Executive Accountability
#16Key Findings
With a public increasingly distrustful of the government and politicians, Slovenia falls into the upper-middle ranks internationally (rank 16) with regard to executive accountability. Its score on this measure has improved by 0.2 points relative to its 2014 level.
Parliamentarians have adequate resources and ample executive-oversight powers. The Court of Audit and the data-protection authority have been subject to increasing political pressure. The independent ombudsman is well regarded, but often has limited impact.
The media has become increasingly polarized, and is subject to increasing political pressure. Many media organizations are owned by business-sector figures that influence their content. The government actively seeks to silence critics, denying journalists access to accurate information. Public interest in politics is relatively low, as are levels of trust in political institutions.
While parties are heterogeneous, decision-making tends to be centralized. Economic-interest organizations cooperate with academics, and have good analytical capacities. The withdrawal of employees’ representatives from the official consultation mechanism in 2021 was a setback. NGOs have come under increasing pressure from the government, and in some cases have become more political.
Parliamentarians have adequate resources and ample executive-oversight powers. The Court of Audit and the data-protection authority have been subject to increasing political pressure. The independent ombudsman is well regarded, but often has limited impact.
The media has become increasingly polarized, and is subject to increasing political pressure. Many media organizations are owned by business-sector figures that influence their content. The government actively seeks to silence critics, denying journalists access to accurate information. Public interest in politics is relatively low, as are levels of trust in political institutions.
While parties are heterogeneous, decision-making tends to be centralized. Economic-interest organizations cooperate with academics, and have good analytical capacities. The withdrawal of employees’ representatives from the official consultation mechanism in 2021 was a setback. NGOs have come under increasing pressure from the government, and in some cases have become more political.
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To what extent are citizens informed of public policies?
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Most citizens are well-informed of a broad range of public policies.
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Many citizens are well-informed of individual public policies.
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Few citizens are well-informed of public policies; most citizens have only a rudimental knowledge of public policies.
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Most citizens are not aware of public policies.
According to a Eurobarometer survey in May 2017, around 70% of Slovenian citizens think they are well informed about what is going on in the country – though their knowledge of government policymaking is rather limited. While both print and electronic media provide mostly adequate information, certain segments of the population lack media literacy, and most citizens are simply not interested in the details of policymaking. However, the Slovenian media are under increased political pressure, which makes objective reporting more difficult and consequently affects the public’s level of information. In addition, the journalists’ association criticizes the poor working conditions of journalists, which lead to self-censorship. Recurring corruption and political scandals, along with the COVID-19 pandemic, have fostered frustration and disenchantment among a majority of the population. Eurobarometer surveys suggest that public interest in politics and trust in political institutions are at the same low levels as a decade ago, albeit trust in the government increased by seven points between 2018 and 2021. Nevertheless, trust levels in government, parliament, political parties and public administration were all well below the EU-27 average during the period under review, and 68% of the population say things are going in the wrong direction.
Citations:
European Commission (2021): Standard Eurobarometer 95. Brussels (https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2532).
Citations:
European Commission (2021): Standard Eurobarometer 95. Brussels (https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2532).
Does the government publish data and information in a way that strengthens citizens’ capacity to hold the government accountable?
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The government publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
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The government most of the time publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
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The government publishes data in a limited and not timely or user-friendly way.
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The government publishes (almost) no relevant data.
The Slovenian government launched a new and unified open data government portal, OPSI (Odprti podatki Slovenije), in late 2016. Further upgraded in 2019 and 2021, the portal provides a central catalogue of all the records and databases of Slovenian public bodies, and an extensive range of datasets in machine-readable formats and with an Open Data license. Access to data is largely unrestricted and published in user-friendly formats.
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Do members of parliament have adequate personnel and structural resources to monitor government activity effectively?
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring all government activity effectively.
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring a government’s major activities.
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
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The resources provided to the members of parliament are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
Slovenian members of parliament command sufficient resources to perform their jobs effectively and to monitor government activity. Each member of parliament has a personal budget for education and literature acquisition as well as access to research and data services provided by the Research and Documentation Section. Additional resources are available to parliamentary party groups for organizational and administrative support, and for hiring expert staff. Parliamentary groups must have a minimum of three members of parliament. During the 2014-2018 parliamentary term, only three members of parliament did not belong to a parliamentary group. During the current 2018–2022, term all members of parliament are part of a parliamentary group.
Are parliamentary committees able to ask for government documents?
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Parliamentary committees may ask for most or all government documents; they are normally delivered in full and within an appropriate time frame.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are slightly limited; some important documents are not delivered or are delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are considerably limited; most important documents are not delivered or delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
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Parliamentary committees may not request government documents.
In Slovenia, parliamentary committees have the right to ask for almost all government documents, and they can discuss any document in sessions either open or closed to the public. However, both the current Janša and former Šarec governments, similar to their predecessors, have sometimes delivered draft bills and other documents at the last minute or with considerable delay, thereby infringing on the work of the committees and obstructing public debate on the proposals.
Are parliamentary committees able to summon ministers for hearings?
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Parliamentary committees may summon ministers. Ministers regularly follow invitations and are obliged to answer questions.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are slightly limited; ministers occasionally refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are considerably limited; ministers frequently refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
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Parliamentary committees may not summon ministers.
The right of parliamentary committees to summon ministers is enshrined in the Rules of Procedure of the Slovenian parliament. Ministers regularly follow invitations; if they are unable to attend in person, they can also authorize state secretaries to represent them. Ministers are also obliged to answer questions from members of parliament, either in oral or written form, and this obligation is largely respected in practice. Moreover, the prime minister must personally answer four questions from members of parliament in every parliamentary session. In 2020, members of parliament submitted a total of 1,857 questions to the government generally or to individual ministers specifically (1,425 more than in 2018 and 251 less than in 2019), with 71.5% of questions submitted by opposition parties. None of the questions remained unanswered.
Citations:
National Assembly (2021): Report on the Work of the National Assembly in 2020. Ljubljana (https://fotogalerija.dz-rs.si/datoteke/Publikacije/PorocilaDZ/Mandat_2018%E2%80%932022/Porocilo_o_delu_Drzavnega_zbora_v_letu_2020.pdf).
Citations:
National Assembly (2021): Report on the Work of the National Assembly in 2020. Ljubljana (https://fotogalerija.dz-rs.si/datoteke/Publikacije/PorocilaDZ/Mandat_2018%E2%80%932022/Porocilo_o_delu_Drzavnega_zbora_v_letu_2020.pdf).
Are parliamentary committees able to summon experts for committee meetings?
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Parliamentary committees may summon experts.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are slightly limited.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are considerably limited.
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Parliamentary committees may not summon experts.
Parliamentary committees in Slovenia may invite experts or form expert groups in charge of helping to draft legislative proposals. Under the Šarec government, the number of experts invited has decreased as a result primarily of a much smaller volume of legislative proposals being prepared and adopted in 2018–19. However, under the Janša government, when the number of legislative proposals substantially increased, the number of invited experts returned to previous levels. Parliamentary committees have launched several public expert discussions on important pieces of legislation and invited experts to the sessions of investigation committees. On the initiative of the National Council, a large expert group has been involved in preparing legislation for the introduction of regions.
Are the task areas and structures of parliamentary committees suited to monitor ministries effectively?
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The match between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are well-suited to the effective monitoring of ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are largely suited to the monitoring ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are partially suited to the monitoring of ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are not at all suited to the monitoring of ministries.
The Slovenian parliament has two kinds of working bodies – 13 committees and two subcommittees – that normally cover the work of ministries and eight commissions, some of them standing, which deal with more specific issues such as rules of procedure, the supervision of intelligence and security services, and issues concerning national minorities. Under both the Šarec and Janša governments, the committee structure has remained largely unchanged, even though the number of ministries has increased. As a result, the number of committees overseeing more than one ministry has grown. However, this has not infringed on the monitoring of ministries.
Citations:
Slovenian National Assembly 2021: Working Bodies. Ljubljana (https://www.dz-rs.si/wps/portal/en/Home/pos/WorkingBodies/!ut/p/z1/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfIjo8zivSy9Hb283Q0N3I2CTA0CXYycfIMNjA2cfQ31w8EKnPyCTD3BCrycTAwCjf19nYLMgwwNA030o4jRj0cBSL8BDuBooF-QGxoKACLpVWs!/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/).
Citations:
Slovenian National Assembly 2021: Working Bodies. Ljubljana (https://www.dz-rs.si/wps/portal/en/Home/pos/WorkingBodies/!ut/p/z1/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfIjo8zivSy9Hb283Q0N3I2CTA0CXYycfIMNjA2cfQ31w8EKnPyCTD3BCrycTAwCjf19nYLMgwwNA030o4jRj0cBSL8BDuBooF-QGxoKACLpVWs!/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/).
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To what extent do media in your country analyze the rationale and impact of public policies?
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A clear majority of mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies.
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About one-half of the mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies. The rest produces a mix of infotainment and quality information content.
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A clear minority of mass media brands focuses on high-quality information content analyzing public policies. Several mass media brands produce superficial infotainment content only.
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All mass media brands are dominated by superficial infotainment content.
By facilitating a replacement of in-depth analysis by a preoccupation with scandals, whether real or alleged, the growing polarization of the media in Slovenia has infringed upon the quality of media reporting. The public media – especially television and radio broadcasters, which have traditionally provided high-quality information about government decisions – have under the influence of political and even societal polarization become more biased and selective, especially since the Janša government took office. It must be critically noted that under the Janša government, media freedoms and pluralism are increasingly considered to be at risk due to increasing news media penetration and commercial or owner influence over editorial content.
The media was often criticized by academia, the non-governmental sector and political parties from both ends of the spectrum for not providing enough expert and high-quality information during the COVID-19 pandemic, and for giving too much media attention to anti-COVID-19 and anti-vaccine movements. Moreover, the government plays an important role in silencing critics, denying journalists access to accurate and relevant information, and proposed changes to media laws.
Citations:
MILOSAVLJEVIC, Marko, BILJAK GERJEVIC, Romana, 2021. Monitoring media pluralism in the digital era : application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, AALBANIA, MONTENEGRO, THE REPUBLIC OF
NORTH MACEDONIA, SERBIA & TURKEY IN THE YEAR 2020. Country report : Slovenia, Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF), Retrieved from Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository, at: https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/67818
The media was often criticized by academia, the non-governmental sector and political parties from both ends of the spectrum for not providing enough expert and high-quality information during the COVID-19 pandemic, and for giving too much media attention to anti-COVID-19 and anti-vaccine movements. Moreover, the government plays an important role in silencing critics, denying journalists access to accurate and relevant information, and proposed changes to media laws.
Citations:
MILOSAVLJEVIC, Marko, BILJAK GERJEVIC, Romana, 2021. Monitoring media pluralism in the digital era : application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, AALBANIA, MONTENEGRO, THE REPUBLIC OF
NORTH MACEDONIA, SERBIA & TURKEY IN THE YEAR 2020. Country report : Slovenia, Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF), Retrieved from Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository, at: https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/67818
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How inclusive and open are the major parties in their internal decision-making processes?
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The party allows all party members and supporters to participate in its decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and agendas of issues are open.
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The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, all party members have the opportunity to participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are rather open.
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The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, a number of elected delegates participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are largely controlled by the party leadership.
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A number of party leaders participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are fully controlled and drafted by the party leadership.
Slovenian party law leaves political parties with some organizational autonomy. Political parties are very heterogeneously organized, with some organized only on the micro level (i.e., in one or several of the 212 municipalities) and others organized only on the macro level. Access to decision-making processes is normally restricted to party members. Whereas party members have the formal right to participate in decisions, the party leadership controls the candidate lists and the policy agendas. The details of internal party decision-making are not widely known to the public, as most decisions are made behind doors that are firmly shut. In the 2018 parliamentary elections, only two political parties managed to win more than 10% of votes.
To what extent are economic interest associations (e.g., employers, industry, labor) capable of formulating relevant policies?
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Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
In Slovenia, with its strong corporatist tradition, economic-interest associations are very well organized, and possess relatively strong analytical capacities to propose and assess policies. Most economic and social policies are discussed in detail in the Economic and Social Council, a tripartite body. Trade unions and employers’ associations do not have their own research institutes but cooperate with universities and think tanks. Trade unions’ analytical capacities have suffered from the fragmentation associated with the coexistence of seven separate union confederations. In the period under review, however, there were some setbacks for the Economic and Social Council, despite an increase in meetings, as employee representatives pulled out of the council in May 2021, accusing the government of breaking the rules of social dialogue.
To what extent are non-economic interest associations capable of formulating relevant policies?
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Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
Slovenia’s vibrant third sector has been quite active in monitoring government activities. Despite a decline in public funding, most interest associations have considerable policy knowledge, and many can rely on think tanks that involve various experts from the universities and research institutes in their work. Policy proposals developed by interest associations, although not numerous, have been featured prominently in the media. During the period under review, interest associations have been heavily involved in three major political issues: the environmental impact of frequent fires that have taken place at waste-management plants, the new legislation on waterside areas and various infrastructure projects (e.g., the second railway to the port of Koper and the Karavanke tunnel). Within the growing political polarization in Slovenia, political pressure from the government on NGOs has increased, and NGOs have become less independent and have in some cases become very political in their activities.
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Does there exist an independent and effective audit office?
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There exists an effective and independent audit office.
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There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is slightly limited.
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There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
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There does not exist an independent and effective audit office.
According to Article 150 of the Slovenian constitution, the Court of Audit is the supreme auditing authority in all matters of public spending. The Court of Audit is an independent authority accountable exclusively to parliament. The Court of Audit scrutinizes the performance of national and local governments and all legal persons established or owned by them. The chairman and the two vice-chairmen are elected by the parliament for nine years – on the basis of secret ballots – and the office reports regularly and whenever requested to the parliament.
The Court of Audit has far-reaching competencies, and still enjoys some reputation and public trust. However, after the Janša government took over, there was a lot of pressure on the court from both the coalition government and opposition to deliver their reports about COVID-19 protective equipment procurement in a way that would favor one or the other side. In addition, a number of political comments made by the chairman of the court during the period under review did not help the independence of the court.
The position of the court is somewhat limited by a lack of both financial and human resources, and by political pressures, which were evident during last term of office. While it can propose its own budget to the legislature, the ultimate decision regarding the Court’s resources rests with parliament.
The Court of Audit has far-reaching competencies, and still enjoys some reputation and public trust. However, after the Janša government took over, there was a lot of pressure on the court from both the coalition government and opposition to deliver their reports about COVID-19 protective equipment procurement in a way that would favor one or the other side. In addition, a number of political comments made by the chairman of the court during the period under review did not help the independence of the court.
The position of the court is somewhat limited by a lack of both financial and human resources, and by political pressures, which were evident during last term of office. While it can propose its own budget to the legislature, the ultimate decision regarding the Court’s resources rests with parliament.
Does there exist an independent and effective ombuds office?
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There exists an effective and independent ombuds office.
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There exists an effective and independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is slightly limited.
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There exists an independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is considerably limited.
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There does not exist an effective and independent ombuds office.
In addition to the parliament’s Commission for Petitions, Human Rights and Equal Opportunities, there is an independent ombudsman, who is accountable exclusively to parliament. The ombudsman is elected by parliament for a term of six years and reports regularly to the legislature. Like his predecessor, Vlasta Nussdorfer, who served from 2013 to 2019, current ombudsman Peter Svetina enjoys a good reputation and is quite effective in settling issues. As with previous ombudspersons, however, Svetina’s role has been occasionally constrained by the lack of interest among members of parliament and ministerial inactivity.
Is there an independent authority in place that effectively holds government offices accountable for handling issues of data protection and privacy?
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An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
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An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is slightly limited.
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A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are strongly limited.
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There is no effective and independent data protection office.
Following the establishment of the Information Commissioner on 31 December 2005, Slovenia has an independent and effective data protection authority. The commissioner supervises the protection of personal data and access to public information. The office is led by Mojca Prelesnik, previously the general secretary to the parliament, who was reelected for a second term in June 2019. The competencies of the Information Commissioner include deciding on appeals against decisions by another body to refuse or dismiss a request for information; deciding on alleged violations of the right to access or reuse public information; supervising the implementation of legislation regulating the processing and protection of personal data; acting as an appellate body on individual complaints regarding a refusal to make personal information available to the respective individual. The ruling coalition criticized and applied some political pressure to the commissioner during the pandemic, regarding her rigid position on the protection of personal data.
There is also a government Office for the Protection of Classified Information. The office monitors the classification and protection of information, and it ensures the development and implementation of classified information protection standards across government agencies, local community agencies, holders of public authorizations, NGOs and commercial companies that hold classified information. The office also issues permissions to access classified information and security certificates to legal persons.
Citations:
The Information Commissioner 2021 (https://www.ip-rs.si/).
There is also a government Office for the Protection of Classified Information. The office monitors the classification and protection of information, and it ensures the development and implementation of classified information protection standards across government agencies, local community agencies, holders of public authorizations, NGOs and commercial companies that hold classified information. The office also issues permissions to access classified information and security certificates to legal persons.
Citations:
The Information Commissioner 2021 (https://www.ip-rs.si/).