Quality of Democracy
#26Key Findings
Despite generally fair and inclusive electoral procedures, Slovakia falls into the lower-middle ranks (rank 27) with respect to democracy quality. Its score on this measure has declined by 0.4 points since 2014.
Formal campaign-financing rules have been repeatedly strengthened. A cap on party donations was imposed in 2019, with the rule evidently meant to weaken a specific new party. The new government has refrained from its predecessor’s attacks on the media, but parliament retains influence over the public media. The government is seeking to make media ownership more transparent.
Civil rights are largely respected. Members of the governing coalition have sought to restrict women’s rights and LGBTQ+ rights. During the pandemic, Roma communities were subject to disproportionate and discriminatory measures. Many laws are passed in a constitutionally dubious fast-track manner.
High-profile judges and prosecutors have been exposed as part of a criminal network. A reform of the judicial system is underway, but is facing resistance by many of those affected. The Constitutional Court appointment process has been modified to reduce the governing coalition’s influence. Corruption remains a serious issue, and is a top priority of the current government.
Formal campaign-financing rules have been repeatedly strengthened. A cap on party donations was imposed in 2019, with the rule evidently meant to weaken a specific new party. The new government has refrained from its predecessor’s attacks on the media, but parliament retains influence over the public media. The government is seeking to make media ownership more transparent.
Civil rights are largely respected. Members of the governing coalition have sought to restrict women’s rights and LGBTQ+ rights. During the pandemic, Roma communities were subject to disproportionate and discriminatory measures. Many laws are passed in a constitutionally dubious fast-track manner.
High-profile judges and prosecutors have been exposed as part of a criminal network. A reform of the judicial system is underway, but is facing resistance by many of those affected. The Constitutional Court appointment process has been modified to reduce the governing coalition’s influence. Corruption remains a serious issue, and is a top priority of the current government.
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How fair are procedures for registering candidates and parties?
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Legal regulations provide for a fair registration procedure for all elections; candidates and parties are not discriminated against.
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A few restrictions on election procedures discriminate against a small number of candidates and parties.
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Some unreasonable restrictions on election procedures exist that discriminate against many candidates and parties.
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Discriminating registration procedures for elections are widespread and prevent a large number of potential candidates or parties from participating.
The procedures for registering candidates and parties in Slovakia are fair and transparent. Regulations governing the electoral process were consolidated in the 2014 election code. Provisions regarding the registration of parties and candidates are liberal and ensure a fair registration procedure. Candidates for presidency must be nominated by at least 15 members of the unicameral National Council or document support from at least 15,000 voters. While independent candidates cannot run for office, candidate lists for parliamentary elections can be nominated by registered political parties, movements and coalitions. For registration, the nominating organizations must obtain 10,000 signatures and make a deposit of €17,000, which is returned only to candidate lists that receive at least 2% of the vote. In October 2018, the rules for the registration of parties were tightened. Since then, parties have had to prove they have functional party bodies and a certain number of members. This law was promoted by the Slovak National Party (SNS), a junior coalition partner in the Pellegrini government, and was aimed at weakening major opposition parties such as Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO), We are Family – Boris Kollár (Sme-Rodina – Boris Kollár) and Freedom and Solidarity (SaS). However, these parties have refrained from challenging the provision, as they have had no problems recruiting the new members needed for fulfilling the minimum requirements.
To what extent do candidates and parties have fair access to the media and other means of communication?
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All candidates and parties have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. All major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of the range of different political positions.
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Candidates and parties have largely equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. The major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of different political positions.
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Candidates and parties often do not have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. While the major media outlets represent a partisan political bias, the media system as a whole provides fair coverage of different political positions.
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Candidates and parties lack equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communications. The major media outlets are biased in favor of certain political groups or views and discriminate against others.
The Election Campaign Act, the Broadcasting Act and the Slovak Press Act regulate media conduct during elections and call for equal access to mass media for all candidates. They stipulate that no candidate and party should be favored over any other and that campaign advertising has to be clearly distinguished from other media content. The public broadcaster Radio and Television of Slovakia (RTVS) has to provide the same conditions for all parties and candidates. The campaign for the 2020 parliamentary elections, which started on 5 November 2019 and ended 48 hours before election day, was pluralistic and competitive (OSCE/ ODIHR 2020). While the public media have shown a certain bias in favor of Smer-SD and SNS, Slovakia’s media market has been sufficiently pluralistic to ensure that all candidates and parties have been able to make themselves heard. The OSCE has criticized the appointment procedure for the two bodies that oversee the media conduct during the electoral campaign (Council for Broadcasting and Retransmission (CBR) and RTVS Council) as not sufficiently safeguarding the impartiality and independence of both bodies from political influence. Departing from its own original selection criteria, RTVS invited the candidate of the nationalist, right-wing Slovak National Party (SNS), one of the parties of the coalition governing from 2016 to 2020, to the much-watched final debate of the candidates ahead of the 2020 parliamentary elections.
Citations:
OSCE/ODIHR (2020): Election Assessment Mission Final Report: Slovak Republic, Parliamentary Elections 29 February 2020. Warsaw (https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/3/452377.pdf).
Citations:
OSCE/ODIHR (2020): Election Assessment Mission Final Report: Slovak Republic, Parliamentary Elections 29 February 2020. Warsaw (https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/3/452377.pdf).
To what extent do all citizens have the opportunity to exercise their right of participation in national elections?
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All adult citizens can participate in national elections. All eligible voters are registered if they wish to be. There are no discriminations observable in the exercise of the right to vote. There are no disincentives to voting.
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The procedures for the registration of voters and voting are for the most part effective, impartial and nondiscriminatory. Citizens can appeal to courts if they feel being discriminated. Disincentives to voting generally do not constitute genuine obstacles.
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While the procedures for the registration of voters and voting are de jure non-discriminatory, isolated cases of discrimination occur in practice. For some citizens, disincentives to voting constitute significant obstacles.
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The procedures for the registration of voters or voting have systemic discriminatory effects. De facto, a substantial number of adult citizens are excluded from national elections.
The electoral process is largely inclusive. In principle, all adult citizens can participate in elections. There is a special electoral register for Slovak citizens without permanent residence in the country (i.e., homeless people). Since November 2009, only prisoners who have been sentenced for “particularly serious crimes” have been disenfranchised. Their number is estimated at about 1,600. Voters that will not be in their place of residence on election day can ask for a special voter’s pass that enables voting elsewhere on the territory of Slovakia. Slovak citizens who are abroad on election day can vote by mail in parliamentary elections. In contrast, citizens living abroad cannot participate in presidential elections, as the Ministry of Interior claims it is not able to manage two rounds of postal voting.
In the 2020 parliamentary election campaign, some controversies over the voting rights of citizens living abroad emerged. When the voter turnout among Slovak migrants turned out to be higher than usual, the Minister of Interior, Denisa Saková (Smer-SD), made the dubious attempt to mobilize domestic voters by stating that the elections should not be decided by those having lived abroad for a long time (Slovak Spectator 2020). Of course, her main fear was that most of the Slovaks abroad would not vote for the governing coalition, but for opposition parties. Before the elections, some voters complained that they had received incomplete sets of ballots for voting by mail (Hrabovská Francelová 2020).
Citations:
Hrabovská Francelová, N. (2020). Election by mail: Some Slovaks received incomplete sets of ballots, in: Slovak Spectator, January 29 ( https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22313441/parliamentary-election-2020-some-slovaks-got -incomplete-set-of-ballots.html?ref=av-center).
N.N. (2020): Initiative questions interior minister’s warning against votes from abroad, in: Slovak Spectator, February 10 (https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22322294/initiative-questions-interior-ministers-warning-against-votes-from-abroad.html).
In the 2020 parliamentary election campaign, some controversies over the voting rights of citizens living abroad emerged. When the voter turnout among Slovak migrants turned out to be higher than usual, the Minister of Interior, Denisa Saková (Smer-SD), made the dubious attempt to mobilize domestic voters by stating that the elections should not be decided by those having lived abroad for a long time (Slovak Spectator 2020). Of course, her main fear was that most of the Slovaks abroad would not vote for the governing coalition, but for opposition parties. Before the elections, some voters complained that they had received incomplete sets of ballots for voting by mail (Hrabovská Francelová 2020).
Citations:
Hrabovská Francelová, N. (2020). Election by mail: Some Slovaks received incomplete sets of ballots, in: Slovak Spectator, January 29 ( https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22313441/parliamentary-election-2020-some-slovaks-got -incomplete-set-of-ballots.html?ref=av-center).
N.N. (2020): Initiative questions interior minister’s warning against votes from abroad, in: Slovak Spectator, February 10 (https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22322294/initiative-questions-interior-ministers-warning-against-votes-from-abroad.html).
To what extent is private and public party financing and electoral campaign financing transparent, effectively monitored and in case of infringement of rules subject to proportionate and dissuasive sanction?
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The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and provides for independent monitoring to that respect. Effective measures to prevent evasion are effectively in place and infringements subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.
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The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and provides for independent monitoring. Although infringements are subject to proportionate sanctions, some, although few, loopholes and options for circumvention still exist.
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The state provides that donations to political parties shall be published. Party financing is subject to some degree of independent monitoring but monitoring either proves regularly ineffective or proportionate sanctions in case of infringement do not follow.
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The rules for party and campaign financing do not effectively enforce the obligation to make the donations public. Party and campaign financing is neither monitored independently nor, in case of infringements, subject to proportionate sanctions.
After long debate and various failed attempts, new rules on campaign finance were eventually adopted in May 2014 and became effective in July 2015. In October 2018, further amendments to the Act on Political Parties were passed. Financial gifts to political parties from a single donor can no longer exceed €300,000 a year. Other amendments have obliged parties to publish detailed information on loans accepted on their website and to open a central account at the State Treasury to which all financial contributions from the state will be transferred. In the 2020 general elections, parties were not allowed to spend more than €3 million, including VAT, on their campaigns. This sum also includes money spent on promotional materials more than 180 days before the announcement of the election day.
In July 2019, just eight months before the 2020 elections, the ruling coalition with the help of the far-right, extremist party ĽSNS and populist Sme-Rodina hastily passed a further amendment on party financing. It set relatively low limits for the private financing of parties through membership fees, donations and loans and introduced party liquidation as a sanction for exceeding the party income limit. The amendment has complicated the financing of new parties and was widely perceived as being directed against Andrej Kiska, the former president, who founded the new party For the People (Za ľudí) at the end of September 2019. The OSCE has criticized the threat of party liquidation as not conforming with international standards and good practices (OSCE/ODIHR 2020: 10-13).
Citations:
OSCE/ODIHR (2020): Election Assessment Mission Final Report: Slovak Republic, Parliamentary Elections 29 February 2020. Warsaw (https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/3/452377.pdf).
In July 2019, just eight months before the 2020 elections, the ruling coalition with the help of the far-right, extremist party ĽSNS and populist Sme-Rodina hastily passed a further amendment on party financing. It set relatively low limits for the private financing of parties through membership fees, donations and loans and introduced party liquidation as a sanction for exceeding the party income limit. The amendment has complicated the financing of new parties and was widely perceived as being directed against Andrej Kiska, the former president, who founded the new party For the People (Za ľudí) at the end of September 2019. The OSCE has criticized the threat of party liquidation as not conforming with international standards and good practices (OSCE/ODIHR 2020: 10-13).
Citations:
OSCE/ODIHR (2020): Election Assessment Mission Final Report: Slovak Republic, Parliamentary Elections 29 February 2020. Warsaw (https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/3/452377.pdf).
Do citizens have the opportunity to take binding political decisions when they want to do so?
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Citizens have the effective opportunity to actively propose and take binding decisions on issues of importance to them through popular initiatives and referendums. The set of eligible issues is extensive, and includes national, regional, and local issues.
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Citizens have the effective opportunity to take binding decisions on issues of importance to them through either popular initiatives or referendums. The set of eligible issues covers at least two levels of government.
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Citizens have the effective opportunity to vote on issues of importance to them through a legally binding measure. The set of eligible issues is limited to one level of government.
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Citizens have no effective opportunity to vote on issues of importance to them through a legally binding measure.
The Slovak constitution provides far-reaching possibilities for citizens to actively propose and take binding decisions on issues of importance to them through popular initiatives and referendums (articles 93 – 100). Referendums are obligatory in the case of the country entering or withdrawing from an alliance with other states (like the European Union). Furthermore, a referendum can be called for in the case of “other important issues of public interest” (Article 93.2); referendums on basic rights and liberties, taxes, levies, and the state budget are forbidden (Article 93.3). There are two ways to call a referendum: by a resolution of the National Council or on the basis of a petition signed by a minimum of 350,000 citizens. The results of referendums are binding, and the constitutional barriers for changing the decisions are high; only a three-fifths majority in the National Council can overrule a decision made by referendum, and can do so only after three years (Article 99.1). Likewise, no referendum on the same issue can be held until three years have passed (Article 99.2). Similar provisions exist at the local level.
While local referendums have taken place regularly and there have been some attempts of collecting signatures for national referendums, only eight referendums have been called since Slovak independence in 1993, the last in 2015 (Szekeres 2021). In spring the of 2021, Hlas-sociálna demokracia, a splinter party from Smer-SD, led by former Prime Minister Peter Pellegrini and other opposition parties, collected 585,000 signatures for a referendum on shortening the current term of the government. In line with earlier decisions, the Constitutional Court in July 2021 declared such a referendum on snap elections unconstitutional (Giba/ Bujňák 2021). In another attempt to mobilize against the government, Smer-SD, at the end of 2021, was considering an initiative for a referendum on the controversial Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States which would allow the United States to use the military airports of Malacky-Kuchyňa and Sliač, or other agreed-on facilities and premises.
Citations:
Giba, M., V. Bujňák (2021): Referendum on early elections: The case of Slovakia in the European context, in: European Studies: The Review of European Law, Economics and Politics 8(1): 39-66.
Szekeres, E. (2021): Who Wants to Vote? The Spectacular Failure of Referenda in Slovakia, in: BalkanInsight, May 17 (https://balkaninsight.com/2021/05/17/who-wants-to-vote-the-spectacular-failure-of-referenda-in-slovakia/).
While local referendums have taken place regularly and there have been some attempts of collecting signatures for national referendums, only eight referendums have been called since Slovak independence in 1993, the last in 2015 (Szekeres 2021). In spring the of 2021, Hlas-sociálna demokracia, a splinter party from Smer-SD, led by former Prime Minister Peter Pellegrini and other opposition parties, collected 585,000 signatures for a referendum on shortening the current term of the government. In line with earlier decisions, the Constitutional Court in July 2021 declared such a referendum on snap elections unconstitutional (Giba/ Bujňák 2021). In another attempt to mobilize against the government, Smer-SD, at the end of 2021, was considering an initiative for a referendum on the controversial Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States which would allow the United States to use the military airports of Malacky-Kuchyňa and Sliač, or other agreed-on facilities and premises.
Citations:
Giba, M., V. Bujňák (2021): Referendum on early elections: The case of Slovakia in the European context, in: European Studies: The Review of European Law, Economics and Politics 8(1): 39-66.
Szekeres, E. (2021): Who Wants to Vote? The Spectacular Failure of Referenda in Slovakia, in: BalkanInsight, May 17 (https://balkaninsight.com/2021/05/17/who-wants-to-vote-the-spectacular-failure-of-referenda-in-slovakia/).
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To what extent are the media independent from government?
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Public and private media are independent from government influence; their independence is institutionally protected and fully respected by the incumbent government.
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The incumbent government largely respects the independence of media. However, there are occasional attempts to exert influence.
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The incumbent government seeks to ensure its political objectives indirectly by influencing the personnel policies, organizational framework or financial resources of public media, and/or the licensing regime/market access for private media.
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Major media outlets are frequently influenced by the incumbent government promoting its partisan political objectives. To ensure pro-government media reporting, governmental actors exert direct political pressure and violate existing rules of media regulation or change them to benefit their interests.
The murder of investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kušnírová in February 2018 has drawn public attention to the issues of media freedom and independence from state intervention and, at the same time, highlighted the limits to media freedom in Slovakia. The Pellegrini government did little to improve the situation. A law passed in September 2019 restored the right to reply, giving politicians the right to receive a reply or have a correction published. If a media outlet fails to fulfill this right, it could be fined up to €5,000. A right to reply was originally introduced by the first government of Robert Fico in 2008, but then abolished by the Radičová government in 2011 following widespread domestic and international criticism of the resulting intimidation of journalists.
Under the new center-right government, the relationship between the government and the media has been less tense. The new government has refrained from the verbal attacks on independent journalists characteristic of its predecessors and has announced to improve the institutional protection of media freedom. With some delay, it has prepared a number of amendments to media legislation and the criminal code. However, progress so far has been limited (Reporters without Borders 2021). Contrary to initial announcements, the governing coalition has not agreed on changes that would have reduced the grip of the parliament on the selection of the director-general of the public radio and TV broadcaster RTVS. While the government has proposed reducing the prison sentence for defamation from eight years to one, it has also suggested criminalizing the spreading of disinformation and promoting hoaxes. These suggestions, which have resembled controversial laws in Hungary, have been criticized by the journalistic community, NGOs and even parts of the governing coalition for opening the way to arbitrary prosecutions of journalists and for encouraging self-censorship.
Citations:
Reporters without Borders (2021): Slovakia must be more ambitious in its support for media independence, December 16 (https://rsf.org/en/news/slovakia-must-be-more-ambitious-its-support-media-independence-rsf-says).
Under the new center-right government, the relationship between the government and the media has been less tense. The new government has refrained from the verbal attacks on independent journalists characteristic of its predecessors and has announced to improve the institutional protection of media freedom. With some delay, it has prepared a number of amendments to media legislation and the criminal code. However, progress so far has been limited (Reporters without Borders 2021). Contrary to initial announcements, the governing coalition has not agreed on changes that would have reduced the grip of the parliament on the selection of the director-general of the public radio and TV broadcaster RTVS. While the government has proposed reducing the prison sentence for defamation from eight years to one, it has also suggested criminalizing the spreading of disinformation and promoting hoaxes. These suggestions, which have resembled controversial laws in Hungary, have been criticized by the journalistic community, NGOs and even parts of the governing coalition for opening the way to arbitrary prosecutions of journalists and for encouraging self-censorship.
Citations:
Reporters without Borders (2021): Slovakia must be more ambitious in its support for media independence, December 16 (https://rsf.org/en/news/slovakia-must-be-more-ambitious-its-support-media-independence-rsf-says).
To what extent are the media characterized by an ownership structure that ensures a pluralism of opinions?
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Diversified ownership structures characterize both the electronic and print media market, providing a well-balanced pluralism of opinions. Effective anti-monopoly policies and impartial, open public media guarantee a pluralism of opinions.
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Diversified ownership structures prevail in the electronic and print media market. Public media compensate for deficiencies or biases in private media reporting by representing a wider range of opinions.
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Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize either the electronic or the print media market. Important opinions are represented but there are no or only weak institutional guarantees against the predominance of certain opinions.
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Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize both the electronic and the print media market. Few companies dominate the media, most programs are biased, and there is evidence that certain opinions are not published or are marginalized.
As is the case in other East-Central European countries, Slovakia has experienced a passing of private media ownership from foreign owners to domestic owners that lack transparency. A large number of media outlets are now directly or indirectly controlled by a limited number of politically well-connected Slovak financial groups. In 2021, there have been two promising developments. First, Penta, the biggest of these groups, sold its 34%-stock of Petit Press which owes the most influential non-tabloid newspaper “Sme.” The new owner, the U.S.-based Media Development Investment Fund (MDIF), is a not-for-profit investment fund for independent media active in countries where access to independent media is under threat. It provides loan and equity financing to media companies that play an important role in maintaining freedom of speech in their home countries. MDIF already provided the loan to Petit Press in 1990s – when it was harassed by the Mečiar government. Second, the new center-right government has started to prepare new media legislation aimed at making media ownership more transparent. A publicly accessible register of all media outlets would be created, identifying not just the owners of any media outlet but also the so-called ultimate beneficial owner of that particular media outlet, that is, the person or entity that is the ultimate beneficiary when an institution initiates a transaction. In addition, the new government plans to install a new regulatory body supervising market shares and enforcing a maximum market share of 60%.
To what extent can citizens obtain official information?
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Legal regulations guarantee free and easy access to official information, contain few, reasonable restrictions, and there are effective mechanisms of appeal and oversight enabling citizens to access information.
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Access to official information is regulated by law. Most restrictions are justified, but access is sometimes complicated by bureaucratic procedures. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms permit citizens to enforce their right of access.
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Access to official information is partially regulated by law, but complicated by bureaucratic procedures and some poorly justified restrictions. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms are often ineffective.
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Access to official information is not regulated by law; there are many restrictions of access, bureaucratic procedures and no or ineffective mechanisms of enforcement.
Access to government information is guaranteed by the constitution and the Act on Free Access to Information (Infolaw), which was originally approved in 2000 and has been amended several times since. After the 2016 elections, Lucia Žitňanská, the Justice Minister in the third Fico government who resigned after the murder of Ján Kuciak, prepared a draft amendment that incorporated recommendations proposed by three prominent watchdog organizations (Transparency International Slovensko-TIS, Fair-Play Alliance, INEKO) including subjecting companies that are fully owned by the state or municipalities to the Infolaw and making public the salaries and CVs of state nominees. However, the Pellegrini government did not pursue the issue. After the 2020 elections, the new Justice Minister Mária Kolíková (SaS) announced plans to eventually amend the Infolaw. However, the amendment has been criticized by NGOs as too modest and has been approved by parliament only in February 2022.
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To what extent does the state respect and protect civil rights and how effectively are citizens protected by courts against infringements of their rights?
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All state institutions respect and effectively protect civil rights. Citizens are effectively protected by courts against infringements of their rights. Infringements present an extreme exception.
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The state respects and protects rights, with few infringements. Courts provide protection.
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Despite formal protection, frequent infringements of civil rights occur and court protection often proves ineffective.
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State institutions respect civil rights only formally, and civil rights are frequently violated. Court protection is not effective.
In Slovakia, civil rights are largely respected. However, the integrity of the judiciary and the long duration of court proceedings remain a problem, as do police discrimination and the mistreatment of the Roma population. New problems have emerged since conservative forces (including several Christian churches) have formed an alliance. Promoting traditional “family values” and opposing “gender ideology,” it has sought to restrict women’s rights and LGBTQ+ rights. These attempts have been supported by Sme-Rodina, one of the parties in the new center-right government, as well as by a number of members of parliament from OĽaNO, the leading party of the governing coalition. In September 2020, for instance, a group of OĽaNO members of parliament led by conservative Member of Parliament Anna Záborská submitted a law for stricter abortions in parliament. During the COVID-19 pandemic, some fundamental civil rights were temporarily restricted. When the first case of COVID-19 in Slovakia was detected in early March 2020, the Pellegrini government limited the freedom of movement and imposed a 14-day quarantine on all arrivals from abroad. People had to stay in state-owned facilities under poor conditions until testing negative for the virus. Despite the Constitutional Court’s suspension of an earlier amendment of the Act on Electronic Communications that gave the public health authority access to location tracking data in the fight against the pandemic, the governing coalition amended the Act in summer 2020 in a similar vein.
To what extent does the state concede and protect political liberties?
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All state institutions concede and effectively protect political liberties.
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All state institutions for the most part concede and protect political liberties. There are only few infringements.
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State institutions concede political liberties but infringements occur regularly in practice.
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Political liberties are unsatisfactory codified and frequently violated.
In Slovakia, political rights are largely respected. Citizens can freely join independent political and civic groups. The murder of Kuciak and Kušnírová in February 2018 evoked the biggest protests since the Velvet revolution in 1989. The movement “For a Decent Slovakia,” which emerged from these protests, continued to organize rallies in 2019. The murder has evidently bolstered sensitivity for political liberties and the need to protect civil liberties. This new sensitivity was a key factor in Zuzana Čaputová’s presidential election victory in March 2019. During the first years of the COVID-19 pandemic, the right to assembly was temporarily restricted – in November 2020, cinemas, churches and theaters were allowed to reopen whereas public gatherings remained restricted (Steuer 2021). However, these restrictions were clearly not directed against the political opposition.
Citations:
Steuer, M. (2021): Slovakia’s Democracy and the COVID-19 Pandemic: When Executive Communication Fails, in: VerfBlog, March 8 (https://verfassungsblog.de/slovakias-democracy-and-the-covid-19-pandemic-when-executive-communication-fails/).
Citations:
Steuer, M. (2021): Slovakia’s Democracy and the COVID-19 Pandemic: When Executive Communication Fails, in: VerfBlog, March 8 (https://verfassungsblog.de/slovakias-democracy-and-the-covid-19-pandemic-when-executive-communication-fails/).
How effectively does the state protect against different forms of discrimination?
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State institutions effectively protect against and actively prevent discrimination. Cases of discrimination are extremely rare.
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State anti-discrimination protections are moderately successful. Few cases of discrimination are observed.
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State anti-discrimination efforts show limited success. Many cases of discrimination can be observed.
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The state does not offer effective protection against discrimination. Discrimination is widespread in the public sector and in society.
Slovakia has fairly sophisticated anti-discrimination legislation in place. However, the former Prime Minister Robert Fico and his coalition partner SNS openly nurtured open public discrimination of Roma, migrants and LGBTQ+ persons and contributed to a toxic climate in Slovak society. Just a few days before the 2020 elections, the parliament, upon the initiative of the the SNS, again rejected the ratification of the Istanbul Convention. The new center-right government has not continued these campaigns. In late 2021, it also approved a new Strategy for Roma Equality, Inclusion and Participation until 2030. In the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic, however, the authorities targeted Roma settlements with disproportionate and discriminatory measures. The authorities tested residents of some Roma settlements for COVID-19 with the assistance of the army and ordered the mandatory quarantine of five Roma settlements on the grounds of public health. The legal basis for these mandatory quarantines, enforced by the police and army, was unclear, raising concerns of arbitrary detention. Moreover, parts of the governing coalition, most notably Sme-Rodina, have fought against gender equality and LGBTQ+ rights in the name of traditional family values.
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To what extent do government and administration act on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions to provide legal certainty?
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Government and administration act predictably, on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions. Legal regulations are consistent and transparent, ensuring legal certainty.
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Government and administration rarely make unpredictable decisions. Legal regulations are consistent, but leave a large scope of discretion to the government or administration.
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Government and administration sometimes make unpredictable decisions that go beyond given legal bases or do not conform to existing legal regulations. Some legal regulations are inconsistent and contradictory.
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Government and administration often make unpredictable decisions that lack a legal basis or ignore existing legal regulations. Legal regulations are inconsistent, full of loopholes and contradict each other.
Government and administration in Slovakia largely act on the basis of the law. However, legal certainty has suffered from frequent legal amendments and opaque laws. The increasing level of political polarization has made many laws rather short lived. As a result of frequent amendments, many laws have become inconsistent, even contradictory. Legal certainty has suffered also from the fact that the Constitutional Court has lacked a unifying normative background. While many court decisions have been inspired by the case law set by the European Court of Human Rights and the rulings of other EU member state constitutional courts, particularly the German one, others have been based on specific and not always transparent views of individual justices. Like its predecessors, the center-right government has passed many laws following a fast-track procedure that is at odds with the constitution. Legislative disorder has been increased by conflicts between the coalition partners. Sme-Rodina in particular has frequently broken previous agreements.
To what extent do independent courts control whether government and administration act in conformity with the law?
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9
9
Independent courts effectively review executive action and ensure that the government and administration act in conformity with the law.
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7
6
Independent courts usually manage to control whether the government and administration act in conformity with the law.
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3
4
3
Courts are independent, but often fail to ensure legal compliance.
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Courts are biased for or against the incumbent government and lack effective control.
The Slovak court system has for long suffered from low-quality decisions, a high backlog of cases, rampant corruption and repeated government intervention. As it has turned out in the proceedings, high-profile judges and prosecutors have been involved in the criminal network of Marian Kočner, the man who is accused of standing behind the murder of Kuciak and Kušnírová. As a result, the lack of Slovak citizens in the judicial system has been low.
Judicial reform has been a major issue in the 2020 election battle and has featured prominently in the government manifesto of the new center-right government. Already at the end of 2020, the government adopted a comprehensive judicial reform prepared by Minister of Justice Mária Kolíková (Za ľudí – For the People) (European Commission 2020, 2021). The reform has included a reform of the Judicial Council, the establishment of a new, Supreme Administrative Court, property checks of justices, an age cap for justices, changes in the appointment of Constitutional Court justices as well as changes in the territorial layout of district and regional appeal courts. However, the implementation of these reforms has faced resistance not only by the “old guard,” that is, those justices and prosecutors most affected by such reforms. The originally planned reduction in the number of district courts, which aimed at weakening long-established ties between justices, politicians, oligarchs and organized crimes, has been blocked by Sme-Rodina. Maroš Žilinka, the new prosecutor general appointed in December 2020, has taken a number of dubious decisions. In particular, he has shielded the well-connected former director of the Slovak Intelligence Service and four other high-profile individuals against corruption charges (Ovádek 2021).
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the courts have remained operational. The Constitutional Court found the government’s declaration of a state of crisis in October 2020 constitutional, but has declared individual government measures unconstitutional
Citations:
European Commission (2020): 2020 Rule of Law Report. Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Slovakia. SWD(2020) 324 final, Brussels (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/sk_rol_country_chapter.pdf).
European Commission (2021): 2021 Rule of Law Report. Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Slovakia. SWD(2021) 727 final, Brussels (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021SC0727&from=EN).
Ovádek, M. (2021): General Prosecutor, the Supreme Leader of the Slovak Republic? in: VerfBlog, September 2 (https://verfassungsblog.de/general-prosecutor-the-supreme-leader-of-the-slovak-republic/).
Judicial reform has been a major issue in the 2020 election battle and has featured prominently in the government manifesto of the new center-right government. Already at the end of 2020, the government adopted a comprehensive judicial reform prepared by Minister of Justice Mária Kolíková (Za ľudí – For the People) (European Commission 2020, 2021). The reform has included a reform of the Judicial Council, the establishment of a new, Supreme Administrative Court, property checks of justices, an age cap for justices, changes in the appointment of Constitutional Court justices as well as changes in the territorial layout of district and regional appeal courts. However, the implementation of these reforms has faced resistance not only by the “old guard,” that is, those justices and prosecutors most affected by such reforms. The originally planned reduction in the number of district courts, which aimed at weakening long-established ties between justices, politicians, oligarchs and organized crimes, has been blocked by Sme-Rodina. Maroš Žilinka, the new prosecutor general appointed in December 2020, has taken a number of dubious decisions. In particular, he has shielded the well-connected former director of the Slovak Intelligence Service and four other high-profile individuals against corruption charges (Ovádek 2021).
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the courts have remained operational. The Constitutional Court found the government’s declaration of a state of crisis in October 2020 constitutional, but has declared individual government measures unconstitutional
Citations:
European Commission (2020): 2020 Rule of Law Report. Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Slovakia. SWD(2020) 324 final, Brussels (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/sk_rol_country_chapter.pdf).
European Commission (2021): 2021 Rule of Law Report. Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Slovakia. SWD(2021) 727 final, Brussels (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021SC0727&from=EN).
Ovádek, M. (2021): General Prosecutor, the Supreme Leader of the Slovak Republic? in: VerfBlog, September 2 (https://verfassungsblog.de/general-prosecutor-the-supreme-leader-of-the-slovak-republic/).
To what extent does the process of appointing (supreme or constitutional court) justices guarantee the independence of the judiciary?
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Justices are appointed in a cooperative appointment process with special majority requirements.
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Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies with special majority requirements or in a cooperative selection process without special majority requirements.
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Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies without special majority requirements.
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All judges are appointed exclusively by a single body irrespective of other institutions.
The justices of the Constitutional Court (CC) are selected for 12 years by the president on the basis of proposals made by the parliament (National Council of the Slovak Republic), until recently without any special majority requirement. From 2014 to the end of 2017, the selection of justices was paralyzed by a struggle between President Kiska, who had made judicial reform a priority in his successful presidential campaign in 2014, and the Smer-SD-dominated parliament. Ignoring a decision by the CC, Kiska blocked the appointment of new justices, arguing that the candidates greenlighted by the National Council lack the proper qualifications for Constitutional Court justices. As a result, three out of 19 seats in the CC remained vacant until Kiska eventually gave in in early December 2017. In February 2019, the tenure of nine out of the court’s 13 justices expired. The process of replacing the justices was highly polarized, especially after former prime minister Robert Fico was nominated as a candidate. The new public hearings for candidates attracted a lot of media and public attention, but probably discouraged several qualified candidates from engaging in a candidature. In April 2019, the first three justices were appointed, but it took another nine months and five votes in parliament to finalize the other six appointments. In 2020, one of the judges – Mojmír Mamojka – resigned due to the involvement in the criminal network of businessman Marián Kočner.
Part of the new center-right government’s comprehensive judicial reforms have involved changes being made to the appointment process for the CC (Farkašová 2021). First, proposals by the parliament must now be based on a three-fifths or, if not achieved, at least an absolute majority of votes. Second, the president is no longer bound to proposals by the parliament, if the latter fails to propose the required number of candidates within specified time limits. These amendments have aimed at limiting the influence of the governing coalition on the composition of the CC by introducing special majority requirements and at strengthening the incentives for parliament to agree on a sufficient number of proposals.
Citations:
Farkašová, S. (2021): Constitutional aspects of the current reform of the selecting constitutional judges in the Slovak Republic and the comparative perspectives in Europe, in: Tribuna Juridica 11(2): 150-173 (https://ideas.repec.org/a/asr/journl/v11y2021i2p150-173.html).
Part of the new center-right government’s comprehensive judicial reforms have involved changes being made to the appointment process for the CC (Farkašová 2021). First, proposals by the parliament must now be based on a three-fifths or, if not achieved, at least an absolute majority of votes. Second, the president is no longer bound to proposals by the parliament, if the latter fails to propose the required number of candidates within specified time limits. These amendments have aimed at limiting the influence of the governing coalition on the composition of the CC by introducing special majority requirements and at strengthening the incentives for parliament to agree on a sufficient number of proposals.
Citations:
Farkašová, S. (2021): Constitutional aspects of the current reform of the selecting constitutional judges in the Slovak Republic and the comparative perspectives in Europe, in: Tribuna Juridica 11(2): 150-173 (https://ideas.repec.org/a/asr/journl/v11y2021i2p150-173.html).
To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?
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Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
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Most integrity mechanisms function effectively and provide disincentives for public officeholders willing to abuse their positions.
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Some integrity mechanisms function, but do not effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
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Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.
Corruption has been the most sensitive political problem undermining political stability and the quality of democracy in Slovakia for some time. The revelations that have followed the murder of Ján Kuciak and Martina Kušnírová have confirmed the prevalence of corruption in the country. Despite widespread public dissatisfaction with corruption, as evidenced by the mass demonstrations in 2018 and the election of Zuzana Čaputová as president in March 2019, the Pellegrini government has been slow to improve integrity mechanisms and has largely confined itself to updating its anti-corruption strategy in a routine manner. The investigations and trials in the context of the murders of Kuciak and Kušnírová have revealed how deeply politicians of the Fico/Pellegrini government and persons with high positions in justice or legislation have been involved in a network of criminal state activity. The victory of OĽaNO at the parliamentary elections in 2020 traces back to the strong anti-corruption stance of this party and its leader Igor Matovič. The fight against corruption has been one of the key priorities of the new center-right government, which announced a range of reforms in this area. As a matter of fact, the numbers both of initiated proceedings in corruption cases of individuals convicted for corruption offenses have risen substantially in 2020 and 2021. By contrast, progress with institutional reforms has been slow. While the new Office for the Protection of Whistleblowers, formally created in 2019, eventually began taking action in late 2021, draft legislation on lobbying, “revolving doors,” asset declarations, conflicts of interest of members of parliament and public procurement remain at the initial stage (European Commission 2021: 10-15).
Citations:
European Commission (2021): 2021 Rule of Law Report. Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Slovakia. SWD(2021) 727 final, Brussels (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021SC0727&from= EN).
Citations:
European Commission (2021): 2021 Rule of Law Report. Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Slovakia. SWD(2021) 727 final, Brussels (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021SC0727&from= EN).