Executive Accountability
#27Key Findings
With a mixed pattern of strengths and weaknesses, the Netherlands falls into the lower-middle ranks (rank 27) with respect to executive accountability. Its score on this measure has declined by 0.6 points relative to its 2014 level.
Parliamentarians have only modest resources, though executive-oversight powers are adequate. Staff cuts at the independent Court of Audit have required frequent research outsourcing. Recent high-profile government policy failures have highlighted the ombuds office’s lack of efficacy. The data-protection agency does not have sufficient funding to address its potential workload.
General disinterest and disinformation efforts have had a deleterious effect on the public’s political knowledge. However, civic-mobilization campaigns are becoming increasingly common. Two groups with roots in protest movements have been given platforms in the public media sector. Some feel this may undermine the system’s statutory mission.
Political-party decision-making is centralized. While labor unions and business associations are formally integrated into government policymaking, professionalized lobbying has also taken hold. Ties between political parties and civil society groups are becoming increasingly common, with high-level staffers routinely going from one side to the other.
Parliamentarians have only modest resources, though executive-oversight powers are adequate. Staff cuts at the independent Court of Audit have required frequent research outsourcing. Recent high-profile government policy failures have highlighted the ombuds office’s lack of efficacy. The data-protection agency does not have sufficient funding to address its potential workload.
General disinterest and disinformation efforts have had a deleterious effect on the public’s political knowledge. However, civic-mobilization campaigns are becoming increasingly common. Two groups with roots in protest movements have been given platforms in the public media sector. Some feel this may undermine the system’s statutory mission.
Political-party decision-making is centralized. While labor unions and business associations are formally integrated into government policymaking, professionalized lobbying has also taken hold. Ties between political parties and civil society groups are becoming increasingly common, with high-level staffers routinely going from one side to the other.
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To what extent are citizens informed of public policies?
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Most citizens are well-informed of a broad range of public policies.
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Many citizens are well-informed of individual public policies.
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Few citizens are well-informed of public policies; most citizens have only a rudimental knowledge of public policies.
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Most citizens are not aware of public policies.
Political knowledge depends on levels of trust in politics and patterns of government-enabled and either invited or spontaneous participation. Voter turnout rates in national elections have been stable between 75% and 80% for some time. Turnout rates in European elections are half this level, while for local and provincial elections, they vary between 55% and 60%. Recent political science research has found that a broad majority of voters believe that the March 2021 elections – during the pandemic – were conducted honestly. But respondents expressed doubts as to the reliability of voting by proxy and mail, which were allowed on a larger scale than usual because of coronavirus measures.
Patterns of participation are stable: more than half of the adult population is non-active; 15% of people occasionally write an email to their local government; 14% are politically active on the neighborhood level; 6% are locally active and have many contacts with local government and politicians; and 7% are “all-rounders” who are both politically and societally active. Since the rise of neoliberal politics, the government has shifted participatory opportunities from the beginning to the end of the policy cycle: from stimulating political participation as an institutionalized and legitimate opportunity for citizens to influence policymaking to regarding societal participation as individual citizens’ self-determined responsibility to co-produce policy implementation and public service delivery. This shift is visible even in citizens’ appreciation of the judiciary: instead of relying on courts and judges, they are increasingly turning to do-it-yourself justice through mediation procedures.
Dutch citizens claim to spend slightly more time than the average European citizen on collecting political information. But many people find political information uninteresting or too complicated; if not for themselves, then for others. Younger people (15-30 yrs.) have begun to avoid political news; if politically interested, they seek information through social media. The broader public does not seem to be well-informed on a wide range of government policies; particularly in the area of international politics, the Dutch public’s knowledge is alarmingly low. This may explain why on the EU, Dutch citizens are caught in a dependence-cum-distrust paradox: they instinctively distrust the European Union and would resist transferring more national powers to the EU level, but simultaneously believe that the European Union should have greater influence over most policy domains.
In addition to disinterest and an increasing knowledge gap between educational levels, systematic (foreign- and nationally led) efforts to disseminate conspiracy theories and disinformation and create “fake news,” even by members of parliament, have had a polarizing effect on knowledge levels regarding political issues and decision-making. The coronavirus crisis has increased awareness of the impact of government on citizens’ daily lives. After a rally-around-the-flag surge, trust in government plummeted as the coronavirus crisis lingered on; exacerbated by public policy failures such as the child benefits scandal, delayed and unfair compensation for earthquake damages in the gas-exploiting areas of Groningen, delays and nondecisions related to the huge levels of nitrogen emissions, and increasingly visible inequality. Ironically, the fact that previous levels of trust were so high has led to disappointment, and this in turn to high levels of distrust, and even disgust and hatred of politics.
Dutch citizens split evenly over the issue of more or less direct influence by citizens. It is the less educated who demand more political influence (through binding referendums), whereas higher educated citizens, especially those with tertiary qualifications, have turned against the idea of referendums, binding or advisory. There has been a wide and broad range of initiatives across all levels of government in all kinds of citizen engagement projects; recently, highly regarded advisory bodies have recommended the use of citizen forums on a national scale for thorny problems like energy transition and (health) care. Thus, belief in participatory options co-exists with low levels of knowledge on policies and widespread discontent with politics and governance. A surge in street protests and large-scale demonstrations – by younger people, climate and animal activists, but also middle-class groups like teachers, nursing personnel, farmers and building-industry employees, has been evident in the years since 2019; this trend continued during the coronavirus crisis of 2020-21 when social distancing rules were frequently disobeyed in large-scale protests and demonstrations. Overall, it appears that spontaneous, citizen-initiated efforts to exert power outside and beyond institutionalized venues and government-sponsored participatory policy exercises are gaining political traction.
Citations:
M. Bovens, and A. Wille, 2011. Diplomademocratie. Over spanningen tussen meritocratie en democratie, Bert Bakker
SCP,. van Houwelingen et al., March 2014. Burgermacht op eigen kracht? Een brede verkenning van ontwikkelingen in burgerparticipatie, Den Haag
Stichting KiezersOnderzoek Nederland, 2021. Versplinterde Vertegenwoordiging.
SCP, De sociale staat van Nederland, 2020
Trouw, Visser, 23 August 2020.Een pandemie is voedsel voor complottheorieën: die bloeien als noot tevoren.
Trouw, de Wit, 25 June 2021. Nederlanders lijden aan een rampzalig gebrek aan kennis over internationale betrekkingen.
SCP, Djunjeva and de Ridder,8 October 2021. Dutch citizens’ expectations and perception of the EU’.
NRC, de Koning and Valk, 24 September 2021. ‘Mensen willen de politiek wel vertrouwen’
NRC.next, 20 March 2021. Klimaattransitie: ‘Stel burgerforum rond klimaatbeleid in.’
NRC, 4 December 2021. Jensma. Het recht als institutie raakt stilaan uit de gratie bij de burgers.
Patterns of participation are stable: more than half of the adult population is non-active; 15% of people occasionally write an email to their local government; 14% are politically active on the neighborhood level; 6% are locally active and have many contacts with local government and politicians; and 7% are “all-rounders” who are both politically and societally active. Since the rise of neoliberal politics, the government has shifted participatory opportunities from the beginning to the end of the policy cycle: from stimulating political participation as an institutionalized and legitimate opportunity for citizens to influence policymaking to regarding societal participation as individual citizens’ self-determined responsibility to co-produce policy implementation and public service delivery. This shift is visible even in citizens’ appreciation of the judiciary: instead of relying on courts and judges, they are increasingly turning to do-it-yourself justice through mediation procedures.
Dutch citizens claim to spend slightly more time than the average European citizen on collecting political information. But many people find political information uninteresting or too complicated; if not for themselves, then for others. Younger people (15-30 yrs.) have begun to avoid political news; if politically interested, they seek information through social media. The broader public does not seem to be well-informed on a wide range of government policies; particularly in the area of international politics, the Dutch public’s knowledge is alarmingly low. This may explain why on the EU, Dutch citizens are caught in a dependence-cum-distrust paradox: they instinctively distrust the European Union and would resist transferring more national powers to the EU level, but simultaneously believe that the European Union should have greater influence over most policy domains.
In addition to disinterest and an increasing knowledge gap between educational levels, systematic (foreign- and nationally led) efforts to disseminate conspiracy theories and disinformation and create “fake news,” even by members of parliament, have had a polarizing effect on knowledge levels regarding political issues and decision-making. The coronavirus crisis has increased awareness of the impact of government on citizens’ daily lives. After a rally-around-the-flag surge, trust in government plummeted as the coronavirus crisis lingered on; exacerbated by public policy failures such as the child benefits scandal, delayed and unfair compensation for earthquake damages in the gas-exploiting areas of Groningen, delays and nondecisions related to the huge levels of nitrogen emissions, and increasingly visible inequality. Ironically, the fact that previous levels of trust were so high has led to disappointment, and this in turn to high levels of distrust, and even disgust and hatred of politics.
Dutch citizens split evenly over the issue of more or less direct influence by citizens. It is the less educated who demand more political influence (through binding referendums), whereas higher educated citizens, especially those with tertiary qualifications, have turned against the idea of referendums, binding or advisory. There has been a wide and broad range of initiatives across all levels of government in all kinds of citizen engagement projects; recently, highly regarded advisory bodies have recommended the use of citizen forums on a national scale for thorny problems like energy transition and (health) care. Thus, belief in participatory options co-exists with low levels of knowledge on policies and widespread discontent with politics and governance. A surge in street protests and large-scale demonstrations – by younger people, climate and animal activists, but also middle-class groups like teachers, nursing personnel, farmers and building-industry employees, has been evident in the years since 2019; this trend continued during the coronavirus crisis of 2020-21 when social distancing rules were frequently disobeyed in large-scale protests and demonstrations. Overall, it appears that spontaneous, citizen-initiated efforts to exert power outside and beyond institutionalized venues and government-sponsored participatory policy exercises are gaining political traction.
Citations:
M. Bovens, and A. Wille, 2011. Diplomademocratie. Over spanningen tussen meritocratie en democratie, Bert Bakker
SCP,. van Houwelingen et al., March 2014. Burgermacht op eigen kracht? Een brede verkenning van ontwikkelingen in burgerparticipatie, Den Haag
Stichting KiezersOnderzoek Nederland, 2021. Versplinterde Vertegenwoordiging.
SCP, De sociale staat van Nederland, 2020
Trouw, Visser, 23 August 2020.Een pandemie is voedsel voor complottheorieën: die bloeien als noot tevoren.
Trouw, de Wit, 25 June 2021. Nederlanders lijden aan een rampzalig gebrek aan kennis over internationale betrekkingen.
SCP, Djunjeva and de Ridder,8 October 2021. Dutch citizens’ expectations and perception of the EU’.
NRC, de Koning and Valk, 24 September 2021. ‘Mensen willen de politiek wel vertrouwen’
NRC.next, 20 March 2021. Klimaattransitie: ‘Stel burgerforum rond klimaatbeleid in.’
NRC, 4 December 2021. Jensma. Het recht als institutie raakt stilaan uit de gratie bij de burgers.
Does the government publish data and information in a way that strengthens citizens’ capacity to hold the government accountable?
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The government publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
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The government most of the time publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
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The government publishes data in a limited and not timely or user-friendly way.
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The government publishes (almost) no relevant data.
The Dutch state shows a Janus face with regard to the issue of open government. On one hand, an avalanche of information about objective data and their official (often scientific) interpretation is made available to every citizen; on the other, the government maintains considerable secrecy about alternatives that may be on or off the table, arguments pro and con used in policy design, considerations relevant in shaping organizational matters, and which organizations and/or representatives participated in the deliberations.
The most important and high-prestige knowledge institutes regularly publish comprehensive, timely and accurate data and analyses. Such information is used in the annual information packages that accompany parliamentary deliberation and decision-making on the national budget and other issues. Throughout the year, government provides topical information about issues pertaining to ministerial policy agendas on the government website. For politically engaged citizens, it is thus quite possible to be well-informed on government policies. In the Edelman Trust Index 2019, like in the recent past, the Netherlands scored relatively high on trust in government information, with little difference between the well-informed and the broader public. But in 2021, much like in other countries, a deep divide showed up between the well-informed and the mass public: four in 10 of the latter believe the government intentionally misleads citizens through statements it knows to be incorrect or exaggerated and biased; moreover, also four in 10 believe that journalists do the same.
Not all of this can be explained as an expected response to fears triggered by the uncertainty and consequences of the pandemic. The Dutch government in fact proved to be less than an open government for two reasons.
First, the Department of Public Health refused to comply with the law which offers public access to most routine government information (Wet Openbaar Bestuur, WOB). Compliance with WOB demands was already an issue of political concern because the law also offers decision-makers plenty of opportunities to withhold or delay information if “necessary” for political convenience. In this case, refusal was based on the argument that in the midst of crisis management, there was not enough staff to process the demands for release of information. A deal with the written media bought time for the department to comply with running requests later; but this promise was never kept. Second, and more serious for trust in government among citizens and members of parliament, in many other cases and for many years the government actively withheld information from parliament. This was possible due to the so-called Rutte doctrine, named after its alleged originator, the prime minister himself. The doctrine held that the government could not be obliged to disclose information to citizens or (against the grain of the constitution, Art. 68) to parliament about “personal policy beliefs intended for internal deliberation (only).”
This exemption ground, stretched in extremis, resulted in tens of thousands of redacted passages in documents disclosed (including those from the child benefits affair), much to the anger and frustration of members of parliament, journalists, NGOs and many citizen activists. At the same time, investigative journalism articles published in De Correspondent and Follow the Money disclosed hidden governance agendas and issues, and government facilitation of structural business lobbying arrangements.
Meanwhile, as of the time of writing, the Rutte doctrine has been rejected as unconstitutional for parliament and members of parliament. The new coalition government promised to change the rules of information disclosure fully in line with the constitution. And the old WOB is being replaced by a new Open Government Law (Wet Open Overheid, Woo), which will enter into force on 1 June 2022. The new law foresees active publication of government information on specified categories by means of a special Platform for Open Government Information. Every government body will have a contact person tasked with helping citizens find the information they are seeking; and an Advisory Body for Open Government and Information Management will advise the government and parliament on compliance with rules on active information publication, and will mediate in conflicts between governing bodies and professional information users, like journalists.
Citations:
De Correspondent, Enthoven, 12 January 2021. De Black Box van het openbaar bestuur.
Adformatie, Mulder, 18 February 2021. Dramatische val van van vertrouwen in Nederland; Edelman Trust Barometer is ongekend pessimistisch
Follow the Money, 27 July 2019. ABDUP: al bijna 75 jaar de onzichtbare lobby van Nederlandse multinationals. (ftm.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)
Rijksoverheid.nl, 5 October 2021. Eerste Kamer stemt in met Wet open overheid (Woo)
The most important and high-prestige knowledge institutes regularly publish comprehensive, timely and accurate data and analyses. Such information is used in the annual information packages that accompany parliamentary deliberation and decision-making on the national budget and other issues. Throughout the year, government provides topical information about issues pertaining to ministerial policy agendas on the government website. For politically engaged citizens, it is thus quite possible to be well-informed on government policies. In the Edelman Trust Index 2019, like in the recent past, the Netherlands scored relatively high on trust in government information, with little difference between the well-informed and the broader public. But in 2021, much like in other countries, a deep divide showed up between the well-informed and the mass public: four in 10 of the latter believe the government intentionally misleads citizens through statements it knows to be incorrect or exaggerated and biased; moreover, also four in 10 believe that journalists do the same.
Not all of this can be explained as an expected response to fears triggered by the uncertainty and consequences of the pandemic. The Dutch government in fact proved to be less than an open government for two reasons.
First, the Department of Public Health refused to comply with the law which offers public access to most routine government information (Wet Openbaar Bestuur, WOB). Compliance with WOB demands was already an issue of political concern because the law also offers decision-makers plenty of opportunities to withhold or delay information if “necessary” for political convenience. In this case, refusal was based on the argument that in the midst of crisis management, there was not enough staff to process the demands for release of information. A deal with the written media bought time for the department to comply with running requests later; but this promise was never kept. Second, and more serious for trust in government among citizens and members of parliament, in many other cases and for many years the government actively withheld information from parliament. This was possible due to the so-called Rutte doctrine, named after its alleged originator, the prime minister himself. The doctrine held that the government could not be obliged to disclose information to citizens or (against the grain of the constitution, Art. 68) to parliament about “personal policy beliefs intended for internal deliberation (only).”
This exemption ground, stretched in extremis, resulted in tens of thousands of redacted passages in documents disclosed (including those from the child benefits affair), much to the anger and frustration of members of parliament, journalists, NGOs and many citizen activists. At the same time, investigative journalism articles published in De Correspondent and Follow the Money disclosed hidden governance agendas and issues, and government facilitation of structural business lobbying arrangements.
Meanwhile, as of the time of writing, the Rutte doctrine has been rejected as unconstitutional for parliament and members of parliament. The new coalition government promised to change the rules of information disclosure fully in line with the constitution. And the old WOB is being replaced by a new Open Government Law (Wet Open Overheid, Woo), which will enter into force on 1 June 2022. The new law foresees active publication of government information on specified categories by means of a special Platform for Open Government Information. Every government body will have a contact person tasked with helping citizens find the information they are seeking; and an Advisory Body for Open Government and Information Management will advise the government and parliament on compliance with rules on active information publication, and will mediate in conflicts between governing bodies and professional information users, like journalists.
Citations:
De Correspondent, Enthoven, 12 January 2021. De Black Box van het openbaar bestuur.
Adformatie, Mulder, 18 February 2021. Dramatische val van van vertrouwen in Nederland; Edelman Trust Barometer is ongekend pessimistisch
Follow the Money, 27 July 2019. ABDUP: al bijna 75 jaar de onzichtbare lobby van Nederlandse multinationals. (ftm.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)
Rijksoverheid.nl, 5 October 2021. Eerste Kamer stemt in met Wet open overheid (Woo)
Graph View
Do members of parliament have adequate personnel and structural resources to monitor government activity effectively?
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring all government activity effectively.
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring a government’s major activities.
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
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The resources provided to the members of parliament are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
A comprehensive study on the information exchange between the States General and government in the Netherlands over the past 25 years concludes: “In a mature democracy the primacy of information provision to parliament ought to be in the hands of parliament itself; but in the Netherlands in 2010 de jure and de facto this is hardly the case. … De facto the information arena in which the cabinet and the parliament operate is largely defined and controlled by the cabinet.” The informal code governing information release to parliament has become known under the label of the Rutte doctrine (see “Access to Government Information”). This reflects the necessity of forming government coalitions supported by the majority of the States General. As an institution, the States General is not necessarily a unified actor. As basically every parliamentary vote can result in the downfall of a government, this creates mutual dependence for political survival: parliamentary groups supporting the government (part of the legislature) and government ministers (the executive) become fused, which threatens the democratic principle of control and accountability.
Moreover, the States General’s institutional resources are modest. Approximately 600 staff assist parliamentarians in developing legislation, knowledge storage and use, and ICT issues. Dutch members of parliament in large parliamentary factions have one staffer each, while members of parliament of smaller factions share just a few staffers. Experienced members of parliament say that a political party needs 15 seats (with staffers) to adequately handle the normal workload of parliamentary business. At present, only four political parties have this size; one of which (populist PVV) has a track record of frequent absence with regard to legislative work. Smaller fractions simply lack the time and the manpower to participate seriously in legislative debate, and thus have to choose their battles carefully, taking their visibility in the press and among their electorate into consideration. Since the larger parties are needed to maintain a stable coalition, in-depth legislative debate de facto is the prerogative of the larger parties that support the government.
In October 2019, the cabinet approved a modest budget enlargement for staff assistance to parliament. Legislators belonging to the coalition parties are usually better informed than are opposition members of parliament. Members of parliament do have the right to summon and interrogate ministers, although the quality of the question-and-answer game is typified as: “Posing the right questions is an art; getting correct answers is grace.” The hard, detailed work of legislation, oversight and control occurs out of the spotlight in departmentally organized permanent parliamentary committee meetings. The small Parliamentary Bureau for Research and Public Expenditure does not produce independent research, but provides assistance to members of parliament.
Policy and program evaluations are conducted by the departments themselves, or by the General Audit Chamber (which has more information-gathering powers than the States General). Another more standardized mechanism is the annual Accountability Day, when the government responds to the Audit Chamber’s annual report on its policy achievements over the last year. Due to restrictive contact rules (oekaze Kok) day-to-day contacts with officials are fuzzy and unsatisfactory. Formal hearings between members of parliament and departmental officials are rare. Members of parliament can ask officials to testify under oath only in the case of formal parliamentary surveys or investigations. Although this is considered an extraordinarily time-consuming instrument, parliament has voted to use it in three cases of contested issues: regarding gas exploitation and earthquakes in the province of Groningen, the child benefits affair and management of the coronavirus crisis.
Citations:
Guido Enthoven (2011), Hoe vertellen we het de Kamer? Een empirisch onderzoek naar de informatierelatie tussen regering en parlement, Eburon
Wikipedia, Parlementaire enquête in Nederland (nl.m.wikipedia.org, accessed 3 November 2018)
Parlement.com, van den Berg, 16 July 2021. Problemen met wetgeving, oud en nieuw
Investico, Kuipers et al., 10 March 2021. Wat geeft de wetgever om de wetten?
Kabinet akkoord met grotere financiële steun Kamerleden en partijen
NRC.next, 27 March 2021. Al die parlementaire enquêtes een gevaar voor Rutte IV? Dat is voorbarig
Moreover, the States General’s institutional resources are modest. Approximately 600 staff assist parliamentarians in developing legislation, knowledge storage and use, and ICT issues. Dutch members of parliament in large parliamentary factions have one staffer each, while members of parliament of smaller factions share just a few staffers. Experienced members of parliament say that a political party needs 15 seats (with staffers) to adequately handle the normal workload of parliamentary business. At present, only four political parties have this size; one of which (populist PVV) has a track record of frequent absence with regard to legislative work. Smaller fractions simply lack the time and the manpower to participate seriously in legislative debate, and thus have to choose their battles carefully, taking their visibility in the press and among their electorate into consideration. Since the larger parties are needed to maintain a stable coalition, in-depth legislative debate de facto is the prerogative of the larger parties that support the government.
In October 2019, the cabinet approved a modest budget enlargement for staff assistance to parliament. Legislators belonging to the coalition parties are usually better informed than are opposition members of parliament. Members of parliament do have the right to summon and interrogate ministers, although the quality of the question-and-answer game is typified as: “Posing the right questions is an art; getting correct answers is grace.” The hard, detailed work of legislation, oversight and control occurs out of the spotlight in departmentally organized permanent parliamentary committee meetings. The small Parliamentary Bureau for Research and Public Expenditure does not produce independent research, but provides assistance to members of parliament.
Policy and program evaluations are conducted by the departments themselves, or by the General Audit Chamber (which has more information-gathering powers than the States General). Another more standardized mechanism is the annual Accountability Day, when the government responds to the Audit Chamber’s annual report on its policy achievements over the last year. Due to restrictive contact rules (oekaze Kok) day-to-day contacts with officials are fuzzy and unsatisfactory. Formal hearings between members of parliament and departmental officials are rare. Members of parliament can ask officials to testify under oath only in the case of formal parliamentary surveys or investigations. Although this is considered an extraordinarily time-consuming instrument, parliament has voted to use it in three cases of contested issues: regarding gas exploitation and earthquakes in the province of Groningen, the child benefits affair and management of the coronavirus crisis.
Citations:
Guido Enthoven (2011), Hoe vertellen we het de Kamer? Een empirisch onderzoek naar de informatierelatie tussen regering en parlement, Eburon
Wikipedia, Parlementaire enquête in Nederland (nl.m.wikipedia.org, accessed 3 November 2018)
Parlement.com, van den Berg, 16 July 2021. Problemen met wetgeving, oud en nieuw
Investico, Kuipers et al., 10 March 2021. Wat geeft de wetgever om de wetten?
Kabinet akkoord met grotere financiële steun Kamerleden en partijen
NRC.next, 27 March 2021. Al die parlementaire enquêtes een gevaar voor Rutte IV? Dat is voorbarig
Are parliamentary committees able to ask for government documents?
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Parliamentary committees may ask for most or all government documents; they are normally delivered in full and within an appropriate time frame.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are slightly limited; some important documents are not delivered or are delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are considerably limited; most important documents are not delivered or delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
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Parliamentary committees may not request government documents.
The government has to provide correct information to the States General (according to Article 68 of the constitution). However, this is often done defensively, in order to protect “ministerial responsibility to parliament” and a “free consultative sphere” with regard to executive communications. According to the Rutted doctrine, providing the States General with internal memos, policy briefs (e.g., on alternative policy options), interdepartmental policy notes or advice from external consultants is viewed as infringing on the policy “intimacy” necessary for open deliberation, as well as the state’s interests. Documents containing such information frequently reach parliament in incomplete form with crucial passages rendered unreadable. As political scientist Hans Daalder noted a long time ago: “In practice, it is the ministers that decide on the provision of information requested.” There are recent examples of cases where the Dutch parliament has not been informed or has been informed incorrectly. These include a childcare allowance scandal and a parliamentary investigation into the legality of (covert) crime investigation techniques used by the police (see Guido Enthoven in de De Groen Amsterdammer, 2021).
Citations:
R.B. Andeweg & G.A. Irwin (2014), Governance and Politics of the Netherlands. Houndmills, Basingstoke: 174-182.
Guido Enthoven (2011), Hoe vertellen we het de Kamer? Een empirisch onderzoek naar de informatierelatie tussen regering en parlement, Eburon
De Groen Amsterdammer, Enthoven, 12 January 2021. Het einde van de Rutte-doctrine. De Black Box van het openbaar bestuur.
Citations:
R.B. Andeweg & G.A. Irwin (2014), Governance and Politics of the Netherlands. Houndmills, Basingstoke: 174-182.
Guido Enthoven (2011), Hoe vertellen we het de Kamer? Een empirisch onderzoek naar de informatierelatie tussen regering en parlement, Eburon
De Groen Amsterdammer, Enthoven, 12 January 2021. Het einde van de Rutte-doctrine. De Black Box van het openbaar bestuur.
Are parliamentary committees able to summon ministers for hearings?
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Parliamentary committees may summon ministers. Ministers regularly follow invitations and are obliged to answer questions.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are slightly limited; ministers occasionally refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are considerably limited; ministers frequently refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
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Parliamentary committees may not summon ministers.
Parliamentary committees may invite ministers to provide testimony or answer questions. Usually, such requests are duly obeyed. For example, in 2018 a minister for public health even canceled international commitments in favor of dealing with parliamentary issues concerning the bankruptcy of two local hospitals. Nevertheless, ministers often do not answer questions in a forthright manner. Sometimes ministers avoid public accountability and step down before being summoned to escape a censure or no-confidence motion. Every week, parliamentarians have the opportunity to summon ministers and pose questions.
Citations:
R.B. Andeweg & G.A. Irwin (2014), Governance and Politics of the Netherlands. Houndmills, Basingstoke: 174-182.
NOS, Minister Bruins wil vinger in de pap bij keuze overnamekandidaat ziekenhuis Lelystad, 2 November
Parlement.com, Aftredende bewindslieden
Citations:
R.B. Andeweg & G.A. Irwin (2014), Governance and Politics of the Netherlands. Houndmills, Basingstoke: 174-182.
NOS, Minister Bruins wil vinger in de pap bij keuze overnamekandidaat ziekenhuis Lelystad, 2 November
Parlement.com, Aftredende bewindslieden
Are parliamentary committees able to summon experts for committee meetings?
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Parliamentary committees may summon experts.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are slightly limited.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are considerably limited.
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Parliamentary committees may not summon experts.
Parliamentary committees may and do regularly summon experts. For example, during the coronavirus crisis, the Committee for Public Health, Welfare and Sports regularly summoned members of the Outbreak Management Teams for so-called technical briefings. In the past, parliament has summoned experts for special topics like climate change.
Citations:
R.B. Andeweg & G.A. Irwin (2014), Governance and Politics of the Netherlands. Houndmills, Basingstoke: 163-174.
Tweede Kamer, Debat gemist, Update coronavirus
18 augustus 2021 Vaste commissie voor Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport Technische briefing
Citations:
R.B. Andeweg & G.A. Irwin (2014), Governance and Politics of the Netherlands. Houndmills, Basingstoke: 163-174.
Tweede Kamer, Debat gemist, Update coronavirus
18 augustus 2021 Vaste commissie voor Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport Technische briefing
Are the task areas and structures of parliamentary committees suited to monitor ministries effectively?
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The match between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are well-suited to the effective monitoring of ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are largely suited to the monitoring ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are partially suited to the monitoring of ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are not at all suited to the monitoring of ministries.
There are 12 (fixed) parliamentary committees (vaste kamercommissies). Only the prime minister’s Department of General Affairs lacks an analogous dedicated parliamentary committee. There are also fixed committees for interdepartmental policymaking on aggregate government expenditure, European affairs and foreign trade, and development aid. Parliamentary committees usually have 25 members, representing all political parties with seats in the States General; they specialize in the policy issues of their dedicated departments and inform their peers (i.e., tell them how to vote as part of the party voting-discipline system). Members of parliament in these parliamentary oversight committees usually have close contacts with (deputy) ministers and (far less) high-level civil servants in the departments they oversee. Some observers see this as having contributed to a mutual interweaving of the executive and legislative branch of the government, thereby diminishing the executive’s accountability to the legislature. There are approximately 1,700 public and non-public committee meetings per year. By giving the committees the right to introduce, discuss and vote on motions (without a subsequent plenary debate and voting), the pressure on the plenary meetings is reduced, and the oversight role of the committees strengthened.
There has been a debate about the Committee on Security (Commissie Stiekem), which includes all leaders of the political parties, as some lawmakers have expressed concern about a lack of effective parliamentary oversight on crucial security issues. Very little is known about why such criticism was voiced and how members look at their role in the parliamentary committee. Other committees have public sessions (since 1966) that are broadcast, which means that there is more information available on the activities of the various political parties. Smaller political parties, especially ones with between one and three members, simply cannot attend all committee meetings. Over time, the core of parliamentary activity has moved from the plenary sessions to the committees.
Citations:
Commissies (tweedekamer.nl, consulted 6 November 2014)
S. Otjes, 6 February 2019, Wie bepaalt de agenda van de Tweede Kamer? (stukroodvlees.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)
G. H. Hagelstein, De parlementaire commissies (Nederlands parlementsrecht, Monografie VI,
Dissertatie Groningen 1991; Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1991, xix + 443 blz., ISBN
90 01 36530 2.
Hijzen, Constant. 2013. “More Than a Ritual Dance. The Dutch Practice of Parliamentary
Oversight and Control of the Intelligence Community.” Security and Human Rights
24; 227-238.
Investico, Kuipers et al., 10 March 2021. Wat geeft de wetgever om de wetten?
There has been a debate about the Committee on Security (Commissie Stiekem), which includes all leaders of the political parties, as some lawmakers have expressed concern about a lack of effective parliamentary oversight on crucial security issues. Very little is known about why such criticism was voiced and how members look at their role in the parliamentary committee. Other committees have public sessions (since 1966) that are broadcast, which means that there is more information available on the activities of the various political parties. Smaller political parties, especially ones with between one and three members, simply cannot attend all committee meetings. Over time, the core of parliamentary activity has moved from the plenary sessions to the committees.
Citations:
Commissies (tweedekamer.nl, consulted 6 November 2014)
S. Otjes, 6 February 2019, Wie bepaalt de agenda van de Tweede Kamer? (stukroodvlees.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)
G. H. Hagelstein, De parlementaire commissies (Nederlands parlementsrecht, Monografie VI,
Dissertatie Groningen 1991; Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1991, xix + 443 blz., ISBN
90 01 36530 2.
Hijzen, Constant. 2013. “More Than a Ritual Dance. The Dutch Practice of Parliamentary
Oversight and Control of the Intelligence Community.” Security and Human Rights
24; 227-238.
Investico, Kuipers et al., 10 March 2021. Wat geeft de wetgever om de wetten?
Graph View
To what extent do media in your country analyze the rationale and impact of public policies?
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A clear majority of mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies.
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About one-half of the mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies. The rest produces a mix of infotainment and quality information content.
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A clear minority of mass media brands focuses on high-quality information content analyzing public policies. Several mass media brands produce superficial infotainment content only.
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All mass media brands are dominated by superficial infotainment content.
Dutch public media are not completely state-run. Rather, they are organized along different segments of the population, each with their own distinct set of beliefs, perspectives, convictions and paying members. The system has been modernized several times, most recently by limiting the number of media organizations to six (plus two task-oriented ones). Every five years the culture branch of the Department of Education, Science and Culture, advised by relevant commissions, judges on the basis of the number of memberships and (vague) substantive criteria which organizations are representative enough to claim broadcasting time and public resources (money, equipment) in this public media system. Every five years, two “aspiring” members are admitted on a temporary basis. To the astonishment of many, in 2021, Unheard Netherlands! (ON!) and Black (Zwart) were admitted. Both broadcasting organizations are rooted in vocal protest movements, and have been visible in Dutch public debate for some time thanks to demonstrations and provocative actions. ON! has frequently criticized Dutch media and journalists as disseminating biased news and for being too left-leaning. Since the public media are by law supposed to further “societal coherence,” it is feared that by coopting these two organizations, the system will be damaged from within. Other recent changes to the system provided more time for regional news on national TV/radio, and devoted less time for commercials, with this falling all the way to zero around children’s programs.
Several media-use trends appear to have reached tipping points. Digitalized media consumption is becoming dominant, even though during the lockdowns the population of people aged 50 and older turned more to paper media and linear tv. This will be a structural change in media use, slowly moving from younger to older users. Streaming services have become mainstream. On-demand video- and audio-content is used by all age groups. All media organizations and enterprises are converging toward cross-media products. Consequently, they group all their content offerings under one and the same brand name. Even former paper-based media like Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant (NRC) and Algemeen Dagblad (AD) have transformed themselves into cross-media news enterprises. The shift from analog to digital media consumption implies that the advertisement incomes of traditional media are transferring to the digitalized cross-media organizations and firms. Since advertisement income is concentrated on big tech companies like Google and Facebook, national broadcasting and publishing companies worry about their economic sustainability. In the Netherlands, this has generated upscaling and acquisition initiatives; for example, the Belgian DPG bought Sanoma, and RTL (with Bertelsmann in the background) intends to become the Dutch media champion. With only two big players, the Media Pluralism Monitor 2021 reports for the Netherlands that: “News media concentration (85%) indicates a high risk. The market is concentrated both in terms of audience share as well as market share. There is no media legislation restricting ownership of media.” Yet the report also states that as yet, this has not resulted in a lack of pluralism or an impoverishment of news sources and varieties.
Citations:
Commissariaat voor de Media, 21 November 2021. Mediamonitor 2021.
NRC, van den Brink, January 23 2021. ‘Eigen signatuur’ pakt rampzalig uit
NRC, Nieher, 4 October 2021. ‘Het is ingewikkeld om deze omroepen af te wijzen’
NRC, Takken and Smouter, 14 November 2021. Mediaminister Slob: ‘Het huis van de publieke omroep is wel erg vol’
Several media-use trends appear to have reached tipping points. Digitalized media consumption is becoming dominant, even though during the lockdowns the population of people aged 50 and older turned more to paper media and linear tv. This will be a structural change in media use, slowly moving from younger to older users. Streaming services have become mainstream. On-demand video- and audio-content is used by all age groups. All media organizations and enterprises are converging toward cross-media products. Consequently, they group all their content offerings under one and the same brand name. Even former paper-based media like Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant (NRC) and Algemeen Dagblad (AD) have transformed themselves into cross-media news enterprises. The shift from analog to digital media consumption implies that the advertisement incomes of traditional media are transferring to the digitalized cross-media organizations and firms. Since advertisement income is concentrated on big tech companies like Google and Facebook, national broadcasting and publishing companies worry about their economic sustainability. In the Netherlands, this has generated upscaling and acquisition initiatives; for example, the Belgian DPG bought Sanoma, and RTL (with Bertelsmann in the background) intends to become the Dutch media champion. With only two big players, the Media Pluralism Monitor 2021 reports for the Netherlands that: “News media concentration (85%) indicates a high risk. The market is concentrated both in terms of audience share as well as market share. There is no media legislation restricting ownership of media.” Yet the report also states that as yet, this has not resulted in a lack of pluralism or an impoverishment of news sources and varieties.
Citations:
Commissariaat voor de Media, 21 November 2021. Mediamonitor 2021.
NRC, van den Brink, January 23 2021. ‘Eigen signatuur’ pakt rampzalig uit
NRC, Nieher, 4 October 2021. ‘Het is ingewikkeld om deze omroepen af te wijzen’
NRC, Takken and Smouter, 14 November 2021. Mediaminister Slob: ‘Het huis van de publieke omroep is wel erg vol’
Graph View
How inclusive and open are the major parties in their internal decision-making processes?
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The party allows all party members and supporters to participate in its decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and agendas of issues are open.
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The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, all party members have the opportunity to participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are rather open.
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The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, a number of elected delegates participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are largely controlled by the party leadership.
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A number of party leaders participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are fully controlled and drafted by the party leadership.
The dominant political view is that government interference in private organizations like political parties is incompatible with the role of the state in a liberal democracy. A law for internal party democracy is appropriate for countries with a history of non-democratic governance (e.g., Germany, some states in southern Europe and in central and eastern Europe). However, in the Netherlands with its strong democratic tradition, many consider it superfluous. Several recent reports show the vulnerability of Dutch democracy to (international) manipulation through weak controls over and accountability for party finance, political campaigning and candidate selection. For example, some political parties deal with their representatives’ ethical issues (especially regarding gender issues) through internal councils or executive organs, political parties report inflated numbers of formal members in order to boost state subsidies, and candidate lists and leadership-succession practices frequently lack transparency, illustrating Robert Michels’ thesis that political parties act as oligarchies.
In addition, political parties are not obliged to have a membership organization or conduct internal decision-making practices democratically. One party (the anti-immigrant party PVV) has only one member – its leader – and not even its members of parliament or local councils are able to join the party they represent, and not even members of parliament have any formal say in policies, candidate selection or internal workings of this party. Several political parties have received very considerable amounts of money (up to €1 billion), sometimes from foreign countries. Entrepreneurs have sold time with ministers and other high officials from governmental parties to companies during dinner parties in order to finance campaigns, eradicating the line between partisan activities and formal duties. Some political scientists therefore advocate a separate law on political parties, including grounds for prohibiting parties that undermine democracy itself; and an independent (non-state) commission for oversight and enforcement. Such a Party Law that would acknowledge the special and crucial functions that parties perform in the country’s democracy is now being prepared.
The very narrow basis of political parties is reflected in their membership figures. Political-party membership reached an all-time low of 285,851 in 2015. It increased to 316,000 in 2021 (2.4% of the electorate), owing to an increase in young voters joining D66, Green Left and Forum for Democracy. Approximately 10% of party members are considered active. Frequently party activism is used as a launching pad for a political career. Across all major political parties, political activists and (semi-)professionals dominate decision-making with regard to candidate lists and political agendas. Political parties are not bottom-up movements. Rather, they are intermediaries between political elites and their electorates, with political-party members as links. The attitude to intra-party democracy (e.g., party congresses, election of party leaders and intra-party referendums) is ambivalent. One former minister of defense and Labor party member commented: “Party congresses don’t buy combat planes.” Party leadership succession, even in political parties with some tradition of intra-party democracy (e.g., Christian Democrats, social democrats and D66), is not necessarily democratically regulated, but is often determined by opaque, “spontaneous” selection processes managed by party elites. In recent years, some political parties – such as the PvdA – have moved to a primary model, but can and do return to much more closed procedures of leadership and candidate selection.
The functional loss of political parties as clear representatives of social groups reverberates across the political system at all levels (see also “Association Competence (Others)”). Lower-educated citizens’ mobilization and integration into politics has declined in particular. Paired with the decline of the centrist parties (in particular the former dominant parties, the social-democratic PvdA and Christian democratic CDA), the rise of more extremist and fringe parties, increasing electoral volatility, parliamentary fragmentation, polarization on particularly cultural issues and strong anti-establishment sentiments have created anxieties regarding the role of politicians and political parties.
Citations:
R.B. Andeweg and G.A. Irwin (2014), Governance and Politics of The Netherlands. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 80-95
NRC Handelsblad, 26 January 2019. Kabinet: verbod op partijfinanciering van buiten de EU.
NRC Handelsblad, 9 March 2019. Politieke partijen die regels ontwijken – en een ministerie dat steeds wegkijkt.
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2018/02/01/rapport-he t-publieke-belang-van-politieke-partijen
Gr. A’dammer, Rijkema, 8 December 2021. Onzeker gesternte.
NRC, 20 March, 2021. Wij zijn het Wilde Westen van het politieke geld.
Andre Krouwel (2012) Leadership and Candidate Selection in Krouwel, A (2012). Party Transformations in European democracies. SUNY Press (State University of New York Press).
Andre Krouwel (1999) The selection of parliamentary candidates in Western Europe: The paradox of democracy, Working Papper Vrije Universiteit https://www.researchgate.net/publication/279848031_The_selection_of_parliamentary_candidates_in_Western_Europe_The_paradox_of_democracy
In addition, political parties are not obliged to have a membership organization or conduct internal decision-making practices democratically. One party (the anti-immigrant party PVV) has only one member – its leader – and not even its members of parliament or local councils are able to join the party they represent, and not even members of parliament have any formal say in policies, candidate selection or internal workings of this party. Several political parties have received very considerable amounts of money (up to €1 billion), sometimes from foreign countries. Entrepreneurs have sold time with ministers and other high officials from governmental parties to companies during dinner parties in order to finance campaigns, eradicating the line between partisan activities and formal duties. Some political scientists therefore advocate a separate law on political parties, including grounds for prohibiting parties that undermine democracy itself; and an independent (non-state) commission for oversight and enforcement. Such a Party Law that would acknowledge the special and crucial functions that parties perform in the country’s democracy is now being prepared.
The very narrow basis of political parties is reflected in their membership figures. Political-party membership reached an all-time low of 285,851 in 2015. It increased to 316,000 in 2021 (2.4% of the electorate), owing to an increase in young voters joining D66, Green Left and Forum for Democracy. Approximately 10% of party members are considered active. Frequently party activism is used as a launching pad for a political career. Across all major political parties, political activists and (semi-)professionals dominate decision-making with regard to candidate lists and political agendas. Political parties are not bottom-up movements. Rather, they are intermediaries between political elites and their electorates, with political-party members as links. The attitude to intra-party democracy (e.g., party congresses, election of party leaders and intra-party referendums) is ambivalent. One former minister of defense and Labor party member commented: “Party congresses don’t buy combat planes.” Party leadership succession, even in political parties with some tradition of intra-party democracy (e.g., Christian Democrats, social democrats and D66), is not necessarily democratically regulated, but is often determined by opaque, “spontaneous” selection processes managed by party elites. In recent years, some political parties – such as the PvdA – have moved to a primary model, but can and do return to much more closed procedures of leadership and candidate selection.
The functional loss of political parties as clear representatives of social groups reverberates across the political system at all levels (see also “Association Competence (Others)”). Lower-educated citizens’ mobilization and integration into politics has declined in particular. Paired with the decline of the centrist parties (in particular the former dominant parties, the social-democratic PvdA and Christian democratic CDA), the rise of more extremist and fringe parties, increasing electoral volatility, parliamentary fragmentation, polarization on particularly cultural issues and strong anti-establishment sentiments have created anxieties regarding the role of politicians and political parties.
Citations:
R.B. Andeweg and G.A. Irwin (2014), Governance and Politics of The Netherlands. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 80-95
NRC Handelsblad, 26 January 2019. Kabinet: verbod op partijfinanciering van buiten de EU.
NRC Handelsblad, 9 March 2019. Politieke partijen die regels ontwijken – en een ministerie dat steeds wegkijkt.
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2018/02/01/rapport-he t-publieke-belang-van-politieke-partijen
Gr. A’dammer, Rijkema, 8 December 2021. Onzeker gesternte.
NRC, 20 March, 2021. Wij zijn het Wilde Westen van het politieke geld.
Andre Krouwel (2012) Leadership and Candidate Selection in Krouwel, A (2012). Party Transformations in European democracies. SUNY Press (State University of New York Press).
Andre Krouwel (1999) The selection of parliamentary candidates in Western Europe: The paradox of democracy, Working Papper Vrije Universiteit https://www.researchgate.net/publication/279848031_The_selection_of_parliamentary_candidates_in_Western_Europe_The_paradox_of_democracy
To what extent are economic interest associations (e.g., employers, industry, labor) capable of formulating relevant policies?
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Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
For a long time, there was no lobbying culture in the Netherlands in the usual sense. Instead, prominent members of labor unions and business associations are regular members of high-level formal and informal networks that also include high-level civil servants and politicians. For example, the day the government announced that it was going into crisis mode due to the coronavirus pandemic, the chairs of the two major employers’ and labor unions met with the ministers of Finance, Economic Affairs and Climate, and Social Affairs and Employment. In the next months, they cobbled together the generous and fast wage-support system that would ultimately save jobs and business activities during the coronavirus lockdowns (see “Economy” and “Labor Markets”). Members of these networks discuss labor market and other important socioeconomic policy issues. These processes have become institutionalized. For instance, there are tripartite negotiations, especially organized in and through the Socioeconomic Council (Sociaal-Economische Raad, SER), in which employers, employees and government experts are fixed discussion partners in government decision-making regarding labor issues. A similar process takes place for regular negotiations with economic interest associations.
The analytic capacities of business and labor associations are well-developed. For example, the strongest labor union, FNV, has claimed success in influencing government policy on stricter hiring and firing rules, the pension agreement, and stricter regulation of a flexible labor market. However, membership in trade unions has shown a continuous decline, particularly among younger people. In addition, members and supporters of trade unions and professional and commercial associations frequently have more radical opinions than their representatives. In recent demonstrations, especially by farmers, teachers and hospital workers, association representatives in negotiations with the government were called back by their followers.
Since the mid-1970s, employers’ associations have consistently been in favor of the liberalization of labor market institutions. They have supported efforts to decentralize, deregulate, individualize and more recently also to decollectivize wages, working-time arrangements and collective bargaining. In the early 2010s, however, even while employers organizations maintained that labor-cost moderation was necessary, they started to acknowledge that the purchasing power of large groups of (middle-class) employees was lagging behind and that in some sectors, labor shortages had reached dangerous levels. Moderation among unions and the presence of center-right (dominated) governments reduced the urgency of dismantling the Dutch corporatist framework throughout most of the post-1970s period. Most demands made by employers thus ended up in the general agreements; however, this posture has changed, and employers organizations have several times questioned the need for collective bargaining and corporatist decision-making. The weakness of the unions has clearly emboldened employers, which could signal more labor market unrest in the (near) future.
This institutionalized “poldering” model has seen the rise of a parallel venue of strong business lobbying. There is now a Professional Association for Public Affairs (BVPA) that boasts 600 members (four times the number of parliamentarians) and a special public-affairs professorship at Leiden University. The professionalization of lobbying is said to be necessary in order to curb unethical practices such as the creation of foundations or crowdsourcing initiatives as a means of pursuing business interests. However, the “quiet politics” (Culpepper) of business lobbying through organizations such as the Commissie Tabaksblat, the Amsterdam (later Holland) Financial Center (Engelen), or Dutch Trade Investment Board (Follow the Money) has proven more than successful in influencing public policies on corporate governance, easing regulation of the banking and financial sector, keeping taxes for business low, and influencing the Dutch stance on Russian gas imports. There is convincing evidence that in terms of election programs and promises, over the long run, Dutch households have been systematically disadvantaged compared to corporations and business. For example, tax reductions and exemptions for business are systematically higher than for ordinary citizens (see also “Taxes”).
Citations:
P.D. Culpepper, 2010. Quiet Politics and Business Power. Corporate Control in Europe and Japan, Cambridge University Press
W. Bolhuis, Van woord tot akkoord: een analyse van verkiezingsprogramma’s en regeerakkoorden, 1885-2017, Universiteit Leiden
W. Bolhuis, Elke formatie faalt. Verkiezingsbeloftes die nooit werden waargemaakt, Uitgeverij Brooklyn, 2018
NRC, Marée, 3 November 2021. Dit jaar opnieuw sterke daling vakbondsleden
NTC, Pelgrim and Sterk, 8 March 2021. Han Busker: ‘De flexibele arneidsmarkt werd gezien als natuurkracht’
NRC, Heck, 5 April 2021. De ceo kan de minister altijd bellen
Follow the Money, Keyzer and Geurts, 11 September 2021. Shell fluisterde Nederlands standpunt in over gas uit Rusland
Boumans, S. (2021). Neoliberalisation of industrial relations: The ideational development of Dutch employers’ organisations between 1976 and 2019. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 1-22. https://doi.org/10.1177/0143831X211020086
The analytic capacities of business and labor associations are well-developed. For example, the strongest labor union, FNV, has claimed success in influencing government policy on stricter hiring and firing rules, the pension agreement, and stricter regulation of a flexible labor market. However, membership in trade unions has shown a continuous decline, particularly among younger people. In addition, members and supporters of trade unions and professional and commercial associations frequently have more radical opinions than their representatives. In recent demonstrations, especially by farmers, teachers and hospital workers, association representatives in negotiations with the government were called back by their followers.
Since the mid-1970s, employers’ associations have consistently been in favor of the liberalization of labor market institutions. They have supported efforts to decentralize, deregulate, individualize and more recently also to decollectivize wages, working-time arrangements and collective bargaining. In the early 2010s, however, even while employers organizations maintained that labor-cost moderation was necessary, they started to acknowledge that the purchasing power of large groups of (middle-class) employees was lagging behind and that in some sectors, labor shortages had reached dangerous levels. Moderation among unions and the presence of center-right (dominated) governments reduced the urgency of dismantling the Dutch corporatist framework throughout most of the post-1970s period. Most demands made by employers thus ended up in the general agreements; however, this posture has changed, and employers organizations have several times questioned the need for collective bargaining and corporatist decision-making. The weakness of the unions has clearly emboldened employers, which could signal more labor market unrest in the (near) future.
This institutionalized “poldering” model has seen the rise of a parallel venue of strong business lobbying. There is now a Professional Association for Public Affairs (BVPA) that boasts 600 members (four times the number of parliamentarians) and a special public-affairs professorship at Leiden University. The professionalization of lobbying is said to be necessary in order to curb unethical practices such as the creation of foundations or crowdsourcing initiatives as a means of pursuing business interests. However, the “quiet politics” (Culpepper) of business lobbying through organizations such as the Commissie Tabaksblat, the Amsterdam (later Holland) Financial Center (Engelen), or Dutch Trade Investment Board (Follow the Money) has proven more than successful in influencing public policies on corporate governance, easing regulation of the banking and financial sector, keeping taxes for business low, and influencing the Dutch stance on Russian gas imports. There is convincing evidence that in terms of election programs and promises, over the long run, Dutch households have been systematically disadvantaged compared to corporations and business. For example, tax reductions and exemptions for business are systematically higher than for ordinary citizens (see also “Taxes”).
Citations:
P.D. Culpepper, 2010. Quiet Politics and Business Power. Corporate Control in Europe and Japan, Cambridge University Press
W. Bolhuis, Van woord tot akkoord: een analyse van verkiezingsprogramma’s en regeerakkoorden, 1885-2017, Universiteit Leiden
W. Bolhuis, Elke formatie faalt. Verkiezingsbeloftes die nooit werden waargemaakt, Uitgeverij Brooklyn, 2018
NRC, Marée, 3 November 2021. Dit jaar opnieuw sterke daling vakbondsleden
NTC, Pelgrim and Sterk, 8 March 2021. Han Busker: ‘De flexibele arneidsmarkt werd gezien als natuurkracht’
NRC, Heck, 5 April 2021. De ceo kan de minister altijd bellen
Follow the Money, Keyzer and Geurts, 11 September 2021. Shell fluisterde Nederlands standpunt in over gas uit Rusland
Boumans, S. (2021). Neoliberalisation of industrial relations: The ideational development of Dutch employers’ organisations between 1976 and 2019. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 1-22. https://doi.org/10.1177/0143831X211020086
To what extent are non-economic interest associations capable of formulating relevant policies?
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Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
Policymaking in the Netherlands has a strong neo-corporatist (“poldering”) tradition that systematically involves all kinds of interest associations in the policymaking process – not just with regard to business and labor issues, but also in the education, care, culture, sports and health sectors. Owing to their well-established positions, associations such as the consumer association; the associations for home-owners, for car owners or for bikers and cyclists; all kinds of environmental NGOs, religious associations, municipal (Vereniging voor Nederlandse Gemeenten) and provincial interests (InterProvinciaal Overleg), and medical and other professional associations (e.g., teachers, universities, legal professions) can influence policymaking through the existing consensus-seeking structures. Tradeoffs are actively negotiated with ministries, other involved governments, stakeholder organizations and even NGOs. Furthermore, noneconomic interest organizations react to policy proposals by ministries and have a role in amending and changing the proposals in the early stages of the cabinet formation and regular policymaking process. During the 2021 cabinet-formation process, many noneconomic associations – representing, for example, the arts, education, the elderly and the care sector – inundated negotiators with policy memos and demands. Of course, they are also involved again at a later stage, during implementation processes. Sometimes, as in the Lelystad airport noise case, truly spontaneous citizen activist groups may be successful in penetrating official policymaking.
Recent research by investigative journalists has unearthed serious evidence that there are systematic links between political parties and more informal sources of influence through jobs and positions in noneconomic and non-political associations. For example, the American tactic of shadow-lobbying – big corporations hiring ostensibly neutral research bodies as indirect sources, above suspicion, that then criticize government policy initiatives – is also practiced in the Netherlands. More important, political parties, especially VVD, D66, PvdA and CDA, are successfully pushing party members that leave formal political positions into high-level leadership and administrative positions in the non-political and noneconomic associations that make up the third sector or civil society – like chairperson positions in the Dutch Association of Local Governments (VNG), the Dutch Organization of Scientific Research (NWO), the Dutch Organization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO), health insurance companies, the National Railway system (NS), etc. Of course, a considerable number of politicians also leave political jobs to go to more lucrative lobbying jobs in business or to prominent civil society organizations. The most recent case is that of the minister of infrastructure and water management leaving her position in the Rutte III caretaker government for a position as chair of Energie Nederland, the umbrella organization for energy companies.
Citations:
Woldendorp, J.J. (2014). Blijvend succes voor het poldermodel? Hoe een klein land met een kleine economie probeert te overleven op de wereldmarkt. In F.H. Becker & M. Hurenkamp (Eds.), De gelukkige onderneming. Arbeidsverhoudingen voor de 21ste eeuw (Jaarboek voor de sociaal-democratie, 2014) (pp. 211-227). Amsterdam: Wiardi Beckman Stichting/Uitgeverij Van Gennep.
NRC Next, 25 juni 2019. ‘Maatschappelijke kosten Lelystad Airport onderschat.’NRC,
Meeus, 20 November 2021 Heeft de Amerikaanse methode van ‘schaduwlobbyen’ Den Haag bereikt?
Groene Amterdammer, 22 February, 2021. Keken and Wittman, Baantjes in de polder. Hoe Nederland liberaal-blauw kleurde.
Montesquieu Instituut, 2 September 2021. Democratie op Donderdag: afkoelingperiode bewinsdpersonen
Recent research by investigative journalists has unearthed serious evidence that there are systematic links between political parties and more informal sources of influence through jobs and positions in noneconomic and non-political associations. For example, the American tactic of shadow-lobbying – big corporations hiring ostensibly neutral research bodies as indirect sources, above suspicion, that then criticize government policy initiatives – is also practiced in the Netherlands. More important, political parties, especially VVD, D66, PvdA and CDA, are successfully pushing party members that leave formal political positions into high-level leadership and administrative positions in the non-political and noneconomic associations that make up the third sector or civil society – like chairperson positions in the Dutch Association of Local Governments (VNG), the Dutch Organization of Scientific Research (NWO), the Dutch Organization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO), health insurance companies, the National Railway system (NS), etc. Of course, a considerable number of politicians also leave political jobs to go to more lucrative lobbying jobs in business or to prominent civil society organizations. The most recent case is that of the minister of infrastructure and water management leaving her position in the Rutte III caretaker government for a position as chair of Energie Nederland, the umbrella organization for energy companies.
Citations:
Woldendorp, J.J. (2014). Blijvend succes voor het poldermodel? Hoe een klein land met een kleine economie probeert te overleven op de wereldmarkt. In F.H. Becker & M. Hurenkamp (Eds.), De gelukkige onderneming. Arbeidsverhoudingen voor de 21ste eeuw (Jaarboek voor de sociaal-democratie, 2014) (pp. 211-227). Amsterdam: Wiardi Beckman Stichting/Uitgeverij Van Gennep.
NRC Next, 25 juni 2019. ‘Maatschappelijke kosten Lelystad Airport onderschat.’NRC,
Meeus, 20 November 2021 Heeft de Amerikaanse methode van ‘schaduwlobbyen’ Den Haag bereikt?
Groene Amterdammer, 22 February, 2021. Keken and Wittman, Baantjes in de polder. Hoe Nederland liberaal-blauw kleurde.
Montesquieu Instituut, 2 September 2021. Democratie op Donderdag: afkoelingperiode bewinsdpersonen
Graph View
Does there exist an independent and effective audit office?
10
9
9
There exists an effective and independent audit office.
8
7
6
7
6
There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is slightly limited.
5
4
3
4
3
There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
2
1
1
There does not exist an independent and effective audit office.
The Netherlands’ General Audit Chamber is the independent organ that audits the legality, effectiveness and efficiency of the national government’s spending. The court reports to the States General and government, and its members are recommended by the States General and appointed by the Council of Ministers. Parliament frequently consults with this institution, and in many cases, this leads to investigations. Investigations may also be initiated by ministers or deputy ministers. However, such requests are not formal due to the independent status of the General Audit Chamber. Requests by citizens are also taken into account. Every year, the chamber checks the financial evaluations of the ministries. During the coronavirus crisis, the Audit Chamber periodically calculated total costs and reported on them. Chamber reports are publicly accessible and can be found online and as parliamentary publications (Kamerstuk). Through unfortunate timing in view of (more) important political developments, in recent years such evaluations played only a minor role in parliamentary debates and government accountability problems. By selecting key issues in each departmental domain, the General Audit Chamber hopes to improve its efficacy as instrumental advice. In addition, there is an evident trend within the chamber to shift the focus of audits and policy evaluations from “oversight” to “insight.” In other words, the chamber is shifting from ex post accountability to ongoing policy-oriented learning. Unfortunately, this has been accompanied by a substantial reduction in resources for the Audit Chamber, resulting in a loss of 40 full-time employees and the need to outsource research frequently. The childcare benefits affair caused the Audit Chamber chair to admit that, obviously, the Chamber and other oversight bodies had been unable to present their criticism in an effective and persuasive way.
Citations:
NRC, 1 October 2021, Aharouay and Valke, Naar de drie toezichthouders wordt vaak niet geluisterd: ‘Het is teveel waan van de dag’
Algemene Rekenkamer, Coronarekening, Editie Prinsjesdag 202
http://www.rekenkamer.nl/Over_de_Algemene_Rekenkamer
P. Koning, Van toezicht naar inzicht, Beleidsonderzoek Online, July 2015
Citations:
NRC, 1 October 2021, Aharouay and Valke, Naar de drie toezichthouders wordt vaak niet geluisterd: ‘Het is teveel waan van de dag’
Algemene Rekenkamer, Coronarekening, Editie Prinsjesdag 202
http://www.rekenkamer.nl/Over_de_Algemene_Rekenkamer
P. Koning, Van toezicht naar inzicht, Beleidsonderzoek Online, July 2015
Does there exist an independent and effective ombuds office?
10
9
9
There exists an effective and independent ombuds office.
8
7
6
7
6
There exists an effective and independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is slightly limited.
5
4
3
4
3
There exists an independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is considerably limited.
2
1
1
There does not exist an effective and independent ombuds office.
The National Ombudsman is a “high council of state” on a par the Council of State and the Netherlands General Audit Chamber. Like the judiciary, the high councils of state are formally independent of the government. The National Ombudsman’s independence from the executive is increased by appointment by the States General (specifically by the Second Chamber or Tweede Kamer). The appointment is for a term of six years, and reappointment is permitted. The National Ombudsman office was established to give individual citizens an opportunity to file complaints about the practices of government before an independent and expert body. The national ombudsman is assisted by deputies tasked with addressing problems facing children and veterans.
Where the government is concerned, it is important to note that the National Ombudsman’s decisions are not legally enforceable. The ombudsman publishes his or her conclusions in annual reports. The ombudsman’s tasks are shifting toward providing concrete and active assistance to citizens who – due to debt and poverty, digitalization and other problems with access to government regulation – have lost their way in the bureaucratic process. On such issues, the ombudsman’s reports have in recent years become harsher in their judgments, as was the case for his forerunner. The childcare benefits affair illustrated the ombudsman’s repeated judgment that policy implementation practices offer too few opportunities for citizens to call for the redress of injustices and mistakes; but also showed the institution’s inability to a make a difference. The affair also showed that too few citizens use the ombudsman function for complaints.
Citations:
De Nationale Ombudsman, Mijn onbegrijpelijke overheid. Verslag van de Nationale ombudsman over 2012.
Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2020-2021, 35 743, nr. 2, JAARVERSLAG VAN DE NATIONALE OMBUDSMAN, DE KINDEROMBUDSMAN EN DE VETERANENOMBUDSMAN OVER 2020
NRC, Ahaouray and Valk, 1 October 2021. Naar de drie toezichthouders wordt vaak niet geluisterd: ‘Het is teveel waan van de dag’
NRC, Valk, 11 May 2021. Nationale Ombudsman: ‘Laat Rutte maar een club oprichten die onze rapporten leest’
Where the government is concerned, it is important to note that the National Ombudsman’s decisions are not legally enforceable. The ombudsman publishes his or her conclusions in annual reports. The ombudsman’s tasks are shifting toward providing concrete and active assistance to citizens who – due to debt and poverty, digitalization and other problems with access to government regulation – have lost their way in the bureaucratic process. On such issues, the ombudsman’s reports have in recent years become harsher in their judgments, as was the case for his forerunner. The childcare benefits affair illustrated the ombudsman’s repeated judgment that policy implementation practices offer too few opportunities for citizens to call for the redress of injustices and mistakes; but also showed the institution’s inability to a make a difference. The affair also showed that too few citizens use the ombudsman function for complaints.
Citations:
De Nationale Ombudsman, Mijn onbegrijpelijke overheid. Verslag van de Nationale ombudsman over 2012.
Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2020-2021, 35 743, nr. 2, JAARVERSLAG VAN DE NATIONALE OMBUDSMAN, DE KINDEROMBUDSMAN EN DE VETERANENOMBUDSMAN OVER 2020
NRC, Ahaouray and Valk, 1 October 2021. Naar de drie toezichthouders wordt vaak niet geluisterd: ‘Het is teveel waan van de dag’
NRC, Valk, 11 May 2021. Nationale Ombudsman: ‘Laat Rutte maar een club oprichten die onze rapporten leest’
Is there an independent authority in place that effectively holds government offices accountable for handling issues of data protection and privacy?
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9
9
An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
8
7
6
7
6
An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is slightly limited.
5
4
3
4
3
A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are strongly limited.
2
1
1
There is no effective and independent data protection office.
The Dutch Data Protection Agency (Authoriteit Persoonsgegens, APG) succeeded the “College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens” (CBP) in 2016, and simultaneously saw its formal competencies somewhat enhanced by the right to fine public and private organizations in violation of Dutch and since mid-2018 European data protections laws (the General Data Protection Regulation, GDPR).
Effective data protection is practically impossible since 2016 for a number of reasons: many capable personnel have left the DPA, even though the number of staff has increased; the organization is underfinanced; hardly any consequential fines have been imposed; “naming and shaming” appears to work, but comprehensive oversight capacity is lacking; laws and regulations are frequently changing, and consequently monitoring and jurisprudence are constantly “in the making.” It looks like the DPA is evolving from a supervisory body to an organization that advises both public and private organizations, and individual citizens on privacy issues, and on how to deal with personal data in ways that (more or less) comply with ever changing regulations and interpretations. All in all, the DPA operates in self-contradictory ways (as both a “hard” inspectorate, and a “soft” advisory body that “names and shames,” and advises commercial and public data-users and data-providers) in a technologically turbulent environment. In 2019, the DPA found that most data leaks are caused through sloppiness in addressing documents and emails; that this occurs more in institutions of care than anywhere else; and that victims are usually individuals rather than entire categories of people. In 2019, the DPA received an additional €3.4 million in funding for enforcement of the General Decree for Data Protection (Algemene Verordening Gegevensbescherming, AVG) and EU privacy rules. During the coronavirus crisis, the APG appeared to play a more prominent role as an advisor on coronavirus-related privacy issues. Yet, it is calculated that only 0.15% of cases are investigated. The organization’s leader admits its inefficacy and asserts that it is underfinanced (€66 billion is needed instead of €45 billion at present), and still grossly understaffed (400 full-time employees are needed, rather than the organization’s current 180).
Citations:
VPNGids.nl, Onderzoek Autoriteit Persoonsgegegeven: Meeste datalekken vinden plaats vanwege fouten in adressering (vpngids.nl, accessed 4 November 2019)
Tweakers, 12 June 2019. Authorities Persoonsgegeven krijgt extra geld voor handhaving AVG. (tweeakters.net, accessed 4 November 2019)
Volkskrant, Verhagen, 16 July 2020. Hoe effectief is de corona app? En hoe zit het met de privacy.
NOS Nieuws, Damen and Bouma, 25 March 2021 De Privacywet wordt tamper gehandhaafd, is meer geld de oplossing?
Effective data protection is practically impossible since 2016 for a number of reasons: many capable personnel have left the DPA, even though the number of staff has increased; the organization is underfinanced; hardly any consequential fines have been imposed; “naming and shaming” appears to work, but comprehensive oversight capacity is lacking; laws and regulations are frequently changing, and consequently monitoring and jurisprudence are constantly “in the making.” It looks like the DPA is evolving from a supervisory body to an organization that advises both public and private organizations, and individual citizens on privacy issues, and on how to deal with personal data in ways that (more or less) comply with ever changing regulations and interpretations. All in all, the DPA operates in self-contradictory ways (as both a “hard” inspectorate, and a “soft” advisory body that “names and shames,” and advises commercial and public data-users and data-providers) in a technologically turbulent environment. In 2019, the DPA found that most data leaks are caused through sloppiness in addressing documents and emails; that this occurs more in institutions of care than anywhere else; and that victims are usually individuals rather than entire categories of people. In 2019, the DPA received an additional €3.4 million in funding for enforcement of the General Decree for Data Protection (Algemene Verordening Gegevensbescherming, AVG) and EU privacy rules. During the coronavirus crisis, the APG appeared to play a more prominent role as an advisor on coronavirus-related privacy issues. Yet, it is calculated that only 0.15% of cases are investigated. The organization’s leader admits its inefficacy and asserts that it is underfinanced (€66 billion is needed instead of €45 billion at present), and still grossly understaffed (400 full-time employees are needed, rather than the organization’s current 180).
Citations:
VPNGids.nl, Onderzoek Autoriteit Persoonsgegegeven: Meeste datalekken vinden plaats vanwege fouten in adressering (vpngids.nl, accessed 4 November 2019)
Tweakers, 12 June 2019. Authorities Persoonsgegeven krijgt extra geld voor handhaving AVG. (tweeakters.net, accessed 4 November 2019)
Volkskrant, Verhagen, 16 July 2020. Hoe effectief is de corona app? En hoe zit het met de privacy.
NOS Nieuws, Damen and Bouma, 25 March 2021 De Privacywet wordt tamper gehandhaafd, is meer geld de oplossing?