Executive Capacity
#12Key Findings
Despite initial difficulties with the unfamiliar coalition-government model, Spain scores well (rank 12) with regard to executive capacity. Its score on this measure has improved by 0.1 point relative to 2014.
Lack of experience in managing a coalition government structure somewhat undermined the coherence of policy formulation, and led to coordination problems among line ministries. The Government Office and Prime Minister’s Office evaluate line-ministry proposals from the political and technical points of view. Strategic planning units take a long-term view of policy challenges.
RIAs are required for all new regulations. Ex post evaluations are still not performed in a systematic manner. The frequency of public consultation has increased over the years, with an online platform allowing citizens to participate. Communication coherence was impaired by scandals and coalition disputes. A cabinet reshuffle in 2021 was partly intended to improve communication and coordination.
Internal policy disputes within the coalition government ultimately led to one party leader leaving the cabinet. However, the coalition was able to advance an ambitious legislative agenda. Considerable sums were transferred to regional governments to help them deal with COVID-19. A long-awaited reform of the territorial financing model has been published. Disparities in regional outcomes are increasing.
Lack of experience in managing a coalition government structure somewhat undermined the coherence of policy formulation, and led to coordination problems among line ministries. The Government Office and Prime Minister’s Office evaluate line-ministry proposals from the political and technical points of view. Strategic planning units take a long-term view of policy challenges.
RIAs are required for all new regulations. Ex post evaluations are still not performed in a systematic manner. The frequency of public consultation has increased over the years, with an online platform allowing citizens to participate. Communication coherence was impaired by scandals and coalition disputes. A cabinet reshuffle in 2021 was partly intended to improve communication and coordination.
Internal policy disputes within the coalition government ultimately led to one party leader leaving the cabinet. However, the coalition was able to advance an ambitious legislative agenda. Considerable sums were transferred to regional governments to help them deal with COVID-19. A long-awaited reform of the territorial financing model has been published. Disparities in regional outcomes are increasing.
Graph View
Graph View
How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?
10
9
9
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
8
7
6
7
6
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
5
4
3
4
3
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
2
1
1
In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
The idea of reinforcing long-term thinking and smarter policymaking has drawn increasing political attention in Spain in recent years. Several key areas including economic policy (structural reforms), climate change, security and external action, are addressed through strategic documents that receive annual evaluations. Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
The lack of experience in forming coalition governments has had an impact on the effectiveness and coherence of policy formulation, and has led to coordination problems among ministries since 2020. However, the coalition agreement included several strategic plans. Moreover, the RRP addresses the specific challenges the country is facing and the interests of future generations. For long-term planning, the Ministry of the Presidency created a National Foresight and Strategy Office in 2020, following other similar precedents in previous governments. In 2021, the office presented its proposals for a long-term national strategy that would look toward 2050. However, this office is not fully integrated in the general process of executive policymaking, and its policy recommendations do not effectively condition the departments’ initiatives. Policy advice is very fragmented among ministries.
Royal Decree 286/2017 of 24 March regulates the government’s Annual Regulatory Plan and the Annual Regulatory Assessment Report. The measure also created the Regulatory Planning and Assessment Council. Since 2018, the Council of Ministers has approved a regulatory plan at the beginning of each calendar year. The plan for 2022 was approved on 11 January 2022.
Citations:
Royal Decree 286/2017 of 24 March
Oficina Nacional de Prospectiva y Estrategia del Gobierno de España (2021), España 2050, https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/presidente/actividades/Documents/2021/200521-Estrategia_Espana_2050.pdf
The lack of experience in forming coalition governments has had an impact on the effectiveness and coherence of policy formulation, and has led to coordination problems among ministries since 2020. However, the coalition agreement included several strategic plans. Moreover, the RRP addresses the specific challenges the country is facing and the interests of future generations. For long-term planning, the Ministry of the Presidency created a National Foresight and Strategy Office in 2020, following other similar precedents in previous governments. In 2021, the office presented its proposals for a long-term national strategy that would look toward 2050. However, this office is not fully integrated in the general process of executive policymaking, and its policy recommendations do not effectively condition the departments’ initiatives. Policy advice is very fragmented among ministries.
Royal Decree 286/2017 of 24 March regulates the government’s Annual Regulatory Plan and the Annual Regulatory Assessment Report. The measure also created the Regulatory Planning and Assessment Council. Since 2018, the Council of Ministers has approved a regulatory plan at the beginning of each calendar year. The plan for 2022 was approved on 11 January 2022.
Citations:
Royal Decree 286/2017 of 24 March
Oficina Nacional de Prospectiva y Estrategia del Gobierno de España (2021), España 2050, https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/presidente/actividades/Documents/2021/200521-Estrategia_Espana_2050.pdf
Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?
10
9
9
In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
8
7
6
7
6
For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
2
1
1
The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
There is no formalized connection between the government and external thinking, although university scholars, think tank analysts and practitioners are often consulted by ministries on legal, economic, welfare and international issues – particularly at the beginning of any legislative process to prepare the draft bill and to assess its impact. In 2020 and 2021, the government asked for external advice when engaged in policy design and institutional redesign. For example, several panels of external experts have been established to advise the government on the development of the Strategic Energy and Climate Change Framework, and Law 7/2021 on Climate Change and Energy Transition established an Expert Committee on Climate Change and Energy Transition as an advisory body. In addition, several consultative councils have been established to ensure the participation of civil society groups as well as that of the private sector in the design and implementation of the RRP.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Spanish government relied on the opinions of professionals from different areas as well as on information from the autonomous communities, town councils and government organizations. Four working groups were created in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. A multidisciplinary working group was set up by the minister of science. The plan to transition to a new normality was prepared by a committee of experts, made up of 15 professionals from different areas. Moreover, the Scientific and Technical Committee was established to advise the government; and a technical group was set up to monitor and evaluate the epidemiological situation in the autonomous communities. There were also expert groups established at the level of autonomous communities. More generally, experts from business interest groups play an important role in the policy process across policy areas, particularly in economic policies and agriculture affairs.
Citations:
Gobierno de España (2021), Plan de Recuperación, Transformación y Resiliencia https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/temas/fondos-recuperacion/Documents/160621-Plan_Recuperacion_Transformacion_Resiliencia.pdf
Feás, Enrique; Steinberg, Federico (2021), The climate and energy transition component of the Spanish National Recovery and Resilience Plan, ARI 64/2021 – 6/7/2021
Laura Chaqués & Iván Medina (2021): The representation of business interests during the COVID-19 pandemic in Spain, Revisat Española de Ciencia Política, No. 57, available at https://recyt.fecyt.es/index.php/recp/article/view/89916
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Spanish government relied on the opinions of professionals from different areas as well as on information from the autonomous communities, town councils and government organizations. Four working groups were created in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. A multidisciplinary working group was set up by the minister of science. The plan to transition to a new normality was prepared by a committee of experts, made up of 15 professionals from different areas. Moreover, the Scientific and Technical Committee was established to advise the government; and a technical group was set up to monitor and evaluate the epidemiological situation in the autonomous communities. There were also expert groups established at the level of autonomous communities. More generally, experts from business interest groups play an important role in the policy process across policy areas, particularly in economic policies and agriculture affairs.
Citations:
Gobierno de España (2021), Plan de Recuperación, Transformación y Resiliencia https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/temas/fondos-recuperacion/Documents/160621-Plan_Recuperacion_Transformacion_Resiliencia.pdf
Feás, Enrique; Steinberg, Federico (2021), The climate and energy transition component of the Spanish National Recovery and Resilience Plan, ARI 64/2021 – 6/7/2021
Laura Chaqués & Iván Medina (2021): The representation of business interests during the COVID-19 pandemic in Spain, Revisat Española de Ciencia Política, No. 57, available at https://recyt.fecyt.es/index.php/recp/article/view/89916
Graph View
Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?
10
9
9
The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
5
4
3
4
3
The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
2
1
1
The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
Spain’s Government Office (Ministry of the Presidency) and Prime Minister’s Office (Gabinete) are tasked with evaluating line-ministry proposals from the political and technical points of view. The internal structure of the Prime Minister’s Office vaguely reflects the various ministerial portfolios, although without achieving a comprehensive policy expertise that enables perfect oversight throughout the executive. For its part, the Government Office, which is also responsible for organizing the Council of Ministers’ cycle of sessions, and whose head is the powerful deputy prime minister, has no sectoral-policy expertise, but also evaluates the substantive content of draft bills to some extent.
During the elaboration and implementation of the RRP, the Government Office coordinated an extensive consultation process among ministries. The office also coordinated dialogue with social partners, regional authorities (a new Recovery Plan Sectoral Conference was created) and local entities. An interministerial commission chaired by the president has been set up to manage the RRP and approve projects.
Citations:
Structure of the Ministry of the Presidency
https://www.mpr.gob.es/mpr/estructura/Documents/ORGANIGRAMA%20MINISTERIO%2001_03_2022.pdf
During the elaboration and implementation of the RRP, the Government Office coordinated an extensive consultation process among ministries. The office also coordinated dialogue with social partners, regional authorities (a new Recovery Plan Sectoral Conference was created) and local entities. An interministerial commission chaired by the president has been set up to manage the RRP and approve projects.
Citations:
Structure of the Ministry of the Presidency
https://www.mpr.gob.es/mpr/estructura/Documents/ORGANIGRAMA%20MINISTERIO%2001_03_2022.pdf
To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?
10
9
9
There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
5
4
3
4
3
Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
2
1
1
Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
Both the Government Office (GO) and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) are regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals by line ministries. Although these offices are formally autonomous, the legal and political hierarchy within the government facilitates and even encourages this pattern of consultation with the prime minister’s entourage. Consultation with the GO tends to focus on drafting or technical issues, while the PMO is more interested in political and strategic considerations. The process is firmly institutionalized and takes place weekly, since representatives of all ministries gather at the cabinet meeting preparatory committee. Advisers from the PMO also participate in this committee and in the important specialized ministerial committee on economic affairs (see “Cabinet Committees”) that also assists the Council of Ministers.
Nevertheless, the lack of experience in managing coalition governments and partisan differences had an impact on the effectiveness and coherence of policy formulation, and led to coordination problems among line ministries. In July 2021, the chief executive reshuffled some key members of the cabinet (his chief of staff and the minister of the presidency) in order to strengthen coordination within the cabinet.
In order to prepare the implementation of the RRP, the government approved, in addition to the new Public Administration Act, a decree-law that establishes a reinforced governance structure. A new interministerial commission presided over by the prime minister is in charge of leading the RRP and approving projects.
Citations:
Orden HFP/1030/2021, de 29 de septiembre, por la que se configura el sistema de gestión del Plan de Recuperación, Transformación y Resiliencia (BOE 30 de septiembre)
Nevertheless, the lack of experience in managing coalition governments and partisan differences had an impact on the effectiveness and coherence of policy formulation, and led to coordination problems among line ministries. In July 2021, the chief executive reshuffled some key members of the cabinet (his chief of staff and the minister of the presidency) in order to strengthen coordination within the cabinet.
In order to prepare the implementation of the RRP, the government approved, in addition to the new Public Administration Act, a decree-law that establishes a reinforced governance structure. A new interministerial commission presided over by the prime minister is in charge of leading the RRP and approving projects.
Citations:
Orden HFP/1030/2021, de 29 de septiembre, por la que se configura el sistema de gestión del Plan de Recuperación, Transformación y Resiliencia (BOE 30 de septiembre)
How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?
10
9
9
The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
8
7
6
7
6
Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
5
4
3
4
3
There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
2
1
1
There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
Two powerful ministerial committees effectively prepare cabinet meetings in Spain: The Committee for Economic Affairs, and the Committee of Undersecretaries and Secretaries of State. The Committee for Economic Affairs review and schedule economic or budgetary interministerial coordination. This committee has been chaired since 2020 by the first vice-president of the government and the minister for economic affairs and digital transformation, and also includes the other ministers and secretaries of state who hold economic responsibilities. For its part, the Committee of Undersecretaries and Secretaries of State effectively filters out and settles issues prior to cabinet meetings. This committee of top officials prepare the Council of Ministers’ weekly sessions, which are held every Tuesday (see “Ministerial Bureaucracy” for further details). No cabinet member participates apart from the deputy prime minister, who serves as its chairperson. Spain’s only Council of Ministers committee composed exclusively of cabinet members is the Foreign Policy Council, which meets only about once a year.
In order to prepare the implementation of the RRP, existing departments have been given new responsibilities. For example, the Economic Office of the Prime Minister will act as a monitoring unit, the Ministry of Finance’s department for EU funds will act as the managing unit and the General Intervention Board of the State Administration will act as an oversight and audit unit.
Citations:
Real Decreto 399/2020, de 25 de febrero, por el que se establecen las Comisiones Delegadas del Gobierno.
In order to prepare the implementation of the RRP, existing departments have been given new responsibilities. For example, the Economic Office of the Prime Minister will act as a monitoring unit, the Ministry of Finance’s department for EU funds will act as the managing unit and the General Intervention Board of the State Administration will act as an oversight and audit unit.
Citations:
Real Decreto 399/2020, de 25 de febrero, por el que se establecen las Comisiones Delegadas del Gobierno.
How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?
10
9
9
Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
8
7
6
7
6
Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
5
4
3
4
3
There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
2
1
1
There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
The two most important senior bureaucratic positions in the ministries are the secretaries of state, who play a role much like that of junior ministers but do not formally belong to the cabinet, and the undersecretaries, who are career civil servants who typically act as department administrators. These figures meet in the so-called General Committee of Undersecretaries and Secretaries of State. This committee effectively prepares the Council of Ministers’ weekly sessions, which are held on Tuesdays. The deputy prime minister and head of the Government Office (GO) chairs the meetings of this preparatory committee in which all draft bills, all appointments and any other ministerial proposals are discussed and scheduled as a part of the Council of Ministers’ agenda. A provisional agenda is published by the GO a week before the cabinet meeting. The GO also collects and circulates all relevant documents for discussion by the line ministers. On Tuesday mornings, the prime minister’s advisers assess the relative importance of agenda items and identify where there are likely to be divergent positions. Thus, the meetings of the preparatory committee perform an important gatekeeping function in returning problematic proposals to the appropriate line ministry and forwarding the remaining proposals to the Council of Ministers.
The role of high-ranking civil servants is crucial in the preparation of policy proposals within every line ministry, but their subsequent involvement in horizontal coordination with other ministries is very limited. In fact, and as a consequence of the strong departmentalization, every ministry tends to act within its area of competence or jurisdiction, avoiding proposals which may involve other ministries. Although many administrative interministerial committees formally exist, in practice these committees do not coordinate the drafting of policy proposals or decision-making between different ministries. However, the creation of the Technical Committee in 2021, and the additional creation of the new interministerial commission on the implementation of the RRF, which is chaired by the prime minister, will increase cooperation and standardize procedures among the line ministries.
Citations:
Orden HFP/1030/2021, de 29 de septiembre, por la que se configura el sistema de gestión del Plan de Recuperación, Transformación y Resiliencia (BOE 30 de septiembre)
The role of high-ranking civil servants is crucial in the preparation of policy proposals within every line ministry, but their subsequent involvement in horizontal coordination with other ministries is very limited. In fact, and as a consequence of the strong departmentalization, every ministry tends to act within its area of competence or jurisdiction, avoiding proposals which may involve other ministries. Although many administrative interministerial committees formally exist, in practice these committees do not coordinate the drafting of policy proposals or decision-making between different ministries. However, the creation of the Technical Committee in 2021, and the additional creation of the new interministerial commission on the implementation of the RRF, which is chaired by the prime minister, will increase cooperation and standardize procedures among the line ministries.
Citations:
Orden HFP/1030/2021, de 29 de septiembre, por la que se configura el sistema de gestión del Plan de Recuperación, Transformación y Resiliencia (BOE 30 de septiembre)
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
10
9
9
Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
8
7
6
7
6
In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
2
1
1
Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
The relative weakness of formal coordination among ministry civil servants in Spain is to some extent compensated for by helpful informal procedures. When interministerial problems cannot be solved informal contacts, or meetings between officials of the various ministries involved are organized. Many policy proposals can in fact be coordinated in this fashion. As senior civil servants are clustered into different specialized bureaucratic corps, informal mechanisms rely often on the fact that officials involved in the coordination may belong to the same corps or share a network of old colleagues. Nevertheless, the existence of specialized corps tends to aggravate administrative fragmentation, since every corps tends to control a department according to its specialization. In this sense, the administration seems to follow a “silo” structure, in which each ministry, department, agency, organism or public entity follows its own operating logic. Within the cabinet, these informal mechanisms are less necessary, since the stable experience of single-party governments with strong prime ministers has up to this point required less coordination than would coalition cabinets. During the period under review, meetings of the heads of ministers’ private offices were introduced.
The cabinet reshuffle of July 2021 (see “Line Ministries”) helped to improve these informal mechanisms of coordination.
Citations:
Círculo de Empresarios (2018), La calidad de las instituciones en España. https://circulodeempresarios.org/app/uploads/2018/04/Calidad-insti-CdE-WEB.pdf
The cabinet reshuffle of July 2021 (see “Line Ministries”) helped to improve these informal mechanisms of coordination.
Citations:
Círculo de Empresarios (2018), La calidad de las instituciones en España. https://circulodeempresarios.org/app/uploads/2018/04/Calidad-insti-CdE-WEB.pdf
How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?
10
9
9
The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
8
7
6
7
6
The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
5
4
3
4
3
The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
2
1
1
The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
Spain ranks ninth out of the 28 EU member states in the European Commission 2021 Digital Economy and Society Index. Spain’s performance was especially notable in the area of digital public services. Law 18/2015 on data reuse and data transparency has promoted a culture of open data within the public administration, and the public sector is quickly progressing with regard to the integration of digital technologies. In recent years, a number of laws updated procedures with the aim of exploring the potential of digital technologies and structures. Moreover, shared interdepartmental platforms (such as the Cl@ve platform) and shared services have been developed.
Under the terms of the Digitalization Plan for Public Administrations 2021 – 2025, all ministries are required to draft digital-transformation action plans. These are to include means of simplifying interdepartmental working procedures, the electronic exchange of information between administrative units, the issue of information classification, and the implementation of standards for the exchange of information. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Digital Transformation (MINECO) is the governing body for digital administration, rationalization of information technologies and communications in the field of public administration. The implementation of the Digital Agenda 2025 will enable a technological leap forward in the digital transformation of interministerial coordination. In order to achieve this goal, Digital Spain 2025 envisages introducing a series of structural reforms in the 2020 – 2022 period, among them the development of “as-a-service” cognitive automation services for the administration, in order to improve the efficiency of processes.
Spain’s decentralized structure has created challenges in establishing a coherent and nationwide interministerial e-government coordination plan. However, Digital Agenda 2025 created a strategic framework for vertical interadministrative compatibility and coordination.
Citations:
Gobierno de España (2021), Public Administrations Digitization Plan, https://tec.scot/sites/default/files/2021-07/Plan-for-the-digitalisation-of-pubic-administrations-TRANSLATED-1.pdf
Gobierno de España (2021), Digital Spain Agenda 2025 https://portal.mineco.gob.es/RecursosArticulo/mineco/ministerio/ficheros/210204_Digital_Spain_2025.pdf
Under the terms of the Digitalization Plan for Public Administrations 2021 – 2025, all ministries are required to draft digital-transformation action plans. These are to include means of simplifying interdepartmental working procedures, the electronic exchange of information between administrative units, the issue of information classification, and the implementation of standards for the exchange of information. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Digital Transformation (MINECO) is the governing body for digital administration, rationalization of information technologies and communications in the field of public administration. The implementation of the Digital Agenda 2025 will enable a technological leap forward in the digital transformation of interministerial coordination. In order to achieve this goal, Digital Spain 2025 envisages introducing a series of structural reforms in the 2020 – 2022 period, among them the development of “as-a-service” cognitive automation services for the administration, in order to improve the efficiency of processes.
Spain’s decentralized structure has created challenges in establishing a coherent and nationwide interministerial e-government coordination plan. However, Digital Agenda 2025 created a strategic framework for vertical interadministrative compatibility and coordination.
Citations:
Gobierno de España (2021), Public Administrations Digitization Plan, https://tec.scot/sites/default/files/2021-07/Plan-for-the-digitalisation-of-pubic-administrations-TRANSLATED-1.pdf
Gobierno de España (2021), Digital Spain Agenda 2025 https://portal.mineco.gob.es/RecursosArticulo/mineco/ministerio/ficheros/210204_Digital_Spain_2025.pdf
Graph View
To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?
10
9
9
RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
8
7
6
7
6
RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
5
4
3
4
3
RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
2
1
1
RIA are not applied or do not exist.
The law on the common administrative procedure (Law 39/2015) included a provision devoted to ensuring that lawmaking in the future will take place in accordance with the principles of “smart regulation” and “better regulation.” Royal Decree 931/2017 establishes specific rules governing the use of RIA. This development, which is based on OECD recommendations, seeks to guarantee that the administration engages in systematic planning before laws are drafted, while creating a more sophisticated RIA process and producing regulations that are proportional to the political goal and more congruent with other laws. Currently, RIAs are required for all regulations in Spain.
According to the OECD indicators on regulatory policy and governance, Spain’s public administration (from the national to the local level) is gradually stepping up its “better regulation” efforts, expanding its initial focus on administrative simplification in order to focus additionally on the issues of stakeholder engagement and ex post evaluation.
Citations:
OECD (2021), Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance: Spain
https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/spain-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdf
Gobierno de España (2021): Guía metodológica para la elaboración de la memoria del análisis de impacto _ormative, available at http://www.mptfp.es/dam/es/portal/funcionpublica/gobernanza-publica/simplificacion/impacto-normativo/guia_metodologica_ain.pdf#page=1
According to the OECD indicators on regulatory policy and governance, Spain’s public administration (from the national to the local level) is gradually stepping up its “better regulation” efforts, expanding its initial focus on administrative simplification in order to focus additionally on the issues of stakeholder engagement and ex post evaluation.
Citations:
OECD (2021), Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance: Spain
https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/spain-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdf
Gobierno de España (2021): Guía metodológica para la elaboración de la memoria del análisis de impacto _ormative, available at http://www.mptfp.es/dam/es/portal/funcionpublica/gobernanza-publica/simplificacion/impacto-normativo/guia_metodologica_ain.pdf#page=1
Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?
10
9
9
RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
8
7
6
7
6
The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
5
4
3
4
3
The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
2
1
1
RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
The use of RIA analyses has largely been focused on administrative simplification and better-regulation programs. The gradual introduction of RIAs since 2009 has resulted in a general template (reinforced by the Law 39/2015 and the Royal Decree 931/2017), which is to be applied across content areas. This emphasizes that draft legislation must address economic and budgetary considerations as well as any other relevant aspects of impact such as environmental impact, gender-equality concerns, and any possible effects on disabled people.
Since 2018, the practice of regulatory impact assessment (RIA) has been strengthened through the creation of a dedicated body for the task. The Office on Regulatory Coordination and Quality within the Ministry of the Presidency is tasked with ensuring the quality, coordination and coherence of rulemaking activity undertaken by the executive. The office has established an information system providing for direct and secure communication with ministerial departments. Moreover, the Ministry of Territorial Policy and Public Function reviews the quality of various RIA components with the autonomous communities, and oversees processes of public consultation and participation. The Council of State, in turn, assesses the legality of regulations and their development, monitors the public administration’s correct functioning, and reviews the legal quality of regulations initiated by the executive. The Council issues statements in response to consultations with ministries, autonomous community presidents and certain state entities.
Preliminary RIAs for legal norms are in some cases developed by entities other than the executive. On occasions, special parliamentary committees are established by either house to study a particular issue. However, most of the processes dealing with RIA depend upon internal ministerial resources, and the outcomes are not typically available to the public. In December 2021, the government published the Normative Annual Plan for 2022, with all laws in development and main decrees expected to be approved in 2022 by the central government.
The Public Administration’s Digitization Plan (2021) calls for transforming the public administration via data-driven public policies into a more modern and “data-driven” entity, in which information from citizens, citizens and other units and levels of the public administration are used efficiently to design public policies.
Citations:
Office on Regulatory Coordination and Quality – https://www.mpr.gob.es/mpr/subse/occn/paginas/index.aspx
Gobierno de España (2021) Public Administrations Digitization Plan, https://tec.scot/sites/default/files/2021-07/Plan-for-the-digitalisation-of-pubic-administrations-TRANSLATED-1.pdf
Gobierno de España (2021): Plan Anual Normativo 2022. Administración General del Estado. Available at https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/consejodeministros/resumenes/Documents/2022/PAN%20202.pdf
Since 2018, the practice of regulatory impact assessment (RIA) has been strengthened through the creation of a dedicated body for the task. The Office on Regulatory Coordination and Quality within the Ministry of the Presidency is tasked with ensuring the quality, coordination and coherence of rulemaking activity undertaken by the executive. The office has established an information system providing for direct and secure communication with ministerial departments. Moreover, the Ministry of Territorial Policy and Public Function reviews the quality of various RIA components with the autonomous communities, and oversees processes of public consultation and participation. The Council of State, in turn, assesses the legality of regulations and their development, monitors the public administration’s correct functioning, and reviews the legal quality of regulations initiated by the executive. The Council issues statements in response to consultations with ministries, autonomous community presidents and certain state entities.
Preliminary RIAs for legal norms are in some cases developed by entities other than the executive. On occasions, special parliamentary committees are established by either house to study a particular issue. However, most of the processes dealing with RIA depend upon internal ministerial resources, and the outcomes are not typically available to the public. In December 2021, the government published the Normative Annual Plan for 2022, with all laws in development and main decrees expected to be approved in 2022 by the central government.
The Public Administration’s Digitization Plan (2021) calls for transforming the public administration via data-driven public policies into a more modern and “data-driven” entity, in which information from citizens, citizens and other units and levels of the public administration are used efficiently to design public policies.
Citations:
Office on Regulatory Coordination and Quality – https://www.mpr.gob.es/mpr/subse/occn/paginas/index.aspx
Gobierno de España (2021) Public Administrations Digitization Plan, https://tec.scot/sites/default/files/2021-07/Plan-for-the-digitalisation-of-pubic-administrations-TRANSLATED-1.pdf
Gobierno de España (2021): Plan Anual Normativo 2022. Administración General del Estado. Available at https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/consejodeministros/resumenes/Documents/2022/PAN%20202.pdf
Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?
10
9
9
Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
8
7
6
7
6
Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
5
4
3
4
3
Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
2
1
1
Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
In 2018, the Council of Ministers approved the “Action Plan for the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda” with the participation of all ministerial departments, the autonomous communities and local entities. Since that time, the government has established a comprehensive institutional governance system with the goal of ensuring that the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) form a common basis for decision-making in Spain. The Ministry of Social Rights and Agenda 2030 has executive powers for the development and coordination of actions related to the SDGs; the government’s Delegated Commission for Agenda 2030 coordinates interministerial dialogue; the Sectoral Conference for Agenda 2030 facilitates coordination with the governments of autonomous communities; and the Sustainable Development Council acts as an advisory body involving the private sector, trade unions, academia and civil society organizations. Moreover, the parliamentary Joint Commission for the Coordination of the Agenda 2030 Strategy monitors their implementation.
The National Strategy contains specific impact indicators for monitoring SDG implementation (144 indicators have been identified). The SDGs are also mentioned in the RRP and the annual budget law. In 2021, the government submitted its latest voluntary national progress report to the High-level Political Forum for Sustainable Development of the United Nations.
However, the RIA framework designed by the 2017 decree does not provide a set of indicators to be specifically addressed by the analysis. Only gender impact and administrative costs are systematically assessed. The analyses do not consider either of these types of impact as they might unfold over time.
Citations:
Gobierno de España (2021), Voluntary National Review 2021, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/memberstates/spain
The National Strategy contains specific impact indicators for monitoring SDG implementation (144 indicators have been identified). The SDGs are also mentioned in the RRP and the annual budget law. In 2021, the government submitted its latest voluntary national progress report to the High-level Political Forum for Sustainable Development of the United Nations.
However, the RIA framework designed by the 2017 decree does not provide a set of indicators to be specifically addressed by the analysis. Only gender impact and administrative costs are systematically assessed. The analyses do not consider either of these types of impact as they might unfold over time.
Citations:
Gobierno de España (2021), Voluntary National Review 2021, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/memberstates/spain
To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?
10
9
9
Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
2
1
1
Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
The 2015 law on the common administrative procedure includes a provision regarding ex post evaluation, making it compulsory to evaluate the application of rules and norms in order to ascertain whether they have met the objectives pursued, and whether costs have been justified. In 2017, the Institute for Evaluation of Public Policies replaced previous structures designed to produce internal policy evaluations of initiatives requested by the government.
The Office on Regulatory Coordination and Quality supervises the initial definition of the objectives and methodology for the ex post evaluation of regulations covered by RIAs, but does not scrutinize ex post evaluations themselves. The Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility (AIReF) is responsible for the evaluation of public spending and the efficiency of public policies. The AIReF analyses key expenditure and investment items such as education, healthcare and public works. The reports are not binding, but if the administration chooses not to follow the recommendations, it must justify this decision.
According to OECD recommendations published in 2021, ex post evaluations of regulations are still not performed in a systematic manner. Developing targeted guidance and standard evaluation techniques would contribute to more widespread and consistent evaluation of how regulations actually work in practice.
Most autonomous communities have developed additional, systematic ex post evaluation programs for their public policies. However, the practical impact of these measures has to date been limited.
Citations:
OECD (2021), Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance: Spain
https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/spain-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdf
Gobierno de España (2021): Informe de diagnóstico de la evaluación en la Administración General del Estado 2021. Available at: https://www.mptfp.gob.es/portal/funcionpublica/evaluacion-politicas-publicas/Informes-de-Evaluacion.html
The Office on Regulatory Coordination and Quality supervises the initial definition of the objectives and methodology for the ex post evaluation of regulations covered by RIAs, but does not scrutinize ex post evaluations themselves. The Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility (AIReF) is responsible for the evaluation of public spending and the efficiency of public policies. The AIReF analyses key expenditure and investment items such as education, healthcare and public works. The reports are not binding, but if the administration chooses not to follow the recommendations, it must justify this decision.
According to OECD recommendations published in 2021, ex post evaluations of regulations are still not performed in a systematic manner. Developing targeted guidance and standard evaluation techniques would contribute to more widespread and consistent evaluation of how regulations actually work in practice.
Most autonomous communities have developed additional, systematic ex post evaluation programs for their public policies. However, the practical impact of these measures has to date been limited.
Citations:
OECD (2021), Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance: Spain
https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/spain-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdf
Gobierno de España (2021): Informe de diagnóstico de la evaluación en la Administración General del Estado 2021. Available at: https://www.mptfp.gob.es/portal/funcionpublica/evaluacion-politicas-publicas/Informes-de-Evaluacion.html
Graph View
Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?
10
9
9
The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
8
7
6
7
6
The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
2
1
1
The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
An Economic and Social Council (ESC) made up of employers’ organizations, trade unions and other societal representatives is provided for in the constitution, while other government advisory bodies are provided for by additional specific policies. The ESC and the other bodies issue opinions on draft legislation, although there is no general common institutionalized procedure for consultation nor in many cases is there an obligation to engage in it.
Since 2017, the frequency of public consultation for legislative projects has increased, with the introduction of so-called annual normative plans helping in this regard. Since 2018, an online platform has published lists of all ongoing consultations, thus allowing citizens to participate in these processes before regulatory development starts and at the draft regulation stage, two important points in the policy cycle.
The government has since 2018 engaged actively in dialogue with trade unions and employers’ associations. The social stakeholders and the government have signed several agreements, for instance relating to the increase in the minimum wage and to the plans for temporary layoffs during the pandemic (ERTEs). The government has also convened many meetings with social stakeholders to structure and monitor the various economic and social responses to the pandemic.
In November 2020, the government, trade unions and employers’ associations set up the Social Dialogue Board for Recovery, Transformation and Resilience. This enabled enterprises, administrations and social partners to be involved in the preparation of the RRP.
Social and environmental interest groups also participated in the elaboration of several additional policy responses such as the Spanish Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for 2021 – 2027. Recent reforms, such as those affecting the labor market and pension system, have involved social dialogue with employers and unions.
Citations:
Participación pública en proyectos normativos, https://transparencia.gob.es/transparencia/transparencia_Home/index/ParticipacionCiudadana/ParticipacionProyectosNormativos.html
Since 2017, the frequency of public consultation for legislative projects has increased, with the introduction of so-called annual normative plans helping in this regard. Since 2018, an online platform has published lists of all ongoing consultations, thus allowing citizens to participate in these processes before regulatory development starts and at the draft regulation stage, two important points in the policy cycle.
The government has since 2018 engaged actively in dialogue with trade unions and employers’ associations. The social stakeholders and the government have signed several agreements, for instance relating to the increase in the minimum wage and to the plans for temporary layoffs during the pandemic (ERTEs). The government has also convened many meetings with social stakeholders to structure and monitor the various economic and social responses to the pandemic.
In November 2020, the government, trade unions and employers’ associations set up the Social Dialogue Board for Recovery, Transformation and Resilience. This enabled enterprises, administrations and social partners to be involved in the preparation of the RRP.
Social and environmental interest groups also participated in the elaboration of several additional policy responses such as the Spanish Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for 2021 – 2027. Recent reforms, such as those affecting the labor market and pension system, have involved social dialogue with employers and unions.
Citations:
Participación pública en proyectos normativos, https://transparencia.gob.es/transparencia/transparencia_Home/index/ParticipacionCiudadana/ParticipacionProyectosNormativos.html
Graph View
To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?
10
9
9
Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
8
7
6
7
6
Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
5
4
3
4
3
Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
2
1
1
Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
A press office in the prime minister’s entourage and the government’s spokesperson try to conduct coherent communication planning. Ministries tend to align their statements and press releases with government strategy. The conservative PP government (in office through May 2018) did not have a well-developed communications strategy. The management of the Catalan conflict was perhaps the best example of this problem, with unconvincing and contradictory statements released both internally and abroad. The PSOE government launched a more thoughtful national and international political communications strategy
Spain’s government used scientific experts in its institutional communication during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the government improved communication with trade unions (UGT and CCOO), the main business association (CEOE) and autonomous communities. However, scandals linked to appointed ministers and among the coalition partners (e.g., regarding the labor market reform) ultimately limited the coherence of the communication strategy. In July 2021, a cabinet reshuffle replaced the state secretary of communication; one goal was to improve policy communication and internal coordination within the PMO and the Ministry of the Presidency.
During the pandemic, the government frequently communicated its assessment of the situation as well as the rationale behind the measures taken. However, despite the daily taskforce briefings and numerous press conferences by members of the government, the management of communication has been widely questioned. The main criticisms have to do with delays in providing information, the lack of consistent and sufficient data, and the lack of clarity.
Citations:
Moreno, Á.; Fuentes-Lara, C.; Navarro, C. (2020). “COVID-19 communication management in Spain: Exploring the effect of information-seeking behavior and message reception in public’s evaluation.” El _rofessional de la información, v. 29, n. 4, e290402. https://doi.org/10.3145/epi.2020.jul.02
Spain’s government used scientific experts in its institutional communication during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the government improved communication with trade unions (UGT and CCOO), the main business association (CEOE) and autonomous communities. However, scandals linked to appointed ministers and among the coalition partners (e.g., regarding the labor market reform) ultimately limited the coherence of the communication strategy. In July 2021, a cabinet reshuffle replaced the state secretary of communication; one goal was to improve policy communication and internal coordination within the PMO and the Ministry of the Presidency.
During the pandemic, the government frequently communicated its assessment of the situation as well as the rationale behind the measures taken. However, despite the daily taskforce briefings and numerous press conferences by members of the government, the management of communication has been widely questioned. The main criticisms have to do with delays in providing information, the lack of consistent and sufficient data, and the lack of clarity.
Citations:
Moreno, Á.; Fuentes-Lara, C.; Navarro, C. (2020). “COVID-19 communication management in Spain: Exploring the effect of information-seeking behavior and message reception in public’s evaluation.” El _rofessional de la información, v. 29, n. 4, e290402. https://doi.org/10.3145/epi.2020.jul.02
Graph View
To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?
10
9
9
The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
5
4
3
4
3
The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
2
1
1
The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
The Spanish government has never instituted a system of benchmarks to evaluate its own performance. However, it has traditionally been successful in the implementation of major policy objectives. Nevertheless, the weakness of the coordination mechanisms with the 17 autonomous communities that are responsible for most policy areas and the high degree of ministerial fragmentation are obstacles to government effectiveness. Moreover, in recent years, the governing party’s parliamentary weakness has become a much greater obstacle. In 2019, the first Sanchez government started an informal system of benchmarks to evaluate its own performance. The third edition of this “Cumpliendo” report, presented in December 2021, concluded that the government had fulfilled 50% of the commitments made in its investiture speech to the parliament. In parliamentary terms, the executive presented 65 legislative initiatives, the second-highest number since 2011 (trailing only 2015), in spite of the high level of fragmentation in the chamber.
In December 2020, the Spanish government approved a royal decree to streamline the Spanish administration and facilitate the bureaucratic process needed to implement the RRP effectively. Among its various components, the decree improved public governance and oversight structures and the frameworks necessary for better collaboration between the public and the private sectors. In order to ensure effective implementation of the plan, the government created several temporary structures and assigned new responsibilities to some existing administrative departments.
Citations:
Gobierno de España (2021) Cumpliendo https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/presidente/actividades/Documents/2021/291221_CumpliendoDiciembre21_Informe.pdf
In December 2020, the Spanish government approved a royal decree to streamline the Spanish administration and facilitate the bureaucratic process needed to implement the RRP effectively. Among its various components, the decree improved public governance and oversight structures and the frameworks necessary for better collaboration between the public and the private sectors. In order to ensure effective implementation of the plan, the government created several temporary structures and assigned new responsibilities to some existing administrative departments.
Citations:
Gobierno de España (2021) Cumpliendo https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/presidente/actividades/Documents/2021/291221_CumpliendoDiciembre21_Informe.pdf
To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?
10
9
9
The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
8
7
6
7
6
The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
5
4
3
4
3
The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
2
1
1
The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
Until 2020, all prime ministers since the restoration of democracy in 1977 presided over single-party governments. Thus, all ministries were chaired by members or persons close to the same party or to the prime minister. The prime minister (who is the leader of the governing party) has been free to reorganize government structures and dismiss ministers he does not consider able or willing to implement the government’s program.
The constitution (which stipulates that parliamentary confidence rests personally with the prime minister and his comprehensive government program), internal party discipline and the organization of the executive thus all provide strong incentives for all ministers to implement the overall government program rather than seeking to realize the sectoral interests of their individual departments. However, the weak dynamic of collective deliberation within the cabinet, and the tradition of departmentalism (with broad levels of autonomy accorded to ministers within their department’s jurisdiction) may erode cabinet cohesion.
Hence, the first minority coalition government, which took office in January 2020, subjected ministerial compliance to a stress test. The coalition agreement established some priorities, policy projects and mechanisms for discussing internal disagreements. On several occasions, the PSOE accused its junior partner, Unidas Podemos, of behaving simultaneously as a part of the government and the opposition. In 2021, there were several notable instances of policy dissonance between the parties. Discord within the coalition reached a fever pitch due to a combination of political differences and personality clashes. In March, Podemos’ leader decided to leave the cabinet. However, the coalition was nonetheless able to advance its ambitious legislative agenda.
Citations:
Politico, March 2, 2021 Spain’s governing partners show bad blood in public.
The constitution (which stipulates that parliamentary confidence rests personally with the prime minister and his comprehensive government program), internal party discipline and the organization of the executive thus all provide strong incentives for all ministers to implement the overall government program rather than seeking to realize the sectoral interests of their individual departments. However, the weak dynamic of collective deliberation within the cabinet, and the tradition of departmentalism (with broad levels of autonomy accorded to ministers within their department’s jurisdiction) may erode cabinet cohesion.
Hence, the first minority coalition government, which took office in January 2020, subjected ministerial compliance to a stress test. The coalition agreement established some priorities, policy projects and mechanisms for discussing internal disagreements. On several occasions, the PSOE accused its junior partner, Unidas Podemos, of behaving simultaneously as a part of the government and the opposition. In 2021, there were several notable instances of policy dissonance between the parties. Discord within the coalition reached a fever pitch due to a combination of political differences and personality clashes. In March, Podemos’ leader decided to leave the cabinet. However, the coalition was nonetheless able to advance its ambitious legislative agenda.
Citations:
Politico, March 2, 2021 Spain’s governing partners show bad blood in public.
How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
5
4
3
4
3
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
2
1
1
The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
The activities of all line ministries are monitored by the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), the Government Office (GO), and ultimately the Council of Ministers. The PMO oversees the flow of political and sectoral information and keeps the prime minister abreast of the activities of all line ministries. The GO, headed by the powerful deputy prime minister, monitors the activities of line ministries through the weekly meetings which prepare the way for Council of Ministers meetings. The capacity of the GO to monitor ministers improved since 2015 due to legislation that introduced a new system for systematically assessing policy implementation, in the form of a periodic evaluation report that is prepared in close consultation with line ministries. Nevertheless, this monitoring cannot guarantee that no sectoral ministry will ever prioritize vertical over horizontal interests. The organizational resources of these central offices are limited, and these bodies rarely engage in direct coordination of ministerial departments. Only the prime minister or his deputy are entitled to play this role. The cabinet reshuffle in July 2021 was intended to improve this function.
Citations:
Funciones del Ministerio de la Presidencia
http://www.mpr.gob.es/mpr/funciones/Paginas/funciones.aspx
Citations:
Funciones del Ministerio de la Presidencia
http://www.mpr.gob.es/mpr/funciones/Paginas/funciones.aspx
How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
8
7
6
7
6
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
5
4
3
4
3
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
2
1
1
The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
Spain’s ministries have the capacity to monitor the activities of the administrative bureaucracy and executive agencies with regard to implementation. In 2012, as a consequence of the crisis, the central control over these public bodies increased, and in some cases entailed the absorption of the smallest agencies by the ministry in charge of their task area.
Law 40/2015 established an integrated framework for evaluation, monitoring and the independent audit of all agencies. Thus, the ministries can now monitor the activities of all executive agencies and force them if necessary to act in accordance with the government’s program. However, it is also true that thanks to bureaucratic drift and/or flexibility in their functioning, some of these semi-autonomous public bodies have been able to elude this control. Ministers have particular difficulties in effectively monitoring the largest ones.
Central government ministries are formally able to supervise the activities of decentralized authorities at the regional level. ´However, many important responsibilities, such as those regarding health or education, have been in the hands of the autonomous communities for almost two decades, and coordination mechanisms are weak. Moreover, the institutional framework for supervision is very limited. For example, during the first weeks of the state of alert in March/April 2020, the national Ministry of Health was unable to collect or provide operational data, let alone coordinate joint actions with the autonomous communities in areas such as the procurement of protective clothing and masks. Another example relates to the controversy over education and linguistic policies implemented by the regional governments, which are not subject to central supervision. This has opened the door for judiciary interventions that have ordered modifications to some relevant aspects of these regional policies.
Citations:
Erkoreka, Mikel; Grau Creus, Mireia; Kölling, Mario (2021), Decentralisation and COVID-19: the Spanish territorial system under pressure, en Nico Steytler (ed.) Comparative Federalism and COVID-19: Combatting the Pandemic, Routledge.
Law 40/2015 established an integrated framework for evaluation, monitoring and the independent audit of all agencies. Thus, the ministries can now monitor the activities of all executive agencies and force them if necessary to act in accordance with the government’s program. However, it is also true that thanks to bureaucratic drift and/or flexibility in their functioning, some of these semi-autonomous public bodies have been able to elude this control. Ministers have particular difficulties in effectively monitoring the largest ones.
Central government ministries are formally able to supervise the activities of decentralized authorities at the regional level. ´However, many important responsibilities, such as those regarding health or education, have been in the hands of the autonomous communities for almost two decades, and coordination mechanisms are weak. Moreover, the institutional framework for supervision is very limited. For example, during the first weeks of the state of alert in March/April 2020, the national Ministry of Health was unable to collect or provide operational data, let alone coordinate joint actions with the autonomous communities in areas such as the procurement of protective clothing and masks. Another example relates to the controversy over education and linguistic policies implemented by the regional governments, which are not subject to central supervision. This has opened the door for judiciary interventions that have ordered modifications to some relevant aspects of these regional policies.
Citations:
Erkoreka, Mikel; Grau Creus, Mireia; Kölling, Mario (2021), Decentralisation and COVID-19: the Spanish territorial system under pressure, en Nico Steytler (ed.) Comparative Federalism and COVID-19: Combatting the Pandemic, Routledge.
To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
8
7
6
7
6
The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
2
1
1
The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
Spain has a very decentralized political and administrative structure, with 17 autonomous communities controlling over a third of public spending, including services such as healthcare and education. In some cases, tasks are delegated to autonomous communities without adequate funding sources. As a result, some autonomous communities have been incapable of adequately fulfilling their delegated tasks without help. A reform of this model planned in 2016 had to be postponed due to political deadlock
The debate over the criteria for allocating funding to autonomous communities continued in 2021, with most autonomous communities seeking a profound revision of the general funding system. Moreover, there is widespread demand for a further revision of the distribution of revenue, so that all autonomous communities have sufficient funds available to fulfill their tasks. In 2017, two expert commissions were appointed – one for regional financing and the other for local financing – which produced reports that same year describing the primary problems and offering reform proposals. Finally, in December 2021, the coalition government published a proposal for the long-awaited reform of the territorial financing model.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the central government allocated a significant amount of additional resources to the regional governments to help them provide services and react to the health crisis. In 2021, these extraordinary funds totaled €13.5 billion.
Citations:
Gobierno de España (2021), Hacienda envía una propuesta de población ajustada para determinar el reparto de los recursos del sistema de financiación autonómica, https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/serviciosdeprensa/notasprensa/hacienda/Paginas/2021/031221-poblacion-ajustada.aspx
The debate over the criteria for allocating funding to autonomous communities continued in 2021, with most autonomous communities seeking a profound revision of the general funding system. Moreover, there is widespread demand for a further revision of the distribution of revenue, so that all autonomous communities have sufficient funds available to fulfill their tasks. In 2017, two expert commissions were appointed – one for regional financing and the other for local financing – which produced reports that same year describing the primary problems and offering reform proposals. Finally, in December 2021, the coalition government published a proposal for the long-awaited reform of the territorial financing model.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the central government allocated a significant amount of additional resources to the regional governments to help them provide services and react to the health crisis. In 2021, these extraordinary funds totaled €13.5 billion.
Citations:
Gobierno de España (2021), Hacienda envía una propuesta de población ajustada para determinar el reparto de los recursos del sistema de financiación autonómica, https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/serviciosdeprensa/notasprensa/hacienda/Paginas/2021/031221-poblacion-ajustada.aspx
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
2
1
1
The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
The constitution sets out the division of powers: some powers are expressly assigned to the central government, while the autonomous communities are by statute able to address all matters not allocated to the central government, as well as the legislative development of these tasks and the implementation of the relevant framework legislation and federal legislation. This enables the autonomous communities to adapt federal laws somewhat to fit their own preferences. Over the last 40 years, the autonomous communities have adopted their own statutes defining their institutions and powers, and have assumed responsibility for providing a wide range of public services of a regional or local nature.
During the COVID-19 crisis, the suspension of EU fiscal rules provided the various levels of government with considerable discretion over overall debt limits, but also uncertainty about the normative context of their medium-term budget planning.
During the first state of alarm (14 March – 21 June), the autonomous communities lost their decision-making capacity, although they remained responsible for the management of centrally issued instructions. However, the second nationwide state of emergency (October 2020 – May 2021) was implemented in a decentralized manner, and was managed primarily by the autonomous community governments. Since then, these entities have been able use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to perimetral lockdowns and restrictions on social and religious gatherings.
The central government allows subnational governments to use their constitutional discretion, but available funding remains an important constraint, with reform to the system still needed.
Citations:
Carrión Álvarez, Miguel (2021), Eurozone fiscal reform in light of COVID-19: a review of existing proposals, FUNCAS, https://www.funcas.es/articulos/eurozone-fiscal-reform-in-light-of-covid-19-a-review-of-existing-proposals/
During the COVID-19 crisis, the suspension of EU fiscal rules provided the various levels of government with considerable discretion over overall debt limits, but also uncertainty about the normative context of their medium-term budget planning.
During the first state of alarm (14 March – 21 June), the autonomous communities lost their decision-making capacity, although they remained responsible for the management of centrally issued instructions. However, the second nationwide state of emergency (October 2020 – May 2021) was implemented in a decentralized manner, and was managed primarily by the autonomous community governments. Since then, these entities have been able use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to perimetral lockdowns and restrictions on social and religious gatherings.
The central government allows subnational governments to use their constitutional discretion, but available funding remains an important constraint, with reform to the system still needed.
Citations:
Carrión Álvarez, Miguel (2021), Eurozone fiscal reform in light of COVID-19: a review of existing proposals, FUNCAS, https://www.funcas.es/articulos/eurozone-fiscal-reform-in-light-of-covid-19-a-review-of-existing-proposals/
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?
10
9
9
Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
2
1
1
Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
The central government has in principle always been committed to ensuring uniform national standards for public services, but this has never been completely effective. In some cases, regional governments design and implement their own public policies without following clearly defined national standards. As a result, there may be some variation in the quality of public services offered by the autonomous communities. In general, minimum standards are set by basic national legislation, but are not subsequently enforced. The formal method for monitoring the provision of services by the autonomous communities through administrative supervision (the so-called High Inspectorate) has not been particularly effective. Regulations on financial sustainability within public administration and local governments have strengthened the tools through which the central government can ensure that regional and local governments realize national minimum standards.
Disparities in educational outcomes, innovation activities and healthcare outcomes are increasing.
During the first month of the COVID-19 pandemic, the central government had difficulties coordinating the national response. It was very difficult for the Ministry of Health to obtain and provide even basic operational data, or to coordinate joint actions with the autonomous communities. As a lesson from the crisis, the National Ministry of Health is seeking to ensure national standards in healthcare delivery. Moreover, efforts are being made to improve coordination and multilevel governance within the management of the National Health System. To this end, the government will create a National Public Health Center tasked with improving the system’s governance, and foster cooperation mechanisms between the autonomous communities’ healthcare and public health services.
In contrast, there are few national standards for other important policy areas (such as social services, education or transport). As a consequence, there is considerable diversity in term of services and outcomes.
Citations:
Erkoreka, Mikel; Grau Creus, Mireia; Kölling, Mario (2021), Decentralisation and COVID-19: the Spanish territorial system under pressure, en Nico Steytler (ed.) Comparative Federalism and COVID-19: Combatting the Pandemic, Routledge.
Kölling; Colino, Jaime-Castillo (2020), Desigualdades socioeconómicas territoriales en España, working paper, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
Disparities in educational outcomes, innovation activities and healthcare outcomes are increasing.
During the first month of the COVID-19 pandemic, the central government had difficulties coordinating the national response. It was very difficult for the Ministry of Health to obtain and provide even basic operational data, or to coordinate joint actions with the autonomous communities. As a lesson from the crisis, the National Ministry of Health is seeking to ensure national standards in healthcare delivery. Moreover, efforts are being made to improve coordination and multilevel governance within the management of the National Health System. To this end, the government will create a National Public Health Center tasked with improving the system’s governance, and foster cooperation mechanisms between the autonomous communities’ healthcare and public health services.
In contrast, there are few national standards for other important policy areas (such as social services, education or transport). As a consequence, there is considerable diversity in term of services and outcomes.
Citations:
Erkoreka, Mikel; Grau Creus, Mireia; Kölling, Mario (2021), Decentralisation and COVID-19: the Spanish territorial system under pressure, en Nico Steytler (ed.) Comparative Federalism and COVID-19: Combatting the Pandemic, Routledge.
Kölling; Colino, Jaime-Castillo (2020), Desigualdades socioeconómicas territoriales en España, working paper, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?
10
9
9
Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
8
7
6
7
6
Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
5
4
3
4
3
Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
2
1
1
Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
The country’s important companies and interest groups have substantial influence over policymaking. In recent years, the Spanish government has faced strong pressure from powerful economic groups in the banking, energy and telecommunications sectors, as well as several private groups such as pensioners and taxi drivers. Non-compliance with the law results in either administrative or criminal sanctions. However, regulators seek to encourage preventive action. Until 2015, with an absolute majority in parliament, the government was able to push unpopular legislative acts through parliament even against the opposition of vested interests. Nevertheless, the minority governments that have held power since 2015 were forced to seek not only the support of other political parties, but also a broader societal consensus. This has limited the ability to push through regulations against strong opposition from powerful interest groups, and produces significant regulatory biases in some policy areas (such as energy, public works, banking, or trade and commerce).
Citations:
Euractiv (2021), Spanish power companies clash with government over measures to reduce electricity bill, 16/09/2021
Citations:
Euractiv (2021), Spanish power companies clash with government over measures to reduce electricity bill, 16/09/2021
Graph View
To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?
10
9
9
The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
8
7
6
7
6
In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
2
1
1
The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
The government has largely adapted its domestic structures to agreements made at international and supranational level, although this adaptation has not always been implemented effectively. The government’s coordination with and adaptation to the European Union is mainly the task of the Secretariat of State for the European Union and the Spanish Permanent Representation in Brussels (both units within the Foreign Ministry). The Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry for Economy, and the Ministry for Finance also have important responsibilities in terms of coordinating cooperation between ministries on EU matters and structural reforms connected to European economic governance. More generally, all line ministries have to some extent Europeanized their organizations, although most ministries lack units dealing specifically with the European Union, and interministerial coordination is weak. Cooperation between central government and the autonomous communities on EU affairs has been managed by the so-called Conferences on Matters Related to the European Union.
A Ministry of Social Rights and Agenda 2030 was created in 2021 with executive powers, and tasked with coordinating domestic actions to promote fulfilment of the SDGs. In addition, a specific governance system has been created: the government commission for the 2030 Agenda will strengthen dialogue and interministerial coordination, while the Sectoral Conference for the 2030 Agenda will facilitate coordination with subnational levels of government. However, the government reacts most frequently to changes in the international developments through further executive centralization around the PMO, as reflected in the management of the Plan for Recovery, Transformation and Resilience.
Citations:
Real Decreto 507/2021, de 10 de julio, por el que se modifica el Real Decreto 2/2020, de 12 de enero, por el que se reestructuran los departamentos ministeriales.
A Ministry of Social Rights and Agenda 2030 was created in 2021 with executive powers, and tasked with coordinating domestic actions to promote fulfilment of the SDGs. In addition, a specific governance system has been created: the government commission for the 2030 Agenda will strengthen dialogue and interministerial coordination, while the Sectoral Conference for the 2030 Agenda will facilitate coordination with subnational levels of government. However, the government reacts most frequently to changes in the international developments through further executive centralization around the PMO, as reflected in the management of the Plan for Recovery, Transformation and Resilience.
Citations:
Real Decreto 507/2021, de 10 de julio, por el que se modifica el Real Decreto 2/2020, de 12 de enero, por el que se reestructuran los departamentos ministeriales.
To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?
10
9
9
The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
2
1
1
The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
The years 2020 and 2021 were important with regard to Spain’s efforts to contribute actively to international efforts to foster the provision of global public goods. The country continued to participate in these efforts as one of the leading EU member states and as a permanent guest at the G-20 summits. The country’s foreign development agencies increased the budget for foreign aid in 2020 and 2021, announcing that they would prioritize global health and epidemic prevention in the country’s development cooperation policy.
In 2020, as a member of the UN Human Rights Council, the government supported a number of resolutions including those addressing violence and discrimination against women and girls in the workplace, an initiative on equal pay, and the declaration on the 40th anniversary of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women.
The government also contributed to international forums and actions responding to various challenges including climate change (through the COP26), energy supply, financial stability and illegal migration (as a signatory to the Global Compact and several bilateral agreements). At the 26th edition of the United Nations Climate Change Conference, the government announced that Spain would increase its financial aid to less developed countries by 50%, to help them make a sustainable and just energy transition.
Opportunities for contributing to collective governance at the European level have expanded since the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU. For example, Spain played an important role in the negotiation of the NextGenerationEU program. Spain’s “non-paper on a European recovery strategy” included the suggestion that a top priority should be given to the ecological and digital transition of the economy, and to boosting the European Union’s long-term industrial and technological autonomy.
The government has advocated finding a common European answer to dealing with the energy crisis. However, member states decided to respect the current market rules and avoid any long-term reforms or market interventions.
Citations:
Government of Spain (2020), non-paper on a European recovery strategy April 19, 2020, https://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Spain-.pdf
In 2020, as a member of the UN Human Rights Council, the government supported a number of resolutions including those addressing violence and discrimination against women and girls in the workplace, an initiative on equal pay, and the declaration on the 40th anniversary of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women.
The government also contributed to international forums and actions responding to various challenges including climate change (through the COP26), energy supply, financial stability and illegal migration (as a signatory to the Global Compact and several bilateral agreements). At the 26th edition of the United Nations Climate Change Conference, the government announced that Spain would increase its financial aid to less developed countries by 50%, to help them make a sustainable and just energy transition.
Opportunities for contributing to collective governance at the European level have expanded since the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU. For example, Spain played an important role in the negotiation of the NextGenerationEU program. Spain’s “non-paper on a European recovery strategy” included the suggestion that a top priority should be given to the ecological and digital transition of the economy, and to boosting the European Union’s long-term industrial and technological autonomy.
The government has advocated finding a common European answer to dealing with the energy crisis. However, member states decided to respect the current market rules and avoid any long-term reforms or market interventions.
Citations:
Government of Spain (2020), non-paper on a European recovery strategy April 19, 2020, https://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Spain-.pdf
Graph View
To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?
10
9
9
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
5
4
3
4
3
The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
2
1
1
There is no monitoring.
The executive actors do not monitor institutional arrangements of governing in a regular basis. On the one hand, such monitoring is highly centralized. The prime minister has the power (both constitutionally and politically) to reformulate the institutional organization of the government. Without any legal constraint, he personally decides on the structure of portfolios and other governing arrangements every time he appoints new ministers. In 2021 Prime Minister Sánchez introduced several changes with regard to ministries’ names and jurisdictions, without a prior impact assessment. On the other hand, this task is not performed regularly, in spite of laws 19/2013 on transparency, access to public information and good governance, and 39/2015 on general administrative procedure, which state that the Government Office must engage in planning, evaluation, and comprehensive monitoring of general legislation and, where appropriate, must promote revision and simplification.
In December 2020, the government approved a royal decree on the oversight structures and the frameworks necessary for domestic oversight control, the ex ante monitoring of expenditures by independent bodies, and ex post monitoring by national audit authorities. In order to detect and correct fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest as well as to increase the effectiveness of the implementation of the RRP, the government created several temporary structures and gave new responsibilities to a number of existing administrative departments.
Citations:
Gobierno de España (2021), Plan de Recuperación, Transformación y Resiliencia https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/temas/fondos-recuperacion/Documents/160621-Plan_Recuperacion_Transformacion_Resiliencia.pdf
In December 2020, the government approved a royal decree on the oversight structures and the frameworks necessary for domestic oversight control, the ex ante monitoring of expenditures by independent bodies, and ex post monitoring by national audit authorities. In order to detect and correct fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest as well as to increase the effectiveness of the implementation of the RRP, the government created several temporary structures and gave new responsibilities to a number of existing administrative departments.
Citations:
Gobierno de España (2021), Plan de Recuperación, Transformación y Resiliencia https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/temas/fondos-recuperacion/Documents/160621-Plan_Recuperacion_Transformacion_Resiliencia.pdf
To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?
10
9
9
The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
8
7
6
7
6
The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
2
1
1
The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
In 2020 and 2021, several important changes were introduced with regard to policy portfolios and associated ministries, in line with the coalition government’s policy priorities and requirements for implementing the RRP. This included the creation of several new departments (including the Ministry for the Ecological Transition and the Demographic challenge and Ministry of Social Rights and Agenda 2030), and changes in the names and responsibilities of others. However, these changes did not significantly alter strategic capacities or policymaking structures.
Citations:
Oficina Nacional de Prospectiva y Estrategia del Gobierno de España (2021), España 2050, https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/presidente/actividades/Documents/2021/200521-Estrategia_Espana_2050.pdf
Real Decreto 507/2021, de 10 de julio, por el que se modifica el Real Decreto 2/2020, de 12 de enero, por el que se reestructuran los departamentos ministeriales.
Citations:
Oficina Nacional de Prospectiva y Estrategia del Gobierno de España (2021), España 2050, https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/presidente/actividades/Documents/2021/200521-Estrategia_Espana_2050.pdf
Real Decreto 507/2021, de 10 de julio, por el que se modifica el Real Decreto 2/2020, de 12 de enero, por el que se reestructuran los departamentos ministeriales.