Social Policies
#22Key Findings
With gaps in its social safety net, Lithuania receives a middling overall score (rank 22) with regard to social policies. Its score on this measure is unchanged relative to its 2014 level.
Education quality is a concern, with students showing middling achievements. An education reform program has been drafted but not yet implemented. Relative-poverty and social-exclusion rates are high. Income inequality is high, but wealth inequality is low in cross-EU comparison. Minimum wages and pensions have been increased.
A surplus of hospital beds proved useful during the pandemic, but excess death rates were high. Health outcomes are poor in cross-EU comparison. The share of women employed is high, but child-care provision is insufficient. A variety of benefits for families and pregnant women have been increased.
A crisis in which Belarus encouraged a flow of illegal immigrants over Lithuania’s border led to policy difficulties. Initially all migrants seeking asylum were admitted; subsequently the country began physically deterring entry, prompting human-rights criticisms. Defense spending has been increased in light of rising threats from Russia.
Education quality is a concern, with students showing middling achievements. An education reform program has been drafted but not yet implemented. Relative-poverty and social-exclusion rates are high. Income inequality is high, but wealth inequality is low in cross-EU comparison. Minimum wages and pensions have been increased.
A surplus of hospital beds proved useful during the pandemic, but excess death rates were high. Health outcomes are poor in cross-EU comparison. The share of women employed is high, but child-care provision is insufficient. A variety of benefits for families and pregnant women have been increased.
A crisis in which Belarus encouraged a flow of illegal immigrants over Lithuania’s border led to policy difficulties. Initially all migrants seeking asylum were admitted; subsequently the country began physically deterring entry, prompting human-rights criticisms. Defense spending has been increased in light of rising threats from Russia.
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To what extent does education policy deliver high-quality, equitable and efficient education and training?
10
9
9
Education policy fully achieves the criteria.
8
7
6
7
6
Education policy largely achieves the criteria.
5
4
3
4
3
Education policy partially achieves the criteria.
2
1
1
Education policy does not achieve the criteria at all.
The educational system in Lithuania is comprised of the following stages: 1) early childhood education and care (pre-primary and pre-primary class-based education); 2) compulsory education for children aged seven through 16 (including primary education, lower-secondary general education, vocational lower-secondary education); 3) upper-secondary and post-secondary education (for people aged 17 to 19); and 4) higher education provided by universities (undergraduate, graduate and PhD studies) and colleges (undergraduate studies). Lithuania has a very high and increasing level of tertiary attainment. Its rate of early school leaving is also below the EU average, at 5.6% in 2020. However, enrollment rates in vocational education and training programs are low.
The reputation of vocational education and training in Lithuania could still be improved. According to an OECD survey of education released in September 2016, only 15% of all students are expected to graduate from vocational training programs compared to an OECD average of 46% and EU average of 50%. Pre-primary education attendance is also low, with only 78.3% of Lithuanian children aged four to six attending pre-primary education programs, compared to the EU-27 average of 92.3%. Adult participation rates in lifelong learning programs are also comparatively low. Moreover, Lithuania needs to increase the quality of its education programs. According to the most recent PISA report, released in early December 2019, Lithuania’s students continued to score lower than the OECD average in the areas of reading, mathematics and science. In addition, the share of students in Lithuania performing at the highest level of proficiency in at least in one subject was lower than the OECD average.
A 2017 OECD report on education in Lithuania stated that Lithuania’s schools and higher-education institutions would benefit from clarifying and raising performance expectations, aligning resources in support of raised performance expectations, strengthening performance-monitoring and quality-assurance procedures, and building institutional capacity. Furthermore, the country must address mismatches between graduates’ skills and labor market needs, as the country’s youth-unemployment rate is partly associated with young people’s insufficient skills and lack of practical experience. In a staff working document, the European Commission recommended improving quality and efficiency at all levels of education and training, including adult education.
In terms of equitable access to education, the country shows an urban-rural divide and some disparities in educational achievements between girls and boys. However, there are no significant gaps in access to education for vulnerable groups (with the exception of the Roma population and, to a certain extent, the migrant population). Spending on education in Lithuania has been above or around the EU average (4.6% of GDP in 2019 compared to an EU average of 4.7%). However, this expenditure is spread across a large number of institutions, and is often used to maintain buildings instead of to improve education quality. The salaries of researchers and teachers have been increasing in the last several years but still remain insufficient. While the country has a relatively high figure with regard to mean years of schooling (Lithuania was ranked 10th out of 141 countries in the Global Competitiveness Index 2019 in this area), it is relatively difficult to find skilled employees (in the same report, Lithuania was ranked only 124th out of 141 countries in this area). Therefore, Lithuanian authorities should improve the labor market relevance of education and training in order to increase the efficiency of resource allocation.
The total number of school graduates declined significantly in recent years due to demographic changes, from around 29,500 in 2010 to 14,100 in 2020 – a reduction by half compared to 2010. The absolute number of foreign students studying in Lithuania has been increasing, but this population still makes up 6% of tertiary students. Decreasing student numbers have intensified pressure on the network of higher-education institutions, especially among less popular institutions. For example, in 2016, there were an estimated 2.9 higher-education institutions per 10,000 students in Lithuania, while there were 1.2 per 10,000 students in Finland and 1.1 in Ireland. In addition, more than 50 (out of 614) study programs in Lithuanian universities and colleges failed to attract enough student applications, and thus may be abolished in the future. Although this has led to proposals to consolidate the network of Lithuanian state universities, and vocational education and training institutions, progress in implementing this reform has been slow.
The Šimonytė government has laid out an educational reform plan, placing a priority on improving access and the quality of education. The government aims to reduce the number of secondary schools with an eye to increasing efficiency and, even more importantly, ensuring an adequate level of quality throughout the country. Furthermore, the government has rolled out a plan to create so-called Millennium schools. These schools would have modern infrastructure and emphasize state-of-the-art learning tools, such as leadership and informal education. By 2025, the plan is to have 150 such schools, which would in turn set a good example for others. Private schools and schools that select students by competition will not be eligible for the program. The national Recovery and Resilience Plan (to be financed by the EU economic recovery fund) foresees reform measures in the field of education, with goals including digitalization and improvement in educational performance. This may improve the chances of advancing those reforms and continuing them after the next parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for 2024.
Citations:
The Eurydice reports on Lithuania are available at https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice/content/lithuania_en
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT, country report Lithuania 2019: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/2019-european-semester-country-report-lithuania_en.pdf
The 2019 Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2019.pdf
OECD, Education at a Glance 2021, OECD indicators: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/f9439e9e-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/f9439e9e-en
OECD, Education in Lithuania, 2017. http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/education-in-lithuania_9789264281486-en;jsessionid=8scv3cpilndh.x-oecd-live-03
OECD, Results from PISA 2018, http://www.oecd.org/pisa/publications/PISA2018_CN_LTU.pdf
Government of Lithuania
Council of the European Union, Council implementing decision on the approval of the assessment of the recovery and resilience plan for Lithuania, Brussels, 20 July, 2021, 10477/21, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10477-2021-INIT/en/pdf
The reputation of vocational education and training in Lithuania could still be improved. According to an OECD survey of education released in September 2016, only 15% of all students are expected to graduate from vocational training programs compared to an OECD average of 46% and EU average of 50%. Pre-primary education attendance is also low, with only 78.3% of Lithuanian children aged four to six attending pre-primary education programs, compared to the EU-27 average of 92.3%. Adult participation rates in lifelong learning programs are also comparatively low. Moreover, Lithuania needs to increase the quality of its education programs. According to the most recent PISA report, released in early December 2019, Lithuania’s students continued to score lower than the OECD average in the areas of reading, mathematics and science. In addition, the share of students in Lithuania performing at the highest level of proficiency in at least in one subject was lower than the OECD average.
A 2017 OECD report on education in Lithuania stated that Lithuania’s schools and higher-education institutions would benefit from clarifying and raising performance expectations, aligning resources in support of raised performance expectations, strengthening performance-monitoring and quality-assurance procedures, and building institutional capacity. Furthermore, the country must address mismatches between graduates’ skills and labor market needs, as the country’s youth-unemployment rate is partly associated with young people’s insufficient skills and lack of practical experience. In a staff working document, the European Commission recommended improving quality and efficiency at all levels of education and training, including adult education.
In terms of equitable access to education, the country shows an urban-rural divide and some disparities in educational achievements between girls and boys. However, there are no significant gaps in access to education for vulnerable groups (with the exception of the Roma population and, to a certain extent, the migrant population). Spending on education in Lithuania has been above or around the EU average (4.6% of GDP in 2019 compared to an EU average of 4.7%). However, this expenditure is spread across a large number of institutions, and is often used to maintain buildings instead of to improve education quality. The salaries of researchers and teachers have been increasing in the last several years but still remain insufficient. While the country has a relatively high figure with regard to mean years of schooling (Lithuania was ranked 10th out of 141 countries in the Global Competitiveness Index 2019 in this area), it is relatively difficult to find skilled employees (in the same report, Lithuania was ranked only 124th out of 141 countries in this area). Therefore, Lithuanian authorities should improve the labor market relevance of education and training in order to increase the efficiency of resource allocation.
The total number of school graduates declined significantly in recent years due to demographic changes, from around 29,500 in 2010 to 14,100 in 2020 – a reduction by half compared to 2010. The absolute number of foreign students studying in Lithuania has been increasing, but this population still makes up 6% of tertiary students. Decreasing student numbers have intensified pressure on the network of higher-education institutions, especially among less popular institutions. For example, in 2016, there were an estimated 2.9 higher-education institutions per 10,000 students in Lithuania, while there were 1.2 per 10,000 students in Finland and 1.1 in Ireland. In addition, more than 50 (out of 614) study programs in Lithuanian universities and colleges failed to attract enough student applications, and thus may be abolished in the future. Although this has led to proposals to consolidate the network of Lithuanian state universities, and vocational education and training institutions, progress in implementing this reform has been slow.
The Šimonytė government has laid out an educational reform plan, placing a priority on improving access and the quality of education. The government aims to reduce the number of secondary schools with an eye to increasing efficiency and, even more importantly, ensuring an adequate level of quality throughout the country. Furthermore, the government has rolled out a plan to create so-called Millennium schools. These schools would have modern infrastructure and emphasize state-of-the-art learning tools, such as leadership and informal education. By 2025, the plan is to have 150 such schools, which would in turn set a good example for others. Private schools and schools that select students by competition will not be eligible for the program. The national Recovery and Resilience Plan (to be financed by the EU economic recovery fund) foresees reform measures in the field of education, with goals including digitalization and improvement in educational performance. This may improve the chances of advancing those reforms and continuing them after the next parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for 2024.
Citations:
The Eurydice reports on Lithuania are available at https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice/content/lithuania_en
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT, country report Lithuania 2019: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/2019-european-semester-country-report-lithuania_en.pdf
The 2019 Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2019.pdf
OECD, Education at a Glance 2021, OECD indicators: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/f9439e9e-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/f9439e9e-en
OECD, Education in Lithuania, 2017. http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/education-in-lithuania_9789264281486-en;jsessionid=8scv3cpilndh.x-oecd-live-03
OECD, Results from PISA 2018, http://www.oecd.org/pisa/publications/PISA2018_CN_LTU.pdf
Government of Lithuania
Council of the European Union, Council implementing decision on the approval of the assessment of the recovery and resilience plan for Lithuania, Brussels, 20 July, 2021, 10477/21, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10477-2021-INIT/en/pdf
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To what extent does social policy prevent exclusion and decoupling from society?
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9
9
Policies very effectively enable societal inclusion and ensure equal opportunities.
8
7
6
7
6
For the most part, policies enable societal inclusion effectively and ensure equal opportunities.
5
4
3
4
3
For the most part, policies fail to prevent societal exclusion effectively and ensure equal opportunities.
2
1
1
Policies exacerbate unequal opportunities and exclusion from society.
The issue of social exclusion is a key challenge for Lithuania’s social policy. Although absolute poverty has been declining considerably, relative poverty rates remain high in the EU context, which is partially due to the limited ability of the existing social transfers to reduce poverty. Therefore, in its 2019 staff working document, the European Commission recommended addressing the issues of income inequality, relative poverty and social exclusion. In 2020, 24.5% of the Lithuanian population was at risk of poverty and social exclusion – down from 30.1% in 2016, but still the sixth-highest such level in the EU. Families with many children, people living in rural areas, youth and disabled people, unemployed persons and the elderly are the demographic groups with the highest poverty risk.
Both the Skvernelis and Šimonytė governments increased the minimum monthly wage and pensions. Nevertheless, disposable income inequality (measured with Gini index), which decreased during the global financial crisis, has again risen, and in 2020 was at the second-highest such level in the EU (after Bulgaria). Furthermore, regional income and opportunity disparities are substantial. Interestingly, however, according to newest research, the level of wealth inequality is one of the lowest within the EU (Bank of Lithuania).
A mix of government interventions (general improvements to the business environment, active labor market measures, adequate education and training, cash social assistance, and social services targeted at the most vulnerable groups) is needed in order to ameliorate Lithuania’s remaining problems of poverty and social exclusion. Emigration trends, with young working-age people leaving for jobs abroad and older family members staying in Lithuania to care for grandchildren, have exacerbated the negative effects of social exclusion. However, as the country’s economy has grown at rates above the EU average, a reversal of migration trends has recently been observed – in 2020, Lithuania’s population increased for the first time since regaining independence.
Citations:
Bank of Lithuania, Tyrimas: kiek turto yra sukaupę gyventojai ir kokia yra turto nelygybė Lietuvoje, https://www.lb.lt/lt/naujienos/tyrimas-kiek-turto-yra-sukaupe-gyventojai-ir-kokia-yra-turto-nelygybe-lietuvoje
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT, country report Lithuania 2019: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/2019-european-semester-country-report-lithuania_en.pdf
Both the Skvernelis and Šimonytė governments increased the minimum monthly wage and pensions. Nevertheless, disposable income inequality (measured with Gini index), which decreased during the global financial crisis, has again risen, and in 2020 was at the second-highest such level in the EU (after Bulgaria). Furthermore, regional income and opportunity disparities are substantial. Interestingly, however, according to newest research, the level of wealth inequality is one of the lowest within the EU (Bank of Lithuania).
A mix of government interventions (general improvements to the business environment, active labor market measures, adequate education and training, cash social assistance, and social services targeted at the most vulnerable groups) is needed in order to ameliorate Lithuania’s remaining problems of poverty and social exclusion. Emigration trends, with young working-age people leaving for jobs abroad and older family members staying in Lithuania to care for grandchildren, have exacerbated the negative effects of social exclusion. However, as the country’s economy has grown at rates above the EU average, a reversal of migration trends has recently been observed – in 2020, Lithuania’s population increased for the first time since regaining independence.
Citations:
Bank of Lithuania, Tyrimas: kiek turto yra sukaupę gyventojai ir kokia yra turto nelygybė Lietuvoje, https://www.lb.lt/lt/naujienos/tyrimas-kiek-turto-yra-sukaupe-gyventojai-ir-kokia-yra-turto-nelygybe-lietuvoje
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT, country report Lithuania 2019: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/2019-european-semester-country-report-lithuania_en.pdf
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To what extent do health care policies provide high-quality, inclusive and cost-efficient health care?
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9
9
Health care policy achieves the criteria fully.
8
7
6
7
6
Health care policy achieves the criteria largely.
5
4
3
4
3
Health care policy achieves the criteria partly.
2
1
1
Health care policy does not achieve the criteria at all.
In Lithuania, some health outcomes are among the poorest in the EU. Lithuania has among the bloc’s lowest expected years of healthy life at birth, as well as one of the lowest life expectancies. The situation for males is particularly bad – the gender life expectancy gap in 2020 was the largest in the EU (at nearly 10 years).
The Lithuanian healthcare system includes public sector institutions financed primarily by the National Health Insurance Fund, and private sector providers financed the National Health Insurance Fund and out-of-pocket patient costs. Government expenditure on healthcare was 7% of GDP in 2019, below the EU average of 9.9%. As a percentage of current healthcare expenditure, spending on preventive care and other related programs is quite low, while the share of spending on pharmaceuticals and other medical non-durables is quite high.
The provision of healthcare services varies to a certain extent among the Lithuanian counties; the inhabitants of a few comparatively poor counties characterized by lower life expectancies (e.g., Tauragė county) on average received fewer healthcare services. Out-of-pocket payments remain high (in particular for pharmaceuticals), a fact that may reduce access to healthcare for vulnerable groups. New prevention-focused programs were introduced by the National Health Insurance Fund. Furthermore, the scope of the new State Public Health Promotion Fund under the Ministry of Health was expanded to support additional public health interventions.
The 2012 – 2016 and 2016 – 2020 governments placed more emphasis on the accessibility of healthcare services and the issue of public health. More specifically, the Skvernelis government reduced the availability of alcohol and tightened regulations on pharmaceuticals in the market. Although the two liberal parties in the new coalition which came to power in 2020 have proposed relaxing alcohol consumption restrictions, the parliament and the government have refused to adopt the measures.
Despite this initiative, the potential for rationalizing the use of resources in the healthcare sector remains largely unfulfilled. There is a need to make the existing healthcare system more efficient by shifting resources from costly inpatient treatments to primary care, outpatient treatment and nursing care. According to the European Commission’s 2019 report, the performance of the healthcare system could be improved by increasing the quality, affordability and efficiency of services, which would in turn improve health outcomes in the country. The current coalition government intends to reform healthcare networks to improve the sector’s inclusiveness and cost efficiency, but it is unclear whether these plans can gain the necessary support in the parliament. The government’s plan to use some of the Recovery and Resilience Fund money allocated by the EU to Lithuania for reforms in the healthcare sector may provide an additional incentive to pursue reforms and maintain continuity after the next parliamentary elections.
Another major problem is corruption in the healthcare sector. The sector continues to be plagued by a culture of informal payments and “special connections.” Furthermore, a case of suicide by a medical practitioner in 2021 led to public discussions of rampant mobbing in the system.
The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in massive challenges to the healthcare system. To some extent, the inefficiency of Lithuania’s healthcare system has turned out to be a slight advantage due to the overcapacity of hospital beds. According to The Economist, Lithuania experienced one of the world’s highest excess death rates during the pandemic. As for vaccination, Lithuanians have been more reluctant than most Western Europeans, but the country actually has one of the highest rates in Central Eastern Europe.
Citations:
The Economist, The pandemic’s true death toll, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/coronavirus-excess-deaths-estimates
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT, country report Lithuania 2019: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/2019-european-semester-country-report-lithuania_en.pdf
Murauskiene L, Janoniene R, Veniute M, van Ginneken E, Karanikolos M. Lithuania: health system review. Health Systems in Transition, 2013; 15(2): 1–150. http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/192130/HiT-Lithuania.pdf.
The Lithuanian healthcare system includes public sector institutions financed primarily by the National Health Insurance Fund, and private sector providers financed the National Health Insurance Fund and out-of-pocket patient costs. Government expenditure on healthcare was 7% of GDP in 2019, below the EU average of 9.9%. As a percentage of current healthcare expenditure, spending on preventive care and other related programs is quite low, while the share of spending on pharmaceuticals and other medical non-durables is quite high.
The provision of healthcare services varies to a certain extent among the Lithuanian counties; the inhabitants of a few comparatively poor counties characterized by lower life expectancies (e.g., Tauragė county) on average received fewer healthcare services. Out-of-pocket payments remain high (in particular for pharmaceuticals), a fact that may reduce access to healthcare for vulnerable groups. New prevention-focused programs were introduced by the National Health Insurance Fund. Furthermore, the scope of the new State Public Health Promotion Fund under the Ministry of Health was expanded to support additional public health interventions.
The 2012 – 2016 and 2016 – 2020 governments placed more emphasis on the accessibility of healthcare services and the issue of public health. More specifically, the Skvernelis government reduced the availability of alcohol and tightened regulations on pharmaceuticals in the market. Although the two liberal parties in the new coalition which came to power in 2020 have proposed relaxing alcohol consumption restrictions, the parliament and the government have refused to adopt the measures.
Despite this initiative, the potential for rationalizing the use of resources in the healthcare sector remains largely unfulfilled. There is a need to make the existing healthcare system more efficient by shifting resources from costly inpatient treatments to primary care, outpatient treatment and nursing care. According to the European Commission’s 2019 report, the performance of the healthcare system could be improved by increasing the quality, affordability and efficiency of services, which would in turn improve health outcomes in the country. The current coalition government intends to reform healthcare networks to improve the sector’s inclusiveness and cost efficiency, but it is unclear whether these plans can gain the necessary support in the parliament. The government’s plan to use some of the Recovery and Resilience Fund money allocated by the EU to Lithuania for reforms in the healthcare sector may provide an additional incentive to pursue reforms and maintain continuity after the next parliamentary elections.
Another major problem is corruption in the healthcare sector. The sector continues to be plagued by a culture of informal payments and “special connections.” Furthermore, a case of suicide by a medical practitioner in 2021 led to public discussions of rampant mobbing in the system.
The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in massive challenges to the healthcare system. To some extent, the inefficiency of Lithuania’s healthcare system has turned out to be a slight advantage due to the overcapacity of hospital beds. According to The Economist, Lithuania experienced one of the world’s highest excess death rates during the pandemic. As for vaccination, Lithuanians have been more reluctant than most Western Europeans, but the country actually has one of the highest rates in Central Eastern Europe.
Citations:
The Economist, The pandemic’s true death toll, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/coronavirus-excess-deaths-estimates
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT, country report Lithuania 2019: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/2019-european-semester-country-report-lithuania_en.pdf
Murauskiene L, Janoniene R, Veniute M, van Ginneken E, Karanikolos M. Lithuania: health system review. Health Systems in Transition, 2013; 15(2): 1–150. http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/192130/HiT-Lithuania.pdf.
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To what extent do family support policies enable women to combine parenting with participation in the labor market?
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9
9
Family support policies effectively enable women to combine parenting with employment.
8
7
6
7
6
Family support policies provide some support for women who want to combine parenting and employment.
5
4
3
4
3
Family support policies provide only few opportunities for women who want to combine parenting and employment.
2
1
1
Family support policies force most women to opt for either parenting or employment.
Many Lithuanian families find it difficult to reconcile family and work commitments. According to the Flash Eurobarometer 470 released in October 2018, 47% of Lithuanian respondents indicated that there are no flexible work arrangements available in their organizations, compared to an EU-28 average of 31%. Interestingly, the rate of those indicating that flexible work arrangements were widespread was the same for both men and women. Nearly half of respondents (47%) disagreed that it was easier for women than for men to make use of such flexible work arrangements. However, more Lithuanians were taking parental leave (34%) than the EU-28 average (26%); 73% of Lithuanian women indicated taking parental leave compared to 30% of men. Among the factors that would encourage them to take parental leave, 51% of Lithuanian respondents preferred receiving additional financial compensation during parental leave (as compared to an EU-28 average of 41%).
The frequent incidence of domestic violence, divorce and single-parent families also present challenges. The country’s fertility rate is low in the global context, but average compared to other country’s examined in the SGI, and has also been gradually increasing over the last decade. The child poverty rate is average compared to other countries in the SGI report. The female labor force participation rate is very high – the highest among countries surveyed in the SGI report.
Lithuanian family policy is based on a set of passive (financial support to families) and active (social services and infrastructure) policy measures. The government provides some support for women seeking to combine parenting and employment, including family and social-welfare legislation (e.g., special conditions of the Labor Code applicable to families), financial assistance to families raising children (child benefits and partial housing subsidies), and social services targeted at both children and parents (including the provision of preschool education and psychiatric help for parents or children). Although access to kindergartens and other childcare facilities is still insufficient and there is a shortage of both full-time and part-time flexible employment opportunities in the labor market, a number of new initiatives emerged after 2015 municipal elections. The Vilnius municipal government has been among the most active groups in facilitating the establishment of private childcare facilities.
Overall, family policy is quite fragmented and focused on families facing particular social risks (especially through the provision of financial support to families with children). More attention should be paid to developing universal family services (with NGO engagement). The Skvernelis government gave substantial attention to family policy, and passed measures intended to help parents combine parenting and work as well as increases financial benefits for families with children. The Šimonytė government has continued increasing financial benefits, raised salaries for specialists in the field, and introduced some new services. For instance, from 2022, new preventive social services will be introduced; in addition, 250 individual care specialists will begin working to provide care services for families.
In April 2017, the Skvernelis government approved a proposal to increase financial incentives and services for young families and those having children. In November 2017, the controversial Law on the Strengthening of the Family was signed. Although supporters argued that the law is needed to coordinate family policies and provide basic family support services, opponents dismissed it as a selection of declarations and criticized its allegedly discriminatory nature in terms of gender. Also, a new strategy on demographic, migration and integration policy for 2018 to 2030 prioritizes the development of a family-friendly environment (through financial support to families and various public services) to increase the country’s birth rate to 1.9 by 2030 (from a projected rate of 1.68 in 2017).
Citations:
European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 470 Report on Work-Life Balance, October 2018: http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/survey/getsurveydetail/instruments/flash/surveyky/2185
The frequent incidence of domestic violence, divorce and single-parent families also present challenges. The country’s fertility rate is low in the global context, but average compared to other country’s examined in the SGI, and has also been gradually increasing over the last decade. The child poverty rate is average compared to other countries in the SGI report. The female labor force participation rate is very high – the highest among countries surveyed in the SGI report.
Lithuanian family policy is based on a set of passive (financial support to families) and active (social services and infrastructure) policy measures. The government provides some support for women seeking to combine parenting and employment, including family and social-welfare legislation (e.g., special conditions of the Labor Code applicable to families), financial assistance to families raising children (child benefits and partial housing subsidies), and social services targeted at both children and parents (including the provision of preschool education and psychiatric help for parents or children). Although access to kindergartens and other childcare facilities is still insufficient and there is a shortage of both full-time and part-time flexible employment opportunities in the labor market, a number of new initiatives emerged after 2015 municipal elections. The Vilnius municipal government has been among the most active groups in facilitating the establishment of private childcare facilities.
Overall, family policy is quite fragmented and focused on families facing particular social risks (especially through the provision of financial support to families with children). More attention should be paid to developing universal family services (with NGO engagement). The Skvernelis government gave substantial attention to family policy, and passed measures intended to help parents combine parenting and work as well as increases financial benefits for families with children. The Šimonytė government has continued increasing financial benefits, raised salaries for specialists in the field, and introduced some new services. For instance, from 2022, new preventive social services will be introduced; in addition, 250 individual care specialists will begin working to provide care services for families.
In April 2017, the Skvernelis government approved a proposal to increase financial incentives and services for young families and those having children. In November 2017, the controversial Law on the Strengthening of the Family was signed. Although supporters argued that the law is needed to coordinate family policies and provide basic family support services, opponents dismissed it as a selection of declarations and criticized its allegedly discriminatory nature in terms of gender. Also, a new strategy on demographic, migration and integration policy for 2018 to 2030 prioritizes the development of a family-friendly environment (through financial support to families and various public services) to increase the country’s birth rate to 1.9 by 2030 (from a projected rate of 1.68 in 2017).
Citations:
European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 470 Report on Work-Life Balance, October 2018: http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/survey/getsurveydetail/instruments/flash/surveyky/2185
Graph View
To what extent does pension policy realize goals of poverty prevention, intergenerational equity and fiscal sustainability?
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9
9
Pension policy achieves the objectives fully.
8
7
6
7
6
Pension policy achieves the objectives largely.
5
4
3
4
3
Pension policy achieves the objectives partly.
2
1
1
Pension policy does not achieve the objectives at all.
Lithuania’s pension system does not adequately protect recipients against old-age poverty. The share of the population over 65 years of age who are poor or suffer from social exclusion is well above the EU average; in the 2011 – 2017 period, pension growth lagged behind average wage growth. During the financial crisis, the Lithuanian authorities were forced to cut social expenditures (including pensions), thus increasing the risk of poverty for some retired people. However, pensions were restored to their pre-crisis levels as of 1 January 2012 and policymakers later decided to compensate pensioners for pension cuts made during the crisis. The Skvernelis government decided to allocate an additional €371.8 million for old-age pensions in 2018 and to reform the pension system by shifting responsibility for contributions to the state social security fund from employers to employees and by increasing contributions to private-savings pillars.
In terms of intergenerational equity, Lithuania’s three-pillar pension system, which mixes public and private pension programs, should ensure equity among pensioners, the active labor force and the adolescent generation. The 2004 pension reform added two privately funded pillars (a statutory pillar that receives a portion of mandatory state social-insurance contributions, and a voluntary pillar that is funded through private contributions) to the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) state insurance fund. However, this system as a whole suffered from instability and uncertainty; for instance, during the financial crisis, the government cut the share of social security contributions going to the second-pillar private pension funds from 5.5% to 1.5%. Beginning in 2013, this contribution was increased to 2.5%. Also in 2013, another change to the private-savings system was introduced that reduced the contribution level to 2%. Furthermore, it allowed individuals either to stop their private contributions or to gradually top up 2% from the social security contributions to the state insurance fund.
In 2016, the Lithuanian parliament approved a new “social model,” which includes three major changes to the state social-insurance pillar. First, the basic pension is state financed, with an individual share dependent on social security contributions and financed from the Social Security Fund. The Skvernelis government proposed going beyond consolidating the state budget and social security fund to reforming both the pay-as-you-go and private-savings pillars. On the basis of these proposals, the parliament adopted changes to the legislation governing the second pillar of the pension system in 2018. The reform abandoned the system whereby the State Social Insurance Fund Board transferred 2% of social-insurance contributions into the second-pillar pension funds. Instead, a new formula (4% + 2%) for pension accumulation was established. This means that pension-fund contributions comprise 4% of the participant’s personal income and 2% of the national average salary as a supplementary contribution paid out of the state budget. Second, clear pension indexation rules link pension increases to average increases in the wage fund. Third, the mandatory period a person must work before qualifying for a pension is gradually being increased from 30 to 35 years by 2027. These changes took effect in 2018.
The Šimonytė government has also increased pensions substantially – they are set to grow by 11% on average in 2022. The new government has also introduced changes to the pension system – in particular, even persons who have not accumulated the necessary work years will also receive a base pension rate. This should help with poverty rates among the elderly, although some analysts have expressed concerns over increasing politicization of the issue and potential disincentive effects. The average pension, which amounted to €255 in 2016, increased to €413 in 2021, and is set to go up to €534 in 2024.
In terms of fiscal stability, Lithuania’s pension system faces unfavorable demographic change ahead. The old-age dependency ratio is projected to more than double by 2060 as the working-age population shrinks by a projected 35.8%. The parliament approved a gradual increase in the age of pension eligibility to 65 years in 2011, and in 2012 changed the pension system’s second pillar to provide for a possible gradual increase in the share of social contributions received by private funds (however, only 33% of those who participated in the previous pension scheme decided to join a new scheme). The unsustainable pay-as-you-go pillar continues to pose a risk to the sustainability of public finances overall.
Citations:
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT, country report Lithuania 2019: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/2019-european-semester-country-report-lithuania_en.pdf
In terms of intergenerational equity, Lithuania’s three-pillar pension system, which mixes public and private pension programs, should ensure equity among pensioners, the active labor force and the adolescent generation. The 2004 pension reform added two privately funded pillars (a statutory pillar that receives a portion of mandatory state social-insurance contributions, and a voluntary pillar that is funded through private contributions) to the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) state insurance fund. However, this system as a whole suffered from instability and uncertainty; for instance, during the financial crisis, the government cut the share of social security contributions going to the second-pillar private pension funds from 5.5% to 1.5%. Beginning in 2013, this contribution was increased to 2.5%. Also in 2013, another change to the private-savings system was introduced that reduced the contribution level to 2%. Furthermore, it allowed individuals either to stop their private contributions or to gradually top up 2% from the social security contributions to the state insurance fund.
In 2016, the Lithuanian parliament approved a new “social model,” which includes three major changes to the state social-insurance pillar. First, the basic pension is state financed, with an individual share dependent on social security contributions and financed from the Social Security Fund. The Skvernelis government proposed going beyond consolidating the state budget and social security fund to reforming both the pay-as-you-go and private-savings pillars. On the basis of these proposals, the parliament adopted changes to the legislation governing the second pillar of the pension system in 2018. The reform abandoned the system whereby the State Social Insurance Fund Board transferred 2% of social-insurance contributions into the second-pillar pension funds. Instead, a new formula (4% + 2%) for pension accumulation was established. This means that pension-fund contributions comprise 4% of the participant’s personal income and 2% of the national average salary as a supplementary contribution paid out of the state budget. Second, clear pension indexation rules link pension increases to average increases in the wage fund. Third, the mandatory period a person must work before qualifying for a pension is gradually being increased from 30 to 35 years by 2027. These changes took effect in 2018.
The Šimonytė government has also increased pensions substantially – they are set to grow by 11% on average in 2022. The new government has also introduced changes to the pension system – in particular, even persons who have not accumulated the necessary work years will also receive a base pension rate. This should help with poverty rates among the elderly, although some analysts have expressed concerns over increasing politicization of the issue and potential disincentive effects. The average pension, which amounted to €255 in 2016, increased to €413 in 2021, and is set to go up to €534 in 2024.
In terms of fiscal stability, Lithuania’s pension system faces unfavorable demographic change ahead. The old-age dependency ratio is projected to more than double by 2060 as the working-age population shrinks by a projected 35.8%. The parliament approved a gradual increase in the age of pension eligibility to 65 years in 2011, and in 2012 changed the pension system’s second pillar to provide for a possible gradual increase in the share of social contributions received by private funds (however, only 33% of those who participated in the previous pension scheme decided to join a new scheme). The unsustainable pay-as-you-go pillar continues to pose a risk to the sustainability of public finances overall.
Citations:
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT, country report Lithuania 2019: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/2019-european-semester-country-report-lithuania_en.pdf
Graph View
How effectively do policies support the integration of migrants into society?
10
9
9
Cultural, education and social policies effectively support the integration of migrants into society.
8
7
6
7
6
Cultural, education and social policies seek to integrate migrants into society, but have failed to do so effectively.
5
4
3
4
3
Cultural, education and social policies do not focus on integrating migrants into society.
2
1
1
Cultural, education and social policies segregate migrant communities from the majority society.
Lithuania remains a rather homogeneous society. According to the Department of Migration, there were 87,269 foreign-born residents living in the country on 1 January 2021. In total, foreign nationals represented around 3.12% of the country’s population. The number increased by 18% during 2020. In the second half of 2020, after the repression of opposition and civil society figures in Belarus that followed presidential elections widely considered by the West not to be fair or free, Lithuania became one of the main destinations for citizens of Belarus fleeing their country, including key opposition figures. Political debates regarding the simplification of employment procedures and education opportunities for migrants from Belarus took place.
The year 2021 brought new substantial changes to the migration situation. In particular, following the political tensions, Belarus President Lukashenko’s regime started encouraging and arguably actively organizing migration flows into Lithuania (as well as Poland and Latvia) from places like the Middle East, Africa and Afghanistan. The number of illegal migrants started increasing very fast in the summer of 2021. In total, more than 4,000 illegal migrants arrived in Lithuania during 2021. Importantly, Lithuania shares a long and poorly guarded border with Belarus.
Initially, Lithuanian authorities followed the established procedures, which meant that all migrants seeking asylum had to be let in, and their applications processed. Nevertheless, in response to rapidly increasing flows, public fears and anticipation that even higher migration flows were forthcoming, the authorities changed their strategy. They declared a state of emergency (supported by most of the members of parliament belonging to the parties in government and the opposition), expanded the powers of the armed forces in support of the Border Security Service and the Public Security Service, started building a physical barrier with Belarus, and began physically deterring migrants from entering the country’s territory. There was a heated debate about the appropriate strategy, with some local and international observers, NGOs, and politicians criticizing the authorities for breaking international law and EU agreements and violating human rights, and others arguing that the nature of the challenge – perceived as “weaponization” of migration and hybrid war waged by Lukashenko – made this strategy indispensable. The latter position prevailed on the political level.
As part of the EU program to distribute asylum-seekers among member states, Lithuania had earlier committed to taking in 1,105 people over the course of two years, but this quota was later reduced to 1,077 people and extended to 1 October 2019. By late September 2018, 486 refugees had been relocated to Lithuania from Italy, Greece and Turkey. However, the majority of refugees ultimately left Lithuania for Sweden, Germany or other EU destinations. In November 2019, five people who received asylum and 137 who had applied for asylum were living in refugee reception centers. A total of 192 people who had been granted asylum and 154 who had been reallocated from other EU countries were participating in municipality integration programs.
Most of the country’s legal migrants, usually searching for jobs, come to Lithuania from either Ukraine or Belarus, both former republics of the Soviet Union. For this reason, their integration into Lithuanian society has not been very difficult, with most taking up jobs in sectors suffering a labor shortage, such as truck driving or construction. However, the majority of new asylum-seekers are from countries such as Iraq, the Republic of Congo, Syria, Cameroon or Afghanistan. This presents Lithuanian authorities with more complex integration challenges (unless the migrants decide to leave Lithuania). Furthermore, a number of developments call for the implementation of new integration measures, including the country’s rising flows of legal and illegal immigration; the economic recovery, which helped contribute to the recent increase in the number of work permits granted to third-country nationals; and the language and cultural problems faced by foreign residents in Lithuania.
Migrants from other EU member states tend to integrate into Lithuanian society more successfully than do third-country nationals. Various cultural, educational and social programs, including the provision of information, advisory, training services and Lithuanian language courses are aimed at integrating migrants into Lithuanian society. However, labor market services are not sufficiently developed in this regard, and foreign residents’ access to relevant education and training programs remains limited in practice. Moreover, new integration facilities and services are necessary in order to support the expected new surge of refugees.
Lithuania also arranged the arrival and integration of 14 Afghan families of translators who had helped Lithuanian military in the country. They were settled in the small town of Raseiniai, but most of them later left the town for bigger cities due to the lack of opportunities for work and study. After the military invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces in February 2022, it is likely that a wave of migrants from Ukraine might arrive in Lithuania, though the majority are likely to stay in Poland, where there is an estimated 1 million migrants from Ukraine.
Citations:
Joanna Hyndle-Hussein, Lithuania’s reactions to the escalating migration crisis, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2021-11-10/lithuanias-reactions-to-escalating-migration-crisis
Human Rights Monitoring Institute, REPORT ON ENSURING HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS IN PLACES OF TEMPORARY ACCOMMODATION OF FOREIGNERS HAVING CROSSED THE BORDER OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA WITH THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS, https://hrmi.lt/en/report-on-ensuring-human-rights-and-freedoms-in-places-of-temporary-accommodation-of-foreigners-having-crossed-the-border-of-the-republic-of-lithuania-with-the-republic-of-belarus/
The year 2021 brought new substantial changes to the migration situation. In particular, following the political tensions, Belarus President Lukashenko’s regime started encouraging and arguably actively organizing migration flows into Lithuania (as well as Poland and Latvia) from places like the Middle East, Africa and Afghanistan. The number of illegal migrants started increasing very fast in the summer of 2021. In total, more than 4,000 illegal migrants arrived in Lithuania during 2021. Importantly, Lithuania shares a long and poorly guarded border with Belarus.
Initially, Lithuanian authorities followed the established procedures, which meant that all migrants seeking asylum had to be let in, and their applications processed. Nevertheless, in response to rapidly increasing flows, public fears and anticipation that even higher migration flows were forthcoming, the authorities changed their strategy. They declared a state of emergency (supported by most of the members of parliament belonging to the parties in government and the opposition), expanded the powers of the armed forces in support of the Border Security Service and the Public Security Service, started building a physical barrier with Belarus, and began physically deterring migrants from entering the country’s territory. There was a heated debate about the appropriate strategy, with some local and international observers, NGOs, and politicians criticizing the authorities for breaking international law and EU agreements and violating human rights, and others arguing that the nature of the challenge – perceived as “weaponization” of migration and hybrid war waged by Lukashenko – made this strategy indispensable. The latter position prevailed on the political level.
As part of the EU program to distribute asylum-seekers among member states, Lithuania had earlier committed to taking in 1,105 people over the course of two years, but this quota was later reduced to 1,077 people and extended to 1 October 2019. By late September 2018, 486 refugees had been relocated to Lithuania from Italy, Greece and Turkey. However, the majority of refugees ultimately left Lithuania for Sweden, Germany or other EU destinations. In November 2019, five people who received asylum and 137 who had applied for asylum were living in refugee reception centers. A total of 192 people who had been granted asylum and 154 who had been reallocated from other EU countries were participating in municipality integration programs.
Most of the country’s legal migrants, usually searching for jobs, come to Lithuania from either Ukraine or Belarus, both former republics of the Soviet Union. For this reason, their integration into Lithuanian society has not been very difficult, with most taking up jobs in sectors suffering a labor shortage, such as truck driving or construction. However, the majority of new asylum-seekers are from countries such as Iraq, the Republic of Congo, Syria, Cameroon or Afghanistan. This presents Lithuanian authorities with more complex integration challenges (unless the migrants decide to leave Lithuania). Furthermore, a number of developments call for the implementation of new integration measures, including the country’s rising flows of legal and illegal immigration; the economic recovery, which helped contribute to the recent increase in the number of work permits granted to third-country nationals; and the language and cultural problems faced by foreign residents in Lithuania.
Migrants from other EU member states tend to integrate into Lithuanian society more successfully than do third-country nationals. Various cultural, educational and social programs, including the provision of information, advisory, training services and Lithuanian language courses are aimed at integrating migrants into Lithuanian society. However, labor market services are not sufficiently developed in this regard, and foreign residents’ access to relevant education and training programs remains limited in practice. Moreover, new integration facilities and services are necessary in order to support the expected new surge of refugees.
Lithuania also arranged the arrival and integration of 14 Afghan families of translators who had helped Lithuanian military in the country. They were settled in the small town of Raseiniai, but most of them later left the town for bigger cities due to the lack of opportunities for work and study. After the military invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces in February 2022, it is likely that a wave of migrants from Ukraine might arrive in Lithuania, though the majority are likely to stay in Poland, where there is an estimated 1 million migrants from Ukraine.
Citations:
Joanna Hyndle-Hussein, Lithuania’s reactions to the escalating migration crisis, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2021-11-10/lithuanias-reactions-to-escalating-migration-crisis
Human Rights Monitoring Institute, REPORT ON ENSURING HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS IN PLACES OF TEMPORARY ACCOMMODATION OF FOREIGNERS HAVING CROSSED THE BORDER OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA WITH THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS, https://hrmi.lt/en/report-on-ensuring-human-rights-and-freedoms-in-places-of-temporary-accommodation-of-foreigners-having-crossed-the-border-of-the-republic-of-lithuania-with-the-republic-of-belarus/
Graph View
How effectively does internal security policy protect citizens against security risks?
10
9
9
Internal security policy protects citizens against security risks very effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
Internal security policy protects citizens against security risks more or less effectively.
5
4
3
4
3
Internal security policy does not effectively protect citizens against security risks.
2
1
1
Internal security policy exacerbates the security risks.
Lithuania’s internal security has improved in recent decades, in part thanks to Lithuania’s accession to the European Union in 2004 and to the Schengen zone in 2007. These relationships improved police cooperation with the country’s EU peers and allowed the public security infrastructure, information systems and staff skills to be upgraded. Crime rates remain high compared to other countries in the SGI report, but have declined significantly over time, which is also reflected in surveys about feelings of safety. Road accidents have also declined substantially, whereas several years ago, one of the major policy problems was the so-called war on the roads. Another positive trend has been increasing levels of popular trust in the police and the legal system. In November 2021, 66% of respondents in Lithuania expressed confidence in the police (Vilmorus). The same amount of trust was expressed regarding the national military forces, and 54% trusted the border control services.
As a share of GDP, government expenditure on public order and safety has been gradually declining in the last decade, from 1.8% in 2011 to 1.4% in 2019 (below the EU average of 1.7%). Observers say that motivation, competence and stability within the police force (and other internal-security organizations) are among the most pressing challenges to improving public safety. The annual report of the Lithuanian Security Department highlighted threats linked to the activities of external intelligence services from neighboring non-NATO countries. The country has reconsidered its internal-security policies due to increasing threats associated with Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. A new long-term Public Security Development Program for 2015 – 2025, which aims at increasing public safety in the country, was adopted by the parliament in May 2015. In addition, in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and increase in its Baltic Sea Region military exercises, Lithuania reintroduced compulsory military conscriptions in 2015. Budgets now consistently contain funding for defense that equals 2% of GDP, sticking to the NATO pledge; moreover, calls to increase this spending to 2.5% of GDP were made after Russia started its war against Ukraine. The government also faced a very significant and multifaced challenge of dealing with the migration crisis, but eventually managed to control it, although arguably at the expense of breaching certain conventions on human rights. Threats from Russia, including its heavily militarized Kaliningrad region, and from Belarus, which hosted an estimated 30,000 Russian troops, thus acting as a base for their invasion of Ukraine, are currently by far the most important dangers to the country’s security.
As a share of GDP, government expenditure on public order and safety has been gradually declining in the last decade, from 1.8% in 2011 to 1.4% in 2019 (below the EU average of 1.7%). Observers say that motivation, competence and stability within the police force (and other internal-security organizations) are among the most pressing challenges to improving public safety. The annual report of the Lithuanian Security Department highlighted threats linked to the activities of external intelligence services from neighboring non-NATO countries. The country has reconsidered its internal-security policies due to increasing threats associated with Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. A new long-term Public Security Development Program for 2015 – 2025, which aims at increasing public safety in the country, was adopted by the parliament in May 2015. In addition, in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and increase in its Baltic Sea Region military exercises, Lithuania reintroduced compulsory military conscriptions in 2015. Budgets now consistently contain funding for defense that equals 2% of GDP, sticking to the NATO pledge; moreover, calls to increase this spending to 2.5% of GDP were made after Russia started its war against Ukraine. The government also faced a very significant and multifaced challenge of dealing with the migration crisis, but eventually managed to control it, although arguably at the expense of breaching certain conventions on human rights. Threats from Russia, including its heavily militarized Kaliningrad region, and from Belarus, which hosted an estimated 30,000 Russian troops, thus acting as a base for their invasion of Ukraine, are currently by far the most important dangers to the country’s security.
Graph View
To what extent does the government demonstrate an active and coherent commitment to promoting equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries?
10
9
9
The government actively and coherently engages in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries. It frequently demonstrates initiative and responsibility, and acts as an agenda-setter.
8
7
6
7
6
The government actively engages in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries. However, some of its measures or policies lack coherence.
5
4
3
4
3
The government shows limited engagement in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries. Many of its measures or policies lack coherence.
2
1
1
The government does not contribute (and often undermines) efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries.
Lithuania’s government participates in international efforts to promote socioeconomic opportunities in developing countries through its development-aid policy. Lithuania has provided development aid to Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, as well as to Afghanistan until mid-2021 (where it was involved in the civilian-military mission). This has been implemented through the country’s own development-aid and democracy-support program, as well as through the European Development Fund, to which it provides a financial contribution (representing 65% of the country’s total development aid). Moreover, in 2011 Lithuania joined the World Bank’s International Development Association, which provides loans and grants for anti-poverty programs. Although Lithuania committed to allocating 0.33% of its gross national income (GNI) to development aid by 2015 as part of its contribution to the U.N. Millennium Development Goals, actual levels of government expenditure remain under the target, reaching 0.14% of GNI in 2018 – an increase from 0.12% in 2019. In absolute terms, development aid increased from €63 million in 2018 to €70 million in 2020. The majority of the aid (around 80%) is multilateral. Lithuanians are less supportive of foreign aid than are many of their European peers. According to Eurobarometer, 16% of respondents in 2020 said that tackling poverty in developing countries was important (the EU average was 30%), an increase of three percentage points relative to 2019. A total of 10% said that tackling poverty should be among the main priorities for the national government (compared to an EU average of 21%), an increase of three percentage points compared to 2019.
According to a 2020 report, Lithuania’s strengths included a clear and functioning institutional setup, good competencies, and the practice of sharing its reform experiences with other Eastern Partnership countries (Zubė/Mizgerytė). As for deficiencies, apart from aid levels failing to reach commitments by a wide margin, the report identified problems with long-term planning, feeble societal support, limited participation by representatives of the business sector, insufficient involvement in the international aid ecosystem, and a lack of synergies between bilateral and multilateral aid efforts.
As a member of the EU, Lithuania is bound by the provisions of the EU’s common policy toward external trade. Although the EU generally maintains a position of openness with regard to trade and investments, it has retained some barriers to market access and other measures that distort international competition. In rare cases, Lithuania has adopted measures within the EU’s external trade regime that restrict trade (e.g., along with other countries, Lithuania prohibited import of a specific genetically modified maize, a measure related to consumer- and environmental-protection concerns, rather than being based on new or additional scientific information about the impact of GMOs). Despite being a small and open economy and officially advocating open global trade policies, Lithuania has often aligned itself in trade discussions with the EU’s most protectionist countries, especially on the application of such instruments as antidumping duties. It has also supported trade protection in the farming sector, backing EU import duties on key agricultural products that hurt developing countries specializing in agricultural exports.
In late 2021, after Lithuania agreed to let Taiwan open a diplomatic office in the country, China started obstructing trade with Lithuania and exerting informal pressure on companies from other EU countries to avoid using components made in Lithuania. The Lithuanian government appealed to the EU and its member states to respond with the anti-coercion measures recently presented by the European Commission. This is a sign of potential future tensions with authoritarian countries that might increasingly inhibit EU’s external trade relations, especially as the EU has responded with new sanctions against Russian officials, entities and sectors following that country’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Citations:
Julius Zubė and Vygantė Mizgerytė, Lietuvos vystomojo bendradarbiavimo politikos veiksmingumo vertinimas, 2020, http://kurklt.lt/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/ESAMOS-SITUACIJOS-ANALIZ%C4%96.pdf
The Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lithuanian development aid, 2013. http://www.orangeprojects.lt/site/newfiles/files/Lietuvos_vystomasis_bendradarbiavimas_2013.pdf;
https://orangeprojects.lt/en/statistics;
OECD, Lithuania’s Official Development Assistance (ODA), 2016: http://www.oecd.org/countries/lithuania/lithuania-official-development-assistance.htm.
European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 476 Report EU citizens and development cooperation, September 2018, http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/survey/getsurveydetail/instruments/special/surveyky/2202
Elsig, M., “European Union trade policy after enlargement: larger crowds, shifting priorities and informal decision-making,” Journal of European Public Policy, 17:6, September 2010, p. 781-798.
According to a 2020 report, Lithuania’s strengths included a clear and functioning institutional setup, good competencies, and the practice of sharing its reform experiences with other Eastern Partnership countries (Zubė/Mizgerytė). As for deficiencies, apart from aid levels failing to reach commitments by a wide margin, the report identified problems with long-term planning, feeble societal support, limited participation by representatives of the business sector, insufficient involvement in the international aid ecosystem, and a lack of synergies between bilateral and multilateral aid efforts.
As a member of the EU, Lithuania is bound by the provisions of the EU’s common policy toward external trade. Although the EU generally maintains a position of openness with regard to trade and investments, it has retained some barriers to market access and other measures that distort international competition. In rare cases, Lithuania has adopted measures within the EU’s external trade regime that restrict trade (e.g., along with other countries, Lithuania prohibited import of a specific genetically modified maize, a measure related to consumer- and environmental-protection concerns, rather than being based on new or additional scientific information about the impact of GMOs). Despite being a small and open economy and officially advocating open global trade policies, Lithuania has often aligned itself in trade discussions with the EU’s most protectionist countries, especially on the application of such instruments as antidumping duties. It has also supported trade protection in the farming sector, backing EU import duties on key agricultural products that hurt developing countries specializing in agricultural exports.
In late 2021, after Lithuania agreed to let Taiwan open a diplomatic office in the country, China started obstructing trade with Lithuania and exerting informal pressure on companies from other EU countries to avoid using components made in Lithuania. The Lithuanian government appealed to the EU and its member states to respond with the anti-coercion measures recently presented by the European Commission. This is a sign of potential future tensions with authoritarian countries that might increasingly inhibit EU’s external trade relations, especially as the EU has responded with new sanctions against Russian officials, entities and sectors following that country’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Citations:
Julius Zubė and Vygantė Mizgerytė, Lietuvos vystomojo bendradarbiavimo politikos veiksmingumo vertinimas, 2020, http://kurklt.lt/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/ESAMOS-SITUACIJOS-ANALIZ%C4%96.pdf
The Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lithuanian development aid, 2013. http://www.orangeprojects.lt/site/newfiles/files/Lietuvos_vystomasis_bendradarbiavimas_2013.pdf;
https://orangeprojects.lt/en/statistics;
OECD, Lithuania’s Official Development Assistance (ODA), 2016: http://www.oecd.org/countries/lithuania/lithuania-official-development-assistance.htm.
European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 476 Report EU citizens and development cooperation, September 2018, http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/survey/getsurveydetail/instruments/special/surveyky/2202
Elsig, M., “European Union trade policy after enlargement: larger crowds, shifting priorities and informal decision-making,” Journal of European Public Policy, 17:6, September 2010, p. 781-798.