Quality of Democracy
#25Key Findings
Despite wide-ranging efforts to enhance the rule of law, South Korea still falls into the lower-middle ranks (rank 25) with respect to democracy quality. Its score on this measure has increased by 1.1 point relative to 2014.
An electoral reform intended to improve minor parties’ chances has had the opposite effect. Parties and candidates largely raise money via private donations and special investments. Monitoring functions are only partially effective. A new system allows citizens to create petitions that the government must address after sufficient public support.
Media manipulation declined substantially under the Moon government. Most major newspapers have a strong conservative bias. Political debate in which diverging political opinions are respected is becoming more routine. Discrimination against women, migrants, LGBTQ+ people and North Korean defectors remains problematic. New workplace harassment penalties have been adopted.
Moon took a number of steps to strengthen the rule of law, including by reducing the influence of the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office and other powerful institutions. Corruption investigations targeting high-ranking officials have been made more independent. However, there has been minimal success in curbing corruption and influence peddling by big business groups.
An electoral reform intended to improve minor parties’ chances has had the opposite effect. Parties and candidates largely raise money via private donations and special investments. Monitoring functions are only partially effective. A new system allows citizens to create petitions that the government must address after sufficient public support.
Media manipulation declined substantially under the Moon government. Most major newspapers have a strong conservative bias. Political debate in which diverging political opinions are respected is becoming more routine. Discrimination against women, migrants, LGBTQ+ people and North Korean defectors remains problematic. New workplace harassment penalties have been adopted.
Moon took a number of steps to strengthen the rule of law, including by reducing the influence of the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office and other powerful institutions. Corruption investigations targeting high-ranking officials have been made more independent. However, there has been minimal success in curbing corruption and influence peddling by big business groups.
Graph View
Graph View
How fair are procedures for registering candidates and parties?
10
9
9
Legal regulations provide for a fair registration procedure for all elections; candidates and parties are not discriminated against.
8
7
6
7
6
A few restrictions on election procedures discriminate against a small number of candidates and parties.
5
4
3
4
3
Some unreasonable restrictions on election procedures exist that discriminate against many candidates and parties.
2
1
1
Discriminating registration procedures for elections are widespread and prevent a large number of potential candidates or parties from participating.
The National Election Commissions, an independent constitutional organ, manages the system of election bodies. Registration of candidates and parties at the national, regional and local levels is done in a free and transparent manner. However, deposit requirements for persons applying as candidates are relatively high, as are ages of eligibility for office. In December 2021, the age of eligibility for running for parliamentary and regional office was lowered from 25 to 18. Also in 2021, the revised Article 6 of the Political Funds Act took effect, allowing (preliminary) candidates for local council elections (in addition to local government heads) to designate supporters’ groups for the purposes of campaign fundraising.
In 2019, the parliamentary election process was reformed to distribute proportional representation seats to better reflect voter preferences and boost the presence of minor parties. The aim was to compensate smaller parties for their disadvantage vis-à-vis large parties due to the first-past-the-poll races in electoral districts. Unfortunately, the reform actually worsened the situation, because in a legally dubious move, former members of major parties created satellite parties to help major parties benefit from the new election system. Thus, the two satellite parties connected to the major parties won 36 of 47 proportional representation seats in the April 2020 parliamentary elections, while truly independent parties fared poorly.
While the National Security Law allows state authorities to block the registration of so-called pro-North Korean parties and candidates, there is no evidence that this had any real impact in the 2017 presidential elections. However, the controversial decision of the Constitutional Court to disband the Unified Progressive Party (UPP) for being pro-North Korean in 2014 remains in force.
Citations:
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2009, New York: Freedom House
The Guardian. South Korea court orders breakup of ‘pro-North’ left-wing party. Dissolution of Unified Progressive party raises questions of South’s commitment to democracy, 19 December 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/19/south-korea-lefwing-unified-progressive-party-pro-north
Hanelt, Etienne. “In the Orbit of Democracy: Satellite Parties in South Korea’s 2020 Parliamentary Election.” Politics Blog. Oxford University, June 8, 2021. https://blog.politics.ox.ac.uk/in-the-orbit-of-democracy-satellite-parties-in-south-koreas-2020-parliamentary-election/.
Lee, Hae-a. “Assembly Passes Bill on Lowering Age of Candidacy for Parliament to 18.” Yonhap News Agency, December 31, 2021. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20211231003200315.
Public Officials Election Act, Act No. 9974, Jan. 25, 2010
정치자금법 (Political Funds Act), 법률 제17885호, 2021. 1. 5., Accessed January 29, 2022, https://www.law.go.kr/
헌법재판소 (Constitutional Court), 2018헌마301·430(병합), 2019.12.27., Accessed January 29, 2022, https://ccourt.go.kr/
In 2019, the parliamentary election process was reformed to distribute proportional representation seats to better reflect voter preferences and boost the presence of minor parties. The aim was to compensate smaller parties for their disadvantage vis-à-vis large parties due to the first-past-the-poll races in electoral districts. Unfortunately, the reform actually worsened the situation, because in a legally dubious move, former members of major parties created satellite parties to help major parties benefit from the new election system. Thus, the two satellite parties connected to the major parties won 36 of 47 proportional representation seats in the April 2020 parliamentary elections, while truly independent parties fared poorly.
While the National Security Law allows state authorities to block the registration of so-called pro-North Korean parties and candidates, there is no evidence that this had any real impact in the 2017 presidential elections. However, the controversial decision of the Constitutional Court to disband the Unified Progressive Party (UPP) for being pro-North Korean in 2014 remains in force.
Citations:
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2009, New York: Freedom House
The Guardian. South Korea court orders breakup of ‘pro-North’ left-wing party. Dissolution of Unified Progressive party raises questions of South’s commitment to democracy, 19 December 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/19/south-korea-lefwing-unified-progressive-party-pro-north
Hanelt, Etienne. “In the Orbit of Democracy: Satellite Parties in South Korea’s 2020 Parliamentary Election.” Politics Blog. Oxford University, June 8, 2021. https://blog.politics.ox.ac.uk/in-the-orbit-of-democracy-satellite-parties-in-south-koreas-2020-parliamentary-election/.
Lee, Hae-a. “Assembly Passes Bill on Lowering Age of Candidacy for Parliament to 18.” Yonhap News Agency, December 31, 2021. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20211231003200315.
Public Officials Election Act, Act No. 9974, Jan. 25, 2010
정치자금법 (Political Funds Act), 법률 제17885호, 2021. 1. 5., Accessed January 29, 2022, https://www.law.go.kr/
헌법재판소 (Constitutional Court), 2018헌마301·430(병합), 2019.12.27., Accessed January 29, 2022, https://ccourt.go.kr/
To what extent do candidates and parties have fair access to the media and other means of communication?
10
9
9
All candidates and parties have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. All major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of the range of different political positions.
8
7
6
7
6
Candidates and parties have largely equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. The major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of different political positions.
5
4
3
4
3
Candidates and parties often do not have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. While the major media outlets represent a partisan political bias, the media system as a whole provides fair coverage of different political positions.
2
1
1
Candidates and parties lack equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communications. The major media outlets are biased in favor of certain political groups or views and discriminate against others.
The opaque character of South Korean election law concerning allowable support for candidates during the election period, which can last for up to 180 days before an election, represents an electoral gray area. According to some interpretations of Article 93 of the election law, all public expressions of support for candidates or parties are illegal during that period unless one is registered as an official campaigner. This can be seen as a disadvantage for smaller candidates who do not have the same access to traditional media. In general, small parties have a difficult time gaining coverage in the mainstream media. However, YouTube and other social networks have become an influential and equalizing means of public communication for all candidates and parties.
On the other hand, the use of social media to illicitly interfere in elections has become a matter of concern. It has even come to light that the Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS) used social media posts to support President Park’s election in 2012. Demonstrating its stance against social media manipulation, the ruling Democratic Party (DP) in 2018 expelled two members involved in an online opinion-rigging scandal that aimed to benefit the Moon administration.
The immensely controversial National Security Law also applies to online media, creating significant limitations regarding the freedom of expression. Under past conservative administrations, the Korea Communications Standards Commission and the National Election Commission have sought to block accounts or fine online users for online comments critical of the government or the ruling party.
Citations:
“Do you know the dismissed journalists?” Journalists Association of Korea, January 20, 2016. (in Korean) http://www.journalist.or.kr/news/article.html?no=38319
Kyunghyang.Competition of new media strategies among presidential candidates. March 16, 2017. http://sports.khan.co.kr/bizlife/sk_index.html?art_id=201703161022003&sec_id=561101&pt=nv
Sent, Dylan. 2018. “Social Media Manipulation of Public Opinion in Korean Elections.” The Diplomat, August 31. Retrieved October 13, 2018 (https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/social-media-manipulation-of-public-opinion-in-korean-elections/)
Jung, Jae-soon. “(3rd LD) Ruling Party Expels Two Members Suspected of Online Comment Rigging.” Yonhap News Agency, April 16, 2018. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20180416003853315.
On the other hand, the use of social media to illicitly interfere in elections has become a matter of concern. It has even come to light that the Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS) used social media posts to support President Park’s election in 2012. Demonstrating its stance against social media manipulation, the ruling Democratic Party (DP) in 2018 expelled two members involved in an online opinion-rigging scandal that aimed to benefit the Moon administration.
The immensely controversial National Security Law also applies to online media, creating significant limitations regarding the freedom of expression. Under past conservative administrations, the Korea Communications Standards Commission and the National Election Commission have sought to block accounts or fine online users for online comments critical of the government or the ruling party.
Citations:
“Do you know the dismissed journalists?” Journalists Association of Korea, January 20, 2016. (in Korean) http://www.journalist.or.kr/news/article.html?no=38319
Kyunghyang.Competition of new media strategies among presidential candidates. March 16, 2017. http://sports.khan.co.kr/bizlife/sk_index.html?art_id=201703161022003&sec_id=561101&pt=nv
Sent, Dylan. 2018. “Social Media Manipulation of Public Opinion in Korean Elections.” The Diplomat, August 31. Retrieved October 13, 2018 (https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/social-media-manipulation-of-public-opinion-in-korean-elections/)
Jung, Jae-soon. “(3rd LD) Ruling Party Expels Two Members Suspected of Online Comment Rigging.” Yonhap News Agency, April 16, 2018. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20180416003853315.
To what extent do all citizens have the opportunity to exercise their right of participation in national elections?
10
9
9
All adult citizens can participate in national elections. All eligible voters are registered if they wish to be. There are no discriminations observable in the exercise of the right to vote. There are no disincentives to voting.
8
7
6
7
6
The procedures for the registration of voters and voting are for the most part effective, impartial and nondiscriminatory. Citizens can appeal to courts if they feel being discriminated. Disincentives to voting generally do not constitute genuine obstacles.
5
4
3
4
3
While the procedures for the registration of voters and voting are de jure non-discriminatory, isolated cases of discrimination occur in practice. For some citizens, disincentives to voting constitute significant obstacles.
2
1
1
The procedures for the registration of voters or voting have systemic discriminatory effects. De facto, a substantial number of adult citizens are excluded from national elections.
All citizens of South Korea aged 18 and over have the right to cast ballots, provided that they are registered as voters at their place of residence in South Korea or in another country. The voting age was lowered from 19 to 18 in December 2019. There had been growing public support for this change since the candlelight demonstrations against President Park in 2016 – 2017. Overseas citizens are able to vote in presidential elections and in National Assembly general elections. Overseas citizens are defined as Korean citizens residing in foreign countries in which they are permanent residents or short-term visitors. Moreover, Korea was the first country in Asia to grant voting rights in local elections to foreign residents who have lived in the country for three or more years. However, voter turnout rates among foreigners are still low. Legally incompetent individuals and convicted criminals still serving prison terms are deprived of active voting rights. The same applies to individuals whose voting rights have been suspended by a court verdict, who have violated election laws, who have committed specified crimes while holding one of a set of public offices, and who have violated the law on political foundations or specific other laws. National elections are national holidays, making it easier for all citizens to vote. Citizens can appeal to the National Election Commission and the courts if they feel they have been discriminated against.
Citations:
National Election Commission, Right to Vote and Eligibility for Election, http://www.nec.go.kr/nec_2009/english/ National Election Commission, NEWS No.7
“Rival parties agree to new map,” Korea Joong Ang Daily, 24 February 2016.
http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3015438
Korea Herald. “Voter Turnout Reaches 77%.” May 9, 2017. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20170509000522
Korea Joongang Daily. “Koreans divided over lowering voting age.” February 11, 2017. http://mengnews.joins.com/view.aspx?aId=3029735
Park, Si-soo. 2018. “Eligible Foreign Voters Surpass 100,000, but Few Cast Ballots.” The Korea Times.https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/10/177_257145.html
Citations:
National Election Commission, Right to Vote and Eligibility for Election, http://www.nec.go.kr/nec_2009/english/ National Election Commission, NEWS No.7
“Rival parties agree to new map,” Korea Joong Ang Daily, 24 February 2016.
http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3015438
Korea Herald. “Voter Turnout Reaches 77%.” May 9, 2017. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20170509000522
Korea Joongang Daily. “Koreans divided over lowering voting age.” February 11, 2017. http://mengnews.joins.com/view.aspx?aId=3029735
Park, Si-soo. 2018. “Eligible Foreign Voters Surpass 100,000, but Few Cast Ballots.” The Korea Times.https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/10/177_257145.html
To what extent is private and public party financing and electoral campaign financing transparent, effectively monitored and in case of infringement of rules subject to proportionate and dissuasive sanction?
10
9
9
The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and provides for independent monitoring to that respect. Effective measures to prevent evasion are effectively in place and infringements subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.
8
7
6
7
6
The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and provides for independent monitoring. Although infringements are subject to proportionate sanctions, some, although few, loopholes and options for circumvention still exist.
5
4
3
4
3
The state provides that donations to political parties shall be published. Party financing is subject to some degree of independent monitoring but monitoring either proves regularly ineffective or proportionate sanctions in case of infringement do not follow.
2
1
1
The rules for party and campaign financing do not effectively enforce the obligation to make the donations public. Party and campaign financing is neither monitored independently nor, in case of infringements, subject to proportionate sanctions.
Since its enactment in 1965, the Political Fund Act in Korea has undergone 24 revisions for the purpose of guaranteeing that political funding is fairly and transparently provided. According to financial reports submitted by political parties in 2015, the total amount of membership fees collected from party members was $52 million, representing only 25.8% of the parties’ total income of $201.3 million. Parties also receive public subsidies according to their share of the vote in the most recent previous election. However, a larger share of campaign financing comes from private donations. Today, many election candidates raise funds in the form of special investments. A system encouraging people to report illegal electoral practices, introduced in 2004, has played a positive role in reducing illegal campaign financing. Although election laws strictly regulate political contributions, efforts to make the political funding process more transparent have had only limited success. Many violations of the political funding law emerge after almost every election, and many elected officials or parliamentarians have lost their offices or seats due to violations. By law, lawmakers lose their National Assembly membership and are not allowed to run for public office for five years if they receive a fine of KRW 1 million or greater due to violations of the election law. Even though breaking the election law carries little stigma, monitoring systems and sanctions are becoming more effective.
An interesting development is the use of cryptocurrency for fundraising by two Democratic Party (DP) candidates, including presidential hopeful Lee Jae-myung. As of the time of writing, Lee planned to issue non-fungible tokens (NFTs) to campaign donors. The DP stated that the National Election Commission confirmed that the use of NFTs for fundraising purposes did not violate the Political Funds Act or the Public Official Election Act.
Citations:
OECD. Korea – Financing Democracy. February 4, 2016.
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/governance/financing-democracy/korea_9789264249455-12-en#page1
“People’s Party lawmaker appears for questioning over rebate allegation,” The Korea Herald, 23 June 2016.
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160623000719
“People’s Party falls into crisis as Ahn resigns,” The Korea Times, 29 June 2016.
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/08/116_208219.html
Park, Jae-hyuk. “Ruling Party to Issue Nfts for Fundraising in Presidential Election.” The Korea Times, January 3, 2022. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/biz/2022/01/488_321539.html.
An interesting development is the use of cryptocurrency for fundraising by two Democratic Party (DP) candidates, including presidential hopeful Lee Jae-myung. As of the time of writing, Lee planned to issue non-fungible tokens (NFTs) to campaign donors. The DP stated that the National Election Commission confirmed that the use of NFTs for fundraising purposes did not violate the Political Funds Act or the Public Official Election Act.
Citations:
OECD. Korea – Financing Democracy. February 4, 2016.
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/governance/financing-democracy/korea_9789264249455-12-en#page1
“People’s Party lawmaker appears for questioning over rebate allegation,” The Korea Herald, 23 June 2016.
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160623000719
“People’s Party falls into crisis as Ahn resigns,” The Korea Times, 29 June 2016.
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/08/116_208219.html
Park, Jae-hyuk. “Ruling Party to Issue Nfts for Fundraising in Presidential Election.” The Korea Times, January 3, 2022. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/biz/2022/01/488_321539.html.
Do citizens have the opportunity to take binding political decisions when they want to do so?
10
9
9
Citizens have the effective opportunity to actively propose and take binding decisions on issues of importance to them through popular initiatives and referendums. The set of eligible issues is extensive, and includes national, regional, and local issues.
8
7
6
7
6
Citizens have the effective opportunity to take binding decisions on issues of importance to them through either popular initiatives or referendums. The set of eligible issues covers at least two levels of government.
5
4
3
4
3
Citizens have the effective opportunity to vote on issues of importance to them through a legally binding measure. The set of eligible issues is limited to one level of government.
2
1
1
Citizens have no effective opportunity to vote on issues of importance to them through a legally binding measure.
Citizen referendums can be conducted at the local and provincial levels, requiring the support of at least 5% to 20% of voters to be called, and a turnout of at least 33% to be valid. However, results are not legally binding. There have been several binding recall votes at the local level, although the rate of success for such efforts is very low, because voter turnout rates have typically been lower than the required 33.3%. At the national level, only the president can call a referendum, but this has never taken place. In 2017, President Moon announced a referendum addressing amendments to the constitution that would improve people’s basic rights and provide local governments with greater autonomy. However, the referendum was rejected by the opposition party in the parliament, and thus could not take place. In 2019, National Assembly Speaker Moon Hee-sang and President Moon again proposed to hold a referendum on constitutional revision, suggesting that people be allowed to vote on the proposal during the April 2020 general election.
In 2017, the Blue House also introduced a petition system under which the government is required to address a certain topic if at least 200,000 citizens sign a petition. Figures released by the Blue House regarding the first two years of the policy indicate that almost 700,000 petitions were submitted (more than 800 petitions per day), that younger generations were far more engaged than their elders, and that the site was visited by almost 250,000 visitors per day. As of April 2020, the Blue House had posted responses to at least 80 petitions.
Citations:
Korea Times. Moon seeks referendum on constitutional revision next year. November 10, 2017. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/10/356_234939.html
NEC, http://www.nec.go.kr/engvote/overview/residents.jsp
“Fail on recall Governor Hong caused by the institution,” Oh My News October 28, 2016 (in Korean) http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0002255460
Kang, Jin-Kyu. 2018. “Constitutional reform derailed.” Korea Joongang Daily, April 25. Retrieved October 13, 2018 (http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3047355)
“대한민국 청와대 (The Blue House).” 대한민국 청와대. Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.president.go.kr/.
In 2017, the Blue House also introduced a petition system under which the government is required to address a certain topic if at least 200,000 citizens sign a petition. Figures released by the Blue House regarding the first two years of the policy indicate that almost 700,000 petitions were submitted (more than 800 petitions per day), that younger generations were far more engaged than their elders, and that the site was visited by almost 250,000 visitors per day. As of April 2020, the Blue House had posted responses to at least 80 petitions.
Citations:
Korea Times. Moon seeks referendum on constitutional revision next year. November 10, 2017. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/10/356_234939.html
NEC, http://www.nec.go.kr/engvote/overview/residents.jsp
“Fail on recall Governor Hong caused by the institution,” Oh My News October 28, 2016 (in Korean) http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0002255460
Kang, Jin-Kyu. 2018. “Constitutional reform derailed.” Korea Joongang Daily, April 25. Retrieved October 13, 2018 (http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3047355)
“대한민국 청와대 (The Blue House).” 대한민국 청와대. Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.president.go.kr/.
Graph View
To what extent are the media independent from government?
10
9
9
Public and private media are independent from government influence; their independence is institutionally protected and fully respected by the incumbent government.
8
7
6
7
6
The incumbent government largely respects the independence of media. However, there are occasional attempts to exert influence.
5
4
3
4
3
The incumbent government seeks to ensure its political objectives indirectly by influencing the personnel policies, organizational framework or financial resources of public media, and/or the licensing regime/market access for private media.
2
1
1
Major media outlets are frequently influenced by the incumbent government promoting its partisan political objectives. To ensure pro-government media reporting, governmental actors exert direct political pressure and violate existing rules of media regulation or change them to benefit their interests.
In 2020 and 2021, Korea was ranked 42nd in the World Press Freedom Index – down one spot from 2019, but still ahead of all other Asian countries. However, some issues remain problematic. For example, Reporters without Borders criticizes the system by which managers are appointed at public broadcasters. Editorial independence is also underdeveloped at many outlets. While media freedom is constitutionally guaranteed, government influence and agenda-setting efforts remain strong, especially among TV broadcasters. Most major newspapers outlets have a strong conservative and pro-business bias, making it difficult to have access to diverse opinions. The politicization of media was evident in COVID-19 reporting. Conservative media were quick to blame the ruling liberal administration for its failure to ban visitors from China, which they portrayed as a direct cause of South Korea’s role as the next COVID-19 hotspot after China.
Korea also has very problematic anti-defamation laws that can result in harsh prison terms for those convicted of defamation – even if the statements are true – if the statements are seen as being contrary to “the public interest.” Defamation suits are frequently filed as a means of preventing critical reporting. Reporting on North Korea remains censored by the National Security Law. All North Korean media are jammed, and North Korean websites are not accessible from South Korea. In general, internet censorship remains widespread, with “indecent” internet sites blocked. Consequently, Freedom House ranks South Korea among the countries in which the internet is only “partly free.”
One critical issue being debated is if and how to control the spread of misinformation, or “fake news.” The Moon administration introduced a revision of the Press Arbitration Act that would allow courts to impose punitive damages on media outlets that publish fake news “by intent or through grave negligence,” or that infringes on aims to push media to be more serious and thorough in fact-checking what they publish. The bill encountered much resistance, including from Human Rights Watch and the United Nations special rapporteur for freedom of expression and opinion. The concern is that the vague definition of “fake news” and the associated hefty penalties could deter journalists from investigating corruption, while increasing censorship and self-censorship. At the same time, there are serious concerns about the increasing incidence of fake news. Between 2009 and 2018, more than 2,000 civil lawsuits were filed seeking compensation for harm caused by fake news. Given the ongoing, contentious debate, the bill has been shelved to allow more discussion and negotiation.
Notwithstanding these controversies, media manipulation seemed much less rampant under the Moon administration than under the two prior conservative administrations of Park Geun-hye and Lee Myung-bak. The Park and Lee administrations were found to have secretly funded pro-government media, blacklisted 10,000 critics and utilized the National Security Agency to conduct online smear campaigns against opponents. These and other actions led to Korea dropping to as low as 70th place on the World Press Freedom Index during the decade prior to Moon’s election. Freedom House also bumped up Korea’s internet freedom score in part due to “less systematic manipulation of online content by the (current) government.”
Citations:
Choe, Sang-hun. “South Korea Shelves ‘Fake News’ Bill amid International Outcry.” The New York Times, October 1, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/01/world/asia/south-korea-fake-news-law.html.
Kim, Hyejin. “How South Korea Is Attempting to Tackle Fake News.” The Diplomat, November 17, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/how-south-korea-is-attempting-to-tackle-fake-news/.
Freedom House. “Freedom on the Net 2020,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/country/south-korea/freedom-net/2020.
Freedom House. “Freedom on the Net 2021,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/country/south-korea/freedom-net/2021.
Reporters Without Borders. “World Press Freedom Index, 2020,” https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2020.
Reporters Without Borders. “World Press Freedom Index, 2021,” https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2021.
Korea also has very problematic anti-defamation laws that can result in harsh prison terms for those convicted of defamation – even if the statements are true – if the statements are seen as being contrary to “the public interest.” Defamation suits are frequently filed as a means of preventing critical reporting. Reporting on North Korea remains censored by the National Security Law. All North Korean media are jammed, and North Korean websites are not accessible from South Korea. In general, internet censorship remains widespread, with “indecent” internet sites blocked. Consequently, Freedom House ranks South Korea among the countries in which the internet is only “partly free.”
One critical issue being debated is if and how to control the spread of misinformation, or “fake news.” The Moon administration introduced a revision of the Press Arbitration Act that would allow courts to impose punitive damages on media outlets that publish fake news “by intent or through grave negligence,” or that infringes on aims to push media to be more serious and thorough in fact-checking what they publish. The bill encountered much resistance, including from Human Rights Watch and the United Nations special rapporteur for freedom of expression and opinion. The concern is that the vague definition of “fake news” and the associated hefty penalties could deter journalists from investigating corruption, while increasing censorship and self-censorship. At the same time, there are serious concerns about the increasing incidence of fake news. Between 2009 and 2018, more than 2,000 civil lawsuits were filed seeking compensation for harm caused by fake news. Given the ongoing, contentious debate, the bill has been shelved to allow more discussion and negotiation.
Notwithstanding these controversies, media manipulation seemed much less rampant under the Moon administration than under the two prior conservative administrations of Park Geun-hye and Lee Myung-bak. The Park and Lee administrations were found to have secretly funded pro-government media, blacklisted 10,000 critics and utilized the National Security Agency to conduct online smear campaigns against opponents. These and other actions led to Korea dropping to as low as 70th place on the World Press Freedom Index during the decade prior to Moon’s election. Freedom House also bumped up Korea’s internet freedom score in part due to “less systematic manipulation of online content by the (current) government.”
Citations:
Choe, Sang-hun. “South Korea Shelves ‘Fake News’ Bill amid International Outcry.” The New York Times, October 1, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/01/world/asia/south-korea-fake-news-law.html.
Kim, Hyejin. “How South Korea Is Attempting to Tackle Fake News.” The Diplomat, November 17, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/how-south-korea-is-attempting-to-tackle-fake-news/.
Freedom House. “Freedom on the Net 2020,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/country/south-korea/freedom-net/2020.
Freedom House. “Freedom on the Net 2021,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/country/south-korea/freedom-net/2021.
Reporters Without Borders. “World Press Freedom Index, 2020,” https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2020.
Reporters Without Borders. “World Press Freedom Index, 2021,” https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2021.
To what extent are the media characterized by an ownership structure that ensures a pluralism of opinions?
10
9
9
Diversified ownership structures characterize both the electronic and print media market, providing a well-balanced pluralism of opinions. Effective anti-monopoly policies and impartial, open public media guarantee a pluralism of opinions.
8
7
6
7
6
Diversified ownership structures prevail in the electronic and print media market. Public media compensate for deficiencies or biases in private media reporting by representing a wider range of opinions.
5
4
3
4
3
Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize either the electronic or the print media market. Important opinions are represented but there are no or only weak institutional guarantees against the predominance of certain opinions.
2
1
1
Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize both the electronic and the print media market. Few companies dominate the media, most programs are biased, and there is evidence that certain opinions are not published or are marginalized.
South Korea has a vibrant and diverse media sector that includes various cable, terrestrial and satellite television stations, and more than 100 daily newspapers in either Korean or English. As the country has the world’s highest internet penetration rates, a great number of readers today gain news exclusively from online sources. Yet despite the great variety of offerings, the diversity of content remains limited. The print media is dominated by three major newspapers: Chosun Ilbo, Dong-a Ilbo and Joong Ang Ilbo. Although the combined market share of these three outlets is declining, it remained at about 65% in 2014, according to the Korea Press Foundation. Smaller alternative newspapers also exist. The major newspapers are politically conservative and business-friendly, partly because they depend to a very large degree on advertising revenues. While there is more pluralism in the broadcasting sector due to the mix of public and private media, the diversity of political opinions in this arena is threatened by government influence over broadcasters’ personnel policies. In general, media pluralism is hampered by a widespread belief that criticism and critical questions are necessarily negative. In May 2019, KBS journalist Song Hyun-jung was threatened by supporters of President Moon who claimed that he had been rude while interviewing the president. They claimed that Song’s questions were “inappropriate,” and a petition was started to demand an apology from or even punishment of Song and KBS. Beyond the traditional media, internet-based news services are widespread and very diverse. The reach of these alternative media outlets is potentially quite large, as Korea’s social media penetration rate (87%) is the third-highest in the world.
Citations:
Youn S., Lee H. (2015) The Ongoing Media Pluralism Debate in South Korea. In: Valcke P., Sükösd M., Picard R.G. (eds) Media Pluralism and Diversity. Palgrave
Media Us. “Eight years after Media Law,” July 21, 2017. http://www.mediaus.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=96976 (In Korean)
Freedom of the Press 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/south-korea
Kang, Tae-jun. 2019. “South Korean Journalist Under Fire for Being ‘Rude’ to President Moon.” The Diplomat, May 11. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/south-korean-journalist-under-fire-for-being-rude-to-president-moon/.
Shim, Woo-hyun. “Korea’s Social Media Penetration Rate Ranks Third in World.” The Korea Herald, September 7, 2020. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20200907000815.
Citations:
Youn S., Lee H. (2015) The Ongoing Media Pluralism Debate in South Korea. In: Valcke P., Sükösd M., Picard R.G. (eds) Media Pluralism and Diversity. Palgrave
Media Us. “Eight years after Media Law,” July 21, 2017. http://www.mediaus.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=96976 (In Korean)
Freedom of the Press 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/south-korea
Kang, Tae-jun. 2019. “South Korean Journalist Under Fire for Being ‘Rude’ to President Moon.” The Diplomat, May 11. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/south-korean-journalist-under-fire-for-being-rude-to-president-moon/.
Shim, Woo-hyun. “Korea’s Social Media Penetration Rate Ranks Third in World.” The Korea Herald, September 7, 2020. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20200907000815.
To what extent can citizens obtain official information?
10
9
9
Legal regulations guarantee free and easy access to official information, contain few, reasonable restrictions, and there are effective mechanisms of appeal and oversight enabling citizens to access information.
8
7
6
7
6
Access to official information is regulated by law. Most restrictions are justified, but access is sometimes complicated by bureaucratic procedures. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms permit citizens to enforce their right of access.
5
4
3
4
3
Access to official information is partially regulated by law, but complicated by bureaucratic procedures and some poorly justified restrictions. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms are often ineffective.
2
1
1
Access to official information is not regulated by law; there are many restrictions of access, bureaucratic procedures and no or ineffective mechanisms of enforcement.
The Act on Disclosure of Information by Public Agencies regulates access to government information. It makes available all documents described by the act. Information can also be accessed online at the Online Data Release System. If an individual requests the disclosure of information, the agency in possession of that information must make a decision on the petition within 15 days. While this is a reasonable level of exception in theory, “national security” is often interpreted very broadly. Decisions by as public institution to not disclose information can be challenged by administrative appeal (to an administrative appeals commission comprised of administrative agencies which supervise the public institution in question) and/or via administrative litigation (administrative court).
A recent reform of the Act on Disclosure of Information by Public Agencies that took effect in December 2020 expanded the scope of information disclosure to include quasi-governmental institutions, local public corporations and regional corporations. Moreover, it strengthened the status of the relevant investigation bodies (the Ministry of the Interior and Safety and the Information Disclosure Committee that was established under the prime minister).
In the 2017 Open Data Barometer’s implementation section, Korea obtained 90 out of 100 points for having a detailed government budget, but only five points with regard to publishing detailed data on government spending. It received 50 points in the legislative category. The National Assembly has proved reluctant to disclose information about its spending, a fact that has triggered considerable public criticism. Moreover the 2018 Global Right to Information Index gives Korea an average rating, citing constraints on access to government information including the existence of other acts that exempt information from disclosure, vague procedural safeguards and limited public interest overrides.
Citations:
Article 19. Country Report: The Right to Information in South Korea. January 21, 2016. https://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/38242/en/country-report:-the-right-to-information-in-south-korea
Open Data Barometer, World Wide Web Foundation. Global Rankings 2017.
http://opendatabarometer.org/2ndEdition/analysis/rankings.html
Open Data Barometer, World Wide Web Foundation. Country Detail: Korea. http://opendatabarometer.org/
“Global Right to Information Rating – South Korea.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.rti-rating.org/country-detail/?country=South+Korea.
공공기관의 정보공개에 관한 법률 (Act on Disclosure of Information by Public Agencies), 법률 제17690호, 2020. 12. 22, Accessed 29 January 2022, https://www.law.go.kr/
A recent reform of the Act on Disclosure of Information by Public Agencies that took effect in December 2020 expanded the scope of information disclosure to include quasi-governmental institutions, local public corporations and regional corporations. Moreover, it strengthened the status of the relevant investigation bodies (the Ministry of the Interior and Safety and the Information Disclosure Committee that was established under the prime minister).
In the 2017 Open Data Barometer’s implementation section, Korea obtained 90 out of 100 points for having a detailed government budget, but only five points with regard to publishing detailed data on government spending. It received 50 points in the legislative category. The National Assembly has proved reluctant to disclose information about its spending, a fact that has triggered considerable public criticism. Moreover the 2018 Global Right to Information Index gives Korea an average rating, citing constraints on access to government information including the existence of other acts that exempt information from disclosure, vague procedural safeguards and limited public interest overrides.
Citations:
Article 19. Country Report: The Right to Information in South Korea. January 21, 2016. https://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/38242/en/country-report:-the-right-to-information-in-south-korea
Open Data Barometer, World Wide Web Foundation. Global Rankings 2017.
http://opendatabarometer.org/2ndEdition/analysis/rankings.html
Open Data Barometer, World Wide Web Foundation. Country Detail: Korea. http://opendatabarometer.org/
“Global Right to Information Rating – South Korea.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.rti-rating.org/country-detail/?country=South+Korea.
공공기관의 정보공개에 관한 법률 (Act on Disclosure of Information by Public Agencies), 법률 제17690호, 2020. 12. 22, Accessed 29 January 2022, https://www.law.go.kr/
Graph View
To what extent does the state respect and protect civil rights and how effectively are citizens protected by courts against infringements of their rights?
10
9
9
All state institutions respect and effectively protect civil rights. Citizens are effectively protected by courts against infringements of their rights. Infringements present an extreme exception.
8
7
6
7
6
The state respects and protects rights, with few infringements. Courts provide protection.
5
4
3
4
3
Despite formal protection, frequent infringements of civil rights occur and court protection often proves ineffective.
2
1
1
State institutions respect civil rights only formally, and civil rights are frequently violated. Court protection is not effective.
Despite the courts’ relatively effective performance in protecting civil rights, and the election of a former human-rights lawyer as president, inadequate rights are accorded to certain populations such as migrant workers, refugees and sexual minorities. South Korea also maintains the possibility of the death penalty, though there has been a moratorium on executions since 1997. On a positive note, in November 2018 the Korean Supreme Court for the first time accepted “conscience or religious beliefs” as a justifiable reason for conscientious objection to the country’s mandatory military service. Unfortunately, the government has to date been slow to offer alternatives to military service for conscientious objectors. In April 2019, the Constitutional Court strengthened women’s rights, ruling that Korea’s 65-year ban on abortion was unconstitutional. In October 2021, stronger workplace harassment penalties were adopted, and beginning in 2022, employees will for the first time be able to petition the Labor Relations Commission for relief and damages in gender discrimination and sexual harassment cases. Migrant workers and refugees continue to face considerable discrimination in Korea (see “Integration” and “Anti-Discrimination”). Personal data privacy has emerged as a sticky issue in the COVID-19 era. As in many countries, South Korea’s COVID-19 response has raised questions regarding the correct balance between personal privacy and public safety. In the wake of MERS, South Korea amended legislation to allow authorities to access personal data without court approval during pandemics. This facilitated South Korea’s successful COVID-19 contact-tracing system, which relies on personal data from mobile phones, GPS, credit cards and CCTV footage. Initially, much of this data was made available to the public, leading to discrimination against infected persons and sometimes against entire groups, such as churches and the LGBTQ+ community, because they were linked to specific infection clusters. Following critique by Korea’s National Human Rights Commission, the government has since limited the information it publicizes to as to protect personal privacy.
Citations:
Amnesty International Report 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/south-korea/report-korea-republic-of/
Human Rights Watch. 2020. “South Korea: Events of 2021.” Retrieved from
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/south-korea
Human Rights Watch. 2021. “South Korea: Events of 2021.” Retrieved from
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/south-korea#
Human Rights Watch. 2022. “South Korea: Events of 2021.” Retrieved from
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/south-korea
Freedom in the World 2021
https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-korea/freedom-world/2021
Citations:
Amnesty International Report 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/south-korea/report-korea-republic-of/
Human Rights Watch. 2020. “South Korea: Events of 2021.” Retrieved from
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/south-korea
Human Rights Watch. 2021. “South Korea: Events of 2021.” Retrieved from
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/south-korea#
Human Rights Watch. 2022. “South Korea: Events of 2021.” Retrieved from
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/south-korea
Freedom in the World 2021
https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-korea/freedom-world/2021
To what extent does the state concede and protect political liberties?
10
9
9
All state institutions concede and effectively protect political liberties.
8
7
6
7
6
All state institutions for the most part concede and protect political liberties. There are only few infringements.
5
4
3
4
3
State institutions concede political liberties but infringements occur regularly in practice.
2
1
1
Political liberties are unsatisfactory codified and frequently violated.
Political liberties are protected by the constitution, but infringements do take place. The National Security Law is considered one of the main obstacles to freedom of expression, association and assembly, as it authorizes the National Intelligence Service (NIS) to punish persons and shut down groups if they are deemed to hold pro-communist views. In 2020, the National Assembly stripped the NIS of its authority to conduct criminal investigations into violations of the National Security Law (effective 2024). Some, however, criticize the amendment for not going far enough (i.e., by abolishing the National Security Law altogether) and/or for creating ambiguity that could be exploited by the NIS to increase its surveillance of citizens and NGOs that have dealings with foreigners involved in international financial transactions. Criticism notwithstanding, the intent of this reform is, as stated by President Moon, to “completely separate powerful institutions from domestic politics and install systems to make any such institutions unable to wield omnipotent power.”
There are also some limits on the freedoms of association and assembly. Labor unions still face difficulties, including legal limits on their freedom to organize and engage in political activities. Businesses can sue labor unions for compensation for “lost profits” during strikes. Outdated regulations exist that can be used by union busters to curb the power and reach of labor unions. For example, in 2013, the conservative government shut down and for years refused to legalize the Korean Teachers and Education Workers Union (KTU), because it allowed employees who had been fired to remain members. In 2020, under the progressive Moon administration, the KTU finally regained its status as a labor union. Moreover, in 2021, 30 years after Korea joined the International Labour Organization (ILO), Korea finally ratified three core ILO conventions: No. 29 (Forced Labor), No. 87 (Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize), and No. 98 (Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining). The bill on ratifying Convention 105 (Abolition of Forced Labor) was withdrawn due to unresolved conflicts with domestic laws regarding prison labor.
The need to contain COVID-19 led to some restrictions and even bans on public demonstrations and other gatherings (e.g., church services) during the reporting period. Some groups, particularly those on the right wing of the political spectrum, accused the government of using the pretext of public health and safety to ban anti-government demonstrations.
Notwithstanding some suspension of some liberties in the interest of pandemic containment, Korea maintained its position as one of the few successful democracies in East Asia. It led the region’s rankings in the areas of press freedom and liberal democracy. Indeed, it was the only Asian country ranked in the top 10% of the 2020 V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index, and its liberal democracy score was higher than more than half of OECD members. In general, the frequency of infringements of political rights by the state declined under the Moon administration, and there is today greater space for and respect accorded to open political debate and diverging political opinions.
Citations:
Amnesty International Report 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/south-korea/report-korea-republic-of/
“Democracy Report 2021: Autocratization Turns Viral.” V-Dem Institute, March 2021. https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/files/dr/dr_2021.pdf.
Haggard, Stephan. “Is Korea Vulnerable to Democratic Backsliding?” The Peninsula Blog. Korea Economic Institute, January 6, 2022. https://keia.org/the-peninsula/is-korea-vulnerable-to-democratic-backsliding/.
Human Rights Watch. 2020. “South Korea: Events of 2019.” Retrieved from
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/south-korea
Human Rights Watch. 2021. “South Korea: Events of 2020.” Retrieved from
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/south-korea#
Human Rights Watch. 2022. “South Korea: Events of 2021.” Retrieved from
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/south-korea
Human Rights Watch. “South Korea: Revise Intelligence Act Amendments,” December 22, 2020. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/22/south-korea-revise-intelligence-act-amendments.
International Labour Organization. “Korea Recognizing Respect for Fundamental Labour Standards as the Foundation for Tackling the Challenges of the Future of Work.”, April 29, 2021. https://www.ilo.org/global/standards/WCMS_785448/lang–en/index.htm.
Jang, Pil-su. “Supreme Court Grants KTU Official Legal Status as Union after 7-Year Legal Battle.” Hankyoreh, September 4, 2020. https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/960826.html.
Pak, Bo-ram. “(Lead) Assembly Passes Revised Spy Agency Law after Eliminating Opposition Filibuster.” Yonhap News Agency, December 13, 2020. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20201213003751315.
UNI Global Union. “Korea: Unions Welcome Government’s Move to Ratify ILO Core Conventions after Thirty Years,” March 18, 2021. https://www.uniglobalunion.org/news/korea-unions-welcome-governments-move-ratify-ilo-core-conventions-after-thirty-years.
There are also some limits on the freedoms of association and assembly. Labor unions still face difficulties, including legal limits on their freedom to organize and engage in political activities. Businesses can sue labor unions for compensation for “lost profits” during strikes. Outdated regulations exist that can be used by union busters to curb the power and reach of labor unions. For example, in 2013, the conservative government shut down and for years refused to legalize the Korean Teachers and Education Workers Union (KTU), because it allowed employees who had been fired to remain members. In 2020, under the progressive Moon administration, the KTU finally regained its status as a labor union. Moreover, in 2021, 30 years after Korea joined the International Labour Organization (ILO), Korea finally ratified three core ILO conventions: No. 29 (Forced Labor), No. 87 (Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize), and No. 98 (Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining). The bill on ratifying Convention 105 (Abolition of Forced Labor) was withdrawn due to unresolved conflicts with domestic laws regarding prison labor.
The need to contain COVID-19 led to some restrictions and even bans on public demonstrations and other gatherings (e.g., church services) during the reporting period. Some groups, particularly those on the right wing of the political spectrum, accused the government of using the pretext of public health and safety to ban anti-government demonstrations.
Notwithstanding some suspension of some liberties in the interest of pandemic containment, Korea maintained its position as one of the few successful democracies in East Asia. It led the region’s rankings in the areas of press freedom and liberal democracy. Indeed, it was the only Asian country ranked in the top 10% of the 2020 V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index, and its liberal democracy score was higher than more than half of OECD members. In general, the frequency of infringements of political rights by the state declined under the Moon administration, and there is today greater space for and respect accorded to open political debate and diverging political opinions.
Citations:
Amnesty International Report 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/south-korea/report-korea-republic-of/
“Democracy Report 2021: Autocratization Turns Viral.” V-Dem Institute, March 2021. https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/files/dr/dr_2021.pdf.
Haggard, Stephan. “Is Korea Vulnerable to Democratic Backsliding?” The Peninsula Blog. Korea Economic Institute, January 6, 2022. https://keia.org/the-peninsula/is-korea-vulnerable-to-democratic-backsliding/.
Human Rights Watch. 2020. “South Korea: Events of 2019.” Retrieved from
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/south-korea
Human Rights Watch. 2021. “South Korea: Events of 2020.” Retrieved from
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/south-korea#
Human Rights Watch. 2022. “South Korea: Events of 2021.” Retrieved from
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/south-korea
Human Rights Watch. “South Korea: Revise Intelligence Act Amendments,” December 22, 2020. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/22/south-korea-revise-intelligence-act-amendments.
International Labour Organization. “Korea Recognizing Respect for Fundamental Labour Standards as the Foundation for Tackling the Challenges of the Future of Work.”, April 29, 2021. https://www.ilo.org/global/standards/WCMS_785448/lang–en/index.htm.
Jang, Pil-su. “Supreme Court Grants KTU Official Legal Status as Union after 7-Year Legal Battle.” Hankyoreh, September 4, 2020. https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/960826.html.
Pak, Bo-ram. “(Lead) Assembly Passes Revised Spy Agency Law after Eliminating Opposition Filibuster.” Yonhap News Agency, December 13, 2020. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20201213003751315.
UNI Global Union. “Korea: Unions Welcome Government’s Move to Ratify ILO Core Conventions after Thirty Years,” March 18, 2021. https://www.uniglobalunion.org/news/korea-unions-welcome-governments-move-ratify-ilo-core-conventions-after-thirty-years.
How effectively does the state protect against different forms of discrimination?
10
9
9
State institutions effectively protect against and actively prevent discrimination. Cases of discrimination are extremely rare.
8
7
6
7
6
State anti-discrimination protections are moderately successful. Few cases of discrimination are observed.
5
4
3
4
3
State anti-discrimination efforts show limited success. Many cases of discrimination can be observed.
2
1
1
The state does not offer effective protection against discrimination. Discrimination is widespread in the public sector and in society.
The Korean constitution states that “there shall be no discrimination in political, economic, social or cultural life on account of sex, religion or social status” (Art. 11). Unfortunately, Korea still lacks a comprehensive anti-discrimination law that would enforce these constitutional rights. In fact, discrimination remains a major problem in South Korea for groups as diverse as women, migrants, handicapped persons, LGBTQ+ people and North Korean defectors. Women are still underrepresented in the labor market, comprising only 43% of the labor force despite having an average education level similar to that of men. The Global Gender Gap Index for 2021 ranks South Korea at 102nd place out of 156 countries evaluated. The gender pay gap remains the largest in the OECD, and the COVID-19 shock disproportionately affected female workers, as they outnumber men in the service sector and in irregular jobs, the areas most affected by the pandemic. In terms of leadership positions, the proportion of women in managerial positions in state-funded and large private companies was 19.8% in 2019, while 19% of National Assembly seats are held by women, both rates below the global average. Having promised to improve gender equality, President Moon appointed women to comprise about one-third of the cabinet – a considerably higher share than in any previous Korean cabinet.
Discrimination against irregular workers, North Korean defectors and ethnic Koreans from other countries (principally China) remains widespread. According to a study by the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, half of the North Korean defectors in South Korea have suffered from discrimination. Discrimination against migrants intensified during COVID-19, as migrants were excluded from disaster relief payments and services (e.g., provision of subsidized masks) that the government provided to all Korean nationals. While courts have strengthened some rights for the LGBT community, the government has failed to take decisive actions to reduce discrimination. The Constitutional Court is reviewing (for the fourth time) the constitutionality of Article 92-6 of the Military Penal Code, which criminalizes sexual relations between members of the same sex within the armed forces.
For the 11th time since 2007, the National Assembly is considering passage of a comprehensive anti-discrimination law that would prohibit discrimination based on gender, disability, medical history, age, origin, ethnicity, race, skin color, physical condition, marital status, sexual orientation and gender identity. Despite widespread public support for such a law and presidential backing, the National Assembly Legislation and Judiciary Committee did not complete its review by the original November 2021 deadline. It extended the review period to May 2024.
Citations:
Amnesty International Report 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/south-korea/report-korea-republic-of/
Human Rights Watch. 2020. “South Korea: Events of 2019.” Retrieved from
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/south-korea
Human Rights Watch. 2021. “South Korea: Events of 2020.” Retrieved from
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/south-korea#
Human Rights Watch. 2022. “South Korea: Events of 2021.” Retrieved from
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/south-korea
Im, Esther S. “How Multiculturalism Has Fared in South Korea amid the Pandemic – the Case for South Korean Soft Power.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 15, 2020. https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/12/15/how-multiculturalism-has-fared-in-south-korea-amid-pandemic-pub-83410.
“Joint Letter to South Korea’s National Assembly Calling for the Immediate Passage of a Comprehensive Anti-Discrimination Law.” Human Rights Watch, December 20, 2021. https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/12/20/joint-letter-south-koreas-national-assembly-calling-immediate-passage-comprehensive.
Ko, Jun-tae. “[Us and Them] Migrant Workers’ Struggles in Korea Continue despite Better Awareness.” The Korea Herald, October 11, 2021. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20211011000208.
Ko, Jun-tae. “Anti-Discrimination Law Again Discussed, Gains Momentum.” The Korea Herald, November 9, 2021. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20211109000736.
Stangarone, Troy. “COVID-19 Has Widened South Korea’s Gender Gap.” The Diplomat, February 26, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/covid-19-has-widened-south-koreas-gender-gap/.
World Economic Forum. “Global Gender Gap Report 2021,” March 2021. https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2021.
Discrimination against irregular workers, North Korean defectors and ethnic Koreans from other countries (principally China) remains widespread. According to a study by the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, half of the North Korean defectors in South Korea have suffered from discrimination. Discrimination against migrants intensified during COVID-19, as migrants were excluded from disaster relief payments and services (e.g., provision of subsidized masks) that the government provided to all Korean nationals. While courts have strengthened some rights for the LGBT community, the government has failed to take decisive actions to reduce discrimination. The Constitutional Court is reviewing (for the fourth time) the constitutionality of Article 92-6 of the Military Penal Code, which criminalizes sexual relations between members of the same sex within the armed forces.
For the 11th time since 2007, the National Assembly is considering passage of a comprehensive anti-discrimination law that would prohibit discrimination based on gender, disability, medical history, age, origin, ethnicity, race, skin color, physical condition, marital status, sexual orientation and gender identity. Despite widespread public support for such a law and presidential backing, the National Assembly Legislation and Judiciary Committee did not complete its review by the original November 2021 deadline. It extended the review period to May 2024.
Citations:
Amnesty International Report 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/south-korea/report-korea-republic-of/
Human Rights Watch. 2020. “South Korea: Events of 2019.” Retrieved from
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/south-korea
Human Rights Watch. 2021. “South Korea: Events of 2020.” Retrieved from
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/south-korea#
Human Rights Watch. 2022. “South Korea: Events of 2021.” Retrieved from
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/south-korea
Im, Esther S. “How Multiculturalism Has Fared in South Korea amid the Pandemic – the Case for South Korean Soft Power.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 15, 2020. https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/12/15/how-multiculturalism-has-fared-in-south-korea-amid-pandemic-pub-83410.
“Joint Letter to South Korea’s National Assembly Calling for the Immediate Passage of a Comprehensive Anti-Discrimination Law.” Human Rights Watch, December 20, 2021. https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/12/20/joint-letter-south-koreas-national-assembly-calling-immediate-passage-comprehensive.
Ko, Jun-tae. “[Us and Them] Migrant Workers’ Struggles in Korea Continue despite Better Awareness.” The Korea Herald, October 11, 2021. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20211011000208.
Ko, Jun-tae. “Anti-Discrimination Law Again Discussed, Gains Momentum.” The Korea Herald, November 9, 2021. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20211109000736.
Stangarone, Troy. “COVID-19 Has Widened South Korea’s Gender Gap.” The Diplomat, February 26, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/covid-19-has-widened-south-koreas-gender-gap/.
World Economic Forum. “Global Gender Gap Report 2021,” March 2021. https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2021.
Graph View
To what extent do government and administration act on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions to provide legal certainty?
10
9
9
Government and administration act predictably, on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions. Legal regulations are consistent and transparent, ensuring legal certainty.
8
7
6
7
6
Government and administration rarely make unpredictable decisions. Legal regulations are consistent, but leave a large scope of discretion to the government or administration.
5
4
3
4
3
Government and administration sometimes make unpredictable decisions that go beyond given legal bases or do not conform to existing legal regulations. Some legal regulations are inconsistent and contradictory.
2
1
1
Government and administration often make unpredictable decisions that lack a legal basis or ignore existing legal regulations. Legal regulations are inconsistent, full of loopholes and contradict each other.
While government actions are generally based on the law, discretionary interpretation and application of laws (particularly new laws) remains a challenge. Foreign companies sometimes complain that regulations are interpreted inconsistently because they lack sufficient detail. In Korea, personal relationships influence decision-making, while legal rules are sometimes seen as an obstacle to flexibility and quick decisions. While Korea has consistently scored 0.73 (on a scale of 0-1) on the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index since 2016, its government corruption score (0.67) is one of the lowest components of its score.
Throughout his tenure, President Moon took steps to strengthen the rule of law, including by “completely separat[ing] powerful institutions from domestic politics and install[ing] systems to make any such institutions unable to wield omnipotent power.” In December 2020, the National Assembly adopted three legislative reforms to this effect. These included: 1) a major police law revision that introduces a local autonomous police system and allows the establishment of a national investigation office; 2) a revision of the National Intelligence Service Act which strips the National Intelligence Service of its authority to conduct criminal investigations into violations of the National Security Law; and 3) a bill establishing the new Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO). The establishment of the CIO is part of Moon’s efforts to check the power of the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office, while also preventing it from interfering in politics. Prosecutors in South Korea lead the investigation of criminal cases, and also have considerable flexibility in deciding whether to prosecute a suspect or not. Unlike judges, prosecutors are not independent, and there have been cases in which they have used their power to harass political opponents. Typically, prosecutors appear more reluctant to investigate acting government officials than the representatives of previous governments. Under President Moon’s directive, two ministers of justice (Cho Kuk and Choo Mi ae) pursued prosecutorial reform in 2019 and 2020. Having been chosen expressly to lead this reform, former Minister of Justice Cho was forced to resign after only a few weeks in office after the Supreme Prosecutors Office turned the tables and charged several members of Cho’s family with corrupt and illicit activities. Cho‘s replacement, Minister Choo, then sought to suspend Prosecutor General Yoon Seok Youl on grounds of ethical misconduct. Yoon successfully challenged his suspension; but eventually resigned, as did Minister Choo. Thus far, the establishment of the CIO (to which prosecutors are now to cede some of their investigative authority) is the most concrete step toward prosecutorial reform.
Citations:
Pak, Bo-ram. “(Lead) Assembly Passes Revised Spy Agency Law after Eliminating Opposition Filibuster.” Yonhap News Agency, December 13, 2020. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20201213003751315.
“South Korea’s Anti-Corruption Campaign so Far: An Honest Crusade or Is It ‘Naeronambul’?” Ropes & Gray, August 27, 2021. https://www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/alerts/2021/August/South-Koreas-Anti-Corruption-Campaign-So-Far-An-Honest-Crusade-or-Is-It-Naeronambul.
U.S. Department of State. „Investment Climate Statements for 2021, Korea, Republic of Korea.“ https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-investment-climate-statements/south-korea/.
Yu, Jae-yun. “Prosecution Challenges Structural Reform Plan by Justice Ministry.” Yonhap News Agency, June 8, 2021. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210608004500315.
Throughout his tenure, President Moon took steps to strengthen the rule of law, including by “completely separat[ing] powerful institutions from domestic politics and install[ing] systems to make any such institutions unable to wield omnipotent power.” In December 2020, the National Assembly adopted three legislative reforms to this effect. These included: 1) a major police law revision that introduces a local autonomous police system and allows the establishment of a national investigation office; 2) a revision of the National Intelligence Service Act which strips the National Intelligence Service of its authority to conduct criminal investigations into violations of the National Security Law; and 3) a bill establishing the new Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO). The establishment of the CIO is part of Moon’s efforts to check the power of the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office, while also preventing it from interfering in politics. Prosecutors in South Korea lead the investigation of criminal cases, and also have considerable flexibility in deciding whether to prosecute a suspect or not. Unlike judges, prosecutors are not independent, and there have been cases in which they have used their power to harass political opponents. Typically, prosecutors appear more reluctant to investigate acting government officials than the representatives of previous governments. Under President Moon’s directive, two ministers of justice (Cho Kuk and Choo Mi ae) pursued prosecutorial reform in 2019 and 2020. Having been chosen expressly to lead this reform, former Minister of Justice Cho was forced to resign after only a few weeks in office after the Supreme Prosecutors Office turned the tables and charged several members of Cho’s family with corrupt and illicit activities. Cho‘s replacement, Minister Choo, then sought to suspend Prosecutor General Yoon Seok Youl on grounds of ethical misconduct. Yoon successfully challenged his suspension; but eventually resigned, as did Minister Choo. Thus far, the establishment of the CIO (to which prosecutors are now to cede some of their investigative authority) is the most concrete step toward prosecutorial reform.
Citations:
Pak, Bo-ram. “(Lead) Assembly Passes Revised Spy Agency Law after Eliminating Opposition Filibuster.” Yonhap News Agency, December 13, 2020. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20201213003751315.
“South Korea’s Anti-Corruption Campaign so Far: An Honest Crusade or Is It ‘Naeronambul’?” Ropes & Gray, August 27, 2021. https://www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/alerts/2021/August/South-Koreas-Anti-Corruption-Campaign-So-Far-An-Honest-Crusade-or-Is-It-Naeronambul.
U.S. Department of State. „Investment Climate Statements for 2021, Korea, Republic of Korea.“ https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-investment-climate-statements/south-korea/.
Yu, Jae-yun. “Prosecution Challenges Structural Reform Plan by Justice Ministry.” Yonhap News Agency, June 8, 2021. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210608004500315.
To what extent do independent courts control whether government and administration act in conformity with the law?
10
9
9
Independent courts effectively review executive action and ensure that the government and administration act in conformity with the law.
8
7
6
7
6
Independent courts usually manage to control whether the government and administration act in conformity with the law.
5
4
3
4
3
Courts are independent, but often fail to ensure legal compliance.
2
1
1
Courts are biased for or against the incumbent government and lack effective control.
In general, courts in South Korea are highly professional, and judges are well trained. The South Korean judiciary is fairly independent, though not totally free from governmental pressure. In a demonstration of judicial independence, the Seoul Administrative Court in December 2020 ruled against the government after Prosecutor General Yoon challenged his suspension by the minister of justice.
Under South Korea’s version of centralized constitutional review, the Constitutional Court is the only body with the power to declare a legal norm unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, is responsible for reviewing ministerial and government decrees. However, in the past, there have been cases with little connection to ministerial or government decree in which the Supreme Court has also demanded the ability to rule on acts’ constitutionality, hence interfering with the Constitutional Court’s authority. This has contributed to legal battles between the Constitutional and Supreme courts on several occasions. On the whole, the Constitutional Court has become an effective guardian of the constitution, although it has been comparably weak on anti-discrimination issues and the defense of political liberties on issues relating to the security threat posed by North Korea.
With COVID-19 restrictions heading into a third year, the number of complaints and lawsuits brought against the government for violation of individual or collective rights is growing. Businesses forced to close have mostly petitioned the president. Civic groups and churches have filed court cases regarding the legality of government bans on political rallies. Courts have largely ruled in favor of the government and upheld the bans. However, in some instances, courts have overturned government decisions and allowed rallies to proceed. In October 2021, the Seoul Administrative court noted that a complete ban on outdoor rallies in Seoul was excessive, and pointed to the double standard of allowing in-person church services and other personal events (e.g., weddings). Such rulings suggest that courts are carefully considering the justifiable limitations of constitutional rights.
Citations:
JoongAng Ilbo. “Selective justice.” October 10, 2019 http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3068919
Lee, Hae-a. “(Lead) Coffee Shops, Bars, Internet Cafes Join Protest against Virus Restrictions.” Yonhap News Agency, January 6, 2021. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210106006451315.
Oh, Sun-min. “Court Allows Small-Scale Holiday Rallies amid Covid-19 Concerns.” Yonhap News Agency, October 1, 2021. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20211001010000325.
Song, Jung-a. “South Korea’s Megachurches Take on Government in Coronavirus Battle.” Financial Times, September 18, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/db67713b-e1d9-4e84-8a40-e3d0f3e1ed57.
Under South Korea’s version of centralized constitutional review, the Constitutional Court is the only body with the power to declare a legal norm unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, is responsible for reviewing ministerial and government decrees. However, in the past, there have been cases with little connection to ministerial or government decree in which the Supreme Court has also demanded the ability to rule on acts’ constitutionality, hence interfering with the Constitutional Court’s authority. This has contributed to legal battles between the Constitutional and Supreme courts on several occasions. On the whole, the Constitutional Court has become an effective guardian of the constitution, although it has been comparably weak on anti-discrimination issues and the defense of political liberties on issues relating to the security threat posed by North Korea.
With COVID-19 restrictions heading into a third year, the number of complaints and lawsuits brought against the government for violation of individual or collective rights is growing. Businesses forced to close have mostly petitioned the president. Civic groups and churches have filed court cases regarding the legality of government bans on political rallies. Courts have largely ruled in favor of the government and upheld the bans. However, in some instances, courts have overturned government decisions and allowed rallies to proceed. In October 2021, the Seoul Administrative court noted that a complete ban on outdoor rallies in Seoul was excessive, and pointed to the double standard of allowing in-person church services and other personal events (e.g., weddings). Such rulings suggest that courts are carefully considering the justifiable limitations of constitutional rights.
Citations:
JoongAng Ilbo. “Selective justice.” October 10, 2019 http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3068919
Lee, Hae-a. “(Lead) Coffee Shops, Bars, Internet Cafes Join Protest against Virus Restrictions.” Yonhap News Agency, January 6, 2021. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210106006451315.
Oh, Sun-min. “Court Allows Small-Scale Holiday Rallies amid Covid-19 Concerns.” Yonhap News Agency, October 1, 2021. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20211001010000325.
Song, Jung-a. “South Korea’s Megachurches Take on Government in Coronavirus Battle.” Financial Times, September 18, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/db67713b-e1d9-4e84-8a40-e3d0f3e1ed57.
To what extent does the process of appointing (supreme or constitutional court) justices guarantee the independence of the judiciary?
10
9
9
Justices are appointed in a cooperative appointment process with special majority requirements.
8
7
6
7
6
Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies with special majority requirements or in a cooperative selection process without special majority requirements.
5
4
3
4
3
Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies without special majority requirements.
2
1
1
All judges are appointed exclusively by a single body irrespective of other institutions.
The appointment process for Constitutional Court justices generally serves to protect the court’s independence. Judges are exclusively appointed by different bodies without special majority requirements, although there is cooperation between the branches in the nomination process. The process is formally transparent and adequately covered by public media, although judicial appointments do not receive significant public attention. All nine judges are appointed by the president, with three of the nine selected by the president, three by the National Assembly and three by the judiciary. By custom, the opposition nominates one of the three justices appointed by the National Assembly. The head of the court is chosen by the president with the consent of the National Assembly. Justices serve renewable terms of six years, with the exception of the chief justice. The National Assembly holds nomination hearings on all nominees for the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court.
Citations:
Article 111 of the Korean Constitution
Croissant, Aurel (2010) Provisions, Practices and Performances of Constitutional Review in Democratizing East Asia, in: The Pacific Review 23(5).
Jongcheol Kim, The Rule of Law and Democracy in South Korea: Ideal and Reality, EAF Policy Debates, No.26, may 12, 2015
Korea Herald. “Moon names new nominee for Constitutional Court Chief.” October 27, 2017. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20171027000588
Citations:
Article 111 of the Korean Constitution
Croissant, Aurel (2010) Provisions, Practices and Performances of Constitutional Review in Democratizing East Asia, in: The Pacific Review 23(5).
Jongcheol Kim, The Rule of Law and Democracy in South Korea: Ideal and Reality, EAF Policy Debates, No.26, may 12, 2015
Korea Herald. “Moon names new nominee for Constitutional Court Chief.” October 27, 2017. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20171027000588
To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?
10
9
9
Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
8
7
6
7
6
Most integrity mechanisms function effectively and provide disincentives for public officeholders willing to abuse their positions.
5
4
3
4
3
Some integrity mechanisms function, but do not effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
2
1
1
Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.
The Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption, established under the Anti-Corruption Act, handles whistleblowers’ reports, recommends policies and legislation for combating corruption, and examines the integrity of public institutions. The Public Service Ethics Act is designed to prevent high-ranking public officials from reaping financial gains related to their duties both during and after their time of public employment. Existing laws and regulations on the issue are generally effective in holding politicians and public servants accountable and in penalizing wrongdoing. Courts have also been tough on those involved in corruption scandals, handing down prison sentences to many involved, including ex-President Park and her predecessor Lee Myung-bak. That said, there are ways around these regulations. For example, after obtaining special permission from public service ethics committees, it is not uncommon for retired bureaucrats to receive golden-parachute appointments in the same industries they were charged with regulating.
President Moon promised to strengthen anti-corruption initiatives further, announcing that members of the elite involved in corruption scandals would not be granted pardons. While the 2019 scandal surrounding former Justice Minister Cho Kuk showed that the Moon government was not above abuse-of-office accusations, the case also showed that checks and balances have improved, as there appears to be increasing readiness to investigate serving high-level officials. In the past, public officials were usually investigated and prosecuted only after they left office, as prosecutors have considerable discretion with regard to deciding who to prosecute. During the Moon administration, in addition to the investigation into Minister Cho, there were various high-profile investigations of ruling party members, including the 2019 conviction of the South Chungcheong Province governor for sexual assault, and the April 2020 resignation of the mayor of Busan after admitting to sexual harassment. Throughout his tenure, President Moon took steps to “separate powerful institutions from domestic politics and install systems to make any such institutions unable to wield omnipotent power.” One such reform was the launch in 2021 of the new Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO). This institutional reform shifts the power to investigate and prosecute corruption among high-level officials from the prosecutor’s office to a new agency. The intent is for the new agency to be less opportunistic and more independent from political meddling.
Despite the strong campaign against corruption in the public sector, there has been minimal success in curbing corruption and influence peddling by big business groups. One serious concern is the massive degree to which economic power is concentrated, and the lack of respect that some economic elites show for the law. Courts are much more lenient toward businessmen than toward public officials. In February 2018, an appellate court reduced the five-year prison sentence handed down to Samsung Electronics Vice Chairman Lee Jae-yong to a suspended sentence of two-and-a-half years. This was seen as extremely lenient when compared to the long jail sentences given to former public officials. In January 2021, following a retrial, Lee Jae-yong was sentenced to an additional two-and-a-half years. He was released on parole in August 2021. Relatedly, many were surprised by President Moon’s decision to pardon former President Park Guen-hye in December 2021.
Citations:
Anti-Corruption Civil & Civil Rights Commision. 2020 Annual Report, July 2, 2021. https://www.acrc.go.kr/en/board.do?command=searchDetail&method=searchDetailViewInc&menuId=020504&confId=64&conConfId=64&conTabId=0&currPageNo=1&boardNum=87799.
Choi, Kyoun-jun, and Jonson N Porteux. “Leviathan for Sale: Maritime Police Privatization, Bureaucratic Corruption, and the Sewol Disaster.” Journal of East Asian Studies 21, no. 1, January 1, 1970. https://www.kci.go.kr/kciportal/ci/sereArticleSearch/ciSereArtiView.kci?sereArticleSearchBean.artiId=ART002728448.
The Economist. “A Presidential Pardon Catches South Korea by Surprise,” January 1, 2022. https://www.economist.com/asia/2022/01/01/a-presidential-pardon-catches-south-korea-by-surprise.
Pak, Bo-ram. “(Lead) Assembly Passes Revised Spy Agency Law after Eliminating Opposition Filibuster.” Yonhap News Agency, December 13, 2020. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20201213003751315.
“South Korea’s Anti-Corruption Campaign so Far: An Honest Crusade or Is It ‘Naeronambul’?” Ropes & Gray, August 27, 2021. https://www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/alerts/2021/August/South-Koreas-Anti-Corruption-Campaign-So-Far-An-Honest-Crusade-or-Is-It-Naeronambul.
Yu, Jae-yun. “Prosecution Challenges Structural Reform Plan by Justice Ministry.” Yonhap News Agency, June 8, 2021. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210608004500315.
President Moon promised to strengthen anti-corruption initiatives further, announcing that members of the elite involved in corruption scandals would not be granted pardons. While the 2019 scandal surrounding former Justice Minister Cho Kuk showed that the Moon government was not above abuse-of-office accusations, the case also showed that checks and balances have improved, as there appears to be increasing readiness to investigate serving high-level officials. In the past, public officials were usually investigated and prosecuted only after they left office, as prosecutors have considerable discretion with regard to deciding who to prosecute. During the Moon administration, in addition to the investigation into Minister Cho, there were various high-profile investigations of ruling party members, including the 2019 conviction of the South Chungcheong Province governor for sexual assault, and the April 2020 resignation of the mayor of Busan after admitting to sexual harassment. Throughout his tenure, President Moon took steps to “separate powerful institutions from domestic politics and install systems to make any such institutions unable to wield omnipotent power.” One such reform was the launch in 2021 of the new Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO). This institutional reform shifts the power to investigate and prosecute corruption among high-level officials from the prosecutor’s office to a new agency. The intent is for the new agency to be less opportunistic and more independent from political meddling.
Despite the strong campaign against corruption in the public sector, there has been minimal success in curbing corruption and influence peddling by big business groups. One serious concern is the massive degree to which economic power is concentrated, and the lack of respect that some economic elites show for the law. Courts are much more lenient toward businessmen than toward public officials. In February 2018, an appellate court reduced the five-year prison sentence handed down to Samsung Electronics Vice Chairman Lee Jae-yong to a suspended sentence of two-and-a-half years. This was seen as extremely lenient when compared to the long jail sentences given to former public officials. In January 2021, following a retrial, Lee Jae-yong was sentenced to an additional two-and-a-half years. He was released on parole in August 2021. Relatedly, many were surprised by President Moon’s decision to pardon former President Park Guen-hye in December 2021.
Citations:
Anti-Corruption Civil & Civil Rights Commision. 2020 Annual Report, July 2, 2021. https://www.acrc.go.kr/en/board.do?command=searchDetail&method=searchDetailViewInc&menuId=020504&confId=64&conConfId=64&conTabId=0&currPageNo=1&boardNum=87799.
Choi, Kyoun-jun, and Jonson N Porteux. “Leviathan for Sale: Maritime Police Privatization, Bureaucratic Corruption, and the Sewol Disaster.” Journal of East Asian Studies 21, no. 1, January 1, 1970. https://www.kci.go.kr/kciportal/ci/sereArticleSearch/ciSereArtiView.kci?sereArticleSearchBean.artiId=ART002728448.
The Economist. “A Presidential Pardon Catches South Korea by Surprise,” January 1, 2022. https://www.economist.com/asia/2022/01/01/a-presidential-pardon-catches-south-korea-by-surprise.
Pak, Bo-ram. “(Lead) Assembly Passes Revised Spy Agency Law after Eliminating Opposition Filibuster.” Yonhap News Agency, December 13, 2020. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20201213003751315.
“South Korea’s Anti-Corruption Campaign so Far: An Honest Crusade or Is It ‘Naeronambul’?” Ropes & Gray, August 27, 2021. https://www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/alerts/2021/August/South-Koreas-Anti-Corruption-Campaign-So-Far-An-Honest-Crusade-or-Is-It-Naeronambul.
Yu, Jae-yun. “Prosecution Challenges Structural Reform Plan by Justice Ministry.” Yonhap News Agency, June 8, 2021. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210608004500315.