Executive Accountability
#32Key Findings
With a number of outstanding gaps, Slovakia scores relatively poorly overall (rank 32) with regard to executive accountability. Its score on this measure has declined by 0.2 points relative to 2014.
Parliamentarians have moderate resources. Oversight powers are not always respected by the executive. The audit office has stepped up its oversight activities. Parliament refused to approve the ombudswoman’s 2020 report due to passages on reproductive and LGBTQ+ rights. The position of data-protection office head was left vacant for a considerable time.
The quality of media reporting is not high overall, but several news portals have increased in quality and expanded their readership. The growing popularity of Russian-sponsored conspiracy websites is a concern. Infighting within the governing coalition has led to an increase in political apathy.
Slovak parties tend to be dominated by their leaders, although several recently formed centrist parties are more democratic. Business lobbying groups are active and produce comprehensive analyses of reform needs, while unions are more fragmented. The vibrant civil society strongly influences public discourse.
Parliamentarians have moderate resources. Oversight powers are not always respected by the executive. The audit office has stepped up its oversight activities. Parliament refused to approve the ombudswoman’s 2020 report due to passages on reproductive and LGBTQ+ rights. The position of data-protection office head was left vacant for a considerable time.
The quality of media reporting is not high overall, but several news portals have increased in quality and expanded their readership. The growing popularity of Russian-sponsored conspiracy websites is a concern. Infighting within the governing coalition has led to an increase in political apathy.
Slovak parties tend to be dominated by their leaders, although several recently formed centrist parties are more democratic. Business lobbying groups are active and produce comprehensive analyses of reform needs, while unions are more fragmented. The vibrant civil society strongly influences public discourse.
To what extent are citizens informed of public policies?
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Most citizens are well-informed of a broad range of public policies.
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Many citizens are well-informed of individual public policies.
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Few citizens are well-informed of public policies; most citizens have only a rudimental knowledge of public policies.
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Most citizens are not aware of public policies.
Given the liberal legislation on access to public information and the existing media pluralism, information about policymaking is available to all citizens. However, population’s overall policy knowledge has suffered from the Fico government’s paternalistic approach. Fico’s main message to the citizens was that the government takes care of people’s everyday worries as well as the national interests of Slovakia, so that there is no need for citizens to engage in politics and to deal with policymaking. Social media have also had a negative impact on citizens’ understanding of public policies, as they contribute to the spread of different “alternative” news and conspiracy theories promoted by low-quality media such as Hlavné správy and Zem a Vek. In the wake of the Kuciak and Kušnírová murders, however, the political interest among broad strata of the population increased, and this contributed to a growing interest in policymaking as well. The interest in environmental issues and the fight against climate change has also risen considerably. More recently, frustration with the quibbling within the center-right government has led once again to an increase in political apathy.
Does the government publish data and information in a way that strengthens citizens’ capacity to hold the government accountable?
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The government publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
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The government most of the time publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
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The government publishes data in a limited and not timely or user-friendly way.
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The government publishes (almost) no relevant data.
Slovakia joined the Open Government Partnership (OGP) in 2011 and opened an Open Data Portal in 2015. While open data has been a part of Slovak OGP action plans every two years, very few high-demand datasets have been published. The quality of published datasets has suffered from persistent problems with insufficient updates to some datasets and the non-standardization of formats. Shortly before the 2020 elections the National Agency for Network and Electronic Services (NASES) has launched a new, improved version of the open data portal. The overhaul was part of the EU-funded project “eDemocracy and Open Government.” However, the provision of data has suffered from the fact that the adoption of the Act on Data, which has been on the agenda for some time, has been postponed several times (Žuffová 2020). The change of government after the 2020 elections and the accompanying staff changes on all levels within ministries have proved disruptive; and the COVID-19 pandemic has delayed the implementation of planned training programs.
Citations:
Žuffová, M. (2022): Independent Reporting Mechanism (IRM): Slovak Republic Transitional Results Report 2019-2021. Washington, D.C.: Open Government Partnership (https://www.opengovpartnership.org/documents/slovak-republic-transitional-results-report-2019-2021/).
Citations:
Žuffová, M. (2022): Independent Reporting Mechanism (IRM): Slovak Republic Transitional Results Report 2019-2021. Washington, D.C.: Open Government Partnership (https://www.opengovpartnership.org/documents/slovak-republic-transitional-results-report-2019-2021/).
Do members of parliament have adequate personnel and structural resources to monitor government activity effectively?
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring all government activity effectively.
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring a government’s major activities.
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
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The resources provided to the members of parliament are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
Members of the National Council, the Slovak parliament, can draw on a set of resources for monitoring government activity. Members of parliament have a budget for assistants and expertise and tend to have a support staff of at least two persons. They can draw on the Parliamentary Institute, an information, education and research unit providing expertise for parliamentary committees, commissions and individual legislators. In addition, there is a parliamentary library.
Are parliamentary committees able to ask for government documents?
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Parliamentary committees may ask for most or all government documents; they are normally delivered in full and within an appropriate time frame.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are slightly limited; some important documents are not delivered or are delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are considerably limited; most important documents are not delivered or delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
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Parliamentary committees may not request government documents.
Parliamentary committees have the formal right to ask for almost all government documents. The main limits stem from the logic of party competition. Governments do not support opposition members of parliament in their legislative activities. As a result, committees’ access to government documents is often not timely. This has not changed under the center-right government.
Are parliamentary committees able to summon ministers for hearings?
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Parliamentary committees may summon ministers. Ministers regularly follow invitations and are obliged to answer questions.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are slightly limited; ministers occasionally refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are considerably limited; ministers frequently refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
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Parliamentary committees may not summon ministers.
The right of parliamentary committees to summon ministers is enshrined in Article 85 of the Slovak constitution. In practice, committees make relatively little use of this right, as the majority of committee members are members of parliament belonging to a government coalition party and often block such proposals.
Are parliamentary committees able to summon experts for committee meetings?
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Parliamentary committees may summon experts.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are slightly limited.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are considerably limited.
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Parliamentary committees may not summon experts.
In Slovakia, parliamentary committees may invite experts. However, this is not a very common practice.
Are the task areas and structures of parliamentary committees suited to monitor ministries effectively?
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The match between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are well-suited to the effective monitoring of ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are largely suited to the monitoring ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are partially suited to the monitoring of ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are not at all suited to the monitoring of ministries.
In the current term, the Slovak National Council has more parliamentary committees than there are ministries (by a ratio of 19 to 14). Two committees (the European Affairs Committee and the Committee for Human Rights and Minorities) have several ministerial counterparts and three committees have special mandates such as supervising intelligence services. However, committees cover all ministerial task areas and thus, the allocation of subject areas among committees does not hamper parliamentary oversight of ministries.
To what extent do media in your country analyze the rationale and impact of public policies?
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A clear majority of mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies.
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About one-half of the mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies. The rest produces a mix of infotainment and quality information content.
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A clear minority of mass media brands focuses on high-quality information content analyzing public policies. Several mass media brands produce superficial infotainment content only.
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All mass media brands are dominated by superficial infotainment content.
The quality of media reporting in Slovakia is limited. The public TV and radio stations provide daily news programs and some analytical, critical programs on a weekly basis. However, much of the commentary is superficial, and debates usually serve as a vehicle for the views of the parliamentary parties. The commercialization of nationwide broadcasters, with a consequent negative impact on public-interest news and current-affairs coverage, has not left the public stations untouched. TA3, a private TV channel dedicated to news, is heavily influenced by its owner, who allegedly sponsors SNS and its leader. The commercial media sector tends to eschew in-depth analysis of current affairs and instead follows an infotainment or scandal-driven news agenda. As for the print media, the recent ownership changes have raised concerns about the political agenda of the new owners and the resulting decline in journalistic quality. A new risk is the growing popularity of conspiracy websites, many of which are sponsored by Russia. The Kuciak and Kušnírová murders have somehow united journalists and have fostered interest in investigative journalism, but have not changed the structural constraints on media quality. A positive development is the increase in quality, and broadening of readership, of the two news portals Aktuality.sk and Denník N. The new Prime Minister Igor Matovič initially announced the publication of a government journal to inform the public, but the center-right government has wisely chosen not to pursue this idea.
How inclusive and open are the major parties in their internal decision-making processes?
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The party allows all party members and supporters to participate in its decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and agendas of issues are open.
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The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, all party members have the opportunity to participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are rather open.
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The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, a number of elected delegates participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are largely controlled by the party leadership.
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A number of party leaders participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are fully controlled and drafted by the party leadership.
The majority of Slovak parties are elite projects that are dominated by a few party leaders (Dolný/ Malová 2016; Gyárfášová 2020). Smer-SD, the dominant party until the 2020 elections, remains strongly centered around Robert Fico, who has led the party since its founding in 1999 and has remained its de facto head even after his resignation as prime minister in March 2018. The inner circle of the party and the number of party representatives with influence are rather limited. The party that gained most votes in the parliamentary elections, OĽaNO, also reflects the character of a personality driven party project with Igor Matovič, who founded the party in 2011 and has headed the party ever since. The program and public support of the party relies mainly on his image and his popularity. OL’aNO is an atypical formation without a membership base, classic party structures and standardized internal processes. Thus, OĽaNO resembles more a vaguely organized movement than an institutionalized party. The party is now confronted with two challenges: achieving sufficient inner consolidation and determining the future role of its founder Igor Matovič, who lost support by his erratic behavior during his short stint as prime minister. In addition to Smer-SD and OL’aNO, the only two parties that gained more than 10% of the votes in the 2020 parliamentary elections, two further parties of the governing coalition – Sme-Rodina and SaS, but also the far-right L’SNS are leader-dominated. The only more inclusive party that has made it in parliament has been the party Za ľudí (For the People), which was founded by former President Andrej Kiska shortly before the 2020 elections.
Citations:
Dolný, B., D. Malová, D. (2016): Organisational Structures of Political Parties in Slovakia: Parties not for Members. In K. Sobolewska-Myślik, B. Kosowska-Gąstoł, & P. Borowiec (Eds.), Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Central and Eastern European Countries. Kraków: Jagiellonian University Press, 391-418.
Gyárfášová, O. (2020): Slovenské voľby 2020: potvrdenie „stabilnej nestability.” Prague: Heinrich Böll Stiftung Prague, March 6 (https://cz.boell.org/cs/Slovak_elections_2020).
Citations:
Dolný, B., D. Malová, D. (2016): Organisational Structures of Political Parties in Slovakia: Parties not for Members. In K. Sobolewska-Myślik, B. Kosowska-Gąstoł, & P. Borowiec (Eds.), Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Central and Eastern European Countries. Kraków: Jagiellonian University Press, 391-418.
Gyárfášová, O. (2020): Slovenské voľby 2020: potvrdenie „stabilnej nestability.” Prague: Heinrich Böll Stiftung Prague, March 6 (https://cz.boell.org/cs/Slovak_elections_2020).
To what extent are economic interest associations (e.g., employers, industry, labor) capable of formulating relevant policies?
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Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
In Slovakia, business associations and unions alike have some policy competence. Business associations are in a better position to provide full-blown policy proposals as they have more resources and some of them run or support think tanks. Trade unions are less well equipped and have suffered from fragmentation. Some trade unions, including those representing medical doctors, nurses and teachers, can analyze the impact of decisions and formulate relevant policies. KOZ SR, the main Trade Union Confederation representing almost 30 sectoral unions, has focused primarily on increasing the minimum wage and an assortment of less controversial issues such as workplace security.
To what extent are non-economic interest associations capable of formulating relevant policies?
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Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
Slovakia has a vibrant third sector and many competent interest associations whose analyses and proposals have featured prominently in the media. Slovakia has a strategy on civil society development, including a legislative and information portal, Slov-Lex, which allows the public to take an active role in the lawmaking process. Think tanks are an integral part of civil society, feature close links to academia and other experts and profoundly influence public discourse. They often serve as a substitute for political opposition. The election of former civil society activist Zuzana Čaputová as the first female president of Slovakia in 2019 represents a meaningful signal. Čaputová previously worked as a lawyer for the NGO-watchdog VIA IURIS, which focuses on improving the rule of law and judicial system. After the murder of Kuciak, VIA IURIS played an important role in informing the public and advocating for more integrity and transparency in the political sphere.
Does there exist an independent and effective audit office?
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There exists an effective and independent audit office.
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There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is slightly limited.
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There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
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There does not exist an independent and effective audit office.
The Supreme Audit Office of the Slovak Republic (NKÚ) is an independent authority accountable exclusively to the National Council. The chairman and the two vice-chairmen are elected by the National Council for seven years each, and the office reports regularly and whenever requested by the council. There is an informal agreement that the chairman should be proposed by the opposition. Since 2019, the NKÚ has stepped up its control activities. The installation of a new planning board has increased the relevance and timeliness of its reviews, and the NKÚ has sought to expand its role in the legislative process and to widen its mandate with regard to local self-government. In October 2021, the NKÚ uncovered substantial flaws in the public procurement process of the construction of highways by the National Highway Company (Slovak Spectator 2021).
Citations:
Slovak Spectator (2021): Slovakia was losing millions due to discrepancies in highway company, audit office says, in: Slovak Spectator, October 12 (https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22761196/slovakia-was-losing-millions-due-to-discrepancies-in-highway-company-audit-office-says.html).
Citations:
Slovak Spectator (2021): Slovakia was losing millions due to discrepancies in highway company, audit office says, in: Slovak Spectator, October 12 (https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22761196/slovakia-was-losing-millions-due-to-discrepancies-in-highway-company-audit-office-says.html).
Does there exist an independent and effective ombuds office?
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There exists an effective and independent ombuds office.
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There exists an effective and independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is slightly limited.
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There exists an independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is considerably limited.
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There does not exist an effective and independent ombuds office.
In addition to the Petitions and Complaints Office of the National Council, there is an independent ombudsman, the Public Defender of Rights, who is accountable exclusively to the Council. The Public Defender is elected by the Council for a term of five years and reports regularly to it. The current ombudsperson – Mária Patakyová, a law professor at Comenius University in Bratislava nominated by Most-Híd – was appointed in 2017. Like her predecessor, Patakyová has taken her advocacy role seriously. In 2018, she announced that she would focus on education rights and the right to compensation for Roma women subject to unlawful sterilization. As in previous years, Patakyová participated in the Pride Parada in Bratislava in 2019 and has actively defended LGTBQ+ rights. She also participated actively in the United Nation’s Orange the World campaign: Generation Equality Stands against Rape! on 25 November 2019. Moreover, she supports measures that will allow Slovak citizens living abroad to vote in all elections, not only in parliamentary elections. As with previous ombudspersons, Patakyová has not received the full support of the parliament. In 2020, the National Council did not approve her annual report because of passages on women’s reproductive rights and LGBTQ+ rights. The governing coalition was split on these issues: The members of parliament of SaS and Za Ľudí as well as half of the members of parliament of OĽaNO voted in favor, while the other half of the OĽaNO members of parliament and all Sme-Rodina (We are Family) members of parliament voted against them, along with the neo-fascist opposition party L’SNS.
Is there an independent authority in place that effectively holds government offices accountable for handling issues of data protection and privacy?
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An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
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An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is slightly limited.
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A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are strongly limited.
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There is no effective and independent data protection office.
Based on the 2013 Act on Personal Data Protection, the Office for Personal Data Protection was established in 2014. The office contributes to the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms by supervising how personal data is processed. The effectiveness of the office has been limited by a lack of resources and a lack of clarity and differing interpretations of individual parts of Slovak data protection legislation. The amendment of the act on personal data protection in January 2018, which has aimed at incorporating the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation, has further aggravated the problems. The nomination of Soňa Pőtheová, the head of the Office for Personal Data Protection from 2015 until 2020, raised some public concerns, as she had been close to senior Smer-SD figures and companies owned by discredited oligarchs. In 2020, she was criticized for threatening Czech journalists. Moreover, the investigations of the Kuciak and Kušnírová murders revealed a close relationship between the controversial businessman Marian Kočner and Pőtheová. The new government dismissed her in April 2020. The position has remained vacant as possible candidates have found the resources of the Office for Personal Data Protection wanting.