Executive Accountability
#10Key Findings
With an increasingly professional national legislature, Switzerland scores well in international comparison (rank 10) with regard to executive accountability. Its score on this measure has improved by 0.9 points relative to its 2014 level.
Swiss citizens are reasonably well informed about policies and referendum proposals. Many citizens overestimate the country’s leverage vis-à-vis the EU when voting in referendums, leading to political and diplomatic difficulties. Media policy coverage is generally of high quality.
Parliamentarians have strong formal oversight powers, but comparatively few resources. A diminishing share of legislators have other jobs, a trend that is allowing the parliament to become more professional. There is no national-level ombudsman, but the Audit Office is independent. Federal data-protection policy has been updated to align with the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation.
Political parties are somewhat oligarchic, but membership rates are declining. Economic organizations are pragmatic and sophisticated, often more so than parties, while the character and influence of other interest groups varies widely.
Swiss citizens are reasonably well informed about policies and referendum proposals. Many citizens overestimate the country’s leverage vis-à-vis the EU when voting in referendums, leading to political and diplomatic difficulties. Media policy coverage is generally of high quality.
Parliamentarians have strong formal oversight powers, but comparatively few resources. A diminishing share of legislators have other jobs, a trend that is allowing the parliament to become more professional. There is no national-level ombudsman, but the Audit Office is independent. Federal data-protection policy has been updated to align with the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation.
Political parties are somewhat oligarchic, but membership rates are declining. Economic organizations are pragmatic and sophisticated, often more so than parties, while the character and influence of other interest groups varies widely.
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To what extent are citizens informed of public policies?
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Most citizens are well-informed of a broad range of public policies.
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Many citizens are well-informed of individual public policies.
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Few citizens are well-informed of public policies; most citizens have only a rudimental knowledge of public policies.
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Most citizens are not aware of public policies.
There is some debate as to whether citizens are well informed in Switzerland. One of the first studies on the issue, based on surveys conducted after popular votes, found that only one out of six voters had a high level of policy knowledge. Studies based on larger data sets and relating to more recent data have showed that about 50% of citizens have good knowledge on public policy issues (i.e., they know the issue at hand and can provide reasons for their decisions). A recent study concluded that roughly equal shares of the citizenry lack civic competences, have medium competence and have a high level of competence. In cases where the public feels insufficiently informed, it votes against change. The power of a “no” heuristics was demonstrated by the 2017 vote one tax reform in which three-quarters of respondents said they had difficulties understanding the proposal (which was of eminent importance to the economy) and a third of those who voted “no” cited their lack of knowledge as a reason for voting against the proposal. The intensity of a campaign is another key factor in the extent to which the public is informed of a bill’s content and in explaining their voting behavior on the relevant issue.
Another recent study found that just 42% of Swiss citizens knew how many parties were in the government (which at the time of the survey had not changed during the previous five decades). Moreover, 36% knew how many signatures were needed to trigger a referendum, and about 45% knew the number of EU member states. A survey in 2017 showed that 35% of all respondents were able to choose the correct answer about the goal-setting institution of the European Union from a list of four possible answers.
Stucki et al. (2018) show that voters are willing and able to actively seek information in making their decision. Thus, in general it seems fair to say that Swiss citizens are as well informed about policies as citizens in other mature and wealthy democracies. An analysis by Colombo (2016) found that Swiss citizens have considerable political knowledge and – in particular – are able to logically explain their vote choice. However, the extent and depth of their political sophistication remain unclear.
There are limitations to cue-taking as an effective means of political decision-making. For example, since 2014, a large share of citizens believes claims by right-wing populist politicians that the European Union is so invested in Switzerland, that it must renegotiate the bilateral agreements to allow for the constitutional amendment limiting immigration. Based on this argument, a majority of citizens supported the new constitutional amendment. From the very beginning, however, the European Union made clear that it would not enter negotiations over the free movement of labor. Notwithstanding these clear messages, in 2017, 56% of Swiss citizens thought that the Swiss government could have brokered a better deal in negotiations with the European Union. Hence, limited political knowledge on the part of citizens (common to all democracies) and ideological contentions by political elites (trusted as reliable cues by knowledge-poor citizens) may lead to political dead ends in a direct democracy.
With regard to subjective knowledge, about 28% of Swiss citizens claim to be very or quite interested in politics, as well as being at least quite able to take an active political role in a political party and to be at least quite confident in their own ability to participate in politics. This percentage is similar to that found in neighboring Germany (31%) and Austria (27%), but clearly more than that seen in France (16%) or Italy (16%) (European Social Survey 2018).
Citations:
ARMINGEON, Klaus and Philipp Lutz 2022: Citizens’ response to a non-responsive government: The Case of the Swiss Initiative on Mass Immigration, unpublished manuscript
Colombo C (2016) Partisan, not Ignorant – Citizens’ Use of Arguments and Justifications in Direct Democracy. Florence: Unpublished PhD thesis.
Colombo C (2018) Justifications and Citizen Competence in Direct Democracy: A Multilevel Analysis. British Journal of Political Science 48(3): 787-806.
De Angelis A, Colombo C and Morisi D (2020) Taking cues from the government: heuristic versus systematic processing in a constitutional referendum. West European Politics 43(4): 845-868.
European Social Survey 2018, 9th wave, published November 2019
KRIESI, Hanspeter 2005a: Argument-Based Strategies in Direct-Democratic Votes: The Swiss Experience, Acta Politica 40: 299-316.
KRIESI; Hanspeter 2005b: Direct-Democratic Choice. The Swiss Experience. Lanham: Rowmann & Littlefield.
Morisi D, Colombo C and De Angelis A (2019) Who is afraid of a change? Ideological differences in support for the status quo in direct democracy. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties. DOI: 10.1080/17457289.2019.1698048. 1-20.
VOTO 2017: VOTO-Studie zur eidgenössischen Volksabstimmung vom 12. Februar 2017, Lausanne, Aarau, Luzern: FORS et al..
Stucki, I., Pleger, L., & Sager, F. (2018). “The making of the informed voter: A split-ballot survey on the use of scientific evidence in direct-democratic campaigns,” Swiss Political Science Review: 24(2): 115–139. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12290
Another recent study found that just 42% of Swiss citizens knew how many parties were in the government (which at the time of the survey had not changed during the previous five decades). Moreover, 36% knew how many signatures were needed to trigger a referendum, and about 45% knew the number of EU member states. A survey in 2017 showed that 35% of all respondents were able to choose the correct answer about the goal-setting institution of the European Union from a list of four possible answers.
Stucki et al. (2018) show that voters are willing and able to actively seek information in making their decision. Thus, in general it seems fair to say that Swiss citizens are as well informed about policies as citizens in other mature and wealthy democracies. An analysis by Colombo (2016) found that Swiss citizens have considerable political knowledge and – in particular – are able to logically explain their vote choice. However, the extent and depth of their political sophistication remain unclear.
There are limitations to cue-taking as an effective means of political decision-making. For example, since 2014, a large share of citizens believes claims by right-wing populist politicians that the European Union is so invested in Switzerland, that it must renegotiate the bilateral agreements to allow for the constitutional amendment limiting immigration. Based on this argument, a majority of citizens supported the new constitutional amendment. From the very beginning, however, the European Union made clear that it would not enter negotiations over the free movement of labor. Notwithstanding these clear messages, in 2017, 56% of Swiss citizens thought that the Swiss government could have brokered a better deal in negotiations with the European Union. Hence, limited political knowledge on the part of citizens (common to all democracies) and ideological contentions by political elites (trusted as reliable cues by knowledge-poor citizens) may lead to political dead ends in a direct democracy.
With regard to subjective knowledge, about 28% of Swiss citizens claim to be very or quite interested in politics, as well as being at least quite able to take an active political role in a political party and to be at least quite confident in their own ability to participate in politics. This percentage is similar to that found in neighboring Germany (31%) and Austria (27%), but clearly more than that seen in France (16%) or Italy (16%) (European Social Survey 2018).
Citations:
ARMINGEON, Klaus and Philipp Lutz 2022: Citizens’ response to a non-responsive government: The Case of the Swiss Initiative on Mass Immigration, unpublished manuscript
Colombo C (2016) Partisan, not Ignorant – Citizens’ Use of Arguments and Justifications in Direct Democracy. Florence: Unpublished PhD thesis.
Colombo C (2018) Justifications and Citizen Competence in Direct Democracy: A Multilevel Analysis. British Journal of Political Science 48(3): 787-806.
De Angelis A, Colombo C and Morisi D (2020) Taking cues from the government: heuristic versus systematic processing in a constitutional referendum. West European Politics 43(4): 845-868.
European Social Survey 2018, 9th wave, published November 2019
KRIESI, Hanspeter 2005a: Argument-Based Strategies in Direct-Democratic Votes: The Swiss Experience, Acta Politica 40: 299-316.
KRIESI; Hanspeter 2005b: Direct-Democratic Choice. The Swiss Experience. Lanham: Rowmann & Littlefield.
Morisi D, Colombo C and De Angelis A (2019) Who is afraid of a change? Ideological differences in support for the status quo in direct democracy. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties. DOI: 10.1080/17457289.2019.1698048. 1-20.
VOTO 2017: VOTO-Studie zur eidgenössischen Volksabstimmung vom 12. Februar 2017, Lausanne, Aarau, Luzern: FORS et al..
Stucki, I., Pleger, L., & Sager, F. (2018). “The making of the informed voter: A split-ballot survey on the use of scientific evidence in direct-democratic campaigns,” Swiss Political Science Review: 24(2): 115–139. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12290
Does the government publish data and information in a way that strengthens citizens’ capacity to hold the government accountable?
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The government publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
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The government most of the time publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
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The government publishes data in a limited and not timely or user-friendly way.
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The government publishes (almost) no relevant data.
The government and its institutions – in particular the Federal Statistical Office – pursue a highly user-friendly policy of internet-based access to information. Any citizen interested in public policy and having access to the internet will find a large body of qualitative and quantitative data. The transparency act (Bundesgesetz über das Öffentlichkeitsprinzip der Verwaltung, BGÖ) ensures full access to public documents apart from classified information.
The official information bulletin is the most important source of information for citizens to make decisions in direct-democratic votes. Overall, government information policy can be considered comprehensive and enables citizens to fully inform themselves about most aspects of the political system and its policymaking.
However, as the case in 2019 of the Supreme Court overturning the outcome of a popular vote makes clear, this information policy is not flawless and is subject to close scrutiny in a direct democracy. The mistakes made by the Federal Council in delivering erroneous information regarding a vote on the taxation of couples compelled the Court to annul the referendum.
The official information bulletin is the most important source of information for citizens to make decisions in direct-democratic votes. Overall, government information policy can be considered comprehensive and enables citizens to fully inform themselves about most aspects of the political system and its policymaking.
However, as the case in 2019 of the Supreme Court overturning the outcome of a popular vote makes clear, this information policy is not flawless and is subject to close scrutiny in a direct democracy. The mistakes made by the Federal Council in delivering erroneous information regarding a vote on the taxation of couples compelled the Court to annul the referendum.
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Do members of parliament have adequate personnel and structural resources to monitor government activity effectively?
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring all government activity effectively.
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring a government’s major activities.
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
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The resources provided to the members of parliament are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
The Swiss parliament is not broadly professionalized. Officially, it is still a militia parliament, meaning that legislators serve alongside their regular jobs. However, this is far from reality (Vatter 2018a: 283). Almost 90% of members use more than a third of their working time for their political roles. Legislators’ incomes have also been increased over time. On average, the various components of remuneration total more than CHF 100,000 annually (about €85,000). Because of this, fewer and fewer members of parliament have other professional activities beside their political mandate (or external mandates paid or otherwise, but related to their activity as a politician). In other words, an increasing number of members of parliament can be considered “professional politicians.” The parliamentary system is, therefore, often described as semi-professional now.
However, legislators do not have personal staffs, and the parliamentary services division offers only very limited research services, though legislators do have access to the parliamentary library. Thus, from a comparative perspective, the resources available to members of parliament are very limited.
Citations:
Bieri, Niklaus. (2018): Das Parlament und die Vernehmlassung. Der Wandel der parlamentarischen Rezeption des Vernehmlassungsverfahrens als Hinweis auf die Erstarkung des Parlaments nach den Parlamentsreformen der frühen 1990er-Jahre. in Traverse – Zeitschrift für Geschichte / Revue d’histoire 2018 (3): 33–45. https://boris.unibe.ch/127608/.
Bütikofer, Sarah. 2014. Das Schweizer Parlament. Eine Institution auf dem Pfad der Moderne, Baden-Baden: Nomos
SRF News (2019): Im neuen Nationalrat sitzen noch mehr Berufspolitiker. https://www.srf.ch/news/schweiz/die-jobs-der-neugewaehlten-im-neuen-nationalrat-sitzen-noch-mehr-berufspolitiker
Vatter, Adrian 2018a; Das politische System der Schweiz. 3rd edition. Baden-Baden: Nomos (UTB)
Vatter, Adrian (Hrsg.) 2018b: Das Parlament in der Schweiz. Macht und Ohnmacht der Volksvertretung, Zürich: NZZ Libro
However, legislators do not have personal staffs, and the parliamentary services division offers only very limited research services, though legislators do have access to the parliamentary library. Thus, from a comparative perspective, the resources available to members of parliament are very limited.
Citations:
Bieri, Niklaus. (2018): Das Parlament und die Vernehmlassung. Der Wandel der parlamentarischen Rezeption des Vernehmlassungsverfahrens als Hinweis auf die Erstarkung des Parlaments nach den Parlamentsreformen der frühen 1990er-Jahre. in Traverse – Zeitschrift für Geschichte / Revue d’histoire 2018 (3): 33–45. https://boris.unibe.ch/127608/.
Bütikofer, Sarah. 2014. Das Schweizer Parlament. Eine Institution auf dem Pfad der Moderne, Baden-Baden: Nomos
SRF News (2019): Im neuen Nationalrat sitzen noch mehr Berufspolitiker. https://www.srf.ch/news/schweiz/die-jobs-der-neugewaehlten-im-neuen-nationalrat-sitzen-noch-mehr-berufspolitiker
Vatter, Adrian 2018a; Das politische System der Schweiz. 3rd edition. Baden-Baden: Nomos (UTB)
Vatter, Adrian (Hrsg.) 2018b: Das Parlament in der Schweiz. Macht und Ohnmacht der Volksvertretung, Zürich: NZZ Libro
Are parliamentary committees able to ask for government documents?
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Parliamentary committees may ask for most or all government documents; they are normally delivered in full and within an appropriate time frame.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are slightly limited; some important documents are not delivered or are delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are considerably limited; most important documents are not delivered or delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
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Parliamentary committees may not request government documents.
Parliamentary committees, as well as members of parliament, have access to government documents and receive copies of these promptly upon request. Legislators have also electronic access to the majority of government documents.
Are parliamentary committees able to summon ministers for hearings?
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Parliamentary committees may summon ministers. Ministers regularly follow invitations and are obliged to answer questions.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are slightly limited; ministers occasionally refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are considerably limited; ministers frequently refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
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Parliamentary committees may not summon ministers.
Parliamentary committees can summon ministers for hearings. Formally, this request is not binding. However, for political reasons, ministers typically respond to these requests, and answer the committees’ questions.
Are parliamentary committees able to summon experts for committee meetings?
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Parliamentary committees may summon experts.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are slightly limited.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are considerably limited.
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Parliamentary committees may not summon experts.
Parliamentary committees are free to invite experts to provide testimony at hearings. This right is actually used. For example, in the summer of 2018, the National Council’s Foreign Policy Committee decided that it would publicly hear experts on the outcome of the negotiations on the institutional agreement between Switzerland and the European Union. The committee set the relevant hearings for the afternoon of 15 January 2019, which were then broadcast live over the internet.
Are the task areas and structures of parliamentary committees suited to monitor ministries effectively?
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The match between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are well-suited to the effective monitoring of ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are largely suited to the monitoring ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are partially suited to the monitoring of ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are not at all suited to the monitoring of ministries.
The Swiss government has only seven ministries, and all attempts to enlarge this number has failed due to political opposition within parliament. Hence, most of the seven ministries have responsibility for many more issue areas than in other democracies. Both the first and the second parliamentary chambers have nine committees dealing with legislation and two committees with oversight functions (e.g., the Finance Committee, which supervises the confederation’s financial management). Four other committees have additional tasks (e.g., the Drafting Committee, which checks the wording of bills and legal texts before final votes). Thus, the task areas of the parliamentary committees do not correspond closely to the task areas of the ministries. Nonetheless, this does not suggest that the committees are not able to monitor the ministries. As the mismatch between ministerial committees and ministries is a function of how the federal government is organized, it does not impair parliament’s oversight function. The congruence between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries therefore is largely suited to the monitoring of ministries.
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To what extent do media in your country analyze the rationale and impact of public policies?
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A clear majority of mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies.
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About one-half of the mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies. The rest produces a mix of infotainment and quality information content.
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A clear minority of mass media brands focuses on high-quality information content analyzing public policies. Several mass media brands produce superficial infotainment content only.
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All mass media brands are dominated by superficial infotainment content.
Radio and television programs are of high quality in Switzerland. With very few exceptions, radio reports are reliable, and analyses are conducted by independent and professional journalists. Some television programs, however, are trending toward infotainment and the personalization of politics.
On 4 March 2018, voters rejected a popular initiative (“Ja zur Abschaffung der Radio – und Fernsehgebühren”) aiming to eliminate per capita fees for the Swiss public broadcaster (SRF). A strong majority of 71.6% and all cantons voted against the initiative, signaling a strong commitment to public media. In spite of this strong showing, the SRF responded to the aggressive campaign with a downsizing project that aimed to dismantle the radio station in the Swiss capital, Bern. This, in turn, led to public protest faulting the SRF for violating its mission to cover the federalist cultural diversity of Switzerland. In November 2019, a decision was reached to keep the editorial desk for foreign and domestic politics in Bern.
In February 2022, a popular vote rejected a law increasing and enlarging subsidies for media, which might undermine information quality and diversity in the future. This law proposal was a response to declining revenues from advertising and a perceived need to provide media coverage even for smaller/regional groups of readers. The proposal was supported by the Social Democrats and Greens, but was opposed by the Liberal Party (FDP) and the Swiss People’s Party.
Citations:
https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/abstimmungen/20180304/volksiniti ative–ja-zur-abschaffung-der-radio–und-fernsehgebueh.html
https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/votes/20220213/measures-to-benefit-the-media.html
On 4 March 2018, voters rejected a popular initiative (“Ja zur Abschaffung der Radio – und Fernsehgebühren”) aiming to eliminate per capita fees for the Swiss public broadcaster (SRF). A strong majority of 71.6% and all cantons voted against the initiative, signaling a strong commitment to public media. In spite of this strong showing, the SRF responded to the aggressive campaign with a downsizing project that aimed to dismantle the radio station in the Swiss capital, Bern. This, in turn, led to public protest faulting the SRF for violating its mission to cover the federalist cultural diversity of Switzerland. In November 2019, a decision was reached to keep the editorial desk for foreign and domestic politics in Bern.
In February 2022, a popular vote rejected a law increasing and enlarging subsidies for media, which might undermine information quality and diversity in the future. This law proposal was a response to declining revenues from advertising and a perceived need to provide media coverage even for smaller/regional groups of readers. The proposal was supported by the Social Democrats and Greens, but was opposed by the Liberal Party (FDP) and the Swiss People’s Party.
Citations:
https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/abstimmungen/20180304/volksiniti ative–ja-zur-abschaffung-der-radio–und-fernsehgebueh.html
https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/votes/20220213/measures-to-benefit-the-media.html
Graph View
How inclusive and open are the major parties in their internal decision-making processes?
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The party allows all party members and supporters to participate in its decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and agendas of issues are open.
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The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, all party members have the opportunity to participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are rather open.
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The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, a number of elected delegates participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are largely controlled by the party leadership.
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A number of party leaders participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are fully controlled and drafted by the party leadership.
Party decisions and party lists are formally produced at conventions of party members or delegates. A 1999 analysis of local party organizations found that Swiss parties – with the exception of the Green party – prioritized party leaders’ strategic capabilities over membership participation. This tendency has increased in recent years.
However, these oligarchic tendencies are arguably not the primary problem with regard to inclusion in Swiss parties. The decline in party membership and party identification – particularly in the case of the Radical and Christian Democratic parties – along with the low level of party resources, may be even greater problems since party decisions are being made by an increasingly shrinking active party membership base.
Citations:
Tresch, Anke, Lauener, Lukas, Bernhard, Laurent, Lutz, Georg and Laura Scaperrotta 2020. Eidgenössische Wahlen 2019. Wahlteilnahme und Wahlentscheid. FORS-Lausanne. DOI: 10.24447/SLC-2020-00001
VATTER, Adrian 2018: Das politische System der Schweiz. 3rd edition. Baden-Baden: Nomos (UTB), chapter 3
However, these oligarchic tendencies are arguably not the primary problem with regard to inclusion in Swiss parties. The decline in party membership and party identification – particularly in the case of the Radical and Christian Democratic parties – along with the low level of party resources, may be even greater problems since party decisions are being made by an increasingly shrinking active party membership base.
Citations:
Tresch, Anke, Lauener, Lukas, Bernhard, Laurent, Lutz, Georg and Laura Scaperrotta 2020. Eidgenössische Wahlen 2019. Wahlteilnahme und Wahlentscheid. FORS-Lausanne. DOI: 10.24447/SLC-2020-00001
VATTER, Adrian 2018: Das politische System der Schweiz. 3rd edition. Baden-Baden: Nomos (UTB), chapter 3
To what extent are economic interest associations (e.g., employers, industry, labor) capable of formulating relevant policies?
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Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
Employers’ organizations and trade unions in Switzerland are pragmatic and avoid rigidly ideological stances. Of course, the major interest organizations do have their ideologies, but this does not prevent them from entering rational discussions with other organizations and political parties. Furthermore, interest organizations in general have access to more substantial professional resources and often have a better-informed view of problems than do political parties. Thus, despite the defense of their own interests, associations often provide better policy proposals than do parties.
The influence of employers’ organizations has declined as single firms or small groups have elected to engage in their own lobbying activities. Internal differences have also split these organizations.
The influence of employers’ organizations has declined as single firms or small groups have elected to engage in their own lobbying activities. Internal differences have also split these organizations.
To what extent are non-economic interest associations capable of formulating relevant policies?
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Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
Noneconomic interest groups are very heterogeneous in Switzerland. Some, such as environmental groups, undertake cooperative efforts with academic bodies, offer reasonable proposals and feature considerable capacity for political mobilization.
Recent research emphasizes the growing importance of citizen groups such as the WWF (Ecihenberger 2020; Mach et al. 2020).
Citations:
EICHENBERGER, S. 2020. The Rise of Citizen Groups within the Administration and Parliament in Switzerland. Swiss Political Science Review, 26, 206-227.
MACH, A., VARONE, F. & EICHENBERGER, S. 2020. Transformations of Swiss neo-corporatism: From pre-parliamentary negotiations toward privileged pluralism in the parliamentary venue. In: CAREJA, R., EMMENEGGER, P. & GIGER, N. (eds.) The European Social Model under Pressure. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27043-8_4.
Recent research emphasizes the growing importance of citizen groups such as the WWF (Ecihenberger 2020; Mach et al. 2020).
Citations:
EICHENBERGER, S. 2020. The Rise of Citizen Groups within the Administration and Parliament in Switzerland. Swiss Political Science Review, 26, 206-227.
MACH, A., VARONE, F. & EICHENBERGER, S. 2020. Transformations of Swiss neo-corporatism: From pre-parliamentary negotiations toward privileged pluralism in the parliamentary venue. In: CAREJA, R., EMMENEGGER, P. & GIGER, N. (eds.) The European Social Model under Pressure. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27043-8_4.
Graph View
Does there exist an independent and effective audit office?
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There exists an effective and independent audit office.
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There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is slightly limited.
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There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
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There does not exist an independent and effective audit office.
Switzerland’s Audit Office is an independent and autonomous body. It supports the Federal Assembly and the Federal Council through the production of analyses and reports. The chairman of the Audit Office is elected by the Federal Council; this election must be confirmed by the Federal Assembly. In administrative terms, the Audit Office falls under the authority of the Department of Finance.
The Audit Office acquired a very independent and self-confident role in the case of the politically controversial export of arms to war-prone regions (NZZ 4 September 2018). It has harshly criticized the Federal Administration as being insufficiently critical and working too closely with representatives from the arms industry.
Citations:
NZZ 4. Sept. 2018
hhttps://www.efk.admin.ch/de/
The Audit Office acquired a very independent and self-confident role in the case of the politically controversial export of arms to war-prone regions (NZZ 4 September 2018). It has harshly criticized the Federal Administration as being insufficiently critical and working too closely with representatives from the arms industry.
Citations:
NZZ 4. Sept. 2018
hhttps://www.efk.admin.ch/de/
Does there exist an independent and effective ombuds office?
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There exists an effective and independent ombuds office.
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There exists an effective and independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is slightly limited.
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There exists an independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is considerably limited.
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There does not exist an effective and independent ombuds office.
There is no ombuds office at the federal level in Switzerland. However, some cantonal administrations do have an ombuds office.
Is there an independent authority in place that effectively holds government offices accountable for handling issues of data protection and privacy?
10
9
9
An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
8
7
6
7
6
An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is slightly limited.
5
4
3
4
3
A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are strongly limited.
2
1
1
There is no effective and independent data protection office.
Article 13 of the constitution establishes that every citizen must be protected against the abuse of data. Data protection legislation has been in force since 1993. The Federal Data Protection Law was revised in 2020, taking into account the General Data Protection Regulation of the European Union, a regulation that Switzerland had already signed. There is the Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner (Eidgenössischer Datenschutz- und Öffentlichkeitsbeauftragter, EDÖB), which had 32 employees in 2020/2021 (EDÖB 2021: 101). A 2011 evaluation of the Federal Data Protection Law attests to the effectiveness, independence and transparency of the EDÖB.
Citations:
https://www.edoeb.admin.ch/edoeb/de/home/datenschutz/ueberblick/datenschutz.html
Christian Bolliger, Marius Féraud, Astrid Epiney, Julia Hänni (2011). Evaluation des Bundesgesetzes über den Datenschutz. Schlussbericht im Auftrag des Bundesamts für Justiz. Bern/Freiburg: Büro Vatter/Institut für Europarecht, Universität Freiburg.
EDÖB, 2021: 28. Tätigkeitsbericht 2020/21. available at https://www.edoeb.admin.ch/edoeb/de/home/dokumentation/taetigkeitsberichte/28–taetigkeitsbericht-2020-2021.html
EDÖB, 2021: The new Data Protection Act from the FDPIC’s perspective. https://www.edoeb.admin.ch/dam/edoeb/en/dokumente/2021/revdsg.pdf.download.pdf/revDSG_EN.pdf
Citations:
https://www.edoeb.admin.ch/edoeb/de/home/datenschutz/ueberblick/datenschutz.html
Christian Bolliger, Marius Féraud, Astrid Epiney, Julia Hänni (2011). Evaluation des Bundesgesetzes über den Datenschutz. Schlussbericht im Auftrag des Bundesamts für Justiz. Bern/Freiburg: Büro Vatter/Institut für Europarecht, Universität Freiburg.
EDÖB, 2021: 28. Tätigkeitsbericht 2020/21. available at https://www.edoeb.admin.ch/edoeb/de/home/dokumentation/taetigkeitsberichte/28–taetigkeitsbericht-2020-2021.html
EDÖB, 2021: The new Data Protection Act from the FDPIC’s perspective. https://www.edoeb.admin.ch/dam/edoeb/en/dokumente/2021/revdsg.pdf.download.pdf/revDSG_EN.pdf