Executive Capacity
#1Key Findings
With multiple layers of effective coordination, Sweden is the SGI 2022’s top scorer (rank 1) in the area of executive capacity. Its score on this measure has improved by 0.2 points relative to its 2014 level.
Strategic planning is performed by commissions of inquiry. Decisions in the government are made collectively, with no individual ministerial accountability. The PMO and Finance Ministry play a significant role in the coordination process. The PMO and GO are more deeply involved in content when policies are initiated, when final decisions are made, and when disagreements among parties emerge.
Ex ante assessments of regulatory impact have been required since 2007. Ex post performance measurement is common. Though institutionalized societal consultation has diminished in past years, the government consults broadly with key societal partners. Efforts to increase communication coherency have led to complaints of declining access to members of the government.
In 2019, the government agreed to implement neoliberal reforms in order to win parliamentary backing. A breakdown in this accord led to a vote of no confidence against the prime minister in 2021. Local governments often complain about unfunded mandates. Standardization at the municipal level is improving.
Strategic planning is performed by commissions of inquiry. Decisions in the government are made collectively, with no individual ministerial accountability. The PMO and Finance Ministry play a significant role in the coordination process. The PMO and GO are more deeply involved in content when policies are initiated, when final decisions are made, and when disagreements among parties emerge.
Ex ante assessments of regulatory impact have been required since 2007. Ex post performance measurement is common. Though institutionalized societal consultation has diminished in past years, the government consults broadly with key societal partners. Efforts to increase communication coherency have led to complaints of declining access to members of the government.
In 2019, the government agreed to implement neoliberal reforms in order to win parliamentary backing. A breakdown in this accord led to a vote of no confidence against the prime minister in 2021. Local governments often complain about unfunded mandates. Standardization at the municipal level is improving.
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How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
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In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
The strategic capacity of the government has been enhanced over the past few years. Much of that capacity is found in the finance ministry where most of the long-term planning takes place. The main role of the Prime Minister’s Office is not so much long-term planning but more coordination within government.
In addition to these planning efforts in the government departments, the agencies are also engaged in planning. They do not operate in close proximity to the departments, however. The exception to this pattern is when a department asks one of its agencies to look into a particular issue and to prepare advice on possible policy initiatives. The center-right government (2006 – 2014) invested considerable energy in increasing coordination among government departments and improving executive agency steering. The Social Democratic-Green minority governments (2014 until summer 2021) have not made any sustained efforts in this respect.
Strategic policy planning in Sweden is performed using commissions of inquiry. Most of these commissions are ad hoc, appointed by the parliament, and their membership tends to reflect the parties with seats in the parliament. Recently, public servants have come to take on a larger role on these commissions. Some commissions are conducted by a single person, a high-ranking nonelected official. The authors of commission reports hold regular meetings and engage in ongoing negotiations with the politicians who ordered the investigation. In practice, any conflicts regarding the contents of the report are teased out during that time. Petersson (2016) notes that commissions of inquiry have increasingly become less independent, especially with the assignment of one special investigator with support staff as opposed to a team of investigators (see also Dahlström, Lundberg and Pronin, 2019; Petridou and Sparf, 2017).
Citations:
Dahlström, Carl, Erik Lundberg and Kira Pronin. 2019. “Det Statliga Kommittéväsendets Förändring 1990-2016.” SNS Analys Rapport nr 59. (Stockholm: SNS).
Petersson, Olof. 2016. “Rational Politics: Commissions of Inquiry and the Referral System in Sweden.” In Jon Pierre (ed.). “The Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics.” 650-662. Oxford University Press.
Petridou, Evangelia and Jörgen Sparf. 2017. “For Safety’s Sake: the Strategies of Institutional Entrepreneurs and Bureaucratic Reforms in Swedish Crisis Management, 2001–2009.” Policy and Society, 36(4), 556-574.
In addition to these planning efforts in the government departments, the agencies are also engaged in planning. They do not operate in close proximity to the departments, however. The exception to this pattern is when a department asks one of its agencies to look into a particular issue and to prepare advice on possible policy initiatives. The center-right government (2006 – 2014) invested considerable energy in increasing coordination among government departments and improving executive agency steering. The Social Democratic-Green minority governments (2014 until summer 2021) have not made any sustained efforts in this respect.
Strategic policy planning in Sweden is performed using commissions of inquiry. Most of these commissions are ad hoc, appointed by the parliament, and their membership tends to reflect the parties with seats in the parliament. Recently, public servants have come to take on a larger role on these commissions. Some commissions are conducted by a single person, a high-ranking nonelected official. The authors of commission reports hold regular meetings and engage in ongoing negotiations with the politicians who ordered the investigation. In practice, any conflicts regarding the contents of the report are teased out during that time. Petersson (2016) notes that commissions of inquiry have increasingly become less independent, especially with the assignment of one special investigator with support staff as opposed to a team of investigators (see also Dahlström, Lundberg and Pronin, 2019; Petridou and Sparf, 2017).
Citations:
Dahlström, Carl, Erik Lundberg and Kira Pronin. 2019. “Det Statliga Kommittéväsendets Förändring 1990-2016.” SNS Analys Rapport nr 59. (Stockholm: SNS).
Petersson, Olof. 2016. “Rational Politics: Commissions of Inquiry and the Referral System in Sweden.” In Jon Pierre (ed.). “The Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics.” 650-662. Oxford University Press.
Petridou, Evangelia and Jörgen Sparf. 2017. “For Safety’s Sake: the Strategies of Institutional Entrepreneurs and Bureaucratic Reforms in Swedish Crisis Management, 2001–2009.” Policy and Society, 36(4), 556-574.
Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?
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In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
Overall, the government department staff solicits advice or other contacts with external actors less frequently than in the past. Communication is today managed in detail and there are disincentives to open up to external actors at sensitive stages of the policy process. Having said that, the recent pandemic crisis has highlighted Sweden’s high policy capacity and reliance on expert knowledge for its policy response (Petridou, 2020; Zahariadis et al, 2021). Notably, the Coronavirus Commission consisted overwhelmingly of academics (Coronakommissionen, 2021).
Citations:
Coronakommissionen. 2021. “Delbetänkande 2: Sverige under pandemi.” SOU 2021:89. https://coronakommissionen.com
Petridou, Evangelia. 2020. “Politics and Administration in Times of Crisis: Explaining the Swedish Response to the COVID-19 Crisis.” European Policy Analysis, 6(2), 147-158.
Zahariadis, Nikolaos, Evangelia Petridou, Theofanis Exadaktylos, and Jörgen Sparf. 2021. “Policy Styles and Political Trust in Europe’s National Responses to the Covid-19 Crisis.” Policy Studies: 1-22.
Citations:
Coronakommissionen. 2021. “Delbetänkande 2: Sverige under pandemi.” SOU 2021:89. https://coronakommissionen.com
Petridou, Evangelia. 2020. “Politics and Administration in Times of Crisis: Explaining the Swedish Response to the COVID-19 Crisis.” European Policy Analysis, 6(2), 147-158.
Zahariadis, Nikolaos, Evangelia Petridou, Theofanis Exadaktylos, and Jörgen Sparf. 2021. “Policy Styles and Political Trust in Europe’s National Responses to the Covid-19 Crisis.” Policy Studies: 1-22.
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Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?
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The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
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The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
Interministerial coordination has been a significant problem in the Swedish system of government for a long time but has now been addressed in a comprehensive strategy. The previous government (2006 – 2014) implemented a major program (“RK Styr”) in order to strengthen the coordination among departments. This goal was believed to be a necessary step to increase the capability of the GO to steer the agencies more effectively.
The government in 2019 decided to strengthen interministerial coordination across broad policy sectors rather than from an institutional perspective, by ministry. The collaboration programs take the Agenda 2030 program as a departure point, as well as a set of topics the government considers to be Sweden’s strengths, including climate adaptation within the private sector; maintaining a competent workforce and lifelong learning; the digital structural shift of the private sector; and health and the life sciences (Regeringskansliet, 2021).
In formal and legal terms, the government and its departments act as a collectivity. All decisions in the government are made collectively, and there is no individual ministerial accountability. The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) plays a significant role in the coordination process. This is also the case for the Finance Ministry. Furthermore, when the incumbent government is a coalition government, as has been the case since 2006, policies must be coordinated not just among the relevant departments but also among the governing parties (Jacobsson, Pierre, and Sundström, 2015).
The practices of governing and coordination are much more complex. Each department has a fair amount of autonomy in its respective sector. Coordination among departments takes place at different organizational levels depending on whether the issue is a technical and administrative issue, or whether it is a more political matter. In the case of the latter, political actors make the final decisions. When bills involving more than one department are drafted, coordination is achieved through meetings where drafts of the bill are discussed. There are instances where drafts have gone through a very large number of revisions as part of the coordination process. In the pro-growth policies of the mid-2000s, for instance, the bill that eventually was submitted to the parliament (Riksdag) was the 56th version of the bill (Dahlström, Peters, and Pierre, 2011; Niemann, 2013).
The lack of coordination has to some extent been resolved by increasing the centralization within the Government Office (GO). The finance ministry has become a “primus inter-pares” among the departments; a pattern that emerged in the wake of the financial crises in the early 1990s but that has remained ever since (Pierre and Sundström, 2009).
The PMO rarely coordinates policy content, which generally takes place during the process of deliberation or drafting of bills.
Citations:
Dahlström, Carl, B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre. (eds.) 2011. “Steering from the Center” Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Jacobsson, Bengt, Jon Pierre and Göran Sundström. 2015. “Governing the Embedded State.” Oxford University Press.
Niemann, Cajsa. 2013. “Villkorat Förtroende. Normer och Rollförväntningar i Relationen Mellan Politiker och Tjänstemän i Regeringskansliet.” Stockholm: Department of Political Science, University of Stockholm.
Pierre, Jon and Göran Sundström. (eds.) 2009. “Den Nya Samhällsstyrningen.” Malmö: Liber.
Regeringskansliet (Government Offices of Sweden). 2021. “Regeringens Strategiska Samverksansprogram.” https://www.regeringen.se/regeringens-politik/regeringens-strategiska-samverkansprogram/
The government in 2019 decided to strengthen interministerial coordination across broad policy sectors rather than from an institutional perspective, by ministry. The collaboration programs take the Agenda 2030 program as a departure point, as well as a set of topics the government considers to be Sweden’s strengths, including climate adaptation within the private sector; maintaining a competent workforce and lifelong learning; the digital structural shift of the private sector; and health and the life sciences (Regeringskansliet, 2021).
In formal and legal terms, the government and its departments act as a collectivity. All decisions in the government are made collectively, and there is no individual ministerial accountability. The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) plays a significant role in the coordination process. This is also the case for the Finance Ministry. Furthermore, when the incumbent government is a coalition government, as has been the case since 2006, policies must be coordinated not just among the relevant departments but also among the governing parties (Jacobsson, Pierre, and Sundström, 2015).
The practices of governing and coordination are much more complex. Each department has a fair amount of autonomy in its respective sector. Coordination among departments takes place at different organizational levels depending on whether the issue is a technical and administrative issue, or whether it is a more political matter. In the case of the latter, political actors make the final decisions. When bills involving more than one department are drafted, coordination is achieved through meetings where drafts of the bill are discussed. There are instances where drafts have gone through a very large number of revisions as part of the coordination process. In the pro-growth policies of the mid-2000s, for instance, the bill that eventually was submitted to the parliament (Riksdag) was the 56th version of the bill (Dahlström, Peters, and Pierre, 2011; Niemann, 2013).
The lack of coordination has to some extent been resolved by increasing the centralization within the Government Office (GO). The finance ministry has become a “primus inter-pares” among the departments; a pattern that emerged in the wake of the financial crises in the early 1990s but that has remained ever since (Pierre and Sundström, 2009).
The PMO rarely coordinates policy content, which generally takes place during the process of deliberation or drafting of bills.
Citations:
Dahlström, Carl, B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre. (eds.) 2011. “Steering from the Center” Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Jacobsson, Bengt, Jon Pierre and Göran Sundström. 2015. “Governing the Embedded State.” Oxford University Press.
Niemann, Cajsa. 2013. “Villkorat Förtroende. Normer och Rollförväntningar i Relationen Mellan Politiker och Tjänstemän i Regeringskansliet.” Stockholm: Department of Political Science, University of Stockholm.
Pierre, Jon and Göran Sundström. (eds.) 2009. “Den Nya Samhällsstyrningen.” Malmö: Liber.
Regeringskansliet (Government Offices of Sweden). 2021. “Regeringens Strategiska Samverksansprogram.” https://www.regeringen.se/regeringens-politik/regeringens-strategiska-samverkansprogram/
To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?
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There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
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The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
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Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
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Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
The leadership of the GO and the PMO are primarily involved when policies are initiated, when final decisions are to be made, and if a disagreement emerges among the governing parties or ministers. However, the line nature of the GO – and the chain of command between the political and administrative levels – means that the top leadership, apart from initiating and deciding on policy, does not routinely monitor its development. There are instead regular briefings and informal consultations. This informal coordination procedure nevertheless ensures that the PMO, in line with the Finance Ministry, plays a crucial role in policy developments. Also, there are established but informal rules regulating procedures when there is disagreement among the non-political advisers on how to design policy. Essentially, the political level of the department should only be consulted when its ruling is critical to policy formulation; otherwise, policy design rests with nonpartisan staff members.
When the government is made up of more than one party, as has been the case for most of Sweden’s recent history, there are mechanisms in place when disagreement arises. Either the political leadership proactively intervenes in the policy-planning process to resolve disagreements or such disagreements are “lifted” to the political level for a ruling.
It should also be noted that line ministries frequently ask for advice from the executive agencies during the early stages of the policy process (Jacobsson, Pierre, and Sundström, 2015; Niemann, 2012; Page, 2012; Premfors and Sundström, 2007).
Citations:
Jacobsson, Bengt, Jon Pierre and Göran Sundström. 2015. “Governing the Embedded State.” Oxford University Press.
Niemann, Cajsa. 2013. “Villkorat Förtroende. Normer och Rollförväntningar i Relationen Mellan Politiker och Tjänstemän i Regeringskansliet.” Department of Political Science, University of Stockholm.
Page, Edward C. 2012. “Policy Without Politicians: Bureaucratic Influence in Comparative Perspective.” Oxford University Press.
Premfors, Rune and Göran Sundström. 2007. “Regeringskansliet.” Liber.
When the government is made up of more than one party, as has been the case for most of Sweden’s recent history, there are mechanisms in place when disagreement arises. Either the political leadership proactively intervenes in the policy-planning process to resolve disagreements or such disagreements are “lifted” to the political level for a ruling.
It should also be noted that line ministries frequently ask for advice from the executive agencies during the early stages of the policy process (Jacobsson, Pierre, and Sundström, 2015; Niemann, 2012; Page, 2012; Premfors and Sundström, 2007).
Citations:
Jacobsson, Bengt, Jon Pierre and Göran Sundström. 2015. “Governing the Embedded State.” Oxford University Press.
Niemann, Cajsa. 2013. “Villkorat Förtroende. Normer och Rollförväntningar i Relationen Mellan Politiker och Tjänstemän i Regeringskansliet.” Department of Political Science, University of Stockholm.
Page, Edward C. 2012. “Policy Without Politicians: Bureaucratic Influence in Comparative Perspective.” Oxford University Press.
Premfors, Rune and Göran Sundström. 2007. “Regeringskansliet.” Liber.
How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?
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The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
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Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
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There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
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There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
There are no standing cabinet committees in the Swedish system of government. Cabinet proposals are coordinated through iterations of sending drafts of bills to the concerned departments. This usually takes place at the middle level of the departments and thus does not involve the political level of the departments.
The cabinet is both a policy-shaping institution as well as the final institution of appeal on a wide range of issues. There is also a requirement that the cabinet must be the formal decision-maker on many issues. This means that the cabinet annually makes more than 100,000 decisions (mostly in bulk).
The cabinet is both a policy-shaping institution as well as the final institution of appeal on a wide range of issues. There is also a requirement that the cabinet must be the formal decision-maker on many issues. This means that the cabinet annually makes more than 100,000 decisions (mostly in bulk).
How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?
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Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
Most of the day-to-day coordination on policy matters is handled at the administrative level, and does not involve the political level of the departments. However, as soon as coordination takes place on a political dimension, it is “lifted” to the political level.
Coordination within the GO remains a significant problem, although some measures have been implemented to address that problem. Many departments still find it difficult to coordinate policy across departmental boundaries. Departments that were formed through mergers of departments tend to display “subcultures” of the former departments (Jacobsson, Pierre, and Sundström, 2015; Niemann, 2013). The government has initiated a coordinated approach involving collaboration along policy sectors as a means of preventing the work from slipping into a silo mentality (Regeringskansliet, 2021).
Citations:
Jacobsson, Bengt, Jon Pierre and Göran Sundström. 2015. “Governing the Embedded State.” Oxford University Press.
Niemann, Cajsa. 2013. “Villkorat Förtroende. Normer och Rollförväntningar i Relationen Mellan Politiker och Tjänstemän i Regeringskansliet.” Department of Political Science, University of Stockholm.
Regeringskansliet (Government Offices of Sweden). 2021. “Regeringens Strategiska Samverksansprogram.” https://www.regeringen.se/regeringens-politik/regeringens-strategiska-samverkansprogram/
Coordination within the GO remains a significant problem, although some measures have been implemented to address that problem. Many departments still find it difficult to coordinate policy across departmental boundaries. Departments that were formed through mergers of departments tend to display “subcultures” of the former departments (Jacobsson, Pierre, and Sundström, 2015; Niemann, 2013). The government has initiated a coordinated approach involving collaboration along policy sectors as a means of preventing the work from slipping into a silo mentality (Regeringskansliet, 2021).
Citations:
Jacobsson, Bengt, Jon Pierre and Göran Sundström. 2015. “Governing the Embedded State.” Oxford University Press.
Niemann, Cajsa. 2013. “Villkorat Förtroende. Normer och Rollförväntningar i Relationen Mellan Politiker och Tjänstemän i Regeringskansliet.” Department of Political Science, University of Stockholm.
Regeringskansliet (Government Offices of Sweden). 2021. “Regeringens Strategiska Samverksansprogram.” https://www.regeringen.se/regeringens-politik/regeringens-strategiska-samverkansprogram/
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Informal mechanisms of coordination among civil servants and higher-ranking politicians alike are common and important in the Swedish system (Petridou and Sparf, 2017). Having said that, they may not always be effective. And yet, informal contacts between departments and agencies are believed to be integral to the efficiency of the politico-administrative system. Informal coordination procedures effectively filter many, but not all, policy proposals (de Fine Licht and Pierre, 2017).
Citations:
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de Fine Licht, Jenny, and Jon Pierre. 2017. “Myndighetschefernas Syn på Regeringens Styrning.” Stockholm: Statskontoret.
Petridou, Evangelia & Jörgen Sparf. 2017. “For Safety’s Sake: the Strategies of Institutional Entrepreneurs and Bureaucratic Reforms in Swedish Crisis Management, 2001–2009.” Policy and Society, 36(4), 556-574.
Citations:
”
de Fine Licht, Jenny, and Jon Pierre. 2017. “Myndighetschefernas Syn på Regeringens Styrning.” Stockholm: Statskontoret.
Petridou, Evangelia & Jörgen Sparf. 2017. “For Safety’s Sake: the Strategies of Institutional Entrepreneurs and Bureaucratic Reforms in Swedish Crisis Management, 2001–2009.” Policy and Society, 36(4), 556-574.
How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?
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The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
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The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
The digitalization of the Swedish public sector has come a rather long way. One exceptional example is the budget process (one of the key mechanisms to support coordination among government departments), where documents are digitally shared and simultaneously developed among various departments. The government also uses digital services to coordinate interdepartmental responses to communications from the EU. Overall, however, digitalization is mainly used to support intraorganizational processes such as drafting documents and only to a lesser extent to support interdepartmental coordination.
The Swedish government now communicates all new legislation and regulations (SFS) digitally, with digital versions given legal precedence over printed versions as they are the most current versions of legislation.
Digitalization has been implemented more extensively at the agency level. For instance, there is now a joint service center (SSC) that manages back-office functions for a growing number of agencies. Also, statistical material and maps are shared digitally among agencies.
The Swedish government now communicates all new legislation and regulations (SFS) digitally, with digital versions given legal precedence over printed versions as they are the most current versions of legislation.
Digitalization has been implemented more extensively at the agency level. For instance, there is now a joint service center (SSC) that manages back-office functions for a growing number of agencies. Also, statistical material and maps are shared digitally among agencies.
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To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?
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RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
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RIA are not applied or do not exist.
The purpose of regulatory impact analysis (RIA) is to assess the degree to which regulation has negative effects and unintended consequences for the targets of regulation. More broadly, RIA is nowadays used to avoid increasing regulatory burdens on private businesses. RIAs are also used to examine which regulatory framework could be simplified or abolished.
The pandemic crisis has highlighted the need for a transformation of the process by which rules are made, especially during a compressed time-frame imposed by urgent conditions. OECD (2021a) stresses the need for international coordination, since the rules one country imposes affects others, as we have seen during the past two years. The OECD further emphasizes the paucity of the use of evidence-based regulations and inconsistency of substantial follow-up.
Ex ante assessments of regulatory impact have been mandatory since 2007. In terms of the OECD’s iREG scores, Sweden scores just below the OECD average for primary laws and subordinate regulations (OECD, 2021b).
Citations:
OECD. 2021a. “OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook.” https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/38b0fdb1-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/38b0fdb1-en
OECD. 2021b. “Sweden: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance 2021.” https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/sweden-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdf
The pandemic crisis has highlighted the need for a transformation of the process by which rules are made, especially during a compressed time-frame imposed by urgent conditions. OECD (2021a) stresses the need for international coordination, since the rules one country imposes affects others, as we have seen during the past two years. The OECD further emphasizes the paucity of the use of evidence-based regulations and inconsistency of substantial follow-up.
Ex ante assessments of regulatory impact have been mandatory since 2007. In terms of the OECD’s iREG scores, Sweden scores just below the OECD average for primary laws and subordinate regulations (OECD, 2021b).
Citations:
OECD. 2021a. “OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook.” https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/38b0fdb1-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/38b0fdb1-en
OECD. 2021b. “Sweden: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance 2021.” https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/sweden-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdf
Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?
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RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
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The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
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The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
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RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
Levels of stakeholder engagement are quite high in the policymaking processes in Sweden. In the period under review, Sweden made progress with regard to systemizing the use of the central governmental portal, where information on consultations and the attendant documentation are posted so that relevant stakeholders can post feedback. Having said that, policy feedback in Sweden is given through organized interest groups; the policymaking process would benefit from a more interactive process in which the public (individual citizens) received greater encouragement to provide feedback regardless of whether they belonged to an organized association.
Simplification remains an important factor in Sweden’s regulatory policy (OECD, 2021). For example, in 2020, the Committee for Technological Innovation and Ethics created a forum to receive feedback from citizens on regulatory barriers in the development of technology, as well as a self-assessment tool for responsible tech in English (KOMET, 2022).
Citations:
KOMET. 2022. “Self assessment tool for responsible tech.” https://www.kometinfo.se/kronika/self-assessment-tool-for-responsible-tech/#.Ye1HLy2HKAk
OECD. 2021. “Sweden: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance 2021.” https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/sweden-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdf
Simplification remains an important factor in Sweden’s regulatory policy (OECD, 2021). For example, in 2020, the Committee for Technological Innovation and Ethics created a forum to receive feedback from citizens on regulatory barriers in the development of technology, as well as a self-assessment tool for responsible tech in English (KOMET, 2022).
Citations:
KOMET. 2022. “Self assessment tool for responsible tech.” https://www.kometinfo.se/kronika/self-assessment-tool-for-responsible-tech/#.Ye1HLy2HKAk
OECD. 2021. “Sweden: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance 2021.” https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/sweden-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdf
Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?
10
9
9
Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
8
7
6
7
6
Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
5
4
3
4
3
Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
2
1
1
Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
Environmental sustainability is one of several mainstreamed goals in the policy process. In theory at least, all government bills, procurements and directives to royal commissions are supposed to be assessed to determine their impact on environmental sustainability. As for other types of sustainability criteria, there is little evidence available about the degree to which they are considered in the RIA process.
To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?
10
9
9
Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
2
1
1
Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
Ex post evaluations take various forms in the Swedish system. For the past 10 to 15 years, performance measurement and management has been an integral part of public management in Sweden, as in most other countries. Also, audits conducted by the Swedish supreme audit institution (Riksrevisionen) are important evaluation instruments. There is, however, a tendency to focus more on institutions and cost efficiency (the audit approach) than on programs and impact (the evaluation approach) – a trend that is increasingly noticeable across many Western countries. That said, both approaches are useful as feedback on public policy (Pierre, Peters and de Fine Licht, 2018; Peters and Pierre, 2019).
Sweden’s pandemic policies are evaluated by an independent commission composed mainly of academics. The first partial reports of this evaluation are already available (https://coronakommissionen.com/).
Citations:
Pierre, Jon. B. Guy Peters and Jenny de Fine Licht. 2018. “Is Auditing the New Evaluation? Can it be? Should it be?,” International Journal of Public Sector Management 31:726-39.
Peters, B. Guy and Jon Pierre. 2019. “From Evaluation to Auditing and from Programs to Institutions?: Causes and Consequences of the Decline of the Program Approach.” Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions. 33(3), 585-597.
Sweden’s pandemic policies are evaluated by an independent commission composed mainly of academics. The first partial reports of this evaluation are already available (https://coronakommissionen.com/).
Citations:
Pierre, Jon. B. Guy Peters and Jenny de Fine Licht. 2018. “Is Auditing the New Evaluation? Can it be? Should it be?,” International Journal of Public Sector Management 31:726-39.
Peters, B. Guy and Jon Pierre. 2019. “From Evaluation to Auditing and from Programs to Institutions?: Causes and Consequences of the Decline of the Program Approach.” Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions. 33(3), 585-597.
Graph View
Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?
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9
9
The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
8
7
6
7
6
The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
2
1
1
The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
Consultation with societal actors has historically been a defining feature of Swedish corporatism. To a large extent, public consultation is still firmly in place in the Swedish policymaking process. In this corporatist arrangement, the government consults with key societal partners on a wide range of issues. Stakeholders are thus given an opportunity to influence public policy from the early stages of the policy process until implementation.
The preparatory work ahead of a policy’s promulgation is often performed in a parliamentary committee. Recently, the number of politicians participating in these committees has decreased, while the number of civil servants has increased (Dahlström, Lundberg & Pronin, 2019). In many cases, a commission of inquiry independently investigates a societal problem with a view to finding a policy solution. The commissions are appointed by the parliament, always include experts, and generally have a membership that reflects the party-political composition of parliament – although in two-thirds of them, a civil servant drawn from the relevant ministry additionally serves on the commission as an expert or secretary. After a report is completed, a referral process ensues that allows relevant ministries, agencies and civil society organizations to submit comments. The process concludes when the government drafts a bill and submits it to the parliament (Larsson & Bäck, 2008). The more specific nature of the relationship between the state and societal actors is changing, however. Previously, these contacts were institutionalized with all major players invited to provide input on almost all major policy issues. Today, these consultations are more ad hoc and strategic. Overall, most observers today agree that corporatism as a model of governance has been significantly weakened in Sweden, while others posit that current research on commissions of inquiry is outdated, and the question of the model’s efficacy must be studied empirically (Lundberg, 2015).
There have also been some tendencies toward increasing societal consultation. The increasing significance of so-called new modes of governance – networks, markets, partnerships and so on – has opened up new arenas for exchanges and communication between government institutions and organized interests. Also, studies show that societal actors now target specific institutions rather than engaging the state as a whole. Unions, for example, still target public institutions that draft policy, whereas business organizations are more active vis-à-vis executive agencies.
Citations:
Dahlström, Carl, Erik Lundberg and Kira Pronin. 2019. ”Det Statliga Kommittéväsendets Förändring 1990-2016.” SNS Analys Rapport nr 59. Stockholm: SNS.
Lundberg, Erik. 2015. “Injured But not Yet Dead: A Bottom-up Perspective on the Swedish Governmental Commissions.” International Journal of Public Administration 38: 346-54.
The preparatory work ahead of a policy’s promulgation is often performed in a parliamentary committee. Recently, the number of politicians participating in these committees has decreased, while the number of civil servants has increased (Dahlström, Lundberg & Pronin, 2019). In many cases, a commission of inquiry independently investigates a societal problem with a view to finding a policy solution. The commissions are appointed by the parliament, always include experts, and generally have a membership that reflects the party-political composition of parliament – although in two-thirds of them, a civil servant drawn from the relevant ministry additionally serves on the commission as an expert or secretary. After a report is completed, a referral process ensues that allows relevant ministries, agencies and civil society organizations to submit comments. The process concludes when the government drafts a bill and submits it to the parliament (Larsson & Bäck, 2008). The more specific nature of the relationship between the state and societal actors is changing, however. Previously, these contacts were institutionalized with all major players invited to provide input on almost all major policy issues. Today, these consultations are more ad hoc and strategic. Overall, most observers today agree that corporatism as a model of governance has been significantly weakened in Sweden, while others posit that current research on commissions of inquiry is outdated, and the question of the model’s efficacy must be studied empirically (Lundberg, 2015).
There have also been some tendencies toward increasing societal consultation. The increasing significance of so-called new modes of governance – networks, markets, partnerships and so on – has opened up new arenas for exchanges and communication between government institutions and organized interests. Also, studies show that societal actors now target specific institutions rather than engaging the state as a whole. Unions, for example, still target public institutions that draft policy, whereas business organizations are more active vis-à-vis executive agencies.
Citations:
Dahlström, Carl, Erik Lundberg and Kira Pronin. 2019. ”Det Statliga Kommittéväsendets Förändring 1990-2016.” SNS Analys Rapport nr 59. Stockholm: SNS.
Lundberg, Erik. 2015. “Injured But not Yet Dead: A Bottom-up Perspective on the Swedish Governmental Commissions.” International Journal of Public Administration 38: 346-54.
Graph View
To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?
10
9
9
Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
8
7
6
7
6
Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
5
4
3
4
3
Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
2
1
1
Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
Improved communications dovetails with increasing coordination among the government departments. Recently, the government has developed and implemented a more coherent communications strategy. The flow of communication from government departments and the PMO is now carefully controlled such that only a very limited number of officials are authorized to engage the media or other actors outside the core of government.
This strategy is very similar to the communications strategies today used in countries such as Canada and the United Kingdom. It implies that cabinet ministers carefully assess invitations from radio and television and, perhaps surprisingly, frequently decline those invitations if they cannot control the format or if they are to debate with representatives from the opposition.
This strategy has been rather successful; indeed, in some ways it may even have been too successful. The media have cited increasing problems in accessing ministers and other representatives of the governing parties. This has the potential to harm the production of knowledge and undermine scrutiny of the public sector. There is also increasing frustration with the GO’s tendency to be slow in providing the media with public documents. Even among several agencies there is now frustration about the decreasing access to government departments and government information (Dahlström, Pierre, and Peters, 2011; Erlandsson, 2008; Jacobsson, Pierre, and Sundström, 2015).
In terms of multilevel governance, municipalities often express their frustration with public agencies regarding a one-way communication flow, in which they are expected to provide information upward, but relatively little information trickles downward, and not in a timely fashion. In the context of the pandemic response, municipalities pointed out that they were often not given sufficient advanced warning regarding upcoming contagion mitigation measures (Sparf et al., 2021).
Citations:
Dahlström, Carl, Jon Pierre and B. Guy Peters. (eds.) 2011. “Steering from the Center.” Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Erlandsson, Magnus. 2008. ”Regeringskansliet och Medierna. Den Politiska Exekutivens Resurser och Strategier för att Hantera och Styra Massmedier.” Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift. 110: 335-49.
Jacobsson, Bengt, Jon Pierre and Göran Sundström. 2015. “Governing the Embedded State.” Oxford University Press.
Sparf, Jörgen, Evangelia Petridou, Mikael Granberg, and Beatrice Onn. 2021. ”Kommunal Organisering av Pandemirespons: En Realstudie av Lokal Resiliens.” MSB: 1792. https://rib.msb.se/filer/pdf/29736.pdf
This strategy is very similar to the communications strategies today used in countries such as Canada and the United Kingdom. It implies that cabinet ministers carefully assess invitations from radio and television and, perhaps surprisingly, frequently decline those invitations if they cannot control the format or if they are to debate with representatives from the opposition.
This strategy has been rather successful; indeed, in some ways it may even have been too successful. The media have cited increasing problems in accessing ministers and other representatives of the governing parties. This has the potential to harm the production of knowledge and undermine scrutiny of the public sector. There is also increasing frustration with the GO’s tendency to be slow in providing the media with public documents. Even among several agencies there is now frustration about the decreasing access to government departments and government information (Dahlström, Pierre, and Peters, 2011; Erlandsson, 2008; Jacobsson, Pierre, and Sundström, 2015).
In terms of multilevel governance, municipalities often express their frustration with public agencies regarding a one-way communication flow, in which they are expected to provide information upward, but relatively little information trickles downward, and not in a timely fashion. In the context of the pandemic response, municipalities pointed out that they were often not given sufficient advanced warning regarding upcoming contagion mitigation measures (Sparf et al., 2021).
Citations:
Dahlström, Carl, Jon Pierre and B. Guy Peters. (eds.) 2011. “Steering from the Center.” Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Erlandsson, Magnus. 2008. ”Regeringskansliet och Medierna. Den Politiska Exekutivens Resurser och Strategier för att Hantera och Styra Massmedier.” Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift. 110: 335-49.
Jacobsson, Bengt, Jon Pierre and Göran Sundström. 2015. “Governing the Embedded State.” Oxford University Press.
Sparf, Jörgen, Evangelia Petridou, Mikael Granberg, and Beatrice Onn. 2021. ”Kommunal Organisering av Pandemirespons: En Realstudie av Lokal Resiliens.” MSB: 1792. https://rib.msb.se/filer/pdf/29736.pdf
Graph View
To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?
10
9
9
The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
5
4
3
4
3
The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
2
1
1
The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
The Swedish government has a robust implementation capacity (Zahariadis et al, 2021). The roughly 340 executive agencies are the key actors in the implementation of policy. Over the past few years, the departments have increased the steering of their agencies. Also, performance measurement and management have become increasingly important in monitoring the agencies and the implementation process.
Yet like the challenge of efficient policy coordination, policy implementation is also a challenge under the restrictions of new governance forms. The relationship between the government and the agencies no longer follows a strict command and control pattern; rather, it is a more interactive form of governance where departments utilize the expertise in the agencies during the early stages of the policy process. This pattern is largely due to the fact that policy expertise is located not just in the departments but also in the agencies (Jacobsson, Pierre, and Sundström, 2015).
The departments as a whole have about 5,000 staff members, including 4,400 civil servants and 200 elected officials (Regeringskansliet, 2021), whereas the number of staffers at the agency level is around 273,000 (OFR, 2021). To a large extent, and with considerable variation among policy sectors and even specific issues, agencies provide informal advice to the government on policy design. In some cases, there is a weekly dialogue between departments and agencies, not just on what departments want agencies to do, but also on matters of policy design. This means effectively that agencies are involved in shaping the policies they will later implement. This arrangement obviously increases the agencies’ commitment to a policy, but at the same time it complicates the implementation process.
The main challenge in implementing government policies is not institutional but rather political. Neither the current nor previous red-green coalition government has held a majority of seats in the parliament. As a consequence, policy proposals have had to be negotiated with opposition parties. If all opposition parties unite against the government, the government’s proposals will be defeated. The complexity of this parliamentary situation has significantly complicated the policy process, especially as the situation was further exacerbated by the inconclusive 2018 election results. After lengthy negotiations, the red-green government struck a deal with the Center Party and the Liberals in January 2019, the so-called January Accord. Under the deal, the government has agreed to implement several distinctly liberal or neoliberal reforms. Thus, while the capacity of the government to implement its policies remains strong, those policies now represent a rather broad spectrum of the party system. Notably, the breakdown of the January Accord in 2021 resulted in a political crisis that included the first vote of no confidence against a prime minister in Sweden.
Citations:
Jacobsson, Bengt, Jon Pierre and Göran Sundström. 2015. “Governing the Embedded State.” Oxford University Press.
OFR. (Offentliganställdas Förhandlingsråd [Public Employees’ Negotiation Council]). 2021. “Branschfakta – Statlig sektor.” https://www.ofr.se/document/branschfakta-staten/
Regeringskansliet (Government Offices of Sweden). 2021. ”Regeringskansliets anställda.” https://www.regeringen.se/regeringskansliet/regeringskansliets-anstallda/
Zahariadis, Nikolaos, Evangelia Petridou, Theofanis Exadaktylos, and Jörgen Sparf. 2021. “Policy Styles and Political Trust in Europe’s National Responses to the Covid-19 Crisis.” Policy Studies: 1-22.
Yet like the challenge of efficient policy coordination, policy implementation is also a challenge under the restrictions of new governance forms. The relationship between the government and the agencies no longer follows a strict command and control pattern; rather, it is a more interactive form of governance where departments utilize the expertise in the agencies during the early stages of the policy process. This pattern is largely due to the fact that policy expertise is located not just in the departments but also in the agencies (Jacobsson, Pierre, and Sundström, 2015).
The departments as a whole have about 5,000 staff members, including 4,400 civil servants and 200 elected officials (Regeringskansliet, 2021), whereas the number of staffers at the agency level is around 273,000 (OFR, 2021). To a large extent, and with considerable variation among policy sectors and even specific issues, agencies provide informal advice to the government on policy design. In some cases, there is a weekly dialogue between departments and agencies, not just on what departments want agencies to do, but also on matters of policy design. This means effectively that agencies are involved in shaping the policies they will later implement. This arrangement obviously increases the agencies’ commitment to a policy, but at the same time it complicates the implementation process.
The main challenge in implementing government policies is not institutional but rather political. Neither the current nor previous red-green coalition government has held a majority of seats in the parliament. As a consequence, policy proposals have had to be negotiated with opposition parties. If all opposition parties unite against the government, the government’s proposals will be defeated. The complexity of this parliamentary situation has significantly complicated the policy process, especially as the situation was further exacerbated by the inconclusive 2018 election results. After lengthy negotiations, the red-green government struck a deal with the Center Party and the Liberals in January 2019, the so-called January Accord. Under the deal, the government has agreed to implement several distinctly liberal or neoliberal reforms. Thus, while the capacity of the government to implement its policies remains strong, those policies now represent a rather broad spectrum of the party system. Notably, the breakdown of the January Accord in 2021 resulted in a political crisis that included the first vote of no confidence against a prime minister in Sweden.
Citations:
Jacobsson, Bengt, Jon Pierre and Göran Sundström. 2015. “Governing the Embedded State.” Oxford University Press.
OFR. (Offentliganställdas Förhandlingsråd [Public Employees’ Negotiation Council]). 2021. “Branschfakta – Statlig sektor.” https://www.ofr.se/document/branschfakta-staten/
Regeringskansliet (Government Offices of Sweden). 2021. ”Regeringskansliets anställda.” https://www.regeringen.se/regeringskansliet/regeringskansliets-anstallda/
Zahariadis, Nikolaos, Evangelia Petridou, Theofanis Exadaktylos, and Jörgen Sparf. 2021. “Policy Styles and Political Trust in Europe’s National Responses to the Covid-19 Crisis.” Policy Studies: 1-22.
To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?
10
9
9
The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
8
7
6
7
6
The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
5
4
3
4
3
The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
2
1
1
The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
In Sweden, ministers and departments do not implement policy. The task is handled by the executive agencies. Additionally, there is no ministerial oversight in Sweden, which means that the agencies are fairly autonomous when it comes to implementing policies (Petridou, 2020).
A major concern in Sweden is the degree to which ministers can, and should, steer the agencies. Swedish agencies are highly autonomous, but departments can formally steer them by appointing the Director General of the agency, deciding on the regulatory and institutional framework of the agency, and allocating financial resources to specific tasks and programs (Premfors and Sundström, 2007).
In Sweden, as in many other countries, the relationship between departments and agencies, and the willingness of the latter to implement policies defined by the former, can hinder or enable implementation. In Sweden, the relationship between departments and agencies is an institutional relation, not a personal relation between a minister and the director of an agency. Thus, to the extent that it is meaningful to talk about incentives, they must be organizational incentives. Furthermore, implementing policy is a core role for the agencies, so incentives are hardly necessary.
Citations:
Petridou, Evangelia. 2020. “Politics and Administration in Times of Crisis: Explaining the Swedish Response to the COVID-19 Crisis.” European Policy Analysis, 6(2), 147-158.
Premfors, Rune and Göran Sundström. 2007. ”Regeringskansliet.” Malmö: Liber.
A major concern in Sweden is the degree to which ministers can, and should, steer the agencies. Swedish agencies are highly autonomous, but departments can formally steer them by appointing the Director General of the agency, deciding on the regulatory and institutional framework of the agency, and allocating financial resources to specific tasks and programs (Premfors and Sundström, 2007).
In Sweden, as in many other countries, the relationship between departments and agencies, and the willingness of the latter to implement policies defined by the former, can hinder or enable implementation. In Sweden, the relationship between departments and agencies is an institutional relation, not a personal relation between a minister and the director of an agency. Thus, to the extent that it is meaningful to talk about incentives, they must be organizational incentives. Furthermore, implementing policy is a core role for the agencies, so incentives are hardly necessary.
Citations:
Petridou, Evangelia. 2020. “Politics and Administration in Times of Crisis: Explaining the Swedish Response to the COVID-19 Crisis.” European Policy Analysis, 6(2), 147-158.
Premfors, Rune and Göran Sundström. 2007. ”Regeringskansliet.” Malmö: Liber.
How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
5
4
3
4
3
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
2
1
1
The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
Formally, ministries are not very involved in the implementation of policies. It is rather the task of agencies to implement policies. Nevertheless, Swedish ministries still control the implementation process of the agencies. The relationship between ministries and agencies implies monitoring by communication and mutual adaptation, rather than through a hierarchical chain of command.
How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
8
7
6
7
6
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
5
4
3
4
3
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
2
1
1
The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
Government departments in the GO monitor the activities of public agencies quite closely. Since the introduction of performance management some 15 to 20 years ago, agencies report to their parent department on their performance targets. In fact, many criticize this reporting, which requires agencies to devote substantial time and effort reporting on their performance to their respective department, because it is so extensive that it has become burdensome. Recently, there has been a tendency to reduce the number of objectives and performance indicators on which the agencies are to report. This tendency is likely to continue over the next several years (Jacobsson, Pierre, and Sundström, 2015; Pierre and de Fine Licht, 2017).
Citations:
Jacobsson, Bengt, Jon Pierre and Göran Sundström. 2015. “Governing the Embedded State.” Oxford University Press.
Pierre, Jon and Jenny de Fine Licht. 2017. ”Myndighetschefernas Syn på Regeringens Styrning.” Stockholm: Statskontoret.
Citations:
Jacobsson, Bengt, Jon Pierre and Göran Sundström. 2015. “Governing the Embedded State.” Oxford University Press.
Pierre, Jon and Jenny de Fine Licht. 2017. ”Myndighetschefernas Syn på Regeringens Styrning.” Stockholm: Statskontoret.
To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
8
7
6
7
6
The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
2
1
1
The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
Unfunded or insufficiently funded mandates have been a long-standing issue in Sweden; indeed, recent studies show an almost complete unanimity among local governments regarding their frustration with insufficiently funded mandates.
Subnational governments enjoy extensive autonomy in relation to the central government in Sweden. Local governments and their national association, the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR), have insisted that all tasks placed upon them by central government must be fully funded.
SALAR has made this claim an overarching principle, which it emphasizes whenever the central government delegates tasks to local authorities. Instead of fully funded mandates, though, the central government frequently negotiates the funding aspect of delegated tasks with the local governments and SALAR. From the local authorities’ perspective, this problem has become more significant as the central government has increased its control over local authorities during the past couple of years, as the Swedish Agency for Public Management recently showed (Statskontoret, 2018). A recently formed commission of inquiry (Regeringskansliet, 2020) is likely to result in municipal reforms in the years to come.
Citations:
Regeringskansliet. (Government Offices of Sweden). 2020. ”Starkare kommuner – med Kapacitet att Klara Välfärdsuppdraget.” https://www.regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/statens-offentliga-utredningar/2020/02/sou-20208/.
Statskontoret. 2020. ”Utveckling av Styrningen av Kommuner och Landsting 2019.” Stockholm: Statskontoret.
Subnational governments enjoy extensive autonomy in relation to the central government in Sweden. Local governments and their national association, the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR), have insisted that all tasks placed upon them by central government must be fully funded.
SALAR has made this claim an overarching principle, which it emphasizes whenever the central government delegates tasks to local authorities. Instead of fully funded mandates, though, the central government frequently negotiates the funding aspect of delegated tasks with the local governments and SALAR. From the local authorities’ perspective, this problem has become more significant as the central government has increased its control over local authorities during the past couple of years, as the Swedish Agency for Public Management recently showed (Statskontoret, 2018). A recently formed commission of inquiry (Regeringskansliet, 2020) is likely to result in municipal reforms in the years to come.
Citations:
Regeringskansliet. (Government Offices of Sweden). 2020. ”Starkare kommuner – med Kapacitet att Klara Välfärdsuppdraget.” https://www.regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/statens-offentliga-utredningar/2020/02/sou-20208/.
Statskontoret. 2020. ”Utveckling av Styrningen av Kommuner och Landsting 2019.” Stockholm: Statskontoret.
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
2
1
1
The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
Although unfunded mandates have been much debated, the central government overwhelmingly respects local autonomy. Local government enjoys extensive autonomy, which is guaranteed by the constitution. Indeed, the strength of local autonomy adds to the fragmented nature of the Swedish political system and sometimes creates problems in governance and coordination. In terms of crisis, extraordinary challenges or when there are major national interests at stake, however, the state can increase its pressure on local government, despite the latter’s formal autonomy. In these cases, the usual procedure is first to negotiate with the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and the Regions (SALAR) and, if that proves unsuccessful, introduce stronger regulatory measures. For instance, in 2015, the appropriate extent to which the central government ought to be able to force local governments to receive asylum-seekers was thoroughly debated. However, the national government did not interfere with the implementation of the contagion mitigation measures at the municipality level, though other Scandinavian countries did so (Petridou, 2020).
State control over autonomous local governments has increased gradually over the past several years. Such control does not reach across the board, but is generally targeted at specific issues and programs such as education. The red-green minority government from 2014 until 2018 and its key advisory agencies established a commission of inquiry and the Public Management Agency review intergovernmental relations in preparation for a reform proposal. A 2020 commission of inquiry (Regeringskansliet, 2020) has also proposed a series of measures (including mergers) that would help municipalities pay for the welfare services they are tasked with providing. Given the sensitivity of this issue, municipal autonomy is sure to be a question in the upcoming 2022 elections.
Citations:
Petridou, Evangelia. 2020. “Politics and Administration in Times of Crisis: Explaining the Swedish Response to the Covid-19 Crisis.” European Policy Analysis 6: 147-58.
Regeringskansliet. (Government Offices of Sweden). 2020. “Starkare Kommuner – med Kapacitet att Klara Välfärdsuppdraget.” https://www.regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/statens-offentliga-utredningar/2020/02/sou-20208/.
State control over autonomous local governments has increased gradually over the past several years. Such control does not reach across the board, but is generally targeted at specific issues and programs such as education. The red-green minority government from 2014 until 2018 and its key advisory agencies established a commission of inquiry and the Public Management Agency review intergovernmental relations in preparation for a reform proposal. A 2020 commission of inquiry (Regeringskansliet, 2020) has also proposed a series of measures (including mergers) that would help municipalities pay for the welfare services they are tasked with providing. Given the sensitivity of this issue, municipal autonomy is sure to be a question in the upcoming 2022 elections.
Citations:
Petridou, Evangelia. 2020. “Politics and Administration in Times of Crisis: Explaining the Swedish Response to the Covid-19 Crisis.” European Policy Analysis 6: 147-58.
Regeringskansliet. (Government Offices of Sweden). 2020. “Starkare Kommuner – med Kapacitet att Klara Välfärdsuppdraget.” https://www.regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/statens-offentliga-utredningar/2020/02/sou-20208/.
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?
10
9
9
Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
2
1
1
Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
Public services have been extensively decentralized over the past decades. Once services are transferred from central to local government, safeguarding national standards and even defining and sustaining those standards becomes problematic. The same problem applies to increasingly privatized services, where the oversight over national standards becomes even more challenging.
Decentralization and local autonomy are essentially institutional choices and, as all choices, these arrangements have their downsides. One of the problems with a decentralized system is that it becomes very difficult to enforce national standards. This became obvious to the government after the extensive decentralization reform during the 1980s and early 1990s. In primary and secondary education, the past two decades have witnessed the central government trying to regain some control in order to ensure some degree of national standards. The main strategy toward this objective has been to extensively evaluate the performance of schools and publicize evaluation reports (i.e., to “name, blame and shame” underperforming schools). Thus, the government exercises a strategy of steering by auditing. In addition, the central government has tried to increase equality among local authorities by revising the general regulatory framework of primary and secondary education, and by targeting financial resources to improve the quality of teaching.
There is a tendency toward centralization and standardization in the field of crisis management as well. A recent commission of inquiry (Regeringskansliet, 2018) resulted in legislative changes mandating that municipalities form joint constellations to fight large forest fires and even the standardization of equipment.
Citations:
Regeringskansliet. (Government Offices of Sweden). 2018. “En Effektivare Kommunal Räddningstjänst.” https://www.regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/statens-offentliga-utredningar/2018/06/sou-201854/
Decentralization and local autonomy are essentially institutional choices and, as all choices, these arrangements have their downsides. One of the problems with a decentralized system is that it becomes very difficult to enforce national standards. This became obvious to the government after the extensive decentralization reform during the 1980s and early 1990s. In primary and secondary education, the past two decades have witnessed the central government trying to regain some control in order to ensure some degree of national standards. The main strategy toward this objective has been to extensively evaluate the performance of schools and publicize evaluation reports (i.e., to “name, blame and shame” underperforming schools). Thus, the government exercises a strategy of steering by auditing. In addition, the central government has tried to increase equality among local authorities by revising the general regulatory framework of primary and secondary education, and by targeting financial resources to improve the quality of teaching.
There is a tendency toward centralization and standardization in the field of crisis management as well. A recent commission of inquiry (Regeringskansliet, 2018) resulted in legislative changes mandating that municipalities form joint constellations to fight large forest fires and even the standardization of equipment.
Citations:
Regeringskansliet. (Government Offices of Sweden). 2018. “En Effektivare Kommunal Räddningstjänst.” https://www.regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/statens-offentliga-utredningar/2018/06/sou-201854/
To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?
10
9
9
Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
8
7
6
7
6
Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
5
4
3
4
3
Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
2
1
1
Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
Much of modern regulation is responsive regulation: it is designed and implemented through a dialogue with the targets of the regulation rather than forcefully imposed. Often, regulatory agencies prefer to use incentives rather than formal rules to elicit the desired behavioral changes among the targets of the regulation. Given that changing behavior is the overarching objective, regulators may use a combination of rules, bargaining and incentives toward that objective. There is no evidence of a systematic bias in this respect among Swedish regulatory agencies (OECD, 2021).
Citations:
OECD. 2021. “OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021.” https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/oecd-regulatory-policy-outlook-2021-38b0fdb1-en.htm
Citations:
OECD. 2021. “OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021.” https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/oecd-regulatory-policy-outlook-2021-38b0fdb1-en.htm
Graph View
To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?
10
9
9
The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
8
7
6
7
6
In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
2
1
1
The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
Following Sweden’s EU membership, which came into effect in the mid-1990s, there has been a sustained effort to adapt government, policy and regulation to EU standards. The bulk of this adaptation relates to changes in domestic regulatory frameworks and policies, a development that does not impact the structure of government (Jacobsson and Sundström, 2006).
Estimates suggest that some 75% of the regulations that pertain to Sweden are today EU rules, not domestic rules. This pattern is probably typical for all EU member states. However, Sweden is today among the forerunners in the EU with respect to its adoption of EU directives and decisions. Most of the adaptation has taken place not at the policy level, but on the administrative level (e.g., by integrating domestic regulatory agencies with EU agencies). At the same time, Eriksson (2021) reports that Sweden has had a considerable influence on EU policymaking in many policy sectors.
Citations:
Eriksson, Jonas. (ed.) 2021. ”Sverige 25 år i EU. Sammanfattningar av åtta forskningsrapporter.” SIEPS: Rapport 2op. https://sieps.se/globalassets/publikationer/2021/sieps-2021_2op-webb.pdf?
Jacobsson Bengt and Göran Sundström. 2006. ”Från Hemvävd till Invävd: Europeiseringen av Svensk Förvaltning och Politik.” Malmö: Liber.
Estimates suggest that some 75% of the regulations that pertain to Sweden are today EU rules, not domestic rules. This pattern is probably typical for all EU member states. However, Sweden is today among the forerunners in the EU with respect to its adoption of EU directives and decisions. Most of the adaptation has taken place not at the policy level, but on the administrative level (e.g., by integrating domestic regulatory agencies with EU agencies). At the same time, Eriksson (2021) reports that Sweden has had a considerable influence on EU policymaking in many policy sectors.
Citations:
Eriksson, Jonas. (ed.) 2021. ”Sverige 25 år i EU. Sammanfattningar av åtta forskningsrapporter.” SIEPS: Rapport 2op. https://sieps.se/globalassets/publikationer/2021/sieps-2021_2op-webb.pdf?
Jacobsson Bengt and Göran Sundström. 2006. ”Från Hemvävd till Invävd: Europeiseringen av Svensk Förvaltning och Politik.” Malmö: Liber.
To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?
10
9
9
The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
2
1
1
The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
Sweden has maintained a rather high international profile on a number of issues requiring international collective action. These issues have traditionally included disarmament, human rights, international solidarity and more recently, climate change and a feminist approach to international relations and peacekeeping (Aggestam and Towns, 2018; Ingebritsen 2006). The country has traditionally been (and still is) a generous contributor to international development work and humanitarian aid (Regeringskansliet, 2021).
Sweden tends to look at itself as an international broker and coordinator, though it may exaggerate its capacity in this regard. Certainly, Sweden, together with several other smaller nations, exerts some degree of international influence through “soft power” (Petridou et al., 2020; Pierre, 2016). However, in seeking to address the pandemic crisis, Sweden largely did not engage in international coordination.
Citations:
Aggestam, Karin, and Ann Towns. 2018. “The Gender Turn in Diplomacy: a New Research Agenda.” International Feminist Journal of Politics, 21(1), 9-28.
Ingebritsen, Christine. 2006. “Scandinavia in World Politics.” Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Pierre, Jon (ed.) 2016. “Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics.” Oxford University Press.
Petridou, Evangelia, Jörgen Sparf, and Kari Pihl. (2020). Resilience Work in Swedish Local Governance: Evidence From the Areas of Climate Change Adaptation, Migration, and Violent Extremism.” In Pedro Pinto Santos, Ksenia Chmutina, Jason von Meding, Emmanuel Raju (eds.) “Understanding Disaster Risk: A Multidimensional Approach.” Amsterdam: Elsevier, 225-238.
Regeringskansliet (Government Offices of Sweden). 2021. Internationellt Unvecklingssamarbete.” https://www.regeringen.se/regeringens-politik/internationellt-utvecklingssamarbete/
Sweden tends to look at itself as an international broker and coordinator, though it may exaggerate its capacity in this regard. Certainly, Sweden, together with several other smaller nations, exerts some degree of international influence through “soft power” (Petridou et al., 2020; Pierre, 2016). However, in seeking to address the pandemic crisis, Sweden largely did not engage in international coordination.
Citations:
Aggestam, Karin, and Ann Towns. 2018. “The Gender Turn in Diplomacy: a New Research Agenda.” International Feminist Journal of Politics, 21(1), 9-28.
Ingebritsen, Christine. 2006. “Scandinavia in World Politics.” Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Pierre, Jon (ed.) 2016. “Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics.” Oxford University Press.
Petridou, Evangelia, Jörgen Sparf, and Kari Pihl. (2020). Resilience Work in Swedish Local Governance: Evidence From the Areas of Climate Change Adaptation, Migration, and Violent Extremism.” In Pedro Pinto Santos, Ksenia Chmutina, Jason von Meding, Emmanuel Raju (eds.) “Understanding Disaster Risk: A Multidimensional Approach.” Amsterdam: Elsevier, 225-238.
Regeringskansliet (Government Offices of Sweden). 2021. Internationellt Unvecklingssamarbete.” https://www.regeringen.se/regeringens-politik/internationellt-utvecklingssamarbete/
Graph View
To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?
10
9
9
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
5
4
3
4
3
The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
2
1
1
There is no monitoring.
Institutional arrangements of governing obviously cover a wide array of arrangements. As indicated earlier, it is astounding in many ways to think that Sweden has transformed politically from a pre-democratic system to a democratic state, embedded in an international union such as the EU, with only a minimum amount of institutional and constitutional reform. Such a transformation testifies to the capacity of institutions to accommodate change. Given their institutional capacity to adapt to external change, institutional arrangements as such are rarely assessed.
The cabinet and government departments were reformed (i.e., merged and/or abolished) during the 1980s and 1990s, but today most observers seem to agree that this type of reform rarely solves any problems. Instead, the main institutional monitoring and reform takes place at the agency level. The number of agencies has been reduced dramatically over the past two decades, from just over 1,300 in 2000 to 343 as of January 2022. Two more agencies will be established in 2022: the Agency for Psychological Defense and the Agency for Human Rights (Statskontoret, 2021).
While some agencies have been abolished, the bulk of the reduction has come from mergers. This reduction in the number of agencies says very little about the extent of regulation; in some ways it is a numbers game aiming to communicate the message to voters that the government is trimming the central bureaucracy. However, there is more or less continuous assessment of the agency system and of the performance of agencies with regard to service delivery and policy implementation.
Agencies are monitored fairly closely, so much so that a couple of recent commissions have recommended that agencies should not have to provide data on their performance with the same frequency as they do today and that the system should allow for more variation among agencies in this respect. The red-green government that came into power in 2014 has launched a process of reducing the number of performance indicators that agencies are requested to provide data on. These efforts are part of a larger project to replace New Public Management models of public sector management with a more trust-based model of management, as advised by the results of commissions of inquiry in 2018 and 2019, which are sure to result in reforms in the future (Regeringskansliet, 2018; 2019).
Citations:
Statskontoret (The Swedish Agency for Public Management). 2021. ”Myndigheterna Under Regeringen.” https://www.statskontoret.se/fokusomraden/fakta-om-statsforvaltningen/fakta-om-statsforvaltningen/
Regeringskansliet. (Government Offices of Sweden). 2019. ”Med Tillit Följer Bättre Resultat – Tillitsbaserad Styrning och Ledning i Staten.” SOU 2019:43 https://www.regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/statens-offentliga-utredningar/2019/10/sou-201943/
Regeringskansliet. (Government Offices of Sweden). 2018. ”Med Tillit Växer Handlingsutrymmet – Tillitsbaserad Styrning och Ledning av Välfärdssektorn.” SOU 2018: 47. https://www.regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/statens-offentliga-utredningar/2018/06/sou-201847/
The cabinet and government departments were reformed (i.e., merged and/or abolished) during the 1980s and 1990s, but today most observers seem to agree that this type of reform rarely solves any problems. Instead, the main institutional monitoring and reform takes place at the agency level. The number of agencies has been reduced dramatically over the past two decades, from just over 1,300 in 2000 to 343 as of January 2022. Two more agencies will be established in 2022: the Agency for Psychological Defense and the Agency for Human Rights (Statskontoret, 2021).
While some agencies have been abolished, the bulk of the reduction has come from mergers. This reduction in the number of agencies says very little about the extent of regulation; in some ways it is a numbers game aiming to communicate the message to voters that the government is trimming the central bureaucracy. However, there is more or less continuous assessment of the agency system and of the performance of agencies with regard to service delivery and policy implementation.
Agencies are monitored fairly closely, so much so that a couple of recent commissions have recommended that agencies should not have to provide data on their performance with the same frequency as they do today and that the system should allow for more variation among agencies in this respect. The red-green government that came into power in 2014 has launched a process of reducing the number of performance indicators that agencies are requested to provide data on. These efforts are part of a larger project to replace New Public Management models of public sector management with a more trust-based model of management, as advised by the results of commissions of inquiry in 2018 and 2019, which are sure to result in reforms in the future (Regeringskansliet, 2018; 2019).
Citations:
Statskontoret (The Swedish Agency for Public Management). 2021. ”Myndigheterna Under Regeringen.” https://www.statskontoret.se/fokusomraden/fakta-om-statsforvaltningen/fakta-om-statsforvaltningen/
Regeringskansliet. (Government Offices of Sweden). 2019. ”Med Tillit Följer Bättre Resultat – Tillitsbaserad Styrning och Ledning i Staten.” SOU 2019:43 https://www.regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/statens-offentliga-utredningar/2019/10/sou-201943/
Regeringskansliet. (Government Offices of Sweden). 2018. ”Med Tillit Växer Handlingsutrymmet – Tillitsbaserad Styrning och Ledning av Välfärdssektorn.” SOU 2018: 47. https://www.regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/statens-offentliga-utredningar/2018/06/sou-201847/
To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?
10
9
9
The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
8
7
6
7
6
The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
2
1
1
The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
While the structural design of the Swedish system looks almost identical to how it did a century ago, there have been substantive changes in the modus operandi of institutions at all levels of government, particularly concerning the relationship between institutions. Perhaps most importantly, coordination among government departments has increased. Furthermore, the agency system is continuously reviewed, and the structure of the system is reformed (e.g., through mergers of agencies). Finally, department steering of the agency has increased, formally and informally.
It is fair to say that the design and functionality of the system is continuously assessed. Over the past decade, issues related to steering and central control have dominated reform ambitions. Again, governments have not hesitated to alter the configuration of departments or agencies when deemed necessary to reflect the changing agenda of the government.
It is fair to say that the design and functionality of the system is continuously assessed. Over the past decade, issues related to steering and central control have dominated reform ambitions. Again, governments have not hesitated to alter the configuration of departments or agencies when deemed necessary to reflect the changing agenda of the government.