South Korea

   

Executive Capacity

#17
Key Findings
With a strong central executive, South Korea falls into the upper-middle ranks (rank 17) with regard to executive capacity. Its score on this measure is unchanged relative to its 2014 level.

The powerful presidential office dominates line ministries. The president’s office has significant strategic-planning capacities. Ministerial compliance is strong, enforced by presidential pressure. Informal coordination plays an important role. The government uses e-government software to monitor policy implementation in real time.

RIA procedures are mandatory, with quality having improved in recent years. The Moon administration consulted far more deeply with societal actors than did its predecessor, and brought labor unions back to the tripartite consultation process. Communication during the pandemic was deemed extremely effective, contributing to public trust in the measures implemented.

The Moon administration was more effective than predecessors in implementing its goals, with COVID-19 policy being a particular bright spot. Policymakers’ pandemic management demonstrated institutional learning and innovation. A decentralization campaign gave local governments greater autonomy and fiscal authority. Regulatory enforcement is often biased toward big business.

Strategic Capacity

#12

How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?

10
 9

Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
 8
 7
 6


Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
 5
 4
 3


Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
 2
 1

In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
Strategic Planning
7
Strategic planning remains an important priority in South Korean governance. Strategic priorities are set by the powerful presidential office, although the fact that the president only serves a single five-year term makes it difficult to plan beyond a single electoral cycle. President Moon launched his five-year vision and plan (“100 Policy Tasks: A Nation of the People, A Just Republic of Korea”) in September 2017. This was supplemented and reinforced in December 2019 by the longer-term “2045 Vision for an Innovative, Inclusive Nation.” To help him develop implement these plans, President Moon relied on the Presidential Commission on Policy Planning, including a policy unit comprised of the Future Policy Research Center (responsible for research and support on national mid- to long-term policies) and the State Affairs Tasks Support Group (provides respective research and support). In total around 100 committee members, mostly professors or other experts, work in one of the six subdivisions addressing the issues of people’s sovereignty, national growth, inclusive society, sustainability, decentralization, and peace and prosperity. In addition, the two special committees on income-led growth and the New Southern Policy help to identify key policies that the government will pursue, and help develop medium- and long-term plans to carry out the policies.
While managing the COVID-19 pandemic overshadowed other policy objectives for most of 2020, the Moon administration took the opportunity of developing a COVID-19 response and recovery plan to review and reinvigorate his administration’s strategic plan. The administration launched the Korean New Deal in 2020 and updated it in 2021. The New Deal – with its three pillars Digital, Green, Human – is consistent with the five-year strategy. The New Deal incorporates and reinvigorates key policy priorities such as fostering a more inclusive, innovative and green economy; improving social protections; and implementing balanced regional development. Moreover, the New Deal seems to strike an appropriate balance between short-to-medium-term response and recovery and long-term transformation.

Citations:
국정기획자문위 6개 분과 34人 ‘정책통 라인업’ (‘Policy Management Lineup’ of 34 members in six subdivisions of the State Affairs Planning Advisory Committee). Maeil Business Newspaper. May 19, 2017. https://www.mk.co.kr/news/politics/view/2017/05/336552/
Korea.net. Policy Roadmap of the Moon Jae-in Administration. July 19, 2017.
Korea.net. President Moon Unveils Five-year Policy Agenda. July 19, 2017. http://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/policies/view?articleId=148013
Korea.net. President Launches Advisory Committee on State Affairs. May 22, 2017. http://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/policies/view?articleId=146390.
“Korean New Deal for the Post-COVID-19 Era.” UNDP Seoul Policy Centre for Knowledge Exchange Through SDG Partnerships, September 10, 2020. https://www1.undp.org/content/seoul_policy_center/en/home/presscenter/articles/2019/Collection_of_Examples_from_the_Republic_of_Korea/korean-new-deal-for-the-post-covid-19-era.html.
Korea Ministry of Economy and Finance. “Government Announces Korean New Deal 2.0,” July 14, 2021. https://english.moef.go.kr/pc/selectTbPressCenterDtl.do?boardCd=N0001&seq=5173.
대통령직속 정책기획위원회 (Presidential Commission on Policy Planning) http://www.pcpp.go.kr/

Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?

10
 9

In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
 8
 7
 6


For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
 2
 1

The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
Expert Advice
6
Non-governmental academic experts have considerable influence on government decision-making. Expertise is sourced from external experts at research institutes and universities. A large portion of the Presidential Commission on Policy Planning is staffed with professors and other experts, and most of the other members have an academic background. In addition to the Presidential Commission on Policy Planning, scholars are often nominated for top government positions. Academic experts participate in diverse statutory advisory bodies established under the offices of the president and prime minister. Advisory commissions are usually dedicated to specific issues deriving from the president’s policy preferences. However, the selection of academic experts is often seen as too narrow and exclusive. The process of appointing experts remains highly politicized, and in the past experts have often been chosen because of their political leanings rather than their academic expertise. Some fault the Moon administration for ignoring criticisms of policies provided by experts with different political perspectives than its own, which makes the process of policy consultation less effective.

Citations:
Korea.net. President Moon appoints senior secretaries. May 11, 2017 http://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/policies/view?articleId=145963

Interministerial Coordination

#9

Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?

10
 9

The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
 8
 7
 6


The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
 5
 4
 3


The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
 2
 1

The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
GO Expertise
8
South Korea’s presidential system has a dual executive structure, with the president serving both as head of state and head of government. The prime minister is clearly subordinate to the president and is not accountable to parliament. The presidential office, known as the Blue House, has the power and expertise to evaluate draft bills. As the real center of power in the South Korean government, the Blue House has divisions corresponding with the various line-ministry responsibilities. The Prime Minister’s Office has sufficient administrative capacity and nonpolitical technocrats to design and implement policies and strategies politically chosen by the Blue House. President Moon has promised to decentralize powers, and plans to hold a referendum to amend the constitution in this manner. As of the time of writing, however, constitutional reform has been stalled due to objections by opposition parties.

Citations:
Government Performance Evaluation Committee, http://www.psec.go.kr
KBS News. “Activate the ministerial meetings for better collaboration.” July 28, 2017. (In Korean) http://news.kbs.co.kr/news/view.do?ncd=3523871
The Korea Institute of Public Administration (KIPA), http://www.kipa.re.kr
Kong, Kanga. “Moon Seeks to End South Korea’s ‘Imperial’ Presidential System.” Bloomberg.com, Bloomberg, Mar. 2018, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-22/moon-seeks-to-end-south-korea-s-imperial-presidential-system.
Mobrand, Erik. “Has the Time Come to Amend South Korea’s Constitution?” The Diplomat, July 24, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/has-the-time-come-to-amend-south-koreas-constitution/.

To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?

10
 9

There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
 8
 7
 6


The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
 5
 4
 3


Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
 2
 1

Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
Line Ministries
9
Executive power is concentrated in the president’s hands. Thus, line ministries have to involve the Blue House in all major policy proposals. South Korea’s constitution grants substantial powers to the executive in general, and the president in particular. Most observers agree that the South Korean presidential system is a paradigmatic example of an “imperial presidency,” at least during times when the party of the president holds a majority in the unicameral South Korean parliament, as was the case after April 2020. The president has the authority to, and often does rearrange, merge and abolish ministries according to his or her agenda. For example, President Moon created a Ministry of SMEs and Startups; renamed the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning as the Ministry of Science and ICT; and merged the National Security Agency and the Ministry of Public Administration and Security into a single Ministry of the Interior and Safety. He also (re-)established the National Fire Agency and the Korea Coast Guard abolished by his predecessor. However, while Moon has promised to decentralize power, there have as yet been few signs of any weakening of the role of the Blue House.

That said, South Korean staff within bureaucracies are highly trained and competent, which helps ensure a degree of continuity. However, strategic planning is weakened by frequent changes in leadership positions. Ministers and state secretaries are often replaced by the president, and staff rotations occur frequently inside ministries. Thus, ministerial staff have little opportunity to acquire expert knowledge and contribute meaningfully to long-term strategic planning.

Conflicts between ministries are frequent but do not substantially affect overall policymaking for high priority policy areas, due to the coordinating role of the president’s office. The fragmentation of government activities in policy areas that are not prioritized by the president is a frequent subject of criticism, and ministries often fail to coordinate activities in these fields.

How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?

10
 9

The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
 8
 7
 6


Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
 5
 4
 3


There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
 2
 1

There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
Cabinet Committees
7
Formally, the cabinet is the executive branch’s highest body for policy deliberation and resolution. In reality, the role of the cabinet is limited because all important issues are discussed bilaterally between the Blue House and the relevant ministry. However, bureaucratic skirmishing takes place on many issues. The Blue House’s capacity to contain rivalries between the various ministries tends to be relatively high early in a given president’s official term. However, coordination power becomes weaker in a lame-duck administration. Committees are either permanent, such as the National Security Council, or created in response to a particular issue (e.g., Presidential Committee on Carbon Neutrality). As many government agencies have recently been moved out of Seoul into Sejong city, the need to hold cabinet meetings without having to convene in one place at the same time has been growing, and the law has therefore been amended to allow cabinet meetings in a visual teleconference format.

How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?

10
 9

Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
 8
 7
 6


Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
 5
 4
 3


There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
 2
 1

There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
Ministerial Bureaucracy
7
Civil servants from different ministries regularly coordinate on policies of common concern. This coordination and cooperation among related civil servants across ministries can be either formal or informal, hierarchical or horizontal. Unfortunately, attitudes in the ministries are shaped by departmentalism that obstructs coordination. Different ministries use their policies to compete for support and approval from the office of the president. There is also a clear hierarchy delineating the ministries. Civil servants in important ministries, such as the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, consider civil servants from other ministries, such as the Labor Ministry or the Environment Ministry, as being “second tier.” Key issues given a high priority by the president can be effectively coordinated among concerned ministries.

Some attempts to improve coordination among ministries are being made. Various interministerial coordination mechanisms have been implemented on the basis of sector and theme, such as the interministerial coordination system for ODA. Moreover, it is expected that the efficiency of and communication between government agencies will be improved by the introduction of a new records-retrieval system. The National Archives and Records Administration (NIS) has announced that it will establish a search and retrieval service in consultation with the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs. However, in spite of the Blue House’s political dominance, the Moon government has exhibited numerous cases of coordination failure among relevant ministries. For example, the Blue House, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, and the Ministry of Strategy and Finance have failed to communicate and coordinate effectively on real estate policy, a fact that has contributed to skyrocketing prices and increasing inequality. A particularly contentious interagency battle took place in 2019-2020, as the Ministry of Justice pushed for and the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office blocked President Moon’s prosecutorial reform initiative.

Citations:
“Korea’s Government 3.0: the Beginning of Open Government Data,” Korea IT Times, February 24, 2016
http://www.koreaittimes.com/story/58369/koreas-government-30-beginning-open-government-data.
Shin, Mitch. “South Korea’s Prosecutor General Wins Another Court Battle against the Government.” The Diplomat, December 22, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/south-koreas-prosecutor-general-wins-another-court-battle-against-the-government/.

How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?

10
 9

Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 8
 7
 6


In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 2
 1

Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Informal Coordination
8
Interministerial coordination is both formal and informal in Korea. Informal coordination is typically, if not always, more effective. There is also a clear hierarchy structuring the ministries. Staffers at the Ministry of Strategy and Finance see themselves as the elite among civil servants. However, the leading role of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance is defined by the president’s mandate.
In addition, informal coordination processes tend to be plagued by nepotism and regional or peer-group loyalties, particularly among high-school and university alumni. Personal networks and loyalties are sometimes considered to be more important than institutions. Informal networks between the president and powerful politicians can work very effectively to further specific policies. However, these practices can also lead to corruption and an inefficient allocation of resources. The Moon government has been criticized for working within relatively small key networks. Moreover, in a number of cases of failed implementation, it has emerged that informal networks and coordination have overridden formal policy.

Citations:
Seungjoo Lee and Sang-young Rhyu, “The Political Dynamics of Informal Networks in South Korea: The Case of Parachute Appointment” (2008), the Pacific Review, 21(1): 45-66.

How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?

10
 9

The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
 8
 7
 6


The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
 5
 4
 3


The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
 2
 1

The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
Digitalization for Interministerial C.
9
The South Korean government utilizes e-government software (the Policy Task Management System) to monitor the implementation of policies in real time. In the UN E-Government Survey 2020, Korea was ranked at second place internationally for the implementation of e-government mechanisms. Korea also ranks at the top of the OECD countries on the OECD’s OUR Data Index, which examines the issue of open, usable and reusable government data.

Citations:
UN E-Government Survey 2020, https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/en-us/Reports/UN-E-Government-Survey-2020.
OECD OURdata Index: 2019 https://www.oecd.org/gov/digital-government/ourdata-index-korea.pdf.

Evidence-based Instruments

#13

To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?

10
 9

RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
 8
 7
 6


RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
 5
 4
 3


RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
 2
 1

RIA are not applied or do not exist.
RIA Application
8
RIA has been mandatory for all new regulations since 2005 and is applied to older regulations if they are strengthened in any way. RIAs assess proposals’ socioeconomic impacts and provide cost-benefit analyses. In its 2021 Regulatory Policy Outlook, the OECD placed the country above the OECD average in all categories.
However, the report also highlighted some weaknesses, particularly with regard to RIAs concerning regulations initiated by the legislature, a category that is currently excluded. The Federation of Korean Industries, which advocates deregulation on behalf of corporate sectors, has proposed that the government apply RIAs to regulatory acts initiated by lawmakers.

Citations:
The Korea Herald. Analytic tools crucial in improving regulatory practices: US adviser. October 13, 2017. http://khnews.kheraldm.com/view.php?ud=20171013000737&md=20171016003056_BL
OECD, Government at a Glance Database, http://www.oecd.org/gov/government-at-a-glance-2017-database.htm
OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/38b0fdb1-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/38b0fdb1-en

Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?

10
 9

RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
 8
 7
 6


The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
 5
 4
 3


The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
 2
 1

RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
Quality of RIA Process
6
The Regulatory Reform Committee (RRC) is the primary institution overseeing the RIA process. Stakeholders are consulted during the RIA process, which includes regular meetings with foreign chambers of commerce, for example. The general public and specific stakeholders can be integrated into the process via online channels such as the Regulatory Information Portal, Regulatory Reform Sinmungo, and the e-Legislation Center. The e-Legislation Center gives the general public the opportunity to propose a bill, submit opinions on regulatory bills or request clarification of how laws have been interpreted. However, RIA committees are often criticized for not being fully autonomous and for being influenced by political and economic interests. Divergent interests and voices from business circles and radical labor organizations are big obstacles in implementing RIA. Other criticisms offered by the OECD include a lack of sufficient time to carry out assessments, insufficient staff, and a lack of expertise and financial resources. The OECD also recommended that the early-stage consultation should be strengthened – specifically, to identify policy alternatives.
The OECD has noted several recent improvements in the quality of RIA processes. A 2018 reform requires analysis to be proportionate to the significance of the regulation, and requires alternative regulatory options to be assessed for all subordinate regulations. RIA for SMEs has been enhanced through the introduction of an impact reporting system and revision of a related guideline in 2020, and the transparency of consultation processes overall has improved.

Citations:
www.better.go.kr/zz.main.PortalMain.laf
www.lawmaking.go.kr
OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/38b0fdb1-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/38b0fdb1-en

Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?

10
 9

Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
 8
 7
 6


Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
 5
 4
 3


Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
 2
 1

Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
Sustainability Check
6
The assessment of policy-implementation sustainability in South Korea is regulated by the 2007 Sustainable Development Act and overseen by the Presidential Commission on Sustainable Development, which reports to the Ministry of Environment. This body’s task is to implement, promote, share, educate, network, monitor and make policy proposals on sustainable development. The act addresses environmental quality, vulnerability to environmental degradation, environmental degradation level, the social and institutional capacities to respond, and responsibility sharing with the international community. The Moon administration promised to focus more strongly on sustainability-related issues, including reductions in youth unemployment rates, air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. For example, the Moon administration promised to build no new nuclear power plants, and additionally promised to close 30 coal-fired power plants (10 by 2022; 20 by 2034). At the same time, the government appeared to be considering a continuation of previous governments’ problematic practice of prioritizing economic growth, for example by issuing waivers for regulations governing economic development or apartment construction within green-belt areas. While President Moon promised to highlight environmental sustainability, the actual effects on the RIA process remain to be seen.

Citations:
Ko, Jun-tae. “Moon vows to shut down 30 more coal plants to bring cleaner air and battle climate change.” Korea Herald, September 8, 2020. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20200908000676
Ministry of Government Legislation, http://www.moleg.go.kr/english/korL awEng?pstSeq=57720
Presidential Commission on Sustainable Development (PCSD), http://ncsd.go.kr:2020/index.asp

To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?

10
 9

Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
 8
 7
 6


Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
 5
 4
 3


Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
 2
 1

Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
Quality of Ex Post Evaluation
7
In a recent (2021) OECD assessment of ex post evaluation, Korea was ranked fifth. Recent changes include making ex post evaluation mandatory for all regulations developed by the executive and central ministries; requiring a quality control process for packaged reviews of ex post evaluations; and conducting reviews with the aim of reducing burdens on new industries and SMEs. While there is an effective evaluation system in place, the effect on policy revision has been limited to date. In recent years, real estate policy has been broadly unsuccessful, contributing to historically high and skyrocketing prices by repeatedly imposing low-quality short-term regulations without effective ex post evaluation. Soaring prices have produced adverse effects by increasing economic inequality.

Citations:
OECD, Government at a Glance Database,
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/9789264303072-en/1/2/2/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/9789264303072-en&_csp_=46cd5ed37844c9dc6cf21c84716ab307&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=book
OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/38b0fdb1-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/38b0fdb1-en

Societal Consultation

#9

Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?

10
 9

The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
 8
 7
 6


The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
 5
 4
 3


The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
 2
 1

The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
Public Consultation
7
There have been major improvements with regard to consultation with societal actors since President Moon took office. President Moon’s interactions with the public are also significantly different than those of his predecessor. He has emphasized the importance of being more open and communicative with the public. He is holding frequent discussions with civil society groups and top business leaders, and allows Q&A sessions during press briefings. The Blue House also introduced a petition system in which the government is required to address a certain topic when at least 200,000 citizens have signed the petition. The Moon government has also tested so-called deliberative democracy processes, in which all stakeholders participate in three- or four-night debates, as a means of drafting controversial policies in areas such as nuclear energy or university admissions.

South Korea has a lively civil society with an average range of interest groups, reflecting most social interests. However, some powerful interests have privileged access to the corridors of power. Business is well represented by networks of interlocking and expertly staffed interest groups. Labor unions are traditionally much weaker, and lack the same kind of access to the government. However, with President Moon’s more accommodating stance on labor unions, he was able to bring the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) back to the tripartite dialogue table for the first time since KCTU’s withdrawal in 1999. President Moon also appointed many former civil society activists to government positions, and frequently utilized the expertise of civil society groups.

During the COVID-19 crisis, the government held public consultation through a social dialogue body called the Economic, Social and Labor Council (ESCL), in which labor, management, government and public interest groups meet and deliberate on public policies. Following these talks, they issued the “Tripartite Declaration to Overcome the Crisis Caused by Spread of COVID-19” in March 2020, which emphasized the need to support workers, public life and health, vulnerable groups, SMEs, and small merchants.

Citations:
E-People, http://www.epeople.go.kr
OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2015, Country profile Korea, www.oecd.org/publications/oecd-regulatory-policy-outlook-2015-9789264238770-en.htm
Korea Herald. Second-largest labor union to stage strike, rally. June 29, 2017. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20170629000963
Yonhap News. Moon promises frequent and frank communication with biz leaders. July 27, 2017. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2017/07/27/0301000000AEN20170727001852315.html
Korea Times, Construction of Shin-Kori 5 and 6 reactors resumes, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/biz/2017/10/367_238189.html

Policy Communication

#21

To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?

10
 9

Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
 8
 7
 6


Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
 5
 4
 3


Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
 2
 1

Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
Coherent Communication
6
In Korea’s presidential system, the president’s office dominates the government communication strategy. Ministries do occasionally issue mutually contradictory statements, but rarely openly contradict statements issued by the presidential office. Early in his tenure, President Moon placed a high priority on communication with citizens. He engaged in more frequent and more direct communications with the public, including meetings with citizens over beer at a bar in Seoul. Moon also launched a presidential petition system, which has been widely used by citizens, particularly youth. The government responds to all presidential petitions with more than 200,000 signatories. However, President Moon’s communication with the public dwindled in more recent years. A survey (by an opposition party member) reported that Moon held fewer press conferences than his liberal predecessors Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun (though a similar number as conservative predecessors Park Geun-hye and Lee Myung-bak), and fewer such engagements than other heads of state (e.g., French President Emmanuel Macron or Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe). In early 2021, Moon’s new chief of staff said that President Moon wanted to expand his public and media engagement going forward – citing COVID-19 as one factor in Moon’s less-active-than-promised engagement in 2020.

The Moon administration was lauded for its responsive communication policy during the COVID-19 pandemic. Korea’s emphasis on communicating accurate and up-to-date information to the public helped manage the spread of misinformation and inspire public trust. At the height of the pandemic, the government held twice-daily, televised press briefings. It also operates a 24-hour hotline and portal site. This transparent and timely communication encouraged voluntary public compliance and bolstered the policy legitimacy of the Moon administration. Koreans’ rate of acceptance of the government’s performance in dealing with the pandemic is above average compared to 14 high-income countries.

Citations:
Brookings Doha Center. “Policy & Institutional Responses to COVID-19: South Korea,” June 2021. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/MENA-Covid-19-Survey-South-Korea-Dyer-June-14-2021.pdf.
Do, Je-hae. “Moon Lacking in Public Communication.” The Korea Times, September 17, 2020. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2020/09/356_296229.html.
Do, Je-Hae. “President Moon Wants to Communicate More, Says His New Chief of Staff.” The Korea Times, February 6, 2021. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2021/11/356_303667.html.

Implementation

#27

To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?

10
 9

The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
 8
 7
 6


The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
 5
 4
 3


The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
 2
 1

The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
Government Effectiveness
6
In South Korea’s presidential system, power is concentrated in the office of the president. However, presidents are also limited to a single five-year term, which means that they can become lame ducks even after completing only half of their term. The Moon administration was somewhat more effective than its predecessor with regard to the implementation of policies, although implementation still fell far short of the president’s ambitious goals (i.e., 100 Policy Tasks). Despite the strong personal mandate deriving from his decisive election victory and strong popularity, Moon’s Democratic Party lacked a majority in parliament until the April 2020 parliamentary elections. Moreover, managing the COVID-19 pandemic overshadowed most other policy priorities in 2020. Nevertheless, the president has far-reaching powers and Moon implemented several important measures that he had promised, including increases in the minimum wage; the creation of new jobs in the public sector; a reduction in the maximum workweek to 52 hours; an expansion of the social safety net; the establishment of an independent anti-corruption agency; the expansion of the autonomy of local governments via amendments of the Local Autonomy Act (e.g., autonomous local police, increased local fiscal authority, enhanced local councils); the adoption of critical and long-overdue labor rights protections; the creation of space for SMEs and startups through regulatory easing; the establishment of more ambitious climate change mitigation targets; the enhancement of Korea’s role in global governance, particularly in the realm of global public health; and the development of a blueprint for Korea’s transition to a digital and green future. However, Moon also postponed or failed to achieve some of his original agenda items, such as the constitutional reform designed to decentralize power, election reform, pension reform, real estate reform and chaebol (business conglomerate) reform.

Moreover, President Moon managed to deliver on these promises while successfully managing the COVID-19 crisis. Indeed, Korea’s COVID-19 response is a compelling example of well-coordinated policy execution – across sectors, levels of administration and the political aisle. Meetings of the Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters (CDSCHQ) meetings, which gather together representatives of all relevant ministries and 17 provinces and major cities, have been held regularly in order to maintain a united national effort in dealing with the spread of the coronavirus. These meetings allow for regular coordination among the highest-level officials and between the central and local governments, which is crucial for jointly identifying problems, blockages and solutions. The regular meetings support the concerted implementation process and the effective allocation of central government resources, and enable rapid local adaptation to changing circumstances when needed. Attesting to the strength of the system, there were no relevant COVID-related disruptions of basic public services. Since the beginning of the pandemic, the government has been able to mobilize the public administration to ensure testing, tracing and quarantine enforcement. While COVID-19 necessitated emergency measures – such as temporary suspension of personal data privacy and association rights – these have been implemented in accordance with relevant laws and by appropriate, designated authorities. The executive and other branches of government have functioned effectively and within their designated authority.

Citations:
“S. Korea ‘bureaucracy risk’ derails economic innovation,” Maeil Business Newspaper, March 26, 2014
Yonhap News. “S. Korea committed to pursuing goal of inclusive growth.” May 06, 2019 https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20190505000200320
Brookings Doha Center. “Policy & Institutional Responses to COVID-19: South Korea,” June 2021. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/MENA-Covid-19-Survey-South-Korea-Dyer-June-14-2021.pdf.

To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?

10
 9

The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 8
 7
 6


The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 5
 4
 3


The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 2
 1

The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
Ministerial Compliance
9
Ministers in South Korea do not have their own political base, and thus depend almost solely on the support of the president. The president has the authority to appoint and dismiss ministers, and frequently reshuffles the cabinet. This high degree of turnover limits ministers’ independence, as they are unable to develop their own voice to pursue their own or institutional policy ideas. Conflicts between ministries are frequent but do not substantially affect overall policymaking within high priority policy areas, due to the coordinating role of the president’s office. The fragmentation of government activities in policy areas that are not prioritized by the president is a frequent subject of criticism, and ministries often fail to coordinate activities in these fields. “Liberal” administrations such as the Moon government tend to face greater challenges in controlling the traditionally conservative bureaucracy than do their conservative counterparts. This dynamic was on display in the 2019-2020 battle between the Ministry of Justice (which pushed for President Moon’s prosecutorial reform initiative) and the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office (which blocked it).

How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
 8
 7
 6


The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
 5
 4
 3


The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
 2
 1

The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
Monitoring Ministries
8
In general, the offices of the president and the prime minister effectively monitor line-ministry activities. The South Korean government utilizes e-government software (the Policy Task Management System) to monitor the implementation of policies in real time. However, political monitoring or pressure is more influential than e-government, and is the usual tool used to supervise ministries. Ministries have little leeway in policy areas that are important to the president. However, while ministerial compliance is largely assured in the Korean system, the ministerial bureaucracy has a certain degree of independence deriving from its members’ status as tenured civil servants. Because ministers have a comparatively short tenure, it is difficult for them to guide and monitor compliance in the bureaucracy. Generally, the degree of independence within the bureaucracy varies substantially, and is stronger in areas that are comparatively less important to the president.

How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 8
 7
 6


The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 5
 4
 3


The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 2
 1

The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
Monitoring Agencies|Bureaucracies
6
The Prime Minister’s Office annually monitors and evaluates the performance of 42 governmental agencies. The ministries effectively monitor the activities of all executive agencies, with each minister holding responsibility for the compliance of the agencies under his or her purview. Once again, the top-down structure of the government typically allows for effective monitoring. Agencies generally have autonomy with respect to day-to-day operations, but even these can occasionally be the subject of top-down interventions. Each ministry sets its own performance and implementation indicators and reports its annual progress. The indicators can be used as a monitoring tool for the activities of bureaucracies and executive agencies with regard to implementation. However, ministries fail in some cases to monitor executive agencies’ implementation activities effectively. By contrast, bureaucrats have often responded to strong political pressures with an apathetic attitude.

To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?

10
 9

The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
 8
 7
 6


The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
 5
 4
 3


The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
 2
 1

The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
Task Funding
5
While South Korea remains a unitary political system, a rather elaborate structure of provincial, district and neighborhood governments has been in place since 1995. Local governments play an important role in providing services to citizens and respectively account for about 35% of government spending in 2017. However, local and state governments have relatively little ability to raise their own revenue and thus depend on central-government support. The financial independence of provinces and municipalities has steadily decreased over the past decade. The fiscal self-reliance ratio dropped from 56.3% in 2003 to 52.5% in 2016. The share of local government revenues raised via local tax revenues decreased from 35.5% in 2006 to 30.7% in 2019.

The Moon administration aimed to transfer additional fiscal authority to local governments. In October 2019, it announced a plan to restructure the relative size of national and local budgets from 8:2 to 7:3. The plan included transforming part of the national value-added tax into a local consumption tax.

Citations:
OECD. 2021. Perspectives on Decentralisation and Rural-Urban Linkages in Korea, https://doi.org/10.1787/499ed299-en.
OECD, Government at a Glance Database, http://www.oecd.org/gov/govataglance.htm
“High welfare-related costs stymie local governments,” Korea JoongAng Daily, Oct 14, 2014
Korea Herald. Moon vows efforts for greater local autonomy. June 14, 2017. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20170614000743
Kwak, Young-sup. “Fiscal Self-Reliance of Local Gov’ts Worsens over 13 Years.” Yonhap News Agency, November 13, 2017. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20171114001900320.

To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 8
 7
 6


Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 5
 4
 3


The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 2
 1

The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
Constitutional Discretion
6
While autonomous local governments are protected by the constitution, the constitution does not clearly define specific competencies and rights. A major obstacle to subnational self-government is the lack of fiscal autonomy accorded to local governments. Due to the very high dependence on transfer grants from the central government, most regional and local governments are vulnerable to central-government interference. In addition, local administrations are understaffed, and central-government employees are often delegated to subnational authorities. The reality of inadequate budgetary and functional authority in many local areas, as well as the disproportionate influence of city and provincial authorities, often leaves local administrators and governments short on revenue and effective governing capacity.

President Moon highlighted the importance of decentralizing state power in order to allow local municipalities and provinces to be run more autonomously. Under the 2018 budget proposal, KRW 3.5 trillion ($3.1 billion) in subsidies was to be provided to provincial governments. While the broader effort to achieve regionally balanced development was delayed, the Moon administration did push through some reforms via amendments to the Local Autonomy Act (e.g., autonomous local police, increased local fiscal authority, enhanced local councils).

Citations:
Kook, Joong-Ho. „Does Local Autonomy Enhance the Autonomy in Local Public Finance? Evidence from the Case of Korea,“ 2014. http://www.akes.or.kr/eng/papers(2014)/127.full.pdf
The Korea Times. Moon and Local Authority. September 26, 2017. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2017/10/625_237037.html
“Moon: Constitutional Amendment Needed for Decentralization.” KBS World, January 17, 2022. http://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&Seq_Code=166948.
“Remarks by President Moon Jae-in at 1st Central and Local Government Cooperation Meeting.” The Republic of Korea Cheong Wa Dae, January 13, 2022. https://english1.president.go.kr/BriefingSpeeches/Speeches/1136.

To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?

10
 9

Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
 8
 7
 6


Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
 5
 4
 3


Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
 2
 1

Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
National Standards
7
The Ministry of Public Administration and Security, created through a merger of earlier agencies, is in charge of ensuring that local governments maintain national minimum standards. However, many local governments, particularly in rural areas, have much lower professional standards than does the city government of Seoul or the central government. While the provision of basic services is similar in all regions, there is a huge difference in the provision of additional services such as recreation facilities between affluent (i.e., self-sufficient) areas like Seoul and the country’s southeast and those less prosperous (i.e., dependent on transfer payments) regions in the southwest. For instance, a number of local governments have recently begun paying child benefits greater than those dictated by national standards. As local-government autonomy develops, a greater number of customized policies are being introduced for residents.

Citations:
Wray, Sarah. Korean local government to pilot basic income. Cities Today, March 22, 2021. https://cities-today.com/korean-local-government-to-pilot-basic-income/

To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?

10
 9

Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
 8
 7
 6


Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
 5
 4
 3


Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
 2
 1

Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
Regulatory Enforcement
5
Government agencies enforce regulation, but are usually biased in favor of certain groups and vested interests. The big business conglomerates and foreign investors are naturally the most powerful vested interests, and most policies take the interests of the big business sector and foreign investors into account. For example, environmental and safety regulations imposed on large businesses such as carmakers or domestic and foreign humidifier makers have been very lenient. SMEs have similarly emerged as a powerful interest group. SMEs have managed to obtain very generous exclusions, for example from the reduction of maximum allowed weekly work times from 68 to 52 hours. Collusion between management and labor unions has also led to circumvention or exploitation of government regulations. For example, by excluding regular (non-performance-based) bonuses from the calculation of the minimum wage, even workers with relatively high total wages were able to benefit from the minimum-wage increase. Since 2019, Korea has introduced regulatory sandboxes (including 21 regulation-free zones) to ease the regulatory burden on new and smaller firms.

Citations:
Rhyu Sang Young, Moon Jae-in and the Politics of Reform in South Korea, Global Asia 2018, https://www.globalasia.org/v13no3/cover/moon-jae-in-and-the-politics-of-reform-in-south-korea_sang-young-rhyu

Adaptability

#10

To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?

10
 9

The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
 8
 7
 6


In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
 2
 1

The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
Domestic Adaptability
8
The government’s ability to engage in policy learning is generally high, but institutional learning is far more limited. Non-governmental academic experts have considerable influence on government decision-making. In addition to their participation on the presidential advisory committee, scholars are often nominated for top government positions, although their tenure seems to be relatively short. The process of appointing experts remains highly politicized, and in the past experts have often been chosen because of their political inclination rather than their academic expertise. The Moon government did not give sufficient attention to criticisms of policy failures stemming from experts with a different political perspective, which makes the process of policy consultation less effective. The short-lived tenures of two ministers of justice (Cho Kuk and Choo Mi ae) and their contentious relationships with the Prosecutor’s Office illustrate the limitations of the echo-chamber approach.

International and supranational developments that affect South Korea directly can trigger rapid and far-reaching change. For example, South Korea has reacted to the global financial and economic crisis with decisive action and massive government intervention. Global standards play a crucial role in the South Korean government. Reports and criticism issued by international organizations such as the OECD or the IMF, or by partners such as the United States or the European Union, are taken very seriously. The government has also declared its intention to increase its provision of official development assistance (ODA) in order to meet global standards in the near future. For example, it was the first Asian donor to join the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), an initiative for enhancing aid transparency. However, the country’s degree of adaptability largely depends upon compatibility with domestic political goals. For example, given its large manufacturing sector, Korea was slow to transition to greater environmental sustainability. However, with its shift to a green and digital economy, environmental standards have also been raised in recent years.

Pandemic management is one area in which the government has demonstrated its capacity for institutional learning and innovation. The government learned from its failures in handling MERS by updating and/or adopting various policies and mechanisms. Measures such as strengthening the role of the Korea Centers for Disease Control, fast-tracking approval for emergency medical supplies, and enhancing communication and the transparency of information helped Korea to respond far more effectively to COVID-19 than it did to the MERS outbreak. Thus, at the beginning of the pandemic, the learning curve was less steep for the Korean government than for other governments. Later, however, the government failed to secure the timely delivery of vaccines. In fact, for some time, the government was a bit too self-confident in its ability to contain the pandemic, and believed that Korea would not need an early vaccination campaign.

Citations:
Asian Development Bank. “The Republic of Korea’s Coronavirus Disease Pandemic Response and Health System Preparedness,” October 4, 2021. https://www.adb.org/publications/republic-korea-coronavirus-disease-pandemic-response.
Kim, Jiyeon, and Neil Richards. “South Korea’s COVID Success Stems from Earlier Lessons in Managing Mers.” The Wire Science, February 27, 2021. https://science.thewire.in/health/south-koreas-covid-success-stems-from-earlier-lessons-in-managing-mers/.
Brookings Doha Center. “Policy & Institutional Responses to COVID-19: South Korea,” June 2021. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/MENA-Covid-19-Survey-South-Korea-Dyer-June-14-2021.pdf.

To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?

10
 9

The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
 8
 7
 6


The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
 5
 4
 3


The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
 2
 1

The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
International Coordination
7
As a member of the United Nations, the World Trade Organization and the G-20, South Korea helps to shape global rules and foster global public goods, but it rarely plays a leading role in international cooperation. The Moon administration has further shifted the attention from multilateral institutions to bilateral negotiations, with a particular focus on North Korea. Nevertheless, Korea does play a role in international organizations; for example, it is currently contributing 627 individuals to UN peacekeeping missions. Korea does engage in development cooperation, and joined the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2009, although initial goals of spending 0.25% of GNI for the purposes of development cooperation have not yet been met. Korea is committed to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and has signed the Paris Agreement on reducing greenhouse gas emissions. However, Korea can hardly be seen as a leader in these fields, as national sustainability and emissions-reduction goals are underwhelming. For example, while the European Union has promised to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 40% below 1990 levels, Korea has only pledged to reduce emissions to 40% below business-as-usual projections, which would represent an increase of 81% compared to 1990.

Following the adoption of its Digital, Green, and Human New Deals in 2020, Korea seems ready to take more of a proactive role in international cooperation. At a summit in 2021, President Moon and President Biden agreed on a U.S.- Korea technology partnership. In 2020, Korea pledged to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050; and at COP26 in 2021, it scaled up its NDC target. In line with President Moon’s inclusive, human-centered vision for Korean society, the administration finally pushed through three key ILO conventions for which labor rights activists have been advocating for decades. Moreover, it pledged to contribute significantly increased amounts to global health initiatives such as GAVI and the Global Fund.

Citations:
The government of Korea. 2016 National Voluntary Review Year One of Implementing the SDGs in the Republic of Korea: From a Model of Development Success to a Vision for Sustainable Development. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/10632National%20Voluntary%20Review%20Report%20(rev_final).pdf
Climate Action Tracker. South Korea Profile. http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/southkorea.html

Organizational Reform

#20

To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?

10
 9

The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
 8
 7
 6


The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
 5
 4
 3


The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
 2
 1

There is no monitoring.
Self-monitoring
6
The president’s office monitors institutional governance arrangements. The president frequently reorganizes ministries and government agencies when inefficiencies are detected. At the same time, institutional reforms are often driven by individual high-ranking government officials rather than being part of a comprehensive plan. For example, the recent controversy over the creation of a new government agency tasked with investigating and prosecuting high-level government officials was primarily driven by former Justice Minister Cho Kuk. However, the initiative did not provide adequate assessment as to how this new institution would be more independent than the existing public prosecutor’s office from political meddling, or how it would improve investigations of high-level officials overall.

To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?

10
 9

The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
 8
 7
 6


The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
 5
 4
 3


The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
 2
 1

The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
Institutional Reform
6
The Moon administration was expected to carry out some institutional reforms during his term. Most importantly, President Moon pledged to decentralize the political system by transferring previously centralized powers to national ministries and agencies as well as to regional and local governments. While the broader effort to achieve regionally balanced development was delayed, the Moon administration did push through some reforms via amendments to the Local Autonomy Act (e.g., autonomous local police, increased local fiscal authority, enhanced local councils). Moon also took concrete steps to reform national institutions including the National Intelligence Service (NIS), the police and the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office. In 2019, proposed reforms of the public prosecutor’s office triggered a major political struggle. While prosecutorial reform will require greater and more politically strategic efforts by the president and his allies, the launch of the new Corruption Investigation Office in 2021 is a first step in curtailing the power of the prosecutor’s office.

Citations:
Korea Herald. What Moon Jae-in pledged to do as president. May 10, 2017. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20170509000521
“Moon: Constitutional Amendment Needed for Decentralization.” KBS World, January 17, 2022. http://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&Seq_Code=166948.
“Remarks by President Moon Jae-in at 1st Central and Local Government Cooperation Meeting.” The Republic of Korea Cheong Wa Dae, January 13, 2022. https://english1.president.go.kr/BriefingSpeeches/Speeches/1136.
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