Executive Capacity
#36Key Findings
With a number of notable weaknesses, Slovakia falls into the bottom ranks internationally (rank 36) in the area of executive capacity. Its score on this measure has fallen by 1.1 point relative to 2014.
The Government Office lacks strategic-planning capacities and sectoral policy-evaluation expertise. Line ministries draft bills with comparatively little substantive oversight. Informal coordination in the form of coalition-party meetings plays a significant role, but tensions have led to several coordination crises.
RIA guidelines are evaded through the use of fast-track legislation. The government has recently engaged in little meaningful consultation with societal actors. Government communication has been somewhat chaotic due to the broad makeup of the coalition. Anti-corruption measures have been implemented swiftly, but coalition tensions have slowed reforms in other areas.
Ministerial compliance has been complicated by the diversity of the governing coalition. Agencies tend to enforce regulations ineffectively and in a biased manner. Subnational governments have considerable responsibilities, but funding has been precarious. The presence of pro-EU and euroskeptic parties in the coalition has complicated the government’s international relations.
The Government Office lacks strategic-planning capacities and sectoral policy-evaluation expertise. Line ministries draft bills with comparatively little substantive oversight. Informal coordination in the form of coalition-party meetings plays a significant role, but tensions have led to several coordination crises.
RIA guidelines are evaded through the use of fast-track legislation. The government has recently engaged in little meaningful consultation with societal actors. Government communication has been somewhat chaotic due to the broad makeup of the coalition. Anti-corruption measures have been implemented swiftly, but coalition tensions have slowed reforms in other areas.
Ministerial compliance has been complicated by the diversity of the governing coalition. Agencies tend to enforce regulations ineffectively and in a biased manner. Subnational governments have considerable responsibilities, but funding has been precarious. The presence of pro-EU and euroskeptic parties in the coalition has complicated the government’s international relations.
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How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
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In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
The institutional capacity for strategic planning in Slovakia is weak. Capacities for planning in the ministries are limited, and there is no central policy-planning unit in the Government Office. The fragmented nature and the rigid departmentalism of public administration in the country have complicated strategic planning. So has the high degree of staff turnover which, driven as it is by a politicized public administration, limits the continuity of institutional expertise. The Matovič government created the new position of a Deputy Prime Minister for Legislation and Strategic Planning. However, the first person to hold this office, Štefan Holý, has done little to improve the government’s strategic capacity.
Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?
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In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
Slovak governments rely on various permanent or temporary advisory committees. Prime ministers have their own advisory body. There are also several public research institutions with close linkages to ministries that are largely dependent on state funding and provide their analysis to the government. Within the ministries, expert advice is provided by so-called “analytical centers,” which are separated units composed of experts with different backgrounds, but a common sense of mission. At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Matovič government set up a temporary advisory body, the Economic Crisis Council. Like its predecessors, however, however, both the Matovič and Heger governments have been inconsistent in deciding upon whether to draw upon external expertise and, if so, whom they choose to work with. During the first wave of the pandemic, Matovič drew in some cases upon the knowledge of health experts to silence criticism and to bypass institutionalized procedures, and backtracked on expert advice when pressed by public opinion in other cases (Buštíková/ Baboš 2020).
Citations:
Buštíková, L., P. Baboš (2020): Best in Covid: Populists in the Time of Pandemic, in: Politics and Governance 8(4): 496-508 (DOI: https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i4.3424).
Citations:
Buštíková, L., P. Baboš (2020): Best in Covid: Populists in the Time of Pandemic, in: Politics and Governance 8(4): 496-508 (DOI: https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i4.3424).
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Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?
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The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
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The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
Slovakia has a strong tradition of departmentalism and collegial cabinets (Blondel et al. 2007), and these two features have deepened under the current coalition, comprised of three very different partners. The Government Office focuses on the legal and technical coherence of draft bills, but lacks the capacity and sectoral expertise to evaluate their policy content.
Citations:
Blondel, J., F. Müller-Rommel, D. Malová et al. (2007): Governing New Democracies. Basingstoke/ London: Palgrave.
Citations:
Blondel, J., F. Müller-Rommel, D. Malová et al. (2007): Governing New Democracies. Basingstoke/ London: Palgrave.
To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?
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There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
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The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
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Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
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Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
In Slovakia, the government manifesto defines certain priorities that are elaborated in legislative plans. These additionally divide tasks and responsibilities among the line ministries and other central bodies, and set deadlines for the submission of bills to the cabinet. In their policy-development process, the line ministries legally must include a range of institutions and interest groups that are defined as stakeholders in their respective fields. Ministries are also obliged to consult with the Government Office and its legislative council as they develop bills. However, final responsibility for drafting bills has traditionally rested with the line ministries, and consultation with the Government Office is mainly technical. This has not changed under the Matovič and Heger governments.
How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?
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The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
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Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
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There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
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There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
In Slovakia, cabinet committees composed exclusively of ministers are an exception. By contrast, other ministerial committees consisting of ministers and senior civil servants and chaired by the four appointed vice prime ministers or line ministers have played a major role in the preparation of government proposals, and have been quite effective in settling controversial issues prior to cabinet meetings. However, they are neither formally nor systematically involved in the preparation of cabinet meetings, partly as these bodies usually reside at the line ministries. In November 2020, the Matovič government established a new Government Council for the European Green Deal, led by the Ministry of the Environment.
How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?
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Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
In Slovakia, senior ministry officials have traditionally been heavily involved in the interministerial coordination process at the drafting stage. In contrast, coordination at the lower levels of the ministerial bureaucracy has suffered from a strong departmentalist culture and the top-down approach taken in most ministries. Professionalism and efficiency in public administration have been suffering from the growth in the size of the central state apparatus, the lack of qualified staff in the civil service and clientelist and politicized appointment practices. The Matovič government tried to improve the quality of public administration by fostering the use of a new Common Assessment Framework (CAF) as a comprehensive management tool. At the same time, the Matovič and Heger governments have stuck to the clientelist approaches to civil service nominations they had criticized fiercely in the past. In October 2021, parliament passed an amendment to the civil service law, which provides for the unconditional dismissal of senior civil servants by the Secretary-General of the Service who serves at the Interior Ministry.
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Like the Pellegrini government, the center-right government has sought to complement the formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination through regular meetings of the leaders of the four coalition partners. However, the relationship between the latter has been tense, so that the government has been subject to a number of coordination crises. The most severe led to a government reshuffle in April 2021 when Prime Minister Igor Matovič and Minister of Finance Eduard Heger changed their positions (Mesežnikov 2021). Matovič has not been able to adapt from the role of loud opposition to a country’s prime minister. His successor Heger has taken a more conciliatory approach, but has been confronted with strong attempts at backseat-driving by Matovič (Dlhopolec 2022).
Citations:
Dlhopolec, P. (2022): The two faces of Slovakia’s prime minister: one for home, one for the world, in: BalkanInsight, May 30 (https://balkaninsight.com/2022/05/30/the-two-faces-of-slovakias-prime-minister-one-for-home-one-for-the-world/).
Mesežnikov, G. (2021): The political crisis in Slovaka is over, but for how long? Heinrich Böll Stiftung Prague, April 7 (https://cz.boell.org/en/2021/04/07/political-crisis-slovakia-over-how-long).
Citations:
Dlhopolec, P. (2022): The two faces of Slovakia’s prime minister: one for home, one for the world, in: BalkanInsight, May 30 (https://balkaninsight.com/2022/05/30/the-two-faces-of-slovakias-prime-minister-one-for-home-one-for-the-world/).
Mesežnikov, G. (2021): The political crisis in Slovaka is over, but for how long? Heinrich Böll Stiftung Prague, April 7 (https://cz.boell.org/en/2021/04/07/political-crisis-slovakia-over-how-long).
How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?
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The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
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The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
Slovakia lags behind most EU member states with regard to digitalization (European Commission 2021). The new government has announced its intent to close that gap. In April 2020, the office of the deputy prime minister for investments and informatization was transformed into the Ministry of Investments, Regional Development and Informatization. In Slovakia’s recovery plan, however, digitalization has not featured very prominently, and digital technologies have continued to play only a limited role in interministerial coordination.
Citations:
European Commission (2021): Digital Public Administration Factsheet 2021. Slovakia. Brussels (https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/collection/nifo-national-interoperability-framework -observatory/digital-public-administration-factsheets-2021).
Citations:
European Commission (2021): Digital Public Administration Factsheet 2021. Slovakia. Brussels (https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/collection/nifo-national-interoperability-framework -observatory/digital-public-administration-factsheets-2021).
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To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?
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RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
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RIA are not applied or do not exist.
When RIAs were introduced in Slovakia back in 2001, no central unit in charge of RIA was created at the government’s core. In response, the first Fico government introduced a Uniform Methodology of Assessment of Selected Impacts in 2008, which was updated by the Radičová government in 2010. The “RIA 2020 Better Regulation Strategy” which was approved by the cabinet in January 2018 has further strengthened the methodological basis for assessing the economic impact of regulation in particular. However, within the period under review, the RIA 2020 framework and other impact assessment tools have not yielded the expected results. One central problem is that impact assessments only apply to measures initiated by the government and not to bills submitted by members of parliament. Moreover, ministries still often struggle with the quantification of wider impacts, focusing mainly on budgetary impacts and, to a lesser extent, impacts on business. Finally, the regular use of fast-track parliamentary procedures hampers evidence-based policymaking by sidelining proper impact assessment efforts and consultations with stakeholders.
Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?
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RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
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The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
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The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
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RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
Procedures for public consultations in the later stage of the regulation-making process are well developed, and include the automatic publication of all legislative documents on the government portal. However, the strong focus of Slovak RIA on the impact on the business sector means that business associations are involved in the process more strongly than other stakeholders. Quality control is not done by an independent body and suffers from fragmentation. In the Permanent Working Committee of the Legislative Council, four ministries are involved in checking the quality of regulatory impact assessments (Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs and Family), with the Economic Analysis Division of the Ministry of Economy playing a coordinating role. While the creation of this committee has led to some improvement, the RIA process would further benefit from making one central government body responsible for evaluating integrated impacts rather than spreading the responsibility across several ministries.
Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?
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Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
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Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
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Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
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Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
The RIA methodology manual requires that sustainability concerns be incorporated in assessment reports. In practice, however, sustainability checks do not feature very prominently and are not undertaken in a comprehensive manner.
This might change as a result of the ongoing revision of the country’s sustainable development strategy. Slovakia took part in the 2018 voluntary national review of the UN High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development and has initiated a review of the country’s national sustainable development strategy with a view to incorporating the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development. The review process has included broad stakeholder participation and the creation of the Government Council for Agenda 2030, involving key line ministers, as well as representatives of NGOs, academia, the private sector, and associations of cities and regions of the Slovak Republic.
Citations:
Deputy Prime Minister’s Office for Investments and Informatization of the Slovak Republic (2018): Voluntary National Review of the Slovak Republic on the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Bratislava (https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/20131Agenda2030_VNR_Slovakia.pdf).
This might change as a result of the ongoing revision of the country’s sustainable development strategy. Slovakia took part in the 2018 voluntary national review of the UN High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development and has initiated a review of the country’s national sustainable development strategy with a view to incorporating the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development. The review process has included broad stakeholder participation and the creation of the Government Council for Agenda 2030, involving key line ministers, as well as representatives of NGOs, academia, the private sector, and associations of cities and regions of the Slovak Republic.
Citations:
Deputy Prime Minister’s Office for Investments and Informatization of the Slovak Republic (2018): Voluntary National Review of the Slovak Republic on the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Bratislava (https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/20131Agenda2030_VNR_Slovakia.pdf).
To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?
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Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
Ex post evaluations have been rare so far. The RIA 2020 Better Regulation Strategy, approved by the cabinet in January 2018, has envisaged comprehensive ex post evaluations. A draft methodology was approved in 2019 and underwent pilot testing. However, the final methodology has yet to be published.
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Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?
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The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
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The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
In Slovakia, comprehensive legal requirements are in place for the consultation with societal actors, which includes social dialogue in the tripartite Economic and Social Council. Despite the deep chasm that emerged in Slovak society following the murder of Ján Kuciak and Martina Kušnírová in February 2018, the Pellegrini government did not try to increase its legitimacy by taking public consultation more seriously. The new center-right government that came into office in April 2020 has not shifted gears toward greater inclusion. Trade unions and employers alike have criticized the government for not consulting with them in formulating the economic and social responses to the COVID-19 pandemic (Simons 2022: 161-162). From October to December 2020, the trade unions even left the Economic and Social Council. The 2020 draft of the national recovery program (Modern and Successful Slovakia) was prepared without the broad public discussion promised by Prime Minister Matovič. Major legislative initiatives of the new government such as the amendment to the law on universities, the Construction Act, and the law on public procurement, have been adopted without a substantial consultation of societal actors.
Citations:
Simons, J. (2022): Slovakia: Moderate but inclusive COVID-19 response, in: D. Bohle, E. Eihmanis, A. Toplišek (eds.), The Political Economy of COVID-19 Responses in East-Central Europe. San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute, 155-173 (https://op.europa.eu/de/publication-detail/-/publication/0bb54570-b3be-11ec-9d96-01aa75ed71a1/language-en).
Citations:
Simons, J. (2022): Slovakia: Moderate but inclusive COVID-19 response, in: D. Bohle, E. Eihmanis, A. Toplišek (eds.), The Political Economy of COVID-19 Responses in East-Central Europe. San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute, 155-173 (https://op.europa.eu/de/publication-detail/-/publication/0bb54570-b3be-11ec-9d96-01aa75ed71a1/language-en).
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To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?
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Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
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Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
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Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
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Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
The center-right government newly formed after the 2020 parliamentary elections is comprised of four parties that cover an ideologically broad spectrum and have leaders not known for their team-player skills. As a result, government communication has sometimes been chaotic, with different ministries issuing contradictory statements. The cacophony culminated in March 2021 when Prime Minister Igor Matovič ordered Russian Sputnik vaccines despite the fact that the cabinet had not approved this action. The replacement of Matovič as prime minister by Eduard Heger in April 2021 has slightly improved the coherence of government communication. Communication has become less polarized, even in those cases in which individual coalition partners did not vote for government projects such as those advanced by Sme-Rodina with regard to hospital reform and the national park reform.
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To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?
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The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
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The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
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The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
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The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
The government manifesto of the new center-right government is long and ambitious, but also relatively vague (Szekeres 2021). The document mentions the word “reform” 41 times and promises far-reaching changes. One important priority has been to strengthen judicial independence and fight corruption. In this area, the government has acted swiftly. Already at the end of 2020, it adopted a comprehensive judicial reform prepared by Minister of Justice Mária Kolíková (Za ľudí – For the People) (European Commission 2020, 2021). The reform has included a reform of the Judicial Council, the establishment of a new, Supreme Administrative Court, property checks of justices, an age cap for justices, changes in the appointment of Constitutional Court justices as well as changes in the territorial layout of district and regional appeal courts. However, the implementation of these reforms has faced resistance not only by the “old guard,” that is, those justices and prosecutors most affected by such reforms. The originally planned reduction in the number of district courts, which aimed at weakening long-established ties between justices, politicians, oligarchs and organized crime, has been blocked by Sme-Rodina. The massive frictions within the governing coalition, along with the short-term pressures associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, have also contributed to a delay and a watering down of reforms in other fields, such as taxes, pensions, healthcare and education.
Citations:
Szekeres, E. (2021): Ambitious, vague, unrealistic: Slovak government manifesto draws mixed reactions, in: Kafkadesk, May 9 (https://kafkadesk.org/2020/05/09/ambitious-vague-unrealistic-slovak-government-manifesto-draws-mixed-reactions/).
Citations:
Szekeres, E. (2021): Ambitious, vague, unrealistic: Slovak government manifesto draws mixed reactions, in: Kafkadesk, May 9 (https://kafkadesk.org/2020/05/09/ambitious-vague-unrealistic-slovak-government-manifesto-draws-mixed-reactions/).
To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?
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The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
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The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
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The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
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The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
Since the 2016 elections, ministerial compliance has been complicated by the fact that governments have been composed of ideologically heterogeneous parties. Under the Pellegrini government, the vagueness of the government manifesto and the weakness of the prime minister allowed ministers to pursue sectoral interests and to follow party lines. The government manifesto of the center-right government has been more comprehensive and detailed. However, the ministers of the junior coalition partners have been difficult to integrate. Most of them have been political newcomers dependent on their party leaders, and the latter have often broken earlier agreements with the coalition partners.
How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?
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The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
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The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
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The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
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The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
The Government Office formally monitors the activities of the line ministries, however, the diverse composition of the center-right coalition governments has strongly limited the actual monitoring of ministries, especially the monitoring of ministries led by junior coalition partners.
How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?
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The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
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The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
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The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
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The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
Slovakia has a rather fragmented structure of agencies and other public sector organizations that undermines the effective monitoring of administrative performance. While agencies subordinate to the central government and ministries can be monitored relatively effectively, autonomous organizations such as public nonprofit institutions, foundations and state-owned enterprises that carry out administrative functions are more difficult to control. Monitoring has suffered from the politicization of agencies. Their leaders are selected on the basis of their party affiliation and social connections (family bonds) rather than their expertise and public reputation.
To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?
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The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
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The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
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The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
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The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
In Slovakia, the degree of decentralization is relatively high. Despite the power of the Association of Towns and Communities of Slovakia (ZMOS), funding for subnational governments has been precarious. While the shares of both municipalities and regional self-governments in personal income tax revenues have substantially risen since 2014, their strong reliance on personal income tax has made their revenues highly dependent on the performance of the economy. About a third of the revenues come from state transfers the allocation of which does not follow clear criteria and is often driven by the patronage of subnational governments. During the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Matovič government has transferred a lot of tasks, including mass testing, to subnational governments, without providing them the requisite financing.
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?
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The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
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Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
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The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
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1
The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
All Fico-led governments pursued a hands-on approach that limited the constitutional discretion of subnational governments and privileged subnational governments considered to be loyal. Under the Pellegrini government, the politics of direct patronage for party-loyal municipalities (such as building sports facilities in towns and villages led by Smer-SD party members) continued. When Smer-SD lost all regional capitals to predominantly independent candidates or candidates supported by the opposition parties in the municipal elections in November 2018, the tensions between central government and subnational self-governments increased even further. The new center-right government has not respected the autonomy of subnational self-governments either. Prime Minister Matovič’s rhetoric toward representatives of self-governments was often offensive, and he did not treat them as equal partners vital to solving this crisis, thus prompting frustration and massive protests by the Association of Towns and Communities of Slovakia (ZMOS) (Hrabovská Francelová 2021). Mass testing activities conducted in October and November 2020 were not done so with the consent of subnational self-governments. Like previous governments, the new government has not based its transfers to municipalities on clear economic and legal criteria.
Citations:
Hrabovská Francelová, N. (2021) Confused and frustrated municipalities call on government to treat them as equals, in: Slovak Spectator, February 4 (https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22589121/municipalities-and-government-clash-over-testing-and-measures.html).
Citations:
Hrabovská Francelová, N. (2021) Confused and frustrated municipalities call on government to treat them as equals, in: Slovak Spectator, February 4 (https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22589121/municipalities-and-government-clash-over-testing-and-measures.html).
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?
10
9
9
Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
2
1
1
Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
Public-service standards are poorly defined, especially with regard to the independent functions of subnational governments. Moreover, the monitoring of compliance with these standards is often fragmented. The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for overseeing subnational self-government, but largely focuses on formal compliance with existing laws and cost efficiency. While the ministry regularly monitors all levels of self-government, the number of breaches of the law and the extent and effects of ministerial intervention are not transparent. Clearly, there are differences between national and EU standards that negatively influence the effective use of EU structural funds.
To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?
10
9
9
Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
8
7
6
7
6
Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
5
4
3
4
3
Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
2
1
1
Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
A core weakness of the Slovak public administration system is the politicization of public decision-making and the influence of economic lobbies and other organized interest groups on policymaking. Thus, government agencies tend to enforce regulations ineffectively and demonstrate bias in their activity.
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To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?
10
9
9
The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
8
7
6
7
6
In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
2
1
1
The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
In the past, Slovakia’s ability to adapt domestic government structures to international and supranational developments, most notably at the EU level, has been weak and its performance ambiguous and confusing. Despite several attempts at reform, the rate of absorption of EU funds has remained low, as the absorption of EU funds has been hindered by dysfunctional planning procedures, poor project design and selection, and the failure to comply with the requirements of environmental impact assessments. Recommendations by European Union or international organizations like the OECD, Council of Europe or UN divisions have been considered selectively. Due to various scandals in the education sector and the misuse of EU funds, Slovakia’s access to financial support from the European Union has tightened. Overall, Slovakia continues to perform poorly in drawing EU funds. During the programming period from 2014 to 2020, the country drew less than a third of the available funds, one of the lowest shares in the EU. Given the opportunities associated with the EU’s new Recovery and Resilience Funds, the new center-right government has launched some reforms to increase absorptive capacity. However, its effects have yet to be seen.
To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?
10
9
9
The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
2
1
1
The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
Because of its size, Slovakia’s capacity to shape strategic global frameworks is limited. For a long time, the country was eager to be seen as a reliable and trustworthy partner within NATO and the European Union (Gould/ Malová 2020). However, Slovakia’s reputation and standing in the EU has suffered from Slovakia aligning with the position of other Visegrád countries in the EU refugee crisis and the increasingly pro-Russian stance of some political parties (SNS, Smer-SD, ĽSNS). The new center-right government is comprised of pro-European parties (OLANO and Za Ľudi) as well as euroskeptical parties (SaS, Sme-Rodina). This makes it difficult to align in a clear way with EU policies. This was demonstrated by the controversies over the purchase of the Russian vaccine, which contributed to the coalition crisis and government reshuffle in spring 2021.
Citations:
Gould, J., D. Malová (2019): Toxic Ordoliberalism on the EU’s Periphery: Slovakia, the Euro and the Migrant Crisis, in: J. Bátora, J.E. Fossum (eds.), Towards a Segmented European Political Order: The European Union’s Post-Crises Conundrum. London/ New York: Routledge, 112-131.
Citations:
Gould, J., D. Malová (2019): Toxic Ordoliberalism on the EU’s Periphery: Slovakia, the Euro and the Migrant Crisis, in: J. Bátora, J.E. Fossum (eds.), Towards a Segmented European Political Order: The European Union’s Post-Crises Conundrum. London/ New York: Routledge, 112-131.
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To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?
10
9
9
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
5
4
3
4
3
The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
2
1
1
There is no monitoring.
There is no regular and systematic self-monitoring of institutional arrangements in Slovakia. Governments and governmental bodies (such as the parliament, Government Office) must issue annual reports and a final report at the end of their term in office, however, these documents focus more on policies and formal financial accounting rather than institutional design. In addition, there are sporadic audits within particular ministries. The institutions and processes of governing are analyzed only infrequently and selectively. Shortcomings in audit procedures persist.
To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?
10
9
9
The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
8
7
6
7
6
The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
2
1
1
The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
The center-right government has initiated some smaller institutional reforms. It has created the new position of a deputy prime minister for legislation and strategic planning and has set up a new Government Council for the European New Deal. Most importantly, it has transformed the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for Investments and Informatization into a full-blown ministry, the Ministry of Investments, Regional Development and Informatization, with a view to improving the absorption of EU funds and strengthening regional development. However, the resulting improvements in the government’s strategic capacity have been limited.