Social Policies
#22Key Findings
With efforts to expand the welfare state having had little immediate effect, South Korea’s social policies fall into the middle ranks (rank 22) in international comparison. Its score on this measure has improved by 0.3 points since 2014.
The healthcare system performed very well in response to COVID-19. Pandemic containment, testing and contact-tracing measures helped keep the number of cases exceptionally low. The “Mooncare” healthcare insurance plan has expanded access to services, while considerably increasing government expenses.
Education outcomes are good. A curriculum reform has sought to reorient teaching toward critical thinking, analytic skills, creativity and digital skills. Special instructors were assigned to ensure that underprivileged students did not fall behind during the pandemic. Poverty and inequality rates are high. The government has boosted social spending to 12.2% of GDP, far below the OECD average of 20%.
Paternal leave, child support benefits and childcare availability have been expanded; nonetheless, there are numerous disincentives to women entering the workforce, and birth rates are extremely low. Old-age poverty is a major problem. While official support for immigrants has expanded, the country’s cultural, education and social policies do not systematically address migrants.
The healthcare system performed very well in response to COVID-19. Pandemic containment, testing and contact-tracing measures helped keep the number of cases exceptionally low. The “Mooncare” healthcare insurance plan has expanded access to services, while considerably increasing government expenses.
Education outcomes are good. A curriculum reform has sought to reorient teaching toward critical thinking, analytic skills, creativity and digital skills. Special instructors were assigned to ensure that underprivileged students did not fall behind during the pandemic. Poverty and inequality rates are high. The government has boosted social spending to 12.2% of GDP, far below the OECD average of 20%.
Paternal leave, child support benefits and childcare availability have been expanded; nonetheless, there are numerous disincentives to women entering the workforce, and birth rates are extremely low. Old-age poverty is a major problem. While official support for immigrants has expanded, the country’s cultural, education and social policies do not systematically address migrants.
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To what extent does education policy deliver high-quality, equitable and efficient education and training?
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Education policy fully achieves the criteria.
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Education policy largely achieves the criteria.
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Education policy partially achieves the criteria.
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Education policy does not achieve the criteria at all.
Education policy is a key priority for the South Korean government, and investments have yielded above-average performance on Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) tests and the OECD’s highest tertiary education rate (69.8%) for those aged 25 to 34. However, Korea’s level of public expenditure (3.8% of GDP) on primary-to-tertiary education is below the OECD average (4.1%), though private expenditure (1.3%) is higher than the OECD average (0.8%). Although general access to education is very good, admission processes for elite universities are remain extremely competitive and unfair, as they favor children from privileged families. Many Koreans spend a large share of their income on private schools and tutoring, a practice that puts low-income households at a disadvantage. A 2020 government survey found that 75% of Korean students participate in some form of private education. Average monthly spending is $377, but middle- and higher-income families spend five times more on private education than do lower-income families. This reliance on privately financed education leads to education inequality in Korea, which has been exacerbated by pandemic-related school closures and distance learning. To address the widening gap between the strongest (generally more privileged) and weakest (generally less privileged) students, the Ministry of Education temporarily assigned instructors to ensure that underprivileged students (29,000 primary; 2,300 secondary) did not fall behind due to COVID-19. More structurally, President Moon vowed to do away with elite schools – either by closing or converting them into public schools. This reform stalled after a group of elite schools filed a petition with the Constitutional Court in 2020 to block the measure. The court’s decision is expected in 2022.
While reforms of elite schools and the university entrance examination system have initially faltered due to insufficient public consultation and support, educational reforms have been folded into the New Deal launched by Moon in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis. Specifically, the Human New Deal includes measures to upgrade and reorient teaching to foster critical thinking, analytic skills, creativity, interpersonal skills and digital technology competence – so that human resources are better aligned with Korea’s transition toward green and digital economies. To promote inclusivity in this period of transition, the Human New Deal will provide specialized support for disadvantaged learners (e.g., disabled, multi-racial, rural and low-income people).
Citations:
OECD, Education at Glance at a Glance 2017
Korea Times. Moon’s education pledges under scrutiny. May 10 2017. Kalenzi, Cornelius, Danbee Back, and Moonjung Kim. “Lessons from South Korea on the Future of Online Education.” World Economic Forum, November 13, 2020. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/11/lessons-from-south-korea-on-the-future-of-online-education/.
Korea Ministry of Economy and Finance. “Government Announces Korean New Deal 2.0,” July 14, 2021. https://english.moef.go.kr/pc/selectTbPressCenterDtl.do?boardCd=N0001&seq=5173.
Lee, Haye-ah. “Elite High Schools Retain Status in 10-0 Victory over Education Authorities.” Yonhap News Agency, July 11, 2021. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210709010500315.
Lee, Ho-jeong. “Moon’s New Deal Gets a 2.0 Overhaul.” Korea JoongAng Daily, July 14, 2021. https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2021/07/14/business/economy/Korean-New-Deal-20-Human-New-Deal-Moon-Jaein/20210714161200360.html.
OECD. “Education at a Glance 2021,” September 16, 2021. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/education-at-a-glance_19991487.
Pak, Mathilde. “Korea: Roadmap to Narrow Digital Gaps.” ECOSCOPE Blog, August 10, 2020. https://oecdecoscope.blog/2020/08/11/korea-roadmap-to-narrow-digital-gaps/.
Park, Ha-na. “Korea to Add W60TR More to Tackle Economic Polarization by 2025.” The Korea Herald, July 14, 2021. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210714000937.
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/05/181_229082.html
University World News. Is South Korea in a Higher Education Access Trap? July 14, 2017. http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20170711111525929
Kim, Hyun-bin. 2018. “[Reporter’s Notebook] Moon gets ‘F’ in education policy.” The Korea Times, May 18. Retrieved September 19 (https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/05/181_249202.html)
While reforms of elite schools and the university entrance examination system have initially faltered due to insufficient public consultation and support, educational reforms have been folded into the New Deal launched by Moon in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis. Specifically, the Human New Deal includes measures to upgrade and reorient teaching to foster critical thinking, analytic skills, creativity, interpersonal skills and digital technology competence – so that human resources are better aligned with Korea’s transition toward green and digital economies. To promote inclusivity in this period of transition, the Human New Deal will provide specialized support for disadvantaged learners (e.g., disabled, multi-racial, rural and low-income people).
Citations:
OECD, Education at Glance at a Glance 2017
Korea Times. Moon’s education pledges under scrutiny. May 10 2017. Kalenzi, Cornelius, Danbee Back, and Moonjung Kim. “Lessons from South Korea on the Future of Online Education.” World Economic Forum, November 13, 2020. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/11/lessons-from-south-korea-on-the-future-of-online-education/.
Korea Ministry of Economy and Finance. “Government Announces Korean New Deal 2.0,” July 14, 2021. https://english.moef.go.kr/pc/selectTbPressCenterDtl.do?boardCd=N0001&seq=5173.
Lee, Haye-ah. “Elite High Schools Retain Status in 10-0 Victory over Education Authorities.” Yonhap News Agency, July 11, 2021. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210709010500315.
Lee, Ho-jeong. “Moon’s New Deal Gets a 2.0 Overhaul.” Korea JoongAng Daily, July 14, 2021. https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2021/07/14/business/economy/Korean-New-Deal-20-Human-New-Deal-Moon-Jaein/20210714161200360.html.
OECD. “Education at a Glance 2021,” September 16, 2021. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/education-at-a-glance_19991487.
Pak, Mathilde. “Korea: Roadmap to Narrow Digital Gaps.” ECOSCOPE Blog, August 10, 2020. https://oecdecoscope.blog/2020/08/11/korea-roadmap-to-narrow-digital-gaps/.
Park, Ha-na. “Korea to Add W60TR More to Tackle Economic Polarization by 2025.” The Korea Herald, July 14, 2021. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210714000937.
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/05/181_229082.html
University World News. Is South Korea in a Higher Education Access Trap? July 14, 2017. http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20170711111525929
Kim, Hyun-bin. 2018. “[Reporter’s Notebook] Moon gets ‘F’ in education policy.” The Korea Times, May 18. Retrieved September 19 (https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/05/181_249202.html)
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To what extent does social policy prevent exclusion and decoupling from society?
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Policies very effectively enable societal inclusion and ensure equal opportunities.
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For the most part, policies enable societal inclusion effectively and ensure equal opportunities.
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For the most part, policies fail to prevent societal exclusion effectively and ensure equal opportunities.
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Policies exacerbate unequal opportunities and exclusion from society.
Korea still has among the lowest rates of social spending and highest rates of poverty and inequality in the OECD. Within the OECD, Korea has the ninth-highest Gini coefficient (0.345 in 2018); fifth-highest incidence of relative poverty (16.7% in 2018); highest elderly poverty rate (43.4% in 2018); and second-highest share of temporary (precarious) workers (26% of employees in 2020).
That said, the Moon administration strongly championed the issue of social inclusion and made some modest progress on narrowing the gap between rich and poor. To bolster income-led growth, the government raised the minimum wage by 16% in 2018 and 11% in 2019 (followed by much smaller increases in the COVID-hit years of 2020 and 2021), significantly increased the earned income tax credit benefit, increased the basic pension entitlement and created more than 2 million new jobs. The government also increased social spending from 9.9% of GDP in 2016 to 12.2% in 2019. These efforts have corresponded with modest declines in poverty and income inequality during the period 2017-2020.
Although formally regarded as equal with men, women are still underrepresented in the overall workforce and particularly in leadership positions. Within the OECD, Korea has the largest gender wage gap (31.5% in 2020); and women are disproportionately more likely to be hired as non-regular (precarious) workers. The growing share of non-regular workers (which rose to an all-time high of 38.4% in August 2021) and the precariousness of non-regular work (non-regular workers earn only about 50% the average monthly wage of regular workers and have much lower rates of social-benefit coverage) are also serious challenges to the Moon administration’s vision of a just and inclusive society.
COVID-19 is likely to have further widened these gaps – that is, between rich and poor, men and women, regular and non-regular workers, etc. Rates of unemployment, underemployment and/or labor market exit have been particularly high among non-regular workers and women during the pandemic. Overall, COVID-19 highlighted the inadequacy of Korea’s social spending of 12.2% of GDP (compared to the OECD average of 20%) with regard to providing automatic stabilizers in times of crisis. The pandemic exposed gaps in social protection coverage, for instance among the large number of self-employed people that do not have employment insurance to buttress pandemic-related income losses. To mitigate COVID-related job and income losses, the government created public jobs and distributed several rounds of Emergency Relief Allowance to households. This experience spurred the government to consider more permanent social safety net enhancements as part of the Human New Deal. It remains to be seen whether the next administration will continue to try to create a more inclusive and equitable society, or instead bow to vested interests and revert to the longer-term trend of social polarization between the (so-called) gold/silver spoons and dirt spoons.
Citations:
An, Sungbae, Minsoo Han, Su Bin Kim, and Jinhee Lee. “The Determinants and Welfare Implications of Labor Share.” KIEP Research Paper, World Economy Brief 21, no. 7 (March 5, 2021). https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3819644.
International Labour Organization. “Republic of Korea: A Rapid Assessment of the Employment Impacts of COVID-19,” November 5, 2020. https://www.ilo.org/emppolicy/pubs/WCMS_760063/lang–en/index.htm.
Korea Ministry of Economy and Finance. “Government Announces Korean New Deal 2.0,” July 14, 2021. https://english.moef.go.kr/pc/selectTbPressCenterDtl.do?boardCd=N0001&seq=5173.
Lee, Ho-jeong. “Moon’s New Deal Gets a 2.0 Overhaul.” Korea JoongAng Daily, July 14, 2021. https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2021/07/14/business/economy/Korean-New-Deal-20-Human-New-Deal-Moon-Jaein/20210714161200360.html.
OECD. “Employment Rate.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/employment-rate/indicator/english_1de68a9b-en.
OECD. “Gender Wage Gap.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/gender-wage-gap/indicator/english_7cee77aa-en.
OECD. “Income Inequality.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/income-inequality/indicator/english_459aa7f1-en.
OECD. “Korea Economic Snapshot,” December 2021. http://www.oecd.org/economy/korea-economic-snapshot/.
OECD. “Poverty Rate.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/poverty-rate/indicator/english_0fe1315d-en.
OECD. “Social Spending.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/social-spending/indicator/english_7497563b-en.
OECD. “Wage Levels.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/wage-levels/indicator/english_0a1c27bc-en.
Pak, Mathilde. “Korea: Roadmap to Narrow Digital Gaps.” ECOSCOPE Blog, August 10, 2020. https://oecdecoscope.blog/2020/08/11/korea-roadmap-to-narrow-digital-gaps/.
Seol, Dong-hoon. “Population Ageing and International Migration Policy in South Korea.” Journal of the Korea Welfare State and Social Policy 2, no. 2 (December 2018): 73–108.
That said, the Moon administration strongly championed the issue of social inclusion and made some modest progress on narrowing the gap between rich and poor. To bolster income-led growth, the government raised the minimum wage by 16% in 2018 and 11% in 2019 (followed by much smaller increases in the COVID-hit years of 2020 and 2021), significantly increased the earned income tax credit benefit, increased the basic pension entitlement and created more than 2 million new jobs. The government also increased social spending from 9.9% of GDP in 2016 to 12.2% in 2019. These efforts have corresponded with modest declines in poverty and income inequality during the period 2017-2020.
Although formally regarded as equal with men, women are still underrepresented in the overall workforce and particularly in leadership positions. Within the OECD, Korea has the largest gender wage gap (31.5% in 2020); and women are disproportionately more likely to be hired as non-regular (precarious) workers. The growing share of non-regular workers (which rose to an all-time high of 38.4% in August 2021) and the precariousness of non-regular work (non-regular workers earn only about 50% the average monthly wage of regular workers and have much lower rates of social-benefit coverage) are also serious challenges to the Moon administration’s vision of a just and inclusive society.
COVID-19 is likely to have further widened these gaps – that is, between rich and poor, men and women, regular and non-regular workers, etc. Rates of unemployment, underemployment and/or labor market exit have been particularly high among non-regular workers and women during the pandemic. Overall, COVID-19 highlighted the inadequacy of Korea’s social spending of 12.2% of GDP (compared to the OECD average of 20%) with regard to providing automatic stabilizers in times of crisis. The pandemic exposed gaps in social protection coverage, for instance among the large number of self-employed people that do not have employment insurance to buttress pandemic-related income losses. To mitigate COVID-related job and income losses, the government created public jobs and distributed several rounds of Emergency Relief Allowance to households. This experience spurred the government to consider more permanent social safety net enhancements as part of the Human New Deal. It remains to be seen whether the next administration will continue to try to create a more inclusive and equitable society, or instead bow to vested interests and revert to the longer-term trend of social polarization between the (so-called) gold/silver spoons and dirt spoons.
Citations:
An, Sungbae, Minsoo Han, Su Bin Kim, and Jinhee Lee. “The Determinants and Welfare Implications of Labor Share.” KIEP Research Paper, World Economy Brief 21, no. 7 (March 5, 2021). https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3819644.
International Labour Organization. “Republic of Korea: A Rapid Assessment of the Employment Impacts of COVID-19,” November 5, 2020. https://www.ilo.org/emppolicy/pubs/WCMS_760063/lang–en/index.htm.
Korea Ministry of Economy and Finance. “Government Announces Korean New Deal 2.0,” July 14, 2021. https://english.moef.go.kr/pc/selectTbPressCenterDtl.do?boardCd=N0001&seq=5173.
Lee, Ho-jeong. “Moon’s New Deal Gets a 2.0 Overhaul.” Korea JoongAng Daily, July 14, 2021. https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2021/07/14/business/economy/Korean-New-Deal-20-Human-New-Deal-Moon-Jaein/20210714161200360.html.
OECD. “Employment Rate.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/employment-rate/indicator/english_1de68a9b-en.
OECD. “Gender Wage Gap.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/gender-wage-gap/indicator/english_7cee77aa-en.
OECD. “Income Inequality.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/income-inequality/indicator/english_459aa7f1-en.
OECD. “Korea Economic Snapshot,” December 2021. http://www.oecd.org/economy/korea-economic-snapshot/.
OECD. “Poverty Rate.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/poverty-rate/indicator/english_0fe1315d-en.
OECD. “Social Spending.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/social-spending/indicator/english_7497563b-en.
OECD. “Wage Levels.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/wage-levels/indicator/english_0a1c27bc-en.
Pak, Mathilde. “Korea: Roadmap to Narrow Digital Gaps.” ECOSCOPE Blog, August 10, 2020. https://oecdecoscope.blog/2020/08/11/korea-roadmap-to-narrow-digital-gaps/.
Seol, Dong-hoon. “Population Ageing and International Migration Policy in South Korea.” Journal of the Korea Welfare State and Social Policy 2, no. 2 (December 2018): 73–108.
Graph View
To what extent do health care policies provide high-quality, inclusive and cost-efficient health care?
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Health care policy achieves the criteria fully.
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Health care policy achieves the criteria largely.
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Health care policy achieves the criteria partly.
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Health care policy does not achieve the criteria at all.
South Korea’s healthcare system is characterized by universal coverage and one of the highest life expectancies in the world. The World Health Organization (WHO) rated Korea’s universal healthcare (UHC) coverage at 85.7 (i.e., 85.7% of the population has basic coverage) in 2017, higher than the OECD average of 80. Korea’s healthcare system performed well on the stress test provided by COVID-19. As of January 2021, Korea had the second-lowest number of COVID-19 cases (per 100,000 people) in the OECD. Indeed, Korea has been internationally lauded for its rapid and effective pandemic containment, in particular its testing, contact-tracing and quarantine procedures.
Yet while some laud Korea for achieving this with relatively low public health expenditure (5% of GDP in 2019 compared to the OECD average of 6.6%), Korea’s low public spending is augmented by high levels of private spending. Levels of out-
of-pocket spending by Korean households are among the highest in the OECD. In 2019, the WHO reported that 22% of the households spend around 10% of their total consumption on health; and 4% of households spend 25% of total consumption on health. These figures are significantly (3-4 times) higher than the OECD average – which indicates that many more households in Korea are at risk of catastrophic (unaffordable, poverty-inducing) health spending.
Since the launch of the more generous “Mooncare” healthcare plan in 2017, the government share of total healthcare expenditure has increased from 59% in 2016 to 62% in 2020. Moreover, private, out-of-pocket outlays declined from 33% of total health spending in 2016 to 29% in 2020. Mooncare’s ongoing expansion of healthcare to cover all medical treatments rather than just four major diseases (cancer, cardiac disorders, cerebrovascular diseases and rare incurable illnesses) – is likely to reduce the incidence of catastrophic healthcare spending by Korean households.
Mooncare has come at a cost. The National Assembly Budget Office projects that government healthcare insurance expenditures will more than double between 2020 and 2030. The financial balance of the health insurance system, which recorded a surplus for seven straight years through 2017, went into deficit in 2018 (when Mooncare was introduced).
Citations:
OECD, OECD Health Policy Overview: Health Policy in Korea. April 2016. https://www.oecd.org/korea/Health-Policy-in-Korea-April-2016.pdf
Korea.net. President announces new ‘Mooncare’ healthcare plan. Aug 11, 2017. http://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/policies/view?articleId=148430
Ebesutani, Chad. 2018. “Korea’s struggles with mental health insurance coverage: lessons learned from the US.” The Korea Times, March 26. Retrieved September 20, 2018 (https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/05/119_245967.html)
Arin, Kim. 2019. “All Foreign Residents required to enroll in National Health Insurance.” The Korea Herald, May 12. Retrieved from http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20190512000186.Asian Development Bank. “The Republic of Korea’s Coronavirus Disease Pandemic Response and Health System Preparedness,” October 4, 2021. https://www.adb.org/publications/republic-korea-coronavirus-disease-pandemic-response.
Korean Culture and Information Service (KOCIS). “President Announces New ‘Mooncare’ Healthcare Plan.” Korea.net, August 11, 2017. http://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/policies/view?articleId=148430.
Ock, Hyun-ju. “S. Korea’s Has Second-Lowest Number of COVID-19 Cases per Person in OECD.” The Korea Herald, December 31, 2020. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20201231000645.
OECD. “Health Spending.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/health-spending/indicator/english_8643de7e-en.
OECD. “OECD Health Policy Overview: Health Policy in Korea,” April 2016. https://www.oecd.org/korea/Health-Policy-in-Korea-April-2016.pdf.
World Health Organization. “Primary Health Care on the Road to Universal Health Coverage: 2019 Monitoring Report,” September 9, 2019. https://www.who.int/healthinfo/universal_health_coverage/report/uhc_report_2019.pdf?ua=1.
Yet while some laud Korea for achieving this with relatively low public health expenditure (5% of GDP in 2019 compared to the OECD average of 6.6%), Korea’s low public spending is augmented by high levels of private spending. Levels of out-
of-pocket spending by Korean households are among the highest in the OECD. In 2019, the WHO reported that 22% of the households spend around 10% of their total consumption on health; and 4% of households spend 25% of total consumption on health. These figures are significantly (3-4 times) higher than the OECD average – which indicates that many more households in Korea are at risk of catastrophic (unaffordable, poverty-inducing) health spending.
Since the launch of the more generous “Mooncare” healthcare plan in 2017, the government share of total healthcare expenditure has increased from 59% in 2016 to 62% in 2020. Moreover, private, out-of-pocket outlays declined from 33% of total health spending in 2016 to 29% in 2020. Mooncare’s ongoing expansion of healthcare to cover all medical treatments rather than just four major diseases (cancer, cardiac disorders, cerebrovascular diseases and rare incurable illnesses) – is likely to reduce the incidence of catastrophic healthcare spending by Korean households.
Mooncare has come at a cost. The National Assembly Budget Office projects that government healthcare insurance expenditures will more than double between 2020 and 2030. The financial balance of the health insurance system, which recorded a surplus for seven straight years through 2017, went into deficit in 2018 (when Mooncare was introduced).
Citations:
OECD, OECD Health Policy Overview: Health Policy in Korea. April 2016. https://www.oecd.org/korea/Health-Policy-in-Korea-April-2016.pdf
Korea.net. President announces new ‘Mooncare’ healthcare plan. Aug 11, 2017. http://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/policies/view?articleId=148430
Ebesutani, Chad. 2018. “Korea’s struggles with mental health insurance coverage: lessons learned from the US.” The Korea Times, March 26. Retrieved September 20, 2018 (https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/05/119_245967.html)
Arin, Kim. 2019. “All Foreign Residents required to enroll in National Health Insurance.” The Korea Herald, May 12. Retrieved from http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20190512000186.Asian Development Bank. “The Republic of Korea’s Coronavirus Disease Pandemic Response and Health System Preparedness,” October 4, 2021. https://www.adb.org/publications/republic-korea-coronavirus-disease-pandemic-response.
Korean Culture and Information Service (KOCIS). “President Announces New ‘Mooncare’ Healthcare Plan.” Korea.net, August 11, 2017. http://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/policies/view?articleId=148430.
Ock, Hyun-ju. “S. Korea’s Has Second-Lowest Number of COVID-19 Cases per Person in OECD.” The Korea Herald, December 31, 2020. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20201231000645.
OECD. “Health Spending.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/health-spending/indicator/english_8643de7e-en.
OECD. “OECD Health Policy Overview: Health Policy in Korea,” April 2016. https://www.oecd.org/korea/Health-Policy-in-Korea-April-2016.pdf.
World Health Organization. “Primary Health Care on the Road to Universal Health Coverage: 2019 Monitoring Report,” September 9, 2019. https://www.who.int/healthinfo/universal_health_coverage/report/uhc_report_2019.pdf?ua=1.
Graph View
To what extent do family support policies enable women to combine parenting with participation in the labor market?
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Family support policies effectively enable women to combine parenting with employment.
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Family support policies provide some support for women who want to combine parenting and employment.
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Family support policies provide only few opportunities for women who want to combine parenting and employment.
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Family support policies force most women to opt for either parenting or employment.
Despite substantial effort, the government has not been very effective in enabling women (or men) to combine parenting with participation in the labor market, which helps explain the low labor market participation rate among women. Cultural (traditional family values that view women as mothers and housewives) and socioeconomic factors such as a gender-based pay gap and a pervasive lack of social mobility discourage women from entering or reentering the workforce. As a result, while the population of college graduates is split fairly evenly between men and women, the employment rate for female graduates is lower than for male graduates. Furthermore, South Korea is the only country in the OECD in which the employment rate among female college graduates is lower than that among women with no more than compulsory education. COVID-19 exacerbated these gender gaps, as disproportionately more women than men were laid off and/or exited the workforce. Women’s rate of employment declined twice as fast as of men in 2020, as measured on a year-over-year basis in August 2020.
In 2021, Korea experienced its first-ever population decline – in part due to the low birthrate and in part due to declining immigration. High housing prices, high childcare and education costs, and precarious job and wage conditions contribute to young couples’ decisions not to have children. In 2020, the fertility rate reached a record low of 0.84, the lowest in the world. This rate is expected to have dropped further to 0.82 in 2021. This is in spite of the Moon administration’s efforts to strengthen family policy, including an expansion of childcare centers and kindergartens; an increase in childcare leave to one year for both women and men (up from 90 days and 20 days, respectively); the provision of subsidies during childcare leave; the provision of subsidies to encourage employers to allow flexible working arrangements; an increase in the scope of coverage of KRW 100,000 allowances for all children aged seven and under; the provision of a new KRW 300,000 monthly allowance for children less than 12 months old (effective 2022); and the provision of a new KRW 2 million bonus for newborns (effective 2022). Many local governments and churches have also offered additional incentives in an effort to raise fertility rates in their jurisdictions.
Citations:
International Labour Organization. “Republic of Korea: A Rapid Assessment of the Employment Impacts of COVID-19,” November 5, 2020. https://www.ilo.org/emppolicy/pubs/WCMS_760063/lang–en/index.htm.
Kang, Jin-gyu. “S.Korea to Report First-Ever Population Drop in 2021.” The Korea Economic Daily Global Edition, December 9, 2021. https://www.kedglobal.com/newsView/ked202112090010.
Korea Ministry of Employment and Labor. “Survey Report on Labor Conditions by Employment Type,” n.d.
Lee, Jiyeun. “The World’s Lowest Fertility Rate Is About to Get Even Lower.” Bloomberg, December 8, 2021. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-09/world-s-lowest-fertility-rate-to-get-even-lower-korea-reports.
OECD. “Gender Wage Gap.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/gender-wage-gap/indicator/english_7cee77aa-en.
OECD. “Labour Force Statistics by Sex and Age: Indicators,” 2021. https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00310-en.
Park, Jong-hong. “S. Korea to Boost Child Care Subsidies to Tackle Low Birth Rate.” KBS World, December 15, 2020. https://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&Seq_Code=158293.
Stangarone, Troy. “COVID-19 Has Widened South Korea’s Gender Gap.” The Diplomat, February 26, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/covid-19-has-widened-south-koreas-gender-gap/.
World Economic Forum. “Global Gender Gap Report 2021,” March 2021. https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2021.
In 2021, Korea experienced its first-ever population decline – in part due to the low birthrate and in part due to declining immigration. High housing prices, high childcare and education costs, and precarious job and wage conditions contribute to young couples’ decisions not to have children. In 2020, the fertility rate reached a record low of 0.84, the lowest in the world. This rate is expected to have dropped further to 0.82 in 2021. This is in spite of the Moon administration’s efforts to strengthen family policy, including an expansion of childcare centers and kindergartens; an increase in childcare leave to one year for both women and men (up from 90 days and 20 days, respectively); the provision of subsidies during childcare leave; the provision of subsidies to encourage employers to allow flexible working arrangements; an increase in the scope of coverage of KRW 100,000 allowances for all children aged seven and under; the provision of a new KRW 300,000 monthly allowance for children less than 12 months old (effective 2022); and the provision of a new KRW 2 million bonus for newborns (effective 2022). Many local governments and churches have also offered additional incentives in an effort to raise fertility rates in their jurisdictions.
Citations:
International Labour Organization. “Republic of Korea: A Rapid Assessment of the Employment Impacts of COVID-19,” November 5, 2020. https://www.ilo.org/emppolicy/pubs/WCMS_760063/lang–en/index.htm.
Kang, Jin-gyu. “S.Korea to Report First-Ever Population Drop in 2021.” The Korea Economic Daily Global Edition, December 9, 2021. https://www.kedglobal.com/newsView/ked202112090010.
Korea Ministry of Employment and Labor. “Survey Report on Labor Conditions by Employment Type,” n.d.
Lee, Jiyeun. “The World’s Lowest Fertility Rate Is About to Get Even Lower.” Bloomberg, December 8, 2021. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-09/world-s-lowest-fertility-rate-to-get-even-lower-korea-reports.
OECD. “Gender Wage Gap.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/gender-wage-gap/indicator/english_7cee77aa-en.
OECD. “Labour Force Statistics by Sex and Age: Indicators,” 2021. https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00310-en.
Park, Jong-hong. “S. Korea to Boost Child Care Subsidies to Tackle Low Birth Rate.” KBS World, December 15, 2020. https://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&Seq_Code=158293.
Stangarone, Troy. “COVID-19 Has Widened South Korea’s Gender Gap.” The Diplomat, February 26, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/covid-19-has-widened-south-koreas-gender-gap/.
World Economic Forum. “Global Gender Gap Report 2021,” March 2021. https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2021.
Graph View
To what extent does pension policy realize goals of poverty prevention, intergenerational equity and fiscal sustainability?
10
9
9
Pension policy achieves the objectives fully.
8
7
6
7
6
Pension policy achieves the objectives largely.
5
4
3
4
3
Pension policy achieves the objectives partly.
2
1
1
Pension policy does not achieve the objectives at all.
Old-age poverty is a major problem in South Korea, which still has the OECD’s highest poverty rate among retirement-age individuals, even though this rate has fallen from a high of 45% in 2016 to 43% 2018. Pensions are small, and most older adults today lack coverage under a national pension system that excluded a large share of the workforce until its expansion in 1999. The government has also failed to enforce mandatory participation in the system, and many employers do not register their employees for participation. National pension benefit levels are still very low (with an average monthly pension of KRW 520,000, equivalent to $440), and employees in private companies are often pressured to retire long before the legal retirement age of 60 (which will gradually increase to 65 by 2033). Thus, pension reform has been one of the Moon administration’s top priorities, although changes have been slow. The basic pension will gradually increase from its current maximum of KRW 206,050 to KRW 300,000 a month by 2021, with benefit eligibility coming at the age of 65. This pension will be provided to the 70% of elderly classified as low-income. Currently, the South Korean government is expending only 3.0% of its GDP for pensions, a very low share compared to the OECD average of 7.7%. Individual contributions to the National Pension have been kept at 9% of income since 1998, which is low compared to the OECD average of 20%. In comparison, National Health Insurance premiums have increased by about 3% per year since 2008. The combination of increasing pension benefit amounts, an increasing old-age dependency ratio and low individual contributions have led experts to predict a depletion of the pension fund by 2056. Various pension reform proposals have been considered since 2018 – including a proposal to raise just the individual contribution, a proposal to raise both contributions and benefits, and a proposal to increase the contribution period / retirement age. However, the process has stalled and is likely to be rolled over to the next administration.
Citations:
Banjo, Shelly. Korea’s Stubborn Leviathan. Sep 11, 2017. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-11/korea-s-reform-block-the-495-billion-national-pension-service
Moon, Hyungpyo. The Korean Pension System: Current State and Tasks Ahead. KDI.
OECD. “Pension Spending.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/pension-spending/indicator/english_a041f4ef-en.
OECD. “Poverty Rate.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/poverty-rate/indicator/english_0fe1315d-en.
Park, Ha-na. “National Pension Is a Mess No One Wants to Fix.” The Korea Herald, November 28, 2021. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20211128000126.
Son, Ji-hyoung. “[Life, Unprepared] Pension Reality Check Looms as Reformists Face Public Backlash.” The Korea Herald, August 2, 2021. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210802000903.
Yonhap News Agency. 2019. “About 15 pct of S. Korea’s population aged 65 or older: report.” Retrieved from https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20190927005500320.
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20181214005000320
Citations:
Banjo, Shelly. Korea’s Stubborn Leviathan. Sep 11, 2017. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-11/korea-s-reform-block-the-495-billion-national-pension-service
Moon, Hyungpyo. The Korean Pension System: Current State and Tasks Ahead. KDI.
OECD. “Pension Spending.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/pension-spending/indicator/english_a041f4ef-en.
OECD. “Poverty Rate.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/poverty-rate/indicator/english_0fe1315d-en.
Park, Ha-na. “National Pension Is a Mess No One Wants to Fix.” The Korea Herald, November 28, 2021. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20211128000126.
Son, Ji-hyoung. “[Life, Unprepared] Pension Reality Check Looms as Reformists Face Public Backlash.” The Korea Herald, August 2, 2021. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210802000903.
Yonhap News Agency. 2019. “About 15 pct of S. Korea’s population aged 65 or older: report.” Retrieved from https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20190927005500320.
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20181214005000320
Graph View
How effectively do policies support the integration of migrants into society?
10
9
9
Cultural, education and social policies effectively support the integration of migrants into society.
8
7
6
7
6
Cultural, education and social policies seek to integrate migrants into society, but have failed to do so effectively.
5
4
3
4
3
Cultural, education and social policies do not focus on integrating migrants into society.
2
1
1
Cultural, education and social policies segregate migrant communities from the majority society.
Since the 1990s, South Korea has evolved from a net-emigration to a net-immigration society. In 2018, South Korea experienced a particularly large increase in the number of foreigners resident in Korea of nearly 9%. However, the net-immigration trend reversed for the first time in a decade in 2020 due to coronavirus-related immigration controls. In 2020, the number of foreigners in Korea declined to a 5.5 year low. The number of migrant workers fell from an annual average of 50,000 to 7,000, and the number of immigrant marriages decreased by 35%. In late 2021, as the country shifted to “living with COVID-19,” and in an effort to address labor shortages, Korea relaxed entry restrictions on migrant workers that had been in place for the past two years.
Despite improvements in the legal conditions and official support provided to immigrants, the country’s cultural, education, and social policies still fail to systematically address the role of migrants in Korea. Foreign investors, ethnic Koreans with foreign passports, and highly educated foreigners are treated more favorably, while migrant blue-collar workers (who are often treated as “disposable labor”), multicultural families, North Koreans and asylum-seekers face considerable discrimination. From a legal perspective, migrant workers are accorded rights very similar to those enjoyed by native Korean employees, but employers routinely infringe these rights. While courts have offered some protection to migrant workers, the government has not actively pursued enforcement measures against employers that exploit the precarious status of migrant workers. In 2021 – spurred by the deaths of several migrant workers living in vinyl greenhouses assigned to them as living quarters – the Ministry of Labor made an inspection and found that nearly 70% of migrant farm/fisheries workers live in makeshift structures. Migrant workers also reported more than KRW 150 billion ($126.6 million) in unpaid wages for 2020. Experts suggest that Korea’s Act on the Employment of Foreign Workers and Employment Permit System contribute to making migrant workers vulnerable. Because their visas are tied to specific employers, migrants have limited bargaining power and options for recourse when unfairly treated by their employers. Granting migrants the freedom to choose and change employers could help improve their working conditions. One expert suggests providing permanent residential status for foreign workers so that there is more incentive to integrate migrants into Korean society.
South Korea has a poor record with regard to fulfilling its obligations under the Geneva Refugee Convention of 1951. From 1994 to 2020, less than 2% of the 71,042 applicants for refugee status have received approval, prompting criticism by the United Nations Refugee Agency. A further 3% of applicants were granted “humanitarian stay” visas, which afford less protection. In 2018, the government gave in to anti-refugee protests by granting humanitarian stay visas to approximately 500 Yemeni refugees that arrived in Korea. Again in 2021, Korea accepted approximately 300 Afghans as “special contributors” rather than as refugees. In 2020, Korea revised the Refugee Act in ways that raise the bar for asylum-seekers and make it easier to reject refugee applicants – prompting some to call this revision a “refugee refusal policy” or “K-Deportation” policy.
Foreigners in Korea have also faced COVID-19-related discrimination, both officially and informally. Informally, foreigners have been treated as more likely to be carriers of the virus, and in some instances (particularly during the early waves of the pandemic) have been barred from restaurants and other social venues. There have also been cases of official discrimination by the government. Several local governments targeted foreign (particularly migrant) workers for selective COVID-19 testing. On the other hand, many foreigners have been selectively excluded from receiving COVID-19 disaster relief funds. Responding to petitions lodged by a coalition of migrants’ rights groups, the National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK) found in May 2020 that excluding foreign residents from local government disaster relief programs was discriminatory, as local governments are obliged by the Local Autonomy Law to provide equal administrative benefits to all residents. The NHRCK accordingly instructed the Seoul metropolitan government and Gyeonggi provincial government to provide relief funds to all registered foreign nationals. However, in November 2020, NHRCK did not recognize the exclusion of foreigners from state disaster relief programs as discrimination, because the central government has the discretion to determine the range of its program beneficiaries. Migrants’ rights groups plan to file another petition in early 2022, as many migrants were excluded once again from another round of disaster relief provided by the state in September 2021. They argue that all foreign residents who have been paying taxes to the state should be eligible for state disaster relief programs. They also note that the country’s policies go against recommendations from international agencies such as the International Organization for Migration that all migrants should be given equal access to COVID-19-related support.
In sum, government immigration and integration policies are mixed. Migrants seem to be tolerated because of the need to address workforce gaps caused by the shrinking population. Experts have for some time flagged the need for a comprehensive anti-discrimination law to strengthen protection and inclusion of migrants and other marginalized groups.
Citations:
HanKyung. No. of Foreign Nationals Residing in Korea Exceeds 2 million in 2016. June 22, 2017.
Korea Herald, Multicultural familes left out in election, as always. May 3, 2017.
Korea.net. Transformation into a Multicultural Society.
Sang-young Rhyu. “The Challenge of Social Integration in South Korea,” Global Asia, Vol.12, No.2 (Summer 2017), 30-35.
Yonhap News. Reasons for expecting new government multicultural policy. August 29, 2017.
Segye Daily.
Lee, Suh-Yoon. 2018. “Multicultural Children Still Face Discrimination at Schools.” Koreatimes. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/10/181_250993.html
Park, Ji-Won. 2018. “Foreigners with Voting Rights Being Ignored.”
Koreatimes. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/04/356_247360.html
Koreatimes. 2019. “No. of foreign residents in Korea up 8.6% last year.” Retrieved from http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2019/05/177_269616.html.
Statistics Korea. “International Migration Statistics in 2018.” Retrieved from http://kostat.go.kr/portal/eng/pressReleases/8/5/index.board.
Kim, Na-young. “S. Korea to Ease Entry Restrictions on Migrant Workers Later This Month: Labor Ministry.” Yonhap News Agency, November 5, 2021. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20211105002700315.
Kim, So-hyun. “Foreign Population in Korea Shrinks to Lowest Level in 5.5 Years.” The Korea Herald, July 28, 2021. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210728000744.
Ko, Jun-tae. “[Us and Them] Migrant Workers’ Struggles in Korea Continue despite Better Awareness.” The Korea Herald, October 11, 2021. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20211011000208.
Korean Culture and Information Service (KOCIS). “Becoming a Society That Respects Cultural Diversity.” Korea.net, June 15, 2020. https://www.korea.net/AboutKorea/Society/Transformation-Multicultural-Society.
Lee, Hyo-jin. “Migrant Groups to Lodge Human Rights Petition on Exclusion from Disaster Relief Fund.” The Korea Times, September 8, 2021. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2021/09/113_315251.html.
Lee, Seoho, and Natalia Slavney. “Afghanistan Crisis Reignites South Korea’s Refugee Debate.” The Diplomat, October 2, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/afghanistan-crisis-reignites-south-koreas-refugee-debate/.
Lee, Suh-yoon. “Multicultural Children Still Face Discrimination at Schools.” The Korea Times, June 21, 2018. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/10/181_250993.html.
Ock, Hyun-ju. “S. Korea’s Refugee Approval Rate Hits All-Time Low.” The Korea Herald, January 14, 2021. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210114001081.
Rhyu, Sang-young. “The Challenge of Social Integration in South Korea.” Global Asia 12, no. 2, June 2017. https://www.globalasia.org/v12no2/cover/the-challenge-of-social-integration-in-south-korea_sang-young-rhyu.
Statistics Korea. “Vital Statistics of Immigrants in 2020.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.kostat.go.kr/portal/eng/pressReleases/8/3/index.board.
Statistics Korea. “Vital Statistics of Immigrants in 2020.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.kostat.go.kr/portal/eng/pressReleases/8/5/index.board.
“’난민법 개정안’ 옷 입고 돌아온 난민 혐오 [Now K-Deportation? Refugee Act Amendment Bill Brings Back Hostility Toward Refugees].” 오마이뉴스 [OhMyNews], January 25, 2021. http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0002712033&SRS_CD=0000013129.
Despite improvements in the legal conditions and official support provided to immigrants, the country’s cultural, education, and social policies still fail to systematically address the role of migrants in Korea. Foreign investors, ethnic Koreans with foreign passports, and highly educated foreigners are treated more favorably, while migrant blue-collar workers (who are often treated as “disposable labor”), multicultural families, North Koreans and asylum-seekers face considerable discrimination. From a legal perspective, migrant workers are accorded rights very similar to those enjoyed by native Korean employees, but employers routinely infringe these rights. While courts have offered some protection to migrant workers, the government has not actively pursued enforcement measures against employers that exploit the precarious status of migrant workers. In 2021 – spurred by the deaths of several migrant workers living in vinyl greenhouses assigned to them as living quarters – the Ministry of Labor made an inspection and found that nearly 70% of migrant farm/fisheries workers live in makeshift structures. Migrant workers also reported more than KRW 150 billion ($126.6 million) in unpaid wages for 2020. Experts suggest that Korea’s Act on the Employment of Foreign Workers and Employment Permit System contribute to making migrant workers vulnerable. Because their visas are tied to specific employers, migrants have limited bargaining power and options for recourse when unfairly treated by their employers. Granting migrants the freedom to choose and change employers could help improve their working conditions. One expert suggests providing permanent residential status for foreign workers so that there is more incentive to integrate migrants into Korean society.
South Korea has a poor record with regard to fulfilling its obligations under the Geneva Refugee Convention of 1951. From 1994 to 2020, less than 2% of the 71,042 applicants for refugee status have received approval, prompting criticism by the United Nations Refugee Agency. A further 3% of applicants were granted “humanitarian stay” visas, which afford less protection. In 2018, the government gave in to anti-refugee protests by granting humanitarian stay visas to approximately 500 Yemeni refugees that arrived in Korea. Again in 2021, Korea accepted approximately 300 Afghans as “special contributors” rather than as refugees. In 2020, Korea revised the Refugee Act in ways that raise the bar for asylum-seekers and make it easier to reject refugee applicants – prompting some to call this revision a “refugee refusal policy” or “K-Deportation” policy.
Foreigners in Korea have also faced COVID-19-related discrimination, both officially and informally. Informally, foreigners have been treated as more likely to be carriers of the virus, and in some instances (particularly during the early waves of the pandemic) have been barred from restaurants and other social venues. There have also been cases of official discrimination by the government. Several local governments targeted foreign (particularly migrant) workers for selective COVID-19 testing. On the other hand, many foreigners have been selectively excluded from receiving COVID-19 disaster relief funds. Responding to petitions lodged by a coalition of migrants’ rights groups, the National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK) found in May 2020 that excluding foreign residents from local government disaster relief programs was discriminatory, as local governments are obliged by the Local Autonomy Law to provide equal administrative benefits to all residents. The NHRCK accordingly instructed the Seoul metropolitan government and Gyeonggi provincial government to provide relief funds to all registered foreign nationals. However, in November 2020, NHRCK did not recognize the exclusion of foreigners from state disaster relief programs as discrimination, because the central government has the discretion to determine the range of its program beneficiaries. Migrants’ rights groups plan to file another petition in early 2022, as many migrants were excluded once again from another round of disaster relief provided by the state in September 2021. They argue that all foreign residents who have been paying taxes to the state should be eligible for state disaster relief programs. They also note that the country’s policies go against recommendations from international agencies such as the International Organization for Migration that all migrants should be given equal access to COVID-19-related support.
In sum, government immigration and integration policies are mixed. Migrants seem to be tolerated because of the need to address workforce gaps caused by the shrinking population. Experts have for some time flagged the need for a comprehensive anti-discrimination law to strengthen protection and inclusion of migrants and other marginalized groups.
Citations:
HanKyung. No. of Foreign Nationals Residing in Korea Exceeds 2 million in 2016. June 22, 2017.
Korea Herald, Multicultural familes left out in election, as always. May 3, 2017.
Korea.net. Transformation into a Multicultural Society.
Sang-young Rhyu. “The Challenge of Social Integration in South Korea,” Global Asia, Vol.12, No.2 (Summer 2017), 30-35.
Yonhap News. Reasons for expecting new government multicultural policy. August 29, 2017.
Segye Daily.
Lee, Suh-Yoon. 2018. “Multicultural Children Still Face Discrimination at Schools.” Koreatimes. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/10/181_250993.html
Park, Ji-Won. 2018. “Foreigners with Voting Rights Being Ignored.”
Koreatimes. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/04/356_247360.html
Koreatimes. 2019. “No. of foreign residents in Korea up 8.6% last year.” Retrieved from http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2019/05/177_269616.html.
Statistics Korea. “International Migration Statistics in 2018.” Retrieved from http://kostat.go.kr/portal/eng/pressReleases/8/5/index.board.
Kim, Na-young. “S. Korea to Ease Entry Restrictions on Migrant Workers Later This Month: Labor Ministry.” Yonhap News Agency, November 5, 2021. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20211105002700315.
Kim, So-hyun. “Foreign Population in Korea Shrinks to Lowest Level in 5.5 Years.” The Korea Herald, July 28, 2021. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210728000744.
Ko, Jun-tae. “[Us and Them] Migrant Workers’ Struggles in Korea Continue despite Better Awareness.” The Korea Herald, October 11, 2021. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20211011000208.
Korean Culture and Information Service (KOCIS). “Becoming a Society That Respects Cultural Diversity.” Korea.net, June 15, 2020. https://www.korea.net/AboutKorea/Society/Transformation-Multicultural-Society.
Lee, Hyo-jin. “Migrant Groups to Lodge Human Rights Petition on Exclusion from Disaster Relief Fund.” The Korea Times, September 8, 2021. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2021/09/113_315251.html.
Lee, Seoho, and Natalia Slavney. “Afghanistan Crisis Reignites South Korea’s Refugee Debate.” The Diplomat, October 2, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/afghanistan-crisis-reignites-south-koreas-refugee-debate/.
Lee, Suh-yoon. “Multicultural Children Still Face Discrimination at Schools.” The Korea Times, June 21, 2018. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/10/181_250993.html.
Ock, Hyun-ju. “S. Korea’s Refugee Approval Rate Hits All-Time Low.” The Korea Herald, January 14, 2021. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210114001081.
Rhyu, Sang-young. “The Challenge of Social Integration in South Korea.” Global Asia 12, no. 2, June 2017. https://www.globalasia.org/v12no2/cover/the-challenge-of-social-integration-in-south-korea_sang-young-rhyu.
Statistics Korea. “Vital Statistics of Immigrants in 2020.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.kostat.go.kr/portal/eng/pressReleases/8/3/index.board.
Statistics Korea. “Vital Statistics of Immigrants in 2020.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://www.kostat.go.kr/portal/eng/pressReleases/8/5/index.board.
“’난민법 개정안’ 옷 입고 돌아온 난민 혐오 [Now K-Deportation? Refugee Act Amendment Bill Brings Back Hostility Toward Refugees].” 오마이뉴스 [OhMyNews], January 25, 2021. http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0002712033&SRS_CD=0000013129.
Graph View
How effectively does internal security policy protect citizens against security risks?
10
9
9
Internal security policy protects citizens against security risks very effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
Internal security policy protects citizens against security risks more or less effectively.
5
4
3
4
3
Internal security policy does not effectively protect citizens against security risks.
2
1
1
Internal security policy exacerbates the security risks.
Korea remains a very safe country with regard to the risk of violent crime. There have been no terror attacks or terrorist activities in Korea in recent years. Nevertheless, extensive media reports about violent crime, along with rumors spread on social media, have led to an increasing subjective feeling of insecurity. Despite low levels of violent crime, perceived levels of personal insecurity are high and trust in the police is low. This might have to do with a seemingly high level of fraud, including white-collar crimes and cyber-crimes (whose perpetrators take advantage of South Korea’s excellent broadband infrastructure and lax online-security measures).
Online sexual exploitation is particularly prevalent. According to a survey by the Korea Communications Commission, nearly 30% of respondents reported having been victims of online violence; while nearly 17% were online abusers. A high-profile case in 2020 in which women and young girls were coerced into producing sexual abusive videos prompted widespread social outcry. This has contributed to strengthening of laws to authorize undercover investigations of digital sex crime cases and legally punish online grooming of minors. Financial scams (“phishing”) are another growing area of concern. A 2018 survey by Korea Financial Investors Protection Foundation found that almost one in five Koreans has been (or was nearly) a victim of financial fraud. In 2020, the government began an interagency effort to strengthen phishing prevention.
In 2021, the country experienced a remarkably high incidence and prevalence of physical violence against children. In February 2021, the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment, etc. of Child Abuse Crimes was strengthened, so that those who abuse children and unintentionally cause death can face the death penalty or imprisonment for seven years to life.
The external threat posed by North Korea persists, although the Moon administration’s policies of engagement have successfully calmed the situation following recent years’ more bellicose rhetoric.
Citations:
“1 In 5 Koreans Exposed to Financial Fraud: Poll.” Yonhap News Agency, March 21, 2018. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20180321002300320.
Chae, Yun-hwan. “Nearly One-Third of S. Koreans Experienced Online Violence Last Year.” Yonhap News Agency, February 4, 2021. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210204003000320.
Financial Services Commission – Press Releases. “Government Unveils Plans to Root Out Vishing,” June 24, 2020. https://www.fsc.go.kr/eng/pr010101/22437.
Kan, Hyeong-woo. “Tighter Regulations on Digital Sex Crime Take Effect.” The Korea Herald, September 23, 2021. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210923000656.
KOSIS Korean Statistical Information Service. “Statistical Database, Crime and Safey.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://kosis.kr/eng/statisticsList/statisticsListIndex.do?parentId=C.1&menuId=M_01_01&vwcd=MT_ETITLE&parmTabId=M_01_01.
The Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) of the United States. “South Korea 2019 Crime & Safety Report,” 2019.
“2021: Korea’s Year of Child Abuse,” Korea Expose, December 21, 2021, https://koreaexpose.com/2021-child-abuse-korea-epidemic-jung-in/ (accessed: February 1, 2022)
“Child abuse can now lead to death penalty in South Korea,” Korea Herald, February 28, 2021, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210228000132 (accessed: February 1, 2022)
Online sexual exploitation is particularly prevalent. According to a survey by the Korea Communications Commission, nearly 30% of respondents reported having been victims of online violence; while nearly 17% were online abusers. A high-profile case in 2020 in which women and young girls were coerced into producing sexual abusive videos prompted widespread social outcry. This has contributed to strengthening of laws to authorize undercover investigations of digital sex crime cases and legally punish online grooming of minors. Financial scams (“phishing”) are another growing area of concern. A 2018 survey by Korea Financial Investors Protection Foundation found that almost one in five Koreans has been (or was nearly) a victim of financial fraud. In 2020, the government began an interagency effort to strengthen phishing prevention.
In 2021, the country experienced a remarkably high incidence and prevalence of physical violence against children. In February 2021, the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment, etc. of Child Abuse Crimes was strengthened, so that those who abuse children and unintentionally cause death can face the death penalty or imprisonment for seven years to life.
The external threat posed by North Korea persists, although the Moon administration’s policies of engagement have successfully calmed the situation following recent years’ more bellicose rhetoric.
Citations:
“1 In 5 Koreans Exposed to Financial Fraud: Poll.” Yonhap News Agency, March 21, 2018. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20180321002300320.
Chae, Yun-hwan. “Nearly One-Third of S. Koreans Experienced Online Violence Last Year.” Yonhap News Agency, February 4, 2021. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210204003000320.
Financial Services Commission – Press Releases. “Government Unveils Plans to Root Out Vishing,” June 24, 2020. https://www.fsc.go.kr/eng/pr010101/22437.
Kan, Hyeong-woo. “Tighter Regulations on Digital Sex Crime Take Effect.” The Korea Herald, September 23, 2021. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210923000656.
KOSIS Korean Statistical Information Service. “Statistical Database, Crime and Safey.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://kosis.kr/eng/statisticsList/statisticsListIndex.do?parentId=C.1&menuId=M_01_01&vwcd=MT_ETITLE&parmTabId=M_01_01.
The Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) of the United States. “South Korea 2019 Crime & Safety Report,” 2019.
“2021: Korea’s Year of Child Abuse,” Korea Expose, December 21, 2021, https://koreaexpose.com/2021-child-abuse-korea-epidemic-jung-in/ (accessed: February 1, 2022)
“Child abuse can now lead to death penalty in South Korea,” Korea Herald, February 28, 2021, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210228000132 (accessed: February 1, 2022)
Graph View
To what extent does the government demonstrate an active and coherent commitment to promoting equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries?
10
9
9
The government actively and coherently engages in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries. It frequently demonstrates initiative and responsibility, and acts as an agenda-setter.
8
7
6
7
6
The government actively engages in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries. However, some of its measures or policies lack coherence.
5
4
3
4
3
The government shows limited engagement in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries. Many of its measures or policies lack coherence.
2
1
1
The government does not contribute (and often undermines) efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries.
South Korea seeks to share its own development experience – in which it rose from one of the world’s most impoverished countries in the world in the 1950s to become the 10th-largest economy worldwide in 2020 – through its development cooperation. The OECD Peer Reviews of Korea’s development cooperation in 2012 and 2017 positively evaluated the role of Korea as a key bridge between developing and developed countries, as well as its leadership in pushing for greater development effectiveness. However, Korea has yet to deliver on its commitment to increase overseas development assistance (ODA) to 0.7% of GNI. Nor has it attained its specific target of reaching 0.2% of GNI by 2020. In fact, ODA disbursement increased only marginally under the Moon administration (as compared to the levels under the prior administration). However, the Moon administration actually committed – for each of the years 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021 – to much larger increases. At least for the Moon administration, it seems that there was a gap between its commitment and ability to deliver ODA. As of the time of writing, preliminary data suggested that Moon might close out his tenure on a high note for development cooperation with an unprecedented 41% increase from 2020 levels.
South Korea’s development and trade cooperation – which it sees as necessarily interlinked – has become increasingly focused on Southeast Asia and India under its New Southern Policy (NSP), launched in 2017. The Moon administration aimed to double ODA to priority NSP countries by 2023, and to increase trade with NSP (ASEAN) countries by 2020. Some criticize Korea for imposing somewhat unfair trade relations on a growing number of developing (including NSP) countries via bilateral preferential trade agreements. Due to product-market regulations and the oligopolistic structure of many market segments, market access for products from developing countries remains limited. On the other hand, Korea – particularly under the NSP – offers cooperation with partner countries on emerging and innovative technologies. Technological cooperation has the potential to help partner countries to escape the dependency trap and leapfrog into the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
Of course, Korea also sees expanded economic relations with more prosperous and stable NSP countries as a way for the country to achieve a degree of strategic autonomy, especially from China (its largest trade partner) and the U.S. (its dominant security partner). Korea has for some time highlighted its win-win, mutual benefit approach to development cooperation. But that notwithstanding, given that its own development success was built on both ODA and trade, Korea likely sees its concerted ODA and trade focus on NSP countries as a credible strategy to support the development and prosperity of these countries.
Citations:
Botto, Kathryn. “South Korea beyond Northeast Asia: How Seoul Is Deepening Ties with India and ASEAN.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 19, 2021. https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/10/19/south-korea-beyond-northeast-asia-how-seoul-is-deepening-ties-with-india-and-asean-pub-85572.
Donor Tracker. “South Korea.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://donortracker.org/country/south-korea.
“OECD Development Co-Operation Peer Reviews: Korea 2018.” OECD, February 7, 2018. https://www.oecd.org/korea/oecd-development-co-operation-peer-reviews-korea-2018-9789264288829-en.htm.
제2차 국제개발협력 종합기본계획 [Korea 2nd Strategic Plan for international Development Cooperation 2016-2020]
제3차 국제개발협력 종합기본계획 [Korea 3rd Strategic Plan for international Development Cooperation 2021-2025]
Korea ODA Annual Implementation Plan – 2016.
Korea ODA Annual Implementation Plan – 2017.
Korea ODA Annual Implementation Plan – 2018.
Korea ODA Annual Implementation Plan – 2019.
Korea ODA Annual Implementation Plan – 2020
Korea ODA Annual Implementation Plan – 2021.
South Korea’s development and trade cooperation – which it sees as necessarily interlinked – has become increasingly focused on Southeast Asia and India under its New Southern Policy (NSP), launched in 2017. The Moon administration aimed to double ODA to priority NSP countries by 2023, and to increase trade with NSP (ASEAN) countries by 2020. Some criticize Korea for imposing somewhat unfair trade relations on a growing number of developing (including NSP) countries via bilateral preferential trade agreements. Due to product-market regulations and the oligopolistic structure of many market segments, market access for products from developing countries remains limited. On the other hand, Korea – particularly under the NSP – offers cooperation with partner countries on emerging and innovative technologies. Technological cooperation has the potential to help partner countries to escape the dependency trap and leapfrog into the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
Of course, Korea also sees expanded economic relations with more prosperous and stable NSP countries as a way for the country to achieve a degree of strategic autonomy, especially from China (its largest trade partner) and the U.S. (its dominant security partner). Korea has for some time highlighted its win-win, mutual benefit approach to development cooperation. But that notwithstanding, given that its own development success was built on both ODA and trade, Korea likely sees its concerted ODA and trade focus on NSP countries as a credible strategy to support the development and prosperity of these countries.
Citations:
Botto, Kathryn. “South Korea beyond Northeast Asia: How Seoul Is Deepening Ties with India and ASEAN.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 19, 2021. https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/10/19/south-korea-beyond-northeast-asia-how-seoul-is-deepening-ties-with-india-and-asean-pub-85572.
Donor Tracker. “South Korea.” Accessed January 18, 2022. https://donortracker.org/country/south-korea.
“OECD Development Co-Operation Peer Reviews: Korea 2018.” OECD, February 7, 2018. https://www.oecd.org/korea/oecd-development-co-operation-peer-reviews-korea-2018-9789264288829-en.htm.
제2차 국제개발협력 종합기본계획 [Korea 2nd Strategic Plan for international Development Cooperation 2016-2020]
제3차 국제개발협력 종합기본계획 [Korea 3rd Strategic Plan for international Development Cooperation 2021-2025]
Korea ODA Annual Implementation Plan – 2016.
Korea ODA Annual Implementation Plan – 2017.
Korea ODA Annual Implementation Plan – 2018.
Korea ODA Annual Implementation Plan – 2019.
Korea ODA Annual Implementation Plan – 2020
Korea ODA Annual Implementation Plan – 2021.