Quality of Democracy
#30Key Findings
With ongoing tension over its treatment of Palestinians, Israel performs relatively poorly (rank 30) with regard to democracy quality. Its score on this measure has declined by 0.4 points relative to 2014.
Despite generally open and free elections, candidates can be banned for rejecting Israel’s Jewish identity, among other issues. Parties receive private and public funding, with considerable spending oversight and large fines levied for rule violations. Critics argue that a recently passed law diminishing state funding for joint party lists was designed to break up an Arab party group.
The use of emergency regulations, while routine throughout the country’s history, accelerated during the pandemic. Laws and legal proposals infringing on basic democratic principles have become more common. Arabs experience systematic discrimination and infringements of their civil rights, and are politically marginalized.
Progress has been made in recent years with regard to women’s and gay rights. The judiciary is independent and regularly rules against the government. A number of prominent politicians have been involved in corruption scandals, with criminal inquiries into politicians including former Prime Minister Netanyahu common.
Despite generally open and free elections, candidates can be banned for rejecting Israel’s Jewish identity, among other issues. Parties receive private and public funding, with considerable spending oversight and large fines levied for rule violations. Critics argue that a recently passed law diminishing state funding for joint party lists was designed to break up an Arab party group.
The use of emergency regulations, while routine throughout the country’s history, accelerated during the pandemic. Laws and legal proposals infringing on basic democratic principles have become more common. Arabs experience systematic discrimination and infringements of their civil rights, and are politically marginalized.
Progress has been made in recent years with regard to women’s and gay rights. The judiciary is independent and regularly rules against the government. A number of prominent politicians have been involved in corruption scandals, with criminal inquiries into politicians including former Prime Minister Netanyahu common.
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How fair are procedures for registering candidates and parties?
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Legal regulations provide for a fair registration procedure for all elections; candidates and parties are not discriminated against.
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A few restrictions on election procedures discriminate against a small number of candidates and parties.
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Some unreasonable restrictions on election procedures exist that discriminate against many candidates and parties.
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Discriminating registration procedures for elections are widespread and prevent a large number of potential candidates or parties from participating.
Israel is an electoral democracy. While it does not have an official constitution, one of its basic laws (The Knesset: 1958), which holds special standing in the Israeli legal framework, constitutes a general, free, equal, discrete, direct and proportional elections, to be held every four years. This Basic Law promises an equal opportunity for each Israeli citizen to elect and to be elected under certain reasonable restraints, namely being a citizen over the age of 21, with no record of incarceration over a three-month period in the seven years prior to his/her nomination. Nominees who held a prominent public office (as specified in the written law) must wait a cooling period. More controversially, the Basic Law: The Knesset authorizes the Central Elections Committee to reject a nominee or a list if they reject Israel’s Jewish and democratic identity, if they support another country or terrorist organization’s armed conflict against Israel, or if they incite racism.
The Central Elections Committee is chaired by a High Court of Justice judge and is assembled by Knesset members according to the prevailing seat allocation in the Knesset. Therefore, it is mainly a political body. Nevertheless, any decision to disqualify a nominee must be authorized by the Supreme Court, which in many cases overrules the committee’s decisions.
Citations:
“Basic Laws: ‘The Knesset’” Knesset official website: www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/ eng-mimshal_yesod1.htm (English)
Fuchs, Amir. “MK Suspension Bill: Anti-Democratic to the Core,” 06.06.2016 https://en.idi.org.il/articles/2357
Hezki, Baruch. “Bill to bar Supreme Court from deciding who can run for Knesset,” 26.10.17, Arutz Sheva: http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/237241
Norris, P., Wynter, T and Cameron, S. (2018). “Corruption and Coercion: The Year in Elections 2017,” The Electoral Integrity Project, https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/the-year-in-elections-2017
“Summary of laws relating to the general elections,” from the Knesset official website (Hebrew)
Staff, ToI. “High Court Bars Far-right Party Leader Ben Ari From Running In Elections,” 17.3.2019, The Times of Israel:
https://www.timesofisrael.com/high-court-bars-far-right-party-leader-ben-ari-from-elections/
The Central Elections Committee is chaired by a High Court of Justice judge and is assembled by Knesset members according to the prevailing seat allocation in the Knesset. Therefore, it is mainly a political body. Nevertheless, any decision to disqualify a nominee must be authorized by the Supreme Court, which in many cases overrules the committee’s decisions.
Citations:
“Basic Laws: ‘The Knesset’” Knesset official website: www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/ eng-mimshal_yesod1.htm (English)
Fuchs, Amir. “MK Suspension Bill: Anti-Democratic to the Core,” 06.06.2016 https://en.idi.org.il/articles/2357
Hezki, Baruch. “Bill to bar Supreme Court from deciding who can run for Knesset,” 26.10.17, Arutz Sheva: http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/237241
Norris, P., Wynter, T and Cameron, S. (2018). “Corruption and Coercion: The Year in Elections 2017,” The Electoral Integrity Project, https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/the-year-in-elections-2017
“Summary of laws relating to the general elections,” from the Knesset official website (Hebrew)
Staff, ToI. “High Court Bars Far-right Party Leader Ben Ari From Running In Elections,” 17.3.2019, The Times of Israel:
https://www.timesofisrael.com/high-court-bars-far-right-party-leader-ben-ari-from-elections/
To what extent do candidates and parties have fair access to the media and other means of communication?
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All candidates and parties have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. All major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of the range of different political positions.
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Candidates and parties have largely equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. The major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of different political positions.
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Candidates and parties often do not have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. While the major media outlets represent a partisan political bias, the media system as a whole provides fair coverage of different political positions.
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Candidates and parties lack equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communications. The major media outlets are biased in favor of certain political groups or views and discriminate against others.
One of the foundation stones of Israeli democracy is its free press and media. As part of this foundation, laws have been passed to ensure equal media access for all candidates and parties. Moreover, the criteria for allocating airtime during election campaigns is impartial: it is not subjected to any kind of arbitrary considerations or determined by the chairman of the Central Elections Committee.
While election broadcasting rights are fair and balanced, achieving equal media representation is a routine challenge. Most notably, minorities often remain under-represented. For example, Arab Israeli interviewees are under-represented in broadcasts by Hebrew media outlets. According to studies of civil society organizations, media coverage of Arab candidates and lists in Hebrew media was relatively low (4.5% and 7.5% of total coverage) during the two elections held in 2019.
In recent years, the number of Jewish-only public opinion surveys has decreased, following criticism waged by the Seventh Eye media watchdog and changes made to the Israel Press Council’s ethical rules. While those surveys sometimes presented as representing the Israeli public opinion, the fact that they exclude Arab Israeli citizens is usually not mentioned.
Citations:
Hattis Rolef, Susan, Ben Meir, Liat and Zwebner, Sarah, “Party financing and election financing in Israel,” Knesset Research Institute, 21.7.2003 (Hebrew).
Persiko, Oren, “An increase in the number of Arab speakers in election bulletin,” The Seventh Eye, 26.9.2019 (Hebrew):
https://www.the7eye.org.il/346075
Persiko, Oren, “On the way down,” The Seventh Eye, 20.8.2019 (Hebrew): https://www.the7eye.org.il/341556
Persiko, Oren, “Mid-2019: 2.7% representation of Arab society, which constitutes about 20% of the population,” The Seventh Eye, 17.7.2019 (Hebrew):
https://www.the7eye.org.il/336325
Persisko, Oren, “The right thing,” The Seventh Eye, 1.11.2019 (Hebrew): https://www.the7eye.org.il/349660
Shwartz-Altshuler and Lurie, Guy, “Redesign the Israeli Election Propaganda Arrangements“, Israel democracy institute website 6.4.2015: https://bit.ly/2ziXcKa (Hebrew)
Stern, Itay. “Israeli-Arab Representation on TV Talk Shows Shot Up in 2016”(Hebrew), 02.02.2017, Haaretz: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.769065”
Zarchia, Z. “The Constitution Committee has approved to introduce a bill suggesting to cancel the prohibit on election propaganda two months before elections” 11.07.18, Calcalist: https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3742130,00.html
While election broadcasting rights are fair and balanced, achieving equal media representation is a routine challenge. Most notably, minorities often remain under-represented. For example, Arab Israeli interviewees are under-represented in broadcasts by Hebrew media outlets. According to studies of civil society organizations, media coverage of Arab candidates and lists in Hebrew media was relatively low (4.5% and 7.5% of total coverage) during the two elections held in 2019.
In recent years, the number of Jewish-only public opinion surveys has decreased, following criticism waged by the Seventh Eye media watchdog and changes made to the Israel Press Council’s ethical rules. While those surveys sometimes presented as representing the Israeli public opinion, the fact that they exclude Arab Israeli citizens is usually not mentioned.
Citations:
Hattis Rolef, Susan, Ben Meir, Liat and Zwebner, Sarah, “Party financing and election financing in Israel,” Knesset Research Institute, 21.7.2003 (Hebrew).
Persiko, Oren, “An increase in the number of Arab speakers in election bulletin,” The Seventh Eye, 26.9.2019 (Hebrew):
https://www.the7eye.org.il/346075
Persiko, Oren, “On the way down,” The Seventh Eye, 20.8.2019 (Hebrew): https://www.the7eye.org.il/341556
Persiko, Oren, “Mid-2019: 2.7% representation of Arab society, which constitutes about 20% of the population,” The Seventh Eye, 17.7.2019 (Hebrew):
https://www.the7eye.org.il/336325
Persisko, Oren, “The right thing,” The Seventh Eye, 1.11.2019 (Hebrew): https://www.the7eye.org.il/349660
Shwartz-Altshuler and Lurie, Guy, “Redesign the Israeli Election Propaganda Arrangements“, Israel democracy institute website 6.4.2015: https://bit.ly/2ziXcKa (Hebrew)
Stern, Itay. “Israeli-Arab Representation on TV Talk Shows Shot Up in 2016”(Hebrew), 02.02.2017, Haaretz: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.769065”
Zarchia, Z. “The Constitution Committee has approved to introduce a bill suggesting to cancel the prohibit on election propaganda two months before elections” 11.07.18, Calcalist: https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3742130,00.html
To what extent do all citizens have the opportunity to exercise their right of participation in national elections?
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All adult citizens can participate in national elections. All eligible voters are registered if they wish to be. There are no discriminations observable in the exercise of the right to vote. There are no disincentives to voting.
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The procedures for the registration of voters and voting are for the most part effective, impartial and nondiscriminatory. Citizens can appeal to courts if they feel being discriminated. Disincentives to voting generally do not constitute genuine obstacles.
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While the procedures for the registration of voters and voting are de jure non-discriminatory, isolated cases of discrimination occur in practice. For some citizens, disincentives to voting constitute significant obstacles.
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The procedures for the registration of voters or voting have systemic discriminatory effects. De facto, a substantial number of adult citizens are excluded from national elections.
In Israel, the right to vote is almost comprehensive, with very few restrictions.
According to the Israeli Basic Law: The Knesset (1958), every Israeli citizen aged 18 or over is eligible to vote in general elections. This right is guaranteed under the principle of equality. Thus, it is only restrained by the need to exhibit a valid government identification with the voter’s name and picture. In addition, the Basic Law: The Knesset defines the day of the national elections as a national holiday, with public transportation and public services open, thus giving voters a positive (or, at least, not a negative) incentive to vote.
The right to vote in Israel applies also to prisoners. Handicapped citizens are entitled to special voting stations that are adequately equipped, thus simplifying their voting process by using double envelopes. Soldiers on active duty are entitled to vote in special voting stations using a double envelope. Although the mentally ill are usually unable to access voting stations (due to hospitalization or personal constraints), they are not restrained by any specific law.
There are informal restrictions on voting, which reduce the ability of citizens belonging to certain groups to actually exercise the right to vote. In contrast to some countries, Israel does not allow citizens that are out of the country (the territories excluded) at the time of the elections to vote unless they are members of a distinct status, eligible by law (e.g., embassy employees stationed abroad). However, every citizen has the right to vote without a minimum period of residency in the country.
Information regarding the voting procedure is available via special government-funded information centers, and be accessed through the media, online and by telephone. Problems and complaints are dealt through the Central Elections Committee, each branch assigned with different level complaints.
Citations:
Bander, Arik, “The Election Committee Suggests: Voters Could Vote in A Different Address Than Registered,” Maariv Online, 22.6.2016, http://www.maariv.co.il/news/politics/Article-546545
“Basic Laws: The Knesset,” Knesset official website: www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/ eng-mimshal_yesod1.htm
Blander, Dana, and Avital Friedman. “Who will not be able to vote on Election Day?,” Israel Democracy Institute, 31.3.2019 (Hebrew): https://www.idi.org.il/articles/26341
The 19th election for the Knesset: Information for the voter Q&A,” National election supervisor website (Hebrew)
“Who is allowed to vote?,” Israel Democracy Institute website, November 2002 (Hebrew)
Central Election Committee: Elections for the 21. Knesset, 9. April 2019: https://bechirot21.bechirot.gov.il/election/Pages/HomePage.aspx (Hebrew)
According to the Israeli Basic Law: The Knesset (1958), every Israeli citizen aged 18 or over is eligible to vote in general elections. This right is guaranteed under the principle of equality. Thus, it is only restrained by the need to exhibit a valid government identification with the voter’s name and picture. In addition, the Basic Law: The Knesset defines the day of the national elections as a national holiday, with public transportation and public services open, thus giving voters a positive (or, at least, not a negative) incentive to vote.
The right to vote in Israel applies also to prisoners. Handicapped citizens are entitled to special voting stations that are adequately equipped, thus simplifying their voting process by using double envelopes. Soldiers on active duty are entitled to vote in special voting stations using a double envelope. Although the mentally ill are usually unable to access voting stations (due to hospitalization or personal constraints), they are not restrained by any specific law.
There are informal restrictions on voting, which reduce the ability of citizens belonging to certain groups to actually exercise the right to vote. In contrast to some countries, Israel does not allow citizens that are out of the country (the territories excluded) at the time of the elections to vote unless they are members of a distinct status, eligible by law (e.g., embassy employees stationed abroad). However, every citizen has the right to vote without a minimum period of residency in the country.
Information regarding the voting procedure is available via special government-funded information centers, and be accessed through the media, online and by telephone. Problems and complaints are dealt through the Central Elections Committee, each branch assigned with different level complaints.
Citations:
Bander, Arik, “The Election Committee Suggests: Voters Could Vote in A Different Address Than Registered,” Maariv Online, 22.6.2016, http://www.maariv.co.il/news/politics/Article-546545
“Basic Laws: The Knesset,” Knesset official website: www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/ eng-mimshal_yesod1.htm
Blander, Dana, and Avital Friedman. “Who will not be able to vote on Election Day?,” Israel Democracy Institute, 31.3.2019 (Hebrew): https://www.idi.org.il/articles/26341
The 19th election for the Knesset: Information for the voter Q&A,” National election supervisor website (Hebrew)
“Who is allowed to vote?,” Israel Democracy Institute website, November 2002 (Hebrew)
Central Election Committee: Elections for the 21. Knesset, 9. April 2019: https://bechirot21.bechirot.gov.il/election/Pages/HomePage.aspx (Hebrew)
To what extent is private and public party financing and electoral campaign financing transparent, effectively monitored and in case of infringement of rules subject to proportionate and dissuasive sanction?
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The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and provides for independent monitoring to that respect. Effective measures to prevent evasion are effectively in place and infringements subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.
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The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and provides for independent monitoring. Although infringements are subject to proportionate sanctions, some, although few, loopholes and options for circumvention still exist.
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The state provides that donations to political parties shall be published. Party financing is subject to some degree of independent monitoring but monitoring either proves regularly ineffective or proportionate sanctions in case of infringement do not follow.
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The rules for party and campaign financing do not effectively enforce the obligation to make the donations public. Party and campaign financing is neither monitored independently nor, in case of infringements, subject to proportionate sanctions.
Israel has strict rules concerning party financing and electoral campaigns. The most important are the Parties Law (1992) and the Party Financing Law (1992), which require all parties to document their finances and report them to the State Comptroller. These laws set strict limits on party membership dues, and fundraising from members and supporters. In addition, the laws define how funds received from the state in accordance with the Political Parties (Financing) Law are allocated. Since 2018, the Parties Law also limits the amount of funding that candidates can raise when participating in intra-party elections.
All financial activities during elections are subjected to the supervision of the State Comptroller, who has on several occasions issued instructions that have the status of subsidiary legislation. The State Comptroller publishes regular reports regarding party finances and is in charge of ruling whether there has been a breach of the law regarding party financing and election financing. Moreover, it is the State Comptroller who can also rule that a party group must return funds to the state because of breaches in the receipt of non-public contributions.
Party funding regulation has been politicized in recent years. Since 2018, an amendment to the party financing law limits the funding that joint parties receive from the state budget so that a joint list of three or four parties would be given the funding of only two parties. In practice, this applies only to the Joint List of four Arab parties and it has been argued that the law was directly intended to break up the Joint List. A year before, another amendment of the party financing law, aimed at limiting the activities of various non-party-political bodies that seek to influence the outcome of elections in Israel. It requires these bodies to report their funding sources to the State Comptroller. The amendment was named “V15 bill” after V15, an organization that was funded by organizations from the United States and Europe, and which funded efforts during the 2015 election campaign against the Likud party and Prime Minister Netanyahu.
Citations:
Amendment to the Party Financing Law, 2018: https://fs.knesset.gov.il//20/law/20_ls2_501466.pdf
Hattis Rolef, Susan, Ben Meir, Liat and Zwebner, Sarah, “Party financing and elections financing in Israel, Knesset Research Institute, 21.7.2003 (Hebrew).
Klein, Z. “The State Comptroller: A fine to The Likus and the Bayit Yehudi,” Israel Hayom: 15.10.2018: https://www.israelhayom.co.il/article/599301
“Knesset passes controversial ‘transparency’ law on NGO funding,” Jewish Telegraph Agency, 12.07.2016: http://www.jta.org/2016/07/12/news-opinion/israel-middle-east/knesset-passes-controversial-transparency-law-on-ngo-funding
Levinson, H. and Lis, Y. “Netanyahu: the NGO Legislation is too weak, We Shall forbid Foreign Funding of Organizations, Haaretz, 11.6.2017, https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politi/1.4161298
Shapira, Asaf. “This is how elections are funded in Israel,” Israel Democracy Institute, 19.7.2019 (Hebrew):
https://www.idi.org.il/articles/25939
The State Comptroller. “The functions and powers of the State Comptroller”: https://www.mevaker.gov.il/En/About/Pages/MevakerTafkid.aspx
All financial activities during elections are subjected to the supervision of the State Comptroller, who has on several occasions issued instructions that have the status of subsidiary legislation. The State Comptroller publishes regular reports regarding party finances and is in charge of ruling whether there has been a breach of the law regarding party financing and election financing. Moreover, it is the State Comptroller who can also rule that a party group must return funds to the state because of breaches in the receipt of non-public contributions.
Party funding regulation has been politicized in recent years. Since 2018, an amendment to the party financing law limits the funding that joint parties receive from the state budget so that a joint list of three or four parties would be given the funding of only two parties. In practice, this applies only to the Joint List of four Arab parties and it has been argued that the law was directly intended to break up the Joint List. A year before, another amendment of the party financing law, aimed at limiting the activities of various non-party-political bodies that seek to influence the outcome of elections in Israel. It requires these bodies to report their funding sources to the State Comptroller. The amendment was named “V15 bill” after V15, an organization that was funded by organizations from the United States and Europe, and which funded efforts during the 2015 election campaign against the Likud party and Prime Minister Netanyahu.
Citations:
Amendment to the Party Financing Law, 2018: https://fs.knesset.gov.il//20/law/20_ls2_501466.pdf
Hattis Rolef, Susan, Ben Meir, Liat and Zwebner, Sarah, “Party financing and elections financing in Israel, Knesset Research Institute, 21.7.2003 (Hebrew).
Klein, Z. “The State Comptroller: A fine to The Likus and the Bayit Yehudi,” Israel Hayom: 15.10.2018: https://www.israelhayom.co.il/article/599301
“Knesset passes controversial ‘transparency’ law on NGO funding,” Jewish Telegraph Agency, 12.07.2016: http://www.jta.org/2016/07/12/news-opinion/israel-middle-east/knesset-passes-controversial-transparency-law-on-ngo-funding
Levinson, H. and Lis, Y. “Netanyahu: the NGO Legislation is too weak, We Shall forbid Foreign Funding of Organizations, Haaretz, 11.6.2017, https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politi/1.4161298
Shapira, Asaf. “This is how elections are funded in Israel,” Israel Democracy Institute, 19.7.2019 (Hebrew):
https://www.idi.org.il/articles/25939
The State Comptroller. “The functions and powers of the State Comptroller”: https://www.mevaker.gov.il/En/About/Pages/MevakerTafkid.aspx
Do citizens have the opportunity to take binding political decisions when they want to do so?
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Citizens have the effective opportunity to actively propose and take binding decisions on issues of importance to them through popular initiatives and referendums. The set of eligible issues is extensive, and includes national, regional, and local issues.
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Citizens have the effective opportunity to take binding decisions on issues of importance to them through either popular initiatives or referendums. The set of eligible issues covers at least two levels of government.
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Citizens have the effective opportunity to vote on issues of importance to them through a legally binding measure. The set of eligible issues is limited to one level of government.
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Citizens have no effective opportunity to vote on issues of importance to them through a legally binding measure.
Israel’s government and parliament have traditionally given little support to popular decision-making mechanisms. However, in March 2014 the Knesset approved Basic Law: Referendum. This law will apply in the event of an agreement or unilateral decision that involves withdrawal from certain geographical areas. The law has never been applied and the use of referendums is limited to this particular issue.
Attempts at encouraging popular decision-making mechanisms tend to take the form either of (1) open information projects or websites addressing national interest investigation committees, or (2) special legal provisions allowing citizens to appeal against decisions on certain issues (e.g., urban planning) or addressing parliament committees on issues that directly concern them. These sorts of initiatives, while important, align with a top-down strategy for civil participation instead of encouraging independent initiatives.
These initiatives, however, remained largely in early stages, and we were unable to find any meaningful ways through which Israeli citizens can affect the decision process directly (that is: without media pressure, persuasion via lobbying firms or appeal to the courts).
Citations:
Altshuler-Shwartz, Tehila, “Open government policy in Israel in the digital age,” Israel democracy institute, 2012. (Hebrew)
“Future recommendations,” sharing: committee for social and economical transformation website. (Hebrew)
Gefen, Haaron, “The effect of institutionalizing participatory democracy on the level of sharing by public organization employees,” Israel Democracy Institute, 2011 (Hebrew)
Karmon, Yoav “Re-inventing Israel’s Democracy,” Vaksman, Efrat and Blander, Dana, “Models for sharing,” Israel Democracy Institute website 2012 (Hebrew)
“Sharing on governmental issues,” Israeli government website (Hebrew)
Attempts at encouraging popular decision-making mechanisms tend to take the form either of (1) open information projects or websites addressing national interest investigation committees, or (2) special legal provisions allowing citizens to appeal against decisions on certain issues (e.g., urban planning) or addressing parliament committees on issues that directly concern them. These sorts of initiatives, while important, align with a top-down strategy for civil participation instead of encouraging independent initiatives.
These initiatives, however, remained largely in early stages, and we were unable to find any meaningful ways through which Israeli citizens can affect the decision process directly (that is: without media pressure, persuasion via lobbying firms or appeal to the courts).
Citations:
Altshuler-Shwartz, Tehila, “Open government policy in Israel in the digital age,” Israel democracy institute, 2012. (Hebrew)
“Future recommendations,” sharing: committee for social and economical transformation website. (Hebrew)
Gefen, Haaron, “The effect of institutionalizing participatory democracy on the level of sharing by public organization employees,” Israel Democracy Institute, 2011 (Hebrew)
Karmon, Yoav “Re-inventing Israel’s Democracy,” Vaksman, Efrat and Blander, Dana, “Models for sharing,” Israel Democracy Institute website 2012 (Hebrew)
“Sharing on governmental issues,” Israeli government website (Hebrew)
Graph View
To what extent are the media independent from government?
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Public and private media are independent from government influence; their independence is institutionally protected and fully respected by the incumbent government.
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The incumbent government largely respects the independence of media. However, there are occasional attempts to exert influence.
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The incumbent government seeks to ensure its political objectives indirectly by influencing the personnel policies, organizational framework or financial resources of public media, and/or the licensing regime/market access for private media.
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Major media outlets are frequently influenced by the incumbent government promoting its partisan political objectives. To ensure pro-government media reporting, governmental actors exert direct political pressure and violate existing rules of media regulation or change them to benefit their interests.
Israel’s media environment is considered lively and pluralistic, and the media is able to criticize the government. Even though the country’s basic laws do not offer direct protection and censorship, agreements accord the military wide discretion over issues of national security, legal protections for the press are robust: The Supreme Court has ruled that freedom of expression is an essential component of human dignity and has continuously defended it, soundly assimilating this principle in the Israeli political culture.
However, in recent years, Israeli media has been downgraded to partially free by Freedom House. Furthermore, the 2019 Reporters without Borders report stated that Israeli media is free but constrained by military censorship, with Israel ranked 88 out of 180 countries. When examining the extent to which the media in Israel is independent, one should also notice the immense power for censorship that the law facilitates. Under a 1996 Censorship Agreement between the media and the military, the censor has the power – on the grounds of national security – to penalize, shut down or stop the printing of a newspaper, or to confiscate its printing machines. In practice, however, the censor’s role is quite limited, and journalists often evade restrictions by leaking a story to a foreign outlet and then republishing.
Citations:
Albin, Einat, Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Aeyal Gross & Tamar Hostovsky-Brandes. (2021). Israel Report, LAC19 Compendium, Lex-Atlas: Covid-19. Retrieved from: https://lexatlas-c19.org.
Freedom House: Israel. 2020. Civil liberties. Retrieved from: https://freedomhouse.org/country/israel/freedom-world/2020
Israeli’s Prime Minister Office. 2020. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s press briefing after consulting on the coronavirus subject. Retrieved from: https://www.gov.il/he/departments/news/spoke_corona150320
Itonaim Website. 2020. Journalist union court appeal accepted: The Supreme Court exempted journalists from shin-bet tracing. Retrieved from: https://www.itonaim.org.il/%D7%91%D7%92%D7%A5-%D7%A7%D7%99%D7%91%D7%9C-%D7%90%D7%AA-%D7%A2%D7%AA%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%AA-%D7%90%D7%A8%D7%92%D7%95%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%A2%D7%99%D7%AA%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%90%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%95%D7%94%D7%92%D7%91/
Man, Elad and Tehila Shwartz-Altshuler. 2020. “Journalistic work out to be exempt from emergency regulations” the Israeli Democracy Institution. Retrieved from https://www.idi.org.il/parliaments/30997/31079
Persico, Oren. 2020. “State rejects supreme court proposal to exempt journalists from shin-bet corona tracing.” The Seventh Eye. Retrieved from https://www.the7eye.org.il/369853
Persico, Oren. 2020. “The pressure worked.” The Seventh Eye. Retrieved from: https://www.the7eye.org.il/380096#comments
Tausig, Shuki. 2020. “Withholding information, blunt discrimination between reporters and delivering partial information.” The Seventh Eye. Retrieved from: https://www.the7eye.org.il/366923
The Knesset Website. 2020. “Finally approved: shin-bet to be certified to perform cellular tracing on a limited measure for three weeks.” Retrieved from: https://m.knesset.gov.il/news/pressreleases/pages/press02.07.20.aspx
However, in recent years, Israeli media has been downgraded to partially free by Freedom House. Furthermore, the 2019 Reporters without Borders report stated that Israeli media is free but constrained by military censorship, with Israel ranked 88 out of 180 countries. When examining the extent to which the media in Israel is independent, one should also notice the immense power for censorship that the law facilitates. Under a 1996 Censorship Agreement between the media and the military, the censor has the power – on the grounds of national security – to penalize, shut down or stop the printing of a newspaper, or to confiscate its printing machines. In practice, however, the censor’s role is quite limited, and journalists often evade restrictions by leaking a story to a foreign outlet and then republishing.
Citations:
Albin, Einat, Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Aeyal Gross & Tamar Hostovsky-Brandes. (2021). Israel Report, LAC19 Compendium, Lex-Atlas: Covid-19. Retrieved from: https://lexatlas-c19.org.
Freedom House: Israel. 2020. Civil liberties. Retrieved from: https://freedomhouse.org/country/israel/freedom-world/2020
Israeli’s Prime Minister Office. 2020. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s press briefing after consulting on the coronavirus subject. Retrieved from: https://www.gov.il/he/departments/news/spoke_corona150320
Itonaim Website. 2020. Journalist union court appeal accepted: The Supreme Court exempted journalists from shin-bet tracing. Retrieved from: https://www.itonaim.org.il/%D7%91%D7%92%D7%A5-%D7%A7%D7%99%D7%91%D7%9C-%D7%90%D7%AA-%D7%A2%D7%AA%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%AA-%D7%90%D7%A8%D7%92%D7%95%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%A2%D7%99%D7%AA%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%90%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%95%D7%94%D7%92%D7%91/
Man, Elad and Tehila Shwartz-Altshuler. 2020. “Journalistic work out to be exempt from emergency regulations” the Israeli Democracy Institution. Retrieved from https://www.idi.org.il/parliaments/30997/31079
Persico, Oren. 2020. “State rejects supreme court proposal to exempt journalists from shin-bet corona tracing.” The Seventh Eye. Retrieved from https://www.the7eye.org.il/369853
Persico, Oren. 2020. “The pressure worked.” The Seventh Eye. Retrieved from: https://www.the7eye.org.il/380096#comments
Tausig, Shuki. 2020. “Withholding information, blunt discrimination between reporters and delivering partial information.” The Seventh Eye. Retrieved from: https://www.the7eye.org.il/366923
The Knesset Website. 2020. “Finally approved: shin-bet to be certified to perform cellular tracing on a limited measure for three weeks.” Retrieved from: https://m.knesset.gov.il/news/pressreleases/pages/press02.07.20.aspx
To what extent are the media characterized by an ownership structure that ensures a pluralism of opinions?
10
9
9
Diversified ownership structures characterize both the electronic and print media market, providing a well-balanced pluralism of opinions. Effective anti-monopoly policies and impartial, open public media guarantee a pluralism of opinions.
8
7
6
7
6
Diversified ownership structures prevail in the electronic and print media market. Public media compensate for deficiencies or biases in private media reporting by representing a wider range of opinions.
5
4
3
4
3
Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize either the electronic or the print media market. Important opinions are represented but there are no or only weak institutional guarantees against the predominance of certain opinions.
2
1
1
Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize both the electronic and the print media market. Few companies dominate the media, most programs are biased, and there is evidence that certain opinions are not published or are marginalized.
Israeli policy toward media pluralism is taking a “multivalued approach,” in the sense that an open media field is viewed as part of the democratic order and is thus valued not only for economic but for normative purposes as well. This view justifies utilizing special regulatory tools (as opposed to exclusive antitrust regulation) in order to prevent the concentration of ownership and cross-ownership in the media sector. In this spirit, media regulation in Israel also oversees issues of content (specifically regarding issues of local production and censorship).
In practice, media regulation in Israel is largely structural, controlling ownership of media outlets (radio, and public and private cable and satellite television). The regulators authorize concessionaires and enforce regulation in matters of ownership concentration, cross-ownership and foreign ownership. However, print media is not under the same restraints as broadcast media, and is regulated by antitrust legislation and voluntary self-regulation. Most news websites in Israel are operated by print media companies. There are ongoing efforts to expand regulation to the digital sphere, but no change has been legislated by parliament as of yet.
Citations:
Agmon, Tamir and Tsadik, Ami, “Analyzing economic ramifications of centralization and cross ownerships in the Media,” Knesset Research and Information Center, 2.11.2011 (Hebrew)
Boker, Ran. “Channel Ten will be closed: The merger of Reshet and Channel Ten was approved,” 8.8.2018 (Hebrew): https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5324863,00.html
“Freedom of the Press: Israel 2017,” Freedom House, 2017 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/israel
Media Ownership Map, The Seventh Eye website: https://cdn.the7eye.org.il/uploads/2016/03/the-7th-eye-israel-media-ownership-map72018.pdf
Halon, E, “Reshet pulls out of a slated merger with Channel Ten,” 15.10.2018, Jerusalem Post: https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Reshet-pulls-out-of-slated-merger-with-Channel-Ten-569464
Tal, Yizhar and Ivry-Omer, Dina, “Regulation of electronic communications services in Israel: The need to establish a communications Authority,” Policy research 76 IDI, November 2009: http://en.idi.org.il/media/277043/pp_76.pdf (Hebrew)
Tucker, Nati, “Why did Shlom Ben Tzvi disappear?,” theMarker 3.10.2014:http://www.themarker.com/markerweek/1.2449472 (Hebrew).
Zrahiya, Zvi, “Israel’s media is riddled with alien interests,” 15.11.2011: http://www.haaretz.com/business/israel-s-media-is-riddled-with-alien-i nterests1.395639?localLinksEnabled =false
In practice, media regulation in Israel is largely structural, controlling ownership of media outlets (radio, and public and private cable and satellite television). The regulators authorize concessionaires and enforce regulation in matters of ownership concentration, cross-ownership and foreign ownership. However, print media is not under the same restraints as broadcast media, and is regulated by antitrust legislation and voluntary self-regulation. Most news websites in Israel are operated by print media companies. There are ongoing efforts to expand regulation to the digital sphere, but no change has been legislated by parliament as of yet.
Citations:
Agmon, Tamir and Tsadik, Ami, “Analyzing economic ramifications of centralization and cross ownerships in the Media,” Knesset Research and Information Center, 2.11.2011 (Hebrew)
Boker, Ran. “Channel Ten will be closed: The merger of Reshet and Channel Ten was approved,” 8.8.2018 (Hebrew): https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5324863,00.html
“Freedom of the Press: Israel 2017,” Freedom House, 2017 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/israel
Media Ownership Map, The Seventh Eye website: https://cdn.the7eye.org.il/uploads/2016/03/the-7th-eye-israel-media-ownership-map72018.pdf
Halon, E, “Reshet pulls out of a slated merger with Channel Ten,” 15.10.2018, Jerusalem Post: https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Reshet-pulls-out-of-slated-merger-with-Channel-Ten-569464
Tal, Yizhar and Ivry-Omer, Dina, “Regulation of electronic communications services in Israel: The need to establish a communications Authority,” Policy research 76 IDI, November 2009: http://en.idi.org.il/media/277043/pp_76.pdf (Hebrew)
Tucker, Nati, “Why did Shlom Ben Tzvi disappear?,” theMarker 3.10.2014:http://www.themarker.com/markerweek/1.2449472 (Hebrew).
Zrahiya, Zvi, “Israel’s media is riddled with alien interests,” 15.11.2011: http://www.haaretz.com/business/israel-s-media-is-riddled-with-alien-i nterests1.395639?localLinksEnabled =false
To what extent can citizens obtain official information?
10
9
9
Legal regulations guarantee free and easy access to official information, contain few, reasonable restrictions, and there are effective mechanisms of appeal and oversight enabling citizens to access information.
8
7
6
7
6
Access to official information is regulated by law. Most restrictions are justified, but access is sometimes complicated by bureaucratic procedures. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms permit citizens to enforce their right of access.
5
4
3
4
3
Access to official information is partially regulated by law, but complicated by bureaucratic procedures and some poorly justified restrictions. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms are often ineffective.
2
1
1
Access to official information is not regulated by law; there are many restrictions of access, bureaucratic procedures and no or ineffective mechanisms of enforcement.
Israel adopted the Freedom of Information Law in 1998, allowing each citizen or resident to apply for information regarding a government authority’s activity, whether written, filmed, recorded or digitized. This legal standing has been the basis of considerable activity by NGOs and private individuals. Naturally, the right to freedom of information is not absolute, with reasonable restrictions on the basis of national security or privacy issues.
The right to privacy law (1998) grants individuals the right to access their personal information held in government or private-entity databases.
In 2011, government decision No. 2950 established a designated unit for freedom of information in the Ministry of Justice. The unit is also in charged with implementing OECD guidelines for managing and sharing information.
In 2018, the Freedom of Information Unit under the Ministry of Justice launched a digital system for managing freedom of information requests in government ministries. The unit introduced a new procedure to increase the transparency of public committees and launched a new campaign to increase public awareness of “Kol Zchut,” a comprehensive database that provides information on the rights of Israeli residents and how to exercise these rights.
Citations:
“About the unit for freedom of information,” The Ministry of Justice website:http://index.justice.gov.il/Units/YechidatChofeshHameyda/About/Pages/OdotHayechida.aspx (Hebrew)
“Annual Report of the unit for freedom of information: 2018,” The Ministry of Justice website: https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/annual_reports/he/annual%20report%202018%20foiu.pdf
“Freedom of Information Law,” 1998: http://www.freedominfo.org/documents/Israel–FOIL1998.pdf
“Protection of privacy law,” 1981: http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/C5205E15-3FE9-4037-BA0F-62212B40773A/18334/ProtectionofPrivacyLaw57411981unofficialtranslatio.pdf
“The Government approved today the publication of all governmental databases” http://www.themarker.com/news/politics/1.3053541 (Hebrew)
“The movement for freedom of information”: http://www.meida.org.il/
Government ICT Authority: Open Government Action Plan for 2018-2019, http://yoursay.gov.il/cio/File/Index/nap3english/
Albin, Einat, Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Aeyal Gross & Tamar Hostovsky-Brandes. (2021). Israel Report, LAC19 Compendium, Lex-Atlas: Covid-19. Retrieved from: https://lexatlas-c19.org.
Persico, Oren. 2020. “The pressure worked.” The Seventh Eye. Retrieved from: https://www.the7eye.org.il/380096#comments
Tausig, Shuki. 2020. “Withholding information, blunt discrimination between reporters and delivering partial information.” The Seventh Eye. Retrieved from: https://www.the7eye.org.il/366923
The right to privacy law (1998) grants individuals the right to access their personal information held in government or private-entity databases.
In 2011, government decision No. 2950 established a designated unit for freedom of information in the Ministry of Justice. The unit is also in charged with implementing OECD guidelines for managing and sharing information.
In 2018, the Freedom of Information Unit under the Ministry of Justice launched a digital system for managing freedom of information requests in government ministries. The unit introduced a new procedure to increase the transparency of public committees and launched a new campaign to increase public awareness of “Kol Zchut,” a comprehensive database that provides information on the rights of Israeli residents and how to exercise these rights.
Citations:
“About the unit for freedom of information,” The Ministry of Justice website:http://index.justice.gov.il/Units/YechidatChofeshHameyda/About/Pages/OdotHayechida.aspx (Hebrew)
“Annual Report of the unit for freedom of information: 2018,” The Ministry of Justice website: https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/annual_reports/he/annual%20report%202018%20foiu.pdf
“Freedom of Information Law,” 1998: http://www.freedominfo.org/documents/Israel–FOIL1998.pdf
“Protection of privacy law,” 1981: http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/C5205E15-3FE9-4037-BA0F-62212B40773A/18334/ProtectionofPrivacyLaw57411981unofficialtranslatio.pdf
“The Government approved today the publication of all governmental databases” http://www.themarker.com/news/politics/1.3053541 (Hebrew)
“The movement for freedom of information”: http://www.meida.org.il/
Government ICT Authority: Open Government Action Plan for 2018-2019, http://yoursay.gov.il/cio/File/Index/nap3english/
Albin, Einat, Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Aeyal Gross & Tamar Hostovsky-Brandes. (2021). Israel Report, LAC19 Compendium, Lex-Atlas: Covid-19. Retrieved from: https://lexatlas-c19.org.
Persico, Oren. 2020. “The pressure worked.” The Seventh Eye. Retrieved from: https://www.the7eye.org.il/380096#comments
Tausig, Shuki. 2020. “Withholding information, blunt discrimination between reporters and delivering partial information.” The Seventh Eye. Retrieved from: https://www.the7eye.org.il/366923
Graph View
To what extent does the state respect and protect civil rights and how effectively are citizens protected by courts against infringements of their rights?
10
9
9
All state institutions respect and effectively protect civil rights. Citizens are effectively protected by courts against infringements of their rights. Infringements present an extreme exception.
8
7
6
7
6
The state respects and protects rights, with few infringements. Courts provide protection.
5
4
3
4
3
Despite formal protection, frequent infringements of civil rights occur and court protection often proves ineffective.
2
1
1
State institutions respect civil rights only formally, and civil rights are frequently violated. Court protection is not effective.
By law, the effort to safeguard civil rights is constituted in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which protects the right of each citizen to privacy, property, dignity, life and so forth. This basic law is meant to carry the spirit of the law and is procedurally protected from nullification. However, provisions from the law can be overruled under specific urgencies stated by the government and the courts. Much of the work of protecting civil rights in Israel is done through judicial review, which operates independently from the legislator and the executive branches. Civil rights claims are voiced through the media, NGO activities, appeals to the Supreme Court, legislative amendments and appeals to government bodies that investigate public complaints.
Yet, there is a gap between the formal guarantees of equal civil rights and the reality of unequal opportunities. Such a gap exists mainly when there is a conflict between civil rights and other core social values (e.g., religious identity, security, and communal rights). According to the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), the government and members of parliament have extensively promoted initiatives that infringe on basic democratic principles, such as minority rights, freedom of speech and the activity of civil society organizations. In particular, the ACRI has expressed concern about the central role played by the Knesset in these initiatives. While not all legislative proposals were adopted, those that were have influenced public discourse on and attitudes toward democracy, human rights, minority groups and the rule of law, among other things.
Throughout the COVID-19 crisis, political and civil rights have been curtailed at various points. Beyond that, Israel relied mainly on emergency regulations to determine its policies. These regulations were made under Basic Law: The Government, which enables the government to pass regulations during a state of emergency. Israel has been in a state of emergency since its founding in 1948 (Gross & Kosti 2021). Emergency regulations can change Knesset legislation, temporarily expropriate legislation or set different conditions for a limited period of three months. Israel has used emergency regulations throughout its history, including during routine periods. However, the use of emergency regulations throughout the COVID-19 period has been higher and more widespread than during any other crisis in the history of the State of Israel, including during wars and military operations. In response to demands by the attorney general and the Supreme Court to cease using of emergency regulations, the Knesset legislated the Coronavirus Law (Gross & Kosti 2021), which grants the government the authority to declare a state of emergency due to the coronavirus and issues regulations to set restrictions accordingly.
Citations:
“Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty”: http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/spec ial/eng/basic3_eng.htm
Dahan, Tal, “Situation report: The state of human rights in Israel and the OPT 2017,” The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), https://campaigns.acri.org.il/report2017en/
Hermann, Tamar et.al., The Israel Democracy Index 2018, The Israel Democracy Institute, Jerusalem 2018, https://en.idi.org.il/media/12170/the-israeli-democracy-index-2018.pdf
Morag, G. and Friedson Y. “Shaked unveils criminal justice system reform bill,” Ynet, 28/05/2018: https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5273104,00.html
The Association for Civil Rights in Israel. “2018 – A bad year for democracy Human Rights in Israel – A Second Snapshot,” October 2018 (Hebrew):
https://a59952db-05ff-468c-a8f0-411f44dfbc9c.filesusr.com/ugd/01368b_4dffc38e27124eea80154d408b5badf3.pdf
ACRI: Israel 2020: 20 Proposals for the New Knesseth, December 2019, https://0aadc55a-bbc6-4bf3-bd01-242c802789e7.usrfiles.com/ugd/0aadc5_5bab9d0d551b4dc789f913b2ecdcf7c4.pdf
Albin, Einat, Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Aeyal Gross & Tamar Hostovsky-Brandes. 2021. Israel Report, LAC19 Compendium, Lex-Atlas: Covid-19: https://lexatlas-c19.org.
Bar-Siman-Tov, Ittai 2020. ‘Covid-19 Meets Politics: The Novel Coronavirus as a Novel Challenge for Legislatures’. The Theory and Practice of Legislation 8(1-2): 11-48.
Gross, Aeyal and Nir Kosti. 2021. ‘The Paradox of the Corona Law’, Verfassungsblog, Retrieved from https://verfassungsblog.de/the-paradox-of-israels-coronavirus-law
Kosti, Nir. 2020. ‘Emergency Regulations: Contemporary and Historical Perspective’, Icon-S-IL Blog, retrieved from https://israeliconstitutionalism.wordpress.com/2020/07/07/%D7%AA%D7%A7%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%A9%D7%A2%D7%AA-%D7%97%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%9D-%D7%9E%D7%91%D7%98-%D7%A2%D7%9B%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%95%D7%99-%D7%95%D7%94%D7%99%D7%A1%D7%98%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%99-%D7%A0
Yet, there is a gap between the formal guarantees of equal civil rights and the reality of unequal opportunities. Such a gap exists mainly when there is a conflict between civil rights and other core social values (e.g., religious identity, security, and communal rights). According to the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), the government and members of parliament have extensively promoted initiatives that infringe on basic democratic principles, such as minority rights, freedom of speech and the activity of civil society organizations. In particular, the ACRI has expressed concern about the central role played by the Knesset in these initiatives. While not all legislative proposals were adopted, those that were have influenced public discourse on and attitudes toward democracy, human rights, minority groups and the rule of law, among other things.
Throughout the COVID-19 crisis, political and civil rights have been curtailed at various points. Beyond that, Israel relied mainly on emergency regulations to determine its policies. These regulations were made under Basic Law: The Government, which enables the government to pass regulations during a state of emergency. Israel has been in a state of emergency since its founding in 1948 (Gross & Kosti 2021). Emergency regulations can change Knesset legislation, temporarily expropriate legislation or set different conditions for a limited period of three months. Israel has used emergency regulations throughout its history, including during routine periods. However, the use of emergency regulations throughout the COVID-19 period has been higher and more widespread than during any other crisis in the history of the State of Israel, including during wars and military operations. In response to demands by the attorney general and the Supreme Court to cease using of emergency regulations, the Knesset legislated the Coronavirus Law (Gross & Kosti 2021), which grants the government the authority to declare a state of emergency due to the coronavirus and issues regulations to set restrictions accordingly.
Citations:
“Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty”: http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/spec ial/eng/basic3_eng.htm
Dahan, Tal, “Situation report: The state of human rights in Israel and the OPT 2017,” The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), https://campaigns.acri.org.il/report2017en/
Hermann, Tamar et.al., The Israel Democracy Index 2018, The Israel Democracy Institute, Jerusalem 2018, https://en.idi.org.il/media/12170/the-israeli-democracy-index-2018.pdf
Morag, G. and Friedson Y. “Shaked unveils criminal justice system reform bill,” Ynet, 28/05/2018: https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5273104,00.html
The Association for Civil Rights in Israel. “2018 – A bad year for democracy Human Rights in Israel – A Second Snapshot,” October 2018 (Hebrew):
https://a59952db-05ff-468c-a8f0-411f44dfbc9c.filesusr.com/ugd/01368b_4dffc38e27124eea80154d408b5badf3.pdf
ACRI: Israel 2020: 20 Proposals for the New Knesseth, December 2019, https://0aadc55a-bbc6-4bf3-bd01-242c802789e7.usrfiles.com/ugd/0aadc5_5bab9d0d551b4dc789f913b2ecdcf7c4.pdf
Albin, Einat, Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Aeyal Gross & Tamar Hostovsky-Brandes. 2021. Israel Report, LAC19 Compendium, Lex-Atlas: Covid-19: https://lexatlas-c19.org.
Bar-Siman-Tov, Ittai 2020. ‘Covid-19 Meets Politics: The Novel Coronavirus as a Novel Challenge for Legislatures’. The Theory and Practice of Legislation 8(1-2): 11-48.
Gross, Aeyal and Nir Kosti. 2021. ‘The Paradox of the Corona Law’, Verfassungsblog, Retrieved from https://verfassungsblog.de/the-paradox-of-israels-coronavirus-law
Kosti, Nir. 2020. ‘Emergency Regulations: Contemporary and Historical Perspective’, Icon-S-IL Blog, retrieved from https://israeliconstitutionalism.wordpress.com/2020/07/07/%D7%AA%D7%A7%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%A9%D7%A2%D7%AA-%D7%97%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%9D-%D7%9E%D7%91%D7%98-%D7%A2%D7%9B%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%95%D7%99-%D7%95%D7%94%D7%99%D7%A1%D7%98%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%99-%D7%A0
To what extent does the state concede and protect political liberties?
10
9
9
All state institutions concede and effectively protect political liberties.
8
7
6
7
6
All state institutions for the most part concede and protect political liberties. There are only few infringements.
5
4
3
4
3
State institutions concede political liberties but infringements occur regularly in practice.
2
1
1
Political liberties are unsatisfactory codified and frequently violated.
Israel’s lack of a constitution means that the guarantee of political rights is confided to status of basic laws. Thus, they are not constitutional as such. For these and other reasons, the responsibility to protect political liberties still lies with the Israeli parliament. However, parliamentary activity has not been conducive to this task. In the last few years, many pieces of legislation and proposed legislation appear to undermine aspects of democracy and due process.
For example, the Disclosure Requirements for Organizations Funded by Foreign Political Entities Law, legislated in 2016, requires NGOs that receive more than half of their income from foreign governments to submit an annual report to the registrar of non-profit associations in the Ministry of Justice. This law was criticized for applying almost exclusively to human rights and left-wing organizations: 25 of the 27 organizations in Israel that get more than half their funding from foreign governments are human rights organizations identified with the left.
Other problematic legislation prohibited people who have supported a boycott of the state of Israel from entering Israel. However, many problematic proposals did not win parliamentary passage or were eventually softened in part due to public opposition.
Citations:
Ben Shitrit, Lihi, “Israel’s Shrinking Democracy.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 10.03.2016: http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/63006
Dahan, Tal, “Situation report: The state of human rights in Israel and the OPT 2016,” The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, http://www.acri.org.il/campaigns/report2016en/
“Freedom in the world 2019,” Freedomhouse website: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019
“Israel minister pursues tougher anti-BDS law,” Memo Middle Rast Monitor, 2/11/2017: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20171102-israel-minister-pursues-tougher-anti-bds-law/
Knesset Press Release “Knesset passes NGO transparency law,” 12.07.2016, http://main.knesset.gov.il/News/PressReleases/pages/press120716.aspx (Hebrew)
“Project Democracy: The Arab minority,” The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (October 2010): http://democracy-project.org.il/he/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/democracy-minorities.pdf
Yishai, Yael, “Civil Society in Israel,” Carmel, Jerusalem, 2003.
Gild-Hayo, Debbie, “Antidemocratic Legislation: Ramifications for Human Rights and the Work of NGO,” ACRI, May 26, 2019, https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/0aadc5_0c8b24f620e24b2eaa25249135148d47.pdf
Asseburg, Muriel, “Shrinking Spaces in Israel,” SWP Comments, September 2017, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2017C36_ass.pdf
For example, the Disclosure Requirements for Organizations Funded by Foreign Political Entities Law, legislated in 2016, requires NGOs that receive more than half of their income from foreign governments to submit an annual report to the registrar of non-profit associations in the Ministry of Justice. This law was criticized for applying almost exclusively to human rights and left-wing organizations: 25 of the 27 organizations in Israel that get more than half their funding from foreign governments are human rights organizations identified with the left.
Other problematic legislation prohibited people who have supported a boycott of the state of Israel from entering Israel. However, many problematic proposals did not win parliamentary passage or were eventually softened in part due to public opposition.
Citations:
Ben Shitrit, Lihi, “Israel’s Shrinking Democracy.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 10.03.2016: http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/63006
Dahan, Tal, “Situation report: The state of human rights in Israel and the OPT 2016,” The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, http://www.acri.org.il/campaigns/report2016en/
“Freedom in the world 2019,” Freedomhouse website: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019
“Israel minister pursues tougher anti-BDS law,” Memo Middle Rast Monitor, 2/11/2017: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20171102-israel-minister-pursues-tougher-anti-bds-law/
Knesset Press Release “Knesset passes NGO transparency law,” 12.07.2016, http://main.knesset.gov.il/News/PressReleases/pages/press120716.aspx (Hebrew)
“Project Democracy: The Arab minority,” The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (October 2010): http://democracy-project.org.il/he/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/democracy-minorities.pdf
Yishai, Yael, “Civil Society in Israel,” Carmel, Jerusalem, 2003.
Gild-Hayo, Debbie, “Antidemocratic Legislation: Ramifications for Human Rights and the Work of NGO,” ACRI, May 26, 2019, https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/0aadc5_0c8b24f620e24b2eaa25249135148d47.pdf
Asseburg, Muriel, “Shrinking Spaces in Israel,” SWP Comments, September 2017, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2017C36_ass.pdf
How effectively does the state protect against different forms of discrimination?
10
9
9
State institutions effectively protect against and actively prevent discrimination. Cases of discrimination are extremely rare.
8
7
6
7
6
State anti-discrimination protections are moderately successful. Few cases of discrimination are observed.
5
4
3
4
3
State anti-discrimination efforts show limited success. Many cases of discrimination can be observed.
2
1
1
The state does not offer effective protection against discrimination. Discrimination is widespread in the public sector and in society.
Israel’s main venue for dealing with cases of discrimination is the court system, particularly the Supreme Court, which addresses cases of discrimination against women and minorities in professional, public and state spheres. Israel has long-standing institutional mechanisms intended to promote equality, such as the Authority for the Advancement of the Status of Women in the Prime Minister’s Office and the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission in the Ministry of the Economy. However, these tend to offer ad hoc solutions instead of comprehensive and long-term plans. Attempts to pass a basic law protecting equality to join existing legislation protecting human dignity and liberty did not yield results.
Progress was achieved in recent years regarding women’s and gay rights. For example, non-biological same-sex parents have been made eligible for guardianship rights and same-sex marriages conducted in foreign countries are recognized by the state. Some advances have also been made in protecting the rights of disabled persons.
Nonetheless, discrimination is prevalent and systematic regarding Palestinians’ rights. Following Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, Arab residents were issued Israeli identity cards and given the option of obtaining Israeli citizenship, though most choose not to seek citizenship for political reasons. These non-citizens have many of the same rights as Israeli citizens, except the right to vote in national elections. They can vote in municipal as well as Palestinian Authority elections, and remain eligible to apply for Israeli citizenship. However, Israeli law strips non-citizens of their local residency if they stay outside the city for more than three months.
A 2003 law denies citizenship and residency status to Palestinian residents of the West Bank or Gaza who marry Israeli citizens. This measure affects about 15,000 couples and has been criticized as blatantly discriminatory. In 2011, the Knesset passed a law allowing the courts to revoke the citizenship of any Israeli convicted of spying, treason or aiding the enemy. A number of civil rights groups and the Shin Bet security service criticized the legislation as unnecessary and overly burdensome.
Citations:
Association for Civil Rights in Israel, http://www.acri.org.il/campaigns/report2016en/
Gild-Hayo, Debbie, Overview of Anti-Democratic Legislation Advanced by the 20th Knesset, October 2018: https://law.acri.org.il/en/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Overview-of-Anti-Democratic-Legislation-October-2018.pdf
Heruti-Sover, Tali. “Gender Wage Gap in Israel Among Highest in the West,” 11/10/2017: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/gender-wage-gap-in-israel-among-highest-in-the-west-1.5457004
Heruti-Sover, Tali. “Report Finds Wide but Varying Pay Gaps by Gender, Religion and Background,” 19/2/2019, Haaretz: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/report-finds-wide-but-varying-pay-gaps-by-gender-religion-and-background-1.6953271
Mako editiorial “The Surrogacy Storm: General Strike and Rage March of the LGTB Community,” 18/7/18, MAKO: https://www.mako.co.il/pride-news/local/Article-530a21c9e6da461006.htm
Sober, Tali Heruty “A rise of 23% in the employment of disabled,” The Marker, 29/11/17: https://www.themarker.com/career/1.4647745
Swirsky, S., E. Konor-Atias, “Social status report 2017,” January 2018. (Hebrew)
http://adva.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Social-Report-2017.pdf
Tzameret-Kertcher, Hagar, Naomi Chazan, Hanna Herzog, Yulia Basin, Ronna Brayer-Garb and Hadass Ben Eliyahu. “The Gender Index, Gender Inequality in Israel 2018,” The Van-Leer Jerusalem Institute, https://genderindex.vanleer.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Gender-Index-2018.pdf
Zohar, Gal, “Equal participation – comparative view- Israel and the World,” Report to the Ministry of Justice, 2016
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:wFtosSXqLwAJ:www.justice.gov.il/Units/NetzivutShivyon/SiteDocs/Disabilities-Affirmative-Action-Report.docx+&cd=2&hl=iw&ct=clnk&gl=il
Minority Rights Group International, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples – Israel: Ethiopian Jews, August 2018, https://www.refworld.org/docid/5ba34c097.html
Progress was achieved in recent years regarding women’s and gay rights. For example, non-biological same-sex parents have been made eligible for guardianship rights and same-sex marriages conducted in foreign countries are recognized by the state. Some advances have also been made in protecting the rights of disabled persons.
Nonetheless, discrimination is prevalent and systematic regarding Palestinians’ rights. Following Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, Arab residents were issued Israeli identity cards and given the option of obtaining Israeli citizenship, though most choose not to seek citizenship for political reasons. These non-citizens have many of the same rights as Israeli citizens, except the right to vote in national elections. They can vote in municipal as well as Palestinian Authority elections, and remain eligible to apply for Israeli citizenship. However, Israeli law strips non-citizens of their local residency if they stay outside the city for more than three months.
A 2003 law denies citizenship and residency status to Palestinian residents of the West Bank or Gaza who marry Israeli citizens. This measure affects about 15,000 couples and has been criticized as blatantly discriminatory. In 2011, the Knesset passed a law allowing the courts to revoke the citizenship of any Israeli convicted of spying, treason or aiding the enemy. A number of civil rights groups and the Shin Bet security service criticized the legislation as unnecessary and overly burdensome.
Citations:
Association for Civil Rights in Israel, http://www.acri.org.il/campaigns/report2016en/
Gild-Hayo, Debbie, Overview of Anti-Democratic Legislation Advanced by the 20th Knesset, October 2018: https://law.acri.org.il/en/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Overview-of-Anti-Democratic-Legislation-October-2018.pdf
Heruti-Sover, Tali. “Gender Wage Gap in Israel Among Highest in the West,” 11/10/2017: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/gender-wage-gap-in-israel-among-highest-in-the-west-1.5457004
Heruti-Sover, Tali. “Report Finds Wide but Varying Pay Gaps by Gender, Religion and Background,” 19/2/2019, Haaretz: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/report-finds-wide-but-varying-pay-gaps-by-gender-religion-and-background-1.6953271
Mako editiorial “The Surrogacy Storm: General Strike and Rage March of the LGTB Community,” 18/7/18, MAKO: https://www.mako.co.il/pride-news/local/Article-530a21c9e6da461006.htm
Sober, Tali Heruty “A rise of 23% in the employment of disabled,” The Marker, 29/11/17: https://www.themarker.com/career/1.4647745
Swirsky, S., E. Konor-Atias, “Social status report 2017,” January 2018. (Hebrew)
http://adva.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Social-Report-2017.pdf
Tzameret-Kertcher, Hagar, Naomi Chazan, Hanna Herzog, Yulia Basin, Ronna Brayer-Garb and Hadass Ben Eliyahu. “The Gender Index, Gender Inequality in Israel 2018,” The Van-Leer Jerusalem Institute, https://genderindex.vanleer.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Gender-Index-2018.pdf
Zohar, Gal, “Equal participation – comparative view- Israel and the World,” Report to the Ministry of Justice, 2016
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:wFtosSXqLwAJ:www.justice.gov.il/Units/NetzivutShivyon/SiteDocs/Disabilities-Affirmative-Action-Report.docx+&cd=2&hl=iw&ct=clnk&gl=il
Minority Rights Group International, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples – Israel: Ethiopian Jews, August 2018, https://www.refworld.org/docid/5ba34c097.html
Graph View
To what extent do government and administration act on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions to provide legal certainty?
10
9
9
Government and administration act predictably, on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions. Legal regulations are consistent and transparent, ensuring legal certainty.
8
7
6
7
6
Government and administration rarely make unpredictable decisions. Legal regulations are consistent, but leave a large scope of discretion to the government or administration.
5
4
3
4
3
Government and administration sometimes make unpredictable decisions that go beyond given legal bases or do not conform to existing legal regulations. Some legal regulations are inconsistent and contradictory.
2
1
1
Government and administration often make unpredictable decisions that lack a legal basis or ignore existing legal regulations. Legal regulations are inconsistent, full of loopholes and contradict each other.
Several institutions in Israel are responsible for reviewing the activities of the government and public administration. The State Comptroller, the attorney general and the Supreme Court (ruling as the High Court of Justice) conduct legal reviews of the actions of the government and administration. The attorney general is in charge of making sure that government actions are conducted in accordance with the rule of law. The Supreme Court hears appeals from citizens, and Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which force the state to explain and justify its actions.
The government of Israel can make extensive use of emergency regulations to determine its policies, since Israel has been under a state of emergency since its founding in 1948 (Gross & Kosti 2021). Emergency regulations can change Knesset legislation, temporarily expropriate legislation or set different conditions for a limited period of three months. In addition, some legal arrangements provide for ad hoc state action to deal with security threats and the Emergency Powers (Detention) Law of 1979 provides for indefinite administrative detention without trial.
Citations:
“Administrative detention,” B’tselem http://www.btselem.org/administrative_detention/statistics
Barzilay, Gad and David Nachmias,” The Attorney General to the government: Authority and responsibility,” IDI website September 1997 (Hebrew)
Bob, Y. J. “Court orders Government to pass a new law or draft all Haredim,” JPost, 12/9/17, http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Court-orders-govt-to-pass-new-law-or-draft-all-haredim-504901
The Israel Democracy Institute, 2022. “2021 Israeli Democracy Index: Israel’s Legal System.” Retrived from: https://en.idi.org.il/articles/37856
The Israel Democracy Institute. “Q&A on the Override Clause,” 17.5.2018: https://en.idi.org.il/articles/23521
“Knesset opens Winter Assembly; Speaker Edelstein: ”Parliament`s status eroded due to lack of separation of powers,” The Knesset Website, 23/10/2017: https://www.knesset.gov.il/spokesman/eng/PR_eng.asp?PRID=13599
Luria, G “How many Laws are dismissed in the world?” IDI, 22.4.18: https://www.idi.org.il/articles/23326
Weitz, Gidi. “In Israel, No Gatekeepers to Stop Netanyahu’s War on Media,” Haaretz, 02/04/2017: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.780680
Transparency International, “Israel releases first ever National Integrity System report on Israel’s government, institutions,” 11.11.2014: https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/tlisrael_releases_first_ever_national_integrity_system_report_on_israels_go
The government of Israel can make extensive use of emergency regulations to determine its policies, since Israel has been under a state of emergency since its founding in 1948 (Gross & Kosti 2021). Emergency regulations can change Knesset legislation, temporarily expropriate legislation or set different conditions for a limited period of three months. In addition, some legal arrangements provide for ad hoc state action to deal with security threats and the Emergency Powers (Detention) Law of 1979 provides for indefinite administrative detention without trial.
Citations:
“Administrative detention,” B’tselem http://www.btselem.org/administrative_detention/statistics
Barzilay, Gad and David Nachmias,” The Attorney General to the government: Authority and responsibility,” IDI website September 1997 (Hebrew)
Bob, Y. J. “Court orders Government to pass a new law or draft all Haredim,” JPost, 12/9/17, http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Court-orders-govt-to-pass-new-law-or-draft-all-haredim-504901
The Israel Democracy Institute, 2022. “2021 Israeli Democracy Index: Israel’s Legal System.” Retrived from: https://en.idi.org.il/articles/37856
The Israel Democracy Institute. “Q&A on the Override Clause,” 17.5.2018: https://en.idi.org.il/articles/23521
“Knesset opens Winter Assembly; Speaker Edelstein: ”Parliament`s status eroded due to lack of separation of powers,” The Knesset Website, 23/10/2017: https://www.knesset.gov.il/spokesman/eng/PR_eng.asp?PRID=13599
Luria, G “How many Laws are dismissed in the world?” IDI, 22.4.18: https://www.idi.org.il/articles/23326
Weitz, Gidi. “In Israel, No Gatekeepers to Stop Netanyahu’s War on Media,” Haaretz, 02/04/2017: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.780680
Transparency International, “Israel releases first ever National Integrity System report on Israel’s government, institutions,” 11.11.2014: https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/tlisrael_releases_first_ever_national_integrity_system_report_on_israels_go
To what extent do independent courts control whether government and administration act in conformity with the law?
10
9
9
Independent courts effectively review executive action and ensure that the government and administration act in conformity with the law.
8
7
6
7
6
Independent courts usually manage to control whether the government and administration act in conformity with the law.
5
4
3
4
3
Courts are independent, but often fail to ensure legal compliance.
2
1
1
Courts are biased for or against the incumbent government and lack effective control.
The Supreme Court is generally viewed as a highly influential institution. It has repeatedly intervened in the political domain to review the legality of political agreements, decisions and allocations. The Israeli Supreme Court has struck down only 18 laws since 1992, a relatively low number compared to other countries. Since a large part of the Supreme Court’s judicial review in recent years is over the activities of a rightist coalition and parliament, it is often criticized for being biased toward the political left. In recent years, public trust in the judicial system has sharply declined. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has maintained its position as one of the three governing institutions with the highest level of trust (after the IDF and the president of Israel)
The independence of the judiciary system is established in the basic law on the judiciary (1984), various individual laws, the ethical guidelines for judges (2007), numerous Supreme Court rulings, and in the Israeli legal tradition more broadly. These instruct governing judicial activity by requiring judgments to be made without prejudice, ensuring that judges receive full immunity, generally banning judges from serving in supplementary public or private positions, and more. Judges are regarded as public trustees, with an independent and impartial judicial authority considered as a critical part of the democratic order.
Citations:
Azulai, Moran and Ephraim, Omri, “Overruling the infiltration law: The Knesset goes into battle,” Ynet 23.9.2014:http://ynet.co.il.d4p.net/articles/0,7340,L-4574094,00.html (Hebrew).
Bob, Yonah Jeremy “Ayelet Shaked To ‘Post’: High Court More Conservative Than Four Years Ago,” 28/10/18, JPOST, https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Ayelet-Shaked-High-court-more-conservative-than-four-years-ago-570354
Herman, Tamar, “Israeli Democracy index 2016,” The Israel Democracy Institute. (Hebrew) https://www.idi.org.il/media/7799/democracy-index-2016.pdf
Hovel, Revital, “Right-wing Israeli Ministers Introduce Plan Targeting High Court’s Powers,” Haaretz, 15/9/2017, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.812425.
Kremnitzer, Mordechai, “Judicial Responsibility at its Best,” IDI website 31.5.2012 (Hebrew).
Plesner, Yohanan. “The Knesset and the Court: Is This Israel’s Override Election?,” The Israel Democracy Institute, 16.9.2019: en.idi.org.il/articles/28629
Svorai, Moran, “Judicial independence as the main feature in judicial ethics” (2010) (Hebrew), http://www.mishpat.ac.il/files/650/3168/3185/3186.pdf
The independence of the judiciary system is established in the basic law on the judiciary (1984), various individual laws, the ethical guidelines for judges (2007), numerous Supreme Court rulings, and in the Israeli legal tradition more broadly. These instruct governing judicial activity by requiring judgments to be made without prejudice, ensuring that judges receive full immunity, generally banning judges from serving in supplementary public or private positions, and more. Judges are regarded as public trustees, with an independent and impartial judicial authority considered as a critical part of the democratic order.
Citations:
Azulai, Moran and Ephraim, Omri, “Overruling the infiltration law: The Knesset goes into battle,” Ynet 23.9.2014:http://ynet.co.il.d4p.net/articles/0,7340,L-4574094,00.html (Hebrew).
Bob, Yonah Jeremy “Ayelet Shaked To ‘Post’: High Court More Conservative Than Four Years Ago,” 28/10/18, JPOST, https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Ayelet-Shaked-High-court-more-conservative-than-four-years-ago-570354
Herman, Tamar, “Israeli Democracy index 2016,” The Israel Democracy Institute. (Hebrew) https://www.idi.org.il/media/7799/democracy-index-2016.pdf
Hovel, Revital, “Right-wing Israeli Ministers Introduce Plan Targeting High Court’s Powers,” Haaretz, 15/9/2017, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.812425.
Kremnitzer, Mordechai, “Judicial Responsibility at its Best,” IDI website 31.5.2012 (Hebrew).
Plesner, Yohanan. “The Knesset and the Court: Is This Israel’s Override Election?,” The Israel Democracy Institute, 16.9.2019: en.idi.org.il/articles/28629
Svorai, Moran, “Judicial independence as the main feature in judicial ethics” (2010) (Hebrew), http://www.mishpat.ac.il/files/650/3168/3185/3186.pdf
To what extent does the process of appointing (supreme or constitutional court) justices guarantee the independence of the judiciary?
10
9
9
Justices are appointed in a cooperative appointment process with special majority requirements.
8
7
6
7
6
Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies with special majority requirements or in a cooperative selection process without special majority requirements.
5
4
3
4
3
Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies without special majority requirements.
2
1
1
All judges are appointed exclusively by a single body irrespective of other institutions.
According to Israel’s basic laws, all judges are to be elected by a special committee, which consists of nine members: the president of the Supreme Court, two other Supreme Court judges, the minister of justice (who also serves as the chairman) and another minister, two Knesset members, and two representatives of the Chamber of Advocates. Since 2008, a nominated candidate must gain the support of at least seven, instead of five, committee members. This change limited the power of the five non-politicians in the committee, and requires cooperation and compromises within the committee.
The cooperative procedure balances various interests and institutions within the government in order to ensure pluralism and protect the legitimacy of appointments. The process receives considerable media coverage and is subject to public criticism, which is usually concerned with whether justices’ professional record or other considerations (e.g., social views, loyalties, and political affiliation) should figure into their appointment.
Citations:
Bob, Yonah Jeremy. “Will Nave replacement end Shaked’s judicial revolution? - analysis.” The Jerusalem Post, 12.6.2019: https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Will-new-lawyers-president-end-Shakeds-judicial-revolution-Analysis-592167
Gueta, Yasmin and Efrat Newman, “Like the ‘Big Brother’: The Procedure to Judge Nomination,” The Marker, 15.2.2016: http://www.themarker.com/law/1.2851297
Hovel, Revital. “Minister, Chief Justice Agree on Israel’s Next Supreme Court President,” Haaretz, 10/7/2017: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.800449
Jerusalem Post Staff, Yonah Jeremy Bob. “Efi Nave, Head of Israeli bar, arrested in sex-for-judgeship scandal.” The Jerusalem Post, 16.1.2019: https://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/Senior-lawyer-arrested-on-suspicion-of-illegal-appointment-of-judges-577580
Lurie, Guy. “The Judicial Selection Committee.” Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2019.
Rubinstein, Amnon, “The constitutional law of the state of Israel,” Shoken, 2005.
Shoken, 2005. “The Ombudsman on judges office: Annual report 2011,” 2012. (Hebrew), http://index.justice.gov.il/Units/NezivutShoftim/pirsomeyhanaziv/Doch/Documents/2012.pdf
“The Ombudsman of judges office: Annual report 2013,” Jerusalem 2014 (Hebrew), http://index.justice.gov.il/Units/NezivutShoftim/MainDocs/Report2013.pdf.
The cooperative procedure balances various interests and institutions within the government in order to ensure pluralism and protect the legitimacy of appointments. The process receives considerable media coverage and is subject to public criticism, which is usually concerned with whether justices’ professional record or other considerations (e.g., social views, loyalties, and political affiliation) should figure into their appointment.
Citations:
Bob, Yonah Jeremy. “Will Nave replacement end Shaked’s judicial revolution? - analysis.” The Jerusalem Post, 12.6.2019: https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Will-new-lawyers-president-end-Shakeds-judicial-revolution-Analysis-592167
Gueta, Yasmin and Efrat Newman, “Like the ‘Big Brother’: The Procedure to Judge Nomination,” The Marker, 15.2.2016: http://www.themarker.com/law/1.2851297
Hovel, Revital. “Minister, Chief Justice Agree on Israel’s Next Supreme Court President,” Haaretz, 10/7/2017: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.800449
Jerusalem Post Staff, Yonah Jeremy Bob. “Efi Nave, Head of Israeli bar, arrested in sex-for-judgeship scandal.” The Jerusalem Post, 16.1.2019: https://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/Senior-lawyer-arrested-on-suspicion-of-illegal-appointment-of-judges-577580
Lurie, Guy. “The Judicial Selection Committee.” Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2019.
Rubinstein, Amnon, “The constitutional law of the state of Israel,” Shoken, 2005.
Shoken, 2005. “The Ombudsman on judges office: Annual report 2011,” 2012. (Hebrew), http://index.justice.gov.il/Units/NezivutShoftim/pirsomeyhanaziv/Doch/Documents/2012.pdf
“The Ombudsman of judges office: Annual report 2013,” Jerusalem 2014 (Hebrew), http://index.justice.gov.il/Units/NezivutShoftim/MainDocs/Report2013.pdf.
To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?
10
9
9
Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
8
7
6
7
6
Most integrity mechanisms function effectively and provide disincentives for public officeholders willing to abuse their positions.
5
4
3
4
3
Some integrity mechanisms function, but do not effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
2
1
1
Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.
A survey of the Israeli legal framework identifies three primary channels of a corruption-prevention strategy. These include maintaining popular trust in public management; ensuring the proper conduct of public servants; and ensuring accountability within the civil service. Israel pursues these goals by various means: It established a legal and ethical framework to guide civil servants and the courts, reinforced the position of the State Comptroller through the passage of a basic law (1988) in order to ensure government accountability, adapted the civil service commission’s authority to manage human resources (e.g., appointments, salaries) and so forth. In 2005, Israel was one of 140 states to sign a national anti-corruption treaty and began implementing it in 2009, issuing annual progress reports.
Criminal inquiries into politicians are common. Prominent examples in recent years include charging Prime Minister Netanyahu with bribery, fraud and breach of trust; indicting the minister for welfare and social services, Haim Katz, for fraud and breach of trust; the minister of the interior, Aryeh Deri, signing a plea deal for tax crimes; the sentencing of former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to six years in prison for accepting bribes while serving as mayor of Jerusalem; and the sentencing of former Tourism Minister Stas Misezhnikov to 15 months in prison for fraud and breach of trust.
Citations:
Aliasuf, Itzak, “Ethics of public servants in Israel,” 1991 (Hebrew) https://bit.ly/3dNefmG
Ariel, Omri, New poll shows 72% view Israel as a corrupt country, 08.01.2016, http://www.jerusalemonline.com/news/in-israel/local/poll-72-see-israel-as-corrupt-18361
Bob, Yonah Jeremy. “AG moves to indict Haim Katz for fraud; Drops IAI charges,” The Jerusalem Post, 15.8.2019: https://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/Mandelblit-Haim-Katz-will-be-indicted-for-breach-of-trust-598601
Bob, Yonah Jeremy. “State Attorney to Attorney General: Indict Arye Deri,” The Jerusalem Post, 15.8.2019:
https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/State-Attorney-to-Attorny-General-Indict-Deri-598752
Holmes, Oliver. “Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu indicted for bribery and fraud.” The Guardian, 21.11.2019: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/21/israeli-prime-minister-benjamin-netanyahu-indicted-for-bribery-and
”Massive scope of Yisrael Beiteinu corruption scandal revealed,” Ynet 25.12.2014:http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4607728,00.html
Ma’anit, Chen, Former tourism minister Stas Misezhnikov signs plea bargain, Globes, 31/10/2017: http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-former-tourism-minister-stas-misezhnikov-signs-plea-bargain-1001209817
Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions Index 2018: http://www.ti-israel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/CPI-2018-Executive-summary-PRINT.pdf
Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2019, 2020, https://www.transparency.org/cpi2019
Wootliff, Raoul, and ToI, “Liberman opposes forming Knesset committee just to reject Netanyahu immunity,” ToI, 26.11.2019, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liberman-opposes-forming-knesset-committee-just-to-reject-netanyahu-immunity/
Criminal inquiries into politicians are common. Prominent examples in recent years include charging Prime Minister Netanyahu with bribery, fraud and breach of trust; indicting the minister for welfare and social services, Haim Katz, for fraud and breach of trust; the minister of the interior, Aryeh Deri, signing a plea deal for tax crimes; the sentencing of former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to six years in prison for accepting bribes while serving as mayor of Jerusalem; and the sentencing of former Tourism Minister Stas Misezhnikov to 15 months in prison for fraud and breach of trust.
Citations:
Aliasuf, Itzak, “Ethics of public servants in Israel,” 1991 (Hebrew) https://bit.ly/3dNefmG
Ariel, Omri, New poll shows 72% view Israel as a corrupt country, 08.01.2016, http://www.jerusalemonline.com/news/in-israel/local/poll-72-see-israel-as-corrupt-18361
Bob, Yonah Jeremy. “AG moves to indict Haim Katz for fraud; Drops IAI charges,” The Jerusalem Post, 15.8.2019: https://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/Mandelblit-Haim-Katz-will-be-indicted-for-breach-of-trust-598601
Bob, Yonah Jeremy. “State Attorney to Attorney General: Indict Arye Deri,” The Jerusalem Post, 15.8.2019:
https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/State-Attorney-to-Attorny-General-Indict-Deri-598752
Holmes, Oliver. “Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu indicted for bribery and fraud.” The Guardian, 21.11.2019: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/21/israeli-prime-minister-benjamin-netanyahu-indicted-for-bribery-and
”Massive scope of Yisrael Beiteinu corruption scandal revealed,” Ynet 25.12.2014:http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4607728,00.html
Ma’anit, Chen, Former tourism minister Stas Misezhnikov signs plea bargain, Globes, 31/10/2017: http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-former-tourism-minister-stas-misezhnikov-signs-plea-bargain-1001209817
Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions Index 2018: http://www.ti-israel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/CPI-2018-Executive-summary-PRINT.pdf
Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2019, 2020, https://www.transparency.org/cpi2019
Wootliff, Raoul, and ToI, “Liberman opposes forming Knesset committee just to reject Netanyahu immunity,” ToI, 26.11.2019, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liberman-opposes-forming-knesset-committee-just-to-reject-netanyahu-immunity/