Social Policies
#34Key Findings
With recent policy shifts sparking considerable controversy, Poland scores relatively poorly (rank 34) with respect to social policies. Its score on this measure has declined by 0.7 points relative to 2014.
Initial reactions to COVID-19 were successful, as the government pumped funding into the healthcare system, reorganized hospitals and bought new equipment. However, subsequent procurement scandals led to the resignation of the health minister, and excess mortality rates were ultimately very high. Social inequality and poverty have diminished under the PiS government. Family benefits are generous.
School reforms have diminished equity in access, and led to an exodus of teachers from the system. The system was not well prepared for distance learning, and student performance suffered badly. The education minister has focused intensively on rewriting school curriculums to follow the ruling party’s nationalist-conservative ideology. Access to childcare remains problematic.
Pensions have been increased without a clear source of funding. A wave of migration across the Belarusian border, fanned by the Belarusian government, generated a harsh reaction from Polish authorities. NGOs provided various kinds of humanitarian support, while the government erected a border fence.
Initial reactions to COVID-19 were successful, as the government pumped funding into the healthcare system, reorganized hospitals and bought new equipment. However, subsequent procurement scandals led to the resignation of the health minister, and excess mortality rates were ultimately very high. Social inequality and poverty have diminished under the PiS government. Family benefits are generous.
School reforms have diminished equity in access, and led to an exodus of teachers from the system. The system was not well prepared for distance learning, and student performance suffered badly. The education minister has focused intensively on rewriting school curriculums to follow the ruling party’s nationalist-conservative ideology. Access to childcare remains problematic.
Pensions have been increased without a clear source of funding. A wave of migration across the Belarusian border, fanned by the Belarusian government, generated a harsh reaction from Polish authorities. NGOs provided various kinds of humanitarian support, while the government erected a border fence.
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To what extent does education policy deliver high-quality, equitable and efficient education and training?
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Education policy fully achieves the criteria.
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Education policy largely achieves the criteria.
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Education policy partially achieves the criteria.
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Education policy does not achieve the criteria at all.
In 1999, the first Tusk government launched a number of education reforms that have significantly increased the quality of education in Poland (Bitek et al. 2021; Wiśniewski/ Zahorska 2020: 185-198). The main aim of the reforms was to reduce the system’s lack of synchronization with labor markets. The reforms have led to greater emphasis being placed on mathematics, science and technology; a strengthening of vocational education; attempts to attract more students to economically relevant areas; the introduction of measures to improve the quality of research and teaching at universities; and the adoption of a national strategy for lifelong learning. Although education expenditure in Poland is lower than the average expenditure in the European Union more broadly, Polish students scored relatively well in the 2018 PISA tests (European Commission 2020: 27).
Under the PiS government, Poland has returned to the traditional two-tier school system with eight years of primary school and four years of upper-secondary school or vocational education. This reform was poorly prepared and insufficiently discussed with teachers, teachers’ unions, parents and students. The reform allowed the government to change the content of textbooks and curricula in which national ideology became more visible, while project-based learning ceased to be mandatory. The abolition of middle schools (gimnazjum) and the bringing forward of entry exams for upper-secondary schools (liceum) have placed children under unnecessary stress. Equity in access has declined, as wealthier and better-educated parents have tended to pay for extra tuition or for private schools. The PiS government’s reforms, along with low salaries and poor working conditions, have prompted the resignation of many teachers as well as frequent teachers’ strikes. In order to end a large strike, in which 80% of teachers participated, the government promised some salary increases in April 2019. However, it did nothing to fill the gaps or to replace the many qualified and motivated teachers that had quit their jobs in recent years. The PiS government’s school reforms also placed a heavy burden on municipal budgets, as expenditure on education by municipalities has been increasing faster than the corresponding ministerial subventions (European Commission 2020: 27).
With the COVID-19 pandemic and the introduction of homeschooling in spring 2020 and again in winter 2020/21, the lack of proper didactical and technical preparedness became visible (Bitek et al. 2021; Marczewski 2020). As a result, exam performance has worsened. In 2020, only 74% of youth – in contrast to 80.5% in 2019 – passed the final exam for high school. At the same time, educational inequalities have further risen. The government provided teachers with vouchers worth PLN 500 to buy computers, but did little to staff the schools properly. Moreover, due to health issues and educators’ dissatisfaction with the government’s crisis management, the number of teachers in 2020 fell by almost 10,000 compared to 2019. The controversial minister of science and education, Przemysław Czarnek, instead focused on the content of school education. He continued to rewrite Poland’s history curriculum, remove liberal and cosmopolitan texts and values from core teaching programs, return to old-fashioned teaching methods, and attack sex education and equal gender roles.
Universities have had fewer problems to weather during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, recent decisions by Minister Czarnek to give Polish journals greater weight in rankings used for assessing the quality of research are at odds with the PiS government’s announcements that it will strengthen the quality of higher education.
Citations:
Bitel, A. et al. (2021): Education in Poland, in: Word Education News and Reviews, October 20 (https://wenr.wes.org/2021/10/education-in-poland).
European Commission (2020): Country Report Poland 2020. SWD (2020) 520 final. Brussels (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/2020-european-semester-c ountry-report-poland_en.pdf).
Marczewski, P. (2020): The Inequality Epidemic in Poland’s Schools, in: Notes from Poland, October 8 (https://notesfrompoland.com/2020/10 /08/the-inequality-epidemic-in-polands-schools/).
Wiśniewski, J., M. Zahorska (2020): Reforming Education in Poland, in: F. M. Reimers (ed.), Audacious Education Purposes. Cham: Springer, pp. 181-208 (https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41882-3_7).
Under the PiS government, Poland has returned to the traditional two-tier school system with eight years of primary school and four years of upper-secondary school or vocational education. This reform was poorly prepared and insufficiently discussed with teachers, teachers’ unions, parents and students. The reform allowed the government to change the content of textbooks and curricula in which national ideology became more visible, while project-based learning ceased to be mandatory. The abolition of middle schools (gimnazjum) and the bringing forward of entry exams for upper-secondary schools (liceum) have placed children under unnecessary stress. Equity in access has declined, as wealthier and better-educated parents have tended to pay for extra tuition or for private schools. The PiS government’s reforms, along with low salaries and poor working conditions, have prompted the resignation of many teachers as well as frequent teachers’ strikes. In order to end a large strike, in which 80% of teachers participated, the government promised some salary increases in April 2019. However, it did nothing to fill the gaps or to replace the many qualified and motivated teachers that had quit their jobs in recent years. The PiS government’s school reforms also placed a heavy burden on municipal budgets, as expenditure on education by municipalities has been increasing faster than the corresponding ministerial subventions (European Commission 2020: 27).
With the COVID-19 pandemic and the introduction of homeschooling in spring 2020 and again in winter 2020/21, the lack of proper didactical and technical preparedness became visible (Bitek et al. 2021; Marczewski 2020). As a result, exam performance has worsened. In 2020, only 74% of youth – in contrast to 80.5% in 2019 – passed the final exam for high school. At the same time, educational inequalities have further risen. The government provided teachers with vouchers worth PLN 500 to buy computers, but did little to staff the schools properly. Moreover, due to health issues and educators’ dissatisfaction with the government’s crisis management, the number of teachers in 2020 fell by almost 10,000 compared to 2019. The controversial minister of science and education, Przemysław Czarnek, instead focused on the content of school education. He continued to rewrite Poland’s history curriculum, remove liberal and cosmopolitan texts and values from core teaching programs, return to old-fashioned teaching methods, and attack sex education and equal gender roles.
Universities have had fewer problems to weather during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, recent decisions by Minister Czarnek to give Polish journals greater weight in rankings used for assessing the quality of research are at odds with the PiS government’s announcements that it will strengthen the quality of higher education.
Citations:
Bitel, A. et al. (2021): Education in Poland, in: Word Education News and Reviews, October 20 (https://wenr.wes.org/2021/10/education-in-poland).
European Commission (2020): Country Report Poland 2020. SWD (2020) 520 final. Brussels (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/2020-european-semester-c ountry-report-poland_en.pdf).
Marczewski, P. (2020): The Inequality Epidemic in Poland’s Schools, in: Notes from Poland, October 8 (https://notesfrompoland.com/2020/10 /08/the-inequality-epidemic-in-polands-schools/).
Wiśniewski, J., M. Zahorska (2020): Reforming Education in Poland, in: F. M. Reimers (ed.), Audacious Education Purposes. Cham: Springer, pp. 181-208 (https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41882-3_7).
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To what extent does social policy prevent exclusion and decoupling from society?
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Policies very effectively enable societal inclusion and ensure equal opportunities.
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For the most part, policies enable societal inclusion effectively and ensure equal opportunities.
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For the most part, policies fail to prevent societal exclusion effectively and ensure equal opportunities.
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Policies exacerbate unequal opportunities and exclusion from society.
In Poland, social inequality and exclusion have visibly declined since the early 2000s. The Gini coefficient and risk of poverty have fallen, and both the Human Development Index and the Gender Development Index have shown improvements. The decline in social inequity and exclusion has partly been due to Poland’s strong economic performance and the resulting decline in unemployment. In addition, regional disparities have been mitigated through regional-development policies financed by EU structural funds.
The PiS government’s social welfare policies, which have been a major cause for its popularity, have fostered social inclusion (Owczarek 2019). The government’s flagship policy has involved generous benefits for families and strong increases in the minimum wage. The government has also had some success in reducing the high share of temporary employment contracts. In the service sector, the payment of social insurance contributions has become obligatory. Pensioners have benefited from various increases in pensions. Since January 2019, people with special needs have enjoyed free access to hospitals and the education sector.
The Polish government sought to limit the social fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic by keeping unemployment low, increasing unemployment benefits and by extending the duration of entitlement for the care allowance paid to parents with children at home by the Social Insurance Institution (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych, ZUS). It also nudged the banks to allow a deferral of housing credit repayments of up to three months and a deferral of loan payments of up to six months. The government has paid special attention to the elderly, who have been particularly vulnerable to the pandemic and lean toward PiS. Other vulnerable groups, such as migrants or single parents have received less support. A survey of social assistance institutions in mid-2020 showed that the unemployed, dependent elderly, victims of domestic violence and people using food aid applied for support more frequently than before the pandemic (Necel/ Zaręba 2020).
With the 2023 parliamentary elections ahead, the PiS government has promised new benefits for families and pensioners within the framework of the “Polish Deal.” In February 2021, the government adopted a new strategy for people with disabilities for 2021–2030. The strategy envisages measures to improve rehabilitation and equal opportunities, with a view to increasing the target group’s employment share from 28.8% in 2019 to 45% in 2030.
Citations:
Necel, R., M. Zaręba (2020): Social assistance institutions during the COVID-19 pandemic: Experiences of Polish social workers, in: International Social Work 63(6): 803-806 (DOI: 10.1177/0020872820959361).
Owczarek, D. (2019): Soziale Probleme lösen oder Wähler gewinnen? Die Sozialpolitik der PiS seit 2015, in: Polen Analysen, Nr. 246, November 19, pp. 2-7 (https://laender-analysen.de/polen-analysen/246/soziale-probleme-loesen-oder-wae hler-gewinnen-die-sozialpolitik-der-pis-seit-2015/)
The PiS government’s social welfare policies, which have been a major cause for its popularity, have fostered social inclusion (Owczarek 2019). The government’s flagship policy has involved generous benefits for families and strong increases in the minimum wage. The government has also had some success in reducing the high share of temporary employment contracts. In the service sector, the payment of social insurance contributions has become obligatory. Pensioners have benefited from various increases in pensions. Since January 2019, people with special needs have enjoyed free access to hospitals and the education sector.
The Polish government sought to limit the social fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic by keeping unemployment low, increasing unemployment benefits and by extending the duration of entitlement for the care allowance paid to parents with children at home by the Social Insurance Institution (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych, ZUS). It also nudged the banks to allow a deferral of housing credit repayments of up to three months and a deferral of loan payments of up to six months. The government has paid special attention to the elderly, who have been particularly vulnerable to the pandemic and lean toward PiS. Other vulnerable groups, such as migrants or single parents have received less support. A survey of social assistance institutions in mid-2020 showed that the unemployed, dependent elderly, victims of domestic violence and people using food aid applied for support more frequently than before the pandemic (Necel/ Zaręba 2020).
With the 2023 parliamentary elections ahead, the PiS government has promised new benefits for families and pensioners within the framework of the “Polish Deal.” In February 2021, the government adopted a new strategy for people with disabilities for 2021–2030. The strategy envisages measures to improve rehabilitation and equal opportunities, with a view to increasing the target group’s employment share from 28.8% in 2019 to 45% in 2030.
Citations:
Necel, R., M. Zaręba (2020): Social assistance institutions during the COVID-19 pandemic: Experiences of Polish social workers, in: International Social Work 63(6): 803-806 (DOI: 10.1177/0020872820959361).
Owczarek, D. (2019): Soziale Probleme lösen oder Wähler gewinnen? Die Sozialpolitik der PiS seit 2015, in: Polen Analysen, Nr. 246, November 19, pp. 2-7 (https://laender-analysen.de/polen-analysen/246/soziale-probleme-loesen-oder-wae hler-gewinnen-die-sozialpolitik-der-pis-seit-2015/)
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To what extent do health care policies provide high-quality, inclusive and cost-efficient health care?
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Health care policy achieves the criteria fully.
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Health care policy achieves the criteria largely.
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Health care policy achieves the criteria partly.
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Health care policy does not achieve the criteria at all.
The Polish healthcare system is generally effective, but underfunded and sometimes inaccessible (OECD/European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies 2021). Public health insurance covers some 98% of Poland’s citizens and legal residents and is financed through social insurance contributions. However, access to healthcare is highly uneven, as public health insurance covers only a limited range of services, and out-of-pocket payments feature prominently in the system (23% of health care spending while the EU average is 16%). Moreover, the poor quality of some services falls far under citizens’ expectations, and for some services, patients must wait for an unreasonable duration. Aggravated by the migration of many doctors to other EU member states, Poland has a low doctor-patient ratio, with only 2.3 doctors per 1,000 inhabitants. Poland’s health problems based on air pollution, tobacco consumption and poor diet are therefore difficult to handle.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the shortcomings of the Polish healthcare system became evident. Initially, the government reacted quickly and pumped €1.7 billion into the system, reorganized hospitals into special COVID-19 clinics, bought respirators, provided more intensive-care beds, developed telemedicine options and paid an additional salary to employees in the healthcare sector. The handling of the second pandemic wave in autumn 2020 was less successful. Scandals around the purchase of tests and respirators forced the health minister to step down in August 2020 (Wanat 2020), and excess mortality in 2020 and 2021 was among the highest in the European Union (Tilles 2022). As part of the “Polish Deal,” the government has announced an increase public healthcare spending from the current 6.5% to 7% of GDP by 2027.
Citations:
OECD/European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies (2021), Poland: Country Health Profile 2021, State of Health in the EU, OECD Publishing, Paris/European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, Brussels.
Tilles, D. (2022): Poland suffered 29% excess death rate in 2021, with more deaths than any year since WWII, in: Notes from Poland, January 18 (https://notesfrompoland.com/2022/01/18/poland-suffered-29-excess-death-rate-in-2021-with-more-deaths-than-any-year-since-wwii/).
Wanat, Z. (2020): Poland’s health minister resigns amid coronavirus second wave fears, in: Politico, August 18 (https://www.politico.eu/article/polands-health-minister-resigns-amid-coronavirus-second-wave-fears/).
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the shortcomings of the Polish healthcare system became evident. Initially, the government reacted quickly and pumped €1.7 billion into the system, reorganized hospitals into special COVID-19 clinics, bought respirators, provided more intensive-care beds, developed telemedicine options and paid an additional salary to employees in the healthcare sector. The handling of the second pandemic wave in autumn 2020 was less successful. Scandals around the purchase of tests and respirators forced the health minister to step down in August 2020 (Wanat 2020), and excess mortality in 2020 and 2021 was among the highest in the European Union (Tilles 2022). As part of the “Polish Deal,” the government has announced an increase public healthcare spending from the current 6.5% to 7% of GDP by 2027.
Citations:
OECD/European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies (2021), Poland: Country Health Profile 2021, State of Health in the EU, OECD Publishing, Paris/European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, Brussels.
Tilles, D. (2022): Poland suffered 29% excess death rate in 2021, with more deaths than any year since WWII, in: Notes from Poland, January 18 (https://notesfrompoland.com/2022/01/18/poland-suffered-29-excess-death-rate-in-2021-with-more-deaths-than-any-year-since-wwii/).
Wanat, Z. (2020): Poland’s health minister resigns amid coronavirus second wave fears, in: Politico, August 18 (https://www.politico.eu/article/polands-health-minister-resigns-amid-coronavirus-second-wave-fears/).
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To what extent do family support policies enable women to combine parenting with participation in the labor market?
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Family support policies effectively enable women to combine parenting with employment.
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Family support policies provide some support for women who want to combine parenting and employment.
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Family support policies provide only few opportunities for women who want to combine parenting and employment.
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Family support policies force most women to opt for either parenting or employment.
Poland’s employment rate among women falls below the OECD and EU averages. The PiS government has followed a very traditional approach toward family policy. The cornerstone of the latter, which featured prominently already in the 2015 election campaign, has been the “Family 500” (€116) program, in effect since 1 April 2016 and paid to parents with two or more children for each child irrespective of the parents’ income (Ciesielska-Klikowska 2020). Since May 2019, all families (not only poor) have been eligible to receive a grant of PLN 500 for their first child. This has increased the estimated costs of the “Family 500” program from 1.3% to 1.7% of Poland’s GDP. Similar payments exist in other EU member states, but in the Polish case, the sum is high compared to the average income. While the measures have improved the financial situation of Polish families, this program has reduced labor market participation rates among women by an estimated 2–3 percentage points since 2016 without having positive effects on the birth rate. In addition, there are benefits for families in difficult situations or with disabled children. Regarding childcare facilities, by contrast, nothing has improved so far. Currently, only 7.9% of children below the age of three have access to childcare, the third lowest such rate in the European Union, while 61% of Polish children aged three and over attend childcare, the fourth lowest such rate in the European Union. Only one year of preschool (prior to entering the first grade in primary school) has become compulsory.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the government established additional financial support schemes for parents. Yet, it did little against the increase in domestic violence. While a new law from April 2020 allows for the immediate separation of perpetrators of domestic violence from the victims, domestic violence is still considered a “family issue.” Moreover, the PiS government has considered leaving the Council of Europe’s Istanbul convention on the prevention of domestic violence. The controversies over family policy were stirred by a decision of the Constitutional Tribunal in October 2020, which declared abortions for health reasons to be unconstitutional.
As part of the “Polish Deal” and a new demographic strategy, the PiS government announced a number of new measures for families in 2021 (Wilczek 2021). It has launched an additional new child benefit scheme (“Parental Care Capital”), which will entitle parents to a total PLN 12,000 (€2,610) for each child after their firstborn between the age of 12 and 36 months. It has also announced that it will facilitate access to housing for families with small children, and provide guarantees of flexible work for pregnant women and parents of children aged up to four. The government’s Demographic Strategy 2040 includes measures to limit several financial incentives to married couples.
Citations:
Ciesielska-Klikowska, J. (2020): Poland social briefing: ‘Family plus’ program – continuation or change?, China-CEE Institute, May 2020, Budapest (https://china-cee.eu/2020/05/25/poland-social-briefing-family-500-plus-program- continuation-or-change/)
Wilczek, M. (2021): Poland to launch demographic plan “based on pro-family policy, not migration”, in: Notes From Poland, December 28 (https://notesfrompoland.com/2021/12/28/poland-to-launch-demographic-strategy-based-on-supporting-families-not-migration/).
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the government established additional financial support schemes for parents. Yet, it did little against the increase in domestic violence. While a new law from April 2020 allows for the immediate separation of perpetrators of domestic violence from the victims, domestic violence is still considered a “family issue.” Moreover, the PiS government has considered leaving the Council of Europe’s Istanbul convention on the prevention of domestic violence. The controversies over family policy were stirred by a decision of the Constitutional Tribunal in October 2020, which declared abortions for health reasons to be unconstitutional.
As part of the “Polish Deal” and a new demographic strategy, the PiS government announced a number of new measures for families in 2021 (Wilczek 2021). It has launched an additional new child benefit scheme (“Parental Care Capital”), which will entitle parents to a total PLN 12,000 (€2,610) for each child after their firstborn between the age of 12 and 36 months. It has also announced that it will facilitate access to housing for families with small children, and provide guarantees of flexible work for pregnant women and parents of children aged up to four. The government’s Demographic Strategy 2040 includes measures to limit several financial incentives to married couples.
Citations:
Ciesielska-Klikowska, J. (2020): Poland social briefing: ‘Family plus’ program – continuation or change?, China-CEE Institute, May 2020, Budapest (https://china-cee.eu/2020/05/25/poland-social-briefing-family-500-plus-program- continuation-or-change/)
Wilczek, M. (2021): Poland to launch demographic plan “based on pro-family policy, not migration”, in: Notes From Poland, December 28 (https://notesfrompoland.com/2021/12/28/poland-to-launch-demographic-strategy-based-on-supporting-families-not-migration/).
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To what extent does pension policy realize goals of poverty prevention, intergenerational equity and fiscal sustainability?
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Pension policy achieves the objectives fully.
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Pension policy achieves the objectives largely.
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Pension policy achieves the objectives partly.
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Pension policy does not achieve the objectives at all.
The three-pillar pension system, which Poland introduced in 1999 following World Bank recommendations, has since been radically transformed. While the first pillar was supposed to become more sustainable through the adoption of a gradual increase in statutory retirement ages, the PiS government lowered the retirement ages for men to 65 and for women to 60 in November 2017, thereby reducing the sustainability of the Polish pension system. The PiS government has also replaced the second pillar with a new occupational pension savings scheme, which started for employees of companies with more than 250 staff in July 2019 and has been extended to cover employees of smaller firms in the second half of 2020. While employees have the right to withdraw from the scheme, the government hopes to integrate up to 75% of the country’s employed population through automatic enrollment. Experts are divided. Some argue that it is a good idea to force Poles to save money and that the government should create incentives to do so, while others argue that these programs are inefficient.
Other pension measures focused on addressing the growing level of poverty among pensioners. Again, this step follows political intentions since pensioners are one of the main groups that vote for PiS. The government adopted the “500+” scheme, which provides an extra annual payment to poor pensioners, with all pensioners receiving a one-time 13th pension of PLN 1,200 prior to the 2019 European Parliament elections, and promised that it would become a regular payment during the parliamentary elections campaign of October 2019. Since November 2021, a 14th pension is paid to everyone except the 10% who receive the highest pensions, amounting to PLN 2,900 (around €640) per month. In February 2021, President Duda signed a bill on a general increase of 4.24% for old-age pensions. The lowest pension since then amounts to PLN 1,250.88 (around €280) per month. However, the financing of these costly actions is unclear. Some PiS members of parliament have suggested that the government could utilize the Solidarity Fund, which was meant to finance improvements for people with special needs. Under the new Polish Deal (Polski Ład), valid from January 2022, pensioners will pay hardly any income tax, except for people who receive a pension above PLN 5,000 per month. PiS also cut pensions for former employees of the secret service.
Other pension measures focused on addressing the growing level of poverty among pensioners. Again, this step follows political intentions since pensioners are one of the main groups that vote for PiS. The government adopted the “500+” scheme, which provides an extra annual payment to poor pensioners, with all pensioners receiving a one-time 13th pension of PLN 1,200 prior to the 2019 European Parliament elections, and promised that it would become a regular payment during the parliamentary elections campaign of October 2019. Since November 2021, a 14th pension is paid to everyone except the 10% who receive the highest pensions, amounting to PLN 2,900 (around €640) per month. In February 2021, President Duda signed a bill on a general increase of 4.24% for old-age pensions. The lowest pension since then amounts to PLN 1,250.88 (around €280) per month. However, the financing of these costly actions is unclear. Some PiS members of parliament have suggested that the government could utilize the Solidarity Fund, which was meant to finance improvements for people with special needs. Under the new Polish Deal (Polski Ład), valid from January 2022, pensioners will pay hardly any income tax, except for people who receive a pension above PLN 5,000 per month. PiS also cut pensions for former employees of the secret service.
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How effectively do policies support the integration of migrants into society?
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Cultural, education and social policies effectively support the integration of migrants into society.
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Cultural, education and social policies seek to integrate migrants into society, but have failed to do so effectively.
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Cultural, education and social policies do not focus on integrating migrants into society.
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Cultural, education and social policies segregate migrant communities from the majority society.
In terms of numbers, emigration from Poland has always been higher than immigration to Poland and previous governments rather engaged in campaigns to motivate Poles to return to their home country. In 2012, Poland had developed an integration concept following EU pressure, while the number of Ukrainian and Vietnamese workers was low. Since PiS return to power in 2015, and following the increase in migration to Europe during the Syrian and other Middle East conflicts, the government’s discourse has been very much against immigration, especially regarding Muslims and people from outside Europe. In 2017, the parliament amended the Act on Foreigners with a view to tightening the domestic institutional framework for dealing with immigration. In the 2019 election campaigns, PiS representatives have continued to denounce Muslim immigrants as potential terrorists, a risk to public health, and a threat to Polish culture and society.
Meanwhile, the number of migrants from Ukraine and Belarus has substantially increased. Since 2014, more than two million Ukrainians have arrived, pushed by the poor economic situation and the war, and pulled by labor shortages and higher wages in Poland. Most Belarussian migrants arrived following the violent suppression of protests in the course of the fraudulent elections in August 2020. While smaller in scale, immigration from countries such as Nepal, India and Bangladesh has also increased. Policies for integrating migrants are weak, as the assumption is that most migrants will only stay temporarily and move on to Western Europe or are so close in cultural and linguistic terms that integration is no real problem (Economist 2020).
In summer and autumn 2021, a new migration crisis occurred at the border between Poland and Belarus after Belarussian state institutions called for and organized flights from the Middle East to Belarus promising quick entry into the European Union. These people got stuck at the border and faced a harsh response from Polish authorities (Bodnar/ Grzelak 2021; Piątek 2021). Criticism from international experts regarded several issues, including that the Polish police were involved in illegal pushbacks of migrants who managed to cross the border; that authorities were not ready to check their asylum applications; that no journalists, NGOs or international medical organizations were allowed to enter the zone after the government declared a state of emergency in the regions of Lublin and Podlaskie; and that Frontex was not invited to assist as the government always claimed this to be a bilateral problem. In August 2021, Prime Minister Morawiecki announced the erection of a 180–190 km fence along those parts of the border to Belarus that would allow for an easier crossing. The parliament passed the bill in October 2021. NGOs and the local population provided various kinds of humanitarian support to migrants on the border.
Citations:
Economist (2020): How to mess up migration: Poland is repeating the mistrakes of other European countries, February 22.
Bodnar, A., A. Grzelak (2021): In Poland, where is Frontex? in: Politico, November 4 (https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-frontex-belarus-border-migration-crisis/).
Piątek, J.J. (2021): Internal Security of the Republic of Poland and International Migration, in: European Research Studies Journal 24(4): 196-205 (DOI: 10.35808/ersj/2681).
Meanwhile, the number of migrants from Ukraine and Belarus has substantially increased. Since 2014, more than two million Ukrainians have arrived, pushed by the poor economic situation and the war, and pulled by labor shortages and higher wages in Poland. Most Belarussian migrants arrived following the violent suppression of protests in the course of the fraudulent elections in August 2020. While smaller in scale, immigration from countries such as Nepal, India and Bangladesh has also increased. Policies for integrating migrants are weak, as the assumption is that most migrants will only stay temporarily and move on to Western Europe or are so close in cultural and linguistic terms that integration is no real problem (Economist 2020).
In summer and autumn 2021, a new migration crisis occurred at the border between Poland and Belarus after Belarussian state institutions called for and organized flights from the Middle East to Belarus promising quick entry into the European Union. These people got stuck at the border and faced a harsh response from Polish authorities (Bodnar/ Grzelak 2021; Piątek 2021). Criticism from international experts regarded several issues, including that the Polish police were involved in illegal pushbacks of migrants who managed to cross the border; that authorities were not ready to check their asylum applications; that no journalists, NGOs or international medical organizations were allowed to enter the zone after the government declared a state of emergency in the regions of Lublin and Podlaskie; and that Frontex was not invited to assist as the government always claimed this to be a bilateral problem. In August 2021, Prime Minister Morawiecki announced the erection of a 180–190 km fence along those parts of the border to Belarus that would allow for an easier crossing. The parliament passed the bill in October 2021. NGOs and the local population provided various kinds of humanitarian support to migrants on the border.
Citations:
Economist (2020): How to mess up migration: Poland is repeating the mistrakes of other European countries, February 22.
Bodnar, A., A. Grzelak (2021): In Poland, where is Frontex? in: Politico, November 4 (https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-frontex-belarus-border-migration-crisis/).
Piątek, J.J. (2021): Internal Security of the Republic of Poland and International Migration, in: European Research Studies Journal 24(4): 196-205 (DOI: 10.35808/ersj/2681).
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How effectively does internal security policy protect citizens against security risks?
10
9
9
Internal security policy protects citizens against security risks very effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
Internal security policy protects citizens against security risks more or less effectively.
5
4
3
4
3
Internal security policy does not effectively protect citizens against security risks.
2
1
1
Internal security policy exacerbates the security risks.
Crime and homicide rates in Poland have fallen and have been relatively low for some time. However, trust in the police and the secret services has suffered under the PiS government. The effectiveness and proportionality of the new Anti-Terror Law, introduced in June 2016, has been a subject of debate. Another critique is the weak oversight of secret services. The parliamentary committee for control was reduced from nine to seven members, and the chair no longer alternates between the government and opposition. Since 2015, Poland’s secret services have been coordinated by Mariusz Kamiński, a controversial figure who was found guilty by a court in 2015 of producing false evidence against a political opponent in his previous position as head of the Anti-Corruption Office (CBA). Poland has been the target of security threats, especially by Russian hackers and intelligence or Belarussian intelligence. In June 2021, several politicians, including the prime minister faced email and social media attacks that obviously came from Russia.
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To what extent does the government demonstrate an active and coherent commitment to promoting equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries?
10
9
9
The government actively and coherently engages in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries. It frequently demonstrates initiative and responsibility, and acts as an agenda-setter.
8
7
6
7
6
The government actively engages in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries. However, some of its measures or policies lack coherence.
5
4
3
4
3
The government shows limited engagement in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries. Many of its measures or policies lack coherence.
2
1
1
The government does not contribute (and often undermines) efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries.
Development cooperation has become a more relevant issue in Poland since EU accession, even though it is still not a priority of the Polish government. Poland became the 28th member of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in October 2013 and remains one of the group’s least-active donors (OECD 2021). However, its contribution has increased over the years and has reached 0.14% of GDP in 2020. In 2020, Poland disbursed $11 million in support for COVID-19 responses in partner countries, of which $2 million was for health-related investments. The majority of its contributions are managed via the European Union and other multilateral organizations. Other than that, Poland’s priorities are on assisting its two eastern neighbors, Ukraine and Belarus, with Turkey being the third-largest recipient.
Citations:
OECD (2021): Poland, in: OECD, Development Co-operation Profiles. Paris (https://doi.org/10.1787/e3ce3d47-en).
Citations:
OECD (2021): Poland, in: OECD, Development Co-operation Profiles. Paris (https://doi.org/10.1787/e3ce3d47-en).