field of expertise and that there is no coordination between them. This is somewhat deliberate as some of the reforms reflect the personal interests of the prime minister’s agenda. For example, the Ministry of Strategic Affairs and Public Diplomacy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came into conflict regarding BDS movements and the question of which ministry was responsible given the lack of coordination between the ministries.
Citations:
“About: Public sharing,” Sharing official website (Hebrew)“ Failures of the public sector and directions for change,” The committee for social and economic change website (Hebrew)
Barda, Moshe, “Coordination between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense,” The Knesset Research Center 2007: http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/m01880.pdf (Hebrew)
Bar-Kol, Yair, “Appointing a minister for interministerial cooperation,” TheMarker 3.4.2013: http://www.themarker.com/opinion/1.1983509 (Hebrew)
Haber, Carmit, “Managerial culture blocks to implementing open government policy,” The Israel Democracy Institute (March 2013) (Hebrew)
Israel Democracy Institute, The two great successes of the outgoing government – thanks to inter-agency cooperation, 2019 [Hebrew]
https://www.idi.org.il/articles/25492
Ravid, Barak.”Watchdog: Power Struggles Between Ministries Hindered Israel’s Battle Against BDS,” 24.5.2016, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.721284
Reducing the number of mandatory regulations that have not yet been enacted, Government decision number 2588, PMO, April 2017, https://www.gov.il/he/departments/policies/2017_dec2588
“The committee to investigate the Prime Minister’s headquarter,” Official state report, April 2012 (Hebrew).
“The division of electronics and technologies,” Accountant General website (Hebrew) “The guide for governmental sharing: A model for cooperation between ministries,” official state publication, 2013: http://www.ihaklai.org.il/Portals/0/Documents/articles/מודל%20לשיתוף%20פעולה%20בין%20משרדי%20הממשלה.pdf (Hebrew)
The Foreign Affairs Ministry closes the department that handled BDS
https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4991405,00.html
“The Leadership Academy- founding statement,” November 2014, Civil Service Commission website:
http://www.csc.gov.il/Tenders/TendersServices/Documents/LeadershipAcademyDoc.pdf
The Open Administration Work Plan for 2018-2019, Israel’s ICT Authority, http://yoursay.gov.il/cio/File/Index/nap3hebrew/
Zinger, Ronny. “175 laws are not implanted because ministries didn’t set regulation for them” – Calcalist, 25.1.2016 (Hebrew): http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3679237,00.html
This lack of communication partially results from the government’s highly centralized budget process, which is controlled by the Ministry of Finance, as this process makes public servants defensive of limited and strictly supervised resources. In 2016, a report by the State Comptroller suggested that the lack of communication regarding foreign affairs is a result of the transfer of duties from away from main ministries such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to other ministries. The report also asserted that interministerial disagreements are delaying the publication of regulations necessary for the implementation of laws.
More so, it seems that in some cases various ministries are responsible for the same topic or field of expertise and that there is no coordination between them. This is somewhat deliberate as some of the reforms reflect the personal interests of the prime minister’s agenda. For example, the Ministry of Strategic Affairs and Public Diplomacy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came into conflict regarding BDS movements and the question of which ministry was responsible given the lack of coordination between the ministries.
Citations:
“About: Public sharing,” Sharing official website (Hebrew)“ Failures of the public sector and directions for change,” The committee for social and economic change website (Hebrew)
Barda, Moshe, “Coordination between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense,” The Knesset Research Center 2007: http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/m01880.pdf (Hebrew)
Bar-Kol, Yair, “Appointing a minister for interministerial cooperation,” TheMarker 3.4.2013: http://www.themarker.com/opinion/1.1983509 (Hebrew)
Haber, Carmit, “Managerial culture blocks to implementing open government policy,” The Israel Democracy Institute (March 2013) (Hebrew)
Israel Democracy Institute, The two great successes of the outgoing government – thanks to inter-agency cooperation, 2019 [Hebrew]
https://www.idi.org.il/articles/25492
Ravid, Barak.”Watchdog: Power Struggles Between Ministries Hindered Israel’s Battle Against BDS,” 24.5.2016, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.721284
Reducing the number of mandatory regulations that have not yet been enacted, Government decision number 2588, PMO, April 2017, https://www.gov.il/he/departments/policies/2017_dec2588
“The committee to investigate the Prime Minister’s headquarter,” Official state report, April 2012 (Hebrew).
“The division of electronics and technologies,” Accountant General website (Hebrew) “The guide for governmental sharing: A model for cooperation between ministries,” official state publication, 2013: http://www.ihaklai.org.il/Portals/0/Documents/articles/מודל%20לשיתוף%20פעולה%20בין%20משרדי%20הממשלה.pdf (Hebrew)
The Foreign Affairs Ministry closes the department that handled BDS
https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4991405,00.html
“The Leadership Academy- founding statement,” November 2014, Civil Service Commission website:
http://www.csc.gov.il/Tenders/TendersServices/Documents/LeadershipAcademyDoc.pdf
The Open Administration Work Plan for 2018-2019, Israel’s ICT Authority, http://yoursay.gov.il/cio/File/Index/nap3hebrew/
Zinger, Ronny. “175 laws are not implanted because ministries didn’t set regulation for them” – Calcalist, 25.1.2016 (Hebrew): http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3679237,00.html
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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9
9
Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
8
7
6
7
6
In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
2
1
1
Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Israel’s government system is greatly influenced by informal coordination mechanisms, such as coalition obligations and internal party politics. However, due to its highly fragmented party system, it is hard to determine whether they support or undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination. While coordination between like-minded parties may be made easier by the situation, fragmentation may result in stagnation over disputed policies.
Citations:
“Annual report 61 for the year 2010: Treatment of prolonged interministerial disagreements,” The State Comptroller office website (Hebrew)
Blander, Dana and Ben Nur, Gal, “Governmental coalitions: A steering mechanism in the political system,” in The political system in Israel 2013: http://www.idi.org.il/ספרים-ומאמרים/הוצאה-לאור/הספרים/הספרייה-לדמוקרטיה/המערכת-הפוליטית-בישראל (Hebrew).
“Coalition management,” the Knesset website: http://main.knesset.gov.il/About/Lexicon/Pages/coalition-management.aspx (Hebrew)
Rivlin, Reuven, “The intellectual independency of the Knesset member: the limit of the coalition obligation,” The Israel Democracy Institute (December 2010) (Hebrew).
Citations:
“Annual report 61 for the year 2010: Treatment of prolonged interministerial disagreements,” The State Comptroller office website (Hebrew)
Blander, Dana and Ben Nur, Gal, “Governmental coalitions: A steering mechanism in the political system,” in The political system in Israel 2013: http://www.idi.org.il/ספרים-ומאמרים/הוצאה-לאור/הספרים/הספרייה-לדמוקרטיה/המערכת-הפוליטית-בישראל (Hebrew).
“Coalition management,” the Knesset website: http://main.knesset.gov.il/About/Lexicon/Pages/coalition-management.aspx (Hebrew)
Rivlin, Reuven, “The intellectual independency of the Knesset member: the limit of the coalition obligation,” The Israel Democracy Institute (December 2010) (Hebrew).
How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?
10
9
9
The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
8
7
6
7
6
The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
5
4
3
4
3
The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
2
1
1
The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
The Israeli Government ICT Authority was created in 2012 and placed under the Prime Minister’s Office in 2015. In 2013, it introduced the Digital Israel program to assist government communication with the public by improving the digitalization of government offices. The initiative aims to strengthen public engagement through a series of websites and online forms, and improve coordination between public, domestic and international NGO, academic, and government actions.
The authority also plans to digitize all services provided by the government and interministerial services. For example, 880 out of 960 forms, which were previously unavailable online, are now available online for public and interministerial use. This in turn facilitates better cooperation and coordination between government offices, as it minimizes bureaucratic work and provides a widely accessible platform for government offices.
Citations:
“Annual report 61 for the year 2010: Treatment of prolonged interministerial disagreements,” The State Comptroller office website (Hebrew)
Approval of the national digital plan, promotion of the “Digital Israel” national initiative and the reform of government decisions, https://www.gov.il/he/departments/policies/2017_dec2733
Blander, Dana and Ben Nur, Gal, “Governmental coalitions: A steering mechanism in the political system,” in The political system in Israel 2013: http://www.idi.org.il/ספרים-ומאמרים/הוצאה-לאור/הספרים/הספרייה-לדמוקרטיה/המערכת-הפוליטית-בישראל (Hebrew).
“Coalition management,” the Knesset website (Hebrew): http://main.knesset.gov.il/About/Lexicon/Pages/coalition-management.aspx
Headquarters for the National Digital Israel Initiative, Ministry of Social Equality, 2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/news/digital_israel_national_plan
KATEF – The Knesset Unit for the Coordination of Parliamentary Oversight, The Knesset (Hebrew): 2018, https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Oversight/Pages/OversightAbout.aspx
National Initiative “Digital Israel,” Decision No. 1046 of the Cabinet, PMO Office, 2013 (Hebrew):
https://www.gov.il/he/Departments/policies/2013_dec1046
OECD report: The government has taken extensive steps to reduce regulation, Ynet news, 2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5310465,00.html
PMO Office, Open Government Years 2018-2019 Work Plan, 2018,
http://www.pmo.gov.il/MediaCenter/SecretaryAnnouncements/Documents/DECO150218.pdf
PMO Office, Israel Government ICT – Activity for the year 2019, 2019,
https://bit.ly/2XHVU4y
Rivlin, Reuven, “The intellectual independency of the Knesset member: the limit of the coalition obligation,” The Israel Democracy Institute (December 2010) (Hebrew).
The end of the fax era? A new headquarters in the Prime Minister’s Office will promote a digital vision for Israel, The Marker 2013 (Hebrew): https://www.themarker.com/technation/1.2185272
The ICT Authority Strategical Work plan for 2016-2018, http://mag.calltext.co.il/storage/95/vzPm3XOxT0gj4vrpikuV.pdf
The Government Coordination Guide, Version 1, 2013, https://bit.ly/3eZAkyv
The authority also plans to digitize all services provided by the government and interministerial services. For example, 880 out of 960 forms, which were previously unavailable online, are now available online for public and interministerial use. This in turn facilitates better cooperation and coordination between government offices, as it minimizes bureaucratic work and provides a widely accessible platform for government offices.
Citations:
“Annual report 61 for the year 2010: Treatment of prolonged interministerial disagreements,” The State Comptroller office website (Hebrew)
Approval of the national digital plan, promotion of the “Digital Israel” national initiative and the reform of government decisions, https://www.gov.il/he/departments/policies/2017_dec2733
Blander, Dana and Ben Nur, Gal, “Governmental coalitions: A steering mechanism in the political system,” in The political system in Israel 2013: http://www.idi.org.il/ספרים-ומאמרים/הוצאה-לאור/הספרים/הספרייה-לדמוקרטיה/המערכת-הפוליטית-בישראל (Hebrew).
“Coalition management,” the Knesset website (Hebrew): http://main.knesset.gov.il/About/Lexicon/Pages/coalition-management.aspx
Headquarters for the National Digital Israel Initiative, Ministry of Social Equality, 2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/news/digital_israel_national_plan
KATEF – The Knesset Unit for the Coordination of Parliamentary Oversight, The Knesset (Hebrew): 2018, https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Oversight/Pages/OversightAbout.aspx
National Initiative “Digital Israel,” Decision No. 1046 of the Cabinet, PMO Office, 2013 (Hebrew):
https://www.gov.il/he/Departments/policies/2013_dec1046
OECD report: The government has taken extensive steps to reduce regulation, Ynet news, 2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5310465,00.html
PMO Office, Open Government Years 2018-2019 Work Plan, 2018,
http://www.pmo.gov.il/MediaCenter/SecretaryAnnouncements/Documents/DECO150218.pdf
PMO Office, Israel Government ICT – Activity for the year 2019, 2019,
https://bit.ly/2XHVU4y
Rivlin, Reuven, “The intellectual independency of the Knesset member: the limit of the coalition obligation,” The Israel Democracy Institute (December 2010) (Hebrew).
The end of the fax era? A new headquarters in the Prime Minister’s Office will promote a digital vision for Israel, The Marker 2013 (Hebrew): https://www.themarker.com/technation/1.2185272
The ICT Authority Strategical Work plan for 2016-2018, http://mag.calltext.co.il/storage/95/vzPm3XOxT0gj4vrpikuV.pdf
The Government Coordination Guide, Version 1, 2013, https://bit.ly/3eZAkyv
Graph View
To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?
10
9
9
RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
8
7
6
7
6
RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
5
4
3
4
3
RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
2
1
1
RIA are not applied or do not exist.
In 2014, Israel launched a five-year plan to reduce regulation, which aimed to reduce the cost of bureaucratic processes by 25% by requiring regulators to formulate regulatory changes according to the government’s RIA guide. Nevertheless, it seems that Israel is still lagging behind other countries when it comes to implementing RIA inside its own ministries. An OECD report from 2018 stated that offices inside the Israeli government have not used RIAs correctly and ignored it in some cases. The last report summarizing regulation improvement pertained to 2018. This report detailed some 60 regulation reduction processes in most government ministries. While the report does not include data on the overall effect of the process vis-à-vis the goal of reducing bureaucratic regulations by 25%, it states that so far ILS 4 billion has been saved (on an approximately ILS 1.3 trillion economy). In late-2021, the government passed the Regulation Fundamentals Law, according to which ministers and regulators have to consult the new Regulation Authority regarding the economic, social and environmental implications of all regulations.
Citations:
Economic Affairs Committee, Committee Protocol of 28.10.15 (Hebrew):
http://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/committees/Economics/Conclusion/coc281015.pdf
“Improving regulation in Israel and easing the burden of bureaucracy is a proposal for a multi-year plan“, IDI Website (Hebrew):
https://www.idi.org.il/media/8867/streamlining-regulation-in-israel-and-easing-the-bureaucratic-burden-proposal-for-a-multi-year-program.pdf
Government Regulation Website, 2018 (Hebrew): http://regulation.gov.il/default.aspx
Government Regulation Website, The regulatory burden reduction book of 2018, July 2019 (Hebrew):
http://regulation.gov.il/uploads/reports/7/2018reg.pdf
RIA Guide, Governmental Regulation Website (Hebrew): http://regulation.pmo.gov.il/RIAguide/Pages/RIA.aspx
RIA Report data, Government Regulation Website, 2018 (Hebrew): http://regulation.gov.il/RIA_REP
RIA Report data, Government Regulation Website, 2019 (Hebrew): http://regulation.gov.il/RIA_REP
“Report from the committee for improving regulatory mechanisms in Israel and reviewing interfaces between various regulators in the market,” official report (2013) (Hebrew).
“The Five Year plan of 2015-2019“, Government Regulation Website, 2018,
http://regulation.gov.il/homesh_plan
“The OECD: “There will be no choice but to establish a regulatory body in Israel,” Calcalist, 2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3742333,00.html
Almog, Tamar. 2020. “Unprecedented: Thousands of Comments Against the Coronavirus law,” Kan, Retrieved from https://www.kan.org.il/item/?itemid=71971
Kogosovski, Mendi. 2020. “The Government Legislation Website is Live.” IsraelDefense, Retrieved from https://www.israeldefense.co.il/he/node/44489
Mor, Guy & Alon Jasper. 2020. Parliamentary Arbitrage and the Case for Regulatory Policy in Parliament,” The Theory and Practice of Legislation 7(3): 283-305.
Nagid, Moran and Morin Amitay. 2020. “Public Participation in Health Policy,” Kohelet Policy Forum, Policy Paper no. 66, retrieved from https://kohelet.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/health.involve.paper_.pdf
Citations:
Economic Affairs Committee, Committee Protocol of 28.10.15 (Hebrew):
http://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/committees/Economics/Conclusion/coc281015.pdf
“Improving regulation in Israel and easing the burden of bureaucracy is a proposal for a multi-year plan“, IDI Website (Hebrew):
https://www.idi.org.il/media/8867/streamlining-regulation-in-israel-and-easing-the-bureaucratic-burden-proposal-for-a-multi-year-program.pdf
Government Regulation Website, 2018 (Hebrew): http://regulation.gov.il/default.aspx
Government Regulation Website, The regulatory burden reduction book of 2018, July 2019 (Hebrew):
http://regulation.gov.il/uploads/reports/7/2018reg.pdf
RIA Guide, Governmental Regulation Website (Hebrew): http://regulation.pmo.gov.il/RIAguide/Pages/RIA.aspx
RIA Report data, Government Regulation Website, 2018 (Hebrew): http://regulation.gov.il/RIA_REP
RIA Report data, Government Regulation Website, 2019 (Hebrew): http://regulation.gov.il/RIA_REP
“Report from the committee for improving regulatory mechanisms in Israel and reviewing interfaces between various regulators in the market,” official report (2013) (Hebrew).
“The Five Year plan of 2015-2019“, Government Regulation Website, 2018,
http://regulation.gov.il/homesh_plan
“The OECD: “There will be no choice but to establish a regulatory body in Israel,” Calcalist, 2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3742333,00.html
Almog, Tamar. 2020. “Unprecedented: Thousands of Comments Against the Coronavirus law,” Kan, Retrieved from https://www.kan.org.il/item/?itemid=71971
Kogosovski, Mendi. 2020. “The Government Legislation Website is Live.” IsraelDefense, Retrieved from https://www.israeldefense.co.il/he/node/44489
Mor, Guy & Alon Jasper. 2020. Parliamentary Arbitrage and the Case for Regulatory Policy in Parliament,” The Theory and Practice of Legislation 7(3): 283-305.
Nagid, Moran and Morin Amitay. 2020. “Public Participation in Health Policy,” Kohelet Policy Forum, Policy Paper no. 66, retrieved from https://kohelet.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/health.involve.paper_.pdf
Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?
10
9
9
RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
8
7
6
7
6
The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
5
4
3
4
3
The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
2
1
1
RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
Israel has recently improved its stakeholder engagement in the regulatory process. In 2018, the OECD Regulatory Report Outlook ranked Israel as one of the top four countries with regards to regulatory improvements, with a particularly substantial improvement in public and stakeholder participation and collaboration in RIAs.
Most RIAs conducted between 2016 and 2019 provided an opportunity for the public and other stakeholders to participate in the regulatory process.
Since 2018, the Prime Minister’s Office has access to all the RIAs submitted for review by each ministry, all RIAs are published online and the parliament’s involvement in these issues has also expanded.
Citations:
“Improving regulation in Israel and easing the burden of bureaucracy Proposal for a multi-year program“, Israeli Democracy Institute (Hebrew):
https://www.idi.org.il/media/8867/streamlining-regulation-in-israel-and-easing-the-bureaucratic-burden-proposal-for-a-multi-year-program.pdf
“OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2018“, OECD WEBSITE, 2018:
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264303072-en.pdf?expires=1540849342&id=id&accname=ocid195467&checksum=2F91C900404B34AA4EE7659685539C79
RIA Report data, Government Regulation Website, 2018 (Hebrew): http://regulation.gov.il/RIA_REP
The Knesset, Parliament involvement with RIA – Comparative Analysis, 2019 (Hebrew):
https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Oversight/Documents/ParliamentLnvolvementRIA2703.pdf
Most RIAs conducted between 2016 and 2019 provided an opportunity for the public and other stakeholders to participate in the regulatory process.
Since 2018, the Prime Minister’s Office has access to all the RIAs submitted for review by each ministry, all RIAs are published online and the parliament’s involvement in these issues has also expanded.
Citations:
“Improving regulation in Israel and easing the burden of bureaucracy Proposal for a multi-year program“, Israeli Democracy Institute (Hebrew):
https://www.idi.org.il/media/8867/streamlining-regulation-in-israel-and-easing-the-bureaucratic-burden-proposal-for-a-multi-year-program.pdf
“OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2018“, OECD WEBSITE, 2018:
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264303072-en.pdf?expires=1540849342&id=id&accname=ocid195467&checksum=2F91C900404B34AA4EE7659685539C79
RIA Report data, Government Regulation Website, 2018 (Hebrew): http://regulation.gov.il/RIA_REP
The Knesset, Parliament involvement with RIA – Comparative Analysis, 2019 (Hebrew):
https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Oversight/Documents/ParliamentLnvolvementRIA2703.pdf
Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?
10
9
9
Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
8
7
6
7
6
Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
5
4
3
4
3
Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
2
1
1
Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
In 2015, Israel adopted a long-term plan (2015 – 2030) to improve and advance a number of SDGs, as part of the U.N. Agenda 2030 Plan for Sustainable Development. The plan covers a wide variety of fields, including reduction of poverty, hunger and inequality; improvement of health outcomes, life quality and educational quality; promotion of gender equality, smart consumption and innovation; and the development of infrastructure, energy and sustainable production. Together with other members of the United Nations, Israel began reporting in 2016 on its efforts to realize the SDGs.
In addition, since 2011, the government has published “workbooks” every year, detailing the quantitative measures used to compare policies and policy goals over time. In 2019, Israel published its first voluntary national review, which reviews its progress regarding Agenda 2030, and presents its accomplishments in fields such as education, water, healthcare and the economy. However, the report also highlights areas that require further attention.
Citations:
Adopting SDG goals – sustainable development goals“, Committee meeting of the 20th Knesset, Open Knesset Website, 2017 (Hebrew):
https://oknesset.org/meetings/2/0/2014108.html
“Agenda 2030 – Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations“. Ministry of the Environment Website
http://www.sviva.gov.il/subjectsEnv/InternationalRelations/InternationalOrganization/Pages/UN.aspx
Arlozorov, Meirav. “The Professionalist Revolution of the Government of Israel.” The Marker website. 2018 (Hebrew): https://www.themarker.com/allnews/1.5846420.
Corporate Responsibility and Sustainable Development, Netivei Israel Company Website (Hebrew):
https://bit.ly/2YcOXaR
“Israel earns UN praise at MFA-IDC conference on UN Sustainable Development,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website, 2017
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/InternatlOrgs/Pages/Israel-earns-UN-praise-at-MFA-IDC-Conference-on-UN-SDGs-19-December-2017.aspx
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals – National Review, 2019 (Hebrew):
https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2019/Documents/Israel%20SDG%20national%20review.pdf
“Vision of Sustainability for Israel in 2030.” Ministry of the Environment Website 2019: http://kayamut2030.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=181%3Aindicators&catid=59&Itemid=149
In addition, since 2011, the government has published “workbooks” every year, detailing the quantitative measures used to compare policies and policy goals over time. In 2019, Israel published its first voluntary national review, which reviews its progress regarding Agenda 2030, and presents its accomplishments in fields such as education, water, healthcare and the economy. However, the report also highlights areas that require further attention.
Citations:
Adopting SDG goals – sustainable development goals“, Committee meeting of the 20th Knesset, Open Knesset Website, 2017 (Hebrew):
https://oknesset.org/meetings/2/0/2014108.html
“Agenda 2030 – Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations“. Ministry of the Environment Website
http://www.sviva.gov.il/subjectsEnv/InternationalRelations/InternationalOrganization/Pages/UN.aspx
Arlozorov, Meirav. “The Professionalist Revolution of the Government of Israel.” The Marker website. 2018 (Hebrew): https://www.themarker.com/allnews/1.5846420.
Corporate Responsibility and Sustainable Development, Netivei Israel Company Website (Hebrew):
https://bit.ly/2YcOXaR
“Israel earns UN praise at MFA-IDC conference on UN Sustainable Development,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website, 2017
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/InternatlOrgs/Pages/Israel-earns-UN-praise-at-MFA-IDC-Conference-on-UN-SDGs-19-December-2017.aspx
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals – National Review, 2019 (Hebrew):
https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2019/Documents/Israel%20SDG%20national%20review.pdf
“Vision of Sustainability for Israel in 2030.” Ministry of the Environment Website 2019: http://kayamut2030.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=181%3Aindicators&catid=59&Itemid=149
To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?
10
9
9
Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
2
1
1
Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
According to OECD reports, which are based on surveys with Israeli civil servants, Israel does not have recommended or binding guidelines for the assessment of ex ante or ex post policies. In addition, in Israel there is no procedural framework for evaluating the performance and effectiveness of the state budget. In a survey, which was conducted in 2016, Israel scored 1.7 on ex post policy evaluation (out of four). This score was similar to that OECD average, but significantly lower than the average of 3.08 for EU member states.
Citations:
“Israel could gain from increased competition, public spending, OECD says “, Times of Israel, 2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-could-gain-from-increased-competition-public-spending-oecd-says/
“OECD economic scenarios to 2060 illustrate the long-run benefits of structural reforms,” OECD Website,
http://www.oecd.org/economy/oecd-economic-scenarios-to-2060-illustrate-the-long-run-benefits-of-structural-reforms.htm
“OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2015,” OECD Website,
https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/Israel-web.pdf
“OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2018“, OECD WEBSITE, 2018
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264303072-en.pdf?expires=1540849342&id=id&accname=ocid195467&checksum=2F91C900404B34AA4EE7659685539C79
“Government at a Glance 2017 – Israel,” OECD Website,
https://www.oecd.org/gov/gov-at-a-glance-2017-israel.pdf
Citations:
“Israel could gain from increased competition, public spending, OECD says “, Times of Israel, 2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-could-gain-from-increased-competition-public-spending-oecd-says/
“OECD economic scenarios to 2060 illustrate the long-run benefits of structural reforms,” OECD Website,
http://www.oecd.org/economy/oecd-economic-scenarios-to-2060-illustrate-the-long-run-benefits-of-structural-reforms.htm
“OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2015,” OECD Website,
https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/Israel-web.pdf
“OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2018“, OECD WEBSITE, 2018
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264303072-en.pdf?expires=1540849342&id=id&accname=ocid195467&checksum=2F91C900404B34AA4EE7659685539C79
“Government at a Glance 2017 – Israel,” OECD Website,
https://www.oecd.org/gov/gov-at-a-glance-2017-israel.pdf
Graph View
Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?
10
9
9
The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
8
7
6
7
6
The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
2
1
1
The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
In recent years, Israel has deepened its public involvement arenas in decision-making processes. A number of roundtables have been set up to enable cooperation between the government, the third sector and the business sector (Prime Minister Office 2008). Israel has also adopted a regulation impact assessment (RIA) mechanism, which involves the public and stakeholders in the regulatory decision-making process (Mor & Jasper 2020). In 2020, a government legislation website was established (Kogosovski 2020). The website allows government ministries to publish drafts of legislations, regulations, guidelines and instructions in order to receive comments on them from the general public. Also in 2020, in the wake of the coronavirus crisis, the website went live. While during calmer periods, these drafts are available for public comments for a period of several weeks, during the coronavirus crisis, the time for public comments has shrunk. For example, when the Law Granting Government Special Authorities to Combat Novel Coronavirus (Temporary Provision) 2020), also known as Israel’s Coronavirus Law, was circulated for public comment, the public was given only a few days to submit comments on the law (Almog 2020). In general, the number of comments each draft receives varies from a few to tens of thousands, as illustrated in the case of the Coronavirus Law. However, government ministries are not obliged to respond to comments. They are also not required to amend the drafts in light of the comments. Therefore, it is difficult to estimate the public’s impact on decision-making. Beyond that, Israel held consultations with various societal bodies actors in preparing and implementing its policy responses, including leaders of religious communities and trade unions, but these processes were not transparent, and were often unfair and clientelist.
Citations:
Census or Democracy: The public is not really involved in urban development, Globes, 2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001193850
“Israel has 200 regulators, 12 in the Netherlands, and 80 in Australia, Globes, 2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001253076
“Israeli government, civil society, and business community,” PMO policy paper (February 2008):
http://beinmigzari.pmo.gov.il/Documents/Policy_English.pdf
Limor, Nissan and Avishai, Libat, “Separately and together: Structuring a relationship of cooperation between government and civil society organizations,” JDC publication 2013 (Hebrew).
PMO Office 2017, Instructions for Public Participation, 2017
http://www.pmo.gov.il/policyplanning/shituf/Documents/all%20web.pdf
“Round table interface: Three years’ summary,” PMO official brochure (August 2011) (Hebrew)
“The round table and the tri-sectoral discourse,” Civil leadership website (Hebrew)
Citations:
Census or Democracy: The public is not really involved in urban development, Globes, 2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001193850
“Israel has 200 regulators, 12 in the Netherlands, and 80 in Australia, Globes, 2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001253076
“Israeli government, civil society, and business community,” PMO policy paper (February 2008):
http://beinmigzari.pmo.gov.il/Documents/Policy_English.pdf
Limor, Nissan and Avishai, Libat, “Separately and together: Structuring a relationship of cooperation between government and civil society organizations,” JDC publication 2013 (Hebrew).
PMO Office 2017, Instructions for Public Participation, 2017
http://www.pmo.gov.il/policyplanning/shituf/Documents/all%20web.pdf
“Round table interface: Three years’ summary,” PMO official brochure (August 2011) (Hebrew)
“The round table and the tri-sectoral discourse,” Civil leadership website (Hebrew)
Graph View
To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?
10
9
9
Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
8
7
6
7
6
Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
5
4
3
4
3
Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
2
1
1
Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
In recent years, there has been a shift toward creating a more “open” government and improving the government’s communications. Nevertheless, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Israel failed to implement a consistent and proactive crisis communication plan. The agencies responsible for communicating policy measures were uncoordinated and biased, their efforts were often met with suspicion and confusion, and the legitimacy of the measures was questioned.
According to a report issued by the State Comptroller, the government response to the need to provide information regarding the COVID-19 crisis and methods to deal with it differed from the Plan for National communication in a Civilian Emergency. Important positions in the communication array established in the Prime Minister’s Office according to a 2007 government resolution were not filled at the time of the outbreak. Therefore, the array did not operate as planned. In addition, the Ministry of Health, which was required to lead government communication efforts, lacked the requisite infrastructure and professional tools. These were supplemented during the crisis, at a time when infection rates were rising, without taking into account the preparations made and resources already invested in the years preceding the crisis (State Comptroller and Ombudsman 2021).
Israel lacks a body specifically designed to handle public communications. The figures most prevalently identified with the responses and restrictions were, by large, politicians (Gesser-Edelsburg et al. 2020). The lack of such a body led governmental agencies to fulfill this role (Shtreckman 2020), although these agencies were neither designed nor had the professional staff to do so. As a result, government communications suffered from delays in providing information, which led to confusion and public frustration (Carol 2020). In the initial stages of the pandemic, the Ministry of Health launched a Telegram channel to provide data about the pandemic’s situation, and the ministry’s assessments and guidelines. The ministry also published a public dashboard with information about the spread of the pandemic. However, various governmental agencies have held different sets of data on the spread of the virus, and their policy recommendations and communication varied significantly (Efrat, 2020). The absence of a single, seemingly unbiased, broadly agreed, authoritative, source has not helped to gain the public’s trust in the measures taken (Knesset News, 2020).
Citations:
State Comptroller and Ombudsman (2021), “The State of Israel Response to the Covid-19 Crisis.” Retrived from: https://www.mevaker.gov.il/sites/DigitalLibrary/Documents/2021/COVID-19/2021-COVID-19-001-EN.pdf
Efrat, Boaz. 2020. “Three agencies, zero transparency: Covid-19’s data debacle of the Ministry of Health.” Walla News, June 21, 2020 (Hebrew). https://news.walla.co.il/item/3368464.
Gesser-Edelsburg A, Cohen R, Hijazi R, Abed Elhadi Shahbari N. 2020. “Analysis of Public Perception of the Israeli Government’s Early Emergency Instructions Regarding COVID-19: Online Survey Study.” J Med Internet Res, vol 22, No 5 (2020), May 15, 2020. https://www.jmir.org/2020/5/e19370/.
Shtreckman, Rotem. 2020. “Israel’s communication efforts caught Covid-19.” The Marker, March 14, 2020 (Hebrew). https://www.themarker.com/allnews/.premium-1.8674539.
Carol, Maya. 2020. ““The chaos in public Information”: Why do we still not understand the corona guidelines?.” Shakuf, November 11, 2020 (Hebrew). https://shkifut.info/2020/11/hasbara/.
Carol, Maya. 2020. “Transparency instead of threats: This is how the fight against Corona should be conducted.” Shakuf, August 20, 2020 (Hebrew). https://shkifut.info/2020/08/corona1/.
The Knesset Website. 2020. “Public Information in the Corona Crisis: The National Security Council has withdrawn its hands; the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Defense have not yet completed the establishment of a coordinated system“ (Hebrew). Retrieved from https://main.knesset.gov.il/News/PressReleases/Pages/press14092020C.aspx
According to a report issued by the State Comptroller, the government response to the need to provide information regarding the COVID-19 crisis and methods to deal with it differed from the Plan for National communication in a Civilian Emergency. Important positions in the communication array established in the Prime Minister’s Office according to a 2007 government resolution were not filled at the time of the outbreak. Therefore, the array did not operate as planned. In addition, the Ministry of Health, which was required to lead government communication efforts, lacked the requisite infrastructure and professional tools. These were supplemented during the crisis, at a time when infection rates were rising, without taking into account the preparations made and resources already invested in the years preceding the crisis (State Comptroller and Ombudsman 2021).
Israel lacks a body specifically designed to handle public communications. The figures most prevalently identified with the responses and restrictions were, by large, politicians (Gesser-Edelsburg et al. 2020). The lack of such a body led governmental agencies to fulfill this role (Shtreckman 2020), although these agencies were neither designed nor had the professional staff to do so. As a result, government communications suffered from delays in providing information, which led to confusion and public frustration (Carol 2020). In the initial stages of the pandemic, the Ministry of Health launched a Telegram channel to provide data about the pandemic’s situation, and the ministry’s assessments and guidelines. The ministry also published a public dashboard with information about the spread of the pandemic. However, various governmental agencies have held different sets of data on the spread of the virus, and their policy recommendations and communication varied significantly (Efrat, 2020). The absence of a single, seemingly unbiased, broadly agreed, authoritative, source has not helped to gain the public’s trust in the measures taken (Knesset News, 2020).
Citations:
State Comptroller and Ombudsman (2021), “The State of Israel Response to the Covid-19 Crisis.” Retrived from: https://www.mevaker.gov.il/sites/DigitalLibrary/Documents/2021/COVID-19/2021-COVID-19-001-EN.pdf
Efrat, Boaz. 2020. “Three agencies, zero transparency: Covid-19’s data debacle of the Ministry of Health.” Walla News, June 21, 2020 (Hebrew). https://news.walla.co.il/item/3368464.
Gesser-Edelsburg A, Cohen R, Hijazi R, Abed Elhadi Shahbari N. 2020. “Analysis of Public Perception of the Israeli Government’s Early Emergency Instructions Regarding COVID-19: Online Survey Study.” J Med Internet Res, vol 22, No 5 (2020), May 15, 2020. https://www.jmir.org/2020/5/e19370/.
Shtreckman, Rotem. 2020. “Israel’s communication efforts caught Covid-19.” The Marker, March 14, 2020 (Hebrew). https://www.themarker.com/allnews/.premium-1.8674539.
Carol, Maya. 2020. ““The chaos in public Information”: Why do we still not understand the corona guidelines?.” Shakuf, November 11, 2020 (Hebrew). https://shkifut.info/2020/11/hasbara/.
Carol, Maya. 2020. “Transparency instead of threats: This is how the fight against Corona should be conducted.” Shakuf, August 20, 2020 (Hebrew). https://shkifut.info/2020/08/corona1/.
The Knesset Website. 2020. “Public Information in the Corona Crisis: The National Security Council has withdrawn its hands; the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Defense have not yet completed the establishment of a coordinated system“ (Hebrew). Retrieved from https://main.knesset.gov.il/News/PressReleases/Pages/press14092020C.aspx
Graph View
To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?
10
9
9
The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
5
4
3
4
3
The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
2
1
1
The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
According to the government’s own reports, in recent years, there has been an improvement in the execution of government decisions, with 79% of all objectives achieved in 2018. However, according to critics, this was due to changes to the methodology for measuring the governments’ objectives and specifically by lowering the standards of achievement.
The implementation of COVID-19 measures in Israel was accompanied by difficulties and inefficiencies in many aspects, including difficulties caused by political and economic pressure groups, a lack of staff, the inefficient allocation of funds, and budgetary concerns. These inefficiencies made it difficult for the government to implement its policies quickly and effectively. Indeed, Israel ranks 19th worldwide in terms of how well it has handled the COVID-19 pandemic, according to new data compiled by the Bloomberg website. (Bloomberg, 2021).
The implementation of health policies has been partly successful and partly very unsuccessful. Israel’s vaccine program outpaced every other county as of January 2021 (Handrix & Rubin 2020) and the number of COVID-19 tests conducted per person in Israel was one of the highest in the world. However, the epidemiological investigation apparatus lacked the required staff at the beginning of the crisis compared to other countries. Six months into the pandemic, the Ministry of Health still relied exclusively on an old, outdated and insufficient epidemiological investigation management system. Furthermore, an absence of synchronization between the Ministry of Health and Education Ministry’s online systems, and between investigators in different cities (which led to numerous delays and errors) undermined the swift implementation of quarantine measures.
Regarding the implementation of economic measures, the lack of suitable protocols and sufficient staff in the Israel Tax Authority (ITO) has created serious tension and frustration between the recipients of emergency economic aid and the agency. The State Comptroller pointed to malfunctions in the agency’s computers and online systems, and to distorted eligibility criteria set for receiving aid. Regarding enforcement personnel, the Israeli police force lacked the necessary staff to enforce the restrictions imposed during the three lockdowns. To tackle the lack of policing staff, the government allowed city inspectors to issue fines for violation of restriction rules, a decision that created substantial differences in the level of enforcement between various municipalities, especially between small and large municipalities (Senior 2020).
Citations:
Bloomberg, 2021, “Covid Resilience Ranking”Retrived from: https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/covid-resilience-ranking/
Aflalo, Eti. 2020. “Distortions in the ITO’s criteria for Covid’s grants reception,” Calcalist website, October 26, 2020 (Hebrew). https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3865790,00.html.
Ashkenazi, Shani. 2020. “From Ikea to Hare’l Vizel: how the ‘combina’(Shadiness) overcame the Corona.” Globes, November 27, 2020 (Hebrew). https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001350995.
Ashkenazi, Shani. 2020. “The head of epidemiological investigations resigned: “millions go in quarantine for no reason.”” Globes, December 23, 2020 (Hebrew). https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001354217.
Ashkenazi, Shani. 2020. “The Health ministry still does not have an effective system off epidemiological investigations.” Globes, October 26, 2020 (Hebrew). https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001347050.
Ben-Tovim, Idan. 2020. “The Health Ministry stops the development of ‘the Shield’, preferring to compel you to install a new application.” GeekTime website, December 1, 2020 (Hebrew). https://www.geektime.co.il/hamagen-shield-app-will-not-get-future-updates-will-be-replaced-by-qr-codes-app/.
Hendrix, Steve and Rubin, Shira. 2020. “Israel is vaccinating so fast it’s running out of vaccine.” The Washington Post, January 4, 2020 (Hebrew). https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/israel-vaccinates-the-most-people/2021/01/04/23b20882-4e73-11eb-a1f5-fdaf28cfca90_story.html.
Israel’s State Comptroller. 2020. “Intermediate report: Israel’s tackling with the Covid-19 Crisis,” Israel’s State Comptroller, (Hebrew).
Senior, Eli. 2020. “Not only policeman: inspectors will also be able to fine violators of Covid-19 distance rules.” Ynet website, April 13, 2020 (Hebrew). https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5713909,00.html.
The implementation of COVID-19 measures in Israel was accompanied by difficulties and inefficiencies in many aspects, including difficulties caused by political and economic pressure groups, a lack of staff, the inefficient allocation of funds, and budgetary concerns. These inefficiencies made it difficult for the government to implement its policies quickly and effectively. Indeed, Israel ranks 19th worldwide in terms of how well it has handled the COVID-19 pandemic, according to new data compiled by the Bloomberg website. (Bloomberg, 2021).
The implementation of health policies has been partly successful and partly very unsuccessful. Israel’s vaccine program outpaced every other county as of January 2021 (Handrix & Rubin 2020) and the number of COVID-19 tests conducted per person in Israel was one of the highest in the world. However, the epidemiological investigation apparatus lacked the required staff at the beginning of the crisis compared to other countries. Six months into the pandemic, the Ministry of Health still relied exclusively on an old, outdated and insufficient epidemiological investigation management system. Furthermore, an absence of synchronization between the Ministry of Health and Education Ministry’s online systems, and between investigators in different cities (which led to numerous delays and errors) undermined the swift implementation of quarantine measures.
Regarding the implementation of economic measures, the lack of suitable protocols and sufficient staff in the Israel Tax Authority (ITO) has created serious tension and frustration between the recipients of emergency economic aid and the agency. The State Comptroller pointed to malfunctions in the agency’s computers and online systems, and to distorted eligibility criteria set for receiving aid. Regarding enforcement personnel, the Israeli police force lacked the necessary staff to enforce the restrictions imposed during the three lockdowns. To tackle the lack of policing staff, the government allowed city inspectors to issue fines for violation of restriction rules, a decision that created substantial differences in the level of enforcement between various municipalities, especially between small and large municipalities (Senior 2020).
Citations:
Bloomberg, 2021, “Covid Resilience Ranking”Retrived from: https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/covid-resilience-ranking/
Aflalo, Eti. 2020. “Distortions in the ITO’s criteria for Covid’s grants reception,” Calcalist website, October 26, 2020 (Hebrew). https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3865790,00.html.
Ashkenazi, Shani. 2020. “From Ikea to Hare’l Vizel: how the ‘combina’(Shadiness) overcame the Corona.” Globes, November 27, 2020 (Hebrew). https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001350995.
Ashkenazi, Shani. 2020. “The head of epidemiological investigations resigned: “millions go in quarantine for no reason.”” Globes, December 23, 2020 (Hebrew). https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001354217.
Ashkenazi, Shani. 2020. “The Health ministry still does not have an effective system off epidemiological investigations.” Globes, October 26, 2020 (Hebrew). https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001347050.
Ben-Tovim, Idan. 2020. “The Health Ministry stops the development of ‘the Shield’, preferring to compel you to install a new application.” GeekTime website, December 1, 2020 (Hebrew). https://www.geektime.co.il/hamagen-shield-app-will-not-get-future-updates-will-be-replaced-by-qr-codes-app/.
Hendrix, Steve and Rubin, Shira. 2020. “Israel is vaccinating so fast it’s running out of vaccine.” The Washington Post, January 4, 2020 (Hebrew). https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/israel-vaccinates-the-most-people/2021/01/04/23b20882-4e73-11eb-a1f5-fdaf28cfca90_story.html.
Israel’s State Comptroller. 2020. “Intermediate report: Israel’s tackling with the Covid-19 Crisis,” Israel’s State Comptroller, (Hebrew).
Senior, Eli. 2020. “Not only policeman: inspectors will also be able to fine violators of Covid-19 distance rules.” Ynet website, April 13, 2020 (Hebrew). https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5713909,00.html.
To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?
10
9
9
The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
8
7
6
7
6
The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
5
4
3
4
3
The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
2
1
1
The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
The OECD and global best-practice methods have influenced Israel’s organization of government in recent years. Values of transparency, planning, comparability, and supervision are defined by a designated unit in the PMO, arguably improving the implementation of the overall government program by increasing ministerial accountability vis-à-vis the government and the public. These new actions accompany more traditional ways to improve compliance, such as weekly cabinet sessions and interministerial roundtable events.
Ministers’ accountability to the Knesset is anchored in Israeli law (Basic Law: the Government 1968). This means that ministries must support and follow government decisions. In addition, coalition agreements, created by the party system in Israel, can be considered a mechanism for the government to force its agenda on ministers. If a minister resists or fails to implement a part of the government program, the minister might be forced by their respective party leader to follow it.
Citations:
Blander, Dana, “Hok Ha-Hesderim: Necessary evil or necessarily evil?,” IDI website 14.1.2007 (Hebrew)
Salonim, Ori, “Measuring performance in the public service,” The eleventh annual Hertzliya conference official publication (Hebrew)
“Book of working plans 2014,” PMO website (March 2014) (Hebrew)
Guidelines of the Attorney General In matters relating to the work Government, Ministry of Justice, 2015
http://www.justice.gov.il/Pubilcations/News/Documents/AttorneyGeneralGuidelines0515.pdf
“Gay Couples Denied Right to Surrogacy in New Law,” JPOST, 18.7.2018, https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Surrogacy-bill-passes-Netanyahu-flip-flops-on-homosexual-surrogacy-562810
Ministers’ accountability to the Knesset is anchored in Israeli law (Basic Law: the Government 1968). This means that ministries must support and follow government decisions. In addition, coalition agreements, created by the party system in Israel, can be considered a mechanism for the government to force its agenda on ministers. If a minister resists or fails to implement a part of the government program, the minister might be forced by their respective party leader to follow it.
Citations:
Blander, Dana, “Hok Ha-Hesderim: Necessary evil or necessarily evil?,” IDI website 14.1.2007 (Hebrew)
Salonim, Ori, “Measuring performance in the public service,” The eleventh annual Hertzliya conference official publication (Hebrew)
“Book of working plans 2014,” PMO website (March 2014) (Hebrew)
Guidelines of the Attorney General In matters relating to the work Government, Ministry of Justice, 2015
http://www.justice.gov.il/Pubilcations/News/Documents/AttorneyGeneralGuidelines0515.pdf
“Gay Couples Denied Right to Surrogacy in New Law,” JPOST, 18.7.2018, https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Surrogacy-bill-passes-Netanyahu-flip-flops-on-homosexual-surrogacy-562810
How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
5
4
3
4
3
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
2
1
1
The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
The basic law on the issue of the government establishes the prime minister’s responsibility over the government’s advancement of policy goals. This includes monitoring and guiding the work of appointed line ministers. In recent years, the PMO has introduced best-practices reforms featuring elements of transparency, sharing and benchmarking that have improved the systematic monitoring of ministries. A special committee formed to review the PMO identified its comparative weakness when dealing with recommendations from the ministries of Finance and Defense, aggravated by the PMO’s tendency to take on the responsibility for executing policies from weaker ministries such as Welfare and Health, thus expending its workload. However, three new professional units have been established in the PMO, each in charge of monitoring related ministries. Moreover, there has been a major improvement in monitoring with the government’s annual coordination of all ministerial reports on the implementation of governmental decisions. Currently, the PMO thus has strong ministerial oversight capacities.
Citations:
“Reorganization of structure,” Civil Service Commissioner information booklet No. 2, October 2012: http://www.csc.gov.il/DataBases/NewsLetters/newsletter2/Pages/MattePMO.aspx (Hebrew).
“Report on the implementation of governmental decisions 2016,” PMO wesite, http://www.pmo.gov.il/policyplanning/mimshal/Documents/dm20161607.pdf (Hebrew)
“The committee to review the PMO’s,” Official state publication, February 2012, (Hebrew)
Environment and Health Fund, Ministry of Health, “Health and Environment in Israel 2017,” http://www.ehf.org.il/magazines/he/EnvHealthIsrael2017/, (Hebrew)
Citations:
“Reorganization of structure,” Civil Service Commissioner information booklet No. 2, October 2012: http://www.csc.gov.il/DataBases/NewsLetters/newsletter2/Pages/MattePMO.aspx (Hebrew).
“Report on the implementation of governmental decisions 2016,” PMO wesite, http://www.pmo.gov.il/policyplanning/mimshal/Documents/dm20161607.pdf (Hebrew)
“The committee to review the PMO’s,” Official state publication, February 2012, (Hebrew)
Environment and Health Fund, Ministry of Health, “Health and Environment in Israel 2017,” http://www.ehf.org.il/magazines/he/EnvHealthIsrael2017/, (Hebrew)
How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
8
7
6
7
6
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
5
4
3
4
3
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
2
1
1
The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
While connections between ministries, and government agencies and NGOs are defined by contractual agreements, and financial and legal oversight, the content and quality of services are not under similar appraisal. Most ministries sufficiently monitor their respective agencies, while some – notably education and welfare – are criticized for failing to implement government policies and effective monitor service provision. According to media reports, government ministries still drag behind when it comes to monitoring and enforcing regulations on private service providers in outsourced services, including protecting the rights of customers and workers.
Citations:
Ben Aeter, Moshe. ‘Who needs the state-own enterprises?’ – Haaretz, 13.04.16 (Hebrew):
http://www.haaretz.co.il/blogs/moshebatar/1.2914354
Detal, Lior, “The Ministry of Education inc.: This is how hundreds of private bodies receive some 11 billion shekels,” themarker 5.10.2014:
http://www.themarker.com/news/education/1.2450395 (Hebrew).
Haber, Carmit, “Managerial culture blocks to implementing open government policy,” The Israel democracy institute (March 2013) (Hebrew)
IDF employees: The state leads to the privatization of the production of tanks and armored personnel carriers,” Globes,10.10.2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001255924
Israel Government Website, “Government Resolution No. 4398 of December 23, 2018: Smart regulation – Implementing OECD recommendations and amending government decision, 2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.gov.il/he/Departments/policies/dec4398_2018
Koren, Ora, “Reform in the public sector: The Ministry of Treasury’s authorities will be restrained, employees will receive incentives,” TheMarker website 9.8.2012 (Hebrew)
Limor, Nissan, “Regulation and oversight over third sector organizations,” Social security no. 70 (2005),159-187.
Maman, Daniel, “State Economy in a Neo-Liberal Age,” In Adva Center’s “30 Years for the Neo-liberal revolution In Israel,” 2016 (Hebrew):
http://adva.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/30yearsto1985.pdf
“Public service provisions using outsourcing,” JDC publication. (Hebrew)
“The Ministry of Health,” in Annual report 63c for 2012, the State Comptroller publication 8.5.2013:
http://www.mevaker.gov.il/he/Reports/Pages/114.aspx?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 (Hebrew)
The privatization failures: “The Transportation Ministry completely smashed the examiners.,” Davar, 22.11.2017 (Hebrew)
https://www.davar1.co.il/95761/
“The state admits failures in privatization tenders and supervision of privatized service” – The Marker, 8.9.2016 (Hebrew):
https://www.themarker.com/news/1.3062114
“The state comptroller presents: “The privatization of IMI was” cooked up ” – Globes, 26.6.2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001243060
Citations:
Ben Aeter, Moshe. ‘Who needs the state-own enterprises?’ – Haaretz, 13.04.16 (Hebrew):
http://www.haaretz.co.il/blogs/moshebatar/1.2914354
Detal, Lior, “The Ministry of Education inc.: This is how hundreds of private bodies receive some 11 billion shekels,” themarker 5.10.2014:
http://www.themarker.com/news/education/1.2450395 (Hebrew).
Haber, Carmit, “Managerial culture blocks to implementing open government policy,” The Israel democracy institute (March 2013) (Hebrew)
IDF employees: The state leads to the privatization of the production of tanks and armored personnel carriers,” Globes,10.10.2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001255924
Israel Government Website, “Government Resolution No. 4398 of December 23, 2018: Smart regulation – Implementing OECD recommendations and amending government decision, 2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.gov.il/he/Departments/policies/dec4398_2018
Koren, Ora, “Reform in the public sector: The Ministry of Treasury’s authorities will be restrained, employees will receive incentives,” TheMarker website 9.8.2012 (Hebrew)
Limor, Nissan, “Regulation and oversight over third sector organizations,” Social security no. 70 (2005),159-187.
Maman, Daniel, “State Economy in a Neo-Liberal Age,” In Adva Center’s “30 Years for the Neo-liberal revolution In Israel,” 2016 (Hebrew):
http://adva.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/30yearsto1985.pdf
“Public service provisions using outsourcing,” JDC publication. (Hebrew)
“The Ministry of Health,” in Annual report 63c for 2012, the State Comptroller publication 8.5.2013:
http://www.mevaker.gov.il/he/Reports/Pages/114.aspx?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 (Hebrew)
The privatization failures: “The Transportation Ministry completely smashed the examiners.,” Davar, 22.11.2017 (Hebrew)
https://www.davar1.co.il/95761/
“The state admits failures in privatization tenders and supervision of privatized service” – The Marker, 8.9.2016 (Hebrew):
https://www.themarker.com/news/1.3062114
“The state comptroller presents: “The privatization of IMI was” cooked up ” – Globes, 26.6.2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001243060
To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
8
7
6
7
6
The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
2
1
1
The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
Local authorities have three main types of income: local taxes (property tax, fines, tolls) earmarked to finance local services, government funds designated for social and educational services, and governmental balancing grants for basic services that poor local authorities are unable to fund. The government’s budgeting procedure for local government is clearly articulated and includes progressive budgetary support. Nevertheless, significant gaps in the economic capacity of rich and poor local authorities hinder the ability of poorer municipalities to implement tasks defined by the central government, especially in education and welfare domains.
Citations:
Ben Basat, Avi and Dahan, Momi, “The political economy of local authorities,” IDI website 2009 (Hebrew)
Ben-Bassat, Avi, Dahan, Momi, and Klor, Esteban F., “Representativeness and efficiency in local government,” Jerusalem: IDI 2013, introduction summary in English: http://en.idi.org.il/media/2464644/ Representativeness-Abstract.pdf
Ben Basat, Avi and Dahan, Momi, “Strike in local authorities,” IDI website 15.1.2012 (Hebrew)
Dahan, Momi, “Why do local authorities hold back pay?,” IDI website 15.11.2009 (Hebrew)
“Instructions for local authorities’ budget frame proposal for the year 2012,” Ministry of Interior website (Hebrew)
Ministry of Interior budget of 2017-2018, Ministry of Interior website (Hebrew)
https://mof.gov.il/BudgetSite/statebudget/BUDGET2017_2018/MINISTERIESBUDGET/MinisteriesBudget/DocLib/Pnim_Main.pdf
Ministry of Interior Work Plan, 2017-2018, Ministry of Interior Website (Hebrew)
https://bit.ly/2UogyVw
Saada, Aria, “Ombudsman’s report 57ב: Budgeting social services for local authorities equality lacking,” Abiliko website 9.7.2010 (Hebrew)
“The State discriminates in welfare budgets between rich and poor authorities,” Ynet News, 6.12.17 (Hebrew)
https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5052419,00.html
Citations:
Ben Basat, Avi and Dahan, Momi, “The political economy of local authorities,” IDI website 2009 (Hebrew)
Ben-Bassat, Avi, Dahan, Momi, and Klor, Esteban F., “Representativeness and efficiency in local government,” Jerusalem: IDI 2013, introduction summary in English: http://en.idi.org.il/media/2464644/ Representativeness-Abstract.pdf
Ben Basat, Avi and Dahan, Momi, “Strike in local authorities,” IDI website 15.1.2012 (Hebrew)
Dahan, Momi, “Why do local authorities hold back pay?,” IDI website 15.11.2009 (Hebrew)
“Instructions for local authorities’ budget frame proposal for the year 2012,” Ministry of Interior website (Hebrew)
Ministry of Interior budget of 2017-2018, Ministry of Interior website (Hebrew)
https://mof.gov.il/BudgetSite/statebudget/BUDGET2017_2018/MINISTERIESBUDGET/MinisteriesBudget/DocLib/Pnim_Main.pdf
Ministry of Interior Work Plan, 2017-2018, Ministry of Interior Website (Hebrew)
https://bit.ly/2UogyVw
Saada, Aria, “Ombudsman’s report 57ב: Budgeting social services for local authorities equality lacking,” Abiliko website 9.7.2010 (Hebrew)
“The State discriminates in welfare budgets between rich and poor authorities,” Ynet News, 6.12.17 (Hebrew)
https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5052419,00.html
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
2
1
1
The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
Economic gaps between local municipalities in Israel greatly affect their autonomy, so the policy autonomy of rich cities (e.g., Tel Aviv) is significantly higher than that of poor municipalities. In addition, rich municipalities in Israel are organized in a forum that acts as a pressure group vis-à-vis the government, further enhancing their de facto autonomy. Tensions between local municipalities and central government are also evident when it comes to central government’s administrative control over a variety of issues. For example, the minister of interior used the ministry’s authority to authorize municipal bylaws to limit supermarket opening hours and public transport operations during Shabbat (Saturday).
Citations:
Benita, Rinat, “Local Authorities in Israel“, The Knesset Research Center 17.5.2015:
http://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/committees/InternalAffairs/Documents/rashpnim.pdf (Hebrew).
Crisis of Jewish Bridge on Saturday Shabbat?, Mako, 14.1.2019 (Hebrew):
https://www.mako.co.il/news-military/politics-q1_2019/Article-56ffda4abbd4861004.htm
Deri used the supermarket law, Channel 7 News, 21.6.2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.inn.co.il/News/News.aspx/376136
“Government legal proposal 292,” Official legal records 1997 (Hebrew)
Hayman-Raiesh, Noami, “Changes in the status of local government,” IDI website, October 2008 (Hebrew)
https://www.idi.org.il/parliaments/4503/4507
Lichtman, Moshe. “It’s not necessary to recommend to reduce mayors term,” 19.9.16 (Hebrew):
http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001152963
Modi’in joined the “bypassing the supermarkets,” Ynet News 3.1.18 (Hebrew)::
https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5065779,00.html
“Municipalities law: A position paper,” IDC, December 2011 (Hebrew)
“Not waiting for government: Tel Aviv will fund buses on Saturday,” The Marker, 10.10.2019 (Hebrew):
https://www.themarker.com/dynamo/cars/.premium-1.7961486
“Stop the train work on Saturday,” Israel Today (“Israel Hayom”), 16.9.2018 (Hebrew): https://www.israelhayom.co.il/article/587241
The report that was shelved: A new bill to combat corruption in the local government, Israel News, 18.1.2018
https://bit.ly/2Y6FkKE
The Supermarkets Law was approved in second and third readings – by a vote of one vote, Walla News, 9.1.2018 (Hebrew):
https://news.walla.co.il/item/3125629
“What will be opened and what will be closed on Shabbat? All you need to know about the “Supermarket Law”“, Ynet
News 9.1.18 (Hebrew):
https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5068454,00.html
Why and by whom is a report of recommendations for eradicating corruption in the local government shelved?, Branza News, 23.1.18, (Hebrew):
http://branza.co.il/site/article/article_view/news-1516727272
https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5068454,00.html
“Buses overflow as Tel Aviv launches public transportation on Shabbat,” Times of Israel, 23.11.2019, https://www.timesofisrael.com/buses-overflow-as-tel-aviv-launches-public-transportation-on-shabbat/
Citations:
Benita, Rinat, “Local Authorities in Israel“, The Knesset Research Center 17.5.2015:
http://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/committees/InternalAffairs/Documents/rashpnim.pdf (Hebrew).
Crisis of Jewish Bridge on Saturday Shabbat?, Mako, 14.1.2019 (Hebrew):
https://www.mako.co.il/news-military/politics-q1_2019/Article-56ffda4abbd4861004.htm
Deri used the supermarket law, Channel 7 News, 21.6.2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.inn.co.il/News/News.aspx/376136
“Government legal proposal 292,” Official legal records 1997 (Hebrew)
Hayman-Raiesh, Noami, “Changes in the status of local government,” IDI website, October 2008 (Hebrew)
https://www.idi.org.il/parliaments/4503/4507
Lichtman, Moshe. “It’s not necessary to recommend to reduce mayors term,” 19.9.16 (Hebrew):
http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001152963
Modi’in joined the “bypassing the supermarkets,” Ynet News 3.1.18 (Hebrew)::
https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5065779,00.html
“Municipalities law: A position paper,” IDC, December 2011 (Hebrew)
“Not waiting for government: Tel Aviv will fund buses on Saturday,” The Marker, 10.10.2019 (Hebrew):
https://www.themarker.com/dynamo/cars/.premium-1.7961486
“Stop the train work on Saturday,” Israel Today (“Israel Hayom”), 16.9.2018 (Hebrew): https://www.israelhayom.co.il/article/587241
The report that was shelved: A new bill to combat corruption in the local government, Israel News, 18.1.2018
https://bit.ly/2Y6FkKE
The Supermarkets Law was approved in second and third readings – by a vote of one vote, Walla News, 9.1.2018 (Hebrew):
https://news.walla.co.il/item/3125629
“What will be opened and what will be closed on Shabbat? All you need to know about the “Supermarket Law”“, Ynet
News 9.1.18 (Hebrew):
https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5068454,00.html
Why and by whom is a report of recommendations for eradicating corruption in the local government shelved?, Branza News, 23.1.18, (Hebrew):
http://branza.co.il/site/article/article_view/news-1516727272
https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5068454,00.html
“Buses overflow as Tel Aviv launches public transportation on Shabbat,” Times of Israel, 23.11.2019, https://www.timesofisrael.com/buses-overflow-as-tel-aviv-launches-public-transportation-on-shabbat/
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?
10
9
9
Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
2
1
1
Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
The provision of local services in Israel is dispersed between many agents, including local authorities, NGOs, government and municipal corporations and institutions such as public and private hospitals. The limited ability of poor local authorities (e.g., largely Arab or Orthodox Jewish municipalities) to maintain government standards incited the expansion of central government’s authorities during the 2000s, and authorized the Ministry of the Interior to closely supervise and even to dissolve councils that fail to deliver proper services, at the cost of a less democratic local representation.
Service treaties in local authorities aim to standardize local services used by residents, while informing residents of their rights and the level of general services in their city or town. In recent years, many local authorities have taken part in this process and published information regarding local services on their website. Additionally, the privatization of social services continues to exhibit problems as weak social ministries struggle to regulate the quality and content of care. Several reports on education services point to ideological conflicts and poor management as well as an increase in the share of privately financed activities and consequent inequality.
Citations:
Bersler-Gonen, Rotem, “Service treaty in local government in Israel – review,” Ministry of the interior website (December 2011) (Hebrew)
Dagan-Buzaglo, Noga, “Aspects in privatization in the education system,” Adva Center 2010. (Hebrew)
Detal, Lior, “The Ministry of Education inc.: This is how hundreds of private bodies receive some 11 billion shekels,” TheMarker 5.10.2014: http://www.themarker.co m/news/education/1.2450395 (Hebrew).
Paz־Fuchs, Amir and Bensimhon־Peleg, Sarit, “On the seam between the public and the private: Privatization and nationalization in Israel: Annual report 2013,” The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, 2014 (Hebrew)
Specktor, Shiri, “Social rights and personal social services in Israel,” The Knesset Research Center 21.10.2010:
http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/m03158.pdf (Hebrew)
“Local government in Israel,” Knesset website (Hebrew)
“On nominated councils and democracy,” Hithabrut website (NGO) (Hebrew)
Local government in Israel, Knesset website:
http://www.knesset.gov.i l/lexicon/eng/LocalAuthorities_eng. Htm
“Quality of service provided to residents of local authorities,” State Comptroller, 2016 (Hebrew):
http://www.mevaker.gov.il/he/Reports/Report_554/8b2456e1-a1dd-450f-af0c-df9fccca5d4f/106-service.pdf
The citizen’s empowerment center in Israel: the implantation of the movement’s decision to establish a regulatory authority over hospitals – review – April 2016:
http://www.ceci.org.il/sites/citizens/UserContent/files/monitorreport/monitor%201622.pdf
Service treaties in local authorities aim to standardize local services used by residents, while informing residents of their rights and the level of general services in their city or town. In recent years, many local authorities have taken part in this process and published information regarding local services on their website. Additionally, the privatization of social services continues to exhibit problems as weak social ministries struggle to regulate the quality and content of care. Several reports on education services point to ideological conflicts and poor management as well as an increase in the share of privately financed activities and consequent inequality.
Citations:
Bersler-Gonen, Rotem, “Service treaty in local government in Israel – review,” Ministry of the interior website (December 2011) (Hebrew)
Dagan-Buzaglo, Noga, “Aspects in privatization in the education system,” Adva Center 2010. (Hebrew)
Detal, Lior, “The Ministry of Education inc.: This is how hundreds of private bodies receive some 11 billion shekels,” TheMarker 5.10.2014: http://www.themarker.co m/news/education/1.2450395 (Hebrew).
Paz־Fuchs, Amir and Bensimhon־Peleg, Sarit, “On the seam between the public and the private: Privatization and nationalization in Israel: Annual report 2013,” The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, 2014 (Hebrew)
Specktor, Shiri, “Social rights and personal social services in Israel,” The Knesset Research Center 21.10.2010:
http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/m03158.pdf (Hebrew)
“Local government in Israel,” Knesset website (Hebrew)
“On nominated councils and democracy,” Hithabrut website (NGO) (Hebrew)
Local government in Israel, Knesset website:
http://www.knesset.gov.i l/lexicon/eng/LocalAuthorities_eng. Htm
“Quality of service provided to residents of local authorities,” State Comptroller, 2016 (Hebrew):
http://www.mevaker.gov.il/he/Reports/Report_554/8b2456e1-a1dd-450f-af0c-df9fccca5d4f/106-service.pdf
The citizen’s empowerment center in Israel: the implantation of the movement’s decision to establish a regulatory authority over hospitals – review – April 2016:
http://www.ceci.org.il/sites/citizens/UserContent/files/monitorreport/monitor%201622.pdf
To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?
10
9
9
Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
8
7
6
7
6
Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
5
4
3
4
3
Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
2
1
1
Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
In general, Israel has a good record in dealing with powerful interest groups and enforcing regulation – the prime example being the Encouragement of Competition and Restriction of Centralism Act of 2013. The law was enacted after a public interministerial committee found that one of the most prevalent structural market failures was the presence of a small group of tycoons that used large pyramidical corporations to control the market. Therefore, it recommended several affirmative actions to regulate the corporative structure of large businesses and ensure the public interest. The government accepted the recommendations and legislated the aforementioned law.
On the other hand, there are many examples according to which the government does not operate with the public interest in mind. For example, in its report from 8 May 2018, the State Comptroller surveyed the Ministry of Health’s policy on reducing smoking and tobacco consumption, and reproached the ministry for its policy discrepancies and close relationship with tobacco companies. One indicative example from that report is that the deputy minister for health, Ya’acov Litzman, and senior officials from his office met twice with representatives of tobacco companies in undisclosed and unreported meetings.
On the other hand, there are many examples according to which the government does not operate with the public interest in mind. For example, in its report from 8 May 2018, the State Comptroller surveyed the Ministry of Health’s policy on reducing smoking and tobacco consumption, and reproached the ministry for its policy discrepancies and close relationship with tobacco companies. One indicative example from that report is that the deputy minister for health, Ya’acov Litzman, and senior officials from his office met twice with representatives of tobacco companies in undisclosed and unreported meetings.
Graph View
To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?
10
9
9
The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
8
7
6
7
6
In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
2
1
1
The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
Following OECD and academic recommendations, the Israeli government advances various administrative reforms regarding regulatory burdens, decision-making and long-term planning. Periodic progress reports show gradual improvement in the dissemination of information as well as in decision-making. The government continues to adapt its domestic structures to international and supranational developments in an ongoing and constructive process. The Ministry of Economy and Industry produces an annual report that reviews progress with regard to implementation of the OECD’s recommendations. For example, in 2015 the report presented the progress made in the ability to regulate the imposition of labor laws. Moreover, in 2015, Israel signed the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in tax matters of the OECD and ratified it in 2016. Many other agreements, such as the enforcement of the anti-bribery convention, have been signed, with policies adapted in Israel in accordance with OECD standards.
Citations:
Arlozorov, Merav. 2020. “Netanyahu’s failing management forces Israel to crawl down to Pfizer”. TheMarker. Retrieved from https://www.themarker.com/coronavirus/.premium-1.9303019
Linder, Roni. 2020. “Israel is burning, said Sigal Sadetzki. Is it happening again, and how did we reach another lockdown.” TheMarker. Retrieved from https://www.themarker.com/news/health/.premium-1.9356648
Israel’s State Comptroller. 2020a. Israel’s handling of the Corona crisis – Special Interim report. Office of the State Comptroller.
Israel’s State Comptroller. 2020b. Health system management in the outbreak of new diseases. Office of the State Comptroller.
Citations:
Arlozorov, Merav. 2020. “Netanyahu’s failing management forces Israel to crawl down to Pfizer”. TheMarker. Retrieved from https://www.themarker.com/coronavirus/.premium-1.9303019
Linder, Roni. 2020. “Israel is burning, said Sigal Sadetzki. Is it happening again, and how did we reach another lockdown.” TheMarker. Retrieved from https://www.themarker.com/news/health/.premium-1.9356648
Israel’s State Comptroller. 2020a. Israel’s handling of the Corona crisis – Special Interim report. Office of the State Comptroller.
Israel’s State Comptroller. 2020b. Health system management in the outbreak of new diseases. Office of the State Comptroller.
To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?
10
9
9
The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
2
1
1
The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
Israel takes part in several international efforts to foster global public goods. Israel joined the OECD in 2010. Since its accession to the OECD, Israel is largely involved and engaged in shaping and implementing the OECD recommendation in several fields.
However, most ministerial committees do not have specific responsibility for the implementation of OECD recommendations. The exception is the ministerial committee on regulatory affairs. Another example of Israel’s intention to be part of international collaboration to foster public goods is its involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, which convenes the Energy Ministers of Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority to cooperate and maintain dialogue regarding gas resources in the region.
Citations:
“Israel in the OECD,” Minister of Treasury formal report (2010) (Hebrew).
“The Second Progress report on the implementation of the OECD recommendations: Labor market and social policies,” Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute (2015) (Hebrew): https://brookdale.jdc.org.il/publication/second-progress-report-implementation-oecd-recommendations-labour-market-social-policies-israel/
“Progress report on the implementation of the OECD recommendations: Labor market and social policies,” Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute (2012) (Hebrew):
https://brookdale.jdc.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/OECD-Progress-report-HEB-Sep-2012.pdf
“Beyond Energy: The Significance of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum,” INSS report (February 2019): https://www.inss.org.il/publication/beyond-energy-significance-eastern-mediterranean-gas-forum/
However, most ministerial committees do not have specific responsibility for the implementation of OECD recommendations. The exception is the ministerial committee on regulatory affairs. Another example of Israel’s intention to be part of international collaboration to foster public goods is its involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, which convenes the Energy Ministers of Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority to cooperate and maintain dialogue regarding gas resources in the region.
Citations:
“Israel in the OECD,” Minister of Treasury formal report (2010) (Hebrew).
“The Second Progress report on the implementation of the OECD recommendations: Labor market and social policies,” Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute (2015) (Hebrew): https://brookdale.jdc.org.il/publication/second-progress-report-implementation-oecd-recommendations-labour-market-social-policies-israel/
“Progress report on the implementation of the OECD recommendations: Labor market and social policies,” Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute (2012) (Hebrew):
https://brookdale.jdc.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/OECD-Progress-report-HEB-Sep-2012.pdf
“Beyond Energy: The Significance of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum,” INSS report (February 2019): https://www.inss.org.il/publication/beyond-energy-significance-eastern-mediterranean-gas-forum/
Graph View
To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?
10
9
9
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
5
4
3
4
3
The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
2
1
1
There is no monitoring.
The Israeli government has installed various executive-branch institutions, both internally and externally, tasked with monitoring its activities and performance in areas such as procedures, financial transfers and human resources. For example, the Accountant General regularly audits financial decisions in ministries. The Civil Service Commission ensures that internal due processes are followed, and oversees human resources. However, in recent Knesset discussion regarding reforms to the Commission’s work, critics have asserted that the Commission’s work is inefficient. The PMO monitors implementation of the State Comptroller’s recommendations as well as the internal accounting units in each ministry. Supplementary mechanisms for self-regulation include protocols and guidelines governing daily practice.
Citations:
“About: the Accountant General,” Ministry of finance website (Hebrew): http://mof.gov.il/AG/About/Pages/About.aspx
“About the Inspection General for State Comptroller Affairs,” PMO website (Hebrew): http://www.pmo.gov.il/BikoretHamedina/Pages/Default.aspx
Government Decision 482: adoption of the recommendations of the governability committee, 30.6.213, http://www.pmo.gov.il/Secretary/GovDecisions/2013/Pages/des482.aspx
“Notice number 3,” Civil service commission website (Hebrew) “About: Civil Service Commission,” Civil service commission website (Hebrew): http://www.csc.gov.il/About/Pages/Roles.aspx
Protocol – The Special Committee – Reforms in the Civil Service Commission: https://oknesset.org/committee/meeting/11826/
“Rules, procedures and guidelines for CEOs in the civil service,” Civil service commission 2013: http://www.csc.gov.il/DataBases/Rules/Documents/BrochureCEOs.pdf (Hebrew)
“The internal audit law 1992,” Official legislation (Hebrew)
Citations:
“About: the Accountant General,” Ministry of finance website (Hebrew): http://mof.gov.il/AG/About/Pages/About.aspx
“About the Inspection General for State Comptroller Affairs,” PMO website (Hebrew): http://www.pmo.gov.il/BikoretHamedina/Pages/Default.aspx
Government Decision 482: adoption of the recommendations of the governability committee, 30.6.213, http://www.pmo.gov.il/Secretary/GovDecisions/2013/Pages/des482.aspx
“Notice number 3,” Civil service commission website (Hebrew) “About: Civil Service Commission,” Civil service commission website (Hebrew): http://www.csc.gov.il/About/Pages/Roles.aspx
Protocol – The Special Committee – Reforms in the Civil Service Commission: https://oknesset.org/committee/meeting/11826/
“Rules, procedures and guidelines for CEOs in the civil service,” Civil service commission 2013: http://www.csc.gov.il/DataBases/Rules/Documents/BrochureCEOs.pdf (Hebrew)
“The internal audit law 1992,” Official legislation (Hebrew)
To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?
10
9
9
The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
8
7
6
7
6
The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
2
1
1
The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
In 2018, the Basic Law: the Government and the Government Act of 2001 were slightly amended to formulate and delineate the cabinet’s authorities. This was done following State Comptroller reports that suggested that the cabinet’s authorities and jurisdictions are not legally specified, and that there are serious deficiencies regarding the extent and the quality of information being transferred to the cabinet. And yet, it is still unclear if the lack of an obligation to transfer information to the cabinet, any other deficiencies related to this, and other questions of decision-making authority, had been resolved.
Citations:
Arlozerov, Merav, “Israeli government; The reform that will end the Treasury’s single rule; Will lose a major part of its authorities,” TheMarker 13.2.2013 (Hebrew)
Azulai, Moran. “The Ministerial Committee for Legislation to Vote on the Cabinet Act.” In Ynet. June 10th, 2017. (Hebrew). https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4973923,00.html.
Base Law: The Government (Hebrew) (Full text: https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/999_119.htm)
Chaimowitz, Mordecai. “The Prime Minister of a State that Woke Up from a Dream to the Worst Nightmare in Its History.” In Nrg website. September 13th, 2013. (Hebrew). https://www.makorrishon.co.il/nrg/online/1/ART2/506/704.html.
Dahan, Momi, “Why do local authorities hold back pay?,” IDI website 15.11.2009 (Hebrew)
“Employing and management in the public service,” Conference in the name of Eli Horovitz 2013: https://www.idi.org.il/media/2803303/public%20service%20b.pdf (Hebrew)
Israel. The State Comptroller. “Operation ‘Protective Edge’: The Decision Making Processes in the Cabinet Regardign Gaza Strip Before and After Operation ‘Protective Edge;’ The Management [lit. Coping] with the Tunnels’ Threat,” Special audit Report, 2017. (Hebrew). (Also available here: http://www.mevaker.gov.il/he/Reports/Pages/568.aspx)
Milman, Omri, “Mayors to Kahlon: ‘If you would promote the differential allocation we won’t build in our territory’“, Calcalist 2.9.2015
Nuri, Dalya Gabrieli. “The Kitchen that Changed the Middle East.” In Ha’aretz website. October 22nd, 2012. (Hebrew). https://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/1.1847556.
“The CEO of the social-economic cabinet approved the establishment of an authority for technological innovation,” Minister of the Economy website 15.9.2014: http://economy.gov.il/Publications/PressReleases/Pages/CabinetForTechnologicalIn novation.aspx (Hebrew)
The Government Act, 2001 (Hebrew) (Full text: https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/999_006.htm)
Vigoda, Eran and Penny, Yuval, “Public sector performance in Israel” (October 2001), (Hebrew)
OECD, “Multi level Governance Reforms. Overview of OECD country experiences,” 2017, https://bit.ly/2AfHNdR
Citations:
Arlozerov, Merav, “Israeli government; The reform that will end the Treasury’s single rule; Will lose a major part of its authorities,” TheMarker 13.2.2013 (Hebrew)
Azulai, Moran. “The Ministerial Committee for Legislation to Vote on the Cabinet Act.” In Ynet. June 10th, 2017. (Hebrew). https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4973923,00.html.
Base Law: The Government (Hebrew) (Full text: https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/999_119.htm)
Chaimowitz, Mordecai. “The Prime Minister of a State that Woke Up from a Dream to the Worst Nightmare in Its History.” In Nrg website. September 13th, 2013. (Hebrew). https://www.makorrishon.co.il/nrg/online/1/ART2/506/704.html.
Dahan, Momi, “Why do local authorities hold back pay?,” IDI website 15.11.2009 (Hebrew)
“Employing and management in the public service,” Conference in the name of Eli Horovitz 2013: https://www.idi.org.il/media/2803303/public%20service%20b.pdf (Hebrew)
Israel. The State Comptroller. “Operation ‘Protective Edge’: The Decision Making Processes in the Cabinet Regardign Gaza Strip Before and After Operation ‘Protective Edge;’ The Management [lit. Coping] with the Tunnels’ Threat,” Special audit Report, 2017. (Hebrew). (Also available here: http://www.mevaker.gov.il/he/Reports/Pages/568.aspx)
Milman, Omri, “Mayors to Kahlon: ‘If you would promote the differential allocation we won’t build in our territory’“, Calcalist 2.9.2015
Nuri, Dalya Gabrieli. “The Kitchen that Changed the Middle East.” In Ha’aretz website. October 22nd, 2012. (Hebrew). https://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/1.1847556.
“The CEO of the social-economic cabinet approved the establishment of an authority for technological innovation,” Minister of the Economy website 15.9.2014: http://economy.gov.il/Publications/PressReleases/Pages/CabinetForTechnologicalIn novation.aspx (Hebrew)
The Government Act, 2001 (Hebrew) (Full text: https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/999_006.htm)
Vigoda, Eran and Penny, Yuval, “Public sector performance in Israel” (October 2001), (Hebrew)
OECD, “Multi level Governance Reforms. Overview of OECD country experiences,” 2017, https://bit.ly/2AfHNdR