Executive Capacity
#24Key Findings
With policy flexibility hampered by parliamentary constraints, Portugal falls into the lower-middle ranks (rank 24) with regard to executive capacity. Its score on this measure has improved by 0.1 point relative to its 2014 level.
The impact of strategic-planning bodies is small. The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has limited policy-assessment capabilities, while the minister of finance has been extremely influential. Informal coordination mechanisms are vital in maintaining communication between ministries and allied political parties.
A recently implemented evaluation methodology, while still being developed, is improving RIA practices. The government consults particularly with economic actors. Communication and coordination efforts were largely but not universally effective during the pandemic. Regulation is generally enforced without bias, though the efficiency of enforcement is low.
The Costa government failed to win parliamentary approval for its 2022 budget proposal, leading to a dissolution of parliament in late 2021. This hampered its ability to implement its agenda. A decentralization program is underway, with greater funding being provided to local governments along with greater responsibility.
The impact of strategic-planning bodies is small. The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has limited policy-assessment capabilities, while the minister of finance has been extremely influential. Informal coordination mechanisms are vital in maintaining communication between ministries and allied political parties.
A recently implemented evaluation methodology, while still being developed, is improving RIA practices. The government consults particularly with economic actors. Communication and coordination efforts were largely but not universally effective during the pandemic. Regulation is generally enforced without bias, though the efficiency of enforcement is low.
The Costa government failed to win parliamentary approval for its 2022 budget proposal, leading to a dissolution of parliament in late 2021. This hampered its ability to implement its agenda. A decentralization program is underway, with greater funding being provided to local governments along with greater responsibility.
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How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
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6
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
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3
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
2
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1
In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
There have been virtually no changes with regard to strategic capacity. While there are strategic planning bodies in most ministries, their impact remains limited. The prime minister’s advisory cabinet is more influential, but it has to deal with a number of day-to-day demands in addition to offering a long-term view on policy challenges and viable solutions. Immediate issues tend to gain precedence over long-term policy-planning. Moreover, the pressures of the pandemic compounded these immediate demands during the period under review. The relative absence of institutionalized forms of strategic planning is evidenced by the government’s decision to outsource the preparation for the Strategic Vision for the Economic Recovery Plan of Portugal.
Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?
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9
In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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1
The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
The government utilizes academic experts for research on a wide variety of topics and to implement strategic development. A good example of this is the government’s decision to commission Professor António Costa e Silva to write the Strategic Vision for the Economic Recovery Plan of Portugal.
In the context of the pandemic, this form of consultation was extended. The government established regular meetings between health experts and political decision-makers, including members of the government, the president, representatives of all parties with parliamentary representation, representatives of trade unions and the business community, and other stakeholders. The first of these meetings took place on 24 March 2020, with subsequent sessions held very frequently (initially weekly, then fortnightly), totaling 10 sessions over the first pandemic wave (the last of which was held on July 24). While no regular meeting schedule was afterward established, this group has met subsequently as deemed necessary.
The government also engaged in consultations with experts from other fields. For example, the prime minister has regularly met with a number of leading economists to discuss economic recovery policies, beginning as early as mid-April 2020 (XXII Governo Constitucional) and continuing in October of that year (Público 2020). Overall, the experts selected represented a diverse body of opinion, and the group was by all accounts open to the addition of new members over time.
However, these mechanisms are mainly used on an ad hoc basis, and without a systematic academic-consultation mechanism in place.
Citations:
Público (2020). “Primeiro-ministro ouve economistas e empresários sobre Plano de Recuperação e Resiliência,” Público, 5 October 2020, available online at: https://www.publico.pt/2020/10/05/politica/noticia/primeiroministro-ouve-economistas-empresarios-plano-recuperacao-resiliencia-1934061
XXII Governo Constitucional (2020). “Primeiro-Ministro reúne-se com académicos e economistas sobre as medidas de relançamento económico,” 13 April 2020, available online at: https://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/gc22/comunicacao/comunicado?i=primeiro-ministro-reune-se-com-academicos-e-economistas-sobre-as-medidas-de-relancamento-economico
XXII Governo Constitucional (2020). “Governo nomeia António Costa e Silva coordenador da preparação do Programa de Recuperação Económica e Social,” 3 June 2020, available online at: https://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/gc22/comunicacao/noticia?i=governo-nomeia-antonio-costa-e-silva-coordenador-da-preparacao-do-programa-de-recuperacao-economica-e-social
In the context of the pandemic, this form of consultation was extended. The government established regular meetings between health experts and political decision-makers, including members of the government, the president, representatives of all parties with parliamentary representation, representatives of trade unions and the business community, and other stakeholders. The first of these meetings took place on 24 March 2020, with subsequent sessions held very frequently (initially weekly, then fortnightly), totaling 10 sessions over the first pandemic wave (the last of which was held on July 24). While no regular meeting schedule was afterward established, this group has met subsequently as deemed necessary.
The government also engaged in consultations with experts from other fields. For example, the prime minister has regularly met with a number of leading economists to discuss economic recovery policies, beginning as early as mid-April 2020 (XXII Governo Constitucional) and continuing in October of that year (Público 2020). Overall, the experts selected represented a diverse body of opinion, and the group was by all accounts open to the addition of new members over time.
However, these mechanisms are mainly used on an ad hoc basis, and without a systematic academic-consultation mechanism in place.
Citations:
Público (2020). “Primeiro-ministro ouve economistas e empresários sobre Plano de Recuperação e Resiliência,” Público, 5 October 2020, available online at: https://www.publico.pt/2020/10/05/politica/noticia/primeiroministro-ouve-economistas-empresarios-plano-recuperacao-resiliencia-1934061
XXII Governo Constitucional (2020). “Primeiro-Ministro reúne-se com académicos e economistas sobre as medidas de relançamento económico,” 13 April 2020, available online at: https://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/gc22/comunicacao/comunicado?i=primeiro-ministro-reune-se-com-academicos-e-economistas-sobre-as-medidas-de-relancamento-economico
XXII Governo Constitucional (2020). “Governo nomeia António Costa e Silva coordenador da preparação do Programa de Recuperação Económica e Social,” 3 June 2020, available online at: https://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/gc22/comunicacao/noticia?i=governo-nomeia-antonio-costa-e-silva-coordenador-da-preparacao-do-programa-de-recuperacao-economica-e-social
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Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?
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The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
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The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has limited policy expertise. While it is able to assess bills, it lacks the resources for in-depth policy assessment capabilities within most policy areas. Under the preceding Passos Coelho government, policy assessment largely centered on budgetary implications, notably in terms of reducing costs and/or increasing revenue. This was particularly true during the bailout period, but persisted into the post-bailout. Under the two Costa governments, budgetary implications remained important, as the government sought to maintain its euro area commitments. However, the government also evaluated how policy proposals might impact the support provided by its potential parliamentary partners, particularly the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and the Left Bloc (BE), with the goal of ensuring that they would at least abstain on the state budget vote.
To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?
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9
There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
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The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
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Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
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Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
The influence of the Ministry of Finance, as noted in previous editions of the SGI, was diminished somewhat by the pressures of the pandemic. However, the ministry remains very influential within the government given the overall goal of ensuring budgetary sustainability. The criticism leveled by the minister for infrastructure and housing in September 2020, seemingly aimed at roadblocks imposed by the Ministry of Finance in plans for the national railway company, illustrate this.
Citations:
Henriques, J. P. (2021), “Guerra dentro do governo. Pedro Nuno Santos desafia João Leão,” DN, available at: https://www.dn.pt/politica/guerra-dentro-do-governo-pedro-nuno-santos-desafia-joao-leao-14170768.html
CENTRO DE COMPETÊNCIAS DE PLANEAMENTO, DE POLÍTICAS E DE PROSPETIVA DA A. P. (PLANAPPDecreto-Lei n.º 21/2021, de 15 de março
The influence of the Ministry of Finance, as noted in previous editions of the SGI, was diminished somewhat by the pressures of the pandemic. However, the ministry remains very influential within the government given the overall goal of ensuring budgetary sustainability. The criticism leveled by the minister for infrastructure and housing in September 2020, seemingly aimed at roadblocks imposed by the Ministry of Finance in plans for the national railway company, illustrate this.
Citations:
Henriques, J. P. (2021), “Guerra dentro do governo. Pedro Nuno Santos desafia João Leão,” DN, available at: https://www.dn.pt/politica/guerra-dentro-do-governo-pedro-nuno-santos-desafia-joao-leao-14170768.html
CENTRO DE COMPETÊNCIAS DE PLANEAMENTO, DE POLÍTICAS E DE PROSPETIVA DA A. P. (PLANAPPDecreto-Lei n.º 21/2021, de 15 de março
How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?
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The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
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Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
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There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
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There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
Most ordinary meetings of the Portuguese cabinet – the Council of Ministers – are used for policy decisions rather than strategic policy debates.
Political issues and strategic policy considerations are by-and-large prepared by an inner core of ministers, augmented by other ministers and staff when required. This inner core is an informal group, with a composition that can vary depending on the policy area.
In addition, Council of Ministers meetings are preceded by a formal weekly meeting of junior ministers (Reunião dos Secretários de Estado), which is intended to prepare the Council of Ministers meeting. These meetings of the junior ministers play a crucial role in filtering out and settling more technical issues prior to cabinet meetings. These meetings are chaired by the minister for the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (Presidência do Conselho dos Ministros), who has a seat in the Council of Ministers.
Political issues and strategic policy considerations are by-and-large prepared by an inner core of ministers, augmented by other ministers and staff when required. This inner core is an informal group, with a composition that can vary depending on the policy area.
In addition, Council of Ministers meetings are preceded by a formal weekly meeting of junior ministers (Reunião dos Secretários de Estado), which is intended to prepare the Council of Ministers meeting. These meetings of the junior ministers play a crucial role in filtering out and settling more technical issues prior to cabinet meetings. These meetings are chaired by the minister for the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (Presidência do Conselho dos Ministros), who has a seat in the Council of Ministers.
How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?
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Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
There are weekly junior minister meetings, with each ministry represented by one of its junior ministers (known in Portugal as secretaries of state). A key purpose of these meetings is to ensure policy coordination across ministries before proposals reach the cabinet.
These meetings are generally very effective in ensuring policy coordination across government. Furthermore, the work of assessing the various proposals within each ministry is not restricted only to the secretaries of state who attend the meeting, but also include ministerial advisers and, to some degree, senior public administration officials.
These meetings are generally very effective in ensuring policy coordination across government. Furthermore, the work of assessing the various proposals within each ministry is not restricted only to the secretaries of state who attend the meeting, but also include ministerial advisers and, to some degree, senior public administration officials.
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Informal coordination mechanisms are central to government functioning and coordination. The horizontal informal links between ministries help compensate for the absence or rigidity of formal horizontal linkages.
How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?
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The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
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The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
There is a unit responsible for providing technological support to the government, the Centro de Gestão da Rede Informática do Governo (Ceger).
This has a central remit to manage the government’s IT network (Rede Informática do Governo, RInG). The information on Ceger’s website indicates that there were 34 people working in this service in August 2020.
Ceger’s services involve basic IT support (e.g., government email, internet access, data protection).
It also has as a remit to provide technological support for cabinet and junior minister meetings, while decree-law 16/2002 stipulates that it should develop common information networks and decision support systems for government.
However, the actual implementation of the latter is ongoing. The existing evidence is anecdotal, but suggests that the full potential of these technologies is as yet unrealized for policy development and monitoring. An indicator of this is that it is not uncommon for ministers to use their own devices (or not to use any device at all) at cabinet meetings.
Citations:
CEGER, Mapa do Pessoal, available online at: https://www.ceger.gov.pt/media/7153/CEGER%20-%20Mapa%20de%20Pessoal_03-08-2020_ass.pdf
This has a central remit to manage the government’s IT network (Rede Informática do Governo, RInG). The information on Ceger’s website indicates that there were 34 people working in this service in August 2020.
Ceger’s services involve basic IT support (e.g., government email, internet access, data protection).
It also has as a remit to provide technological support for cabinet and junior minister meetings, while decree-law 16/2002 stipulates that it should develop common information networks and decision support systems for government.
However, the actual implementation of the latter is ongoing. The existing evidence is anecdotal, but suggests that the full potential of these technologies is as yet unrealized for policy development and monitoring. An indicator of this is that it is not uncommon for ministers to use their own devices (or not to use any device at all) at cabinet meetings.
Citations:
CEGER, Mapa do Pessoal, available online at: https://www.ceger.gov.pt/media/7153/CEGER%20-%20Mapa%20de%20Pessoal_03-08-2020_ass.pdf
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To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?
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RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
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RIA are not applied or do not exist.
As noted in previous reports, the first Costa government introduced RIA processes for the first time, formalizing a body responsible for RIAs within the public administration. The successor government maintained those efforts; indeed, its program sets out the goal of having all draft bills it submits to parliament be accompanied by a legislative impact assessment. Moreover, it sought to extend a pilot program that assesses the impact of legislation intended to combat poverty and corruption.
These are positive steps in a country where RIA has historically been lacking. However, there is still considerable room for improvement. The OECD’s Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance 2021 note that the role of RIA has increased in Portugal. This is reflected in the fact that the “Custa Quanto” RIA, which assesses the economic cost of the government’s legislative proposals, was formalized in the post-2019 government’s internal organization, after a trial in 2017 and the establishment of a definitive model in 2018. This, as well as the developments noted in the previous paragraph, explain the considerable improvements in the OECD assessment relative to 2018. At the same time, the OECD notes that limitations remain both in the scope and application of the practice, with Portugal scoring below the OECD average in terms of RIA.
Citations:
JurisAPP, A Avaliação de Impacto em Portugal, available online at: https://jurisapp.gov.pt/avaliacao-de-impacto/a-avaliacao-de-impacto/
OECD (2021), “Portugal: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance 2021,” available online at: https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/portugal-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdf
XXII Governo Constitucional, Programa do XXII Governo Constitucional 2019-2023, available online at: https://www.portugal.gov.pt/download-ficheiros/ficheiro.aspx?v=%3d%3dBAAAAB%2bLCAAAAAAABACzsDA1AQB5jSa9BAAAAA%3d%3d
These are positive steps in a country where RIA has historically been lacking. However, there is still considerable room for improvement. The OECD’s Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance 2021 note that the role of RIA has increased in Portugal. This is reflected in the fact that the “Custa Quanto” RIA, which assesses the economic cost of the government’s legislative proposals, was formalized in the post-2019 government’s internal organization, after a trial in 2017 and the establishment of a definitive model in 2018. This, as well as the developments noted in the previous paragraph, explain the considerable improvements in the OECD assessment relative to 2018. At the same time, the OECD notes that limitations remain both in the scope and application of the practice, with Portugal scoring below the OECD average in terms of RIA.
Citations:
JurisAPP, A Avaliação de Impacto em Portugal, available online at: https://jurisapp.gov.pt/avaliacao-de-impacto/a-avaliacao-de-impacto/
OECD (2021), “Portugal: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance 2021,” available online at: https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/portugal-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdf
XXII Governo Constitucional, Programa do XXII Governo Constitucional 2019-2023, available online at: https://www.portugal.gov.pt/download-ficheiros/ficheiro.aspx?v=%3d%3dBAAAAB%2bLCAAAAAAABACzsDA1AQB5jSa9BAAAAA%3d%3d
Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?
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RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
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The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
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The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
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RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
RIAs are a recently introduced feature of Portuguese policymaking. The OECD’s Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance 2021 notes that stakeholders are involved when a draft regulation is proposed, but that RIA is not used ahead of the drafting process, for instance in consulting with stakeholders. The OECD has been asked to evaluate Portugal’s RIA process; but, from the information we can gather, there is as yet no institutionalized and systematic process evaluating RIA quality.
Citations:
OECD (2021), “Portugal: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance 2021,” available online at: https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/portugal-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdf
Citations:
OECD (2021), “Portugal: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance 2021,” available online at: https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/portugal-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdf
Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?
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Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
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Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
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Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
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Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
Sustainability checks are not integrated systematically into impact assessments. They may take place in some assessment processes but not in others, in a rather ad hoc fashion that depends on who is carrying out the impact assessment. The same is true with regard to the use of sustainability-focused indicators, as well as the temporal dimension of the analyses.
To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?
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9
Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
A recent study noted that ex post evaluation is very weakly institutionalized in Portugal. The ex post evaluations that take place are largely the result of external pressures (notably, EU requirements) and take place within a limited set of policy areas – usually those that legally require ex post evaluation. This was also confirmed by the OECD’s Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance 2021, which recommend that “Portugal could consider introducing systematic requirements to undertake ex post evaluation as well as introducing ‘in-depth’ reviews in particular sectors or policy areas to identify core reforms to Portugal’s regulatory framework.”
Citations:
Ana Diogo (2018), “Hacia un sistema integrado de M&E para los objetivos de desarrollo sostenible en Portugal” [dissertation], available online at: https://www.somosiberoamerica.org/investigaciones/la-evaluacion-de-la-agenda-2030/
OECD (2021), “Portugal: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance 2021,” available online at: https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/portugal-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdf
Citations:
Ana Diogo (2018), “Hacia un sistema integrado de M&E para los objetivos de desarrollo sostenible en Portugal” [dissertation], available online at: https://www.somosiberoamerica.org/investigaciones/la-evaluacion-de-la-agenda-2030/
OECD (2021), “Portugal: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance 2021,” available online at: https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/portugal-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdf
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Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?
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The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
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The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
The government consults with societal actors. As the OECD’s Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance 2021 note, stakeholders are consulted in the process of drawing up all draft regulations. For example, the Social and Economic Council (Conselho Económico e Social, CES) serves as a constitutional body for consultation and social concertation. Within the CES, there is a Standing Committee on Social Concertation (Comissão Permanente de Concertação Social, CPCS) that brings together the government, employer associations and trade unions. The CES and the CPCS continued to hold regular discussions during the period under review.
Citations:
OECD (2021), “Portugal: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance 2021,” available online at: https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/portugal-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdf
Citations:
OECD (2021), “Portugal: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance 2021,” available online at: https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/portugal-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdf
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To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?
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Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
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Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
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Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
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Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
Communication became considerably more challenging during the pandemic period, given its rapidly changing dynamics and policy responses. The government was fairly effective in general. However, it was certainly not flawless in this regard, as the prime minister himself recognized in a press conference in November 2020.
Citations:
Borges, L. (2020), “‘A culpa é toda minha. O mensageiro transmitiu mal a mensagem’, diz Costa,” Público, available online at: https://www.publico.pt/2020/11/12/politica/noticia/culpa-mensageiro-transmitiu-mal-mensagem-costa-1939017
Citations:
Borges, L. (2020), “‘A culpa é toda minha. O mensageiro transmitiu mal a mensagem’, diz Costa,” Público, available online at: https://www.publico.pt/2020/11/12/politica/noticia/culpa-mensageiro-transmitiu-mal-mensagem-costa-1939017
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To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?
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The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
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The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
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The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
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The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
The government in office during the period under review was the 22nd constitutional government of António Costa. This government was guided by the government program, Programa do XXII Governo Constitucional 2019 – 2023. Given the exceptional circumstances caused by the pandemic, the government was fairly successful in implementing its measures. However, it did fail to win approval for its 2022 budget proposal in parliament, which led to a dissolution of parliament in December 2021 and new legislative elections that were scheduled for late January 2022. Thus, the government’s ability to implement its program fully was clearly curtailed by its early demise.
Citations:
Programa do XXI Governo Constitucional, 2015 – 2019.
Jose Maria Sousa Rego, “No centro do power-Governo e Administração Publica em Portugal” Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos, 2018
https://www.publico.pt/2019/…/estado-nacao-governo-considera-ja-cumpriu-81-mediPrograma do XXII Governo Constitucional, 2019 – 2023
Citations:
Programa do XXI Governo Constitucional, 2015 – 2019.
Jose Maria Sousa Rego, “No centro do power-Governo e Administração Publica em Portugal” Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos, 2018
https://www.publico.pt/2019/…/estado-nacao-governo-considera-ja-cumpriu-81-mediPrograma do XXII Governo Constitucional, 2019 – 2023
To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?
10
9
9
The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
8
7
6
7
6
The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
5
4
3
4
3
The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
2
1
1
The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
The organization of relations in the parliamentary and cabinet systems ensure that ministers have incentives to implement the government’s program. While ministers in the PS government that took office in late October 2019 were generally aligned with the government program, the fact that the government did not have a majority in parliament, and thus had to depend on other parties to pass legislation, did create difficulties with regard to ministerial compliance.
How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
5
4
3
4
3
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
2
1
1
The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
Ministries in Portugal are not independent of the prime minister. The prime minister is also assisted by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and by the Office of the Adjunct Secretary of State of the Prime Minister. These entities can and do monitor all line ministries’ implementation activities. However, the lack of in-depth policy capacity and the reality of limited resources limit the overall degree of control.
How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
8
7
6
7
6
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
5
4
3
4
3
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
2
1
1
The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
Over the course of the 1990s and 2000s, Portugal experienced a proliferation of quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations, agencies and other structures. In the context of the bailout, the Passos Coelho government closed and restructured a number of these agencies, while also tightening control over their work in order to reduce public expenditure.
This increased scrutiny generally remains in the current, post-bailout period. Appointments to these agencies seek to ensure fairly high levels of ex ante alignment between the appointee and the government, which constrains bureaucratic drift. At the ex post level, the political staff of ministries monitor the activities of these agencies, paying greater attention to the more relevant agencies.
This increased scrutiny generally remains in the current, post-bailout period. Appointments to these agencies seek to ensure fairly high levels of ex ante alignment between the appointee and the government, which constrains bureaucratic drift. At the ex post level, the political staff of ministries monitor the activities of these agencies, paying greater attention to the more relevant agencies.
To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
8
7
6
7
6
The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
2
1
1
The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
Portugal is one of the most centralized countries in Western Europe, with autonomous self-governing areas in the island regions of the Azores and Madeira. A total of 308 municipalities constitute the main subnational level of government. Few tasks are decentralized, which is reflected in very low levels of subnational public expenditure overall. According to available OECD figures for 2019, subnational government expenditure in Portugal accounts for 13.5% of total public expenditure, compared to an OECD-wide weighted average of 40.2% and an OECD weighted average for unitary states of 28.8%. This represents 5.7% of GDP (compared to an OECD average of 16.2%).
The preceding 21st constitutional government approved a deal with the National Association of Portuguese Municipalities in July 2018. This led to more substantial delegation of tasks and increased funding for local governments. Implementation of this decentralization program began in 2019, with municipalities able to selectively adopt elements of the decentralization process between 2019 and 2020. All elements of the decentralization package were to become mandatory in 2021, but this deadline was extended until March 2022. The new government’s program aimed to expand this decentralization package by identifying new responsibilities to be decentralized. A June 2021 deadline for announcing the new areas was not met, and this new package was then expected to be unveiled in 2022. However, with the dissolution of parliament in early December 2021 and legislative elections scheduled for January 2022, the program’s status remained uncertain as of the time of writing.
Citations:
OECD, Subnational governments in OECD countries: key data, available online at: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=RFD
Patrício, I. (2021), “É oficial. Adiada para 2022 descentralização na Educação e Saúde,” Eco, available online at: https://eco.sapo.pt/2020/08/12/e-oficial-adiada-para-2022-descentralizacao-na-educacao-e-saude/
Soldado, C. (2021), “Governo deixa derrapar meta da nova fase da descentralização,” Público, available online at: https://www.publico.pt/2021/09/01/politica/noticia/governo-deixa-derrapar-meta-nova-fase-descentralizacao-1975850
XXII Governo Constitucional, Programa do XXII Governo Constitucional 2019-2023, available online at: https://www.portugal.gov.pt/download-ficheiros/ficheiro.aspx?v=%3d%3dBAAAAB%2bLCAAAAAAABACzsDA1AQB5jSa9BAAAAA%3d%3d
The preceding 21st constitutional government approved a deal with the National Association of Portuguese Municipalities in July 2018. This led to more substantial delegation of tasks and increased funding for local governments. Implementation of this decentralization program began in 2019, with municipalities able to selectively adopt elements of the decentralization process between 2019 and 2020. All elements of the decentralization package were to become mandatory in 2021, but this deadline was extended until March 2022. The new government’s program aimed to expand this decentralization package by identifying new responsibilities to be decentralized. A June 2021 deadline for announcing the new areas was not met, and this new package was then expected to be unveiled in 2022. However, with the dissolution of parliament in early December 2021 and legislative elections scheduled for January 2022, the program’s status remained uncertain as of the time of writing.
Citations:
OECD, Subnational governments in OECD countries: key data, available online at: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=RFD
Patrício, I. (2021), “É oficial. Adiada para 2022 descentralização na Educação e Saúde,” Eco, available online at: https://eco.sapo.pt/2020/08/12/e-oficial-adiada-para-2022-descentralizacao-na-educacao-e-saude/
Soldado, C. (2021), “Governo deixa derrapar meta da nova fase da descentralização,” Público, available online at: https://www.publico.pt/2021/09/01/politica/noticia/governo-deixa-derrapar-meta-nova-fase-descentralizacao-1975850
XXII Governo Constitucional, Programa do XXII Governo Constitucional 2019-2023, available online at: https://www.portugal.gov.pt/download-ficheiros/ficheiro.aspx?v=%3d%3dBAAAAB%2bLCAAAAAAABACzsDA1AQB5jSa9BAAAAA%3d%3d
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
2
1
1
The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
Formally, the central government enables subnational governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation. However, subnational governments have very limited scope for independent action, which requires cooperation with the central government in many domains of policy implementation, and certainly for the most important domains. The central government is not always fully responsive to local government communications in this regard, though that appears to be a largely inadvertent consequence of the complex, legalistic structure and rigid bureaucracy noted elsewhere in this report. It should be noted that local governments have very limited sources of revenue, and are largely dependent on transfers from the central government.
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?
10
9
9
Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
2
1
1
Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
National standards are largely uniformly applied, albeit as a result of the control and provision of most public services by the central government. However, there are differences between municipalities in some services, as in the case of infrastructure, culture and extracurricular educational offerings. Similarly, differences in service provision can result from the “luck of the draw” in terms of the specific civil servant a citizen encounters. This reflects both the complex and frequently changing policy framework and the relative lack of accountability in public-services provision.
To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?
10
9
9
Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
8
7
6
7
6
Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
5
4
3
4
3
Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
2
1
1
Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
On the whole, government agencies enforce regulations on powerful vested interests largely without bias. While the level of effectiveness is low, this is a general problem in Portugal, particularly when faced by powerful vested interests that are more adept at finding loopholes in Portugal’s complex legal structure.
At the same time, these vested interests may well have the ability to capture and shape regulation toward their interests. As such, government agencies may to some extent be enforcing regulations that are already designed to serve the interests of these interests.
At the same time, these vested interests may well have the ability to capture and shape regulation toward their interests. As such, government agencies may to some extent be enforcing regulations that are already designed to serve the interests of these interests.
Graph View
To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?
10
9
9
The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
8
7
6
7
6
In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
2
1
1
The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
The European Union is vital to Portugal in all respects. Since joining the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986, Portugal has become an integral part of Europe, with all the implications arising from integration into a huge variety of legal, organizational, security and reporting frameworks. While the government of Portugal has not yet applied all of the EU laws and regulations, it is steadily adopting EU policies. Obviously, since Portugal is part of the European Union, and dependent upon it for funds and trade, the country has had to adapt its structures accordingly.
In terms of organizational adaptation, this is reflected in the creation of positions such as the secretary of state for European affairs in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the General-Directorate for European Affairs. In addition, almost all ministries have structures designed to interact with the EU level.
In terms of organizational adaptation, this is reflected in the creation of positions such as the secretary of state for European affairs in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the General-Directorate for European Affairs. In addition, almost all ministries have structures designed to interact with the EU level.
To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?
10
9
9
The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
2
1
1
The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
Although Portugal is small, relatively poor and not very influential as a nation, it is a member of the European Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe, NATO, OECD, the World Trade Organization and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, CPLP), among other groups. It works actively with other nations through these organizations to develop policies. Given the country’s size and importance, it collaborates quite effectively in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods.
Portugal “punches well above its weight” in military diplomacy through participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief programs under the auspices of the European Union, the UN and NATO. It must also be noted that the previous president of the European Commission (José Manuel Durão Barroso) and the current secretary-general of the United Nations, António Guterres, are Portuguese, both having been prime ministers of the country. The latter figure was reelected as UN secretary-general in June 2021. The former was appointed chair of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) – an international partnership involving the World Health Organization, UNICEF, the World Bank and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, among others, which seeks to increase access to vaccines in poorer countries – beginning in January 2021.
During the review period, Portugal played a central role in terms of international coordination during its presidency of the Council of the European Union in the first semester of 2021, and through its participation in the presidency’s trio from July 2020 till the end of 2021. The Portuguese presidency was deemed very successful by the European Commission, as a number of important dossiers were advanced.
Citations:
Politico (2021), “The Portuguese presidency’s policy efforts, marked,” available online at: https://www.politico.eu/article/the-portuguese-presidencys-policy-efforts-marked/
Eco (2021), “Von der Leyen: Portuguese presidency ‘incredibly successful’ despite pandemic,” available online at: https://econews.pt/2021/07/05/von-der-leyen-portuguese-presidency-incredibly-successful-despite-pandemic/
Portugal “punches well above its weight” in military diplomacy through participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief programs under the auspices of the European Union, the UN and NATO. It must also be noted that the previous president of the European Commission (José Manuel Durão Barroso) and the current secretary-general of the United Nations, António Guterres, are Portuguese, both having been prime ministers of the country. The latter figure was reelected as UN secretary-general in June 2021. The former was appointed chair of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) – an international partnership involving the World Health Organization, UNICEF, the World Bank and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, among others, which seeks to increase access to vaccines in poorer countries – beginning in January 2021.
During the review period, Portugal played a central role in terms of international coordination during its presidency of the Council of the European Union in the first semester of 2021, and through its participation in the presidency’s trio from July 2020 till the end of 2021. The Portuguese presidency was deemed very successful by the European Commission, as a number of important dossiers were advanced.
Citations:
Politico (2021), “The Portuguese presidency’s policy efforts, marked,” available online at: https://www.politico.eu/article/the-portuguese-presidencys-policy-efforts-marked/
Eco (2021), “Von der Leyen: Portuguese presidency ‘incredibly successful’ despite pandemic,” available online at: https://econews.pt/2021/07/05/von-der-leyen-portuguese-presidency-incredibly-successful-despite-pandemic/
Graph View
To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?
10
9
9
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
5
4
3
4
3
The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
2
1
1
There is no monitoring.
During the period under review, no substantial measures have been introduced concerning the monitoring of institutional arrangements and there is little evidence of de facto monitoring of institutional governance arrangements. What little monitoring occurs appears to be reactive to political crises or challenges. The rules of procedure for the Council of Ministers under the government that took office in 2019 were changed only minimally relative to those used by the preceding executive, and continued to make no reference to self-monitoring mechanisms.
Citations:
Regimento do Conselho de Ministros do XXII Governo Constitucional – Resolução do Conselho de Ministros n.o 49/2019, Diário da República, 1.a série—N.o 44—4 de março de 2019, available online at: https://www.sg.pcm.gov.pt/media/36241/regimento-cm_1ª-alteração_2019.pdf
Citations:
Regimento do Conselho de Ministros do XXII Governo Constitucional – Resolução do Conselho de Ministros n.o 49/2019, Diário da República, 1.a série—N.o 44—4 de março de 2019, available online at: https://www.sg.pcm.gov.pt/media/36241/regimento-cm_1ª-alteração_2019.pdf
To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?
10
9
9
The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
8
7
6
7
6
The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
2
1
1
The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
There is no evidence that the new Costa government changed institutional arrangements significantly in such a way as to improve strategic capacity during the period under review. Moreover, the pressures of the pandemic made any such reform more difficult.