Executive Capacity
#9Key Findings
Reflecting a collegial, decentralized political system, Switzerland receives high overall rankings (rank 9) with regard to executive capacity. Its score on this measure has declined by 0.1 point relative to its 2014 level.
Compared with other advanced democracies, strategic planning in Switzerland is underdeveloped. As there is no prime minister, the seven members of the Federal Council act collegially. Interministerial planning is centered in the Chancellery. Coordination and consensus have become more difficult as government parties have become more polarized, thus shifting initiative to individual line ministries.
New regulations are subject to a “quick check” RIA procedure, followed by deeper review if the issue demands. Policymaking is strongly based on public consultation with interest groups. Most tax revenue is raised by highly autonomous local administrations. Cantonal autonomy ensures significant variation in standards.
Cantonal implementation of regulations is pragmatic, and is often tailored to the concerns of powerful local interests. International coordination has been problematic, as it is seen as infringing sovereignty. An inability to resolve tensions over the vital relationship with the EU has highlighted inflexibilities with regard to domestic adaptability.
Compared with other advanced democracies, strategic planning in Switzerland is underdeveloped. As there is no prime minister, the seven members of the Federal Council act collegially. Interministerial planning is centered in the Chancellery. Coordination and consensus have become more difficult as government parties have become more polarized, thus shifting initiative to individual line ministries.
New regulations are subject to a “quick check” RIA procedure, followed by deeper review if the issue demands. Policymaking is strongly based on public consultation with interest groups. Most tax revenue is raised by highly autonomous local administrations. Cantonal autonomy ensures significant variation in standards.
Cantonal implementation of regulations is pragmatic, and is often tailored to the concerns of powerful local interests. International coordination has been problematic, as it is seen as infringing sovereignty. An inability to resolve tensions over the vital relationship with the EU has highlighted inflexibilities with regard to domestic adaptability.
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How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
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1
In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
Strategic planning is not given significant weight in Switzerland. It is further rendered difficult by the fact that the country has a quasi-presidential political system (meaning the government cannot be voted out of office by the parliament) with a collegial government, a strong non-professional element, a consociational decision-making structure, a strong corporatist relationship between a weak federal state and outside interest organizations, and considerable uncertainty deriving from the system of direct democracy. Compared with other advanced democracies, strategic planning in Switzerland is underdeveloped and, constrained by the governmental and federal structure and the logics of direct democracy, it is rather inefficient.
The Swiss government is not strictly speaking a parliamentary government and does not have a policy agenda comparable to a “normal” parliamentary government. Furthermore, all seven members of the government have equal rights and powers; there is no prime minister. The president of the government is primus inter pares. He or she is not leader of the government in the sense of a prime minister.
Strategic planning is the task of the Federal Chancellery, the central coordinating body of the federal administration. Strategic planning in this context involves: identifying the current legislative period’s major challenges; describing the legislative period’s major goals and instruments; specifying the goals for the current year; and exercising accountability by providing parliament with annual reports.
A recent review of the state of research finds that “in the context of a strongly federal and non-parliamentary system with extended direct democracy, the Federal Council usually fails to present – and implement – a forward-looking strategic management and coherent policy-planning with clear priorities” (Vatter 2020: 251).
Citations:
Schedler, Kuno 2019: Strategische Staatsführung und Steuerungsinstrumente –wie können Regierung und Exekutive strategisch führen?, in: Ritz, Adrian, Theo Haldemann and Fritz Sager (eds.): Blackbox Exekutive. Regierungslehre in der Schweiz, Zürich: NZZ Libro, 285-305
Vatter, Adrian. 2018. Das Politische System Der Schweiz. Grundlagen, Institutionen Und Vergleich, 3rd edition, Baden-Baden: Nomos (UTB).
Vatter, Adrian (2020): Der Bundesrat. Die Schweizer Regierung. Zürich: NZZ
The Swiss government is not strictly speaking a parliamentary government and does not have a policy agenda comparable to a “normal” parliamentary government. Furthermore, all seven members of the government have equal rights and powers; there is no prime minister. The president of the government is primus inter pares. He or she is not leader of the government in the sense of a prime minister.
Strategic planning is the task of the Federal Chancellery, the central coordinating body of the federal administration. Strategic planning in this context involves: identifying the current legislative period’s major challenges; describing the legislative period’s major goals and instruments; specifying the goals for the current year; and exercising accountability by providing parliament with annual reports.
A recent review of the state of research finds that “in the context of a strongly federal and non-parliamentary system with extended direct democracy, the Federal Council usually fails to present – and implement – a forward-looking strategic management and coherent policy-planning with clear priorities” (Vatter 2020: 251).
Citations:
Schedler, Kuno 2019: Strategische Staatsführung und Steuerungsinstrumente –wie können Regierung und Exekutive strategisch führen?, in: Ritz, Adrian, Theo Haldemann and Fritz Sager (eds.): Blackbox Exekutive. Regierungslehre in der Schweiz, Zürich: NZZ Libro, 285-305
Vatter, Adrian. 2018. Das Politische System Der Schweiz. Grundlagen, Institutionen Und Vergleich, 3rd edition, Baden-Baden: Nomos (UTB).
Vatter, Adrian (2020): Der Bundesrat. Die Schweizer Regierung. Zürich: NZZ
Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?
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In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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1
The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
In the Swiss political system, the drafting of bills takes place primarily within extra-parliamentary and parliamentary committees. As of November 2019, 116 of these extra-parliamentary committees existed, with government-selected members that included academics, representatives of interest groups and parties, individuals with particular expertise and other such experts. While there are multiple criteria for selecting members, the government seeks a balanced representation of language groups, political parties and ideologies and other societal interests. Academics are selected on the basis of academic profile, but their allegiance to political parties or other societal interests may also be taken into account.
In December 2018, the Federal Council decided to reduce the number of committees by 13, but also to create two new committees.
Thus, while expert commissions and their members do have a dominant influence on governmental decision-making, the influence of academics per se is much more limited than is the influence of the politically constituted groups as a whole. In addition, the share of academics on these committees is rather limited, amounting to about 11% of all seats. However, the combined total of academics and high-level federal and canton civil servants (who usually have academic training) accounts for about half of all commission seats.
In Switzerland, public policies are regularly assessed by evaluators who have had academic training. According to a 2016 study by Pleger et al., about 50% of these evaluators felt influenced or pressured by stakeholders; about the same level as in the United States, but considerably less than in Germany and the United Kingdom (about 80%).
This finding underscores the importance of evaluations for policymaking. A 2017 large-scale cooperative research project by Sager et al. concluded that policy evaluations not only play an important role for policymaking in the executive-administrative nexus but also contribute to decision-making in parliament and to a lesser degree in direct-democratic decision-making.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the reliance on evaluation rather than organized expertise in external committees proved to be problematic. While the government established the Science Covid Task Force, it did not know how to handle the advice it received from the Science Task Force. It was evident that Swiss politics lacked a routine for integrating scientific advice into policymaking while pressure. This lack of routine culminated in the SVP’s proposal to prohibit the Science Task Force from issuing public statements about the pandemic. Nevertheless, while the parliament rejected the proposal, it is evidence of the bumps in the science-policy interface that Switzerland will need to address in the aftermath of the coronavirus crisis (Hadorn et al. 2022; Sager et al. 2022). While Switzerland was arguable successful in dealing with the crisis, this was not due to a smooth exchange between science and politics.
Citations:
Hadorn, Susanne, Fritz Sager, Céline Mavrot, Anna Malandrino, Jörn Ege (2022). Evidence-based Policymaking in Times of Acute Crisis: Comparing the Use of Scientific Knowledge in Germany, Switzerland and Italy. Politische Vierteljahresschrift: forthcoming.
Lyn Pleger, Fritz Sager, Michael Morris, Wolfgang Meyer, and Reinhard Stockmann 2016: Are Some Countries More Prone to Pressure Evaluators Than Others? Comparing Findings from the United States, United Kingdom, Germany and Switzerland, American Journal of Evaluation, DOI: 10.1177/1098214016662907
Sager, Fritz (2017). “Evaluation and democracy: do they fit?” Evaluation and Program Planning. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evalprogplan.2017.08.005
Sager, Fritz, Thomas Widmer und Andreas Balthasar (Hg.) (2017). Evaluation im politischen System der Schweiz – Entwicklung, Bedeutung und Wechselwirkungen. Zürich: NZZ Verlag, Reihe „Politik und Gesellschaft in der Schweiz“.
Sager, Fritz, Céline Mavrot, Johanna Hornung (2022). Wissenschaftliche Politikberatungssysteme in der Covid-19-Krise: Die Schweiz im Vergleich mit Deutschland, Italien, Frankreich und Grossbritannien. Bern: Untersuchung im Auftrag der Schweizerischen Bundeskanzlei.
https://www.admin.ch/ch/d/cf/ko/Statistik_AnzahlGremienAK.html
In December 2018, the Federal Council decided to reduce the number of committees by 13, but also to create two new committees.
Thus, while expert commissions and their members do have a dominant influence on governmental decision-making, the influence of academics per se is much more limited than is the influence of the politically constituted groups as a whole. In addition, the share of academics on these committees is rather limited, amounting to about 11% of all seats. However, the combined total of academics and high-level federal and canton civil servants (who usually have academic training) accounts for about half of all commission seats.
In Switzerland, public policies are regularly assessed by evaluators who have had academic training. According to a 2016 study by Pleger et al., about 50% of these evaluators felt influenced or pressured by stakeholders; about the same level as in the United States, but considerably less than in Germany and the United Kingdom (about 80%).
This finding underscores the importance of evaluations for policymaking. A 2017 large-scale cooperative research project by Sager et al. concluded that policy evaluations not only play an important role for policymaking in the executive-administrative nexus but also contribute to decision-making in parliament and to a lesser degree in direct-democratic decision-making.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the reliance on evaluation rather than organized expertise in external committees proved to be problematic. While the government established the Science Covid Task Force, it did not know how to handle the advice it received from the Science Task Force. It was evident that Swiss politics lacked a routine for integrating scientific advice into policymaking while pressure. This lack of routine culminated in the SVP’s proposal to prohibit the Science Task Force from issuing public statements about the pandemic. Nevertheless, while the parliament rejected the proposal, it is evidence of the bumps in the science-policy interface that Switzerland will need to address in the aftermath of the coronavirus crisis (Hadorn et al. 2022; Sager et al. 2022). While Switzerland was arguable successful in dealing with the crisis, this was not due to a smooth exchange between science and politics.
Citations:
Hadorn, Susanne, Fritz Sager, Céline Mavrot, Anna Malandrino, Jörn Ege (2022). Evidence-based Policymaking in Times of Acute Crisis: Comparing the Use of Scientific Knowledge in Germany, Switzerland and Italy. Politische Vierteljahresschrift: forthcoming.
Lyn Pleger, Fritz Sager, Michael Morris, Wolfgang Meyer, and Reinhard Stockmann 2016: Are Some Countries More Prone to Pressure Evaluators Than Others? Comparing Findings from the United States, United Kingdom, Germany and Switzerland, American Journal of Evaluation, DOI: 10.1177/1098214016662907
Sager, Fritz (2017). “Evaluation and democracy: do they fit?” Evaluation and Program Planning. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evalprogplan.2017.08.005
Sager, Fritz, Thomas Widmer und Andreas Balthasar (Hg.) (2017). Evaluation im politischen System der Schweiz – Entwicklung, Bedeutung und Wechselwirkungen. Zürich: NZZ Verlag, Reihe „Politik und Gesellschaft in der Schweiz“.
Sager, Fritz, Céline Mavrot, Johanna Hornung (2022). Wissenschaftliche Politikberatungssysteme in der Covid-19-Krise: Die Schweiz im Vergleich mit Deutschland, Italien, Frankreich und Grossbritannien. Bern: Untersuchung im Auftrag der Schweizerischen Bundeskanzlei.
https://www.admin.ch/ch/d/cf/ko/Statistik_AnzahlGremienAK.html
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Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?
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The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
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The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
The Swiss political system does not have a prime minister or a prime minister’s office. The government is a collegial body. However, there are several instruments of interministerial coordination and various mechanisms by which ministries’ draft bills are evaluated. Departments engage in a formal process of consultation when drafting proposals, the Department of Justice provides legal evaluations of draft bills, and the Federal Chancellery and Federal Council provide political coordination. In particular, the Federal Chancellery has gained its reputation as the central institution for interministerial planning (Vatter 2020: Chapter 7).
Due to the double role of the Federal Council as a collegial unit with the task of producing widely acceptable proposals, and individual federal councilors as heads of departments with the task of satisfying their parties’ programs and their department policies, coordination becomes more difficult with the increasing political polarization between government parties
Citations:
Vatter, Adrian 2020: Der Bundesrat. Die Schweizer Regierung. Zürich: NZZ
Due to the double role of the Federal Council as a collegial unit with the task of producing widely acceptable proposals, and individual federal councilors as heads of departments with the task of satisfying their parties’ programs and their department policies, coordination becomes more difficult with the increasing political polarization between government parties
Citations:
Vatter, Adrian 2020: Der Bundesrat. Die Schweizer Regierung. Zürich: NZZ
To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?
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There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
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The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
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Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
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Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
Switzerland’s government consists of only seven ministries, each of which has a broad area of competency and is responsible for a large variety of issues. There are no line ministries. However, there are federal offices and institutions connected to the various ministries. These work closely with the minister responsible for their group. Since ministers must achieve a large majority on the Federal Council in order to win support for a proposal, there is strong coordination between offices. Indeed, political coordination among the high ranks of the administration can be rather intense, although the limited capacity and time of the Federal Council members, as well as their diverging interests, create practical bottlenecks.
There is a tension, however, between the consensus principle in the Federal Council that demands a common solution supported by all seven ministers, and the departmental principle that enables ministers to pursue their party line within their departments which, in turn, allows them to satisfy party members as they secure support for consensus-derived government solutions. Increasing polarization in parliament strengthens the departmental principle and renders consensus-driven solutions within the Federal Council more difficult to achieve. Nonetheless, the Federal Council so far managed to balance the two principles (Sager and Vatter 2019).
Citations:
Sager, F. & Vatter A. (2019). „Regierungshandeln im Spannungsfeld von Partei- und Exekutivpolitik am Beispiel des Bundesrats“, in Blackbox Exekutive. Eds. A. Ritz, T. Haldemann & F. Sager. 195-211. Zürich. NZZ Libro.
There is a tension, however, between the consensus principle in the Federal Council that demands a common solution supported by all seven ministers, and the departmental principle that enables ministers to pursue their party line within their departments which, in turn, allows them to satisfy party members as they secure support for consensus-derived government solutions. Increasing polarization in parliament strengthens the departmental principle and renders consensus-driven solutions within the Federal Council more difficult to achieve. Nonetheless, the Federal Council so far managed to balance the two principles (Sager and Vatter 2019).
Citations:
Sager, F. & Vatter A. (2019). „Regierungshandeln im Spannungsfeld von Partei- und Exekutivpolitik am Beispiel des Bundesrats“, in Blackbox Exekutive. Eds. A. Ritz, T. Haldemann & F. Sager. 195-211. Zürich. NZZ Libro.
How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?
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The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
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Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
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There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
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There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
Not surprisingly, given the small number of ministries, there are no cabinet committees in Switzerland’s political system. However, there is considerable coordination, delegation and communication at the lower level of the federal government. Every minister is in a sense already a “ministerial committee,” representing the coordination of numerous cooperating departmental units.
How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?
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Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
The federal government deliberates behind closed doors, and minutes of these meetings are not public. A leading expert on government decision processes has estimated that in most decision-making processes, “either the preliminary procedure or the co-reporting procedure leads to an agreement.” The preliminary procedure consists of interministerial consultations at the level of the federal departments. After the departments have been consulted, the co-reporting procedure begins. The Federal Chancellery leads the process by submitting the proposal under consideration as prepared by the ministry responsible to all other ministries. These then have the opportunity to submit a report or express an opinion. A process of discussion and coordination ensues, designed to eliminate all or most differences before the proposal is discussed by the Federal Council.
Two instruments, the large and the small co-reporting procedures, are specifically designed to coordinate policy proposals between the ministries. These processes invite the ministries to take positions on political issues. The co-reporting procedure is largely a process of negative coordination, which highlights incompatibilities with other policies but does not systematically scrutinize the potential for synergy.
Citations:
Vatter, Adrian (2020): Der Bundesrat. Die Schweizer Regierung. Zürich: NZZ
Two instruments, the large and the small co-reporting procedures, are specifically designed to coordinate policy proposals between the ministries. These processes invite the ministries to take positions on political issues. The co-reporting procedure is largely a process of negative coordination, which highlights incompatibilities with other policies but does not systematically scrutinize the potential for synergy.
Citations:
Vatter, Adrian (2020): Der Bundesrat. Die Schweizer Regierung. Zürich: NZZ
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Given the small size of the federal administration and the country’s tradition of informal coordination, there is a continuing presence of strong and effective informal coordination. According to Mavrot and Sager, informal coordination not only takes place among administrative units in the seven departments, but also between the respective administrations at the different federal levels.
Citations:
Mavrot, Céline, and Fritz Sager (2018). Vertical epistemic communities in multilevel governance. Policy & Politics, Volume 46, Number 3, pp. 391-407.
Citations:
Mavrot, Céline, and Fritz Sager (2018). Vertical epistemic communities in multilevel governance. Policy & Politics, Volume 46, Number 3, pp. 391-407.
How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?
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The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
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The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
The Federal Council has developed a strategy for information and communication technology in the Federal Administration. It uses digital technologies effectively to support interministerial coordination. The development and use of IT in the Federal Administration has, however, experienced challenges with regard to efficiency and the appropriate use of fiscal resources. For example, the development of software for use in tax policy and administration has been heavily criticized by the Swiss Federal Audit Office.
As for the cantons, Schmid et al. developed a digitalization index for each canton and found that a high level of e-government and digitalization can be found in cantons with strong financial resources (i.e., wealthy inhabitants and a strong economy). The cantons of St. Gallen, Aargau, Zug and Neuenburg score highest in this index.
In cross-national comparison, Switzerland receives medium to low scores on e-government issues. The European Commission’s e-Government Benchmark 2021 report, which examines progress in the digitalization of administration, has been summarized by the government in the following way:
“Despite the increase in overall performance, Switzerland still ranks low (in international comparison):
“With an overall performance of 52.3% (EU 67.9%), Switzerland ranks a low 32nd out of 36, down from 49.9% (EU 62%) two years ago … Switzerland also compares poorly with neighboring countries that also have a federal structure, such as Austria (84.1%) and Germany (62.1%) … When it comes to the use of basic services, the majority of European countries are significantly more advanced than Switzerland (CH 34%; EU 65.2%). Switzerland has not yet established a state-recognized e-ID that can be used for digital identification in the processing of e-services. Pre-filled forms with data from sources such as basic registers (authentic sources) exist in only 12% (+4%) of the e-services examined (EU: 61.5%). Automatically pre-filled forms with data that the authorities already have from certain sources would significantly reduce the effort for the user (no multiple entries, “once-only” principle) and the administration (increase in data quality).
“In the area of transparency of e-services, Switzerland continues to develop (+3.5%) and is approaching the benchmark average (CH 43.8%; EU 64.3%). In terms of the traceability of service provision (completion of forms until receipt of the service), Switzerland is clearly behind the EU average (62%) at around 22%. The report places a great deal of emphasis on information regarding deadlines for the provision of benefits. Here, Switzerland performs poorly. Switzerland has made progress (approx. +10%) in terms of transparency with regard to the personal data used by the authorities. Users can manage their personal data themselves in around 42% of the e-services examined.
“The report shows that Swiss authorities need to improve, especially in citizen-related online services (marriage, birth, death, work, study, etc.). Here, basic services are missing, such as pre-filled forms, or the process of handling services is not transparent. Swiss authorities are more progressive when it comes to business-related services and information, such as starting a business.
“In the area of user-centeredness, Switzerland can keep up with the EU average. About 80% (EU: 87.2%) of the government services and information examined are available online on government websites. Almost nine out of 10 of the websites surveyed also offer online support, help functions and feedback mechanisms and are mobile-enabled.” (https://www.egovernment.ch/de/aktuelles/medieninformationen/e-government-benchmark-der-eu-2021/)
Citations:
https://www.bakom.admin.ch/bakom/en/homepage/digital-switzerland-and-internet/strategie-digitale-schweiz.html
Schmid, J., Urben, M., & Vatter, A. (2018). Cyberföderalismus in der Schweiz: Befunde zur Digitalisierung kantonaler Verwaltungen. Yearbook of Swiss Administrative Sciences, 9(1), 12–24. DOI: http://doi.org/10.5334/ssas.116https:
//www.egovernment.ch/de/
https://www.egovernment.ch/de/aktuelles/medieninformationen/e-government-benchmark-der-eu-2021/
As for the cantons, Schmid et al. developed a digitalization index for each canton and found that a high level of e-government and digitalization can be found in cantons with strong financial resources (i.e., wealthy inhabitants and a strong economy). The cantons of St. Gallen, Aargau, Zug and Neuenburg score highest in this index.
In cross-national comparison, Switzerland receives medium to low scores on e-government issues. The European Commission’s e-Government Benchmark 2021 report, which examines progress in the digitalization of administration, has been summarized by the government in the following way:
“Despite the increase in overall performance, Switzerland still ranks low (in international comparison):
“With an overall performance of 52.3% (EU 67.9%), Switzerland ranks a low 32nd out of 36, down from 49.9% (EU 62%) two years ago … Switzerland also compares poorly with neighboring countries that also have a federal structure, such as Austria (84.1%) and Germany (62.1%) … When it comes to the use of basic services, the majority of European countries are significantly more advanced than Switzerland (CH 34%; EU 65.2%). Switzerland has not yet established a state-recognized e-ID that can be used for digital identification in the processing of e-services. Pre-filled forms with data from sources such as basic registers (authentic sources) exist in only 12% (+4%) of the e-services examined (EU: 61.5%). Automatically pre-filled forms with data that the authorities already have from certain sources would significantly reduce the effort for the user (no multiple entries, “once-only” principle) and the administration (increase in data quality).
“In the area of transparency of e-services, Switzerland continues to develop (+3.5%) and is approaching the benchmark average (CH 43.8%; EU 64.3%). In terms of the traceability of service provision (completion of forms until receipt of the service), Switzerland is clearly behind the EU average (62%) at around 22%. The report places a great deal of emphasis on information regarding deadlines for the provision of benefits. Here, Switzerland performs poorly. Switzerland has made progress (approx. +10%) in terms of transparency with regard to the personal data used by the authorities. Users can manage their personal data themselves in around 42% of the e-services examined.
“The report shows that Swiss authorities need to improve, especially in citizen-related online services (marriage, birth, death, work, study, etc.). Here, basic services are missing, such as pre-filled forms, or the process of handling services is not transparent. Swiss authorities are more progressive when it comes to business-related services and information, such as starting a business.
“In the area of user-centeredness, Switzerland can keep up with the EU average. About 80% (EU: 87.2%) of the government services and information examined are available online on government websites. Almost nine out of 10 of the websites surveyed also offer online support, help functions and feedback mechanisms and are mobile-enabled.” (https://www.egovernment.ch/de/aktuelles/medieninformationen/e-government-benchmark-der-eu-2021/)
Citations:
https://www.bakom.admin.ch/bakom/en/homepage/digital-switzerland-and-internet/strategie-digitale-schweiz.html
Schmid, J., Urben, M., & Vatter, A. (2018). Cyberföderalismus in der Schweiz: Befunde zur Digitalisierung kantonaler Verwaltungen. Yearbook of Swiss Administrative Sciences, 9(1), 12–24. DOI: http://doi.org/10.5334/ssas.116https:
//www.egovernment.ch/de/
https://www.egovernment.ch/de/aktuelles/medieninformationen/e-government-benchmark-der-eu-2021/
Graph View
To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?
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RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
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RIA are not applied or do not exist.
There is no formal institution responsible for ex ante impact assessment in Switzerland. Article 170 of the constitution states that “(t)he federal parliament shall ensure that the efficacy of measures taken by the confederation is evaluated.” In some ministries such as the Department of Economic Affairs, individual units occasionally perform systematic and encompassing ex ante impact assessments. Furthermore, ex ante evaluations by the administration always include checks for consistency with existing law (performed by the Department of Justice), compatibility with EU regulations, and if necessary, analyze budget implications, probable administrative costs and personnel requirements. Ex post evaluations have also been strongly developed; however, it is unclear whether the results of these analyses have any substantial effect on implementation.
In a 2011 study, Sager and Rissi argue that “the meager impact and success of the RIA is due to its institutional context, namely Swiss semi-direct referendum democracy. Direct-democratic involvement and the division of power in the course of consensual government are both great barriers for effective policy appraisal.”
Beyond these processes, functional equivalents of impact assessments do exist. First, expert commissions that draft or suggest laws also evaluate alternatives, while examining the potential impacts, benefits and problems associated with proposed solutions. Second, and probably more important, is the so-called consultation procedure derived from Article 147 of the constitution. This article stipulates that “the cantons, the political parties and the interested circles shall be heard in the course of the preparation of important legislation and other projects of substantial impact, and on important international treaties.” As a consequence, all those who are affected by a planned law have a constitutional right to give their opinion as to its pros and cons. This has been emphasized recently in a report written by collaborators of the OECD (Arndt-Bascle et al. 2022).
From a comparative perspective, Switzerland was a relative latecomer to performance-management policies, as were Germany and Austria. It was only in 2011 that the Federal Administration decided to implement some form of performance management on a consistent basis.
In 2016, a report by the Federal Audit Office criticized RIA praxis in Switzerland arguing that it did not fully comply with the formal requirements for RIA. This critique led to a political debate about whether the Federal Administration had deliberately misinformed the parliament. In the course of this debate, the widespread neglect of RIA by politicians was largely ignored. In December 2018, the Federal Council emphasized the need to improve RIAs by optimizing existing processes without creating new institutions. In a recent report, the OECD notes that, while there is no major significant improvement, recently Switzerland has also made some adjustments by reforming “its regulatory policy framework in 2019, in particular through the issuing of new regulatory impact assessment (RIA) directives by the Federal Council. The requirement for RIA to be conducted for all regulations in Switzerland has been refined with a ‘quick check’ procedure and additional consideration for proportionality; however this does not mean that RIA is done in an encompassing and systematic manner. All regulations must undergo a preliminary RIA, which will allow identifying regulations to be subject to an in-depth assessment. A threshold test, based on quantitative and qualitative criteria, is applied to determine whether a regulation should be subject to a simplified or full RIA. The obligation to quantify regulatory costs has been extended and systematized, such as for all new regulations which cause additional regulatory costs for more than 1,000 companies or which place a particular burden on an economic sector. Switzerland focuses less on quantifying benefits and costs of regulations to citizens” (OECD 2021: 286; Arndt-Bascle et al. 2022).
Citations:
Arndt-Bascle, Christiane and Paul Davidson, Marie-Gabrielle de Liedekerke 2022: Wie man schlaue Regulierungen findet, Die Volkswirtschaft 1–2 / 2022, 39-42.
EFK [Eidgenössische Finanzkontrolle] (2016). Prognosen in den Botschaften des Bundesrates, Evaluation der prospektiven Folgenabschätzungen von Gesetzesentwürfen, Bern.
OECD 2021: Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021, Paris: OECD.
Fritz Sager/Christof Rissi 2013: The limited scope of policy appraisal in the context of referendum democracy – the case of regulatory impact assessment in Switzerland, Evaluation: The International Journal of Theory, Research and Practice 17(2): 151-164.
Fritz Sager (2017). „Regulierungsfolgenabschätzung (RFA): Prognosen und Kompromisse“, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 14. Februar 2017, S. 9.
In a 2011 study, Sager and Rissi argue that “the meager impact and success of the RIA is due to its institutional context, namely Swiss semi-direct referendum democracy. Direct-democratic involvement and the division of power in the course of consensual government are both great barriers for effective policy appraisal.”
Beyond these processes, functional equivalents of impact assessments do exist. First, expert commissions that draft or suggest laws also evaluate alternatives, while examining the potential impacts, benefits and problems associated with proposed solutions. Second, and probably more important, is the so-called consultation procedure derived from Article 147 of the constitution. This article stipulates that “the cantons, the political parties and the interested circles shall be heard in the course of the preparation of important legislation and other projects of substantial impact, and on important international treaties.” As a consequence, all those who are affected by a planned law have a constitutional right to give their opinion as to its pros and cons. This has been emphasized recently in a report written by collaborators of the OECD (Arndt-Bascle et al. 2022).
From a comparative perspective, Switzerland was a relative latecomer to performance-management policies, as were Germany and Austria. It was only in 2011 that the Federal Administration decided to implement some form of performance management on a consistent basis.
In 2016, a report by the Federal Audit Office criticized RIA praxis in Switzerland arguing that it did not fully comply with the formal requirements for RIA. This critique led to a political debate about whether the Federal Administration had deliberately misinformed the parliament. In the course of this debate, the widespread neglect of RIA by politicians was largely ignored. In December 2018, the Federal Council emphasized the need to improve RIAs by optimizing existing processes without creating new institutions. In a recent report, the OECD notes that, while there is no major significant improvement, recently Switzerland has also made some adjustments by reforming “its regulatory policy framework in 2019, in particular through the issuing of new regulatory impact assessment (RIA) directives by the Federal Council. The requirement for RIA to be conducted for all regulations in Switzerland has been refined with a ‘quick check’ procedure and additional consideration for proportionality; however this does not mean that RIA is done in an encompassing and systematic manner. All regulations must undergo a preliminary RIA, which will allow identifying regulations to be subject to an in-depth assessment. A threshold test, based on quantitative and qualitative criteria, is applied to determine whether a regulation should be subject to a simplified or full RIA. The obligation to quantify regulatory costs has been extended and systematized, such as for all new regulations which cause additional regulatory costs for more than 1,000 companies or which place a particular burden on an economic sector. Switzerland focuses less on quantifying benefits and costs of regulations to citizens” (OECD 2021: 286; Arndt-Bascle et al. 2022).
Citations:
Arndt-Bascle, Christiane and Paul Davidson, Marie-Gabrielle de Liedekerke 2022: Wie man schlaue Regulierungen findet, Die Volkswirtschaft 1–2 / 2022, 39-42.
EFK [Eidgenössische Finanzkontrolle] (2016). Prognosen in den Botschaften des Bundesrates, Evaluation der prospektiven Folgenabschätzungen von Gesetzesentwürfen, Bern.
OECD 2021: Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021, Paris: OECD.
Fritz Sager/Christof Rissi 2013: The limited scope of policy appraisal in the context of referendum democracy – the case of regulatory impact assessment in Switzerland, Evaluation: The International Journal of Theory, Research and Practice 17(2): 151-164.
Fritz Sager (2017). „Regulierungsfolgenabschätzung (RFA): Prognosen und Kompromisse“, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 14. Februar 2017, S. 9.
Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?
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9
9
RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
8
7
6
7
6
The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
5
4
3
4
3
The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
2
1
1
RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
While stakeholder participation in regulatory impact assessment (RIA) procedures is a particularly strong point in Switzerland, communications processes vary between regions and policy fields. For in-depth RIA, an extended version of standard RIA, Rissi and Sager show how procedural assessments used to be the most prominent form of RIA utilization in Switzerland. RIA are often outsourced to independent research companies, though this does not affect utilization. In the course of the debate about the Federal Audit Office report on the quality of RIA, an independent Regulation Assessment Unit was demanded by some politicians. However, the proposal is yet to be made concrete.
Citations:
Rissi Christof and Fritz Sager (2013). “Types of Knowledge Utilization of Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA). Evidence from Swiss Policymaking,” Regulation & Governance 7(3): 348–364.
Citations:
Rissi Christof and Fritz Sager (2013). “Types of Knowledge Utilization of Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA). Evidence from Swiss Policymaking,” Regulation & Governance 7(3): 348–364.
Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?
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9
9
Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
8
7
6
7
6
Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
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4
3
4
3
Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
2
1
1
Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
The government conducts effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA. Given the decentralized political and administrative system of Switzerland, however, they are only used in few departments.
The Federal Office for Spatial Development uses the Sustainability Impact Assessment (Nachhaltigkeitsbeurteilung, NHB) and the Federal Office for the Environment uses the Economic Impact Assessment (Volkswirtschaftliche Beurteilung, VOBU). There is no social impact assessment at the federal level.
Citations:
ok.
The Federal Office for Spatial Development uses the Sustainability Impact Assessment (Nachhaltigkeitsbeurteilung, NHB) and the Federal Office for the Environment uses the Economic Impact Assessment (Volkswirtschaftliche Beurteilung, VOBU). There is no social impact assessment at the federal level.
Citations:
ok.
To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?
10
9
9
Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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7
6
7
6
Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
2
1
1
Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
Article 170 of the constitution states that “(t)he federal parliament shall ensure that the efficacy of measures taken by the confederation is evaluated.” Ex post evaluations have been strongly developed and are, to varying degrees, standard in most policy fields. Evaluations are best established in the fields of development cooperation, public health, education and economy. Ex post evaluations are a most important source of information for the revision and development of policies when used by the administration. Administration experts draft laws and reports based on the available empirical evidence, which mostly consists of policy evaluations. However, the administration formulates drafts that are subject to pre-parliamentarian and parliamentarian policymaking processes that include many relevant actors that do not prioritize evidence. The main goal of policymaking in Switzerland is acceptance rather than evidence-based policy. However, as many evaluations focus on learning within the administration rather than executive control and new legislation, the impact of evaluations remains significant in Switzerland. The Swiss evaluation community is one of the most professional in Europe and evaluations are of good quality. The role of ex post evaluations in Switzerland can thus be considered important.
Citations:
Fritz Sager, Thomas Widmer, Andreas Balthasar (eds.) 2017: Evaluation im politischen System der Schweiz. Entwicklung, Bedeutung und Wechselwirkungen, Zürich: NZZ Verlag
Citations:
Fritz Sager, Thomas Widmer, Andreas Balthasar (eds.) 2017: Evaluation im politischen System der Schweiz. Entwicklung, Bedeutung und Wechselwirkungen, Zürich: NZZ Verlag
Graph View
Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?
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9
9
The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
8
7
6
7
6
The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
2
1
1
The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
Policymaking in Switzerland is strongly based on public consultation with interest groups. Traditionally, in the Swiss liberal-conservative political system, business and employer interest groups have more influence and power than trade unions or non-producer interests. The latter, however, has enjoyed a significant increase in its political influence recently (Kriesi 1980; 1982; Häusermann et al. 2004; Armingeon 2011; Sciarini et al. 2015; Eichenberger 2020; Mach et al. 2020).
Within Switzerland’s corporatist system, which links organizations of labor, capital and the state, there are numerous pre-parliamentary procedures and committees focused on consultation with various societal groups. One of the main ones is the consultation procedure, which enables invited (communal and cantonal umbrella organizations, relevant interest groups) and uninvited parties to submit statements in a preliminary legislative procedure. These instruments are designed to prevent government proposals from failing in parliament or in referendums, and to offer solutions that benefit all parties. However, research shows that the degree of corporatist integration has declined in recent years. This is in part attributable to the growing intensity of conflicts between the social partners, as well to the influence of European integration and internationalization. If judged from a comparative perspective, the level of corporatist integration remains very high in Switzerland, but from a historical perspective it is low. During the pandemic, corporatism has proven to be very resilient and efficient for swift socioeconomic policymaking, although this corporatist coordination happened very silently, while lobbying was much more in the focus of the mass media (Armingeon and Sager 2022). In any case, direct democracy offers interest groups major influence by threatening to trigger a referendum. This offers strong incentives for political elites to incorporate major interest groups in policy development. On the other hand, the federal government has become stronger in domestic politics due to the consequences of European integration.
Citations:
ARMINGEON, Klaus. 2011. A prematurely announced death? Swiss corporatism in comparative perspective. In: TRAMPUSCH, C. & MACH, A. (eds.) Switzerland in Europe: Continuity and Change in the Swiss Political Economy. London/New York: Routledge.
Armingeon, Klaus and Fritz Sager 2022: Muting Science: Input overload versus scientific advice in Swiss policymaking during the COVID-19 pandemic, unpublished paper.
EICHENBERGER, S. 2020. The Rise of Citizen Groups within the Administration and Parliament in Switzerland. Swiss Political Science Review, 26, 206-227.
Fischer, Manuel and Pascal Sciarini (2019): Die Position der Regierung in Entscheidungsstrukturen, in: Ritz, Adrian, Theo Haldemann and Fritz Sager (eds.): Blackbox Exekutive. Regierungslehre in der Schweiz, Zürich, NZZ Libro, 49-64.
HÄUSERMANN, S., MACH, A. & PAPADOPOULOS, Y. 2004. From Corporatism to Partisan Politics: Social Policy Making under Strain in Switzerland. Revue Suisse de Science Politique, 11, 33-59.
KRIESI, H. 1980. Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Schweizer Politik, Frankfurt am Main, New York, Campus.
KRIESI, H. 1982. The Structure of the Swiss Political System. In: LEHMBRUCH, G. & SCHMITTER, P. C. (eds.) Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making. London, Beverly Hills: Sage.
Lexicon of parliamentary terms (2022). Consultation procedure. https://www.parlament.ch/en/%C3%BCber-das-parlament/parlamentsw%C3%B6rterbuch/parlamentsw%C3%B6rterbuch-detail?WordId=225
MACH, A., VARONE, F. & EICHENBERGER, S. 2020. Transformations of Swiss neo-corporatism: From pre-parliamentary negotiations toward privileged pluralism in the parliamentary venue. In: CAREJA, R., EMMENEGGER, P. & GIGER, N. (eds.) The European Social Model under Pressure. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27043-8_4.
SAGER, F. & MAVROT, C. 2020. Switzerland’s COVID-19 policy response: Consociational crisis management and neo-corporatist reopening. European Policy Analysis, 6, 293-304.
SCIARINI, P., FISCHER, M. & TRABER, D. (eds.) 2015. Political Decision-Making in Switzerland. The Consensus Model under Pressure, Houndsmill, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Sciarini, Pascal, Manuel Fischer and Denise Traber (eds) (2015): Political decision-making in Switzerland: Challenges to consensus politics, Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan
Within Switzerland’s corporatist system, which links organizations of labor, capital and the state, there are numerous pre-parliamentary procedures and committees focused on consultation with various societal groups. One of the main ones is the consultation procedure, which enables invited (communal and cantonal umbrella organizations, relevant interest groups) and uninvited parties to submit statements in a preliminary legislative procedure. These instruments are designed to prevent government proposals from failing in parliament or in referendums, and to offer solutions that benefit all parties. However, research shows that the degree of corporatist integration has declined in recent years. This is in part attributable to the growing intensity of conflicts between the social partners, as well to the influence of European integration and internationalization. If judged from a comparative perspective, the level of corporatist integration remains very high in Switzerland, but from a historical perspective it is low. During the pandemic, corporatism has proven to be very resilient and efficient for swift socioeconomic policymaking, although this corporatist coordination happened very silently, while lobbying was much more in the focus of the mass media (Armingeon and Sager 2022). In any case, direct democracy offers interest groups major influence by threatening to trigger a referendum. This offers strong incentives for political elites to incorporate major interest groups in policy development. On the other hand, the federal government has become stronger in domestic politics due to the consequences of European integration.
Citations:
ARMINGEON, Klaus. 2011. A prematurely announced death? Swiss corporatism in comparative perspective. In: TRAMPUSCH, C. & MACH, A. (eds.) Switzerland in Europe: Continuity and Change in the Swiss Political Economy. London/New York: Routledge.
Armingeon, Klaus and Fritz Sager 2022: Muting Science: Input overload versus scientific advice in Swiss policymaking during the COVID-19 pandemic, unpublished paper.
EICHENBERGER, S. 2020. The Rise of Citizen Groups within the Administration and Parliament in Switzerland. Swiss Political Science Review, 26, 206-227.
Fischer, Manuel and Pascal Sciarini (2019): Die Position der Regierung in Entscheidungsstrukturen, in: Ritz, Adrian, Theo Haldemann and Fritz Sager (eds.): Blackbox Exekutive. Regierungslehre in der Schweiz, Zürich, NZZ Libro, 49-64.
HÄUSERMANN, S., MACH, A. & PAPADOPOULOS, Y. 2004. From Corporatism to Partisan Politics: Social Policy Making under Strain in Switzerland. Revue Suisse de Science Politique, 11, 33-59.
KRIESI, H. 1980. Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Schweizer Politik, Frankfurt am Main, New York, Campus.
KRIESI, H. 1982. The Structure of the Swiss Political System. In: LEHMBRUCH, G. & SCHMITTER, P. C. (eds.) Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making. London, Beverly Hills: Sage.
Lexicon of parliamentary terms (2022). Consultation procedure. https://www.parlament.ch/en/%C3%BCber-das-parlament/parlamentsw%C3%B6rterbuch/parlamentsw%C3%B6rterbuch-detail?WordId=225
MACH, A., VARONE, F. & EICHENBERGER, S. 2020. Transformations of Swiss neo-corporatism: From pre-parliamentary negotiations toward privileged pluralism in the parliamentary venue. In: CAREJA, R., EMMENEGGER, P. & GIGER, N. (eds.) The European Social Model under Pressure. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27043-8_4.
SAGER, F. & MAVROT, C. 2020. Switzerland’s COVID-19 policy response: Consociational crisis management and neo-corporatist reopening. European Policy Analysis, 6, 293-304.
SCIARINI, P., FISCHER, M. & TRABER, D. (eds.) 2015. Political Decision-Making in Switzerland. The Consensus Model under Pressure, Houndsmill, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Sciarini, Pascal, Manuel Fischer and Denise Traber (eds) (2015): Political decision-making in Switzerland: Challenges to consensus politics, Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan
Graph View
To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?
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9
9
Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
8
7
6
7
6
Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
5
4
3
4
3
Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
2
1
1
Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
Government communications have professionalized in recent years. In the 1940s and 1950s, the chancellor (and thus the government spokesman) used to tack a note “There is nothing to report from today’s Federal Council meeting” on a blackboard. By 1997, a new law states that the Federal Council “shall report to the public in a timely and comprehensive manner on its activities” (Vatter 2020: 271-280).
Switzerland’s government acts as a collegial body. All members of the government have to defend the government’s decisions, irrespective of their own opinion. However, in the 2003 to 2007 period, when the Swiss People’s Party’s (SVP) Christoph Blocher participated in government, communication was less coherent than before and afterward, and the country’s politics shifted, taking a more populist, aggressive and confrontational tack. Although the current government is much more consistent in its public statements, coherence has not yet returned to the level reached in the 1970s through the 1990s. The government includes two SVP members who have little incentive to increase communication coherence. The following factors have contributed to this decline in the coherence of government policy communications:
• the structure of the collegiate body itself, which makes it difficult to speak with one voice in the mass media age;
• political polarization, even among the members of the broad coalition government;
• the systematic distortion of the Federal Council’s communication leaks on the part of some aggressive media outlets; and
• the Federal Council’s lack of authority or capacity to punish and deter communication leaks, and its inability to manage its communication policy effectively.
Having said this, it needs to be emphasized that in international comparison (e.g., in comparison with the German or Austrian federal governments) Switzerland’s federal ministries are most of the time highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
Overall, as digital transformation proceeds, government communication is increasingly influenced by and conducted through various media forms, including social media.
Citations:
Hinterleitner, M. & Sager, F. (2019). „Krisenmanagement und Risikovermeidung“, in Blackbox Exekutive. Eds. A. Ritz, T. Haldemann & F. Sager. 409-427. Zürich. NZZ Libro.
Raupp, Juliana and Jan Niklas Kocks (2019): Regierungskommunikation, in: Ritz, Adrian, Theo Haldemann and Fritz Sager (eds.): Blackbox Exekutive. Regierungslehre in der Schweiz, Zürich, NZZ Libro, 373-388.
Vatter, Adrian 2020: Der Bundesrat. Die Schweizer Regierung. Zürich: NZZ
Switzerland’s government acts as a collegial body. All members of the government have to defend the government’s decisions, irrespective of their own opinion. However, in the 2003 to 2007 period, when the Swiss People’s Party’s (SVP) Christoph Blocher participated in government, communication was less coherent than before and afterward, and the country’s politics shifted, taking a more populist, aggressive and confrontational tack. Although the current government is much more consistent in its public statements, coherence has not yet returned to the level reached in the 1970s through the 1990s. The government includes two SVP members who have little incentive to increase communication coherence. The following factors have contributed to this decline in the coherence of government policy communications:
• the structure of the collegiate body itself, which makes it difficult to speak with one voice in the mass media age;
• political polarization, even among the members of the broad coalition government;
• the systematic distortion of the Federal Council’s communication leaks on the part of some aggressive media outlets; and
• the Federal Council’s lack of authority or capacity to punish and deter communication leaks, and its inability to manage its communication policy effectively.
Having said this, it needs to be emphasized that in international comparison (e.g., in comparison with the German or Austrian federal governments) Switzerland’s federal ministries are most of the time highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
Overall, as digital transformation proceeds, government communication is increasingly influenced by and conducted through various media forms, including social media.
Citations:
Hinterleitner, M. & Sager, F. (2019). „Krisenmanagement und Risikovermeidung“, in Blackbox Exekutive. Eds. A. Ritz, T. Haldemann & F. Sager. 409-427. Zürich. NZZ Libro.
Raupp, Juliana and Jan Niklas Kocks (2019): Regierungskommunikation, in: Ritz, Adrian, Theo Haldemann and Fritz Sager (eds.): Blackbox Exekutive. Regierungslehre in der Schweiz, Zürich, NZZ Libro, 373-388.
Vatter, Adrian 2020: Der Bundesrat. Die Schweizer Regierung. Zürich: NZZ
Graph View
To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?
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9
9
The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
5
4
3
4
3
The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
2
1
1
The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
The Swiss polity contains many different potential veto points, including political parties, cantons that have veto power in the second chamber, and interest groups with the power to trigger a referendum. Thus, the government must hammer out compromises carefully when drafting legislation. This is done in the pre- parliamentary stage of legislation. Once a bill is introduced into parliament, many of the necessary compromises have already been reached. For this reason, a substantial number of bills are passed in parliament without being modified, although the parliament tends to gain in strength, and thus intervene more and more in the parliamentary phase.
Actual implementation then takes place at the cantonal level. The cantons formulate and decide upon an implementation act for each federal law, a process very similar to the EU transposition process and in which cantons enjoy large discretion. The actual policy delivery for almost all policies is in the hands of the cantons.
It needs to be emphasized that the federal government in Switzerland does not correspond to the idea of government based on the logic of opposition and government, or on the notion that those political parties that obtain a majority of votes have a mandate to pursue their programs as a single party or minimal winning coalition. Rather, in Switzerland, federal government always means broad coalitions with the inclusion of almost all major political actors. Therefore, any governmental policy is a result of encompassing negotiations and compromises, which also address potential opposition to its implementation on the cantonal level. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that there is no such thing as a “government program” or a “coalition treaty” with clearly laid out policy objectives. But of course, as comparative analyses show, these limitations do not imply that such types of governments are less effective, at least over the medium to long run.
Citations:
Sager, F., & Thomann, E. (2016). “A Multiple Streams Approach to Member State Implementation Research: Politics, Problem Construction and Policy Paths in Swiss Asylum Policy,” Journal of Public Policy, 37(3): 287-314. doi: doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X1600009X
Sager, F., Ingold, K. & Balthasar, A. (2017). Policy-Analyse in der Schweiz. Besonderheiten, Theorien, Beispiele. Zürich: NZZ Verlag, Reihe „Politik und Gesellschaft in der Schweiz“.
Sciarini, Pascal. 2014. „Eppure si muove: the changing nature of the Swiss consensus democracy.“ Journal of European Public Policy 21 (1): 116–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2013.822822.
Actual implementation then takes place at the cantonal level. The cantons formulate and decide upon an implementation act for each federal law, a process very similar to the EU transposition process and in which cantons enjoy large discretion. The actual policy delivery for almost all policies is in the hands of the cantons.
It needs to be emphasized that the federal government in Switzerland does not correspond to the idea of government based on the logic of opposition and government, or on the notion that those political parties that obtain a majority of votes have a mandate to pursue their programs as a single party or minimal winning coalition. Rather, in Switzerland, federal government always means broad coalitions with the inclusion of almost all major political actors. Therefore, any governmental policy is a result of encompassing negotiations and compromises, which also address potential opposition to its implementation on the cantonal level. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that there is no such thing as a “government program” or a “coalition treaty” with clearly laid out policy objectives. But of course, as comparative analyses show, these limitations do not imply that such types of governments are less effective, at least over the medium to long run.
Citations:
Sager, F., & Thomann, E. (2016). “A Multiple Streams Approach to Member State Implementation Research: Politics, Problem Construction and Policy Paths in Swiss Asylum Policy,” Journal of Public Policy, 37(3): 287-314. doi: doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X1600009X
Sager, F., Ingold, K. & Balthasar, A. (2017). Policy-Analyse in der Schweiz. Besonderheiten, Theorien, Beispiele. Zürich: NZZ Verlag, Reihe „Politik und Gesellschaft in der Schweiz“.
Sciarini, Pascal. 2014. „Eppure si muove: the changing nature of the Swiss consensus democracy.“ Journal of European Public Policy 21 (1): 116–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2013.822822.
To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?
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9
9
The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
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7
6
7
6
The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
5
4
3
4
3
The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
2
1
1
The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
Government in Switzerland is not (primarily) party driven. Ministers are expected to work together as a collegium, and to abstain from any politics or policies that benefit their party or themselves as individual politicians. In general, this worked quite well so long as all members of government felt bound by the rules of collegiality. In recent years, due to growing political polarization and an attack on consociational politics by the right-wing populist party, there have been some deviations from this course. However, even in periods of polarized politics, the Swiss government and its policy implementation is much less driven by the interests of individual politicians or parties than is typically the case for parliamentary governments. In the current review period, ministerial compliance and cooperation were much more pronounced than between 2003 and 2007.
In the Swiss federal system, implementation is first the task of the cantons and even the municipalities. Implementation therefore must be seen as a multilevel process. According to Sager and Thomann, implementation varies among the cantons and is determined by political party government composition, policy pressures and bureaucratic preferences at the cantonal level.
Citations:
Sager, Fritz, and Eva Thomann (2016). “A Multiple Streams Approach to Member State Implementation Research: Politics, Problem Construction and Policy Paths in Swiss Asylum Policy,” Journal of Public Policy 37 (3): 287–314.
In the Swiss federal system, implementation is first the task of the cantons and even the municipalities. Implementation therefore must be seen as a multilevel process. According to Sager and Thomann, implementation varies among the cantons and is determined by political party government composition, policy pressures and bureaucratic preferences at the cantonal level.
Citations:
Sager, Fritz, and Eva Thomann (2016). “A Multiple Streams Approach to Member State Implementation Research: Politics, Problem Construction and Policy Paths in Swiss Asylum Policy,” Journal of Public Policy 37 (3): 287–314.
How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
5
4
3
4
3
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
2
1
1
The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
Switzerland’s government features neither a prime minister’s office nor line ministries, but does offer functional equivalents. Given the rule of collegiality and the consociational decision-making style, as well as the high level of cooperation at lower levels of the Federal Administration, there is little leeway for significant deviation from the government line. Monitoring is built into the cooperative process of policy formulation and implementation.
How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
8
7
6
7
6
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
5
4
3
4
3
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
2
1
1
The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
Switzerland’s governance system offers considerable flexibility in implementing decisions. The central administration is very small; this does not prevent bureaucratic drift, but in all likelihood the opportunities for such drift are much smaller than in huge administrations.
A number of factors mitigate for close coordination between the federal government and the Federal Administration. The country’s direct democracy means that citizens have the ability to limit the maneuvering room of both government and administration. In the collegial governmental system, coordination is essential to success, and government and administration alike depend on efficient collaboration given the reality of parliamentary control. There is little evidence of an administrative class that acts on its own; moreover, administrative elites perceive themselves to be politically neutral.
Furthermore, Switzerland’s model of federalism implies that cantons have considerable responsibility for implementing policy, while the federal state has a subsidiary role. According to Article 3 of the constitution: “The cantons are sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the federal constitution; they shall exercise all rights which are not transferred to the confederation.” Even in areas in which the federal state has tasks and powers, such as social insurance, environmental protection or zoning, implementation is carried out by the cantonal and sometimes municipal administrations. These bodies have considerable flexibility in performing their work, and implementation of federal guidelines frequently varies substantially between cantons. Zoning policy has offered examples in which the same federal regulation has led to opposite outcomes in different cantons. In addition, much implementation is carried out by interest organizations though the corporatist channel.
A 2016 study by Fritz Sager and Eva Thomann on cantonal asylum policies showed that implementation was mainly dependent on the extent of the problem, politicization and partisan power distribution in the respective canton as well as the previous policy. This analysis allows for many different constellations, which can explain the large variation in cantonal implementation of federal laws.
Federal agencies are monitored by the Swiss Federal Audit Office and the Parliamentary Control of the Administration; public and semi-public enterprises are monitored by various independent regulatory agencies.
Citations:
Fritz Sager and Eva Thomann: Multiple streams in member state implementation: politics, problem construction and policy paths in Swiss asylum policy. Journal of Public Policy, Available on CJO 2016 doi:10.1017/S0143814X1600009X
A number of factors mitigate for close coordination between the federal government and the Federal Administration. The country’s direct democracy means that citizens have the ability to limit the maneuvering room of both government and administration. In the collegial governmental system, coordination is essential to success, and government and administration alike depend on efficient collaboration given the reality of parliamentary control. There is little evidence of an administrative class that acts on its own; moreover, administrative elites perceive themselves to be politically neutral.
Furthermore, Switzerland’s model of federalism implies that cantons have considerable responsibility for implementing policy, while the federal state has a subsidiary role. According to Article 3 of the constitution: “The cantons are sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the federal constitution; they shall exercise all rights which are not transferred to the confederation.” Even in areas in which the federal state has tasks and powers, such as social insurance, environmental protection or zoning, implementation is carried out by the cantonal and sometimes municipal administrations. These bodies have considerable flexibility in performing their work, and implementation of federal guidelines frequently varies substantially between cantons. Zoning policy has offered examples in which the same federal regulation has led to opposite outcomes in different cantons. In addition, much implementation is carried out by interest organizations though the corporatist channel.
A 2016 study by Fritz Sager and Eva Thomann on cantonal asylum policies showed that implementation was mainly dependent on the extent of the problem, politicization and partisan power distribution in the respective canton as well as the previous policy. This analysis allows for many different constellations, which can explain the large variation in cantonal implementation of federal laws.
Federal agencies are monitored by the Swiss Federal Audit Office and the Parliamentary Control of the Administration; public and semi-public enterprises are monitored by various independent regulatory agencies.
Citations:
Fritz Sager and Eva Thomann: Multiple streams in member state implementation: politics, problem construction and policy paths in Swiss asylum policy. Journal of Public Policy, Available on CJO 2016 doi:10.1017/S0143814X1600009X
To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
8
7
6
7
6
The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
2
1
1
The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
In Switzerland, cantons and municipalities levy most of the country’s tax revenues. They determine local tax rates and decide how tax revenues will be distributed. Between 2004 and 2007, Switzerland passed a rather successful reform of its financial federalism, which has now taken effect. The basic idea was to establish a clear division of tasks between the federation and cantons as well as create transparency with regard to the flow of resources between the federal state and cantons. In this reform, the basic principle of fiscal equivalence was strengthened. This means that communes, cantons and the federation each are responsible for the funding of their own tasks, and for the balance of their own budgets. The fiscal equalization scheme has been retained, as it is necessary to reduce certain geographical, economic and social disparities, but the danger of providing badly aligned incentives through earmarked subsidies is eliminated through the use of grants. Funds thus continue to flow vertically (from the federal state to the cantons and vice versa) as well as horizontally (between communes and cantons). Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether the new fiscal equalization scheme will help cantons that have serious problems in fulfilling their tasks or in meeting their goals due to their small size, lack of resources or other reasons. In any case, there is a divide between those cantons that pay more and those receiving payments.
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
2
1
1
The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
Municipalities and cantons have a high degree of autonomy, while the federation has only a subsidiary role. The central government has little opportunity to counter decisions made by cantonal parliaments or governments. Municipal discretion in policymaking is a constitutional norm. Article 50 of the constitution states: “(1) The autonomy of the municipalities is guaranteed within the limits fixed by cantonal law. (2) In its activity, the confederation shall take into account the possible consequences for the municipalities. (3) In particular, it shall take into account the special situation of cities, agglomerations and mountainous regions.” The municipalities and cantons make use of their competences to the maximum extent possible.
The main competences for public policies are with the cantons. The implementation of federal policies in Switzerland is strongly shaped by the institutional setting. According to Vatter, “While the Federation holds the legislative power in many areas, responsibility for implementing federal policies resides to a large extent with the cantons.” Therefore, in a great number of policy domains, the federal level is dependent on the cantons for the implementation of federal legislation. Due to the high degree of legislative autonomy of the Swiss cantons, the delegation applies not only to the actual implementation of federal laws (i.e., the right to act) but also to the adaptation of these provisions to the local situation (i.e., the right to decide). The cantons are not only implementing, but also programming authorities. According to Sager et al., the complexities of modern infrastructure, economic intervention and social programs have stimulated mechanisms of intensive cooperation between the three levels of the federal system.
Sager et al. (2019) show how the cantons use their discretionary power to complement federal policies in order to achieve their stated objectives.
Citations:
Sager, F., Ingold, K., & Balthasar, A. (2017). Policy-Analyse in der Schweiz: Besonderheiten, Theorien, Beispiele. Politik und Gesellschaft in der Schweiz. Zürich: NZZ.
Sager, Fritz, Christian Rüefli and Eva Thomann (2019). « Fixing Federal Faults. Complementary Member State Policies in Swiss Health Care Policy », International Review of Public Policy [Online], 1:2 | 2019, Online since 20 November 2019, connection on 04 December 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/irpp/426
Vatter, A. (2007) ‘Federalism,’ in U. Klöti et al. (eds), Handbook of Swiss Politics, 2nd edn, Zurich: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 77-99.
The main competences for public policies are with the cantons. The implementation of federal policies in Switzerland is strongly shaped by the institutional setting. According to Vatter, “While the Federation holds the legislative power in many areas, responsibility for implementing federal policies resides to a large extent with the cantons.” Therefore, in a great number of policy domains, the federal level is dependent on the cantons for the implementation of federal legislation. Due to the high degree of legislative autonomy of the Swiss cantons, the delegation applies not only to the actual implementation of federal laws (i.e., the right to act) but also to the adaptation of these provisions to the local situation (i.e., the right to decide). The cantons are not only implementing, but also programming authorities. According to Sager et al., the complexities of modern infrastructure, economic intervention and social programs have stimulated mechanisms of intensive cooperation between the three levels of the federal system.
Sager et al. (2019) show how the cantons use their discretionary power to complement federal policies in order to achieve their stated objectives.
Citations:
Sager, F., Ingold, K., & Balthasar, A. (2017). Policy-Analyse in der Schweiz: Besonderheiten, Theorien, Beispiele. Politik und Gesellschaft in der Schweiz. Zürich: NZZ.
Sager, Fritz, Christian Rüefli and Eva Thomann (2019). « Fixing Federal Faults. Complementary Member State Policies in Swiss Health Care Policy », International Review of Public Policy [Online], 1:2 | 2019, Online since 20 November 2019, connection on 04 December 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/irpp/426
Vatter, A. (2007) ‘Federalism,’ in U. Klöti et al. (eds), Handbook of Swiss Politics, 2nd edn, Zurich: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 77-99.
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?
10
9
9
Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
2
1
1
Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
The Swiss political system is one of the most decentralized systems in the world. Cantons and municipalities enjoy very substantial autonomy not only in terms of organization but also in terms of policy. Within the scope of their quite significant competencies, it is up to the cantons and municipalities to decide what public services they want to offer, to what extent and at what level of quality. Therefore, there are no national standards for public services except with regard to those limited parts of the administration that implement federal law. However, all public services must comply with the rule of the law and the human rights set out in the constitution. A comparatively small number of issues (i.e., social policies) are decided at the federal level, and are thus subject to national standards. In these cases, federal laws are implemented by cantonal administrations, which have to follow national norms.
Multilateral agreements between some or all cantons (“Konkordate”) for common standards of public services can be seen as a functional equivalent to national policy standards.
As member-state implementation in all policy sectors leads to marked differences in both conformance and performance compliance, the federal government increasingly employs non-binding policy programs instead of legal acts to steer the cantons and secure distributive justice in service delivery. These programs often take the form of financial incentives or funding schemes for the achievement of given policy goals. They rest upon deliberative action rather than hierarchical coercion.
Citations:
Ritz, M., Neumann, O. and Sager, F. (2019), Senkt New Public Management die Verwaltungsausgaben in den Schweizer Kantonen? Eine empirische Analyse über zwei Dekaden. Swiss Polit Sci Rev. 25(3): 226–252 doi:10.1111/spsr.12381
Multilateral agreements between some or all cantons (“Konkordate”) for common standards of public services can be seen as a functional equivalent to national policy standards.
As member-state implementation in all policy sectors leads to marked differences in both conformance and performance compliance, the federal government increasingly employs non-binding policy programs instead of legal acts to steer the cantons and secure distributive justice in service delivery. These programs often take the form of financial incentives or funding schemes for the achievement of given policy goals. They rest upon deliberative action rather than hierarchical coercion.
Citations:
Ritz, M., Neumann, O. and Sager, F. (2019), Senkt New Public Management die Verwaltungsausgaben in den Schweizer Kantonen? Eine empirische Analyse über zwei Dekaden. Swiss Polit Sci Rev. 25(3): 226–252 doi:10.1111/spsr.12381
To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?
10
9
9
Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
8
7
6
7
6
Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
5
4
3
4
3
Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
2
1
1
Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
In Switzerland, there is a very limited likelihood that regulations contradict the interests of powerful groups, considering the numerous opportunities to articulate private interests in policy development. A case in point is agricultural policy: farmers are very effective in impeding regulations given their political power in parliament.
In addition, implementation – even of federal regulations – is almost exclusively done by cantonal and local administrations. Frequently, they apply federal law in a very pragmatic way, tailored to the needs of local and cantonal interests. Hence, if federal rules are in direct conflict with powerful vested interests, they are likely to be implemented in a way that minimizes the disadvantages for the powerful vested interests on the cantonal or local level.
Moreover, vested economic interests are very powerful in the implementation process of public policy. Obvious examples are federal rules which were agreed upon in popular votes but violated major economic interests. In 2017, the government and parliament avoided implementing a constitutional rule constraining the inflow of foreign workers. The government and parliament feared that the rule would entail massive economic disadvantages and were supported in their view by economic interest organizations – ranging from trade unions to employers’ associations – and individual firms. Likewise, the strict implementation of a constitutional rule limiting the construction of vacation homes was considerably modified due to powerful cantonal and local economic interests.
Discretion is a necessary condition for implementation, be it by interest groups or cantons. The main goal of federal legislation is the formulation of policy proposals that are accepted in a referendum. This is only possible by granting discretion in the implementation of policies: allowing implementing agents to adjust federal policy. As the federal government depends on implementing agents for basically all policies, there are strong reservations against strict enforcement of compliance. This is a deliberate consequence of the Swiss institutionalized emphasis on policy acceptance rather than outcomes.
In addition, implementation – even of federal regulations – is almost exclusively done by cantonal and local administrations. Frequently, they apply federal law in a very pragmatic way, tailored to the needs of local and cantonal interests. Hence, if federal rules are in direct conflict with powerful vested interests, they are likely to be implemented in a way that minimizes the disadvantages for the powerful vested interests on the cantonal or local level.
Moreover, vested economic interests are very powerful in the implementation process of public policy. Obvious examples are federal rules which were agreed upon in popular votes but violated major economic interests. In 2017, the government and parliament avoided implementing a constitutional rule constraining the inflow of foreign workers. The government and parliament feared that the rule would entail massive economic disadvantages and were supported in their view by economic interest organizations – ranging from trade unions to employers’ associations – and individual firms. Likewise, the strict implementation of a constitutional rule limiting the construction of vacation homes was considerably modified due to powerful cantonal and local economic interests.
Discretion is a necessary condition for implementation, be it by interest groups or cantons. The main goal of federal legislation is the formulation of policy proposals that are accepted in a referendum. This is only possible by granting discretion in the implementation of policies: allowing implementing agents to adjust federal policy. As the federal government depends on implementing agents for basically all policies, there are strong reservations against strict enforcement of compliance. This is a deliberate consequence of the Swiss institutionalized emphasis on policy acceptance rather than outcomes.
Graph View
To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?
10
9
9
The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
8
7
6
7
6
In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
2
1
1
The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
Switzerland directly implements international treaties which today account for about half of the federal legislation. Whenever Switzerland agrees to cooperate with other countries or international organizations, it attempts to meet all the requirements of the agreement, including implementation of the necessary administrative reforms.
With regard to the European Union, however, the adaptation is idiosyncratic. On the one hand, the government cannot in a self-executing way update domestic legislation to EU rules, as most Swiss do not want to join the European Union and have expressed in several referendums their skepticism toward the European Union. On the other hand, adaptations to EU law reach beyond these treaties and comprise also large parts of (domestic) economic law. The strategy of bilateral treaties has been placed in jeopardy following the passage of the popular initiative capping mass immigration. The parliament solved the problem by paying lip-service to the constitutional amendment while drafting an implementation law that does not correspond to the wording and the spirit of the popular decision (“implementation light”). Moreover, there are serious concerns as to whether the “strategy of bilaterals” is sufficient or sustainable. Conflicts between the European Union and Switzerland have escalated since 2008, with the European Union demanding that institutional solutions be developed to address the bilateral system’s weaknesses. Specifically, the European Union has called for self-executing rules enabling bilateral treaties to be updated as well as independent institutions for the settlement of conflicts arising from the bilateral treaties. Switzerland has opposed these proposals. There is strong domestic opposition against any such institutional framework agreement, while the European Union is not willing to continue the previous case-by-case updating of bilateral agreements nor the unanimous adjudication of conflicts by a joint committee of the European Union and Switzerland. Switzerland has tried to wait out the decision, but the European Union has threatened and then executed sanctions. Given the long list of unresolved issues touching the interests of diverse groups such as trade unions and right-wing populist politicians, the Swiss political system has been unable to adapt to these external challenges. Instead, the executive and most political parties procrastinated and muddled their way through. Finally, in spring 2021, the government terminated any development of an institutional agreement with the European Union having failed to find consensus within the government or win over a clear majority of voters and interest groups for the draft agreement that had been hammered out over the previous years. The left, and in particular the trade unions, feared becoming victims of the liberalizing negative integration which is spurred by the rulings of the European Court of Justice. The right-wing populist party took an oppositional approach as a matter of principle.
Hence, relations between the European Union and Switzerland have stalled at the time of writing. In principle, the European Union has made any update to and extension of its bilateral treaties with Switzerland conditional on a sufficient institutional agreement that defines the dynamic updating of the bilateral treaties and dispute settlement, and a central role for the European Court of Justice. Some Swiss actors, on the other hand, believe that in the end the European Union will agree to a gradual process of updating of the treaties because of Switzerland’s importance to the European Union. This is the position of the party with the largest vote share in Switzerland, the Swiss People’s Party. Other major parties see the need to respond to the EU demand for an institutional arrangement, but are far from finding consensus on what such an arrangement might look like.
Over recent decades, the Swiss government adapted its government structures to increasing European integration. There is a desk on European integration (which has had various names and various ministry assignments) in the federal government. There is a leading federal officer for European Affairs (who has sometimes even been granted the competencies of a state secretary, which is just below the level of a federal minister). Meanwhile, with respect to European politics, power has shifted somewhat from interest associations and a pre-parliamentary commission to the national parliament and particularly the federal government. Finally, cantons have far-reaching powers and participate accordingly in the formulation of Switzerland’s European policy when their interests are affected. The cantons determine their positions in the Conference of Cantonal Governments (KdK), which is represented at the Swiss Mission to the European Union.
Citations:
Armingeon, Klaus/Lutz, Philipp (2020): Muddling between responsiveness and responsibility: the Swiss case of a non-implementation of a constitutional rule, in: Comparative European Politics 18, 256-280.https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-019-00185-2
Armingeon, Klaus and Philipp Lutz 2022: Citizens’ response to a non-responsive government: The Case of the Swiss Initiative on Mass Immigration, unpublished manuscript
DARDANELLI, Paolo and Oscar Mazzoleni eds 2021: Switzerland-EU Relations. Lessons for the UK after Brexit?, London: Routledge.
Lauener, Lukas/Emmenegger, Patrick/Häusermann, Silja, et al. 2021: Torn Between International Cooperation and National Sovereignty: Voter Attitudes in Trade-off Situations in Switzerland, in: Swiss Political Science Review. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/spsr.12484
Wasserfallen, Fabio 2021: Die Europäische Union und die Schweiz, in Bernauer, T. et al.: Schweizer Aussenpolitik, Zürich: NZZ-Verlag.
With regard to the European Union, however, the adaptation is idiosyncratic. On the one hand, the government cannot in a self-executing way update domestic legislation to EU rules, as most Swiss do not want to join the European Union and have expressed in several referendums their skepticism toward the European Union. On the other hand, adaptations to EU law reach beyond these treaties and comprise also large parts of (domestic) economic law. The strategy of bilateral treaties has been placed in jeopardy following the passage of the popular initiative capping mass immigration. The parliament solved the problem by paying lip-service to the constitutional amendment while drafting an implementation law that does not correspond to the wording and the spirit of the popular decision (“implementation light”). Moreover, there are serious concerns as to whether the “strategy of bilaterals” is sufficient or sustainable. Conflicts between the European Union and Switzerland have escalated since 2008, with the European Union demanding that institutional solutions be developed to address the bilateral system’s weaknesses. Specifically, the European Union has called for self-executing rules enabling bilateral treaties to be updated as well as independent institutions for the settlement of conflicts arising from the bilateral treaties. Switzerland has opposed these proposals. There is strong domestic opposition against any such institutional framework agreement, while the European Union is not willing to continue the previous case-by-case updating of bilateral agreements nor the unanimous adjudication of conflicts by a joint committee of the European Union and Switzerland. Switzerland has tried to wait out the decision, but the European Union has threatened and then executed sanctions. Given the long list of unresolved issues touching the interests of diverse groups such as trade unions and right-wing populist politicians, the Swiss political system has been unable to adapt to these external challenges. Instead, the executive and most political parties procrastinated and muddled their way through. Finally, in spring 2021, the government terminated any development of an institutional agreement with the European Union having failed to find consensus within the government or win over a clear majority of voters and interest groups for the draft agreement that had been hammered out over the previous years. The left, and in particular the trade unions, feared becoming victims of the liberalizing negative integration which is spurred by the rulings of the European Court of Justice. The right-wing populist party took an oppositional approach as a matter of principle.
Hence, relations between the European Union and Switzerland have stalled at the time of writing. In principle, the European Union has made any update to and extension of its bilateral treaties with Switzerland conditional on a sufficient institutional agreement that defines the dynamic updating of the bilateral treaties and dispute settlement, and a central role for the European Court of Justice. Some Swiss actors, on the other hand, believe that in the end the European Union will agree to a gradual process of updating of the treaties because of Switzerland’s importance to the European Union. This is the position of the party with the largest vote share in Switzerland, the Swiss People’s Party. Other major parties see the need to respond to the EU demand for an institutional arrangement, but are far from finding consensus on what such an arrangement might look like.
Over recent decades, the Swiss government adapted its government structures to increasing European integration. There is a desk on European integration (which has had various names and various ministry assignments) in the federal government. There is a leading federal officer for European Affairs (who has sometimes even been granted the competencies of a state secretary, which is just below the level of a federal minister). Meanwhile, with respect to European politics, power has shifted somewhat from interest associations and a pre-parliamentary commission to the national parliament and particularly the federal government. Finally, cantons have far-reaching powers and participate accordingly in the formulation of Switzerland’s European policy when their interests are affected. The cantons determine their positions in the Conference of Cantonal Governments (KdK), which is represented at the Swiss Mission to the European Union.
Citations:
Armingeon, Klaus/Lutz, Philipp (2020): Muddling between responsiveness and responsibility: the Swiss case of a non-implementation of a constitutional rule, in: Comparative European Politics 18, 256-280.https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-019-00185-2
Armingeon, Klaus and Philipp Lutz 2022: Citizens’ response to a non-responsive government: The Case of the Swiss Initiative on Mass Immigration, unpublished manuscript
DARDANELLI, Paolo and Oscar Mazzoleni eds 2021: Switzerland-EU Relations. Lessons for the UK after Brexit?, London: Routledge.
Lauener, Lukas/Emmenegger, Patrick/Häusermann, Silja, et al. 2021: Torn Between International Cooperation and National Sovereignty: Voter Attitudes in Trade-off Situations in Switzerland, in: Swiss Political Science Review. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/spsr.12484
Wasserfallen, Fabio 2021: Die Europäische Union und die Schweiz, in Bernauer, T. et al.: Schweizer Aussenpolitik, Zürich: NZZ-Verlag.
To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?
10
9
9
The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
2
1
1
The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
Switzerland is a fairly active member of the United Nations, the IMF, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe and most of the other important international organizations. Swiss foreign economic policy works actively to defend the interests of its export-oriented economy, as for instance in the context of the WTO.
However, the policy of neutrality and the objective of safeguarding national autonomy set clear limits to the country’s international engagement in the past, and direct democracy further reduced the scope of action in international affairs. During the growing polarization witnessed in Swiss politics over the past 20 years, together with the associated decline in consociational patterns of behavior, right-wing politicians have emphasized the notion of a small, neutral and independent nation-state surviving on the basis of smart strategies in a potentially hostile environment. Large portions of the population support these ideas. Popular skepticism toward European integration has mounted over the course of the last years.
The country concentrates its efforts in areas where it can realistically have some influence, such as economic matters or technical organizations dealing with issues such as transport, ecology or development. This said, there is a clear gap between the government’s stated goals in terms of international cooperation and the resources – institutional or otherwise – that it has at its disposal for these tasks
However, the policy of neutrality and the objective of safeguarding national autonomy set clear limits to the country’s international engagement in the past, and direct democracy further reduced the scope of action in international affairs. During the growing polarization witnessed in Swiss politics over the past 20 years, together with the associated decline in consociational patterns of behavior, right-wing politicians have emphasized the notion of a small, neutral and independent nation-state surviving on the basis of smart strategies in a potentially hostile environment. Large portions of the population support these ideas. Popular skepticism toward European integration has mounted over the course of the last years.
The country concentrates its efforts in areas where it can realistically have some influence, such as economic matters or technical organizations dealing with issues such as transport, ecology or development. This said, there is a clear gap between the government’s stated goals in terms of international cooperation and the resources – institutional or otherwise – that it has at its disposal for these tasks
Graph View
To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?
10
9
9
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
5
4
3
4
3
The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
2
1
1
There is no monitoring.
Self-monitoring takes place as a part of the political process, which includes numerous private and public actors. It is not institutionalized outside the context of the evaluation of policies (as by implication, policy evaluation leads indirectly to the monitoring of the institutional framework for these policies). The major actor in self-monitoring is the Parliamentary Control of the Administration (PCA), an evaluation service of the Federal Assembly which, on behalf of the Control Committees (“Geschäftsprüfungskommissionen”), conducts studies on the legality, expediency and effectiveness of federal authorities’ activities. When commissioned to do so, the PCA can also scrutinize the effectiveness of federal government measures on behalf of other parliamentary committees. In addition, the various federal offices conduct internal evaluations that they trigger themselves. The nature of these self-evaluations varies and depends on the activity of the respective evaluation unit.
In general, according to Sager et al., evaluation activity in Switzerland is high and evaluations form an important part of political life in Switzerland.
Citations:
Sager, Fritz, Thomas Widmer und Andreas Balthasar (Hg.) (2017). Evaluation im politischen System der Schweiz – Entwicklung, Bedeutung und Wechselwirkungen. Zürich: NZZ Verlag, Reihe „Politik und Gesellschaft in der Schweiz“.
https://www.parlament.ch/en/organe/committees/parliamentary-control-administration-pca
In general, according to Sager et al., evaluation activity in Switzerland is high and evaluations form an important part of political life in Switzerland.
Citations:
Sager, Fritz, Thomas Widmer und Andreas Balthasar (Hg.) (2017). Evaluation im politischen System der Schweiz – Entwicklung, Bedeutung und Wechselwirkungen. Zürich: NZZ Verlag, Reihe „Politik und Gesellschaft in der Schweiz“.
https://www.parlament.ch/en/organe/committees/parliamentary-control-administration-pca
To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?
10
9
9
The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
8
7
6
7
6
The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
2
1
1
The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
The federal government has sought to improve its institutional arrangements through the adoption of new administrative techniques (specifically, new public management practices) and a number of other organizational changes. However, whenever the central government has sought to engage in substantial change through institutional reform (e.g., through reorganization of the Federal Council and the collegiate system), it has met with resistance on the part of the public and the cantons, which do not want more resources or powers to go to the federal level. This has limited the range of feasible institutional reforms.
While the basic structures of federalism and direct democracy are very robust, and direct democracy provides incentives for political parties to cooperate within the context of power-sharing structures, lower-level government structures are subject to constant change. Recent examples of such change have affected parliamentary practices, fiscal federalism and the judicial system, canton- and communal-level electoral systems, communal organization and public management. Nevertheless, one of the most important reforms, the reorganization of the Federal Council and its collegiate system, has failed despite several attempts. While the Federal Council is not prone to institutional reforms, the administrative body undertakes reforms quite frequently, not least as a substitute for a lack of government reforms.
The subnational units are more open to reform and display great variation in their administrative and institutional forms.
Citations:
Ritz, M., Neumann, O. and Sager, F. (2019), Senkt New Public Management die Verwaltungsausgaben in den Schweizer Kantonen? Eine empirische Analyse über zwei Dekaden. Swiss Polit Sci Rev. 25(3): 226–252 doi:10.1111/spsr.12381
While the basic structures of federalism and direct democracy are very robust, and direct democracy provides incentives for political parties to cooperate within the context of power-sharing structures, lower-level government structures are subject to constant change. Recent examples of such change have affected parliamentary practices, fiscal federalism and the judicial system, canton- and communal-level electoral systems, communal organization and public management. Nevertheless, one of the most important reforms, the reorganization of the Federal Council and its collegiate system, has failed despite several attempts. While the Federal Council is not prone to institutional reforms, the administrative body undertakes reforms quite frequently, not least as a substitute for a lack of government reforms.
The subnational units are more open to reform and display great variation in their administrative and institutional forms.
Citations:
Ritz, M., Neumann, O. and Sager, F. (2019), Senkt New Public Management die Verwaltungsausgaben in den Schweizer Kantonen? Eine empirische Analyse über zwei Dekaden. Swiss Polit Sci Rev. 25(3): 226–252 doi:10.1111/spsr.12381