Executive Capacity
#19Key Findings
Following the implementation of far-reaching management reforms, Italy falls into the middle ranks (rank 19) with regard to executive capacity. Its score on this measure has improved by 0.7 points relative to 2014.
The Draghi government significantly improved strategic planning mechanisms. PMO control over draft bill content rose, and coordination between ministries and the PMO improved. Informal meetings between coalition party leaders helped reduce conflicts. Considerable planning focus was centered around use of the EU COVID-19 recovery funds.
The Draghi government placed a strong emphasis on promoting digitalization within the public administration. Few ministries have the capacity to perform effective RIAs. Communication under the Conte governments was split between party leaders, but the Draghi administration streamlined and controlled public statements.
Disagreements under the Conte governments made it difficult to achieve an ambitious agenda. Draghi proved more effective in achieving a slimmed-down set of goals. Resources to local governments have been significantly increased. The COVID-19 crisis enhanced cooperation between the central and regional authorities.
The Draghi government significantly improved strategic planning mechanisms. PMO control over draft bill content rose, and coordination between ministries and the PMO improved. Informal meetings between coalition party leaders helped reduce conflicts. Considerable planning focus was centered around use of the EU COVID-19 recovery funds.
The Draghi government placed a strong emphasis on promoting digitalization within the public administration. Few ministries have the capacity to perform effective RIAs. Communication under the Conte governments was split between party leaders, but the Draghi administration streamlined and controlled public statements.
Disagreements under the Conte governments made it difficult to achieve an ambitious agenda. Draghi proved more effective in achieving a slimmed-down set of goals. Resources to local governments have been significantly increased. The COVID-19 crisis enhanced cooperation between the central and regional authorities.
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How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
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In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
The concept of strategic planning is not particularly developed in Italian governmental and administrative culture. This is in part due to the fact that governments have been predominantly preoccupied with coalition problems and that the administration is still very much guided by a legalistic culture. Nevertheless, some progress has been made under recent governments. Recent government programs have been more detailed, and have become significant instruments for organizing and planning government activity. Within the government office (called the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, or Presidenza del Consiglio), a special department guided by a minister without portfolio has been created to oversee the implementation of this program. This department produces regular reports on the program’s implementation status.
The financial aspect of strategic planning has historically been somewhat more developed, as the Treasury has to implement rigorous budgetary stability goals and works within a triennial perspective.
The configuration of the first two cabinets of the 2018–2023 legislature was based on rather incoherent majorities (the Five Star Movement and the Northern League for the first one, and the Five Star Movement and Democratic Party for the second) and with a prime minister who wielded little political clout compared to the coalition party leaders. This left little space for policy-focused strategic planning. Since the beginning of 2020, the COVID-19 emergency has increasingly distracted the second Conte government from strategic planning.
The Draghi government – thanks to the strong personality and authority of the prime minister, and under the pressure of the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR) – has significantly improved the mechanisms of strategic planning. A strategic and coordinating unit (Cabina di Regia) under the Presidency of the Council of Ministers has gained a crucial role in the monitoring and driving of government actions linked to the PNRR. At the same time, however, it is still not sufficiently clear whether the strong centralization of PNRR guidance will be successful not only in the design (as it has been), but also in the implementation of the PNRR.
The financial aspect of strategic planning has historically been somewhat more developed, as the Treasury has to implement rigorous budgetary stability goals and works within a triennial perspective.
The configuration of the first two cabinets of the 2018–2023 legislature was based on rather incoherent majorities (the Five Star Movement and the Northern League for the first one, and the Five Star Movement and Democratic Party for the second) and with a prime minister who wielded little political clout compared to the coalition party leaders. This left little space for policy-focused strategic planning. Since the beginning of 2020, the COVID-19 emergency has increasingly distracted the second Conte government from strategic planning.
The Draghi government – thanks to the strong personality and authority of the prime minister, and under the pressure of the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR) – has significantly improved the mechanisms of strategic planning. A strategic and coordinating unit (Cabina di Regia) under the Presidency of the Council of Ministers has gained a crucial role in the monitoring and driving of government actions linked to the PNRR. At the same time, however, it is still not sufficiently clear whether the strong centralization of PNRR guidance will be successful not only in the design (as it has been), but also in the implementation of the PNRR.
Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?
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In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
Italy lacks a strong tradition of regular government consultation with non-governmental academics. A small group of partisan experts selected by the prime minister and other ministers frequently offer strategic and technical advice. However, independent experts are rarely consulted in a transparent way. Important legislative proposals do not benefit from an institutionalized, open and transparent consultation process. In the finance, culture and labor ministries the role of external experts is more established. Independent academic experts have in the past been involved in the spending review, but only on a short-term basis.
The current Draghi government has given a prominent role to non-partisan experts by assigning them four important ministries (environmental transition; infrastructure; technological innovation and digital transition; and university and research). Generally speaking, the policy advisory system in Italy is not very inclusive and it is based only on bureaucratic expertise combined with partisan advisers.
The current Draghi government has given a prominent role to non-partisan experts by assigning them four important ministries (environmental transition; infrastructure; technological innovation and digital transition; and university and research). Generally speaking, the policy advisory system in Italy is not very inclusive and it is based only on bureaucratic expertise combined with partisan advisers.
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Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?
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The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
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The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) as a rule evaluates all draft bills before they are submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval. This scrutiny, however, mainly deals with legal aspects (which to a significant extent also concerns compatibility with European laws), as the PMO itself does not have the size and the systematic sectoral expertise that would allow it to scrutinize policy in detail. This means that intervention by the PMO is in general more reactive than proactive. As a result, corrections to the legislative proposals of the government are often necessary prior to parliamentary approval. Important draft bills are in general scrutinized by the office with regard to the effects a bill may have on the cohesion of the majority coalition. A detailed scrutiny of the financial implications of each bill is conducted by the Treasury, which has a kind of preventive veto power.
With the new Draghi government and the strong political leadership exercised by the new prime minister, the PMO’s control over the content of draft bills has significantly increased. The greater control is also due to the need to respect the strict requirements of the Recovery and Resilience Plan, which affect a large part of the legislative initiative.
With the new Draghi government and the strong political leadership exercised by the new prime minister, the PMO’s control over the content of draft bills has significantly increased. The greater control is also due to the need to respect the strict requirements of the Recovery and Resilience Plan, which affect a large part of the legislative initiative.
To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?
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There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
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The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
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Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
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Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
The Prime Minister’s Office is in principle regularly kept informed of the development of policy proposals generated by line ministries. With regard to the policy proposals of particular political relevance for the government, the consultation process starts from the early stages of drafting and is more significant, involving not only formal but also substantive issues. In the fields less directly connected with the main mission of the government, exchanges are more formal and occur only when proposals have been fully drafted. Under the Conte government, control over line ministries was weaker than in previous governments, given the political weakness of the prime minister and the lack of ideological cohesion of the coalition. Ministers responded more readily to their party leader than to the head of government. The new government guided by Draghi has substantially increased the degree of coordination between line ministries and the PMO.
How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?
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The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
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Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
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There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
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There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
A significant number of policy proposals require de jure scrutiny by a Council of Ministers committee or even the explicit consent of a plurality of ministers. In a number of cases, this is only a formal exercise and the Council of Ministers committees are not an important mechanism. It is more significant that a number of important issues are de facto dealt through consultations among a few ministers (and their ministerial cabinets) before being brought to the Council of Ministers or are sent to this type of proceeding after preliminary discussion in the council. These consultations, which usually include the Treasury, typically avoid conflicts in the Council. Discussions of policy proposals in Council of Ministers meetings are typically very cursory. Most problems have been resolved beforehand, either in formal or informal meetings.
Under the Draghi government, the ability of cabinet committees, some of them guided by the prime minister himself or by the finance minister, to review and coordinate proposals of strategic importance has significantly increased compared to previous cabinets.
Under the Draghi government, the ability of cabinet committees, some of them guided by the prime minister himself or by the finance minister, to review and coordinate proposals of strategic importance has significantly increased compared to previous cabinets.
How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?
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Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
Before every Council of Ministers meeting there is a preparatory meeting – the “pre-consiglio” – where the heads of all legislative ministerial offices filter and coordinate the proposals to be submitted to the Council of Ministers meeting. The head of the Department for Juridical and Legislative Affairs of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers chairs these meetings. Proposals on which there is no agreement will rarely make it to the Council of Ministers. Further informal meetings between ministerial officials take place at earlier stages of drafting. However, the bureaucracies of individual ministries are normally protective of their prerogatives and are not keen to surrender autonomy. Under the Draghi government, the PMO has regained its coordination ability, which had declined under the Conte cabinets.
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
The Draghi government has added to its more formal coordination mechanisms, such as the “cabina di regia” that was established by law decree n. 77 of 31 May 2021, regular informal meetings with the leaders of the parties supporting the governmental majority. These informal meetings have effectively reduced conflicts within a very large coalition.
Citations:
Law-Decree n. 77: https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2021/07/30/21G00118/sg (accessed 12 January 2022)
Citations:
Law-Decree n. 77: https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2021/07/30/21G00118/sg (accessed 12 January 2022)
How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?
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The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
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The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
The promotion of digitalization within public administration is one of the main goals of the Draghi government. The process for the creation of a national cloud service to be used by the public sector was launched with law decree n. 77 of May 2021, and a new mechanism of digital monitoring and coordination of governmental activities (REGIS) was established by a decree of the president of the council in September 2021. It is, however, too early to evaluate how efficient implementation will be.
Citations:
for the law decree n. 77 see: https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2021/07/30/21A04731/sg (accessed 29 January 2021)
for the REGIS system see: https://www.mef.gov.it/inevidenza/2021/article_00060/Presentazione-Master-PNRR-PMST2021920STLM03-3.pdf (accessed 29 January 2021)
Citations:
for the law decree n. 77 see: https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2021/07/30/21A04731/sg (accessed 29 January 2021)
for the REGIS system see: https://www.mef.gov.it/inevidenza/2021/article_00060/Presentazione-Master-PNRR-PMST2021920STLM03-3.pdf (accessed 29 January 2021)
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To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?
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RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
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RIA are not applied or do not exist.
RIAs are in principle required from all ministries and local authorities (under laws 50/1999 and 246/2005). At the national level, RIAs fall under the responsibility of individual ministries. The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) is responsible for the review and quality control of the whole RIA processes as well as for the coordination of activities associated with an RIA. The Department for Juridical and Legislative Affairs of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (DAGL) is responsible for the elaboration of RIA methodology. Annual reports are submitted to parliament.
Following reforms adopted by previous governments (a new more comprehensive RIA regulation took effect on 15 December 2017), the current RIA framework prohibits any discussion by the Council of Ministers of a proposal that lacks an RIA. While in the past these rules were not always applied, things have gradually changed, and most normative acts are now accompanied by an RIA unless an exemption has been granted because of the limited relevance of a proposal. The quality of RIAs is still far from homogeneous, and qualified observers have found that while RIAs conducted by independent authorities are in general sound, those of ministerial departments continue to be rather formalistic (Osservatorio air 2014). A 2018 OECD study showed Italy lagging behind in this field, particularly with regard to ex post evaluations.
The government’s report to parliament for 2020 provides a broad documentation of RIA activities, but indicates also the problems arising in implementing them during the pandemic, and suggests the need to re-evaluate RIA procedures and reports. Few ministries have well organized offices, which can perform effective RIAs.
Furthermore, it has to be underlined that without considering the RIA procedures, evidence-based policymaking is still very problematic in the country due to political constraints and to the random use of existing knowledge.
Citations:
Maria Francesca Rocchetti: Impact Assessment in Italy: State of the Art and Patterns of Regulatory Reform: http://regulatoryreform.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Rocchetti-Impact-Assessment-in-Italy-Sept-2014.pdf
http://www.osservatorioair.it/in-gazzetta-ufficiale-il-nuovo-regolamento-di-disciplina-dellair-della-vir-e-della-consultazione/
https://presidenza.governo.it/DAGL/uff_studi/RelazioneAnnuale2020.pdf (accessed 29 January 2021)
http://www.oecd.org/publications/better-regulation-practices-across-the-european-union-9789264311732-en.htm
Following reforms adopted by previous governments (a new more comprehensive RIA regulation took effect on 15 December 2017), the current RIA framework prohibits any discussion by the Council of Ministers of a proposal that lacks an RIA. While in the past these rules were not always applied, things have gradually changed, and most normative acts are now accompanied by an RIA unless an exemption has been granted because of the limited relevance of a proposal. The quality of RIAs is still far from homogeneous, and qualified observers have found that while RIAs conducted by independent authorities are in general sound, those of ministerial departments continue to be rather formalistic (Osservatorio air 2014). A 2018 OECD study showed Italy lagging behind in this field, particularly with regard to ex post evaluations.
The government’s report to parliament for 2020 provides a broad documentation of RIA activities, but indicates also the problems arising in implementing them during the pandemic, and suggests the need to re-evaluate RIA procedures and reports. Few ministries have well organized offices, which can perform effective RIAs.
Furthermore, it has to be underlined that without considering the RIA procedures, evidence-based policymaking is still very problematic in the country due to political constraints and to the random use of existing knowledge.
Citations:
Maria Francesca Rocchetti: Impact Assessment in Italy: State of the Art and Patterns of Regulatory Reform: http://regulatoryreform.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Rocchetti-Impact-Assessment-in-Italy-Sept-2014.pdf
http://www.osservatorioair.it/in-gazzetta-ufficiale-il-nuovo-regolamento-di-disciplina-dellair-della-vir-e-della-consultazione/
https://presidenza.governo.it/DAGL/uff_studi/RelazioneAnnuale2020.pdf (accessed 29 January 2021)
http://www.oecd.org/publications/better-regulation-practices-across-the-european-union-9789264311732-en.htm
Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?
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RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
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The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
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The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
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RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
The RIA process is still in its infancy in Italy. The participation of stakeholders remains limited and is not systematically pursued. The annual reports, presented by the Prime Minister’s Office to parliament, indicate a gradual improvement in this field. A special government website (www.Consultazione.governo.it) has been created for documenting all consultation processes involving national and local public administrations. The results of consultation processes are still not available for most of 2020 and 2021.
Communication to the public needs to be significantly improved. The impact of RIAs on the policymaking process is still insufficient.
Communication to the public needs to be significantly improved. The impact of RIAs on the policymaking process is still insufficient.
Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?
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Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
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Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
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Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
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Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
Sustainability checks within the framework of RIA are still underdeveloped but are gradually improving. The reports of the Prime Minister’s Office to the parliament show that they are not yet systematically integrated within RIA and they are not exhaustive from the point of view of the indicators included (economic indicators still play a greater role than social and environmental ones). With a decision taken in 2017, the PMO together with the Ministry of Environment will exercise tighter control over the adoption of sustainability criteria in regulation. In line with the policies of the European Union, both the second Conte government and the Draghi government indicated their willingness to pay greater attention to sustainability criteria in their policies and to integrate SDGs in the RIAs. So far, however, the attention given in RIA reports to this aspect has not improved significantly (Relazione annuale 2020).
Citations:
https://www.mite.gov.it/pagina/la-strategia-nazionale-lo-sviluppo-sostenibile (accessed 29 December 2021)
https://presidenza.governo.it/DAGL/uff_studi/RelazioneAnnuale2020.pdf (accessed 29 December 2021)
Citations:
https://www.mite.gov.it/pagina/la-strategia-nazionale-lo-sviluppo-sostenibile (accessed 29 December 2021)
https://presidenza.governo.it/DAGL/uff_studi/RelazioneAnnuale2020.pdf (accessed 29 December 2021)
To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?
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Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
Italian governments and parliaments do not regularly conduct in-depth ex post evaluations of policies before promoting a revision of existing or the development of new policies. Any new bill is accompanied by a technical report, which typically discusses existing policies and explains the benefits of the new policy. But only rarely is this the result of an in-depth evaluation process conducted through a public and open debate. It may happen for some of the most controversial reforms after some years of implementation. For instance, this was the case under the Draghi government for the pension reform and the citizenship income, which had been introduced by the first Conte government. In sum, ex post evaluation has not yet become a regularly applied policy instrument, but is conducted in a non-systematic way.
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Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?
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The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
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The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
Consultations with economic and social actors have not been a key priority for recent governments. With their options limited by a difficult budgetary and economic situation, recent governments have been reluctant to involve themselves in long and (according to experience) often unproductive consultations. The Draghi government has conducted some consultations with labor unions on tax and pension policies, but their impact upon final policy decisions in these fields was minor. The need to reach difficult agreements with the majority parties prevailed.
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To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?
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Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
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Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
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Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
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Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
Italian governments have in general coordinated communication rather weakly. Ministers and even undersecretaries have often been able and willing to express their personal positions without coordinating their comments with the Prime Minister’s Office. Under the second Conte government, the prime minister had sought to affirm his communication primacy, but was frequently challenged by the very vocal leaders of the coalition partners. During the Draghi cabinet, the prime minister has asserted a rather clear pre-eminence in the field of government communication. The voices of the other ministers and party leaders have been overshadowed.
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To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?
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The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
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The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
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The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
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The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
The second Conte government, which assumed office in autumn 2019, defined a very broad set of policies in the fields of taxation, labor law, environmental protection, justice and infrastructure. The implementation of these goals, which proved extremely difficult because of internal disagreements among the coalition parties, was further hindered by the pandemic crisis. Meanwhile, the current Draghi government has defined a more parsimonious set of objectives (the implementation of a strong COVID-19 vaccination strategy and the achievement of the tasks mandated by the first year of the Recovery and Resilience Plan) and has largely succeeded in implementing them.
Citations:
for the achievement of the PNRR tasks see: https://www.governo.it/it/articolo/pnrr-cabina-di-regia-con-il-presidente-draghi/18891 and https://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/RelazionePNRR.pdf (accessed 30 December 2021)
Citations:
for the achievement of the PNRR tasks see: https://www.governo.it/it/articolo/pnrr-cabina-di-regia-con-il-presidente-draghi/18891 and https://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/RelazionePNRR.pdf (accessed 30 December 2021)
To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?
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The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
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The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
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The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
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The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
Coalition agreements between the parties supporting the government are in general the ordinary instrument for guiding ministers in the implementation of the government program. During the life of a cabinet, summits between the prime minister and the leaders of the coalition parties are often used to solve problems arising in the implementation of the program. Under the Draghi government, the need to ensure the timely implementation of the goals set by the Recovery and Resilience Plan has led to an institutionalization of these summits, which now take place regularly and frequently.
How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?
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The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
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The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
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The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
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The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
The monitoring of the implementation of the government program is delegated to one of the undersecretaries attached to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and supported by a special office of the presidency (Ufficio per l’attuazione del programma di governo). This office monitors the main legislative activities of the ministries and more recently has started to monitor regularly also the implementation activities related to the legislation adopted. The office publishes a monthly report. However, monitoring has tended to be a formal activity that simply documents what has been done rather than being a real instrument of political control. Under the Draghi government, the monitoring of line ministry activities has been significantly strengthened. The State General Accounting Department (Ragioneria Generale dello Stato, RGS) of the Finance Ministry has gained an enhanced role and is responsible for monitoring all activities mandated under the PNRR.
Citations:
on the monitoring of implementation see: https://www.programmagoverno.gov.it/media/4514/quinta-relazione-sul-monitoraggio-dei-provvedimenti-attuativi-della-xvii-e-xviii-legislatura.pdf (accessed 31.12.2021)
on the role of RGS see: https://www.programmagoverno.gov.it/media/1308/20160621_protocollo_inegrato_upg_igb.pdf (accessed 31.12.2021)
Citations:
on the monitoring of implementation see: https://www.programmagoverno.gov.it/media/4514/quinta-relazione-sul-monitoraggio-dei-provvedimenti-attuativi-della-xvii-e-xviii-legislatura.pdf (accessed 31.12.2021)
on the role of RGS see: https://www.programmagoverno.gov.it/media/1308/20160621_protocollo_inegrato_upg_igb.pdf (accessed 31.12.2021)
How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
8
7
6
7
6
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
5
4
3
4
3
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
2
1
1
The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
Autonomous executive agencies are not very common in Italian ministries, but they have increased with time (there are currently around 15 agencies) and their autonomy is quite differentiated (some of them are highly autonomous, while others function as an executive branch of the respective ministry). Although their activities are monitored, this monitoring is neither systematic nor particularly effective. There are some exceptions: for example, the monitoring of the tax agency (Agenzia delle Entrate) by the Ministry of Finance is more effective than many other oversights. The Corte dei Conti – the main Audit Office – performs a systematic monitoring of bureaucratic offices and also of executive agencies but this monitoring is mainly focused on legal and procedural aspects and is much less effective in covering other aspects such as cost efficiency.
Monitoring of regional healthcare agencies, and healthcare expenditure and procurements is theoretically very adequate. This is thanks to the role of the AGENAS (Agenzia Nazionale per i Servizi Sanitari Regionali), which is in charge of monitoring the work of the regional healthcare systems. AGENAS oversees the field effectively, but overall decision-making lacks coherence. As in the case of the standard cost that is not implemented due to the lack of political effectiveness, despite the empirical evidence offered by the monitoring activity of AGENAS.
Monitoring of regional healthcare agencies, and healthcare expenditure and procurements is theoretically very adequate. This is thanks to the role of the AGENAS (Agenzia Nazionale per i Servizi Sanitari Regionali), which is in charge of monitoring the work of the regional healthcare systems. AGENAS oversees the field effectively, but overall decision-making lacks coherence. As in the case of the standard cost that is not implemented due to the lack of political effectiveness, despite the empirical evidence offered by the monitoring activity of AGENAS.
To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
8
7
6
7
6
The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
2
1
1
The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
In recent years, a double and to some extent contradictory trend has taken place in the relationship between central government and local administrations (regions, provinces and municipalities). On the one hand, constitutional reforms, legislative and administrative changes have transferred broader tasks to local governments. This has particularly been the case for regions where the devolution of functions in the field of healthcare has been particularly extensive. On the other hand, however, because of budgetary constraints and strong pressures from the European Union and international markets, the central government has increasingly reduced transfers to local governments in order to balance its own budget. Local governments have tried to resist this fiscal squeeze without great success and have had to increase local taxation. At the same time, the government has reduced the autonomy of municipalities to levy property taxes. As a result, functions delegated to subnational governments are now often underfunded, and local authorities have been forced to cut services.
Under the new Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR), resources for local governments, especially with regards to infrastructural expenditures, have been significantly increased. The open question is whether local governments will be able to spend these resources in time.
Under the new Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR), resources for local governments, especially with regards to infrastructural expenditures, have been significantly increased. The open question is whether local governments will be able to spend these resources in time.
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
2
1
1
The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
The constitutional and legislative changes, which had substantially increased the powers and scope of regional government activity over the last 20 years, did not make the relationship between different levels of government less antagonistic. Across an increased number of policy fields, central and regional governments have concurrent legislative powers. In these areas, the central state should simply define general guidelines, leaving the articulation of specific legislative contents to regional assemblies. However, the national government and parliament have a tendency not to respect this division of authority, impinging upon the sphere of regional autonomy instead.
For their part, regions often adopt a posture of resistance to national rules. This has produced an exceeding amount of litigation before the Constitutional Court. Tensions between the two levels have also increased as a result of the strained fiscal context. The central government has sought greater oversight over local governments (often perceived as the culprits of unrestrained spending). In order to balance the national budget, central government transfers to local authorities are repeatedly cut. These cuts are typically applied universally, rather than selectively. However, in several emergencies, the national government has given substantial financial aid to municipalities and regions. Moreover, central government has provided the necessary funds whenever local governments have been close to defaulting.
The COVID-19 emergency has fostered a greater degree of cooperation between central government and regional authorities through regular consultation procedures involving the government and the Conferenza Sato-Regioni (State-Regions conference).
Citations:
https://www.statoregioni.it/it/conferenza-unificata/sedute-2021/seduta-del-20122021/report/ (accessed 2 January 2022).
For their part, regions often adopt a posture of resistance to national rules. This has produced an exceeding amount of litigation before the Constitutional Court. Tensions between the two levels have also increased as a result of the strained fiscal context. The central government has sought greater oversight over local governments (often perceived as the culprits of unrestrained spending). In order to balance the national budget, central government transfers to local authorities are repeatedly cut. These cuts are typically applied universally, rather than selectively. However, in several emergencies, the national government has given substantial financial aid to municipalities and regions. Moreover, central government has provided the necessary funds whenever local governments have been close to defaulting.
The COVID-19 emergency has fostered a greater degree of cooperation between central government and regional authorities through regular consultation procedures involving the government and the Conferenza Sato-Regioni (State-Regions conference).
Citations:
https://www.statoregioni.it/it/conferenza-unificata/sedute-2021/seduta-del-20122021/report/ (accessed 2 January 2022).
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?
10
9
9
Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
2
1
1
Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
Minimal national standards for decentralized public services (e.g., public healthcare and utilities) are agreed upon and set at national level in a number of areas. The permanent conference for relations between the state, regions, provinces and cities (Conferenza Stato-Regioni ed Unificata) is an important forum in which national standards are discussed. However, the implementation of these standards is still far from satisfactory: as the administrative quality of different local authorities varies significantly, standards can differ substantially from one area of the country to another. In many fields (e.g., education and healthcare), the north–south divide remains significant, and seriously affects equality of opportunities and national cohesion. So far, efforts to overcome it have not proven very successful.
Concerning national standards for utilities (e.g., water, electricity and communications), independent authorities are in most cases responsible for their definition and implementation. Implementation in this field is fairly adequate.
Concerning national standards for utilities (e.g., water, electricity and communications), independent authorities are in most cases responsible for their definition and implementation. Implementation in this field is fairly adequate.
To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?
10
9
9
Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
8
7
6
7
6
Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
5
4
3
4
3
Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
2
1
1
Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
The ability of the government to effectively enforce regulations against resourceful interest groups received renewed attention after the 2018 collapse of the Genova motorway bridge. It has become clear, for instance, that the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructures did not adequately monitor the implementation of the motorway concession agreements by the private companies who were the concessionaires (particularly in the field of investments and security controls). A review of other fields would likely reveal similar problems. So far, no major steps forward have been made to improve the situation.
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To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?
10
9
9
The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
8
7
6
7
6
In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
2
1
1
The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
In the medium term, the most significant impact that international, and particularly supranational (EU-related) developments have had upon the structure and working of the government concerns the role of the minister of finance and of the treasury. Because of budgetary requirements deriving from European integration and participation in the euro area, the minister of finance has acquired increasing weight in the governmental decision-making process, exercising an effective gatekeeping role with respect to the proposals of line ministries. Consequently, the prime minister and the finance minister gained a more central role in the implementation of the government program, guiding the most important decisions, while other ministers assumed a secondary role.
Under the first Conte government (2018–2019), this trend appeared to be reversing itself. The political influence of the prime minister and finance minister was reduced to accommodate the policy initiatives of the two party leaders of the coalition, who made little effort to respect Italy’s international and European obligations. However, the second Conte government has backed somewhat away from this mode of operation and, with the increasing need to obtain European support during the pandemic crisis, the role of the finance minister has gained new weight. This trend has been significantly reinforced by the Draghi government, and the large funds attributed to Italy by the European Commission and the Next Generation EU program. The role of the prime minister and of the finance minister have become crucial in steering the implementation of this program.
Under the first Conte government (2018–2019), this trend appeared to be reversing itself. The political influence of the prime minister and finance minister was reduced to accommodate the policy initiatives of the two party leaders of the coalition, who made little effort to respect Italy’s international and European obligations. However, the second Conte government has backed somewhat away from this mode of operation and, with the increasing need to obtain European support during the pandemic crisis, the role of the finance minister has gained new weight. This trend has been significantly reinforced by the Draghi government, and the large funds attributed to Italy by the European Commission and the Next Generation EU program. The role of the prime minister and of the finance minister have become crucial in steering the implementation of this program.
To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?
10
9
9
The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
2
1
1
The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
The ability of Italian governments to take a leading role in international efforts is generally limited. This is in part due to the country’s size, but also to the fact that Italian politics tends to focus on internal matters. Moreover, frequent changes in political leadership have made it difficult to provide a strong and clear position in international efforts. There have been occasional exceptions when the government has been more active on a specific issue (e.g., the abolition of death penalty, or in the promotion of peace talks in the Middle East). With regard to the immigration crisis, Italian governments have tried to promote a sharing of responsibility among EU member states.
The first Conte government adopted a rather confrontational attitude toward the European Union and the main EU member states, which undermined its international actions. In contrast, the second Conte government increasingly adopted a more cooperative approach toward the European Union. Furthermore, the current Draghi government has significantly strengthened this cooperative attitude toward the European Union and at the same time with the new Biden administration. Thanks to the international prestige of the prime minister, Italy has played a more active role in various international forums, such as the G20 and COP26, and the current government has deliberately given the international arena much greater attention compared to previous governments.
The first Conte government adopted a rather confrontational attitude toward the European Union and the main EU member states, which undermined its international actions. In contrast, the second Conte government increasingly adopted a more cooperative approach toward the European Union. Furthermore, the current Draghi government has significantly strengthened this cooperative attitude toward the European Union and at the same time with the new Biden administration. Thanks to the international prestige of the prime minister, Italy has played a more active role in various international forums, such as the G20 and COP26, and the current government has deliberately given the international arena much greater attention compared to previous governments.
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To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?
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9
9
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
5
4
3
4
3
The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
2
1
1
There is no monitoring.
Traditionally, the attention paid to the internal organization of the government machine has been selective and sporadic. No systematic monitoring was accomplished on a regular basis. The spending review initiated under the Monti government, and continued by the Letta, Renzi and Gentiloni governments, reformed this field somewhat. Reforms have focused mainly on financial issues, but have also involved the monitoring of institutional arrangements of government (with particular attention given to the structures of local government). However, many of these review exercises’ proposals for a deeper restructuring of government have not been seriously implemented. After limited past reforms that increased the ability to monitor the government program, little attention has been paid to a serious restructuring of the Prime Minister’s Office. Reforms introduced under the Conte government only marginally affected the state bureaucracy’s low level of productivity. The Draghi government – because of its specific mission and as a consequence of the rules imposed by the Next Generation EU program – has developed more effective instruments for monitoring the activities of ministries, administrative units and local governments, and to measure their effectiveness in implementing the actions prescribed by the Resilience and Recovery Plan (PNRR). From this point of view, 2021 has been a very positive year.
Citations:
http://www.funzionepubblica.gov.it/sites/funzionepubblica.gov.it/files/Valutazione_DLgs_25_maggio_2017_n74.pdf
https://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legge:2021-05-31;77!vig=
Citations:
http://www.funzionepubblica.gov.it/sites/funzionepubblica.gov.it/files/Valutazione_DLgs_25_maggio_2017_n74.pdf
https://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legge:2021-05-31;77!vig=
To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?
10
9
9
The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
8
7
6
7
6
The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
2
1
1
The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
Despite several years of public debate, successive governments have been unable to significantly improve the effectiveness and efficiency of central government. The attempt of the Renzi government to introduce a broad constitutional reform was strongly rejected in the referendum held in December 2016. The reform had aimed to reduce the delays caused by veto powers originating from the perfect bicameralism, and redistribute powers between regional and central governments to make the responsibilities of each level clearer. The rejection of the reform demonstrated the difficulties of introducing broad reforms.
While the previous path toward constitutional reform was abandoned after several failed attempts, the current Draghi government has adopted a softer strategy to improve its policy capacities. A greater concentration of decision-making powers in the hands of the prime minister and of the prime minister’s staff has been coupled with a regular and more effective mechanism of consultation with the leaders of the parties supporting the government. It remains to be seen if such arrangements will continue under a new government.
While the previous path toward constitutional reform was abandoned after several failed attempts, the current Draghi government has adopted a softer strategy to improve its policy capacities. A greater concentration of decision-making powers in the hands of the prime minister and of the prime minister’s staff has been coupled with a regular and more effective mechanism of consultation with the leaders of the parties supporting the government. It remains to be seen if such arrangements will continue under a new government.