Executive Accountability
#35Key Findings
With a number of accountability concerns, Mexico receives relatively low overall rankings (rank 35) with regard to executive accountability. Its score in this area has declined by 0.4 points relative to 2014.
The presidential and electoral systems have systematically weakened parliament and its members. The government’s strong support in the legislature has led to limited oversight. The audit office is independent, but has little ability to effect change. The current ombudsman is loyal to the president’s party, leading critics to question the office’s independence.
Policy knowledge varies by class and education level. Many citizens proved ill-informed on COVID-19 issues, undermining efforts to manage the pandemic. Rampant violence has produced significant self-censorship among journalists, particularly on security-related issues. The new government relies on social media to get around an oligopolistic media.
The current government has worked more closely with NGO and social movements than with employers’ associations or trade unions. A number of union leaders are facing corruption charges.
The presidential and electoral systems have systematically weakened parliament and its members. The government’s strong support in the legislature has led to limited oversight. The audit office is independent, but has little ability to effect change. The current ombudsman is loyal to the president’s party, leading critics to question the office’s independence.
Policy knowledge varies by class and education level. Many citizens proved ill-informed on COVID-19 issues, undermining efforts to manage the pandemic. Rampant violence has produced significant self-censorship among journalists, particularly on security-related issues. The new government relies on social media to get around an oligopolistic media.
The current government has worked more closely with NGO and social movements than with employers’ associations or trade unions. A number of union leaders are facing corruption charges.
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To what extent are citizens informed of public policies?
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Most citizens are well-informed of a broad range of public policies.
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Many citizens are well-informed of individual public policies.
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Few citizens are well-informed of public policies; most citizens have only a rudimental knowledge of public policies.
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Most citizens are not aware of public policies.
Socioeconomically, Mexico is a very internally divided country, which translates into uneven policy knowledge across the population. Due in part to its poverty levels, Mexico has the lowest performing students in the OECD and up to a third of the population has little more than primary education. However, at the other end of the scale, literally millions of Mexicans attend universities, and hundreds of thousands of Mexicans have attended foreign universities. There is, therefore, a marked split between a highly educated Mexico, which is concerned with the finer details of politics and policy, and a less politically and intellectually sophisticated Mexico composed of people who are mostly trying to get by. While better educated Mexicans are well-informed, poor and less educated citizens lack knowledge and interest in politics. The coronavirus pandemic clearly exposed this information gap in Mexican politics, as many Mexicans proved to be ill-informed about the policy measures needed to contain the pandemic.
In the latest survey by the National Bureau of Statistics (INEGI), 44.5% of respondents said that they were content with the quality of government services in 2017. In the latest National Survey on Political Culture (2012), 65% of respondents stated that they had little to no interest in politics, and 77% thought that government was an instrument of manipulation that benefits only politicians and wealthy people. More recent data is offered by the AmericasBarometer (2021): In Mexico, support for democracy fell from 70.2% in 2004 to 49.4% in 2017, and rose to 63% in 2021. But only 50% of Mexicans are satisfied with democracy as practiced in Mexico. President Peña Nieto and his government left office with historically low approval ratings. President López Obrador started with an extraordinary high level of popular support, reaching 71% in November 2018. After half of his term, he still enjoys the support of 65% of Mexicans (November 2021). However, according to the Latinobarometro Report 2021, important political institutions do not enjoy a high level of trust in Mexico. Only 24% of the population trusts the judiciary, 22% the police, 22% the Congress, and only 13% the political parties.
Citations:
INEGI (2018). ENCUESTA NACIONAL DE CALIDAD E IMPACTO GUBERNAMENTAL (ENCIG) 2017. http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/contenidos/saladeprensa/boletines/2018/EstSegPub/encig2018_03.pdf
ENCUP (2012). National Survey on Political Culture. http://www.encup.gob.mx/
AmericasBarometer (2018). THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN MEXICO AND IN THE AMERICAS, 2016/17. https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/mexico/AB2016-17_Mexico_Country_Report_English_V1_05.15.18_W_10.25.18.pdf.
INFORME LATINOBARÓMETRO 2018, http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp
In the latest survey by the National Bureau of Statistics (INEGI), 44.5% of respondents said that they were content with the quality of government services in 2017. In the latest National Survey on Political Culture (2012), 65% of respondents stated that they had little to no interest in politics, and 77% thought that government was an instrument of manipulation that benefits only politicians and wealthy people. More recent data is offered by the AmericasBarometer (2021): In Mexico, support for democracy fell from 70.2% in 2004 to 49.4% in 2017, and rose to 63% in 2021. But only 50% of Mexicans are satisfied with democracy as practiced in Mexico. President Peña Nieto and his government left office with historically low approval ratings. President López Obrador started with an extraordinary high level of popular support, reaching 71% in November 2018. After half of his term, he still enjoys the support of 65% of Mexicans (November 2021). However, according to the Latinobarometro Report 2021, important political institutions do not enjoy a high level of trust in Mexico. Only 24% of the population trusts the judiciary, 22% the police, 22% the Congress, and only 13% the political parties.
Citations:
INEGI (2018). ENCUESTA NACIONAL DE CALIDAD E IMPACTO GUBERNAMENTAL (ENCIG) 2017. http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/contenidos/saladeprensa/boletines/2018/EstSegPub/encig2018_03.pdf
ENCUP (2012). National Survey on Political Culture. http://www.encup.gob.mx/
AmericasBarometer (2018). THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN MEXICO AND IN THE AMERICAS, 2016/17. https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/mexico/AB2016-17_Mexico_Country_Report_English_V1_05.15.18_W_10.25.18.pdf.
INFORME LATINOBARÓMETRO 2018, http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp
Does the government publish data and information in a way that strengthens citizens’ capacity to hold the government accountable?
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The government publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
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The government most of the time publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
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The government publishes data in a limited and not timely or user-friendly way.
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The government publishes (almost) no relevant data.
Mexico’s access to information law from 2003 guarantees the public’s right to request and receive information from the federal government. With the law, Mexico created the innovative Federal Institute for Access to Information (Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información Pública – IFAI), which helps citizens to collect data and information. The government of President López Obrador is pursuing a more transparent policy toward citizens. The president’s daily press conferences symbolize this new openness. But on the other hand, the press conference is also used to avoid critical questions and circumvent independent media, expressing the top-down character of López Obrador’s information policy. Additionally, government communication policies at the national and subnational levels, especially regarding the war on drugs, cannot be considered very transparent. Another example can be seen in the data provided on the COVID-19 pandemic, which was rather (mis-)used by government to legitimize government policies rather than being a source of neutral and reliable information.
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Do members of parliament have adequate personnel and structural resources to monitor government activity effectively?
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring all government activity effectively.
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring a government’s major activities.
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
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The resources provided to the members of parliament are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
The Mexican presidential system, with its emphasis on the presidential government, and the electoral system have systematically weakened parliament and members of parliament. Formally, Congress is well staffed and sufficiently financed to fulfill its duties. Members of Congress were until recently prohibited from running for re-election. This system was intended to bring legislators closer to civil society, but it had weakened the legislative role and increased the power of party bosses. The most senior members largely control Congress. They tend to control the careers of more junior congressional members because the effect of Mexico’s strong no re-election rule prevents members of Congress from using their constituency as a political base. In turn, members tended to lack resources and legislative scrutiny was often perfunctory. Similarly, members have had little incentive to take a deep interest in lawmaking, because their term as incumbents was so short. Moreover, good legislative performance often went unrewarded in local or national politics.
Since 2018, local representatives, city council members and mayors have been able to run for reelection. Senators and federal representatives in Congress will have to wait until 2024 before they are able to run for two consecutive terms in a row; thus, the midterm elections of 2021 were still functioning under the traditional no-reelection condition.
Since 2018, local representatives, city council members and mayors have been able to run for reelection. Senators and federal representatives in Congress will have to wait until 2024 before they are able to run for two consecutive terms in a row; thus, the midterm elections of 2021 were still functioning under the traditional no-reelection condition.
Are parliamentary committees able to ask for government documents?
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Parliamentary committees may ask for most or all government documents; they are normally delivered in full and within an appropriate time frame.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are slightly limited; some important documents are not delivered or are delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are considerably limited; most important documents are not delivered or delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
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Parliamentary committees may not request government documents.
The constitution invests Congress with significant powers. However, until recently, the independence of Congress was undermined by legislation that blocked congressional members from being immediately re-elected. This ban made congressional members dependent on a few powerful leaders who controlled access to resources and increased traditional personalistic and clientelist party structures. For this political, rather than legal, reason congressional committees voted largely along party lines and legislative scrutiny was generally perfunctory. For example, congressional members are legally entitled to request and scrutinize government documentation under the Freedom of Information Act. While the ban on being immediately re-elected has been abolished, it is too early to assess the effect of this change on legislative scrutiny.
Are parliamentary committees able to summon ministers for hearings?
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Parliamentary committees may summon ministers. Ministers regularly follow invitations and are obliged to answer questions.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are slightly limited; ministers occasionally refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are considerably limited; ministers frequently refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
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Parliamentary committees may not summon ministers.
Under Article 93 of the constitution, parliamentary committees have the right to summon ministers, which happens quite a lot in practice.
Regarding the resources of legislators to monitor the government, it is worth noting that – through legislative committees – they can (and frequently do) conduct hearings where they summon ministers as well as other public officials, who have an obligation to attend. It is often the case that hearings are held right after Annual Presidential Reports to go over evidence and documents supporting the president’s claims on their respective offices (similar to the State of the Union Address in the United States). While these resources are relevant and useful for monitoring, they very rarely have meaningful consequences for public officials (positive or negative).
In reality, the majority of MORENA and its allies in Congress support President López Obrador. This has led to a unified government with power concentrated in the executive, which has in turn undermined the legislature’s oversight function. In the midterm elections of 2021, the governing coalition lost the supermajority needed to change the constitution, but retained a simple majority in Congress.
Regarding the resources of legislators to monitor the government, it is worth noting that – through legislative committees – they can (and frequently do) conduct hearings where they summon ministers as well as other public officials, who have an obligation to attend. It is often the case that hearings are held right after Annual Presidential Reports to go over evidence and documents supporting the president’s claims on their respective offices (similar to the State of the Union Address in the United States). While these resources are relevant and useful for monitoring, they very rarely have meaningful consequences for public officials (positive or negative).
In reality, the majority of MORENA and its allies in Congress support President López Obrador. This has led to a unified government with power concentrated in the executive, which has in turn undermined the legislature’s oversight function. In the midterm elections of 2021, the governing coalition lost the supermajority needed to change the constitution, but retained a simple majority in Congress.
Are parliamentary committees able to summon experts for committee meetings?
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Parliamentary committees may summon experts.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are slightly limited.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are considerably limited.
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Parliamentary committees may not summon experts.
Congressional committees frequently summon experts, including international ones, and often take their input seriously. Indeed, there is evidence that experts play a considerable role in the legislative process. This aspect of governance mostly works well, because it provides a source of independent scrutiny.
Are the task areas and structures of parliamentary committees suited to monitor ministries effectively?
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The match between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are well-suited to the effective monitoring of ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are largely suited to the monitoring ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are partially suited to the monitoring of ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are not at all suited to the monitoring of ministries.
There are far more committees than members of the cabinet. This is negative from the point of view of effective monitoring. Yet there are more significant obstacles to the effectiveness of congressional committees than their official scope. The most notable limitation has been the one-term limit for legislators, which has now been changed. However, it is too early to assess the effect of this change.
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To what extent do media in your country analyze the rationale and impact of public policies?
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A clear majority of mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies.
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About one-half of the mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies. The rest produces a mix of infotainment and quality information content.
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A clear minority of mass media brands focuses on high-quality information content analyzing public policies. Several mass media brands produce superficial infotainment content only.
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All mass media brands are dominated by superficial infotainment content.
The quality of the media is mixed. The quality of some Mexico City newspapers and magazines is high, but the majority of the press, and particularly radio and TV focus mainly on entertainment. This is particularly troublesome as there is a high degree of media concentration, with only two national TV companies (Televisa and TV Azteca) controlling 94% of commercial TV frequencies. These companies have similar programming and political inclinations, and account for 76% of the political news content consumed by Mexicans. The Mexican NGO Centro Nacional de Comunicación Social claims that the concentration of media ownership in only a few hands undermines media pluralism. On the supply side, producing high-quality journalism remains a challenge. Particularly on security-related issues, the increasing levels of violence against individuals and organizations producing critical and investigative journalism often results in self-censorship.
At the same time, media diversity has strongly increased in the last decade, largely thanks to online media, and Mexicans do have access to high-quality offerings if they are interested. Moreover, information on Mexican politics is easily accessible from U.S.-based and Latin American media outlets. However, this diversity in content and quality has little impact for the majority of the population, as only a very small minority of Mexicans use the internet and newspapers as their main sources of political information.
President López Obrador’s government is critical of the media, with the president personally criticizing the mainstream media for condoning fraud in previous elections and allegedly treating him unfairly. Social media plays a more important role for the new government. With his daily press conference, broadcast on YouTube, López Obrador avoids critical questions and circumvents traditional media, while also establishing a direct link to the people in a typically populist manner.
Citations:
MOM (2018). Media Ownership Monitor Mexico: Who owns the media?. http://mexico.mom-rsf.org/
At the same time, media diversity has strongly increased in the last decade, largely thanks to online media, and Mexicans do have access to high-quality offerings if they are interested. Moreover, information on Mexican politics is easily accessible from U.S.-based and Latin American media outlets. However, this diversity in content and quality has little impact for the majority of the population, as only a very small minority of Mexicans use the internet and newspapers as their main sources of political information.
President López Obrador’s government is critical of the media, with the president personally criticizing the mainstream media for condoning fraud in previous elections and allegedly treating him unfairly. Social media plays a more important role for the new government. With his daily press conference, broadcast on YouTube, López Obrador avoids critical questions and circumvents traditional media, while also establishing a direct link to the people in a typically populist manner.
Citations:
MOM (2018). Media Ownership Monitor Mexico: Who owns the media?. http://mexico.mom-rsf.org/
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How inclusive and open are the major parties in their internal decision-making processes?
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The party allows all party members and supporters to participate in its decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and agendas of issues are open.
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The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, all party members have the opportunity to participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are rather open.
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The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, a number of elected delegates participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are largely controlled by the party leadership.
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A number of party leaders participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are fully controlled and drafted by the party leadership.
In terms of candidate selection, it is normal for the presidential candidate of each of the major parties to participate in some kind of primary election. The selection of candidates in all parties for the 2018 elections was unusual. The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) selected José Antonio Meade, a former finance minister, who was not a party member. The Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and the National Action Party (PAN) agreed to present a common candidate, Ricardo Anaya, following bitter internal debates because of the strange left-right-coalition. MORENA, a rather personalistic movement, selected former PRD-politician Andrés Manuel López Obrador.
Candidate nomination for other mandates vary from state to state and from municipality to municipality because of the federal system. PRI, the governing party, tends to be rather secretive, clientelist and hierarchical. Meanwhile, MORENA tends to be heavily reliant on the personality of its leader, AMLO. PAN is much more of a members’ party, with a degree of internal democracy, but an exclusionary attitude toward non-party members. The question of which party is in government is also crucial. Incumbent parties tend to be more internally authoritarian because of their greater patronage resources. In general, the PRI is probably the most controlled and authoritarian of the major parties.
In terms of candidates to both chambers of Congress, all parties are dominated by a leadership elite which makes all relevant decisions. They can operate in this exclusionary way because they are in control of the delegates’ votes. When the candidate lists are chosen, delegates will vote as their respective leaders indicate.
The current governing party, MORENA, promised during the election campaign to change the country’s political culture and adopt a more open process in its politics. To date, the results have been ambivalent. On the one hand, MORENA is highly hierarchical, and decisions are made by the undisputed leader, President López Obrador, in a traditional caudillo-like style. On the other hand, several elements of participatory democracy have been introduced, such as the introduction of the recall referendum that was scheduled for 2022. This constitutional change enables voters to remove the president and governors after the middle of their term. Although participation in direct democratic mechanisms has to date been very limited, future use could change the country’s political culture.
Citations:
Greene, K./Sánchez-Talanquer, M (2018). Mexico’s Party System Under Stress. Journal of Democracy, 29, 4, October 2018: 31-42.
Candidate nomination for other mandates vary from state to state and from municipality to municipality because of the federal system. PRI, the governing party, tends to be rather secretive, clientelist and hierarchical. Meanwhile, MORENA tends to be heavily reliant on the personality of its leader, AMLO. PAN is much more of a members’ party, with a degree of internal democracy, but an exclusionary attitude toward non-party members. The question of which party is in government is also crucial. Incumbent parties tend to be more internally authoritarian because of their greater patronage resources. In general, the PRI is probably the most controlled and authoritarian of the major parties.
In terms of candidates to both chambers of Congress, all parties are dominated by a leadership elite which makes all relevant decisions. They can operate in this exclusionary way because they are in control of the delegates’ votes. When the candidate lists are chosen, delegates will vote as their respective leaders indicate.
The current governing party, MORENA, promised during the election campaign to change the country’s political culture and adopt a more open process in its politics. To date, the results have been ambivalent. On the one hand, MORENA is highly hierarchical, and decisions are made by the undisputed leader, President López Obrador, in a traditional caudillo-like style. On the other hand, several elements of participatory democracy have been introduced, such as the introduction of the recall referendum that was scheduled for 2022. This constitutional change enables voters to remove the president and governors after the middle of their term. Although participation in direct democratic mechanisms has to date been very limited, future use could change the country’s political culture.
Citations:
Greene, K./Sánchez-Talanquer, M (2018). Mexico’s Party System Under Stress. Journal of Democracy, 29, 4, October 2018: 31-42.
To what extent are economic interest associations (e.g., employers, industry, labor) capable of formulating relevant policies?
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Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
With regard to economic interest organizations, there is clear asymmetry. Trade unions are not sophisticated organizations in Mexico, while employers and business associations mostly are. However, these organizations tend to be dominated by a small group of empowered agents who guide most of their policy positions and decision-making processes. The collective interest of those supposedly represented by the association is seldom the one that prevails. A good example of this is the Employers Confederation of the Mexican (COPARMEX): it would be in their best interest to push for a tax consolidation (combined reporting) reform. However, because it is not in the interest of the most influential members of the organization (frequently owners of the largest companies in the country), this issue is almost completely out of the organization’s agenda.
Due to the anti-corruption efforts of the new government, several union leaders are facing corruption charges, including the leader of Pemex’s workers’ union. In addition, the former CEO of Pemex is also facing corruption charges.
In contrast to its predecessors, the new government is cooperating more with NGOs, and social movements and activists, which has at least partly counterbalanced the traditional weight of established interest associations.
Due to the anti-corruption efforts of the new government, several union leaders are facing corruption charges, including the leader of Pemex’s workers’ union. In addition, the former CEO of Pemex is also facing corruption charges.
In contrast to its predecessors, the new government is cooperating more with NGOs, and social movements and activists, which has at least partly counterbalanced the traditional weight of established interest associations.
To what extent are non-economic interest associations capable of formulating relevant policies?
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Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
Against the background of corporatist authoritarianism in 20th century Mexico, economic interest groups in democratic Mexico could draw on many associational experiences. Moreover, since the early 2000s, there has been a considerable increase in the quantity and the sophistication of noneconomic interest groups in Mexican civil society. Many talented graduates have found positions in domestic and international NGOs, and work to influence policy in Mexico via advocacy-oriented strategies. Several tertiary-education institutes (e.g., ITAM, Colmex, CIDE) both teach and conduct public policy research, and some are highly influential in the political sphere as think tanks and/or advocacy institutions, often through the personal linkages to the government and its administration. Furthermore, there has been an increase in the number of national and international advocacy NGOs that, depending on the sector and the government in place, are also relevant in the agenda-setting process. Moreover, many grassroots organizations founded in the last 10 years aim to influence local and regional policymaking. Finally, the degree of movement of personnel between NGOs, think tanks and government is high compared to other OECD countries. While the capacity of most of these organizations to propose policy reforms in complex policy settings is rather restricted, it has been growing steadily and their role influencing public opinion is more relevant every year. Examples of these associations include IMCO, Mexico Evalua and Mexicanos Primero, which have been able to affect the policy agenda of the government in the last years on issues related to transparency, accountability and development effectiveness.
The record of the new government of President López Obrador and his party MORENA toward social movements and NGOs has been mixed so far. On the one hand, MORENA is associated with social movements and is trying to establish a new style in Mexican politics, away from traditional vested interests. On the other hand, the government’s austerity measures have cut state subsidies for NGOS, for which NGOs have heavily criticized the government. Moreover, the populist legacy of the current government also indicates tensions between “popular consultation” on the one hand and top-down, populist decision-making on the other. Mexico nonetheless has a very lively civil society.
Citations:
El Universal (2018). Mexican NGOs to keep working on the development of civil society. http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/english/mexican-ngos-keep-working-development-civil-society
The record of the new government of President López Obrador and his party MORENA toward social movements and NGOs has been mixed so far. On the one hand, MORENA is associated with social movements and is trying to establish a new style in Mexican politics, away from traditional vested interests. On the other hand, the government’s austerity measures have cut state subsidies for NGOS, for which NGOs have heavily criticized the government. Moreover, the populist legacy of the current government also indicates tensions between “popular consultation” on the one hand and top-down, populist decision-making on the other. Mexico nonetheless has a very lively civil society.
Citations:
El Universal (2018). Mexican NGOs to keep working on the development of civil society. http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/english/mexican-ngos-keep-working-development-civil-society
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Does there exist an independent and effective audit office?
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There exists an effective and independent audit office.
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There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is slightly limited.
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There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
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There does not exist an independent and effective audit office.
The federal Superior Audit Office (ASF) was set up in 2001 to help the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of the National Congress, and it has technical and managerial autonomy. In practice, the audit office shows a high degree of independence, but little sanctioning power. The audit office is accountable to parliament exclusively. Over the last decade, the audit office has become stronger in technical terms, but remains incapable of fully covering all relevant topics. A central problem remains impunity, a challenge which has become more and more severe over the last decade, and undermines the authority of the institution.
In general, President López Obrador intends to reform the constitution to limit the number and competences of independent and autonomous bodies, with the goal of concentrating competences in the executive. The debates over the issue and the stated intention to bring about the change have already limited the oversight function exerted by independent bodies.
Citations:
OECD 2017: Mexico’s National Auditing System. Strengthening Accountable Governance, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264264748-en
In general, President López Obrador intends to reform the constitution to limit the number and competences of independent and autonomous bodies, with the goal of concentrating competences in the executive. The debates over the issue and the stated intention to bring about the change have already limited the oversight function exerted by independent bodies.
Citations:
OECD 2017: Mexico’s National Auditing System. Strengthening Accountable Governance, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264264748-en
Does there exist an independent and effective ombuds office?
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There exists an effective and independent ombuds office.
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There exists an effective and independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is slightly limited.
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There exists an independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is considerably limited.
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There does not exist an effective and independent ombuds office.
During its process of political liberalization, Mexico established an Ombudsman’s Office in 1992. The office is generally respected, and the ombudsman can, and sometimes does, criticize government policy. In 2007, the ombudsman publicly advised President Calderón not to use the army in counter-narcotics activities. Calderón nevertheless sent troops in, which provoked an ongoing discussion on the army’s domestic tasks. More recently, the limited de facto power of the institution has become visible particularly in the field of domestic security (e.g., drug crime, human rights abuses). In short, while Mexico has an independent and respected Ombudsman’s Office, it is not necessarily powerful, particularly against the backdrop of an unprecedented spread of violence in recent years.
Under the new government of López Obrador, the ombudsman is a loyal MORENA supporter, which has led to criticism of the office’s lack of independence. In general, President López Obrador intends to reform the constitution so as to limit the number and competences of independent and autonomous bodies, with the goal of concentrating competences in the executive. However, there have as yet been no signs that the Ombudsman’s Office is to be included in this revision.
Under the new government of López Obrador, the ombudsman is a loyal MORENA supporter, which has led to criticism of the office’s lack of independence. In general, President López Obrador intends to reform the constitution so as to limit the number and competences of independent and autonomous bodies, with the goal of concentrating competences in the executive. However, there have as yet been no signs that the Ombudsman’s Office is to be included in this revision.
Is there an independent authority in place that effectively holds government offices accountable for handling issues of data protection and privacy?
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An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
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7
6
An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is slightly limited.
5
4
3
4
3
A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are strongly limited.
2
1
1
There is no effective and independent data protection office.
Legislation on data protection in Mexico has been ineffective since 2010. The National Institute for Transparency, Access to Information and Personal Data Protection (INAI) is an autonomous constitutional body that oversees data protection. Implementation of data protection is limited, especially in remote areas, for poor and uneducated people, and where security issues are involved. Thus, while there is an adequate institutional framework and organizational setup, the reality of data protection, particularly at the lower levels of government, is sobering. In general, President López Obrador intends to reform the constitution to limit the number and competences of independent and autonomous bodies, with the goal of concentrating competences in the executive. The debates over the issue and the stated intention to bring about the change have already limited the oversight function exerted by independent bodies.