Executive Capacity
#32Key Findings
With a number of a significant gaps, Slovenia scores relatively poorly (rank 32) with regard to executive capacity. Its score on this measure has improved by 0.8 points since 2014.
Institutional strategic-planning capacities are generally weak, but a number of expert advisory groups have been created. The government office (GO) reviews bills from a legal and technical perspective but lacks sectoral expertise. Legislative projects depend largely on coalition-party negotiations, and are drafted by line ministries or interministerial teams with little GO participation.
RIA quality is uneven, and much legislation is exempt. A strong tradition of consultation exists, but employee representatives pulled out of the mechanism in 2021. Communication was somewhat incoherent during the early pandemic period, but improved afterward. The government has been quite successful in implementing its policy objectives.
Bureaucratic burdens on municipalities have been reduced, and central government transfers have been substantially increased. While regulations are generally enforced effectively and without bias, they are at times affected by interest-group pressure. The country was well prepared for its EU Council presidency in 2021.
Institutional strategic-planning capacities are generally weak, but a number of expert advisory groups have been created. The government office (GO) reviews bills from a legal and technical perspective but lacks sectoral expertise. Legislative projects depend largely on coalition-party negotiations, and are drafted by line ministries or interministerial teams with little GO participation.
RIA quality is uneven, and much legislation is exempt. A strong tradition of consultation exists, but employee representatives pulled out of the mechanism in 2021. Communication was somewhat incoherent during the early pandemic period, but improved afterward. The government has been quite successful in implementing its policy objectives.
Bureaucratic burdens on municipalities have been reduced, and central government transfers have been substantially increased. While regulations are generally enforced effectively and without bias, they are at times affected by interest-group pressure. The country was well prepared for its EU Council presidency in 2021.
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How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?
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9
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
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7
6
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
5
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4
3
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
2
1
1
In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
The institutional capacity for strategic planning in Slovenia is rather weak. Capacities for planning in the ministries are limited, and there is no central policy-planning unit in the Government Office. After assuming office, the Cerar government announced that it would expand planning capacities. However, save for the adoption in December 2017 of the strategic framework for policymaking, the Slovenian Development Strategy 2030, the Cerar government achieved little in the way of progress. The Šarec government did nothing to improve strategic planning. Meanwhile, the Janša government has been rather pre-occupied with the COVID-19 pandemic, but still managed to prepare a comprehensive report on the implementation of the Slovenian Development Strategy 2030.
Citations:
Government of the Republic of Slovenia (2017): Slovenian Development Strategy 2030. Ljubljana (http://www.vlada.si/fileadmin/dokumenti/si/projekti/2017/srs2030/en/Slovenia_2030.pdf).
Government of the Republic of Slovenia (2020): Report on the Development 2020. Ljubljana (https://www.umar.gov.si/fileadmin/user_upload/razvoj_slovenije/2020/slovenski/POR2020.pdf).
Citations:
Government of the Republic of Slovenia (2017): Slovenian Development Strategy 2030. Ljubljana (http://www.vlada.si/fileadmin/dokumenti/si/projekti/2017/srs2030/en/Slovenia_2030.pdf).
Government of the Republic of Slovenia (2020): Report on the Development 2020. Ljubljana (https://www.umar.gov.si/fileadmin/user_upload/razvoj_slovenije/2020/slovenski/POR2020.pdf).
Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?
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9
In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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6
For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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3
In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
2
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1
The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
In Slovenia, the Government Office and the ministries have various advisory bodies that include academic experts. Prime Minister Cerar, an academic himself, strongly relied on academic and practitioners’ advice when establishing his party platform, coalition and government program. While the Cerar government regularly sought external advice, it often failed to implement it. The Šarec government behaved in a similar fashion. The Janša government has established several expert groups for digitalization, de-bureaucratization, healthcare reform and the coronavirus crisis, which have been tasked with preparing policy solutions and proposing new or adopted legislation. Several solutions (e.g., concerning de-bureaucratization and digitalization) have already been adopted inside amended normative frameworks. For instance, the de-bureaucratization law was adopted in December 2021 following intense public debate and included dozens of de-bureaucratization measures, which aim to simplify administrative procedures in both the public and private sectors.
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Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?
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9
The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
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3
The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
2
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1
The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
Slovenia has a strong tradition of departmentalism and collegial cabinets. The Government Office focuses on the legal and technical coherence of draft bills but lacks the capacity and sectoral expertise to evaluate their policy content, especially since the recruitment of expert staff is limited and often subject to political pressures and political compromise. Janez Janša, the new prime minister, has brought in a few new experts. Among others, he made Jelko Kacin, a former member of the European Parliament, his national coordinator for COVID-19 vaccinations. He also appointed Igor Senčar, the former ambassador and long-time expert in foreign affairs, as his adviser on foreign affairs and EU coordination. On the other side, Janša appointed some of his own party figures to the Prime Minister’s Office to serve as advisors for national security and healthcare.
To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?
10
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9
There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
8
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7
6
The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
5
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3
Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
2
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1
Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
The Government Office is not directly and systematically involved in line ministries’ preparation of policy proposals. Once the coalition agreement and government program have defined certain projects, full responsibility for drafting bills rests with the line ministries, interministerial commissions or project teams. The Government Office is seldom briefed about the state of affairs. If it is, consultation is rather formal and focuses mostly on legal and technical issues.
How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?
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The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
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6
Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
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There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
2
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1
There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
Cabinet committees play an important role in the preparation of cabinet proposals in Slovenia and settle issues prior to the cabinet meeting. The Janša government, similar to previous governments, has kept the three standing cabinet committees: the Committee of State Matters and Public Issues, the Committee of National Economy and the Commission of Administrative and Personnel Matters. In the first 20 months of the Janša government, the three committees met 180 times in regular in-person meetings and 67 times at a correspondence sessions.
How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?
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Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
5
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3
There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
2
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1
There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
The government rules of procedure establish clear mechanisms to ensure effective cooperation between the ministries. They require the consultation of all ministries that are concerned before the submission of bills to the cabinet. While senior civil servants are thus heavily involved in the coordination of legislation, the effectiveness of this coordination has suffered from the deteriorating quality and increasing politicization of the upper echelons of civil service.
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
2
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1
Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Slovenia’s tradition of coalition governments has meant that informal coordination procedures have played a significant role in policy coordination. In the period under review, the leaders of the four coalition parties (later three parties, after DeSUS left the coalition) met frequently, making major decisions at coalition meetings that were often also attended by the ministers and from time to time also by the leaders of parliamentary majority groups and coalition members of parliament. There were also regular meetings between the coalition and their external expert groups, most notably the Expert Group on Containment and Epidemic Management of COVID-19. In press conferences and public statements after these meetings, some information about the decisions made was provided to the public, which was especially the case when the meeting also involved external experts. The dominant role of the party leaders within their parties meant that a considerable amount of policy coordination took place in party bodies and between the general secretaries of the coalition parties.
How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?
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The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
5
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The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
2
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1
The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
In an effort to better coordinate the digitalization of public administration with the broader issue of digital transformation, the Cerar government transferred in 2016 competences for information society and electronic communication from the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport to the Ministry of Public Administration. This reorganization of responsibilities has yielded a more appropriate structure for the implementation of the 2016 “Digital Slovenia 2020” strategy and a more efficient use of the existing ICT infrastructure. One of the goals of the strategy is to further strengthen the use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination. Even if implementation of the strategy slowed under the Šarec government, the Janša government has made digitalization one of the government’s key policy priorities, appointed a special minister for digital transformation (July 2021) and established the Government Office for Digital Transformation.
Citations:
Government of Slovenia (2016): Digital Slovenia 2020: Development strategy for the information society until 2020. Ljubljana (http://www.mju.gov.si/fileadmin/mju.gov.si/pageuploads/DID/Informacijska_druzba/pdf/DSI_2020_3-2016_pic1.pdf).
RTVSLO.si (2021): Mark Boris Andrijanič imenovan za ministra brez listnice, pristojnega za digitalno preobrazbo. Ljubljana (https://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/mark-boris-andrijanic-imenovan-za-ministra-brez-listnice-pristojnega-za-digitalno-preobrazbo/587808).
Citations:
Government of Slovenia (2016): Digital Slovenia 2020: Development strategy for the information society until 2020. Ljubljana (http://www.mju.gov.si/fileadmin/mju.gov.si/pageuploads/DID/Informacijska_druzba/pdf/DSI_2020_3-2016_pic1.pdf).
RTVSLO.si (2021): Mark Boris Andrijanič imenovan za ministra brez listnice, pristojnega za digitalno preobrazbo. Ljubljana (https://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/mark-boris-andrijanic-imenovan-za-ministra-brez-listnice-pristojnega-za-digitalno-preobrazbo/587808).
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To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?
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RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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3
4
3
RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
2
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1
RIA are not applied or do not exist.
In Slovenia, RIA guidelines have largely been copied and pasted from the European Union. The government’s Public Administration Development Strategy 2015-2020 acknowledged the need for improving RIA and has brought some progress. These culminate in the 2019–2022 Action Plan, which calls for the expansion of RIA guidance to include the assessment of non-financial impacts and suggests the implementation of preliminary impact assessments. However, oversight has continued to suffer from institutional fragmentation, so that the quality of RIA has been uneven among ministries. When an RIA is applied, it is often limited to a qualitative assessment, and there are no official statistics regarding the implementation of RIA. As fast-track legislation is exempt from RIA, RIAs were not performed for at least a third of all new measures passed in the period under review.
Citations:
Government of the Republic of Slovenia (2015): Public Administration 2020: Public Administration Development Strategy 2015-2020. Ljubljana (http://www.mju.gov.si/fileadmin/mju.gov.si/pageuploads/JAVNA_UPRAVA/Kakovost/Strategija_razvoja_JU_2015-2020/Strategija_razvoja_ANG_final_web.pdf).
OECD (2018): Regulatory Policy in Slovenia: Oversight Matters. Paris.
OECD (2021): Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021: Slovenia. (https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/3ebf1de2-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/3ebf1de2-en)
Citations:
Government of the Republic of Slovenia (2015): Public Administration 2020: Public Administration Development Strategy 2015-2020. Ljubljana (http://www.mju.gov.si/fileadmin/mju.gov.si/pageuploads/JAVNA_UPRAVA/Kakovost/Strategija_razvoja_JU_2015-2020/Strategija_razvoja_ANG_final_web.pdf).
OECD (2018): Regulatory Policy in Slovenia: Oversight Matters. Paris.
OECD (2021): Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021: Slovenia. (https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/3ebf1de2-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/3ebf1de2-en)
Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?
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9
RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
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The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
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3
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3
The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
2
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1
RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
The RIA process in Slovenia suffers from several weaknesses. First, public participation often fails to meet the legal standards. Second, the conducted RIAs are rarely made public, if ever. Third, quality control is limited. RIA oversight is divided among several agencies; however, supervising agencies largely check for formal and legal correctness, without addressing substantive quality.
Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?
10
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9
Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
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Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
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Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
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Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
Slovenia’s RIA guidelines provide for relatively far-reaching sustainability checks. However, the specification of assessment criteria and the set of indicators to be used suffer from gaps, and the actual quality of RIA is very uneven. In some cases, there are only vague assessments; in others, comprehensive analytical work is done. During the period under review, the quality of assessments has somewhat improved.
To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?
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9
Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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3
Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
2
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1
Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
Ex post evaluations are regularly carried out for the most significant policies, but rarely for all other policies. When carried out, ex post evaluations are mostly used for the improvement of existing policies rather than for the development of new policies.
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Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?
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The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
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1
The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
Slovenia has a strong tradition of corporatism and of government consultation with interest groups more generally. The Šarec government has stuck to this tradition and has discussed part of its legislative initiatives in the Economic and Social Council, the tripartite body for social and economic dialogue. One of the flagship projects of the new Šarec government, the increase in the minimum wage in 2019, was prepared without consulting the social partners, which has led to heavy criticism from employers’ associations. However, the Šarec government succeeded where its predecessor had failed and completed negotiations with public sector unions late in 2018, avoiding a series of strikes and calming tensions within the public sector. In May 2021, employee representatives decided to pull-out of the Economic and Social Council, citing a lack of commitment from the government side, despite the data that shows that the Economic and Social Council had almost the same number of meetings (16) per year and a slightly higher number of issues debated per meeting (3.7) than before the Janša government took over (14 meetings per year, and 2.7 issues debated per meeting under the Cerar and Šarec governments).
Citations:
Oštro (2021), Ekonomsko-socialni svet ni zasedal več kot prej v šestih letih skupaj (https://www.ostro.si/si/razkrinkavanje/objave/ekonomsko-socialni-svet-ni-zasedal-vec-kot-prej-v-sestih-letih-skupaj).
Citations:
Oštro (2021), Ekonomsko-socialni svet ni zasedal več kot prej v šestih letih skupaj (https://www.ostro.si/si/razkrinkavanje/objave/ekonomsko-socialni-svet-ni-zasedal-vec-kot-prej-v-sestih-letih-skupaj).
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To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?
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Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
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Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
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Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
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Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
The Janša government started its term just one day after the previous Šarec government declared COVID-19 an epidemic. COVID-19 heavily influenced the Janša government’s communication with the public and media, and various governmental officials and expert groups often made incoherent announcements. In addition, the relationship between the government – especially Janša himself and some of his own party ministers – on one side, and several media outlets were very antagonistic, almost hostile from the start. Some elements in the media took a very tough approach toward the Janša government, actively supporting anti-government activities. Meanwhile, Janša and his party continued their hostile and distrustful relationship with most of the media. In the second half of the term, however, ministerial communication became more coherent and there have been fewer instances of incoherent communication. Compared to his predecessors, Janša has exercised an authoritative leadership style. As such, unlike under previous governments, there have been almost no contradictory statements from different coalition partners.
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To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?
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The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
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The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
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3
The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
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The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
The Šarec government’s coalition agreement was relatively sparse in content and far less detailed than that of the previous government, but the Janša government’s coalition agreement is much more detailed. While the Šarec government was successful in reaching an agreement with the government’s social partners on public sector wage rises and abandoning some austerity measures, it was much less successful in other policy areas and failed to launch any substantial policy reform. The government’s appetite for reform abated toward its second year in the office and government support in the parliament was often lacking. Once the Janša government took over in March 2020, it had to deal with the pandemic and implemented a wide range of anti-coronavirus measures, as Prime Minister Šarec resigned in late January 2020 and failed to prepare the country for the upcoming health and economic crisis. During the period under review, the Janša government was quite successful in implementing its own policy objectives, despite a very thin majority in the parliament. Notable achievements included adopting the Long-term Care Act (a major goal for all coalition governments over the last two decades, which had never previously even reached the parliamentary procedure), progress on several infrastructure projects initiated by previous governments (e.g., the construction of a second railway track to the port of Koper and the second Karavanke highway tunnel to Austria), major progress on digitalization (e.g., introducing digital highway vignettes), the substantially improvement in relations with all Slovenia’s neighbors and the Visegrad countries, and adopting a minor tax reform as well as a state budget for 2021–23.
To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?
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The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
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The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
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The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
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The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
As head of a four-party coalition government (which became a three-party coalition government in 2021), Prime Minister Janša primarily relied on coalition meetings of narrow (including only the presidents of coalition parties) and broader composition (including ministers and members of parliament as well) in order to ensure the implementation of the government’s program. Janša often used meetings with experts from various fields and established a number of expert groups to assist in achieving the government’s policy objectives. However, Prime Minister Janša had a very tense (and sometimes combative) relationship with major media outlets and the majority of opposition parties. Consequently, the public had less insight into the outcomes of these meetings, as the media and opposition usually focused on the prime minister’s communication style, and less on the policies being proposed, adopted and implemented. While seven ministers either resigned or were removed from office during the 18 months of the Šarec government, there has been more stability under the Janša government, as only three minister resigned in the first 21 months of the Janša government.
Citations:
Haček, M., S. Kukovič, M. Brezovšek (2017): Slovenian Politics and the State. Lanham, New York, London, Boulder: Lexington Books.
Citations:
Haček, M., S. Kukovič, M. Brezovšek (2017): Slovenian Politics and the State. Lanham, New York, London, Boulder: Lexington Books.
How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?
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The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
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The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
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The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
2
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1
The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
The weak capacity of the Government Office (GO) and the predominance of coalition governments have limited the GO’s role in monitoring line ministries’ implementation activities. Under the Janša and previous governments, the GO tended to respect the assignment of ministries in the coalition agreement, so that most monitoring took place in coalition meetings.
How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
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The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
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3
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
2
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1
The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
Favored by the 2002 Civil Service Act, the politicization of executive agencies in Slovenia has increased. Governments have reduced the autonomy of the independent regulatory agencies and filled leading positions in executive agencies with politically loyal, but professionally weak personnel. Political and personal ties have prevented misconduct and incompetency being subject to sanctions. While both the Šarec and Janša governments have paid some lip service to the depoliticization of public administration, the situation has deteriorated even further, with ample examples of the partisan politicization of state bureaucracy, regulatory agencies and even the police.
Citations:
Ottavio Marzocchi 2021: The situation of Democracy, the Rule of Law andFundamental Rights in Slovenia. Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs Directorate-General for Internal Policies PE 690.410
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/231906/SLOVENIA%20IDA%20DRFMG.up date.pdf
Citations:
Ottavio Marzocchi 2021: The situation of Democracy, the Rule of Law andFundamental Rights in Slovenia. Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs Directorate-General for Internal Policies PE 690.410
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/231906/SLOVENIA%20IDA%20DRFMG.up date.pdf
To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?
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9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
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The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
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3
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3
The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
2
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1
The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
Municipal governments – the sole tier of subnational self-government in Slovenia – have suffered substantial fiscal difficulties for some time. Both the Cerar and Šarec governments focused on reducing the bureaucratic burdens without reducing the number of municipalities. However, the measures taken were not effective, and municipalities suffered from the government’s decision to postpone the re-introduction of the property tax. The Janša government finally succeeded in implementing effective measures to reduce bureaucratic burdens on municipalities, as well as reaching a financial agreement, and subsequently improved central government transfers to municipalities, which had been below the legal limit for a number of years. Relations between central government, and the Association of Municipalities and Towns of Slovenia (SOS), the Association of Municipalities of Slovenia (ZOS), and the Association of City Municipalities (ZMOS) improved substantially with a number of meetings between both sides and governmental visits to most municipalities.
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
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6
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6
Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
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3
4
3
The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
2
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1
The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
The Slovenian constitution, the European Charter on Local Government (ratified in 1996) and the Local Government Act give municipalities responsibility for all local public affairs and some autonomy in implementing national legislation. In practice, however, financing constraints and a limited administrative capacity in the larger number of small municipalities limit local autonomy, although the situation improved in a major way during the period under review. The Cerar government started to address this issue through the adoption of the Public Administration Development Strategy in April 2015 and a separate strategy for the development of local government in September 2016. The implementation of those strategies was very slow from the beginning, achieving the stated goals only under the Janša government, when an agreement between central government and the three representative municipal associations was signed regarding adequate funding for local communities and lowering the bureaucratic burdens on municipalities.
Citations:
Government of the Republic of Slovenia (2015): Public Administration 2020: Public Administration Development Strategy 2015-2020. Ljubljana (http://www.mju.gov.si/fileadmin/mju.gov.si/pageuploads/JAVNA_UPRAVA/Kakovost/Strategija_razvoja_JU_2015-2020/Strategija_razvoja_ANG_final_web.pdf).
Ministry for Public Administration (2016): Strategija razvoja lokalne samouprave do 2020 (Strategy of local government development until 2020). Ljubljana (http://www.mju.gov.si/fileadmin/mju.gov.si/pageuploads/JAVNA_UPRAVA/svlsrp.gov.si/pageuploads/lok-sam-2015/aktualno-ls/strateg-ls/12_SRLS_16.9.2016.pdf).
Citations:
Government of the Republic of Slovenia (2015): Public Administration 2020: Public Administration Development Strategy 2015-2020. Ljubljana (http://www.mju.gov.si/fileadmin/mju.gov.si/pageuploads/JAVNA_UPRAVA/Kakovost/Strategija_razvoja_JU_2015-2020/Strategija_razvoja_ANG_final_web.pdf).
Ministry for Public Administration (2016): Strategija razvoja lokalne samouprave do 2020 (Strategy of local government development until 2020). Ljubljana (http://www.mju.gov.si/fileadmin/mju.gov.si/pageuploads/JAVNA_UPRAVA/svlsrp.gov.si/pageuploads/lok-sam-2015/aktualno-ls/strateg-ls/12_SRLS_16.9.2016.pdf).
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?
10
9
9
Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
2
1
1
Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
In Slovenia, public-service standards are poorly defined, especially with regard to the independent functions of municipal governments. As the constitution guarantees the autonomy of every municipality, the extent and quality of public services differ substantially across the country. Financial controls and inspections are often ineffective due to the lack of resources and staff. Moreover, the monitoring of standards is often highly fragmented. In the case of finances, for instance, the Ministry of Finance, the Court of Audit and municipal supervisory committees all play an oversight role.
To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?
10
9
9
Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
8
7
6
7
6
Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
5
4
3
4
3
Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
2
1
1
Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
Ministries and government agencies largely succeed in enforcing regulations effectively and without bias. However, there have been some cases in which they have succumbed to pressure from interest groups. A good case in point have been the protracted conflicts over the enforcement of public procurement rules which have delayed the construction of the second Karavanke tunnel tube on the highway to Austria and have led to the resignation in April 2019 of Borut Smrdel, the head of the National Review Commission (DKOM), a review body for procurement-related disputes.
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To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?
10
9
9
The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
8
7
6
7
6
In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
2
1
1
The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
Upon EU accession, Slovenia developed a complex system for coordinating European affairs, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs serving as the central coordinator. The Cerar, Šarec and current Janša governments left this system largely unchanged. In order to increase the absorption of EU funds, the Cerar government created a new ministry without portfolio with responsibility for development, strategic projects and cohesion and changed procedures. The Šarec government has kept the ministry, but replaced its minister twice due to the ministry’s poor performance. In addition, the Janša government has kept the ministry, but notably increased the efficacy of cohesion funds absorption capacity. Slovenia was well prepared to take over the presidency of the Council of the European Union for the second time in the second half of 2021.
To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?
10
9
9
The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
2
1
1
The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
Like their predecessors, the Šarec and partially also the Janša governments have been preoccupied with domestic political and economic issues and have paid little attention to improving institutional capacity for shaping and implementing global initiatives. The country’s main international focus has been on shaping the European Union’s policy toward the western Balkans, where Slovenia sees its strategic interests. In the period under review, the 25-year long territorial dispute between Slovenia and Croatia over the Gulf of Piran and part of the land border continued. While Slovenia accepted the arbitration decision of June 2017 and amended its legislation in December 2017, Croatia has refused to do so, prompting Slovenia to pursue legal action in the European Court of Justice in July 2018. In a judicial setback to Slovenia in its long dispute with Croatia over their maritime border, the Court of Justice said in January 2020 it has no jurisdiction to rule on the dispute and merely urged both sides to resolve their differences. In addition, during the period under review, Slovenia took over the presidency of the Council of the European Union for the second time in the second half of 2021.
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To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?
10
9
9
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
5
4
3
4
3
The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
2
1
1
There is no monitoring.
There is no regular self-monitoring of institutional arrangements In Slovenia. The monitoring that takes place is ad hoc and limited. The annual reports of state organizations are formal and self-congratulatory. Under both the Šarec and Janša governments, the number of audits performed by private sector organizations remained low.
To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?
10
9
9
The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
8
7
6
7
6
The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
2
1
1
The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
At the beginning of its term, the Cerar government increased the number of ministries from 13 to 16 and changed ministerial portfolios. By establishing separate ministries for public administration, infrastructure and environment/spatial planning, as well as by creating a ministry without a portfolio responsible for development, strategic projects and cohesion, the Cerar government improved its strategic capacity. The strengthening of the Government Office for Development and European Cohesion Policy and the changing procedures associated with the creation of a new ministry for development, strategic projects and cohesion have helped to substantially increase the absorption rate. The Šarec government has kept the structure of ministries intact and had paid no attention to institutional reform. The only significant development in 2019 was the preparation of the legislative package for the regionalization of Slovenia, which was prepared by a large expert group on the initiative of the National Council. However, this stalled in 2020 following the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic. In July 2021, the Janša government added a new minister responsible for digital transformation, but – given the lack of support in parliament and the outbreak of coronavirus – paid little attention to institutional reform.