Social Policies
#9Key Findings
Despite some gaps, generally successful outcomes give Switzerland’s social policies a good overall ranking (rank 9) in international comparison. Its score on this measure is unchanged relative to its 2014 level.
The quality of the education system is high, but students of low social status are less likely to go on to higher education. Vocational training is very solid, contributing to low employment rates among young people. While social assistance policies are effective, poverty rates are on the rise. Gender inequality remains a significant issue.
Healthcare quality and inclusiveness is excellent, but the system is very expensive. The pandemic exposed a shortage of personnel in the system. Policies helping women to reconcile work and family are weak in international comparison. Family benefit spending is low, and childcare facilities are very limited. Pension levels are generally high, but repeated efforts to reform the system have failed.
Integration policy varies by canton, but has not been broadly successful. Naturalization can be very difficult. An anti-foreigner right-wing populist grouping is the strongest political party. Crime rates are low. Development cooperation has become somewhat controversial, with the right-wing party calling for cuts.
The quality of the education system is high, but students of low social status are less likely to go on to higher education. Vocational training is very solid, contributing to low employment rates among young people. While social assistance policies are effective, poverty rates are on the rise. Gender inequality remains a significant issue.
Healthcare quality and inclusiveness is excellent, but the system is very expensive. The pandemic exposed a shortage of personnel in the system. Policies helping women to reconcile work and family are weak in international comparison. Family benefit spending is low, and childcare facilities are very limited. Pension levels are generally high, but repeated efforts to reform the system have failed.
Integration policy varies by canton, but has not been broadly successful. Naturalization can be very difficult. An anti-foreigner right-wing populist grouping is the strongest political party. Crime rates are low. Development cooperation has become somewhat controversial, with the right-wing party calling for cuts.
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To what extent does education policy deliver high-quality, equitable and efficient education and training?
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9
9
Education policy fully achieves the criteria.
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7
6
7
6
Education policy largely achieves the criteria.
5
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3
4
3
Education policy partially achieves the criteria.
2
1
1
Education policy does not achieve the criteria at all.
Switzerland’s education system is strongly influenced by the country’s federal and decentralized structure, as education policy falls under the jurisdiction of the cantons and municipalities. The system provides a high-quality education. The university system performs very well, as is the case in many other small and open European countries. Vocational training is very solid and seems to be one of the most important factors in the low levels of unemployment, particularly among younger people. Two out of three young people undertake basic occupational training. The state plays an active role in orchestrating the vocational training system (Busemeyer et al. 2022, see in particular the section on Switzerland). The permeability of vocational and tertiary education has improved in comparison to other countries. During the past 20 years, Switzerland experienced very strong growth in tertiary education. The number of students enrolled at the tertiary level (universities, universities of applied sciences and professional education institutions) more than tripled between 1999/2000 and 2020/21. This is chiefly due to a growth in colleges of education and universities of applied sciences, which were institutionalized in 1998. Students with vocational training can acquire a diploma to enter these universities of applied sciences either during their training or through a special one-year course after they have finished their apprenticeship. In 2017/2018, almost a fifth of all students were at the tertiary level (compared to 11% in 1999/2000). For the educational year of 2020/21, 61% of all students in tertiary education attended universities, 31% attended universities of applied sciences and 8% professional education institutions. While only 50% of those entitled to attend universities of applied sciences did so in 2000, this share increased to 64% by 2017. The share of female students in tertiary education increased from 39% in 1990 to 52% by 2020/21. In 2019, 41% of the population had completed tertiary education; in 2000, this figure was at 26%.
While women and – with some exceptions – persons from peripheral regions have equal access to higher education, the Swiss education system continues to discriminate at all levels against students from families with low social status. There is no empirical evidence that the education system discriminates against foreigners born in the country. Their lower success rates can be explained as a special case of discrimination against students from families with low social status.
Higher education in Switzerland is affected by the federal system. Whereas cantons such as Geneva, Basel-City and Ticino have followed international trends favoring general qualifications for university entrance, other cantons and in particular the German-speaking parts of the country, have focused on a split system of university and vocational education. Thus, in the canton of Geneva 34% of the respective age group acquire the matura, a secondary school exit diploma, which allows them to go directly to a university or university of applied sciences. In contrast, in the canton of Uri, only 13% gain direct access to a university or university of applied sciences (2019). However, the effect of this “federal” discrimination is somewhat reduced by permeability within the school and university systems.
The vocational-training system also offers considerable career prospects. Men with vocational training in particular have similarly high employment rates over the course of their working life as do men with tertiary education. However, there is a significant difference in earnings. At the age of 50, the median annual earnings of a male academic is about CHF 125,000, in contrast to about CHF 80,000 for a male worker with vocational training. Average figures indicate that workers with vocational education earn about 60% of that earned by a worker with a university degree (Korber and Oesch, 2016; BASS 2017).
With regard to digital skills, 43% of the population possess digital skills, according to Eurostat and the OECD. Switzerland lags top performing countries, such as the Netherlands and Norway (around 50%), but is ahead of neighboring countries (Austria 36%, Germany 37% and France 29%) (OECD 2019). Given the competencies of cantons, national plans and policies for digital education are limited. A study by the European Commission showed that learning outcomes on all three school levels target six out of eight basic areas of digital competence. This is fewer than in the highest performing countries (e.g., Estonia), almost equal to neighboring Austria, and slightly more than in Germany and Italy (European Commission 2019: 43).
Resource allocation within the educational system appears to be very efficient. In general, the quality of the Swiss education system is outstanding. However, given the strong impact of parents’ social status on access to higher education, there are questions about overall equity in terms of access.
Citations:
https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/bildung-wissenschaft/bildungsindikatoren/themen/bildungserfolg/maturitaetsquote.assetdetail.19305671.html
https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/bildung-wissenschaft/personen-ausbildung/tertiaerstufe-hochschulen.html
BÜRO FÜR ARBEITS- UND SOZIALPOLITISCHE STUDIEN BASS AG 2017: Analyse der Löhne von Frauen und Männern anhand der Lohnstrukturerhebung 2014, Bern/Neuchatel: Bass & Bundesamt für Statistik.
Busemeyer, Marius R/Carstensen, Martin B/Emmenegger, Patrick Orchestrators of coordination: Toward a new role of the state in coordinated capitalism?, in: European Journal of Industrial Relations 0, 09596801211062556.https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/09596801211062556
EU Commission 2019: European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2019. Digital Education at School in Europe. Eurydice Report. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.
Korber, M. & Oesch, D. 2016: Berufslehre bietet bessere Lohnaussichten für Männer, Die Volkswirtschaft, Nov. 2016, 44-47.
OECD 2019: Economic Survey Switzerland, November 2019, Paris: OECD
OECD 2020: OECD Digital Economy Outlook 2020, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/bb167041-en.
While women and – with some exceptions – persons from peripheral regions have equal access to higher education, the Swiss education system continues to discriminate at all levels against students from families with low social status. There is no empirical evidence that the education system discriminates against foreigners born in the country. Their lower success rates can be explained as a special case of discrimination against students from families with low social status.
Higher education in Switzerland is affected by the federal system. Whereas cantons such as Geneva, Basel-City and Ticino have followed international trends favoring general qualifications for university entrance, other cantons and in particular the German-speaking parts of the country, have focused on a split system of university and vocational education. Thus, in the canton of Geneva 34% of the respective age group acquire the matura, a secondary school exit diploma, which allows them to go directly to a university or university of applied sciences. In contrast, in the canton of Uri, only 13% gain direct access to a university or university of applied sciences (2019). However, the effect of this “federal” discrimination is somewhat reduced by permeability within the school and university systems.
The vocational-training system also offers considerable career prospects. Men with vocational training in particular have similarly high employment rates over the course of their working life as do men with tertiary education. However, there is a significant difference in earnings. At the age of 50, the median annual earnings of a male academic is about CHF 125,000, in contrast to about CHF 80,000 for a male worker with vocational training. Average figures indicate that workers with vocational education earn about 60% of that earned by a worker with a university degree (Korber and Oesch, 2016; BASS 2017).
With regard to digital skills, 43% of the population possess digital skills, according to Eurostat and the OECD. Switzerland lags top performing countries, such as the Netherlands and Norway (around 50%), but is ahead of neighboring countries (Austria 36%, Germany 37% and France 29%) (OECD 2019). Given the competencies of cantons, national plans and policies for digital education are limited. A study by the European Commission showed that learning outcomes on all three school levels target six out of eight basic areas of digital competence. This is fewer than in the highest performing countries (e.g., Estonia), almost equal to neighboring Austria, and slightly more than in Germany and Italy (European Commission 2019: 43).
Resource allocation within the educational system appears to be very efficient. In general, the quality of the Swiss education system is outstanding. However, given the strong impact of parents’ social status on access to higher education, there are questions about overall equity in terms of access.
Citations:
https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/bildung-wissenschaft/bildungsindikatoren/themen/bildungserfolg/maturitaetsquote.assetdetail.19305671.html
https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/bildung-wissenschaft/personen-ausbildung/tertiaerstufe-hochschulen.html
BÜRO FÜR ARBEITS- UND SOZIALPOLITISCHE STUDIEN BASS AG 2017: Analyse der Löhne von Frauen und Männern anhand der Lohnstrukturerhebung 2014, Bern/Neuchatel: Bass & Bundesamt für Statistik.
Busemeyer, Marius R/Carstensen, Martin B/Emmenegger, Patrick Orchestrators of coordination: Toward a new role of the state in coordinated capitalism?, in: European Journal of Industrial Relations 0, 09596801211062556.https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/09596801211062556
EU Commission 2019: European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2019. Digital Education at School in Europe. Eurydice Report. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.
Korber, M. & Oesch, D. 2016: Berufslehre bietet bessere Lohnaussichten für Männer, Die Volkswirtschaft, Nov. 2016, 44-47.
OECD 2019: Economic Survey Switzerland, November 2019, Paris: OECD
OECD 2020: OECD Digital Economy Outlook 2020, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/bb167041-en.
Graph View
To what extent does social policy prevent exclusion and decoupling from society?
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Policies very effectively enable societal inclusion and ensure equal opportunities.
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For the most part, policies enable societal inclusion effectively and ensure equal opportunities.
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For the most part, policies fail to prevent societal exclusion effectively and ensure equal opportunities.
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1
Policies exacerbate unequal opportunities and exclusion from society.
In contrast to many Western European countries, Switzerland has recorded no major increase in income inequality over the past 20 years. Life satisfaction is very high and the share of working poor in the population is comparatively small. This is due to an effective system of social assistance, including a complex but comprehensive pension system, unemployment and disability insurance, as well as social assistance. But even though the country has been comparatively successful at preventing poverty, with poverty rates falling under 6% in 2013, poverty rates have increased again since 2014, exceeding 8% in 2019. Single parents, foreigners, people with a lower level of educational attainment and people over 65 are most at risk of poverty.
Despite a comprehensive pension system, which combines a pay-as-you-go with two different capital funded systems, it is not uncommon for people to fall into poverty after retirement, especially for foreigners, women and people who belonged to low-incomes groups during their working lives.
The main social insurance programs regulated on the federal level (addressing sickness, unemployment, accidents and old age) work effectively, are comparatively sustainable and provide a generous level of benefits. Social assistance is means-tested, consequently some stigma is attached to its receipt.
Despite a slow but progressive narrowing of gender inequalities, gender inequality remains a significant issue in Switzerland. Although the long-term effects of the pandemic cannot be measured yet, initial findings suggest that the pandemic may be contributing to an increase in gender inequalities in Switzerland. For example, it appears that school closures and other measures placed greater burden on women than men.
The transition to a knowledge-based service economy entails new social risks. These will be faced most by workers unable to cope with the challenges of this new economy. These vulnerable workers include young people who lack either the cognitive or psychological resources to obtain sufficient training and begin a career, single mothers who are unable to finish vocational training, highly skilled female employees who cannot reconcile work and family, and persons (typically women) who must care for elderly relatives. Like most continental welfare states, Switzerland has not sufficiently reformed the welfare system to address the challenges of a service-based economy. There is, however, considerable variance between local communities in the degree to which they address these challenges.
Tensions between Swiss citizens and foreigners over the benefits provided by the welfare state, as well as their financing, are strong. In 2021, the unemployment rate of foreign workers was 2.5 times higher than the unemployment rate of Swiss workers. Remarkably, this was about the same share as one year before. The share of recipients of social assistance was 2.1% for Swiss nationals and 6.2% for foreign nationals in 2020 (BSV 2020). The share of social assistance recipients varies strongly by national origin. It is highest among non-EU citizens. On average, EU/EFTA citizens have a slightly higher share (2.9%) than Swiss citizens (2.2%), while non-EU foreigners rely more heavily on social assistance (16.3%) (EDI/BSV 2020). It should be noted that unemployment and poverty is most pronounced among low-skilled workers, where immigrants are over-represented. At the same time, highly skilled foreign employees subsidize the Swiss welfare state, which benefits low-skilled foreign workers and middle-class Swiss workers. For example, in 2020, citizens from EU/EFTA countries paid 27% of all contributions to the first pillar of the pension system (AHV), while they received only 16% of all AHV spending (EDI/BSV 2017; Observatorium 2021: 34).
The Disability Insurance (DI), which enables Swiss workers to receive a minimum income in the event of loss of capacity to perform work, was at the center of many reforms in the 2000s. The main aim of these reforms is to encourage the professional reintegration of the persons concerned and to avoid as far as possible the granting of new pensions, or to see pensions as only a temporary bridge leading to a final reinsertion (BSV 2011). These investments, which were made to support the reintegration into the labor market, suggest that the participation and inclusion of this traditionally marginalized and precarious population will improve. However, a number of factors have cultivated a climate of mistrust and fear among the population and within institutions. For example, the number of new pensions being granted is decreasing; insecurity regarding these pensions, which are now largely granted on a transitional basis, is growing; outcomes regarding one’s ability to return to the labor market once the reintegration measures have been completed are uncertain; and there is an intense battle against alleged fraudsters (“Scheininvalidität”) All in all, this situation is not conducive to mitigating the marginalization of those subject to precariousness (Hassler 2016).
Citations:
EDI/BSV (Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen), 2017: Faktenblatt – Auswirkungen der Personenfreizügigkeit EU/EFTA auf Sozialversicherungen und Sozialhilfe, available at: http://www.bsv.admin.ch/themen/inte rnationales/aktuell/index.html?lang =de
EDI/BSV (Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen), 2020: Auswirkungen der Freizügigkeit auf die schweizerischen Sozialversicherungen, Bern: BSV 19.8.2020
BSV 2021: Poverty. https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/economic-social-situation-population/economic-and-social-situation-of-the-population/poverty-and-material-deprivation/poverty.html
BSV 2021: Sozialhilfebeziehende in der Schweiz 2020, https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/soziale-sicherheit/sozialhilfe.assetdetail.19384836.html, last accessed on 17 January 2022
HASSLER B. 2016. «Arbeitsmarktfähigkeit unter Beobachtung. «Scheininvalidität» in der Schweiz» in Aschauer W. et al. Solidaritätsbrüche in Europa. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien.
FOGE (federal Office for Gender Equality: Impact of the pandemic on families: work and childcare place greater burden on women than men. https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-releases.msg-id-79484.html
Observatorium zum Freizügigkeitsabkommen Schweiz-EU (2021): 17. Bericht des Observatoriums zum Freizügigkeitsabkommen Schweiz-EU. Auswirkungen der Personenfreizügigkeit auf den Schweizer Arbeitsmarkt, Bern: Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft.
Despite a comprehensive pension system, which combines a pay-as-you-go with two different capital funded systems, it is not uncommon for people to fall into poverty after retirement, especially for foreigners, women and people who belonged to low-incomes groups during their working lives.
The main social insurance programs regulated on the federal level (addressing sickness, unemployment, accidents and old age) work effectively, are comparatively sustainable and provide a generous level of benefits. Social assistance is means-tested, consequently some stigma is attached to its receipt.
Despite a slow but progressive narrowing of gender inequalities, gender inequality remains a significant issue in Switzerland. Although the long-term effects of the pandemic cannot be measured yet, initial findings suggest that the pandemic may be contributing to an increase in gender inequalities in Switzerland. For example, it appears that school closures and other measures placed greater burden on women than men.
The transition to a knowledge-based service economy entails new social risks. These will be faced most by workers unable to cope with the challenges of this new economy. These vulnerable workers include young people who lack either the cognitive or psychological resources to obtain sufficient training and begin a career, single mothers who are unable to finish vocational training, highly skilled female employees who cannot reconcile work and family, and persons (typically women) who must care for elderly relatives. Like most continental welfare states, Switzerland has not sufficiently reformed the welfare system to address the challenges of a service-based economy. There is, however, considerable variance between local communities in the degree to which they address these challenges.
Tensions between Swiss citizens and foreigners over the benefits provided by the welfare state, as well as their financing, are strong. In 2021, the unemployment rate of foreign workers was 2.5 times higher than the unemployment rate of Swiss workers. Remarkably, this was about the same share as one year before. The share of recipients of social assistance was 2.1% for Swiss nationals and 6.2% for foreign nationals in 2020 (BSV 2020). The share of social assistance recipients varies strongly by national origin. It is highest among non-EU citizens. On average, EU/EFTA citizens have a slightly higher share (2.9%) than Swiss citizens (2.2%), while non-EU foreigners rely more heavily on social assistance (16.3%) (EDI/BSV 2020). It should be noted that unemployment and poverty is most pronounced among low-skilled workers, where immigrants are over-represented. At the same time, highly skilled foreign employees subsidize the Swiss welfare state, which benefits low-skilled foreign workers and middle-class Swiss workers. For example, in 2020, citizens from EU/EFTA countries paid 27% of all contributions to the first pillar of the pension system (AHV), while they received only 16% of all AHV spending (EDI/BSV 2017; Observatorium 2021: 34).
The Disability Insurance (DI), which enables Swiss workers to receive a minimum income in the event of loss of capacity to perform work, was at the center of many reforms in the 2000s. The main aim of these reforms is to encourage the professional reintegration of the persons concerned and to avoid as far as possible the granting of new pensions, or to see pensions as only a temporary bridge leading to a final reinsertion (BSV 2011). These investments, which were made to support the reintegration into the labor market, suggest that the participation and inclusion of this traditionally marginalized and precarious population will improve. However, a number of factors have cultivated a climate of mistrust and fear among the population and within institutions. For example, the number of new pensions being granted is decreasing; insecurity regarding these pensions, which are now largely granted on a transitional basis, is growing; outcomes regarding one’s ability to return to the labor market once the reintegration measures have been completed are uncertain; and there is an intense battle against alleged fraudsters (“Scheininvalidität”) All in all, this situation is not conducive to mitigating the marginalization of those subject to precariousness (Hassler 2016).
Citations:
EDI/BSV (Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen), 2017: Faktenblatt – Auswirkungen der Personenfreizügigkeit EU/EFTA auf Sozialversicherungen und Sozialhilfe, available at: http://www.bsv.admin.ch/themen/inte rnationales/aktuell/index.html?lang =de
EDI/BSV (Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen), 2020: Auswirkungen der Freizügigkeit auf die schweizerischen Sozialversicherungen, Bern: BSV 19.8.2020
BSV 2021: Poverty. https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/economic-social-situation-population/economic-and-social-situation-of-the-population/poverty-and-material-deprivation/poverty.html
BSV 2021: Sozialhilfebeziehende in der Schweiz 2020, https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/soziale-sicherheit/sozialhilfe.assetdetail.19384836.html, last accessed on 17 January 2022
HASSLER B. 2016. «Arbeitsmarktfähigkeit unter Beobachtung. «Scheininvalidität» in der Schweiz» in Aschauer W. et al. Solidaritätsbrüche in Europa. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien.
FOGE (federal Office for Gender Equality: Impact of the pandemic on families: work and childcare place greater burden on women than men. https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-releases.msg-id-79484.html
Observatorium zum Freizügigkeitsabkommen Schweiz-EU (2021): 17. Bericht des Observatoriums zum Freizügigkeitsabkommen Schweiz-EU. Auswirkungen der Personenfreizügigkeit auf den Schweizer Arbeitsmarkt, Bern: Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft.
Graph View
To what extent do health care policies provide high-quality, inclusive and cost-efficient health care?
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Health care policy achieves the criteria fully.
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7
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Health care policy achieves the criteria largely.
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3
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3
Health care policy achieves the criteria partly.
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1
1
Health care policy does not achieve the criteria at all.
Healthcare in Switzerland is said to be qualitatively excellent. According to the OECD, its healthcare system is among the best in the OECD, but also one of the most expensive (OECD 2022). Mandatory health insurance ensures that the total population is covered. However, care is expensive. Health-insurance premiums (at constant prices) have nearly doubled over the past 20 years. Cost efficiency is a major problem, in particular with regard to the organization of hospitals and the price of pharmaceuticals.
Health insurance is managed according to a very liberal formula. Premiums for health insurance do not depend on income, and premiums do not take into account the number of family members. Hence, insurance must be bought for each member of the family, although premiums are reduced for children. In recent years, this liberal model has been modified through the provision of subsidies for low-wage earners and their families. These subsidies vary by canton, and policy change is frequent. In general, healthcare reforms have not been particularly successful in terms of improving efficiency or controlling the structural rise in health expenditures. In 2019, health expenditure was equal to 11% of GDP, compared to 17% in the United States and 13% in Germany (OECD 2022). In 2018, the healthcare system was financed by the public sector (29%), by health insurance, which is organized as private mutual funds (37%), by other (private) health insurance (9%) and by patient self-payments (26%) (BfS 2020b). These self-payments are very high by international comparison. According to a 2011 OECD report, “Switzerland has among the highest percentage of out-of-pocket costs as a share of health expenditure in the OECD” (OECD 2011: 35). Drawing on several studies, the federal government reported that the proportion of people who forego medical services for cost reasons is in the range of 10-20% of the population. According to a report by the OBSAN, the proportion of the population that has given up going to the doctor because of cost-related reasons rose sharply between 2010 and 2016, and is most marked in the 18 to 45 age group, with an increase of around 15% (Merçay 2016). The proportion of those who would forego necessary services is in the lower single-digit percentage range, although it is very difficult to define “necessary treatments” (Bundesrat 2017: 22-26).
Healthcare insurance is provided by a large number of competing mutual funds (non-profit insurance programs), all of which are required to offer the same benefits. Hence, there is no competition in the area of benefits, but only in the field of premiums, which is largely a function of administrative costs and membership structure. Considerable discussion has focused on whether this competitive market structure should be replaced by a single insurance company. In 2014, voters decided in a popular vote to retain the present system. Currently, a number of attempts to curb the large increase in health expenditures are meeting stiff resistance from vested interests, such as doctors, hospitals or health-insurance funds.
The pandemic revealed some existing tensions regarding the issue of hospital care and in particular the shortage of medical staff working in hospitals, which led to the overloading of staff or delays to non-urgent procedures and interventions. In this context, voters accepted an initiative that modified the constitution in 2021. The initiative states, “The Confederation and the cantons recognize and promote care as an important part of healthcare and ensure that sufficient, high-quality care is available to all. They shall ensure that a sufficient number of qualified nurses are available to meet the increasing demand and that the persons working in nursing are trained and qualified in accordance with their training and skills are deployed in accordance with their training and skills.”
Another aspect of the Swiss healthcare system is the decentralization of health policy, which is basically a cantonal responsibility. By implication, Switzerland has 26 different healthcare systems, which are only marginally coordinated. This could be an asset, if all of these healthcare administrations react appropriately, swiftly and professionally to challenges such as the recent pandemic, which showed regional variation in depth and development. However, it could also be a major vulnerability, if some of these healthcare administrations fail to cope with the challenges due to political reasons or due to reasons of quality of administration.
Even given these problems, the quality and inclusiveness of Swiss healthcare has shown itself to be outstanding, and there is no reason to expect any major change in this respect in the coming years. The system produced excellent outcomes during the pandemic. There remains, however, some concern about the centralization of medical services and sufficiency of medical coverage in marginal regions.
Citations:
Bundesrat 2017: Kostenbeteiligung in der obligatorischen Krankenpflegeversicherung. Bericht des Bundesrats in Erfüllung des Postulats Schmid-Federer vom 22.03.2013 (13.3250 «Auswir-kung der Franchise auf die Inanspruchnahme von medizinischen Leistungen») 28.06.2017, Bern: Bundesrat.
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SHA
GDK 2016: Schweizerische Konferenz der Kantonalen Gesundheitsdirektorinnen und -direktoren und odasanté: Nationaler Versorgungsbericht für die Gesundheitsberufe 2016. Nachwuchsbedarf und Massnahmen zur Personalsicherung auf nationaler Ebene, Bern: GDK
MERCAY 2016: Expérience de la population âgée de 18 ans et plus avec le système de santé – Situation en Suisse et comparaison internationale: Analyse de l’International Health Policy Survey 2016 du Commonwealth Fund sur mandat de l’Office fédéral de la santé publique (OFSP) (Obsan Dossier No. 56) (p. 186). Neuchâtel: Observatoire suisse de la santé
SRF News: Pflege am Limit – Risikozone Spital: Pflegende schlagen Alarm. https://www.srf.ch/news/abstimmungen-28-november-2021/pflege-initiative/pflege-am-limit-risikozone-spital-pflegende-schlagen-alarm
Health insurance is managed according to a very liberal formula. Premiums for health insurance do not depend on income, and premiums do not take into account the number of family members. Hence, insurance must be bought for each member of the family, although premiums are reduced for children. In recent years, this liberal model has been modified through the provision of subsidies for low-wage earners and their families. These subsidies vary by canton, and policy change is frequent. In general, healthcare reforms have not been particularly successful in terms of improving efficiency or controlling the structural rise in health expenditures. In 2019, health expenditure was equal to 11% of GDP, compared to 17% in the United States and 13% in Germany (OECD 2022). In 2018, the healthcare system was financed by the public sector (29%), by health insurance, which is organized as private mutual funds (37%), by other (private) health insurance (9%) and by patient self-payments (26%) (BfS 2020b). These self-payments are very high by international comparison. According to a 2011 OECD report, “Switzerland has among the highest percentage of out-of-pocket costs as a share of health expenditure in the OECD” (OECD 2011: 35). Drawing on several studies, the federal government reported that the proportion of people who forego medical services for cost reasons is in the range of 10-20% of the population. According to a report by the OBSAN, the proportion of the population that has given up going to the doctor because of cost-related reasons rose sharply between 2010 and 2016, and is most marked in the 18 to 45 age group, with an increase of around 15% (Merçay 2016). The proportion of those who would forego necessary services is in the lower single-digit percentage range, although it is very difficult to define “necessary treatments” (Bundesrat 2017: 22-26).
Healthcare insurance is provided by a large number of competing mutual funds (non-profit insurance programs), all of which are required to offer the same benefits. Hence, there is no competition in the area of benefits, but only in the field of premiums, which is largely a function of administrative costs and membership structure. Considerable discussion has focused on whether this competitive market structure should be replaced by a single insurance company. In 2014, voters decided in a popular vote to retain the present system. Currently, a number of attempts to curb the large increase in health expenditures are meeting stiff resistance from vested interests, such as doctors, hospitals or health-insurance funds.
The pandemic revealed some existing tensions regarding the issue of hospital care and in particular the shortage of medical staff working in hospitals, which led to the overloading of staff or delays to non-urgent procedures and interventions. In this context, voters accepted an initiative that modified the constitution in 2021. The initiative states, “The Confederation and the cantons recognize and promote care as an important part of healthcare and ensure that sufficient, high-quality care is available to all. They shall ensure that a sufficient number of qualified nurses are available to meet the increasing demand and that the persons working in nursing are trained and qualified in accordance with their training and skills are deployed in accordance with their training and skills.”
Another aspect of the Swiss healthcare system is the decentralization of health policy, which is basically a cantonal responsibility. By implication, Switzerland has 26 different healthcare systems, which are only marginally coordinated. This could be an asset, if all of these healthcare administrations react appropriately, swiftly and professionally to challenges such as the recent pandemic, which showed regional variation in depth and development. However, it could also be a major vulnerability, if some of these healthcare administrations fail to cope with the challenges due to political reasons or due to reasons of quality of administration.
Even given these problems, the quality and inclusiveness of Swiss healthcare has shown itself to be outstanding, and there is no reason to expect any major change in this respect in the coming years. The system produced excellent outcomes during the pandemic. There remains, however, some concern about the centralization of medical services and sufficiency of medical coverage in marginal regions.
Citations:
Bundesrat 2017: Kostenbeteiligung in der obligatorischen Krankenpflegeversicherung. Bericht des Bundesrats in Erfüllung des Postulats Schmid-Federer vom 22.03.2013 (13.3250 «Auswir-kung der Franchise auf die Inanspruchnahme von medizinischen Leistungen») 28.06.2017, Bern: Bundesrat.
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SHA
GDK 2016: Schweizerische Konferenz der Kantonalen Gesundheitsdirektorinnen und -direktoren und odasanté: Nationaler Versorgungsbericht für die Gesundheitsberufe 2016. Nachwuchsbedarf und Massnahmen zur Personalsicherung auf nationaler Ebene, Bern: GDK
MERCAY 2016: Expérience de la population âgée de 18 ans et plus avec le système de santé – Situation en Suisse et comparaison internationale: Analyse de l’International Health Policy Survey 2016 du Commonwealth Fund sur mandat de l’Office fédéral de la santé publique (OFSP) (Obsan Dossier No. 56) (p. 186). Neuchâtel: Observatoire suisse de la santé
SRF News: Pflege am Limit – Risikozone Spital: Pflegende schlagen Alarm. https://www.srf.ch/news/abstimmungen-28-november-2021/pflege-initiative/pflege-am-limit-risikozone-spital-pflegende-schlagen-alarm
Graph View
To what extent do family support policies enable women to combine parenting with participation in the labor market?
10
9
9
Family support policies effectively enable women to combine parenting with employment.
8
7
6
7
6
Family support policies provide some support for women who want to combine parenting and employment.
5
4
3
4
3
Family support policies provide only few opportunities for women who want to combine parenting and employment.
2
1
1
Family support policies force most women to opt for either parenting or employment.
In general, Swiss family policy has a clearly conservative outlook with a strong liberal undertone. It is mildly supportive of the traditional family. For example, there are some tax deductions and a period of 14 weeks of parental leave offered to mothers, as well as a very limited number of childcare facilities. In September 2020, a constitutional amendment was accepted in a public vote. The amendment, which establishes two weeks of parental leave for fathers with a coverage of 80% of the father’s wage, came into effect on 1 January 2021.
Recent statistics show that women spend an average of 16.6 hours a week in paid employment compared to 27.3 hours for men. Likewise, women spend a weekly average of 28.1 hours on domestic work and men 17.9 hours (BfS 2017). Other figures show that within couples that live together domestic chores are carried out by women in 60% of cases. In 33.7% of households the tasks are divided equally between men and women. However, it was noted that inequalities in the distribution of domestic chores explode with children. Tasks are distributed equally among 49.5% of couples without children, against 25.9% of couples in households with children under 25 (BfS 2019).
In international comparison, Swiss family policy has done relatively little to enable women to enter the workforce. Policies to reconcile work and family lag very much behind other comparable modern societies. Overall spending for family benefits is low in international comparison and Switzerland ranks very low with regard to length of paid maternity leave as well as enrollment of children between 3 and 5 in formal pre-primary education.
A January 2009 federal law providing subsidy payments to families – amounting to 4% of all social policy spending in 2015 – has done little to change the country’s ranking in international comparison nor has it changed the substantial variation between cantons, one of the most salient characteristics of Swiss family policy. The new federal law defines minimum child and education benefits, but cantons may add a variable amount to this basic federal benefit level. In 2018 a new law has been enacted providing a paternity leave of two weeks. There are currently additional initiatives by left and green-liberal parties to establish a longer leave for parents.
In 2020, the WEF’s Global Competitiveness Report, which focused on the road out of the pandemic, ranked Switzerland 12th with regard to expanding care for the elderly, childcare, as well as healthcare infrastructure and innovation, after countries such as Canada, the United States or Germany (WEF 2020: 74). It is also notable that many measures introduced to mitigate the pandemic placed a greater burden on women than on men. For example, the closure of schools and childcare facilities, as well as quarantine periods for children were mostly compensated for by women who were pushed back into the household, reinforcing the traditionally conservative division of labor.
There are substantial variations of family policy on the cantonal and municipal level. The canton of Ticino has a very generous family policy aimed at helping mothers reconcile work and family; other cantons (and their municipalities) frequently fail to offer any substantial help (e.g., childcare facilities) on a broad scale. Differences and reform dynamics are particularly pronounced between municipalities with regard to external childcare. For example, in the largest canton of Zürich, 75% of the costs of preschool care (Kitas) are covered privately by parents (NZZ 9 December 2020). Local communities with minimalistic family policies co-exist with municipalities, which strongly facilitate the reconciliation of work and family for young mothers. It has been argued that the interplay of local, cantonal, and federal family policies makes the policy process and power distribution very disparate.
Likewise, tax policies providing incentives either to stay at home or reenter the labor market vary from canton to canton. However, taking the median canton and municipality, the portrait of a liberal-conservative family policy applies. Policies tend to create incentives for young mothers to stay at home during the first years of their children’s lives. Afterward, mothers are provided with reasonable opportunity to find employment; however, these are in most cases part-time jobs. This allows mothers to care for their children, while also having some limited employment. Taking part-time jobs usually reduces the ability to have a sustained career as compared to the opportunities offered by full-time employment. In this regard, the OECD recently suggested expanding affordable childcare and access to early childhood education so that women can expand their working hours. Currently, the system works in the sense that it mobilizes women within the labor market, but without giving them opportunities for income and career advancement equal to those afforded to men – with considerable regional variation.
Citations:
Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen 2017: Schweizerische Sozialversicherungsstatistik 2017, Bern: BSV
Bundesrat 2017: Familienbericht 2017, Bern: Bundesrat.
BfS (Bundesamt für Statistik) 2017: Schweizerische Arbeitskräfteerhebung, Unbezahlte Arbeit (Modul der Schweizerischen Arbeitskräfteerhebung SAKE), No je-f-03.06.00.01
BfS (Bundesamt für Statistik) 2019: Enquête sur les familles et les générations, No su-f-01.07.05.08.
BfS (Bundesamt für Statistik) 2017: Familien in der Schweiz. Statistischer Bericht 2017, Neuenburg: BfS
Chzhen, Y., Anna Gromada and Gwyther Rees (2019), Are the world’s richest countries family friendly? Policy in the OECD and EU, UNICEF Office of Research, Florence.
Häusermann, Silja. 2013. The Politics of Old and New Social Policies. In: Bonoli, Giuliano. & Natali, David (eds.) The Politics of the New Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
FOGE (Federal Office for Gender Equality), 18.06.2020. Impact of the Pandemic on Families: word and childcare place greater burden on women than men. https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-releases.msg-id-79484.html
NZZ 2020 12 09: https://www.nzz.ch/zuerich/kitas-in -zuerich-eltern-zahlen-drei-viertel -aller-kosten-ld.1590904?mktcid=nle d&mktcval=165_2020–12-09&kid=_2020- 12-8&ga=1&trco=
OECD 2019: Economic Survey Switzerland, November 2019, Paris: OECD.
Stutz, Heid; Livia Bannwart, Victor Legler 2017: Familienberichte, Familienleitbilder und Familienkonzepte der Kantone. Forschungsbericht Nr. 1/2017, Bern: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen( These reports are accessible via: https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/d okumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg -id-66484.html)
Stadelmann-Steffen, Isabelle; Oehrli, Dominique 2017. Perceiving Reconciliation: Child Care Policies and Gendered Time Conflicts. Gender & Society, 31(5), pp. 597-623
WEF 2020: The Global Competitiveness Report. How countries are performing on the road to recovery, Special edition, Geneva: WEF, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Th eGlobalCompetitivenessReport2020.pd
Recent statistics show that women spend an average of 16.6 hours a week in paid employment compared to 27.3 hours for men. Likewise, women spend a weekly average of 28.1 hours on domestic work and men 17.9 hours (BfS 2017). Other figures show that within couples that live together domestic chores are carried out by women in 60% of cases. In 33.7% of households the tasks are divided equally between men and women. However, it was noted that inequalities in the distribution of domestic chores explode with children. Tasks are distributed equally among 49.5% of couples without children, against 25.9% of couples in households with children under 25 (BfS 2019).
In international comparison, Swiss family policy has done relatively little to enable women to enter the workforce. Policies to reconcile work and family lag very much behind other comparable modern societies. Overall spending for family benefits is low in international comparison and Switzerland ranks very low with regard to length of paid maternity leave as well as enrollment of children between 3 and 5 in formal pre-primary education.
A January 2009 federal law providing subsidy payments to families – amounting to 4% of all social policy spending in 2015 – has done little to change the country’s ranking in international comparison nor has it changed the substantial variation between cantons, one of the most salient characteristics of Swiss family policy. The new federal law defines minimum child and education benefits, but cantons may add a variable amount to this basic federal benefit level. In 2018 a new law has been enacted providing a paternity leave of two weeks. There are currently additional initiatives by left and green-liberal parties to establish a longer leave for parents.
In 2020, the WEF’s Global Competitiveness Report, which focused on the road out of the pandemic, ranked Switzerland 12th with regard to expanding care for the elderly, childcare, as well as healthcare infrastructure and innovation, after countries such as Canada, the United States or Germany (WEF 2020: 74). It is also notable that many measures introduced to mitigate the pandemic placed a greater burden on women than on men. For example, the closure of schools and childcare facilities, as well as quarantine periods for children were mostly compensated for by women who were pushed back into the household, reinforcing the traditionally conservative division of labor.
There are substantial variations of family policy on the cantonal and municipal level. The canton of Ticino has a very generous family policy aimed at helping mothers reconcile work and family; other cantons (and their municipalities) frequently fail to offer any substantial help (e.g., childcare facilities) on a broad scale. Differences and reform dynamics are particularly pronounced between municipalities with regard to external childcare. For example, in the largest canton of Zürich, 75% of the costs of preschool care (Kitas) are covered privately by parents (NZZ 9 December 2020). Local communities with minimalistic family policies co-exist with municipalities, which strongly facilitate the reconciliation of work and family for young mothers. It has been argued that the interplay of local, cantonal, and federal family policies makes the policy process and power distribution very disparate.
Likewise, tax policies providing incentives either to stay at home or reenter the labor market vary from canton to canton. However, taking the median canton and municipality, the portrait of a liberal-conservative family policy applies. Policies tend to create incentives for young mothers to stay at home during the first years of their children’s lives. Afterward, mothers are provided with reasonable opportunity to find employment; however, these are in most cases part-time jobs. This allows mothers to care for their children, while also having some limited employment. Taking part-time jobs usually reduces the ability to have a sustained career as compared to the opportunities offered by full-time employment. In this regard, the OECD recently suggested expanding affordable childcare and access to early childhood education so that women can expand their working hours. Currently, the system works in the sense that it mobilizes women within the labor market, but without giving them opportunities for income and career advancement equal to those afforded to men – with considerable regional variation.
Citations:
Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen 2017: Schweizerische Sozialversicherungsstatistik 2017, Bern: BSV
Bundesrat 2017: Familienbericht 2017, Bern: Bundesrat.
BfS (Bundesamt für Statistik) 2017: Schweizerische Arbeitskräfteerhebung, Unbezahlte Arbeit (Modul der Schweizerischen Arbeitskräfteerhebung SAKE), No je-f-03.06.00.01
BfS (Bundesamt für Statistik) 2019: Enquête sur les familles et les générations, No su-f-01.07.05.08.
BfS (Bundesamt für Statistik) 2017: Familien in der Schweiz. Statistischer Bericht 2017, Neuenburg: BfS
Chzhen, Y., Anna Gromada and Gwyther Rees (2019), Are the world’s richest countries family friendly? Policy in the OECD and EU, UNICEF Office of Research, Florence.
Häusermann, Silja. 2013. The Politics of Old and New Social Policies. In: Bonoli, Giuliano. & Natali, David (eds.) The Politics of the New Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
FOGE (Federal Office for Gender Equality), 18.06.2020. Impact of the Pandemic on Families: word and childcare place greater burden on women than men. https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-releases.msg-id-79484.html
NZZ 2020 12 09: https://www.nzz.ch/zuerich/kitas-in -zuerich-eltern-zahlen-drei-viertel -aller-kosten-ld.1590904?mktcid=nle d&mktcval=165_2020–12-09&kid=_2020- 12-8&ga=1&trco=
OECD 2019: Economic Survey Switzerland, November 2019, Paris: OECD.
Stutz, Heid; Livia Bannwart, Victor Legler 2017: Familienberichte, Familienleitbilder und Familienkonzepte der Kantone. Forschungsbericht Nr. 1/2017, Bern: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen( These reports are accessible via: https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/d okumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg -id-66484.html)
Stadelmann-Steffen, Isabelle; Oehrli, Dominique 2017. Perceiving Reconciliation: Child Care Policies and Gendered Time Conflicts. Gender & Society, 31(5), pp. 597-623
WEF 2020: The Global Competitiveness Report. How countries are performing on the road to recovery, Special edition, Geneva: WEF, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Th eGlobalCompetitivenessReport2020.pd
Graph View
To what extent does pension policy realize goals of poverty prevention, intergenerational equity and fiscal sustainability?
10
9
9
Pension policy achieves the objectives fully.
8
7
6
7
6
Pension policy achieves the objectives largely.
5
4
3
4
3
Pension policy achieves the objectives partly.
2
1
1
Pension policy does not achieve the objectives at all.
The Swiss pension system is based on three pillars, each with its own logic of financing and redistribution. The underlying concept is that pension income should not fall below the subsistence level and should provide 60% of average pre-retirement income. The first pillar guarantees a basic income. The minimum benefit level for a single person in 2022 was CHF 1,195 per month, while the maximum benefit was CHF 2,390 per month. The sum of the two individual pensions of a married couple may not exceed 150% of the maximum pension (i.e., CHF 3,585 per month). If this maximum amount is exceeded, the two individual pensions are reduced accordingly. Employers and employees finance this through contributions. It is a pay-as-you-go system and highly redistributive, since the maximum benefit level for couples (provided to high-income earners) is just 1.5 times that of the minimum benefit level, while contributions are proportional to income.
The second pillar is a funded system financed through contributions by employers and employees. Contributions and benefits are proportional to income. Employees whose income from the first pillar already covers about 60% of their wage income are not entitled to this system. Many pension programs, particularly in the public sector, are very generous, and provide pension incomes (first and second pillars combined) that exceed 60% of previous income. Historically, this system of occupational pensions is the core of the Swiss pension system and powerful interests (e.g., major political parties and financial institutions) allow for only piecemeal reforms.
The third pillar takes the form of personal tax-deductible savings of up to CHF 6,883 per year (2021). This system benefits high-income groups, since they can afford to put aside these sums and have the highest returns on these savings given the tax advantages.
In international comparison, the Swiss pension system performs extremely well. According to a comparative analysis of 24 countries, this system has one of the smallest pension gaps among developed democracies. A pension gap is the estimated share of income which a worker at age 50 must save privately in addition to contributions to the pension system if she wants to enjoy an adequate lifestyle during retirement. The respective figure for Switzerland is 14%, while in Germany it is 30%, in the United Kingdom 26% and in France 44% (UBS 2021).
Given the solid basis of the pension system overall, Switzerland faces less pressure than many other European countries to adapt to demographic change. However, Switzerland has tried many times to reform its system. with little to no success so far. In September 2017, an ambitious reform proposal failed in a popular vote – as many other reform efforts in this policy area over the last 20 years. During the past 25 years, all major attempts to reform the pension system have failed. Even when the parliament could agree on a reform, the reform failed in a popular vote. In December 2021, the parliament accepted two proposals, one for the first pillar and one for the second pillar. However, these reforms are opposed by the trade unions and the political left, and therefore – given the experience of previous reform attempts – it is not unlikely that these reforms will also be rejected in a referendum.
Important lessons can be learned from previous referendums on pensions and the ongoing reform debates as recent research has shown. There is no majority for substantial retrenchment, in particular with regard to an increase in the age of retirement. Likewise, there is no majority for increasing the generosity of the system if this endangers its financial sustainability (Häusermann et al. 2019). Hence, the status quo.
With regard to poverty prevention, the pension system is considered comparatively efficient. Citizens, EU citizens and foreigners, who have resided for at least 10 years without a break in Switzerland, can claim additional payments if they are not entitled to the first pillar’s minimum pension. The system as a whole has a high degree of intergenerational equity, as it rests on three different pillars and only the first pillar is exclusively based on intergenerational payments. However, the system fails to account properly for different, modern working schemes and people who work part-time or experience work interruptions, mostly women, remain disadvantaged. While in 2020 both men and women received similar pensions on average from the first pillar (CHF 1,899 per month for men, CHF 1,769 for women), much greater differences were observed for the second and third pillars (CHF 2,600 for men, CHF 1,543 for women from the second pillar) (FSO 2022). Although some compensations are foreseen for childcare and other societal contribution, women remain disadvantage by this pension system, which can push women into poverty or a position of financial dependence.
The retirement age for women is also under scrutiny. Right and liberal parties are trying to raise it through a new reform, which was accepted by the Swiss parliament in June 2021. However, the reform will be subject to a referendum, as 100,000 signatures – the threshold to trigger a referendum – were collected in about 50 days, much less than the allowed 100 days.
Financial sustainability will be a potential problem over time, but the pension system remains stronger than in comparable countries such as Germany.
Citations:
Armingeon, Klaus 2018. „Die Entwicklung der schweizerischen Altersvorsorge“, in: Swiss Political Science Review 24(1): 43–52, https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12291
Bertozzi, Fabio, Giuliano Bonoli and Benoit Gay-des-Combes. 2005. La Réforme De L’etat Social En Suisse. Vieillissement, Emploi, Conflit Travail-Famille. Lausanne: Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes.
FSO (Federal Statistical Office), 2022. New Pension Statistics. https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/social-security/old-age-provision-reports/new-pensions-statistics.html
Häusermann, Silja/Kurer, Thomas/Traber, Denise (2019): The Politics of Trade-Offs: Studying the Dynamics of Welfare State Reform With Conjoint Experiments, in: Comparative Political Studies 52, 1059-1095.https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414018797943
Leimgruber, Matthieu. 2008. Solidarity without the State? Business and the Shaping of the Swiss Welfare State, 1890-2000. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press.
UBS 2021: UBS International Pension Gap Index, https://www.ubs.com/ch/de/private/pension/pension-gap-index.html
The second pillar is a funded system financed through contributions by employers and employees. Contributions and benefits are proportional to income. Employees whose income from the first pillar already covers about 60% of their wage income are not entitled to this system. Many pension programs, particularly in the public sector, are very generous, and provide pension incomes (first and second pillars combined) that exceed 60% of previous income. Historically, this system of occupational pensions is the core of the Swiss pension system and powerful interests (e.g., major political parties and financial institutions) allow for only piecemeal reforms.
The third pillar takes the form of personal tax-deductible savings of up to CHF 6,883 per year (2021). This system benefits high-income groups, since they can afford to put aside these sums and have the highest returns on these savings given the tax advantages.
In international comparison, the Swiss pension system performs extremely well. According to a comparative analysis of 24 countries, this system has one of the smallest pension gaps among developed democracies. A pension gap is the estimated share of income which a worker at age 50 must save privately in addition to contributions to the pension system if she wants to enjoy an adequate lifestyle during retirement. The respective figure for Switzerland is 14%, while in Germany it is 30%, in the United Kingdom 26% and in France 44% (UBS 2021).
Given the solid basis of the pension system overall, Switzerland faces less pressure than many other European countries to adapt to demographic change. However, Switzerland has tried many times to reform its system. with little to no success so far. In September 2017, an ambitious reform proposal failed in a popular vote – as many other reform efforts in this policy area over the last 20 years. During the past 25 years, all major attempts to reform the pension system have failed. Even when the parliament could agree on a reform, the reform failed in a popular vote. In December 2021, the parliament accepted two proposals, one for the first pillar and one for the second pillar. However, these reforms are opposed by the trade unions and the political left, and therefore – given the experience of previous reform attempts – it is not unlikely that these reforms will also be rejected in a referendum.
Important lessons can be learned from previous referendums on pensions and the ongoing reform debates as recent research has shown. There is no majority for substantial retrenchment, in particular with regard to an increase in the age of retirement. Likewise, there is no majority for increasing the generosity of the system if this endangers its financial sustainability (Häusermann et al. 2019). Hence, the status quo.
With regard to poverty prevention, the pension system is considered comparatively efficient. Citizens, EU citizens and foreigners, who have resided for at least 10 years without a break in Switzerland, can claim additional payments if they are not entitled to the first pillar’s minimum pension. The system as a whole has a high degree of intergenerational equity, as it rests on three different pillars and only the first pillar is exclusively based on intergenerational payments. However, the system fails to account properly for different, modern working schemes and people who work part-time or experience work interruptions, mostly women, remain disadvantaged. While in 2020 both men and women received similar pensions on average from the first pillar (CHF 1,899 per month for men, CHF 1,769 for women), much greater differences were observed for the second and third pillars (CHF 2,600 for men, CHF 1,543 for women from the second pillar) (FSO 2022). Although some compensations are foreseen for childcare and other societal contribution, women remain disadvantage by this pension system, which can push women into poverty or a position of financial dependence.
The retirement age for women is also under scrutiny. Right and liberal parties are trying to raise it through a new reform, which was accepted by the Swiss parliament in June 2021. However, the reform will be subject to a referendum, as 100,000 signatures – the threshold to trigger a referendum – were collected in about 50 days, much less than the allowed 100 days.
Financial sustainability will be a potential problem over time, but the pension system remains stronger than in comparable countries such as Germany.
Citations:
Armingeon, Klaus 2018. „Die Entwicklung der schweizerischen Altersvorsorge“, in: Swiss Political Science Review 24(1): 43–52, https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12291
Bertozzi, Fabio, Giuliano Bonoli and Benoit Gay-des-Combes. 2005. La Réforme De L’etat Social En Suisse. Vieillissement, Emploi, Conflit Travail-Famille. Lausanne: Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes.
FSO (Federal Statistical Office), 2022. New Pension Statistics. https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/social-security/old-age-provision-reports/new-pensions-statistics.html
Häusermann, Silja/Kurer, Thomas/Traber, Denise (2019): The Politics of Trade-Offs: Studying the Dynamics of Welfare State Reform With Conjoint Experiments, in: Comparative Political Studies 52, 1059-1095.https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414018797943
Leimgruber, Matthieu. 2008. Solidarity without the State? Business and the Shaping of the Swiss Welfare State, 1890-2000. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press.
UBS 2021: UBS International Pension Gap Index, https://www.ubs.com/ch/de/private/pension/pension-gap-index.html
Graph View
How effectively do policies support the integration of migrants into society?
10
9
9
Cultural, education and social policies effectively support the integration of migrants into society.
8
7
6
7
6
Cultural, education and social policies seek to integrate migrants into society, but have failed to do so effectively.
5
4
3
4
3
Cultural, education and social policies do not focus on integrating migrants into society.
2
1
1
Cultural, education and social policies segregate migrant communities from the majority society.
For many years, Swiss integration policy was predicated on the perception that foreigners were “guest workers,” whose limited stay meant that broad efforts to encourage integration were unnecessary. As many foreign workers gained access to unlimited work permits between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s, the policy approach grew inappropriate over time. Accordingly, a number of efforts to improve integration have been made, starting as early as kindergarten. Nonetheless, integration policy cannot broadly be called a success in Switzerland, particularly given that about 25% of the population are migrants (accounting for about one-quarter of the country’s residents) and 40% of the population has a migration background. People with a migration background include foreign nationals, naturalized Swiss citizens (except for those born in Switzerland and whose parents were both born in Switzerland) as well as Swiss citizens at birth whose parents were both born abroad (2020; BfS 2022b).
For example, the Migrant Integration Policy Index for Switzerland (MIPEX, 2022, most recent data for 2019) is “halfway favorable” (45), clearly below all neighboring countries except Austria. There is a substantial variation in integration by groups of migrants. In 2017, 39% of migrants from northern and western Europe were members of voluntary associations and groups compared to about 50% of Swiss citizens without a migration background. In contrast, such membership applies to less than 20% of those from southern and eastern European countries.
Yet if the lack of a coherent federal integration policy is undisputable, this does not mean that integration policy as a whole is failing. Many local and cantonal authorities are doing a good and sometimes innovative job of integration, especially for second-generation migrants. In this respect, most policy development and implementation are decentralized to the local and regional levels.
According to OECD statistics, second-generation migrants in Switzerland perform better in school and are better integrated into the labor market than in other European countries. This is not to say that immigrants have equal opportunities in all respects. If immigrant unemployment rates and dependence on social aid are above the national average, this is due to the fact that the share of low-skilled workers with a correspondingly higher risk of unemployment is also above average among immigrants. But the lack of a coherent integration policy may add to the problems, and social discrimination is not limited to the labor market. Within the housing market, for instance, some groups of immigrants may find it comparatively difficult to rent apartments.
With regard to naturalization, about 34,100 foreigners were granted Swiss citizenship in 2020, with Germans and Italians comprising the largest groups (BfS 2022a). Calculating the number of naturalizations as a share of all migrants actually living in the country, the Swiss rate of naturalization is very low in comparison with other consolidated democracies. In 2020, about 2.0% of resident foreigners acquired Swiss citizenship (BfS 2020). Only some of the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and a few Western democracies (e.g., Austria and Germany) have similar or lower naturalization rates. The naturalization procedure is burdensome. As naturalization in Switzerland is a bottom-up process that starts at the level of the commune, considerable regional differences are evident, with some communes and cantons pursuing a liberal naturalization policy, and others acting more restrictively. The potentially arbitrary nature of naturalization procedures in municipalities is also regularly discussed. These regional differences show up also in the issue of political rights. A few cantons and communes grant political-participation rights to foreigners, even though the federal government does not. Thus, with regard to integration, naturalization and legislation on political rights, we find a bottom-up approach rather than federal standards, which also asks the question of equal treatment and equal opportunities for foreigners.
In Switzerland, as in all modern societies, some segments of society suffer from globalization and, in particular, from the free movement of labor. These “globalization losers” are particularly likely to hold xenophobic attitudes – to insist on “my country first” positions – and, consequently, to vote for right-wing populist parties. The Swiss Peoples Party is the political party with the strongest electoral support. It has been particularly successful in mobilizing these segments of society. However, this is a far from perfect explanation. In a 2017 survey (MOSAiCH), 59% of all respondents with below median years of education supported a xenophobic statement, compared to 43% of those with above median years of education.
Therefore, on the one hand there, is limited prospect for a more generous and liberal integration policy in the near term given the strength of integration-averse political actors and citizens. On the other hand, as a comparative analysis of European Social Survey data shows, Switzerland belongs to the least xenophobic societies in Western Europe, together with the Nordic countries; for example, the country is much less xenophobic than Austria, the United Kingdom and France (Armingeon/Engler 2015).
Citations:
Armingeon, Klaus and Sarah Engler 2015: Polarisierung als Strategie. Die Polarisierung des Schweizer Parteiensystems im internationalen Vergleich, in Markus Freitag and Adrian Vatter (Hrsg.): Wahlen und Wählerschaften in der Schweiz, Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 355-379, 467-469. ISBN: 978-3-03810-098-0
BfS 2020: Erwerb des Schweizer Bürgerrechts, BfS: Neuchâtel
BfS 2022a: Citizenship, https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/population/migration-integration/citizenship.html
BfS 2022b: Population by migration status, https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/population/migration-integration/by-migration-status.html
LAVENEX, Sandra; Paula Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik and Philipp Lutz (2021): Migration, in: BERNAUER, Thomas, Katja Gentinetta and Joëlle Kuntz (eds.): Eine Aussenpolitik für die Schweiz, Zürich: NZZ Verlag
LAVENEX, Sandra and Anita MANATSCHAL (2021). Migrationspolitik. In P. Emmenegger, F. Fossati & S.
Häusermann (Eds.), Handbuch der Schweizer Politik. Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung.
MANATSCHAL, Anita and Isabelle STADELMANN-STEFFEN (2013). „Cantonal variations of integration policy and their impact on immigrant educational inequality“, special issue „From Models to Indices and Beyond: Tracking Citizenship and Diversity“,Comparative European Politics 11.5): 671-695.
MIPEX 2022: Switzerland, https://www.mipex.eu/switzerland
MOSAiCH 2017, Statement: Ich wünsche mir einen Schweiz, … mit gleichen Chancen für Schweizer einerseits und Ausländer andererseits / eine Schweiz mit besseren Chancen für die Schweizer (Respondents supporting the latter statement were coded as xenophobic).
For example, the Migrant Integration Policy Index for Switzerland (MIPEX, 2022, most recent data for 2019) is “halfway favorable” (45), clearly below all neighboring countries except Austria. There is a substantial variation in integration by groups of migrants. In 2017, 39% of migrants from northern and western Europe were members of voluntary associations and groups compared to about 50% of Swiss citizens without a migration background. In contrast, such membership applies to less than 20% of those from southern and eastern European countries.
Yet if the lack of a coherent federal integration policy is undisputable, this does not mean that integration policy as a whole is failing. Many local and cantonal authorities are doing a good and sometimes innovative job of integration, especially for second-generation migrants. In this respect, most policy development and implementation are decentralized to the local and regional levels.
According to OECD statistics, second-generation migrants in Switzerland perform better in school and are better integrated into the labor market than in other European countries. This is not to say that immigrants have equal opportunities in all respects. If immigrant unemployment rates and dependence on social aid are above the national average, this is due to the fact that the share of low-skilled workers with a correspondingly higher risk of unemployment is also above average among immigrants. But the lack of a coherent integration policy may add to the problems, and social discrimination is not limited to the labor market. Within the housing market, for instance, some groups of immigrants may find it comparatively difficult to rent apartments.
With regard to naturalization, about 34,100 foreigners were granted Swiss citizenship in 2020, with Germans and Italians comprising the largest groups (BfS 2022a). Calculating the number of naturalizations as a share of all migrants actually living in the country, the Swiss rate of naturalization is very low in comparison with other consolidated democracies. In 2020, about 2.0% of resident foreigners acquired Swiss citizenship (BfS 2020). Only some of the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and a few Western democracies (e.g., Austria and Germany) have similar or lower naturalization rates. The naturalization procedure is burdensome. As naturalization in Switzerland is a bottom-up process that starts at the level of the commune, considerable regional differences are evident, with some communes and cantons pursuing a liberal naturalization policy, and others acting more restrictively. The potentially arbitrary nature of naturalization procedures in municipalities is also regularly discussed. These regional differences show up also in the issue of political rights. A few cantons and communes grant political-participation rights to foreigners, even though the federal government does not. Thus, with regard to integration, naturalization and legislation on political rights, we find a bottom-up approach rather than federal standards, which also asks the question of equal treatment and equal opportunities for foreigners.
In Switzerland, as in all modern societies, some segments of society suffer from globalization and, in particular, from the free movement of labor. These “globalization losers” are particularly likely to hold xenophobic attitudes – to insist on “my country first” positions – and, consequently, to vote for right-wing populist parties. The Swiss Peoples Party is the political party with the strongest electoral support. It has been particularly successful in mobilizing these segments of society. However, this is a far from perfect explanation. In a 2017 survey (MOSAiCH), 59% of all respondents with below median years of education supported a xenophobic statement, compared to 43% of those with above median years of education.
Therefore, on the one hand there, is limited prospect for a more generous and liberal integration policy in the near term given the strength of integration-averse political actors and citizens. On the other hand, as a comparative analysis of European Social Survey data shows, Switzerland belongs to the least xenophobic societies in Western Europe, together with the Nordic countries; for example, the country is much less xenophobic than Austria, the United Kingdom and France (Armingeon/Engler 2015).
Citations:
Armingeon, Klaus and Sarah Engler 2015: Polarisierung als Strategie. Die Polarisierung des Schweizer Parteiensystems im internationalen Vergleich, in Markus Freitag and Adrian Vatter (Hrsg.): Wahlen und Wählerschaften in der Schweiz, Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 355-379, 467-469. ISBN: 978-3-03810-098-0
BfS 2020: Erwerb des Schweizer Bürgerrechts, BfS: Neuchâtel
BfS 2022a: Citizenship, https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/population/migration-integration/citizenship.html
BfS 2022b: Population by migration status, https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/population/migration-integration/by-migration-status.html
LAVENEX, Sandra; Paula Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik and Philipp Lutz (2021): Migration, in: BERNAUER, Thomas, Katja Gentinetta and Joëlle Kuntz (eds.): Eine Aussenpolitik für die Schweiz, Zürich: NZZ Verlag
LAVENEX, Sandra and Anita MANATSCHAL (2021). Migrationspolitik. In P. Emmenegger, F. Fossati & S.
Häusermann (Eds.), Handbuch der Schweizer Politik. Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung.
MANATSCHAL, Anita and Isabelle STADELMANN-STEFFEN (2013). „Cantonal variations of integration policy and their impact on immigrant educational inequality“, special issue „From Models to Indices and Beyond: Tracking Citizenship and Diversity“,Comparative European Politics 11.5): 671-695.
MIPEX 2022: Switzerland, https://www.mipex.eu/switzerland
MOSAiCH 2017, Statement: Ich wünsche mir einen Schweiz, … mit gleichen Chancen für Schweizer einerseits und Ausländer andererseits / eine Schweiz mit besseren Chancen für die Schweizer (Respondents supporting the latter statement were coded as xenophobic).
Graph View
How effectively does internal security policy protect citizens against security risks?
10
9
9
Internal security policy protects citizens against security risks very effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
Internal security policy protects citizens against security risks more or less effectively.
5
4
3
4
3
Internal security policy does not effectively protect citizens against security risks.
2
1
1
Internal security policy exacerbates the security risks.
Switzerland has improved its internal security through its integration into the European Schengen/Dublin regime. However, the country’s participation remains domestically controversial, as right-wing populist actors have accused center-left politicians of cooperating in an inefficient European security network.
With the de-facto break-down of the Schengen and Dublin rules in 2015, Switzerland resorted to more systematic controls at its borders.
Internal security policy has developed as a collaborative policy field in which various international and national governmental actors interact with private organizations. Given the country’s comparatively low crime rates, and the public confidence shown in the police and the justice system, internal security policy can be deemed a success.
On the whole, Swiss citizens feel quite safe. In 2021, a survey asking for the five most pressing problems found that issues related to safety were mentioned only moderately: asylum-seekers (19%), social security (11%), personal security (11%), internet security (9%) and terrorism (4%) (GfS 2021: 31-33).
Citations:
GfS 2021: Sorgenbarometer 2021, https://www.gfsbern.ch/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/credit-suisse_sorgenbarometer2021_schlussbericht.pdf
Staatssekretariat für Migration, Asylstatistik, https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/de/home/publiservice/statistik/asylstatistik/uebersichten.html
With the de-facto break-down of the Schengen and Dublin rules in 2015, Switzerland resorted to more systematic controls at its borders.
Internal security policy has developed as a collaborative policy field in which various international and national governmental actors interact with private organizations. Given the country’s comparatively low crime rates, and the public confidence shown in the police and the justice system, internal security policy can be deemed a success.
On the whole, Swiss citizens feel quite safe. In 2021, a survey asking for the five most pressing problems found that issues related to safety were mentioned only moderately: asylum-seekers (19%), social security (11%), personal security (11%), internet security (9%) and terrorism (4%) (GfS 2021: 31-33).
Citations:
GfS 2021: Sorgenbarometer 2021, https://www.gfsbern.ch/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/credit-suisse_sorgenbarometer2021_schlussbericht.pdf
Staatssekretariat für Migration, Asylstatistik, https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/de/home/publiservice/statistik/asylstatistik/uebersichten.html
Graph View
To what extent does the government demonstrate an active and coherent commitment to promoting equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries?
10
9
9
The government actively and coherently engages in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries. It frequently demonstrates initiative and responsibility, and acts as an agenda-setter.
8
7
6
7
6
The government actively engages in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries. However, some of its measures or policies lack coherence.
5
4
3
4
3
The government shows limited engagement in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries. Many of its measures or policies lack coherence.
2
1
1
The government does not contribute (and often undermines) efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries.
The Swiss government has increased its development-aid contributions since 2000. Currently, Switzerland’s contributions are 0.44 of GNI in 2020. This remains far below the UN target of 0.7 of GNI as well as it spends less than countries such as the Nordic countries, Germany or the United Kingdom (DEZA 2022). The Swiss government has set the goal of spending 0.5% of its GDP on development aid in the long run. Sustainable agriculture, decentralized governance, poverty reduction and vocational training are core issues driving Swiss development cooperation (SDC). In the countries where it supports projects or aid distribution, SDC has a good reputation for maintaining independence from home industrial interests and for making long-term commitments. Nevertheless, it is a small donor with limited impact. SDC is well embedded within international development agencies and coordinates its activities with their agendas on issues such as poverty reduction, climate change and sustainable economic development. To a certain degree, SDC’s activities differ from general patterns of Swiss foreign policy, which is more conventional. Foreign policy is mainly trade oriented, supporting policies of market liberalization through international agencies like the WTO. In this context, development cooperation policies have become controversial. Whereas the SVP criticizes development cooperation as ineffective and calls for SDC budget cuts, the policy network of Swiss private development-aid agencies advocates a shift in policy that involves the mitigation of north-south inequalities by revising trade arrangements that disadvantage developing countries.
Citations:
DEZA 2022: https://admin.media-flow.ch/deza-seco-jahresbericht-2020-de#2637
Citations:
DEZA 2022: https://admin.media-flow.ch/deza-seco-jahresbericht-2020-de#2637