Executive Capacity
#40Key Findings
With a substantial array of shortcomings, Romania shares the SGI 2022’s lowest rank (rank 40) with regard to executive capacity. Its score on this measure has declined by 0.4 points relative to 2014.
Policymaking has suffered from a lack of strategic planning. Repeated reorganization of the government office has undermined its policy evaluation capacity. Informal coordination often takes the form of power struggles within parties, increasing government fragility. Coordination on policy development is led by the line ministry initiating the proposal.
RIAs are theoretically required, though quality and actual use are highly uneven. Ex post evaluations have remained the exception rather than the rule. The quality of public consultation has declined in recent years. Communication is often fragmented, undermining public trust. During the pandemic, this facilitated misinformation, leading to increased infection and death rates and slow vaccine uptake.
Recent years have featured a revolving door of failed coalitions, reducing the government’s ability to advance meaningful programs. Funding for local governments has been biased toward those controlled by the party in power at the national level. Regulations are mostly enforced to the extent that they benefit powerful lobbies and politicians’ clients.
Policymaking has suffered from a lack of strategic planning. Repeated reorganization of the government office has undermined its policy evaluation capacity. Informal coordination often takes the form of power struggles within parties, increasing government fragility. Coordination on policy development is led by the line ministry initiating the proposal.
RIAs are theoretically required, though quality and actual use are highly uneven. Ex post evaluations have remained the exception rather than the rule. The quality of public consultation has declined in recent years. Communication is often fragmented, undermining public trust. During the pandemic, this facilitated misinformation, leading to increased infection and death rates and slow vaccine uptake.
Recent years have featured a revolving door of failed coalitions, reducing the government’s ability to advance meaningful programs. Funding for local governments has been biased toward those controlled by the party in power at the national level. Regulations are mostly enforced to the extent that they benefit powerful lobbies and politicians’ clients.
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How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?
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9
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
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6
7
6
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
5
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3
4
3
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
2
1
1
In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
While EU membership has forced the Romanian government to produce regular strategic documents, and despite Romania’s 2018 National Reform Program having declared strategic planning a key priority for the government, policymaking in Romania still lacks strategic planning. In March 2019, parliament adopted “Romania 2040,” which outlines a long-term national social and economic development strategy that is coordinated by a multi-stakeholder commission (Commisia Romania 2040) and elaborated by a council (Consiliul de Programare Economica si Comisia Nationala de Strategie si Prognoza) that would advise government policy for years to come. In June 2019, however, the Constitutional Court rejected “Romania 2040” criticizing the substitution of the parliament by the commission. Critics also noted that the strategy had been pushed by PSD head Dragnea so that a smaller PSD-controlled commission would adopt the national budget for the years to come instead of parliament.
The European Commission continues to support Romania to improve its strategic planning capacities through the implementation of the Annual Working Plan of the Government and supporting frameworks. Of note, the Romanian government extended its strategic planning systems so that all 13 Institutional Strategic Plans were updated for 2019–2022.
Citations:
Romanian Government (2018): National Reform Program 2018. Bucharest (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2018-european-semester-country-report-romania-en.pdf)
Romanian Government (2020): National Reform Program 2020. Bucharest (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/2020-european-semester-national-reform-programme-romania_en_0.pdf)
The European Commission continues to support Romania to improve its strategic planning capacities through the implementation of the Annual Working Plan of the Government and supporting frameworks. Of note, the Romanian government extended its strategic planning systems so that all 13 Institutional Strategic Plans were updated for 2019–2022.
Citations:
Romanian Government (2018): National Reform Program 2018. Bucharest (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2018-european-semester-country-report-romania-en.pdf)
Romanian Government (2020): National Reform Program 2020. Bucharest (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/2020-european-semester-national-reform-programme-romania_en_0.pdf)
Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?
10
9
9
In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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6
7
6
For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
5
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3
4
3
In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
2
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1
The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
Cooperation between the government and non-governmental experts is weakly institutionalized. Consultations are irregular and lack transparency as well as mechanisms that would ensure feedback received is actually accounted for in policy. The dismantling in 2018 of the Ministry for Public Consultation and Civic Dialogue, to ensure systematic public consultation, marked a step backward in the formalization of public and expert consultation processes within the country. No real changes occurred under Dăncilă and Orban in 2019. As part of its National Action Plan, Open Government Partnership (2018–2020), the Romanian government sought to standardize the public consultation process. However, the outcome of this exercise is not clear and public consultation on legislative or institutional activities remains sporadic.
Citations:
Open Government Partnership, National Action Plan (2018-2020). Bucharest.
(https://www.opengovpartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Romania_Action-Plan_2018-2020_EN.pdf)
Citations:
Open Government Partnership, National Action Plan (2018-2020). Bucharest.
(https://www.opengovpartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Romania_Action-Plan_2018-2020_EN.pdf)
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Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?
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The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
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3
The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
2
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1
The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
The way in which the Government Office is organized in administrative terms has undergone frequent changes. Until January 2017, it featured two bodies that were engaged in interministerial coordination, the General Secretariat of the Government (GSG) and the Prime Minister’s Chancellery (PMC). Whereas the GSG focused on the formal coordination, the PMC, consisting of about 15 state counselors with different backgrounds, provided the policy expertise. In January 2017, Prime Minister Grindeanu dismantled the PMC and transferred its responsibilities to the GSG. Once appointed, its successor, Prime Minister Tudose, re-established the PMC and the old dual structure. Under Prime Minister Dăncilă, the PMC included seven pro bono “scientific” members with some sectoral experts. Under Prime Minister Orban, the PMC has had only six members in total. This situation has not improved under prime ministers Cîțu and Ciucă.
To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?
10
9
9
There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
8
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7
6
The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
5
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3
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3
Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
2
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1
Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
Policy proposals are usually drafted within ministries. The Secretariat General of the Government provides administrative and legal support for policymaking but has a limited role in the quality control of policy design. The Prime Minister’s Chancellery usually becomes involved only after the compulsory public-consultation procedures are finalized, and its mandate is to ensure that policy proposals align with broader government strategy. While the prime minister occasionally publicly involves himself in debating certain legislative proposals and may contradict line ministers, the final decision on the content of the policy proposal tends to be made by the line ministry.
How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?
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The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
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Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
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There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
2
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1
There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
In Romania, ministerial committees, which are composed of one minister, deputy ministers and public servants, feature prominently in interministerial coordination. They are used for preparing decisions on issues that involve multiple ministries. However, de facto coordination of the process is typically led by the line ministry initiating the policy proposal. By contrast, committees consisting only of ministers or with several ministers are rare.
How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?
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Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
5
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3
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3
There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
2
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1
There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
In the absence of interministerial committees, bills are subject to interministerial consultation by being sent for review to the ministries affected by each act. If ministries do not respond to the review request within five days, the non-response is considered tacit approval. Prior to government meetings discussing a particular legislative proposal, the Secretariat General of the Government organizes working groups between the representatives of ministries and agencies involved in initiating or reviewing the proposal in order to harmonize their views. While these procedures promote coordination, the capacity limitations of many ministries and the short turnaround time allowed for review undermine effective review and hence allow for only superficial coordination in many cases.
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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3
In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
2
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1
Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
In addition to the formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination, there has been an informal coordination of the government’s work by PSD chef Liviu Dragnea, the “éminence grise” of the PSD governments. Barred from becoming prime minister himself by a criminal conviction, Dragnea has been keen on preventing prime ministers to act in too independent a manner. In January 2018, he toppled Prime Minister Mihai Tudose, barely seven months after his predecessor Sorin Grindeanu had suffered the same fate. Thus, the informal coordination within the governing party has tended to undermine rather than complement the formal coordination mechanisms within government. This remains true for 2020 and 2021, which saw two coalition governments collapse in addition to parliamentary elections, which has continued to undermine the government’s ability to advance national priorities. Infighting in major political parties (e.g., concerning former Prime Minister Orban’s bid to unseat the current acting Prime Minister Citu as head of the PNL in fall 2021) has contributed to an environment in which powerful political actors, former or current, are able to exert disproportionate influence over intergovernmental coordination.
How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?
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The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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3
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The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
2
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1
The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
The 2014 National Strategy on Digital Agenda for Romania explicitly called on the public sector to embrace and optimize the use of digital technology for improving effectiveness in governance. This commitment was further buttressed through the establishment of a Government Chief Information Officer within the chancellery. In July 2018, the government announced plans to spend €45 million on the development of a government cloud framework to be used by all public institutions in the country. However, similar plans were announced in 2014 and 2017 without substantial results. Indeed, a 2018 report on government digitalization ranked Romania 67th out of 193 countries and last among 28 EU member states, and also noted that Romania implemented only one-fourth of all commitments it assumed in 2014. To date, the role actually played by digital technologies in interministerial coordination has been limited.
While there have not been any notable developments in 2020 or 2021, Romania’s Recovery and Resilience Plan, endorsed by the European Commission in 2021, commits €1.5 billion to digitalizing public administration. This should support the digitalization of interministerial coordination.
Citations:
Ministry for the Information Society (2018): National Strategy on Digital Agenda for Romania. Bucharest (https://www.trusted.ro/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Digital-Agenda-Strategy-for-Romania-8-september-2014.pdf).
European Commission (2021): Factsheet on Romania’s Recovery and Resilience Plan. Brussels. (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/factsheet-romania_en.pdf)
While there have not been any notable developments in 2020 or 2021, Romania’s Recovery and Resilience Plan, endorsed by the European Commission in 2021, commits €1.5 billion to digitalizing public administration. This should support the digitalization of interministerial coordination.
Citations:
Ministry for the Information Society (2018): National Strategy on Digital Agenda for Romania. Bucharest (https://www.trusted.ro/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Digital-Agenda-Strategy-for-Romania-8-september-2014.pdf).
European Commission (2021): Factsheet on Romania’s Recovery and Resilience Plan. Brussels. (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/factsheet-romania_en.pdf)
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To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?
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RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
2
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1
RIA are not applied or do not exist.
RIA-related procedures were introduced in Romania in 2005. At least in theory, legislative proposals cannot enter the legislative process without RIA approval from the Public Policy Unit of the Secretariat General of the Government (GSG). In practice, the use and the quality of RIA is highly uneven, and many RIAs are superficial. Capacity remains a critical obstacle to the effective implementation of RIA procedures and requirements. Further problems have stemmed from the complex division of monitoring and evaluation responsibilities between the GSG and the Prime Minister’s Chancellery. While Romania’s 2018 National Reform Program stressed the government’s commitment to improve RIA, no significant improvements have actually taken place.
Citations:
Romanian Government (2018): National Reform Programme 2018. Bucharest, 21 (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2018-european-semester-country-repor t-romania-en.pdf).
Citations:
Romanian Government (2018): National Reform Programme 2018. Bucharest, 21 (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2018-european-semester-country-repor t-romania-en.pdf).
Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?
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RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
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The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
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3
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3
The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
2
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1
RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
Romanian law stipulates that RIAs, along with proposed regulations, must be published for at least 30 days on the ministerial websites, and this obligation is usually respected. Only a select few stakeholders are regularly involved in the RIA process. Public consultations are largely online (which is problematic given unequal internet access within the country) with a short timeframe for input, while in-person consultations tend to be informal and, as a result, risk being subject to regulatory capture. Other ministries are not systematically involved in the RIA process. While the RIA process as a whole has been reviewed by the OECD as well as the World Bank, there are no regular independent quality evaluations of individual RIA assessments.
In the 2020 country report for Romania, prepared by the European Commission, the commission noted that Romania had stalled on its reform of public administration, including on the implementation of effective regulatory impact assessments, and has recommended the establishment of an independent regulatory impact assessment board.
Citations:
European Commission (2020): National Reform Program, Romania. Brussels. (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/2021-european-semester-national-reform-programme-romania_en.pdf)
European Commission (2020): Country Report, Romania. Brussels. (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/2020-european_semester_country-report-romania_en.pdf)
In the 2020 country report for Romania, prepared by the European Commission, the commission noted that Romania had stalled on its reform of public administration, including on the implementation of effective regulatory impact assessments, and has recommended the establishment of an independent regulatory impact assessment board.
Citations:
European Commission (2020): National Reform Program, Romania. Brussels. (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/2021-european-semester-national-reform-programme-romania_en.pdf)
European Commission (2020): Country Report, Romania. Brussels. (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/2020-european_semester_country-report-romania_en.pdf)
Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?
10
9
9
Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
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Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
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3
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3
Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
2
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1
Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
Romania is formally committed to SDG implementation. It participated in the 2018 voluntary national review of the United Nation’s High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development and has initiated a review of the country’s 2008 National Sustainable Development Strategy with a view to incorporating the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The RIA methodology manual requires that sustainability concerns be incorporated in assessment reports. In practice, however, sustainability checks do not feature very prominently, are not done in a comprehensive manner, and draw on minimal sets of impact indicators. Romania has also adopted the 2030 Sustainable Development Strategy, which aims to support the 17 SDGs.
Citations:
Ministry of the Environment (2018): Transformation Toward a Sustainable and Resilient Romania: Romania’s Voluntary National Review 2018. Bucharest (https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/memberstates/romania).
Government of Romania (2018): Romania’s Sustainable Development Strategy 2030. Bucharest. (https://sdgtoolkit.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Romanias-Sustainable-Development-Strategy-2030.pdf)
Citations:
Ministry of the Environment (2018): Transformation Toward a Sustainable and Resilient Romania: Romania’s Voluntary National Review 2018. Bucharest (https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/memberstates/romania).
Government of Romania (2018): Romania’s Sustainable Development Strategy 2030. Bucharest. (https://sdgtoolkit.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Romanias-Sustainable-Development-Strategy-2030.pdf)
To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?
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9
9
Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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6
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6
Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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3
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3
Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
2
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1
Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
While the institutionalization of ex post evaluations has been announced several times, they have remained the exception rather than the rule. If such evaluations have been done, their impact on decision-making has been intransparent.
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Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?
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The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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3
The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
2
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1
The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
In Romania, there are two tripartite bodies, the Economic and Social Council (Consiliul Economic şi Social, CES), which must approve every legislative proposal and government decision, and the National Tripartite Council for Social Dialogue (Consiliul National Tripartit pentru Dialog Social, CNTDS). In early 2018, the Dăncilă government disbanded the Ministry for Public Consultation and Civic Dialogue that was established by the Cioloș government in 2015, stating that its responsibilities were to be taken over by other unspecified ministries. Later in 2018 and with little warning, the government replaced 13 of the 15 representatives on the CES in order to help ensure its priorities would be accepted. Consultation with societal actors has been ad hoc and is used primarily as a means of government communication, not as an attempt at collaboration. Societal actors as diverse as trade unions and the judges’ professional associations have complained that their views have not been taken seriously by the government.
Despite an enabling legislative framework for civil society in the country, mandatory consultation procedures prior to the adoption of normative acts are seen as perfunctory. The number of public consultations and impact assessments remains limited, and the few bills that are subject to public consultation do not tend to have a major budgetary impact.
The European Commission’s 2020 Country Report on Romania indicates that the quality of public consultation has deteriorated, despite being widely used in the government’s policy development process.
Citations:
European Commission (2020): Country Report, Romania. Brussels. (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/2020-european_semester_country-re port-romania_en.pdf)
European Commission, “COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2021 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Romania Accompanying the COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2021 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union,” SWD(2021) 724 final, Brussels, 20 July 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/def ault/files/2021_rolr_country_chapte r_romania_en.pdf
Despite an enabling legislative framework for civil society in the country, mandatory consultation procedures prior to the adoption of normative acts are seen as perfunctory. The number of public consultations and impact assessments remains limited, and the few bills that are subject to public consultation do not tend to have a major budgetary impact.
The European Commission’s 2020 Country Report on Romania indicates that the quality of public consultation has deteriorated, despite being widely used in the government’s policy development process.
Citations:
European Commission (2020): Country Report, Romania. Brussels. (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/2020-european_semester_country-re port-romania_en.pdf)
European Commission, “COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2021 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Romania Accompanying the COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2021 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union,” SWD(2021) 724 final, Brussels, 20 July 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/def ault/files/2021_rolr_country_chapte r_romania_en.pdf
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To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?
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Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
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Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
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3
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3
Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
2
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1
Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
Despite the fact that the Chancellery of the Prime Minister was tasked with taking care of public relations and communication with mass media, the Romanian government continues to lack a coherent communications strategy. Individual ministries issue fragmented releases and public trust in government communication is low. During the COVID-19 pandemic, these shortcomings allowed misinformation to run rampant leading to increased infection and death rates, and lower vaccine uptake. Romania and its local health authorities lacked a clear communication strategy implemented at a national level and did not have a clear risk management or crisis communication procedure.
Citations:
Cernicova-Buca, M.; Palea, A. An Appraisal of Communication Practices Demonstrated by Romanian District Public Health Authorities at the Outbreak of the COVID-19 Pandemic. Sustainability 2021, 13, 2500. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13052500
Citations:
Cernicova-Buca, M.; Palea, A. An Appraisal of Communication Practices Demonstrated by Romanian District Public Health Authorities at the Outbreak of the COVID-19 Pandemic. Sustainability 2021, 13, 2500. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13052500
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To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?
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The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
8
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6
7
6
The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
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3
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3
The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
2
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1
The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
Romania’s revolving door of governments has reduced the government’s effectiveness and ability to advance consistent and meaningful legislative programs. In 2020 and 2021, Romania experienced two failed coalitions, which resulted in the collapse of government in addition to the parliamentary elections in 2020. This has made it extremely difficult for any government to advance its priorities. The European Commission’s 2020 Country Report on Romania indicates only moderate progress in ensuring the long-term viability of the second pension pillar and in implementing the national public procurement strategy. Meanwhile, limited or no progress has been made in strengthening tax compliance; improving the quality and inclusiveness of education; increasing the coverage and quality of social services; improving social dialogue; developing a minimum wage-setting mechanism based on objective criteria; improving access and cost-efficiency of healthcare; focusing investments on key policy areas; ensuring the national fiscal framework is implemented; ensuring the sustainability of the public pension system; improving skills in the labor force; completing the minimum inclusion income reform; and improving the predictability of decision-making.
Citations:
European Commission (2020): Country Report, Romania. Brussels. (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/2020-european_semester_country-re port-romania_en.pdf)
Citations:
European Commission (2020): Country Report, Romania. Brussels. (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/2020-european_semester_country-re port-romania_en.pdf)
To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?
10
9
9
The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
8
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6
7
6
The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
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3
4
3
The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
2
1
1
The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
Ministers in Romania have traditionally held significant leeway in terms of deciding policy details within their departments. This leeway was exemplified in 2021, when the then justice minister, Stelian Ion (USR-PLUS), unilaterally decided to block an investment program that would provide RON 10 billion in funding to local governments to upgrade infrastructure. Prime Minister Cîțu (PNL) called blocking the investment scheme “blackmail,” a tussle which eventually resulted in the collapse of the governing coalition. While the USR-PLUS issued legitimate concerns over the scheme, claiming it would allow wealthy individuals access to easy financing without the checks of EU-funded projects (a claim supported by non-governmental organizations and other opponents), the move demonstrated the flexibility ministers have to influence government policy.
Citations:
https://www.euronews.com/2021/09/02/romania-s-ruling-coalition-in-crisis-after-pm-florin-citu-dismisses-justice-minister
Citations:
https://www.euronews.com/2021/09/02/romania-s-ruling-coalition-in-crisis-after-pm-florin-citu-dismisses-justice-minister
How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
5
4
3
4
3
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
2
1
1
The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
The government has a special office in charge of monitoring the activities of line ministries and other public bodies, the Control Body of the Prime Minister. In spite of having limited staff and resources, this office monitors the activity of most line ministries fairly effectively.
How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
8
7
6
7
6
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
5
4
3
4
3
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
2
1
1
The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
The monitoring of agencies in Romania has been plagued by political clientelism and the capacity reduction suffered by many ministries following the often-haphazard personnel reductions associated with the austerity measures adopted in 2010 – 2011. Many agencies even fail to provide legally required information on their websites.
To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
8
7
6
7
6
The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
2
1
1
The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
Subnational governments suffer from a lack of revenues and thus remain dependent on central government funding. As the governing coalition has done little to secure sufficient funding for subnational governments, the quality of public services has remained low. Central government funding has been tainted by party bias, with subnational governments controlled by the ruling parties receiving more money. Moreover, the funds from Bucharest have come late, so that subnational units have scrambled to keep projects alive during the first months of each calendar year. The financial dependence of subnational governments has contributed to an unwillingness to implement larger-scale projects for fear of losing funding as a result of political changes. Concerns with bias in the distribution of funds to regional governments continued in 2021, when the USR-PLUS accused the PNL of using a large-scale infrastructure funding scheme to buy political support in subnational regions ahead of a party leadership campaign. The scuffle precipitated the collapse of the ruling government, forcing Romania into its third shuffle in two years.
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
2
1
1
The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
The autonomy of subnational units is often curtailed by fiscal measures enforced from the central level. The allocation of discretionary financial transfers and investment projects to municipalities and counties along partisan lines has continued during the period under review. Another problem is that allocations are often made with considerable delay, which affects the capacity of subnational units to initiate and complete projects. The Dăncilă government promised to further decentralization, but was unable to deliver on this promise by the time it was unseated. The current government does not list decentralization among its major objectives.
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?
10
9
9
Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
2
1
1
Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
The central government seeks to ensure that subnational governments realize national public-service standards. The prefects, which represent the central government in each of the country’s 41 counties as well as in the municipality of Bucharest, have an important role in this respect. In practice, however, enforcement is often undermined by the inadequate and uneven funding of subnational governments.
To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?
10
9
9
Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
8
7
6
7
6
Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
5
4
3
4
3
Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
2
1
1
Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
Generally speaking, government agencies possess the technical capacity to enforce regulations against vested interests. In practice, however, regulations are mostly enforced only to the extent to which they benefit powerful lobbies and politicians’ clients.
Graph View
To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?
10
9
9
The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
8
7
6
7
6
In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
2
1
1
The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
On 30 June 2019, Romania completed its six-month term hosting the EU Council Presidency, with the last summit hosted in President Iohannis’ hometown of Sibiu. The presidency went better than expected, producing 90 pieces of legislation addressing banking, workforce, future migrant crisis situations, the gas market, and low-emission vehicles. The better-than-expected functioning of Romania’s presidency shows that Romania was able to adapt its government structures and processes so as to successfully meet its obligations as EU council president. At the same time, little progress was made in terms of improving the absorption of EU funds. Since the end of its EU presidency, Romania has not demonstrated any notable developments in its capacity to adapt government structures to respond to new challenges.
To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?
10
9
9
The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
2
1
1
The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
Romanian governments have supported international efforts to provide global public goods. The country has been actively involved in various UN peacekeeping missions, has contributed to global action against climate change and has participated constructively in the allocation of refugees within the European Union. In April 2018, it also became a member in the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee. The country’s international ambitions are evident in its intention to seek a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council from 2020–2021; an initiative that was ultimately unsuccessful as members opted to award the seat to Estonia instead. Romania remains committed to joining the Schengen Area as soon as possible, an ambition regularly reiterated in meetings with the European Council. However, Romania’s international standing has suffered from the democratic backsliding.
Graph View
To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?
10
9
9
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
5
4
3
4
3
The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
2
1
1
There is no monitoring.
There is no systematic and regular monitoring of institutional arrangements. Occasionally, the OECD and World Bank have been involved in governance reviews, but the effects of the latter have been negligible. The European Commission also participates in country reviews, though governance and monitoring of institutional arrangements is not identified as a priority area for Romania in light of more pressing reform priorities.
To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?
10
9
9
The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
8
7
6
7
6
The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
2
1
1
The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
Institutional reforms under the Tudose and Dăncilă governments were confined to changes in the portfolios of ministries. Most notably, the Dăncilă government split the Ministry for Regional Development, Public Administration and European Funds into two separate ministries and abolished the Ministry of Public Consultation and Social Dialogue. However, these changes have failed to improve the government’s strategic capacity. The absorption of EU funds has remained low, and public consultation has further lost importance. There have been no institutional reforms to address long-standing problems such as limited planning capacities or the low quality of RIA. The pledged reforms of subnational administration have not been adopted.
Former Prime Minister Orban reduced the number of deputy prime ministers and cut the number of ministers s from 27 to 18 by merging some portfolios. Under the most recent government led by Prime Minister Ciuca (a coalition of PNL, PSD and UDMR), 21 ministers and deputy ministers were sworn into cabinet. The dual crises of the COVID-19 pandemic and the collapse of coalition governments through 2020–2021 have prevented progress on additional institutional reforms, which are not high on the new government’s list of priorities in light of the continued COVID-19 crisis.
Former Prime Minister Orban reduced the number of deputy prime ministers and cut the number of ministers s from 27 to 18 by merging some portfolios. Under the most recent government led by Prime Minister Ciuca (a coalition of PNL, PSD and UDMR), 21 ministers and deputy ministers were sworn into cabinet. The dual crises of the COVID-19 pandemic and the collapse of coalition governments through 2020–2021 have prevented progress on additional institutional reforms, which are not high on the new government’s list of priorities in light of the continued COVID-19 crisis.