Poland

   

Executive Accountability

#30
Key Findings
With polarization levels high, Poland receives comparatively low rankings (rank 30) with regard to executive accountability. Its score on this measure has declined by 1.5 points since 2014.

Parliamentarians’ oversight powers have been eroded. The audit office has effectively exposed government abuses. The ombudsman, rather than the data protection authority, ultimately spoke out against pandemic-era data privacy issues and the government’s use of spyware.

While citizens’ policy knowledge remains low on average, dissatisfaction with the government’s policies has heightened many people’s interest in politics. The public media now serves as a government mouthpiece. Citizen trust in the various public or private media organizations follows the patterns of strong political polarization.

The PIS is hierarchically organized, while rival parties allow members a greater say in internal policies. The trade unions’ once-friendly relations with the PiS have deteriorated due to COVID-19 decisions. Most independent NGOs are relatively small, but many can still produce well-developed policy proposals.

Citizens’ Participatory Competence

#35

To what extent are citizens informed of public policies?

10
 9

Most citizens are well-informed of a broad range of public policies.
 8
 7
 6


Many citizens are well-informed of individual public policies.
 5
 4
 3


Few citizens are well-informed of public policies; most citizens have only a rudimental knowledge of public policies.
 2
 1

Most citizens are not aware of public policies.
Political Knowledge
5
The average level of knowledge regarding government policy within the Polish public is limited. Many citizens have little knowledge regarding major political and public institutions and are unfamiliar with basic political facts (Cześnik/ Wenzel 2018). Reasons for this low level of policy knowledge include a tendency toward infotainment in many media outlets, the populist propaganda produced by the government party, and a general detachment from politics among citizens. Moreover, political parties (most of which lack a broad membership base), trade unions, and most other professional associations do not adequately perform their socialization function and do not work to improve their members’ policy knowledge. However, an important segment of society has become more interested in politics due to strong dissatisfaction with the PiS government’s policies and the polarization of society. This has become visible, for example, in public participation in demonstrations and campaigns, and the relatively high electoral turnout in the 2020 presidential elections.

Citations:
Cześnik, M, M Wenzel (2018): Wiedza polityczna Polaków w perspektywie porównawczej, in: Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne 57: 103-123 (https://czasopisma.marszalek.com.pl/images/pliki/apsp/57/apsp5706.pdf).

Does the government publish data and information in a way that strengthens citizens’ capacity to hold the government accountable?

10
 9

The government publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
 8
 7
 6


The government most of the time publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
 5
 4
 3


The government publishes data in a limited and not timely or user-friendly way.
 2
 1

The government publishes (almost) no relevant data.
Open Government
5
Poland is not a member of the Open Government Partnership. Still, the PiS government has expanded digital access to public administration and government data, and runs an open data portal (https://dane.gov.pl). In response to the European Commission’s new 2020 European Data Strategy, the government adopted a new medium-term data opening strategy in March 2021. This strategy aims to increase the number of available data resources from 19,000 in 2021 to 55,000 in 2027. However, the provision of data does not primarily aim to foster citizens’ participatory competence. This is clearly shown by the government’s selective and biased publication of information related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The government ignored calls by the Presidium of the Main Council of Doctors (Naczelna Rada Lekarska) to regularly publish data on COVID-19 infections among medical staff. Likewise, when Michał Rogalski, a 19-year-old high school student gathering data on the COVID-19 pandemic, found out that the infection numbers published by the subnational sanitary authorities did not add up to the totals presented by the government, the government responded by ceasing to publish the powiat-level data (Jaraczewski 2021). Given the gaps and inconsistencies in official data, many epidemiologists have preferred to work with the data gathered by Rogalski and his supporters.

Citations:
Jaraczewski, J. (2021): The New Normal? – Emergency Measures in Response to the Second COVID-19 Wave in Poland, in: Verfassungsblog, March 24 (https://verfassungsblog.de/the-new-normal-emergency-measures-in-response-to-the-second-covid-19-wave-in-poland/).

Legislative Actors’ Resources

#34

Do members of parliament have adequate personnel and structural resources to monitor government activity effectively?

10
 9

The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring all government activity effectively.
 8
 7
 6


The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring a government’s major activities.
 5
 4
 3


The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
 2
 1

The resources provided to the members of parliament are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
Parliamentary Resources
6
The members of the Sejm, the Polish parliament, have permanent support staff and can draw on the Sejm’s library and the expertise of the Sejm’s Bureau of Research (BAS). In addition to researching legal issues, the BAS publishes a newsletter, discussion papers, and a peer-reviewed quarterly Law Review (Zeszyty Prawnicze BAS). Since PiS’s victory in the 2015 and 2019 parliamentary elections, however, the BAS has been progressively streamlined so as to reflect the political will of the ruling party. As a result, the quality of its expertise has declined, and it no longer issues critical studies.

Are parliamentary committees able to ask for government documents?

10
 9

Parliamentary committees may ask for most or all government documents; they are normally delivered in full and within an appropriate time frame.
 8
 7
 6


The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are slightly limited; some important documents are not delivered or are delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
 5
 4
 3


The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are considerably limited; most important documents are not delivered or delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
 2
 1

Parliamentary committees may not request government documents.
Obtaining Documents
6
On paper, parliamentary committees have full access to government documents. Members of parliament may demand information from government officials, either in written or verbal form, at the Sejm plenary or a committee meeting. Since the 2015 change in government, however, it has become increasingly difficult for opposition members of the Sejm to obtain government documents and receive them in good time. The government has also failed to deliver the correct documents in some cases.

Are parliamentary committees able to summon ministers for hearings?

10
 9

Parliamentary committees may summon ministers. Ministers regularly follow invitations and are obliged to answer questions.
 8
 7
 6


The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are slightly limited; ministers occasionally refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
 5
 4
 3


The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are considerably limited; ministers frequently refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
 2
 1

Parliamentary committees may not summon ministers.
Summoning Ministers
7
Ministers and heads of the supreme organs of state administration (or their representatives) are obliged to participate in committee meetings whenever issues are discussed that fall within their domain. Groups comprising at least 15 members of parliament and parliamentary party groups have the right to ask for up-to-date information from members of the government. The PiS government has taken the summoning of ministers less seriously than previous governments. Ministers have occasionally refused to follow invitations or to answer questions.

Are parliamentary committees able to summon experts for committee meetings?

10
 9

Parliamentary committees may summon experts.
 8
 7
 6


The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are slightly limited.
 5
 4
 3


The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are considerably limited.
 2
 1

Parliamentary committees may not summon experts.
Summoning Experts
7
Parliamentary committees have the right to invite experts to give statements on hearings on particular issues or to take part in ordinary committee proceedings. However, suppose bills are introduced by individual members of parliament (as has often been the case under the PiS government). In that case, the summoning of experts must be supported by a majority of members of parliament. The PiS majority in the Sejm has used this procedural rule to limit the invitation of experts close to the parliamentary opposition. Given the maneuvering of the PiS in the Sejm, some experts have refrained from participating in what they consider political manipulation.

Are the task areas and structures of parliamentary committees suited to monitor ministries effectively?

10
 9

The match between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are well-suited to the effective monitoring of ministries.
 8
 7
 6


The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are largely suited to the monitoring ministries.
 5
 4
 3


The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are partially suited to the monitoring of ministries.
 2
 1

The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are not at all suited to the monitoring of ministries.
Task Area Congruence
8
The number of Sejm committees exceeds the number of ministries. However, most ministries, including the more important ones, have only a single oversight committee, a so-called branch committee. Thus, the distribution of subject areas among committees does not infringe upon parliament’s ability to monitor ministries.

Media

#25

To what extent do media in your country analyze the rationale and impact of public policies?

10
 9

A clear majority of mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies.
 8
 7
 6


About one-half of the mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies. The rest produces a mix of infotainment and quality information content.
 5
 4
 3


A clear minority of mass media brands focuses on high-quality information content analyzing public policies. Several mass media brands produce superficial infotainment content only.
 2
 1

All mass media brands are dominated by superficial infotainment content.
Media Reporting
5
In Poland, the division of the media is less about information or entertainment than about political divides. Government decisions are widely covered by all main TV and radio stations, but there are few print outlets, and TV and radio stations that have been able to resist political pressure. Due to its biased approach, the public TVP is often referred to as TV-PiS. Jacek Kurski, a PiS party ideologist, is still the TV director, and he hired several party loyal journalists to be anchors for the news shows and other relevant positions. The leading news show on TVP – Wiadomosci – has lost almost 20% of its viewers since 2015. In the private media, despite a tendency toward infotainment, the quality of reporting, especially of the two major TV companies, POLSAT and TVN, has increased. Rzeczpospolita, the second-largest daily paper in Poland, has benefited from a change in ownership and editorial staff and has become less politically partisan. Generally, survey respondents’ party affiliations continue to influence the level to which they trust public or private TV and radio organizations (CBOS 2020). In 2020, 86% of PiS supporters thought the TVP public TV station is “good,” while only 8% of the supporters of the oppositional Civic Coalition (KO) held the same opinion. By contrast, 82% of KO supporters trusted TVN, for PiS supporters at least 45% supported that view.

Citations:
CBOS (2020): Opinie o stacjach telewizyjnych i radiowych. Kommunikat z Bada, No. 147/2020, Warsaw (https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2020/K_147_20.PDF).

Parties and Interest Associations

#26

How inclusive and open are the major parties in their internal decision-making processes?

10
 9

The party allows all party members and supporters to participate in its decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and agendas of issues are open.
 8
 7
 6


The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, all party members have the opportunity to participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are rather open.
 5
 4
 3


The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, a number of elected delegates participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are largely controlled by the party leadership.
 2
 1

A number of party leaders participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are fully controlled and drafted by the party leadership.
Intra-party Decision-Making
5
For the last decade, political parties have functioned under legislation that strictly defines the role of a political party and how parties are financed. Since most funding is public, the government mandates that democratic principles govern parties themselves. However, the reality is mixed, with some parties meeting democratic standards while others fall short (Wincławska et al. 2021). While in the 2015 parliamentary elections, only two parties – the Law and Justice Party (PiS) and the Civic Platform (PO) – received more than 10% of the votes, in October 2019, the social-democratic Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) also managed to overcome this threshold. The three parties differ enormously from one another in their internal decision-making processes. PiS, led by Jarosław Kaczyński since 2003, is characterized by a hierarchical model of organization. Legal statutes and bodies notwithstanding, all important decisions are ultimately made directly or indirectly by Jarosław Kaczyński. By contrast, PO, the second-largest party in parliament, and SLD have given members a more significant say, which has allowed for more far-reaching internal debates. The SLD was renamed the New Left (NL) in 2020 and has merged with the Spring party in 2021.

Citations:
Wincławska, M., A. Pacześniak, B. Brodzińska-Mirowska, M. Jacuński (2021): Party Management from the Perspective of Party Members: Evidence from Poland, in: Problems of Post-Communism 68(4): 315-326 (https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2020.1757466).

To what extent are economic interest associations (e.g., employers, industry, labor) capable of formulating relevant policies?

10
 9

Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
 8
 7
 6


Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
 5
 4
 3


Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
 2
 1

Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
Association Competence (Employers & Unions)
6
Poland has a relatively developed universe of interest associations. Business associations and trade unions have become increasingly professional over time. The trade unions, especially NSZZ Solidarność, used to have quite friendly relations with the PiS government, which have now deteriorated due to the government bypassing trade unions over decisions regarding COVID-19 measures. Trade unions are also more critical of the school reforms and have supported the various teachers’ strikes. Leading business associations such as the Konfederacja Lewiatan and the Business Center Club (BCC) have the expertise and resources to carry out research and formulate elaborate reform proposals. Konfederacja Lewiatan monitors many draft bills, and its spokespeople maintain a strong media presence. There are also a number of smaller associations that organize internationally known events such as the European Forum for New Ideas (EFNI), which annually invites leading public intellectuals, academics, and politicians, both Polish and European, to the EFNI conference in Sopot. All associations complain about not being involved in government policy discussions, despite the formal existence of the Council of Social Dialogue.

To what extent are non-economic interest associations capable of formulating relevant policies?

10
 9

Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
 8
 7
 6


Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
 5
 4
 3


Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
 2
 1

Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
Association Competence (Others)
6
Poland has many interest associations beyond business associations and trade unions. However, compared to other countries, there are comparatively few environmental groups. However, the existing groups have become more important in the current discourse on how to mediate the effects of climate change. Most independent non-governmental organizations are relatively small and do not benefit from the funds distributed by the National Freedom Institute, the official organization in charge of helping NGOs with capacity-building. However, many NGOs have good international contacts, can rely on academic expertise, and can thus develop full-blown policy proposals. The Catholic Church, still the most influential interest group in Poland, pursues relatively narrow interests, and is primarily preoccupied with stabilizing its influence within an increasingly secular society and has to deal with cases of sexual abuse. It currently has good access to the new government, but some of its priests also asked for more national solidarity, peaceful cooperation and a friendlier approach toward refugees. In recent times, some interest groups have become more publicly outspoken. The Polish Doctors’ Council frequently complains about the government’s actions and that their expertise is not being heard. Similarly, the judges’ associations Iustitia and Themis opposed changes to the judiciary and court system. The All-Polish Women’s Strike (Ogólnopolski Strajk Kobiet, OSK) has become very vocal against the abortion law, and in general about women’s rights and PiS’s illiberalism.

Independent Supervisory Bodies

#18

Does there exist an independent and effective audit office?

10
 9

There exists an effective and independent audit office.
 8
 7
 6


There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is slightly limited.
 5
 4
 3


There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
 2
 1

There does not exist an independent and effective audit office.
Audit Office
8
Poland’s Supreme Audit Office (Naczelna Izba Kontroli, NIK) is accountable exclusively to the Sejm. The NIK chairperson is elected by the Sejm for six years, ensuring that his or her term does not coincide with the term of the Sejm. The Senate has to approve the Sejm’s decision. The NIK has wide-ranging competencies and is entitled to audit all state institutions, government bodies and local-government administrative units, and corporate bodies and non-governmental organizations that pursue public contracts or receive government grants or guarantees. The NIK can initiate monitoring proceedings itself or do so at the request of the Sejm, its bodies or its representatives (e.g., the speaker of the Sejm, the national president or the prime minister). It is also responsible for auditing the state budget. Since August 2019, Marian Banaś, a former PiS minister of finance, has headed NIK.

Shortly after Banaś assumed office, accusations emerged that he had provided irregular information on his income and had contact with criminal circles in Craców. As no real evidence has been found as of today, he has stayed on. Under his leadership, the NIK has continued to behave professionally and independently (Wilczek 2021). Since 2020, the NIK has reported on several cases in which the government misspent money. This includes the unlawfully organized postal votes for the presidential election, which wasted PLN 130 million. A further PLN 280 million (€61 million) was misspent by the Justice Fund, which belongs to the Justice Ministry. Instead of helping crime victims, the funds were used for political purposes that benefited the government. The NIK has also played a major role in uncovering, and putting on the agenda, the government’s use of the Israeli Pegasus spyware (Wanat 2022). The governing coalition has responded to the NIK’s activities by increasing the pressure on Banaś. Various government members have asked Banaś to step down, Justice Minister Ziobro, in his function as prosecutor general, requested that legal immunity be lifted from Banaś, and Banaś and is family have frequently been the object of investigations by the Anti-Corruption Office (CBA).

Citations:
Wilczek, M. (2021): ‘Armored Marian’ — the man who has Poland’s Law and Justice party in his sights, in: Politico, May 13 (https://www.politico.eu/article/marian-banas-poland-takes-on-law-and-justice-government/).

Wanat, Z. (2022): Poland’s Watergate: Ruling party leader admits country has Pegasus hacking software, in: Politico, January 7, https://www.politico.eu/article/kaczynski-poland-has-pegasus-but-didnt-use-it-in-the-election-campaign/

Does there exist an independent and effective ombuds office?

10
 9

There exists an effective and independent ombuds office.
 8
 7
 6


There exists an effective and independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is slightly limited.
 5
 4
 3


There exists an independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is considerably limited.
 2
 1

There does not exist an effective and independent ombuds office.
Ombuds Office
10
The Commissioner for Citizens’ Rights, the Polish ombuds office, is an independent state organ and is accountable exclusively to the Sejm. The commissioner is elected for five years and can be re-elected once. The office has substantial investigative powers, including the right to view relevant files or contact the prosecutor general and send any law to the Constitutional Court. Because of its strong engagement for citizens’ rights ever since its creation in 1987, the ombuds office has traditionally been accorded a good reputation. However, the effectiveness of the ombuds office has suffered insofar, as the institution has been assigned new tasks in the field of anti-discrimination policy, but did not achieve more funds to perform the tasks properly.

Adam Bodnar, who served as ombudsman from September 2015 to July 2021, was a very active defender of civil and political rights. He was responsible for appealing the Anti-Terror Law and new laws on high-ranking civil servants, the Constitutional Court, and the media to the Constitutional Court. He was also fighting for the rights of his own office since the Sejm passed a law in 2016 that makes it easier to remove the serving commissioner. When Bodnar’s term of office ended in September 2020, it took six attempts to elect a successor and until July 2021, so he stayed in office until then. A new commissioner can only be elected with the consent of the Senate and the opposition holds a small majority of 51 out of 100 seats in the Senate. After all the unsuccessful attempts, the Sejm and the Senate elected the lawyer Marian Wiącek in his second round of candidacy. He had been nominated by the opposition parties.

Is there an independent authority in place that effectively holds government offices accountable for handling issues of data protection and privacy?

10
 9

An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
 8
 7
 6


An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is slightly limited.
 5
 4
 3


A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are strongly limited.
 2
 1

There is no effective and independent data protection office.
Data Protection Authority
6
In May 2018, a new act on data protection entered into force. The law has renamed the supervisory authority in Poland, the Office of Personal Data Protection (Urzędu Ochrony Danych Osobowych, UODO), which replaced the Inspector General for Personal Data Protection. The president of this office is appointed for a four-year term by the Sejm, with the consent of the second chamber, the Senate. The current president, Jan Nowak, came into office in May 2019. While a lack of resources has limited the effectiveness of the UODO, Nowak, like his predecessor, has acted quite independently. In August 2019, the UODO initiated ex officio proceedings against the Ministry of Justice and the National Council of the Judiciary, following accusations that the bodies had collected and processed the personal data of judges and their families and had shared the data with third parties.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, however, the UODO has played a limited role. When containment measures were introduced in March 2020, the UODO issued a statement on data processing during the lockdown and the implications for dealing with personal data, which was widely perceived as too vague. In May 2020, the UODO did not challenge the Chief Sanitary Inspectorate’s controversial instructions on the collection of employee health data by companies. Nor did the UODO join the debate about the data protection issues prompted by the originally planned contact-tracing app. Thus, it was the commissioner for citizens’ rights, ombudsman Adam Bodnar, rather than the UODO who spoke out against violations of data protection and privacy issues during the pandemic, as well as against the government’s use of Pegasus spyware.
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