Executive Accountability
#21Key Findings
Despite some bright spots, Spain receives a middling overall score (rank 21) in the area of executive accountability. Its score on this measure has declined by 0.1 point relative to its 2014 level.
Parliamentarians have limited resources, but oversight powers are generally adequate. The audit office’s party-influenced appointments process hampers its independence. The ombudsman was replaced in late 2021 after four years of delay. The data-protection agency is effective, and is independent of the public administration.
Levels of political knowledge are generally low, but interest in political information is rising. The general public is highly concerned about the dissemination of false information. The media played a key role in providing information about COVID-19. New parties’ voters tend to follow new media and social networks rather than traditional media.
The party landscape has expanded dramatically, with parties pursuing varying internal-governance styles. Economic associations remain closely involved in the policymaking process despite constrained resources and a fragmentation of the labor market and economic landscape. Other civil-society organizations have less influence, but some play an important role in individual parties.
Parliamentarians have limited resources, but oversight powers are generally adequate. The audit office’s party-influenced appointments process hampers its independence. The ombudsman was replaced in late 2021 after four years of delay. The data-protection agency is effective, and is independent of the public administration.
Levels of political knowledge are generally low, but interest in political information is rising. The general public is highly concerned about the dissemination of false information. The media played a key role in providing information about COVID-19. New parties’ voters tend to follow new media and social networks rather than traditional media.
The party landscape has expanded dramatically, with parties pursuing varying internal-governance styles. Economic associations remain closely involved in the policymaking process despite constrained resources and a fragmentation of the labor market and economic landscape. Other civil-society organizations have less influence, but some play an important role in individual parties.
Graph View
Graph View
To what extent are citizens informed of public policies?
10
9
9
Most citizens are well-informed of a broad range of public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Many citizens are well-informed of individual public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few citizens are well-informed of public policies; most citizens have only a rudimental knowledge of public policies.
2
1
1
Most citizens are not aware of public policies.
Although levels of interest in politics have traditionally been low in Spain as compared with other Western European countries, the deep changes in the political landscape have somewhat changed Spaniards’ attitudes toward the policy process. The public now demands more information, and the motives behind and implications of government policy decisions are now better explained in the media than was the case in the old two-party system. Research conducted by CIS, a public sociological research center, demonstrates that attentiveness to political information within Spain has improved (around 40% of the population indicated that they were very or quite interested in politics at the end of 2021). While levels of political knowledge in Spain are generally low, there are also important socioeconomic and gender differences in levels of knowledge. Knowledge is higher among those with higher levels of education, greater socioeconomic and cognitive resources, and, in particular, among men.
During the pandemic, Spanish citizens showed a high degree of public concern about the dissemination of false information. According to the 2020 Digital News Report, only 36% of Spanish users trust media news, the lowest level since 2015. Trust in information disseminated via social networks (23%) or internet search engines (32%) is also declining. Only 24% of young people trust social networks, 13 percentage points 2019’s level, while 63% say they are concerned about not knowing what is true or false on the internet. The majority of Spanish citizens (49%) believe that the government, national politicians and parties are the main sources of disinformation.
Citations:
Villena-Alarcón, E.; Caballero-Galeote, L. (2020), COVID-19 Media Coverage on Spanish Public TV – http://www.tripodos.com/index.php/Facultat_Comunicacio_Blanquerna/article/view/818/837
Digital news report España (2020), https://www.digitalnewsreport.es/
Mónica Ferrín, Marta Fraile Maldonado (2014): La medición del conocimiento político en Españaproblemas y consecuencias para el caso de las diferencias de género. Revista de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Vol. 147. Available at: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=4773592
During the pandemic, Spanish citizens showed a high degree of public concern about the dissemination of false information. According to the 2020 Digital News Report, only 36% of Spanish users trust media news, the lowest level since 2015. Trust in information disseminated via social networks (23%) or internet search engines (32%) is also declining. Only 24% of young people trust social networks, 13 percentage points 2019’s level, while 63% say they are concerned about not knowing what is true or false on the internet. The majority of Spanish citizens (49%) believe that the government, national politicians and parties are the main sources of disinformation.
Citations:
Villena-Alarcón, E.; Caballero-Galeote, L. (2020), COVID-19 Media Coverage on Spanish Public TV – http://www.tripodos.com/index.php/Facultat_Comunicacio_Blanquerna/article/view/818/837
Digital news report España (2020), https://www.digitalnewsreport.es/
Mónica Ferrín, Marta Fraile Maldonado (2014): La medición del conocimiento político en Españaproblemas y consecuencias para el caso de las diferencias de género. Revista de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Vol. 147. Available at: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=4773592
Does the government publish data and information in a way that strengthens citizens’ capacity to hold the government accountable?
10
9
9
The government publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
8
7
6
7
6
The government most of the time publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
5
4
3
4
3
The government publishes data in a limited and not timely or user-friendly way.
2
1
1
The government publishes (almost) no relevant data.
Ministries and public agencies (e.g., the National Statistics Institute, INE, and the Sociological Research Center, CIS) often publish data and information that enables citizens to hold the government accountable. The centralized online platform transparencia.gob.es lists all ongoing legislative initiatives and consultations, thus facilitating citizen participation.
During the COVID-19 state of alarm, the national government’s service providing open access to data was suspended.
In October 2020, the government approved the Fourth Open Government Plan (2020 – 2024). The plan was jointly approved by the national, regional and local governments following a consultative process. The plan includes 110 initiatives and 529 activities; one of many aims is to create effective and transparent institutions that are accountable and guarantee public access to information. The Open Government Forum, composed of representatives of public administrations and civil society, has continued its operations, and in October 2021 delivered its recommendations for the reform of the transparency law.
Citations:
Spanish Government (2020), Fourth Open Government Plan (2020-2024) https://transparencia.gob.es/transparencia/ca/dam/jcr:eaa4dcf1-c1e6-48be-a43e-965d16a19983/4thPlan_OpenGov_Spain_EN.pdf
Gobierno Abierto de Navarra, http://www.gobiernoabierto.navarra.es/es
During the COVID-19 state of alarm, the national government’s service providing open access to data was suspended.
In October 2020, the government approved the Fourth Open Government Plan (2020 – 2024). The plan was jointly approved by the national, regional and local governments following a consultative process. The plan includes 110 initiatives and 529 activities; one of many aims is to create effective and transparent institutions that are accountable and guarantee public access to information. The Open Government Forum, composed of representatives of public administrations and civil society, has continued its operations, and in October 2021 delivered its recommendations for the reform of the transparency law.
Citations:
Spanish Government (2020), Fourth Open Government Plan (2020-2024) https://transparencia.gob.es/transparencia/ca/dam/jcr:eaa4dcf1-c1e6-48be-a43e-965d16a19983/4thPlan_OpenGov_Spain_EN.pdf
Gobierno Abierto de Navarra, http://www.gobiernoabierto.navarra.es/es
Graph View
Do members of parliament have adequate personnel and structural resources to monitor government activity effectively?
10
9
9
The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring all government activity effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring a government’s major activities.
5
4
3
4
3
The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
2
1
1
The resources provided to the members of parliament are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
Every parliamentary group is assigned funds to hire personnel, with budget allocations dependent on the party’s electoral results. However, individual members of parliament lack even a single exclusive assistant, and the small number of staff members is shared. No real parliamentary research units exist, and committees have few independent administrative resources, but can count on the important legal expertise of clerks. The lack of technical support for deputies and senators, who cannot effectively oversee all dimensions of public policy, has been frequently criticized, but no improvements are in sight.
The scrutiny of EU policymaking illustrates the lack of resources, as the Joint Committee of the Congress and the Senate for European Affairs has at its disposal only two legal clerks, a librarian and three administrative personnel. Despite growing demands for greater parliamentary involvement in EU affairs, budgetary restrictions have prevented any change with regard to human and financial resources.
The parliamentary staff is also involved in the institution’s external relations, specifically interparliamentary relations and parliamentary diplomacy. However, the resources available are limited, which makes it difficult for them to offer value-added services.
Citations:
Kölling, M. and I. Molina. 2022, The Administration of the Spanish Cortes Generales: Organizing Legitimacy, Executive Dominance and Party Discipline, Routledge Handbook of Parliamentary Administrations. (forthcoming)
Jorge M. Fernandes, Cristina Leston-Bandeiraeds. (2019): The Iberian Legislatures in Comparative Perspective. London: Routledge.
The scrutiny of EU policymaking illustrates the lack of resources, as the Joint Committee of the Congress and the Senate for European Affairs has at its disposal only two legal clerks, a librarian and three administrative personnel. Despite growing demands for greater parliamentary involvement in EU affairs, budgetary restrictions have prevented any change with regard to human and financial resources.
The parliamentary staff is also involved in the institution’s external relations, specifically interparliamentary relations and parliamentary diplomacy. However, the resources available are limited, which makes it difficult for them to offer value-added services.
Citations:
Kölling, M. and I. Molina. 2022, The Administration of the Spanish Cortes Generales: Organizing Legitimacy, Executive Dominance and Party Discipline, Routledge Handbook of Parliamentary Administrations. (forthcoming)
Jorge M. Fernandes, Cristina Leston-Bandeiraeds. (2019): The Iberian Legislatures in Comparative Perspective. London: Routledge.
Are parliamentary committees able to ask for government documents?
10
9
9
Parliamentary committees may ask for most or all government documents; they are normally delivered in full and within an appropriate time frame.
8
7
6
7
6
The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are slightly limited; some important documents are not delivered or are delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
5
4
3
4
3
The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are considerably limited; most important documents are not delivered or delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
2
1
1
Parliamentary committees may not request government documents.
The information and documentation requested from the government must be made available within a period not exceeding 30 days and in the manner most suitable to the applicant. If this is not done, “the legally justified reasons preventing the supply of such information” must be provided. This legal margin allows the government to avoid delivering some important documents (e.g., on the grounds of secrecy), or enables it to deliver the documents incompletely or late. Furthermore, although every member of a committee is in principle entitled to request any information or document, they can only do so with the prior knowledge of their respective parliamentary group. Access to documents may also vary depending on the ministry. Documents generally arrive on time and in full, but obstacles are occasionally erected.
Are parliamentary committees able to summon ministers for hearings?
10
9
9
Parliamentary committees may summon ministers. Ministers regularly follow invitations and are obliged to answer questions.
8
7
6
7
6
The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are slightly limited; ministers occasionally refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
5
4
3
4
3
The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are considerably limited; ministers frequently refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
2
1
1
Parliamentary committees may not summon ministers.
According to Article 110 of the constitution, the committees of either the Congress of Deputies or the Senate “may summon members of the government” to ask them questions. At least 70 deputies or one-fifth of the members of a committee need to make the request. The request is subject to a vote in the Bureau of Congress and the Board of Spokespersons. The party supporting the government may try to reject some of the requirements made by the opposition, but after 2016, minority governments have been in a weak parliamentary position, rendering this veto much more difficult to sustain. If the initiatives are approved, ministers are obliged to answer questions raised in these sessions. Ministers are regularly summoned by the committees overseeing their policy areas (see “Task Area Congruence”) and it is quite common for ministers themselves to request to be allowed to report on matters relating to their respective departments.
The COVID-19 pandemic had a substantial impact on the work of Spain’s parliament. During the coronavirus crisis, both chambers demonstrated a remarkable ability to continue their legislative business thanks to a largely digital working environment that was already in place. However, from 26 February until 25 April 2020, no question-and-answer governmental oversight sessions were held in the Congress’ plenary. However, the minister of public health did appear several times in front of the Congress’s Commission of Public Health.
However, following frequent debates in parliament during the state of alarm, from June 2020 through the end of the review period the president appeared before parliament to provide a briefing only once every two months, and the minister of health once every month. This has reduced the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight of government decision-making. In 2021 the parliament recovered its constitutional functions, both regarding the legislative process and in monitoring the actions of the government.
Citations:
García-Escudero Márquez, P. (2020), Actividad y funcionamiento de las Cortes generales durante el estado de alarma por COVID-19, Cuadernos Manuel Giménez Abad, Junio.
The COVID-19 pandemic had a substantial impact on the work of Spain’s parliament. During the coronavirus crisis, both chambers demonstrated a remarkable ability to continue their legislative business thanks to a largely digital working environment that was already in place. However, from 26 February until 25 April 2020, no question-and-answer governmental oversight sessions were held in the Congress’ plenary. However, the minister of public health did appear several times in front of the Congress’s Commission of Public Health.
However, following frequent debates in parliament during the state of alarm, from June 2020 through the end of the review period the president appeared before parliament to provide a briefing only once every two months, and the minister of health once every month. This has reduced the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight of government decision-making. In 2021 the parliament recovered its constitutional functions, both regarding the legislative process and in monitoring the actions of the government.
Citations:
García-Escudero Márquez, P. (2020), Actividad y funcionamiento de las Cortes generales durante el estado de alarma por COVID-19, Cuadernos Manuel Giménez Abad, Junio.
Are parliamentary committees able to summon experts for committee meetings?
10
9
9
Parliamentary committees may summon experts.
8
7
6
7
6
The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are slightly limited.
5
4
3
4
3
The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are considerably limited.
2
1
1
Parliamentary committees may not summon experts.
The standing orders of the Congress of Deputies and the Senate state that parliamentary committees may request, through their respective speakers, “the attendance of persons competent in the subject-matter for the purposes of reporting to and advising the committee.” The rights of parliamentary committees to send invitations to independent experts are not limited by any legal constraint.
Requests to summon experts have increased in number in recent years, particularly at the beginning of the legislative process or in specialized subcommittees. Nevertheless, the limited nature of the parliament’s staffing and financial resources have to date prevented any systematic involvement in the lawmaking process by university scholars, think tank analysts or other experts. There has been formal and informal collaboration with other public administrations and the Bank of Spain, although this information cannot be considered autonomous and include political judgment of the executive.
In October 2020, the Joint Congress-Senate Commission was created to assess the causes and effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Several experts were invited to appear before the committee.
Citations:
Kölling, M. and I. Molina. (2022), The Administration of the Spanish Cortes Generales: Organizing Legitimacy, Executive Dominance and Party Discipline, Routledge Handbook of Parliamentary Administrations. (Forthcoming)
Requests to summon experts have increased in number in recent years, particularly at the beginning of the legislative process or in specialized subcommittees. Nevertheless, the limited nature of the parliament’s staffing and financial resources have to date prevented any systematic involvement in the lawmaking process by university scholars, think tank analysts or other experts. There has been formal and informal collaboration with other public administrations and the Bank of Spain, although this information cannot be considered autonomous and include political judgment of the executive.
In October 2020, the Joint Congress-Senate Commission was created to assess the causes and effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Several experts were invited to appear before the committee.
Citations:
Kölling, M. and I. Molina. (2022), The Administration of the Spanish Cortes Generales: Organizing Legitimacy, Executive Dominance and Party Discipline, Routledge Handbook of Parliamentary Administrations. (Forthcoming)
Are the task areas and structures of parliamentary committees suited to monitor ministries effectively?
10
9
9
The match between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are well-suited to the effective monitoring of ministries.
8
7
6
7
6
The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are largely suited to the monitoring ministries.
5
4
3
4
3
The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are partially suited to the monitoring of ministries.
2
1
1
The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are not at all suited to the monitoring of ministries.
The task areas of the regular parliamentary committees in the Congress of Deputies and the Senate generally correspond to the functions exercised by government ministries. Since 2020, the 22 ministries have been monitored by 21 standing legislative committees in the Congress, which were even renamed to match the ministerial portfolios. Thus, there is no mismatch, although other structural factors (limited committee resources) are rather more problematic with regard to effective monitoring. In recent years, the delay in forming governments has also interfered with the organization of parliamentary committees.
Citations:
Índice de Comisiones, XIV Legislatura
https://www.congreso.es/comisiones
Citations:
Índice de Comisiones, XIV Legislatura
https://www.congreso.es/comisiones
Graph View
To what extent do media in your country analyze the rationale and impact of public policies?
10
9
9
A clear majority of mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
About one-half of the mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies. The rest produces a mix of infotainment and quality information content.
5
4
3
4
3
A clear minority of mass media brands focuses on high-quality information content analyzing public policies. Several mass media brands produce superficial infotainment content only.
2
1
1
All mass media brands are dominated by superficial infotainment content.
The main print periodicals provide a fairly significant amount of in-depth analyses of the policy process and sophisticated op-ed analyses of government decisions, despite their partisan preferences. The print-media readership is declining, and the impact of these publications is thus limited, but a growing number of readers follow online newspapers (either electronic versions of the mainstream print publications or standalone online and politics-themed blogs.
TV is the most important source of political information for the average citizen, since almost 70% of Spaniards watch TV news every day. However, a large portion of the time devoted to political information is given over to news and talk shows. A third of Spaniards also follow political news via radio stations, which devote many hours a week to political information. All main stations have early-morning and afternoon programs combining both background news and political debate, as well as a late-night news program. Privately owned radio stations are more ideologically biased than the major TV stations (with participants in the radio debates blatantly biased in favor of or against the government).
The political information provided via TV shows with larger audiences usually takes the form of infotainment, with an intensive focus on partisan disagreements and face-to-face debates. In contrast, detailed information on policy decisions is less frequently provided, and is not usually broadcast during prime-time hours. Studies show that new parties’ voters tend to be more likely to follow new media and social networks.
The media played a key role in providing information about and making people aware of the emergency situation during 2020. Although both audiences and experts have appreciated the work done by Spanish public television, the majority opinion is negative. In this regard, critics argue that coverage has not been impartial and there has been an excess of information. There is a high degree of public concern about the dissemination of false information. According to the 2020 Digital News Report, only 36% of Spanish users trust media news, the lowest level since 2015. The majority of Spanish citizens (49%) believe that the government, national politicians and parties are the main sources of disinformation.
Citations:
Universidad de Navarra (2021), Digital News Report https://www.digitalnewsreport.es/resumen-ejecutivo-digitalnewsreport-es-2021-periodismo-de-calidad-y-cercania-para-combatir-la-infodemia/
TV is the most important source of political information for the average citizen, since almost 70% of Spaniards watch TV news every day. However, a large portion of the time devoted to political information is given over to news and talk shows. A third of Spaniards also follow political news via radio stations, which devote many hours a week to political information. All main stations have early-morning and afternoon programs combining both background news and political debate, as well as a late-night news program. Privately owned radio stations are more ideologically biased than the major TV stations (with participants in the radio debates blatantly biased in favor of or against the government).
The political information provided via TV shows with larger audiences usually takes the form of infotainment, with an intensive focus on partisan disagreements and face-to-face debates. In contrast, detailed information on policy decisions is less frequently provided, and is not usually broadcast during prime-time hours. Studies show that new parties’ voters tend to be more likely to follow new media and social networks.
The media played a key role in providing information about and making people aware of the emergency situation during 2020. Although both audiences and experts have appreciated the work done by Spanish public television, the majority opinion is negative. In this regard, critics argue that coverage has not been impartial and there has been an excess of information. There is a high degree of public concern about the dissemination of false information. According to the 2020 Digital News Report, only 36% of Spanish users trust media news, the lowest level since 2015. The majority of Spanish citizens (49%) believe that the government, national politicians and parties are the main sources of disinformation.
Citations:
Universidad de Navarra (2021), Digital News Report https://www.digitalnewsreport.es/resumen-ejecutivo-digitalnewsreport-es-2021-periodismo-de-calidad-y-cercania-para-combatir-la-infodemia/
Graph View
How inclusive and open are the major parties in their internal decision-making processes?
10
9
9
The party allows all party members and supporters to participate in its decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and agendas of issues are open.
8
7
6
7
6
The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, all party members have the opportunity to participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are rather open.
5
4
3
4
3
The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, a number of elected delegates participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are largely controlled by the party leadership.
2
1
1
A number of party leaders participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are fully controlled and drafted by the party leadership.
Parties in Spain are progressively allowing all members and even (for some issues) non-members to participate in making key decisions. Party candidate lists and issue agendas have not been as open. Internal debates within most Spanish political parties on electoral programs are common and made public. However, party leadership structures keep a significant level of control over the most important decisions, including the appointment of individual party leaders.
Spain’s political landscape now includes five major parties that draw more than 10% of the popular vote at the national level: the social-democratic PSOE, the conservative party PP, the left-wing party Podemos, the center-right Ciudadanos party and the right-wing populist party Vox.
The PSOE has never been a president-driven party. Internal debate on electoral programs is common and even public, frequently involving some of the regional branches (especially the powerful Andalusian and Catalonian sections, the latter of which is formally an independent party). The manner in which the PSOE selects its leader and main candidates has become quite open. With regard to the 2019 elections, the PSOE secretary-general was automatically named the party’s prime-ministerial candidate (since no other candidate sought to challenge him).
PP President Pablo Casado, who was selected as party chairman in 2018 after a vote by members (for the first time), was automatically named the party’s prime-ministerial candidate.
Podemos and Ciudadanos present themselves as more internally democratic. However, despite the rhetoric in these two parties, closed groups of party leaders were able to fully control the most important decisions,.
The Vox party has presented itself as more grassroots oriented and internally democratic than Spain’s traditional parties. However, the reformed statute of the party presented suppressed the election of candidates by party members, and gave total control over the procedure and election to the national direction.
Following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, these parties have increased their use of digital tools to foster internal party activities.
Citations:
Juan Rodríguez Teruel and Oscar Barberà (2022): “¿Cuánto ha cambiado la oferta política? El impacto de los nuevos partidos en el reclutamiento de los candidatos,” Elecciones autonómicas 2019-2022, Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
Spain’s political landscape now includes five major parties that draw more than 10% of the popular vote at the national level: the social-democratic PSOE, the conservative party PP, the left-wing party Podemos, the center-right Ciudadanos party and the right-wing populist party Vox.
The PSOE has never been a president-driven party. Internal debate on electoral programs is common and even public, frequently involving some of the regional branches (especially the powerful Andalusian and Catalonian sections, the latter of which is formally an independent party). The manner in which the PSOE selects its leader and main candidates has become quite open. With regard to the 2019 elections, the PSOE secretary-general was automatically named the party’s prime-ministerial candidate (since no other candidate sought to challenge him).
PP President Pablo Casado, who was selected as party chairman in 2018 after a vote by members (for the first time), was automatically named the party’s prime-ministerial candidate.
Podemos and Ciudadanos present themselves as more internally democratic. However, despite the rhetoric in these two parties, closed groups of party leaders were able to fully control the most important decisions,.
The Vox party has presented itself as more grassroots oriented and internally democratic than Spain’s traditional parties. However, the reformed statute of the party presented suppressed the election of candidates by party members, and gave total control over the procedure and election to the national direction.
Following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, these parties have increased their use of digital tools to foster internal party activities.
Citations:
Juan Rodríguez Teruel and Oscar Barberà (2022): “¿Cuánto ha cambiado la oferta política? El impacto de los nuevos partidos en el reclutamiento de los candidatos,” Elecciones autonómicas 2019-2022, Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
To what extent are economic interest associations (e.g., employers, industry, labor) capable of formulating relevant policies?
10
9
9
Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
2
1
1
Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
During the period under review, the government actively engaged in dialogue with Spain’s biggest trade unions (UGT and CCOO) and employers’ associations. The social stakeholders and the government signed several agreements, including on the increase in the minimum wage, the plans for temporary layoffs during the pandemic (ERTEs), a benefit programs for self-employed workers, the Economic Reactivation and Employment Agreement, and the Remote Working Agreement. The government also convened many meetings with trade unions (UGT and CCOO) and employers’ associations to structure and monitor the various economic and social responses to the pandemic.
In November 2020, the government, trade unions and employers’ associations set up the Social Dialogue Board for Recovery, Transformation and Resilience. This board serves as a channel for the regulation of dialogue between the government and social stakeholders regarding the design and implementation of the national recovery plan.
More generally, the main economic interest associations are coping with increasingly constrained resources and a fragmentation of both the labor market and the economic landscape (as is also happening to political parties). But they remain closely involved in the policymaking process at the executive level.
Citations:
Gobierno de España (2021), Plan de Recuperación, Transformación y Resiliencia https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/temas/fondos-recuperacion/Documents/160621-Plan_Recuperacion_Transformacion_Resiliencia.pdf
In November 2020, the government, trade unions and employers’ associations set up the Social Dialogue Board for Recovery, Transformation and Resilience. This board serves as a channel for the regulation of dialogue between the government and social stakeholders regarding the design and implementation of the national recovery plan.
More generally, the main economic interest associations are coping with increasingly constrained resources and a fragmentation of both the labor market and the economic landscape (as is also happening to political parties). But they remain closely involved in the policymaking process at the executive level.
Citations:
Gobierno de España (2021), Plan de Recuperación, Transformación y Resiliencia https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/temas/fondos-recuperacion/Documents/160621-Plan_Recuperacion_Transformacion_Resiliencia.pdf
To what extent are non-economic interest associations capable of formulating relevant policies?
10
9
9
Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
2
1
1
Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
Noneconomic interest associations are relatively weak, and it has been difficult for them to influence political decision-making with relevant policy proposals. Furthermore, the lack of a strong, organized civil society is a disincentive for the government to take these associations’ views into account as it formulates policy (since the process would then become much more complex without necessarily adding social legitimacy as a compensation). Even the strong Catholic Church lacks a research unit capable of formulating policies, although it remains influential on education and moral issues. Leading environmental groups and some NGOs devoted to human rights (such as Amnesty International) or development aid have gained technical competence, and increasingly rely on academic expertise and specialized publications to influence public opinion and policymakers within their areas of interest. Women’s associations are an exception in this portrait. Although they are also weak as autonomous organizations, they have become increasingly influential within the political parties (especially in the PSOE). The LGBTQ+ movement has successfully defended homosexuals’ rights. Platforms and networks have been able to gain media attention and even shape public policy by demanding more transparency, better regulation of mortgages, and changes in areas such as healthcare and education. Over the course of the last several years, pensioners have staged several large protests to demand fairer pensions for themselves and for future generations. Social movements promoting or opposing the Catalan government’s bid for independence also have experts that conduct research on issues related to independence.
Graph View
Does there exist an independent and effective audit office?
10
9
9
There exists an effective and independent audit office.
8
7
6
7
6
There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is slightly limited.
5
4
3
4
3
There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
2
1
1
There does not exist an independent and effective audit office.
The Court of Auditors is the audit office body charged with auditing the state’s accounts, electoral and party funding, and the financial management of the entire public sector. In addition, most autonomous communities have also established courts of audit tasked with monitoring their devolved competences. The national Audit Office is empowered to undertake investigations on its own initiative following the submission of a complaint, and has authority to impose substantial penalties for the misuse of public funds. Although there have been certain improvements, the office suffers from a lack of resources and political independence, since its members are appointed by the parties themselves. In recent years, it has also been accused of nepotism.
Deadlines for submitting accounts and other financial information to the Court of Auditors were suspended during the first nationwide state of alarm. Moreover, the Coordination Committee of the Court of Auditors on several occasions pointed out that the fight against COVID-19 has had a substantial impact on public spending and auditing. In 2021, the Court of Auditors started to revise all emergency contracts between government ministries, the autonomous communities, town councils and publicly owned businesses. However, in 2021, the Court restructured its departments, and the final report on emergency contracts was postponed. The Court’s decision to implement embargoes and charges against Catalan secessionists was criticized by the Council of Europe. In November 2021, all but one of the members of the Court of Auditors were replaced.
Deadlines for submitting accounts and other financial information to the Court of Auditors were suspended during the first nationwide state of alarm. Moreover, the Coordination Committee of the Court of Auditors on several occasions pointed out that the fight against COVID-19 has had a substantial impact on public spending and auditing. In 2021, the Court of Auditors started to revise all emergency contracts between government ministries, the autonomous communities, town councils and publicly owned businesses. However, in 2021, the Court restructured its departments, and the final report on emergency contracts was postponed. The Court’s decision to implement embargoes and charges against Catalan secessionists was criticized by the Council of Europe. In November 2021, all but one of the members of the Court of Auditors were replaced.
Does there exist an independent and effective ombuds office?
10
9
9
There exists an effective and independent ombuds office.
8
7
6
7
6
There exists an effective and independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is slightly limited.
5
4
3
4
3
There exists an independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is considerably limited.
2
1
1
There does not exist an effective and independent ombuds office.
Article 54 of the constitution regulates the Office of the Ombudsperson (Defensor del Pueblo). He or she is authorized to supervise the activities of the government and administration, expressly forbidding any arbitrariness. The ombudsperson is elected by both the Congress and the Senate for a five-year period (thus avoiding coinciding with the legislative term of four years) by a qualified majority of three-fifths. The office is not subjected to any imperative mandate, does not receive instructions from any authority, and performs its functions autonomously. The officeholder is granted immunity and inviolability during his or her time in the post. In addition, there are also nine regional ombuds offices, focused on supervising the functioning of their own regional and local administrations.
Almost 75% of the recommendations made by Spain’s Ombudsperson are accepted by the public administration. However, its advocacy role is slightly limited by two factors: 1) a lack of resources, and 2) inadequate departmental collaboration. During 2020 and 2021, the Spanish Ombudsman forwarded numerous complaints from citizens to the Ministry of the Interior about the restrictions imposed on movement after the first state of alarm was declared. The Spanish ombudsman was replaced in December 2021, after four years of delay.
Citations:
Defensor del Pueblo (2020), “Más de un millar de quejas por el COVID-19,” noticia de 3 de abril de 2020, https://www.defensordelpueblo.es/noticias/mas-millar-quejas-covid-19/. 13
Defensor del Pueblo (2020), “El Defensor plantea la posibilidad de que niños y niñas puedan salir a la calle de manera limitada y tomando las debidas precauciones,” noticia de 17 de abril de 2020, https://www.defensordelpueblo.es/noticias/defensor-crisis-covid/
Almost 75% of the recommendations made by Spain’s Ombudsperson are accepted by the public administration. However, its advocacy role is slightly limited by two factors: 1) a lack of resources, and 2) inadequate departmental collaboration. During 2020 and 2021, the Spanish Ombudsman forwarded numerous complaints from citizens to the Ministry of the Interior about the restrictions imposed on movement after the first state of alarm was declared. The Spanish ombudsman was replaced in December 2021, after four years of delay.
Citations:
Defensor del Pueblo (2020), “Más de un millar de quejas por el COVID-19,” noticia de 3 de abril de 2020, https://www.defensordelpueblo.es/noticias/mas-millar-quejas-covid-19/. 13
Defensor del Pueblo (2020), “El Defensor plantea la posibilidad de que niños y niñas puedan salir a la calle de manera limitada y tomando las debidas precauciones,” noticia de 17 de abril de 2020, https://www.defensordelpueblo.es/noticias/defensor-crisis-covid/
Is there an independent authority in place that effectively holds government offices accountable for handling issues of data protection and privacy?
10
9
9
An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
8
7
6
7
6
An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is slightly limited.
5
4
3
4
3
A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are strongly limited.
2
1
1
There is no effective and independent data protection office.
The Spanish Data Protection Agency (AEPD) is a public authority that acts fully independently of the public administration. Being integrated in a wider international and subnational network of agencies, the AEPD has the capacities and personnel resources to advocate data protection and privacy issues vis-à-vis the government and against vested interests. However, in December 2021, the selection of new top-level staff at the Data Protection Agency led to criticism from the European Data Protection Supervisor, which did not rule out intervening in the event that the candidates agreed by PSOE and PP were finally elected.
On 5 December 2018, the Organic Law 3/2018 on the Protection of Personal Data and the Guarantee of Digital Rights was approved. With 93% parliamentary support, the law aligns Spanish law with the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and introduces new mechanisms for informing citizens about the processing of their personal data.
In 2021, the AEPD set a new record in the number of sanctions implemented, amounting to 32 million (up from only 3 million in 2020). This increase was partly due to the effect of the abovementioned Law 3/2018.
Citations:
Business Insider (2021): “Protección de Datos multa un 1.000% más y convierte a España en el sexto país europeo en sanciones por vulnerar el RGPD,” Available at: https://www.businessinsider.es/multas-proteccion-datos-1000-grandes-2021-982521
On 5 December 2018, the Organic Law 3/2018 on the Protection of Personal Data and the Guarantee of Digital Rights was approved. With 93% parliamentary support, the law aligns Spanish law with the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and introduces new mechanisms for informing citizens about the processing of their personal data.
In 2021, the AEPD set a new record in the number of sanctions implemented, amounting to 32 million (up from only 3 million in 2020). This increase was partly due to the effect of the abovementioned Law 3/2018.
Citations:
Business Insider (2021): “Protección de Datos multa un 1.000% más y convierte a España en el sexto país europeo en sanciones por vulnerar el RGPD,” Available at: https://www.businessinsider.es/multas-proteccion-datos-1000-grandes-2021-982521