Executive Capacity
#28Key Findings
Following the revelation of recent management failures, the Netherlands falls into the lower-middle ranks (rank 28) in the area of executive capacity. Its score on this measure has declined by 0.8 points relative to its 2014 level.
The Prime Minister’s Office coordinates policy, but has limited capacity to evaluate proposals. Independent strategic-planning units and knowledge centers help guide long-term strategies. Proposals often stem from the government coalition agreements or EU policy coordination. Important decisions are often made in meetings between the prime minister, cabinet and coalition parties.
RIAs are broadly and effectively applied particularly with regard to environmental impact and administrative-burden reduction. The use of the “poldering” interest-group consultation model privileges some groups over others. Considerable resources have been spent on communication experts, with some arguing this has generated propaganda.
The previous government stepped down after the revelation of serious policy failures stemming from monitoring and coordination failures. Austerity policies have produced a significant number of implementation failures. Subnational governments lack sufficient funding for their assigned tasks. The political system is widely viewed as having wrongly prioritized efficiency over public value.
The Prime Minister’s Office coordinates policy, but has limited capacity to evaluate proposals. Independent strategic-planning units and knowledge centers help guide long-term strategies. Proposals often stem from the government coalition agreements or EU policy coordination. Important decisions are often made in meetings between the prime minister, cabinet and coalition parties.
RIAs are broadly and effectively applied particularly with regard to environmental impact and administrative-burden reduction. The use of the “poldering” interest-group consultation model privileges some groups over others. Considerable resources have been spent on communication experts, with some arguing this has generated propaganda.
The previous government stepped down after the revelation of serious policy failures stemming from monitoring and coordination failures. Austerity policies have produced a significant number of implementation failures. Subnational governments lack sufficient funding for their assigned tasks. The political system is widely viewed as having wrongly prioritized efficiency over public value.
Graph View
Graph View
How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?
10
9
9
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
8
7
6
7
6
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
5
4
3
4
3
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
2
1
1
In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
The Dutch national government is run at the cabinet level as an exercise in political risk management by a smart “fixer” (e.g., Prime Minister Rutte), who is well known for his aversion to strategic vision. The political inevitability of multiparty coalition governments with narrow parliamentary majorities almost dictates a monistic relationship between parliament and executive. Therefore, important decisions are taken during Monday morning meetings between the prime minister and his core cabinet and the leaders of (four) coalition parties. Sectoral ministers outside the core lend support in preparing decisions, but play a larger role in departmental implementation planning. In cases where political support is difficult and the problematic is societally and technically complex, the Rutte government used another typical Dutch coalition tactic: “poldering” through extensive societal consultation with numerous business and civil society associations (also see “Societal Consultation”) This “double compromise” nature of Dutch politics is hardly conducive to policymaking through well-thought-out long-term strategy.
As a kind of countervailing factor, the Dutch government has four strategic-planning units: the Scientific Council for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regereingsbeleid, WRR), the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy (Centraal Plan Bureau, CPB), the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, SCP) and the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Bureau (Planbureau voor de Leefbaarheid, PBL). All of these are formally part of a ministry, but their statutes guarantee them independent advisory functions. Yet, their close ties to government departments means they are frequently used to model the short- and mid-term effects of proposed policy proposals. The CPB and PBL in particular are “obligatory passage points” in the financial-economic feasibility testing that has dominated neoliberal austerity strategies for over a decade. Even parliament imposed upon itself the rule that every new policy proposal had to fit within given financial constraints. This resulted, on one hand, in the huge financial reserves that allowed the government to provide generous support to firms during the coronavirus pandemic; on the other hand, for a long time, it slowed down the shift away from neoliberalism and effectively choked serious policy initiatives and investment in areas such as education and the greening of the economy.
It was this political climate that in 2019-2021 led to political demonstrations by farmers, construction workers, teachers, students and healthcare workers on a scale not seen for decades. Another long-term negative impact of the neoliberal political mood has been knowledge “leakage,” if not destruction, in the departmental structure and in the civil service. In the departmental structure, the political will to reduce the cabinet to as few members as possible resulted in the abolition of the Department for Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment – policy domains where huge problems popped up during Rutte III. The recruitment and training of civil servants focused much more on procedural matters, political communication skills and damage control rather than innovative thinking in terms of the environment, climate change, the sustainability transition strategy, or the skills needed for a rapidly changing economy and society. Also hampering matters was the fact that the system for recruiting top-level civil servants is not linked to strategic government goals, but rather to implementing a carousel of interorganizational mobility with fixed term limits (the average departmental top-level civil servant occupies his/her position for only about four years before moving on to another position, mostly in another department.)
Long-term steering capacity has traditionally been strong in the areas of water management and the management of care – that is, in ensuring the maximum opportunity for good care for every eligible citizen, for an acceptable cost. Planning units jointly advocated a coordinated long-term exit strategy for the coronavirus crisis and the development of pandemic preparedness for a next public health crisis; and they have released a flurry of new policy proposals, although their data and policy recommendations, in the age of science skepticism, have been attacked by the political parties that normally rely on them for political debate and deliberation. These proposals have addressed the areas of pensions, population growth, most aspects of climate change (the Urgenda verdict, the new nitrogen-emissions rule, biodiversity in the Dutch natural environment), the future of Dutch agriculture, traffic infrastructure and mobility, (social) housing, the future of care as a social issue, the role of money and financial regulation, and labor market regulatory reforms, digitalization and the use of algorithms by government, and for the first time in many years, long-term planning on defense issues.
Many of the issues mentioned in these long-term strategic explorations and scenarios appear to have found their way into the new coalition agreement of December 2021. Yet the agreement reads more like a wish-list expressing the need to start making serious policies on long overdue problems than a coherent strategy for the future. Moreover, responding to the political mood and desire to conduct government in a more dualist way, and to have more steering flexibility and space for political debate and negotiations with opposition parties, the agreement for the first time in recent history drops the routine practice of thorough financial feasibility testing of coalition agreement proposals.
Citations:
Joop van den Berg, Schrammen maar geen wonden Premier Mark Rutte en de grenzen van de individualisering, in Montesqieu Instituut, 2021. ‘Niet stoffig, toch?’ Terugblik op het kabinet Rutte III. Den Haag, 13-27
R. Hoppe, 2014. Patterns of science/policy interaction in The Netherlands, in P. Scholten & F. van Nispen, Policy Analysis in the Netherlands, Policy Press, Bristol (ISBN 9781447313335)
CPB, CBS, SCP, PBL, Verkenning en Monitor Brede Welvaart (https://www.cpb.nl/sites/default/files/omnidownload/PBL-CPB-SCP-Verkenning-Brede-Welvaart-2018.pdf)
WRR, News, WRR and KNAW: government must anticipate different coronavirus scenarios 16-11-2021
Haagse Beek, Weggeman en Spaan, 15 June 2021. Hoe de carrousel van de ABD zorgt voor kennisvernietiging bij de overheid
Universiteit Utrecht, Nieuws, 15 January 2021. Algemene Bestuursdienst (ABD) moet zichtbaarder en strategischer worden
DRIFT en NSOB, Bode et al., October 22, 2020. Sturing in transities. Een raamwerk voor strategiebepaling.
WRR rapport no. 105. 11 November 2021. Opgave AI. De nieuwe systeemtechnologie.
Clingendaal, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, DECEMBER 2020. Hoe moet de Nederlandse defensie er in de toekomst uitzien? Het perpetuum mobile van uitstel.
As a kind of countervailing factor, the Dutch government has four strategic-planning units: the Scientific Council for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regereingsbeleid, WRR), the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy (Centraal Plan Bureau, CPB), the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, SCP) and the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Bureau (Planbureau voor de Leefbaarheid, PBL). All of these are formally part of a ministry, but their statutes guarantee them independent advisory functions. Yet, their close ties to government departments means they are frequently used to model the short- and mid-term effects of proposed policy proposals. The CPB and PBL in particular are “obligatory passage points” in the financial-economic feasibility testing that has dominated neoliberal austerity strategies for over a decade. Even parliament imposed upon itself the rule that every new policy proposal had to fit within given financial constraints. This resulted, on one hand, in the huge financial reserves that allowed the government to provide generous support to firms during the coronavirus pandemic; on the other hand, for a long time, it slowed down the shift away from neoliberalism and effectively choked serious policy initiatives and investment in areas such as education and the greening of the economy.
It was this political climate that in 2019-2021 led to political demonstrations by farmers, construction workers, teachers, students and healthcare workers on a scale not seen for decades. Another long-term negative impact of the neoliberal political mood has been knowledge “leakage,” if not destruction, in the departmental structure and in the civil service. In the departmental structure, the political will to reduce the cabinet to as few members as possible resulted in the abolition of the Department for Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment – policy domains where huge problems popped up during Rutte III. The recruitment and training of civil servants focused much more on procedural matters, political communication skills and damage control rather than innovative thinking in terms of the environment, climate change, the sustainability transition strategy, or the skills needed for a rapidly changing economy and society. Also hampering matters was the fact that the system for recruiting top-level civil servants is not linked to strategic government goals, but rather to implementing a carousel of interorganizational mobility with fixed term limits (the average departmental top-level civil servant occupies his/her position for only about four years before moving on to another position, mostly in another department.)
Long-term steering capacity has traditionally been strong in the areas of water management and the management of care – that is, in ensuring the maximum opportunity for good care for every eligible citizen, for an acceptable cost. Planning units jointly advocated a coordinated long-term exit strategy for the coronavirus crisis and the development of pandemic preparedness for a next public health crisis; and they have released a flurry of new policy proposals, although their data and policy recommendations, in the age of science skepticism, have been attacked by the political parties that normally rely on them for political debate and deliberation. These proposals have addressed the areas of pensions, population growth, most aspects of climate change (the Urgenda verdict, the new nitrogen-emissions rule, biodiversity in the Dutch natural environment), the future of Dutch agriculture, traffic infrastructure and mobility, (social) housing, the future of care as a social issue, the role of money and financial regulation, and labor market regulatory reforms, digitalization and the use of algorithms by government, and for the first time in many years, long-term planning on defense issues.
Many of the issues mentioned in these long-term strategic explorations and scenarios appear to have found their way into the new coalition agreement of December 2021. Yet the agreement reads more like a wish-list expressing the need to start making serious policies on long overdue problems than a coherent strategy for the future. Moreover, responding to the political mood and desire to conduct government in a more dualist way, and to have more steering flexibility and space for political debate and negotiations with opposition parties, the agreement for the first time in recent history drops the routine practice of thorough financial feasibility testing of coalition agreement proposals.
Citations:
Joop van den Berg, Schrammen maar geen wonden Premier Mark Rutte en de grenzen van de individualisering, in Montesqieu Instituut, 2021. ‘Niet stoffig, toch?’ Terugblik op het kabinet Rutte III. Den Haag, 13-27
R. Hoppe, 2014. Patterns of science/policy interaction in The Netherlands, in P. Scholten & F. van Nispen, Policy Analysis in the Netherlands, Policy Press, Bristol (ISBN 9781447313335)
CPB, CBS, SCP, PBL, Verkenning en Monitor Brede Welvaart (https://www.cpb.nl/sites/default/files/omnidownload/PBL-CPB-SCP-Verkenning-Brede-Welvaart-2018.pdf)
WRR, News, WRR and KNAW: government must anticipate different coronavirus scenarios 16-11-2021
Haagse Beek, Weggeman en Spaan, 15 June 2021. Hoe de carrousel van de ABD zorgt voor kennisvernietiging bij de overheid
Universiteit Utrecht, Nieuws, 15 January 2021. Algemene Bestuursdienst (ABD) moet zichtbaarder en strategischer worden
DRIFT en NSOB, Bode et al., October 22, 2020. Sturing in transities. Een raamwerk voor strategiebepaling.
WRR rapport no. 105. 11 November 2021. Opgave AI. De nieuwe systeemtechnologie.
Clingendaal, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, DECEMBER 2020. Hoe moet de Nederlandse defensie er in de toekomst uitzien? Het perpetuum mobile van uitstel.
Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?
10
9
9
In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
8
7
6
7
6
For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
2
1
1
The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
The government frequently employs ad hoc commissions of scientific experts on technical topics like water management, harbor and airport expansion, gas drilling on Wadden Sea islands and pollution studies. The function of scientific advisory services in departments has been changed through the establishment of “knowledge chambers” and, following U.S. and UK practice, the appointment of chief scientific officers or chief scientists as advisory experts. Depending on the nature of the policy issues, these experts may flexibly mobilize the required scientific bodies and scientists instead of relying on fixed advisory councils with fixed memberships. This also allows room for political flexibility – that is, by hiring or contracting commercial, private consultancies to provide politically needed and desirable research and advice.
Although the use of scientific expertise is quite high, its actual influence on policymaking cannot be precisely ascertained, as scholarly advice is intended to be instrumental and therefore is less welcome in the early phases of policymaking. During the pandemic, the government has relied heavily on expert advice from the Outbreak Management Team. It is certainly not transparent to the wider public, although the public has become more aware of – and alarmed – about the importance of expert advice during the management of the coronavirus pandemic. Since 2011, the focus of advice has been redirected from relatively “strategic and long-term” issues to “technical, instrumental and mid-/short-term” matters.
As might be expected in times of political polarization and science skepticism, even members of parliament have expressed doubts about the integrity of the knowledge institutes and the validity of their information. The research unit of the Ministry of Justice and Safety (Wetenschappelijk Onderzoeks – en Documentatie Centrum, WODC) has been subject to political meddling, and during the debates and deliberations on the climate agreement, on flight routes to and from the newly built but not yet used Lelystad Airport, and especially on estimating the agriculture sector’s nitrogen emissions, the Environmental Planning Agency’s measurement and modeling practices came under scrutiny. Generally, politicians and the wider public have become more aware that expert advice frequently relies on plausible assumptions-based modeling rather than on evidence-based information.
Nevertheless, the cabinet still appears to rely heavily on its knowledge institutes and departmental knowledge centers for its long-term strategies and decision-making. The scrutiny by political parties, members of parliament, civil society associations and journalists has generally been beneficial with regard to the transparency of information collection and the policy support provided by the government’s knowledge institutes.
Citations:
R. Hoppe, 2014. Patterns of science/policy interaction in The Netherlands, in P. Scholten & F. van Nispen, Policy Analysis in the Netherlands, Policy Press, Bristol (ISBN 9781447313335)
RTL Nieuws, Commissie: huidig rekensysteem stikstof niet geschikt voor vergunningen
15 juni 2020
Volkskrant, Yvonne Hofs. 19 juli 2020. Boeren gaan protesteren bij ‘selectief’ rekenend RIVM: soepel voor de snelweg en streng voor het vee
P. Omtzigt, 2021. Een nieuw social contract, Deel III. Hoe modellen Nederland bepalen, Amsterdam: Prometheus
Boin, A. et al., 2020. Een analyse van de nationale crisiresponse. Leiden: The Crisis University Press
R. Hoppe, 2014. Patterns of science/policy interaction in The Netherlands, in P. Scholten & F. van Nispen, Policy Analysis in the Netherlands, Policy Press, Bristol (ISBN 9781447313335)
Although the use of scientific expertise is quite high, its actual influence on policymaking cannot be precisely ascertained, as scholarly advice is intended to be instrumental and therefore is less welcome in the early phases of policymaking. During the pandemic, the government has relied heavily on expert advice from the Outbreak Management Team. It is certainly not transparent to the wider public, although the public has become more aware of – and alarmed – about the importance of expert advice during the management of the coronavirus pandemic. Since 2011, the focus of advice has been redirected from relatively “strategic and long-term” issues to “technical, instrumental and mid-/short-term” matters.
As might be expected in times of political polarization and science skepticism, even members of parliament have expressed doubts about the integrity of the knowledge institutes and the validity of their information. The research unit of the Ministry of Justice and Safety (Wetenschappelijk Onderzoeks – en Documentatie Centrum, WODC) has been subject to political meddling, and during the debates and deliberations on the climate agreement, on flight routes to and from the newly built but not yet used Lelystad Airport, and especially on estimating the agriculture sector’s nitrogen emissions, the Environmental Planning Agency’s measurement and modeling practices came under scrutiny. Generally, politicians and the wider public have become more aware that expert advice frequently relies on plausible assumptions-based modeling rather than on evidence-based information.
Nevertheless, the cabinet still appears to rely heavily on its knowledge institutes and departmental knowledge centers for its long-term strategies and decision-making. The scrutiny by political parties, members of parliament, civil society associations and journalists has generally been beneficial with regard to the transparency of information collection and the policy support provided by the government’s knowledge institutes.
Citations:
R. Hoppe, 2014. Patterns of science/policy interaction in The Netherlands, in P. Scholten & F. van Nispen, Policy Analysis in the Netherlands, Policy Press, Bristol (ISBN 9781447313335)
RTL Nieuws, Commissie: huidig rekensysteem stikstof niet geschikt voor vergunningen
15 juni 2020
Volkskrant, Yvonne Hofs. 19 juli 2020. Boeren gaan protesteren bij ‘selectief’ rekenend RIVM: soepel voor de snelweg en streng voor het vee
P. Omtzigt, 2021. Een nieuw social contract, Deel III. Hoe modellen Nederland bepalen, Amsterdam: Prometheus
Boin, A. et al., 2020. Een analyse van de nationale crisiresponse. Leiden: The Crisis University Press
R. Hoppe, 2014. Patterns of science/policy interaction in The Netherlands, in P. Scholten & F. van Nispen, Policy Analysis in the Netherlands, Policy Press, Bristol (ISBN 9781447313335)
Graph View
Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?
10
9
9
The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
5
4
3
4
3
The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
2
1
1
The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
The Dutch prime minister is formally in charge of coordinating government policy as a whole, and has a concomitant range of powers, which include deciding on the composition of the Council of Ministers’ agenda and formulating its conclusions and decisions; chairing Council of Ministers meetings, committees (onderraad) and (in most cases) ministerial committees; adjudicating interdepartmental conflicts; serving as the primary press spokesperson and first speaker in the States General; and speaking in international forums and arenas (e.g., European Union and the United Nations) on behalf of the Council of Ministers and the Dutch government as a whole. This figure is also responsible for all affairs concerning the Royal House.
The prime minister’s own Ministry of General Affairs office has 14 advising councilors (raadadviseurs, with junior assistants) at its disposal. The advising councilors are top-level civil servants, not political appointees; they are the secretaries of the cabinet subcouncils and committees. In addition, the prime minister has a special relationship with the Scientific Council of Government Policy. Sometimes, deputy directors of the planning agencies play the role of secretaries for interdepartmental “front gates.” To conclude, the Prime Minister’s Office and the prime minister himself have a rather limited capacity to evaluate the policy content of line-ministry proposals unless they openly clash with the government platform (regeer-akkoord). The current prime minister’s style of running his cabinet his sectoral ministers with considerable scope for action.
Of course, personal skills and experience make a difference, and Prime Minister Rutte has a reputation for clever informal leadership and conflict management, and (until recently) a Houdini-like skill with regard to extricating himself from political affairs and scandals. He is also known for his aversion to visionary leadership, expressed in a quip ascribed to him: “If you have a vision, consult your eye doctor.” In late 2020 and early 2021, Prime Minister Rutte’s political career was endangered by his own political shrewdness, which included a tendency to provide parliament with meager and only piecemeal information with regard to the cabinet’s decision-making practices (the so-called Rutte-doctrine), along with a routine tactic of claiming selective memory (“Sorry, but I have no active memory of X,Y,Z.”). This misfired when he was caught lying to parliament. He only survived because, despite this, he was a winner in the March 2021 elections, because he could exploit his highly visible leadership role in the efforts to manage the coronavirus crisis. His party (VVD) rallied around him, and in a record-long process of cabinet formation, he regained sufficient levels of trust from the other party leaders involved (CU and especially D66) by giving in to their demands and promising to revise his governing and leadership style.
Citations:
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/regering/bewindspersonen/jan-peter-balkenende/taken
http://www.nationaalarchief.nl/selectielijsten/BSD_Coordinatie_algemeen_regering sbeleid_stcrnt_2009_63.pdf
M. Rutte, De minister-president: een aanbouw aan het huis van Thorbecke, Lecture by the Prime Minister, 12 October 2016 (rijksoverheid.nl, consulted 8 November 2016)
M. van Weezel and T. Broer, Max en Rhijs over de premier: het geheim van politiek trapezewerker en ‘nat zeepje’ Mark Rutte (Vrij Nederland, vn.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)
Wikipedia, Rutte-doctrine
Nu.nl., April 1, 2021. Rutte opperde andere functie voor CDA-kamerlid Omtzigt; ‘Minister maken’.
P. de Koning, 2020. Mark Rutte, Uitgevrij Brooklyn
The prime minister’s own Ministry of General Affairs office has 14 advising councilors (raadadviseurs, with junior assistants) at its disposal. The advising councilors are top-level civil servants, not political appointees; they are the secretaries of the cabinet subcouncils and committees. In addition, the prime minister has a special relationship with the Scientific Council of Government Policy. Sometimes, deputy directors of the planning agencies play the role of secretaries for interdepartmental “front gates.” To conclude, the Prime Minister’s Office and the prime minister himself have a rather limited capacity to evaluate the policy content of line-ministry proposals unless they openly clash with the government platform (regeer-akkoord). The current prime minister’s style of running his cabinet his sectoral ministers with considerable scope for action.
Of course, personal skills and experience make a difference, and Prime Minister Rutte has a reputation for clever informal leadership and conflict management, and (until recently) a Houdini-like skill with regard to extricating himself from political affairs and scandals. He is also known for his aversion to visionary leadership, expressed in a quip ascribed to him: “If you have a vision, consult your eye doctor.” In late 2020 and early 2021, Prime Minister Rutte’s political career was endangered by his own political shrewdness, which included a tendency to provide parliament with meager and only piecemeal information with regard to the cabinet’s decision-making practices (the so-called Rutte-doctrine), along with a routine tactic of claiming selective memory (“Sorry, but I have no active memory of X,Y,Z.”). This misfired when he was caught lying to parliament. He only survived because, despite this, he was a winner in the March 2021 elections, because he could exploit his highly visible leadership role in the efforts to manage the coronavirus crisis. His party (VVD) rallied around him, and in a record-long process of cabinet formation, he regained sufficient levels of trust from the other party leaders involved (CU and especially D66) by giving in to their demands and promising to revise his governing and leadership style.
Citations:
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/regering/bewindspersonen/jan-peter-balkenende/taken
http://www.nationaalarchief.nl/selectielijsten/BSD_Coordinatie_algemeen_regering sbeleid_stcrnt_2009_63.pdf
M. Rutte, De minister-president: een aanbouw aan het huis van Thorbecke, Lecture by the Prime Minister, 12 October 2016 (rijksoverheid.nl, consulted 8 November 2016)
M. van Weezel and T. Broer, Max en Rhijs over de premier: het geheim van politiek trapezewerker en ‘nat zeepje’ Mark Rutte (Vrij Nederland, vn.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)
Wikipedia, Rutte-doctrine
Nu.nl., April 1, 2021. Rutte opperde andere functie voor CDA-kamerlid Omtzigt; ‘Minister maken’.
P. de Koning, 2020. Mark Rutte, Uitgevrij Brooklyn
To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?
10
9
9
There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
5
4
3
4
3
Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
2
1
1
Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
Since about 2010, departmental reform in the Netherlands sought to transform the notion of line ministries itself, as the limited number of cores or building blocks in the organization of the bureaucracy. The key idea was that task allocation and coordination were no longer to be dependent on (ever-changing) policy directions, leading to repeated disappointments when abolishing certain departments, initiating a new department, or the amalgamation of several departments every time new government were installed after elections. Instead, the idea was to define organizational units around their core managerial functions (personnel, information, organization, finances, communication, facilitation and building); these would in turn flexibly support ever-changing policy formulation and implementation tasks with less organizational inertia and resistance, and lower transfer costs.
This so-called liquid governance would position ministers as managers of organizational complexes, supporting relatively easy-to-change core policy programs. Paradoxically, this resulted in ever more organizational reshuffling within a government that was increasingly seen as apolitical and managerial in nature. For example, the core Economic Affairs department was expanded so as to attend also to agricultural policies when the separate Department of Agriculture was abolished; later, the Department of Agriculture was resurrected, but climate change policy was added to a department now named Economic Affairs and Climate Change. Under the Rutte IV government there will be, next to the “old” Economic Affairs, a new Department of Climate and Energy. Policing, formerly part of Homeland Affairs, was transferred to a Justice department, now rebaptized as Justice and Safety. The Rutte IV government has made many such political adaptations and reshuffles, with 20 full ministers and nine deputy ministers attending to the major political crises of the moment. These include mining (mainly to attend to earthquake damages in the former gas-exploiting areas of the province of Groningen; fiscal affairs (Fiscaliteit) and allowances and customs (Toeslagen en Douane, which is under the Finance Department), poverty policy, participation and pensions, which is distinct from social affairs and employment, and nature and nitrogen. The make-up of the Rutte IV government represents a shift from the idea that government should have as few ministers as possible. There is a lesson to be learned from the fact that a large number of (deputy) ministers in the Rutte III government left their jobs, citing family, burnout or a new job as the motivation.
Generally, departmental legislative or white-paper initiatives are rooted in the government policy agreement, EU policy coordination and subsequent Council of Ministers decisions to allocate drafting to one or two particular ministries. In the case of complex problems, draft legislation may involve considerable jockeying for position among the various line ministries. The prime minister is always involved in the kick-off of major new policy initiatives and sometimes in the wording of the assignment/terms of reference itself. After that, however, it may take between six months and four years before the issue reaches the decision-making stage in ministerial and Council of Ministers committees, and again comes under the formal review of the prime minister. Meanwhile, the prime minister is obliged to rely on informal coordination with his fellow ministers. It is difficult to draw conclusions regarding the effectiveness of informal coordination, information-sharing procedures and other such practices. High-level civil servants close to the prime minister have complained about the increasing use of spin doctors and political assistants in such processes. But the prime minister has a good reputation with regard to formal leadership and conflict management.
Citations:
Your citations
R.B. Andeweg and G.A. Irwin ( 2014), Governance and politics of the Netherlands. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
NSOB, Van der Steen and van Twist, 2010. Veranderende vernieuwing: op weg naar vloeibaar bestuur. Een beschouwing over 60 jaar vernieuwing van de rijksdienst.
NSOB, Termeer et al., 2021. Het terugkerend verlangen naar regie. Over de vraag hoe belangen van landbouw, natuur en vitaal platteland stevig te behartigen zijn in vele spelen met vele andere legitieme belangen.
RTL Nieuws, 17 November 2021. Clash ministeries Hoekstra en Wiebes over plan Europees noodfonds
Trouw, Van Egmond en Wijffels, 11 September 2021. Industrieterrein Nederland heeft een ministerie van ecologische zaken nodig
De Zeeuw en Verdaas, n.d., Na Wild West en Science Fiction op zoek naar de juiste film. Naar een nieuw struringsconcept voot de inrichting van Nederland
NRC-H, Dupuy and Aharouay, December 17, 2021. Rutte na eerste formatieoverleg: een grotere ploeg, verdeling posten per partij is rond; and Nog twee nieuwe posten: ministers voor Natuur en Stikstof en Armoedebeleid, Participatie en Pensioenen
This so-called liquid governance would position ministers as managers of organizational complexes, supporting relatively easy-to-change core policy programs. Paradoxically, this resulted in ever more organizational reshuffling within a government that was increasingly seen as apolitical and managerial in nature. For example, the core Economic Affairs department was expanded so as to attend also to agricultural policies when the separate Department of Agriculture was abolished; later, the Department of Agriculture was resurrected, but climate change policy was added to a department now named Economic Affairs and Climate Change. Under the Rutte IV government there will be, next to the “old” Economic Affairs, a new Department of Climate and Energy. Policing, formerly part of Homeland Affairs, was transferred to a Justice department, now rebaptized as Justice and Safety. The Rutte IV government has made many such political adaptations and reshuffles, with 20 full ministers and nine deputy ministers attending to the major political crises of the moment. These include mining (mainly to attend to earthquake damages in the former gas-exploiting areas of the province of Groningen; fiscal affairs (Fiscaliteit) and allowances and customs (Toeslagen en Douane, which is under the Finance Department), poverty policy, participation and pensions, which is distinct from social affairs and employment, and nature and nitrogen. The make-up of the Rutte IV government represents a shift from the idea that government should have as few ministers as possible. There is a lesson to be learned from the fact that a large number of (deputy) ministers in the Rutte III government left their jobs, citing family, burnout or a new job as the motivation.
Generally, departmental legislative or white-paper initiatives are rooted in the government policy agreement, EU policy coordination and subsequent Council of Ministers decisions to allocate drafting to one or two particular ministries. In the case of complex problems, draft legislation may involve considerable jockeying for position among the various line ministries. The prime minister is always involved in the kick-off of major new policy initiatives and sometimes in the wording of the assignment/terms of reference itself. After that, however, it may take between six months and four years before the issue reaches the decision-making stage in ministerial and Council of Ministers committees, and again comes under the formal review of the prime minister. Meanwhile, the prime minister is obliged to rely on informal coordination with his fellow ministers. It is difficult to draw conclusions regarding the effectiveness of informal coordination, information-sharing procedures and other such practices. High-level civil servants close to the prime minister have complained about the increasing use of spin doctors and political assistants in such processes. But the prime minister has a good reputation with regard to formal leadership and conflict management.
Citations:
Your citations
R.B. Andeweg and G.A. Irwin ( 2014), Governance and politics of the Netherlands. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
NSOB, Van der Steen and van Twist, 2010. Veranderende vernieuwing: op weg naar vloeibaar bestuur. Een beschouwing over 60 jaar vernieuwing van de rijksdienst.
NSOB, Termeer et al., 2021. Het terugkerend verlangen naar regie. Over de vraag hoe belangen van landbouw, natuur en vitaal platteland stevig te behartigen zijn in vele spelen met vele andere legitieme belangen.
RTL Nieuws, 17 November 2021. Clash ministeries Hoekstra en Wiebes over plan Europees noodfonds
Trouw, Van Egmond en Wijffels, 11 September 2021. Industrieterrein Nederland heeft een ministerie van ecologische zaken nodig
De Zeeuw en Verdaas, n.d., Na Wild West en Science Fiction op zoek naar de juiste film. Naar een nieuw struringsconcept voot de inrichting van Nederland
NRC-H, Dupuy and Aharouay, December 17, 2021. Rutte na eerste formatieoverleg: een grotere ploeg, verdeling posten per partij is rond; and Nog twee nieuwe posten: ministers voor Natuur en Stikstof en Armoedebeleid, Participatie en Pensioenen
How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?
10
9
9
The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
8
7
6
7
6
Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
5
4
3
4
3
There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
2
1
1
There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
Council of Ministers committees (onderraad) involve a separate meeting chaired by the prime minister for the ministers involved. Each committee has a coordinating minister responsible for relevant input and documents. Discussion and negotiations focus on issues not resolved through prior administrative coordination and consultation. If the committee fails to reach a decision, the matter is pushed up to the Council of Ministers.
Since the Balkenende IV Council of Ministers there have been six standing Council of Ministers committees: international and European affairs; economics, knowledge and innovation; social coherence; safety and legal order; and administration, government and public services. Given the elaborate process of consultations and negotiations, few issues are likely to have escaped attention and discussion before reaching the Council of Ministers.
However, since the Rutte I and II government, cabinets have consisted of two or more political parties of contrary and/or very divergent ideological character in the Second Chamber (the conservative-liberal VVD and the PvdA or Labor Party, in the case of Rutte II; VVD, CDA, CU and D66 in Rutte III). Political pragmatism has tended to transform “review and coordination” to, in the Dutch political jargon, “smart positive exchange,” meaning that each party agrees tacitly or explicitly not to veto the other’s bills. This tendency has contributed to the public image of a “managerial” governing style, and may have had negative consequences for the quality of policymaking, as minority views in the cabinet have effectively won parliamentary majorities if they were feasible from a budgetary perspective, without first undergoing rigorous policy and legal analyses. In the second half of the Rutte III cabinet, much to the dismay of VVD and D66, government lost majority support in the Senate and, thus, had to garner ad hoc political support for its policy initiatives through elaborate negotiations with political parties that were not part of the governing coalition. Introducing a wider range of perspectives and decision criteria though, may have increased the quality of policymaking and the democratic nature of the process, given that not only ministerial committees but also political parties were involved.
Citations:
Trouw, Lagas. 14 February 2013. Heerlijk helder ruilen lukt VVD en PvdA niet.
Nu.nl., November 2, 2017. Rutte bereikt compromis en sluit bezuiniging wijkverpleegkundige uit.
Trouw, Kieskamp, 19 July 2020. Ruttes lelijke akkefietje met de Eerste Kamer.
De Correspondent, Chavannes, 27 November 2020. De overheid werd een bedrijf dat mensen onverdiend wantrouwt. Alleen Kamer en kabinet kunnen die denkfout herstellen.
Since the Balkenende IV Council of Ministers there have been six standing Council of Ministers committees: international and European affairs; economics, knowledge and innovation; social coherence; safety and legal order; and administration, government and public services. Given the elaborate process of consultations and negotiations, few issues are likely to have escaped attention and discussion before reaching the Council of Ministers.
However, since the Rutte I and II government, cabinets have consisted of two or more political parties of contrary and/or very divergent ideological character in the Second Chamber (the conservative-liberal VVD and the PvdA or Labor Party, in the case of Rutte II; VVD, CDA, CU and D66 in Rutte III). Political pragmatism has tended to transform “review and coordination” to, in the Dutch political jargon, “smart positive exchange,” meaning that each party agrees tacitly or explicitly not to veto the other’s bills. This tendency has contributed to the public image of a “managerial” governing style, and may have had negative consequences for the quality of policymaking, as minority views in the cabinet have effectively won parliamentary majorities if they were feasible from a budgetary perspective, without first undergoing rigorous policy and legal analyses. In the second half of the Rutte III cabinet, much to the dismay of VVD and D66, government lost majority support in the Senate and, thus, had to garner ad hoc political support for its policy initiatives through elaborate negotiations with political parties that were not part of the governing coalition. Introducing a wider range of perspectives and decision criteria though, may have increased the quality of policymaking and the democratic nature of the process, given that not only ministerial committees but also political parties were involved.
Citations:
Trouw, Lagas. 14 February 2013. Heerlijk helder ruilen lukt VVD en PvdA niet.
Nu.nl., November 2, 2017. Rutte bereikt compromis en sluit bezuiniging wijkverpleegkundige uit.
Trouw, Kieskamp, 19 July 2020. Ruttes lelijke akkefietje met de Eerste Kamer.
De Correspondent, Chavannes, 27 November 2020. De overheid werd een bedrijf dat mensen onverdiend wantrouwt. Alleen Kamer en kabinet kunnen die denkfout herstellen.
How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?
10
9
9
Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
8
7
6
7
6
Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
5
4
3
4
3
There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
2
1
1
There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
Since the 2006 elections, politicians have demanded a reduction in the number of civil servants. This has resulted in a loss of substantive expertise, with civil servants essentially becoming process managers. For example, during the beginning of the pandemic and through a good deal of the later events, the Ministry of Public Health had no medical experts among its top-level civil servants. Moreover, it has undermined the traditional relations of loyalty and trust between (deputy) ministers and top-level officers. The former have broken the monopoly formerly held by senior staff on the provision of policy-relevant information and advice by turning increasingly to outside expertise such as consultants and lobbyists. Top-level officers have responded with risk-averse and defensive behavior exemplified by professionally driven organizational communication and process management. They have embraced some Dutch variation of New Public Management (NPM) thinking and practices. One of the results is that in the 2019 International Civil Service Effectiveness Index (InCiSE), the Netherlands received a below-average score in the area of policymaking.
The upshot is that ministerial compartmentalization in the preparation of Council of Ministers meetings has increased. Another, recently severely criticized NPM-related impact has been the sharp organizational boundary between policy formulation and implementation in independent administrative organizations (Zelfstandige Bestuurs Organen, ZBO) like the Social Security Bank (Sociale VerzekeringsBank, SVB) for pensions and children’s allowances; the Implementation Institute for Employee Benefits (Uitvoeringsinstituut WerknemersVerzekeringen, UWV) for a raft of different employee benefits; and even the tax authorities, which no longer just collect taxes but also manage a gamut of tax benefits/incentives for thousands of eligible families, such as the now scandal-ridden child assistance benefits. The consequence has been that policy is off-loaded to implementation institutions without thorough feasibility testing, let alone prior assessment of impacts on citizens. The neoliberal mood also meant that the monitoring and oversight bodies, the inspectorates, were overburdened and understaffed.
Citations:
Your citations
R.B. Andeweg and G.A. Irwin ( 2014), Governance and politics of the Netherlands. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
NRC.next, 30 June 2021. VWS volgt altijd de Gezondheidsraad – bij gebrek aan kennis
H. Tjeenk Willink, Een nieuw idee van de staat, Socialisme & Democratie, 11/12, 2012, pp. 70-78
Vereniging voor Bestuurskunde, van den Berg, August 31, 2017. De ongemakkelijke waarheid van Tjeenk Willink.
De Correspondent, Den Haag bestuurt het land alsof het een bedrijf is. En democratie heeft het nakijken, 29 June 2018
International Civil Service Effectiveness Index (InCiSE), 2019, p. 54
The upshot is that ministerial compartmentalization in the preparation of Council of Ministers meetings has increased. Another, recently severely criticized NPM-related impact has been the sharp organizational boundary between policy formulation and implementation in independent administrative organizations (Zelfstandige Bestuurs Organen, ZBO) like the Social Security Bank (Sociale VerzekeringsBank, SVB) for pensions and children’s allowances; the Implementation Institute for Employee Benefits (Uitvoeringsinstituut WerknemersVerzekeringen, UWV) for a raft of different employee benefits; and even the tax authorities, which no longer just collect taxes but also manage a gamut of tax benefits/incentives for thousands of eligible families, such as the now scandal-ridden child assistance benefits. The consequence has been that policy is off-loaded to implementation institutions without thorough feasibility testing, let alone prior assessment of impacts on citizens. The neoliberal mood also meant that the monitoring and oversight bodies, the inspectorates, were overburdened and understaffed.
Citations:
Your citations
R.B. Andeweg and G.A. Irwin ( 2014), Governance and politics of the Netherlands. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
NRC.next, 30 June 2021. VWS volgt altijd de Gezondheidsraad – bij gebrek aan kennis
H. Tjeenk Willink, Een nieuw idee van de staat, Socialisme & Democratie, 11/12, 2012, pp. 70-78
Vereniging voor Bestuurskunde, van den Berg, August 31, 2017. De ongemakkelijke waarheid van Tjeenk Willink.
De Correspondent, Den Haag bestuurt het land alsof het een bedrijf is. En democratie heeft het nakijken, 29 June 2018
International Civil Service Effectiveness Index (InCiSE), 2019, p. 54
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
10
9
9
Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
8
7
6
7
6
In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
2
1
1
Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Very little is actually known about informal coordination at the (sub-)Council of Ministers level regarding policymaking and decision-making. The best-known informal procedure used to be the “Torentjesoverleg,” in which the prime minister and a core members of the Council of Ministers consulted with the leaders of the political parties supporting the coalition in the Prime Minister’s Office (“Het Torentje,” meaning the small tower) or elsewhere, usually at the beginning of the week. Although sometimes considered objectionable – as it appears to contradict the ideal of dualism between the executive and the legislative – coalition governments cannot survive without this kind of high-level political coordination between the government and the States General. Given shaky parliamentary support such informal coordination is no longer limited to political parties providing support to the governing coalition.
Under present conditions, in which ministers and civil servants are subject to increasing parliamentary and media scrutiny, and in which gaps in trust and loyalty between the political leadership and the bureaucracy staff are growing, informal coordination and the personal chemistry among civil servants are what keeps things running. Regarding interministerial coordination, informal contacts between the senior staff (raadadviseurs) in the prime minister’s Council of Ministers and senior officers working for ministerial leadership are absolutely crucial. Nonetheless, such bureaucratic coordination is undermined by insufficient or absent informal political coordination. Until recently, contacts between civil servant and members of parliament were prohibited (oekaze Kok); under Rutte III this rule was somewhat relaxed.
Citations:
R.B. Andeweg and G.A. Irwin (2014), Governance and politics of the Netherlands. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 154-163, 198-203, 220-228.
S. Jilke et al., Public Sector Reform in the Netherlands: Views and Experiences from Senior Executives, COCOPS Research Report, 2013
M. van Weezel and T. Broer, Max en Thijs over de premier: het geheim van politiek trapezewerker en ‘nat zeepje’ Mark Rutte (Vrij Nederland, vn.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)
Under present conditions, in which ministers and civil servants are subject to increasing parliamentary and media scrutiny, and in which gaps in trust and loyalty between the political leadership and the bureaucracy staff are growing, informal coordination and the personal chemistry among civil servants are what keeps things running. Regarding interministerial coordination, informal contacts between the senior staff (raadadviseurs) in the prime minister’s Council of Ministers and senior officers working for ministerial leadership are absolutely crucial. Nonetheless, such bureaucratic coordination is undermined by insufficient or absent informal political coordination. Until recently, contacts between civil servant and members of parliament were prohibited (oekaze Kok); under Rutte III this rule was somewhat relaxed.
Citations:
R.B. Andeweg and G.A. Irwin (2014), Governance and politics of the Netherlands. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 154-163, 198-203, 220-228.
S. Jilke et al., Public Sector Reform in the Netherlands: Views and Experiences from Senior Executives, COCOPS Research Report, 2013
M. van Weezel and T. Broer, Max en Thijs over de premier: het geheim van politiek trapezewerker en ‘nat zeepje’ Mark Rutte (Vrij Nederland, vn.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)
How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?
10
9
9
The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
8
7
6
7
6
The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
5
4
3
4
3
The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
2
1
1
The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
Although it may safely be assumed that well-known digital technologies like WhatsApp and Signal are used in Dutch interministerial coordination, digitalization designed specifically for interministerial coordination appears absent or is unknown. Like in ICT use across government in general, different departments use different systems whose interoperability is low or absent. Although the Legis project aspires to a more integrated ICT approach in the Dutch legislative system, results have been poor. For example, it is impossible as a non-insider to trace progress in legislative work on a particular bill, let alone to have an overview of all bills in preparation. Digitalization in legislation and interministerial coordination in the Netherlands clearly lags behind that in the United Kingdom or Finland.
In 2019, two important leaders in the push for improved ICT use within governmental departments resigned, and there are severe disagreements between the political and administrative levels of the Department of Internal Affairs and the leadership of the ICT Assessment Bureau, which was established in 2015 to coordinate ICT projects and contain cost overruns.
Responding to concerns voiced by the Council of State, the Rathenau Institute and the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), the December 2021 coalition agreement creates a minister for digital affairs. This figure will focus on the uses of algorithms in decision-making relating to policy designs, legislative work, jurisprudence and implementation practices.
Citations:
W. Voermans et al., 2012. Legislative processes in transition. Comparative study of the legislative processes in Finland, Slovenia and the UK as a source of inspiration for enhancing the efficiency of the Dutch legislative process, Leiden University ((open access.leidenuniv.nl, accessed 31 October 2018)
Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2014-5, 33 326, nr. 5, Eindrapport onderzoek naar ICT projecten bij de overheid (accessed 4 November 2018)
Trouw, 15 May 2019. De ICT-projecten bij de overheid zijn nog steeds een chaos. (trouw.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)
Rathenau Instituut, November 5, 2021. Deskundigen in de Eerste Kamer over AI bij overheidsbesluitvorming.
WRR, November 11, 2021. WRR-rapport nr. 105: Opgave AI. De nieuwe systeemtechnologie.
Raad van State, June 28, 2021. Publicatie Raad van State over digitalisering in wetgeving en bestuursrechtspraak.
In 2019, two important leaders in the push for improved ICT use within governmental departments resigned, and there are severe disagreements between the political and administrative levels of the Department of Internal Affairs and the leadership of the ICT Assessment Bureau, which was established in 2015 to coordinate ICT projects and contain cost overruns.
Responding to concerns voiced by the Council of State, the Rathenau Institute and the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), the December 2021 coalition agreement creates a minister for digital affairs. This figure will focus on the uses of algorithms in decision-making relating to policy designs, legislative work, jurisprudence and implementation practices.
Citations:
W. Voermans et al., 2012. Legislative processes in transition. Comparative study of the legislative processes in Finland, Slovenia and the UK as a source of inspiration for enhancing the efficiency of the Dutch legislative process, Leiden University ((open access.leidenuniv.nl, accessed 31 October 2018)
Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2014-5, 33 326, nr. 5, Eindrapport onderzoek naar ICT projecten bij de overheid (accessed 4 November 2018)
Trouw, 15 May 2019. De ICT-projecten bij de overheid zijn nog steeds een chaos. (trouw.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)
Rathenau Instituut, November 5, 2021. Deskundigen in de Eerste Kamer over AI bij overheidsbesluitvorming.
WRR, November 11, 2021. WRR-rapport nr. 105: Opgave AI. De nieuwe systeemtechnologie.
Raad van State, June 28, 2021. Publicatie Raad van State over digitalisering in wetgeving en bestuursrechtspraak.
Graph View
To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?
10
9
9
RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
8
7
6
7
6
RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
5
4
3
4
3
RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
2
1
1
RIA are not applied or do not exist.
In the Netherlands, RIAs are broadly and effectively applied in two fields: environmental-impact assessments (EIMs) and administrative-burden-reduction assessments (ABRAs).
Environmental impact assessments are legally prescribed for projects (e.g., infrastructure, water management, tourism, rural projects, garbage processing, energy and industry) with foreseeable large environmental impacts. Initiators of such projects are obliged to produce an environmental impact report that specifies the environmental impacts of the intended project and activities and includes major alternatives. Environmental research and multi-criteria analysis are the standard methods used.
The development of a method for ex ante evaluation of intended legislation regarding compliance costs to business and citizens was entrusted in 1998 to an ad hoc, temporary, but independent advisory commission called the Advisory Board on Administrative Burden Reduction (ACTAL). In 2011, some policymakers suggested that ACTAL become a permanent rather than temporary body. The policy philosophy on administrative regulation was at that time already shifting from (always negative) “burden reduction” to (prudentially positive and strategic) “appropriate regulation.” After evaluating its impact, the government decided in 2017 that ACTAL would be succeeded by a formal advisory body, the Advisory Body on Assessment of Regulatory Burdens (Adviescollege Toetsing Regeldruk, ATR). Parliament has called for the ATR to assess the administrative burden associated not only with new regulation, but also of existing regulation as well. At present the ATR, which is slated to retain temporary status until 2022, has no capacity to do this.
During the coronavirus crisis, the ATR was involved in the rapid assessment of all new regulations; it rejected some, and its advice was incorporated in improved bills and rules. The ATR is involved in assessing a large number of regulations concerning topics such as small and medium-sized enterprises, social care, education and EU regulations. The body has concluded that the quality of legislation is insufficient. In about 25% of new laws, the parliament’s rationale (necessity and utility) is not identified or is insufficiently argued. In about two-thirds of cases, there is inadequate or hardly any attention paid to feasibility; the laws do not fit the way firms have shaped their production processes, or how citizens organize their lives.
Meanwhile, the Dutch government has been developing an integrated impact assessment framework for policy and legislation, which ought to be applied by every Dutch civil servant preparing policy documents for ministerial decision-making. The ATR has argued that this framework does not fit policymaking officials’ expectations, and has noted that nobody is responsible for monitoring or correct use of the system.
Citations:
Milieueffectrapportage (nl.m.wikipedia.org, consulted 26 October 2014)
Staatscourant nr. 29814, 29 Mei 2017, Besluit van 17 mei 2017, nr. 2017000809, houdende instelling van het Adviescollege toetsing regeldruk
Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid, Kenniscentrum Wetgeving en Juridische Zaken, Integraal afwegingskader voor beleid en regelgeving, 16 October 2018 (accessed 31 October 2018)
ATR, Naar betere regels. Lessen uit 17 jaar Actal (air-regeldruk.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)
Staatscourant nr. 29814, 29 Mei 2017, Besluit van 17 mei 2017, nr. 2017000809, houdende instelling van het Adviescollege toetsing regeldruk
Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid, Kenniscentrum Wetgeving en Juridische Zaken, Integraal afwegingskader voor beleid en regelgeving, 16 October 2018 (accessed 31 October 2018)
ATR, Naar betere regels. Lessen uit 17 jaar Actal (air-regeldruk.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)
Adviescommissie Toetsing Regeldruk, Jaarverslag 2020.
Environmental impact assessments are legally prescribed for projects (e.g., infrastructure, water management, tourism, rural projects, garbage processing, energy and industry) with foreseeable large environmental impacts. Initiators of such projects are obliged to produce an environmental impact report that specifies the environmental impacts of the intended project and activities and includes major alternatives. Environmental research and multi-criteria analysis are the standard methods used.
The development of a method for ex ante evaluation of intended legislation regarding compliance costs to business and citizens was entrusted in 1998 to an ad hoc, temporary, but independent advisory commission called the Advisory Board on Administrative Burden Reduction (ACTAL). In 2011, some policymakers suggested that ACTAL become a permanent rather than temporary body. The policy philosophy on administrative regulation was at that time already shifting from (always negative) “burden reduction” to (prudentially positive and strategic) “appropriate regulation.” After evaluating its impact, the government decided in 2017 that ACTAL would be succeeded by a formal advisory body, the Advisory Body on Assessment of Regulatory Burdens (Adviescollege Toetsing Regeldruk, ATR). Parliament has called for the ATR to assess the administrative burden associated not only with new regulation, but also of existing regulation as well. At present the ATR, which is slated to retain temporary status until 2022, has no capacity to do this.
During the coronavirus crisis, the ATR was involved in the rapid assessment of all new regulations; it rejected some, and its advice was incorporated in improved bills and rules. The ATR is involved in assessing a large number of regulations concerning topics such as small and medium-sized enterprises, social care, education and EU regulations. The body has concluded that the quality of legislation is insufficient. In about 25% of new laws, the parliament’s rationale (necessity and utility) is not identified or is insufficiently argued. In about two-thirds of cases, there is inadequate or hardly any attention paid to feasibility; the laws do not fit the way firms have shaped their production processes, or how citizens organize their lives.
Meanwhile, the Dutch government has been developing an integrated impact assessment framework for policy and legislation, which ought to be applied by every Dutch civil servant preparing policy documents for ministerial decision-making. The ATR has argued that this framework does not fit policymaking officials’ expectations, and has noted that nobody is responsible for monitoring or correct use of the system.
Citations:
Milieueffectrapportage (nl.m.wikipedia.org, consulted 26 October 2014)
Staatscourant nr. 29814, 29 Mei 2017, Besluit van 17 mei 2017, nr. 2017000809, houdende instelling van het Adviescollege toetsing regeldruk
Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid, Kenniscentrum Wetgeving en Juridische Zaken, Integraal afwegingskader voor beleid en regelgeving, 16 October 2018 (accessed 31 October 2018)
ATR, Naar betere regels. Lessen uit 17 jaar Actal (air-regeldruk.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)
Staatscourant nr. 29814, 29 Mei 2017, Besluit van 17 mei 2017, nr. 2017000809, houdende instelling van het Adviescollege toetsing regeldruk
Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid, Kenniscentrum Wetgeving en Juridische Zaken, Integraal afwegingskader voor beleid en regelgeving, 16 October 2018 (accessed 31 October 2018)
ATR, Naar betere regels. Lessen uit 17 jaar Actal (air-regeldruk.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)
Adviescommissie Toetsing Regeldruk, Jaarverslag 2020.
Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?
10
9
9
RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
8
7
6
7
6
The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
5
4
3
4
3
The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
2
1
1
RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
RIAs are obliged to identify one or several alternatives to the option chosen by an initiator. According to Advisory Board on Administrative Burden Reduction (ATR) guidelines, alternative options for administrative burden reduction assessments (ABRAs) are usually investigated. In principle, the option involving the greatest cost reduction ought to be selected. The extent to which practice follows theory is not known; in several cases, the ATR has judged that the less cost-efficient solution was selected. Stakeholders and decision-makers have been involved in the process of producing RIAs, helping in the process of creating burden-reduction analyses by providing needed information.
Stakeholders and interested parties, typically including semi-public bodies and the lobbyists for commercial and/or professional associations (e.g., representing SMEs, social- and medical-care professionals, or farmers), are generally consulted in the intra- or interministerial preparation of bills and policy proposals. Before a draft is passed onto the Council of Ministers, a proposal has to pass a wide range of quality tests, for example regarding budgetary effects, business effects, administrative-burden effects, and societal and environmental effects. In some cases, departments publicize a draft bill as part of an e-consultation process to solicit feedback from citizens, but this practice is exceptional. Sometimes the results of the burden-reduction assessments do not reach parliament in time to be used. In an evaluation of the ATR’s performance by Berenschaot Consultants, stakeholders indicated that they were in general satisfied.
Given the continued and widespread complaints, mainly by business, about regulatory burdens (e.g., by dentists, general practitioners, youth workers, nurses, farmers and shopkeepers, to mention just a few), there is some question as to the effectiveness of regulatory-burden reduction campaigns and the efficacy of the ATR as an independent watchdog. Interestingly, the ATR claims that it warned several years ago that the complexity of tax-benefit regulation surpassed the understanding and capability of citizens.
Citations:
W. Voermans et al., 2012. Legislative processes in transition, Leiden University (open access.leideuniv.nl, accessed 31 October 2018)
Staatscourant nr. 29814, 29 Mei 2017, Besluit van 17 mei 2017, nr. 2017000809, houdende instelling van het Adviescollege toetsing regeldruk
V. Bekkers and A. Edwards, 2018. The role of social media in the policy process, in H. Colebatch and R. Hoppe (eds.), Handbook of Policy, Process and Governing, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar
De Volkskrant, 30 September 2019. Drrie redenen waarom regeldruk de zorg blijft teisteren. (volkskrant.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)
Adviescollege Toetsing Regeldruk, Jaarverslag 2020.
Financieel Dagblad, 1 November 2021. Als je al die peperdure regels niet snoeit dan woekeren ze voort
Stakeholders and interested parties, typically including semi-public bodies and the lobbyists for commercial and/or professional associations (e.g., representing SMEs, social- and medical-care professionals, or farmers), are generally consulted in the intra- or interministerial preparation of bills and policy proposals. Before a draft is passed onto the Council of Ministers, a proposal has to pass a wide range of quality tests, for example regarding budgetary effects, business effects, administrative-burden effects, and societal and environmental effects. In some cases, departments publicize a draft bill as part of an e-consultation process to solicit feedback from citizens, but this practice is exceptional. Sometimes the results of the burden-reduction assessments do not reach parliament in time to be used. In an evaluation of the ATR’s performance by Berenschaot Consultants, stakeholders indicated that they were in general satisfied.
Given the continued and widespread complaints, mainly by business, about regulatory burdens (e.g., by dentists, general practitioners, youth workers, nurses, farmers and shopkeepers, to mention just a few), there is some question as to the effectiveness of regulatory-burden reduction campaigns and the efficacy of the ATR as an independent watchdog. Interestingly, the ATR claims that it warned several years ago that the complexity of tax-benefit regulation surpassed the understanding and capability of citizens.
Citations:
W. Voermans et al., 2012. Legislative processes in transition, Leiden University (open access.leideuniv.nl, accessed 31 October 2018)
Staatscourant nr. 29814, 29 Mei 2017, Besluit van 17 mei 2017, nr. 2017000809, houdende instelling van het Adviescollege toetsing regeldruk
V. Bekkers and A. Edwards, 2018. The role of social media in the policy process, in H. Colebatch and R. Hoppe (eds.), Handbook of Policy, Process and Governing, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar
De Volkskrant, 30 September 2019. Drrie redenen waarom regeldruk de zorg blijft teisteren. (volkskrant.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)
Adviescollege Toetsing Regeldruk, Jaarverslag 2020.
Financieel Dagblad, 1 November 2021. Als je al die peperdure regels niet snoeit dan woekeren ze voort
Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?
10
9
9
Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
8
7
6
7
6
Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
5
4
3
4
3
Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
2
1
1
Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
In the Netherlands, RIAs are broadly and effectively applied in two fields: environmental impact assessments (EIMs) and administrative-burden-reduction assessments (ABRAs). EIMs have been legally mandated since 1987. Anyone who needs a government license for initiating substantial spatial or land-use projects with potentially harmful environmental impacts is obliged to research and disclose potential project impacts. More than 1,000 EIM reports have been administratively and politically processed. They guarantee that environmental and sustainability considerations play a considerable role in government decision-making. However, environmental impact assessments are sometimes subordinated to economic impact assessments. There are no systematic social – or, for example, health – impact assessments. In 2017, and repeatedly in later years, the DNB (Dutch National Bank) warned that there would a review of whether firms in the financial sector had sufficiently explored the risks of climate change in their policies. In the water sector, similar stress tests of policies by water management boards, and municipal and local water management/emergency plans are being prepared. In 2018, the results of recent climate-change platform debates, and negotiations between government, business and other stakeholders were elaborately scrutinized and re-calculated by the Planning Bureau for the Living Environment (PBL).
Nevertheless, as reported elsewhere (see “Environment”), the Dutch government has regularly helped economic sectors (farmers, fishermen, civil aviation) delay necessary action and downplay the urgency of sustainability problems. This continued hesitation and delay finally drove environmental activists to sue the government successfully for negligence and lack of effort (in the Urgenda and nitrogen emission cases).
Given the trend toward operationalizing the Sustainable Development Goals into measurable units, and similar efforts to broaden conventional economic indicators like GDP into an indicator system measuring welfare more broadly, it is to be expected that environmental RIA practices will be affected sooner or later.
Citations:
NRC.next, “DNB waarschuwt financiële sector voor risico’s klimaatverandering, 4 October 2017”
Kennisportaal Ruimtelijke Adaptatie, “Verpliche stresstest wateroverlast voor waterschappen en gemeenten,” consulted 12 October 2017
PBL, Analyse van het voorstel voor hoofdlijnen van het klimaatakkoord, 27 September 2018 (www.pbl.nl>publicaties, accessed 31 October 2018)
M. Chavannes, 19 July, 2019. De net-niet-politiek van Nederland: zwoegen aan het Klimaatakkoord om draagvlak te creëeren voor rustig aan doen. (decorrespondent.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)
Me Judice, 2 apr 2021 Stam and van Zanden, De politieke neutraliteit van bbp ontmaskerd
Nevertheless, as reported elsewhere (see “Environment”), the Dutch government has regularly helped economic sectors (farmers, fishermen, civil aviation) delay necessary action and downplay the urgency of sustainability problems. This continued hesitation and delay finally drove environmental activists to sue the government successfully for negligence and lack of effort (in the Urgenda and nitrogen emission cases).
Given the trend toward operationalizing the Sustainable Development Goals into measurable units, and similar efforts to broaden conventional economic indicators like GDP into an indicator system measuring welfare more broadly, it is to be expected that environmental RIA practices will be affected sooner or later.
Citations:
NRC.next, “DNB waarschuwt financiële sector voor risico’s klimaatverandering, 4 October 2017”
Kennisportaal Ruimtelijke Adaptatie, “Verpliche stresstest wateroverlast voor waterschappen en gemeenten,” consulted 12 October 2017
PBL, Analyse van het voorstel voor hoofdlijnen van het klimaatakkoord, 27 September 2018 (www.pbl.nl>publicaties, accessed 31 October 2018)
M. Chavannes, 19 July, 2019. De net-niet-politiek van Nederland: zwoegen aan het Klimaatakkoord om draagvlak te creëeren voor rustig aan doen. (decorrespondent.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)
Me Judice, 2 apr 2021 Stam and van Zanden, De politieke neutraliteit van bbp ontmaskerd
To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?
10
9
9
Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
2
1
1
Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
The General Audit Chamber (Algemene Rekenkamer) scrutinizes ex post policy evaluations by ministerial departments. Since 2000, the chamber has reported its findings to parliament on the third Wednesday in May each year. In 2012, the government introduced the Regulation for Regular Evaluation Studies, which specifies research criteria for assessing policy efficiency, goal achievement, evidence-based policymaking and subsidy-based policies. Yet, time and again, the chamber has reported deficits in goal achievement and weaknesses in goal formulation, which undermine the quality of ex post evaluation research. Other weaknesses in policy evaluation studies include the lack of citizen perspectives, inability to accurately calculate societal costs and benefits, overreliance on input from implementing organizations for evidence and lack of public access to many evaluations. In line with the general trend toward more instrumental advice, over the last couple of years, the General Audit Chamber has focused its attention on specific points in departmental agendas.
Moreover, there are a wide range of additional non-obligatory evaluations produced by ministerial departments, parliament, government-sponsored knowledge institutes, the ombudsman, implementation bodies and quasi-independent non-governmental bodies. In response to the coronavirus crisis, several evaluations were undertaken, including a review of impacts on different groups of citizens. The PBL did an ex ante evaluation of the sustainability impacts of proposals in the party platforms of six political parties. In response to worries about the use of algorithms in governance, and anticipating the abuse of algorithms by the tax authorities in the child benefits affair, the General Audit Chamber developed an ex ante evaluation framework for the design and use of algorithms. Since evaluation findings are just one factor in designing new or adjusting existing policies, it is not clear how much policy learning from formal and informal evaluations actually occurs. A recent study commissioned by the minister of finance assessed past evaluations and their use. The study confirmed that although “no other country evaluates so many of its policies,” policymaking civil servants and members of parliament are less sensitive to the outcomes of previous policies than to images and incidents (in the press). Moreover, obstruction and disinterestedness contribute to methodological weaknesses in many of the evaluation studies, this assessment found. For example, although the government agreement stipulates that a new policy decriminalizing the use of hashish may be experimentally tested at the local level, interference in the study’s design has already made a politically unbiased evaluation of results as good as impossible.
Dutch ex post evaluators closely follow international trends of “evidence informed” and “behavioral knowledge” evaluation studies. There has been a tendency to move away from a focus on single, case-specific ex post evaluation studies to a focus on the construction of broader, more balanced departmental knowledge portfolios, in which ex post evaluation studies are embedded as elements in a larger body of knowledge accessible to policymakers and other participants in policy subsystems. It is not yet clear to what extent such trends in evaluation research really inform evaluation practices.
Citations:
A. Knottnerus, Van casus-specifieke beleidsevaluatie naar systematische opbouw van kennis en ervaring, Beleidsonderzoek Online, May 2016
Meyken Houppermans, ‘Wat is de toegevoegde waarde van de onafhankelijk
deskundige bij beleidsdoorlichtingen?’, Beleidsonderzoek Online juni 2018,
DOI: 10.5553/BO/221335502018000005001
SEO Economisch Onderzoek, december 2018. Beleidsdoorlichtingen belicht (SEO-rapport nr. 2018-110, sep.nl, accessed 8 November 2019
Algemene Rekenkamer,26-01-2021. Betere kwaliteitscontrole en meer inzicht voor burgers nodig bij algoritmes overheid
Platform O, Klieverik and Zwetsloot, 22 March 2021, Overheid, positioneer algoritmes als oplossing
FD, Daan Ballegeer Jean Dohmen 16 mrt 2021. ‘Er wordt veel beleid gemaakt waarvan we niet weten of het werkt’
PBL, 01-03-2021. Analyse leefomgevingseffecten verkiezingsprogramma’s 2021-2025
Moreover, there are a wide range of additional non-obligatory evaluations produced by ministerial departments, parliament, government-sponsored knowledge institutes, the ombudsman, implementation bodies and quasi-independent non-governmental bodies. In response to the coronavirus crisis, several evaluations were undertaken, including a review of impacts on different groups of citizens. The PBL did an ex ante evaluation of the sustainability impacts of proposals in the party platforms of six political parties. In response to worries about the use of algorithms in governance, and anticipating the abuse of algorithms by the tax authorities in the child benefits affair, the General Audit Chamber developed an ex ante evaluation framework for the design and use of algorithms. Since evaluation findings are just one factor in designing new or adjusting existing policies, it is not clear how much policy learning from formal and informal evaluations actually occurs. A recent study commissioned by the minister of finance assessed past evaluations and their use. The study confirmed that although “no other country evaluates so many of its policies,” policymaking civil servants and members of parliament are less sensitive to the outcomes of previous policies than to images and incidents (in the press). Moreover, obstruction and disinterestedness contribute to methodological weaknesses in many of the evaluation studies, this assessment found. For example, although the government agreement stipulates that a new policy decriminalizing the use of hashish may be experimentally tested at the local level, interference in the study’s design has already made a politically unbiased evaluation of results as good as impossible.
Dutch ex post evaluators closely follow international trends of “evidence informed” and “behavioral knowledge” evaluation studies. There has been a tendency to move away from a focus on single, case-specific ex post evaluation studies to a focus on the construction of broader, more balanced departmental knowledge portfolios, in which ex post evaluation studies are embedded as elements in a larger body of knowledge accessible to policymakers and other participants in policy subsystems. It is not yet clear to what extent such trends in evaluation research really inform evaluation practices.
Citations:
A. Knottnerus, Van casus-specifieke beleidsevaluatie naar systematische opbouw van kennis en ervaring, Beleidsonderzoek Online, May 2016
Meyken Houppermans, ‘Wat is de toegevoegde waarde van de onafhankelijk
deskundige bij beleidsdoorlichtingen?’, Beleidsonderzoek Online juni 2018,
DOI: 10.5553/BO/221335502018000005001
SEO Economisch Onderzoek, december 2018. Beleidsdoorlichtingen belicht (SEO-rapport nr. 2018-110, sep.nl, accessed 8 November 2019
Algemene Rekenkamer,26-01-2021. Betere kwaliteitscontrole en meer inzicht voor burgers nodig bij algoritmes overheid
Platform O, Klieverik and Zwetsloot, 22 March 2021, Overheid, positioneer algoritmes als oplossing
FD, Daan Ballegeer Jean Dohmen 16 mrt 2021. ‘Er wordt veel beleid gemaakt waarvan we niet weten of het werkt’
PBL, 01-03-2021. Analyse leefomgevingseffecten verkiezingsprogramma’s 2021-2025
Graph View
Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?
10
9
9
The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
8
7
6
7
6
The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
2
1
1
The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
International references to the “polder model” as a form of consensus-building through practices of societal consultations testify to the Dutch reputation for negotiating non-parliamentary support for public policies, often on contested issues as a precondition for parliamentary approval. In this form of neo-corporatism and network governance, the government consults extensively with vested interest groups in the economy and/or civil society during policy preparation and attempts to involve them in policy implementation. It has been a strong factor in the mode of political operation and public policymaking deployed by all the Rutte governments. Recent examples include the public debate on pension reform, the national summit on climate policy following the Paris Accords (involving five sectoral platforms: electricity, built environment, industry, agriculture and land use, and mobility), and preventive public health (focusing on obesity, smoking and “problematic” alcohol consumption).
In spite of its apparent revival, this mode of politics and policymaking is contested. Trade unions have suffered due to an erosion of representativeness and increasing fragmentation, although employers’ associations have been less affected. Professional associations of teachers, nurses and others also suffer from a representation deficit; their constituencies frequently show their disaffection with policy agreements concluded by their leadership. This has resulted in many public demonstrations near government buildings in The Hague. Another criticism is that results may be politically pre-cooked depending on who is invited to sit at the negotiation table. For example, in the negotiations over the climate agreement, this criticism applied to the discussions on energy and health issues, in which the results allegedly strongly reflected the interests of the energy and pharmaceutical industries. Even the High Council of State issued a warning that agreements reached in the polder model are too often presented by the government to parliament as a fait accompli. They also too often lead to very broad platform legislation that specifies future goals and indicates a budget, but leaves implementation commitments and legal implications wide open. Green NGOs dissatisfied with the influence they have been able to exert through the polder model, and who have watched one delay after another in the implementation of environmental pollution policy, have successfully turned to the judiciary to force government to finally take its climate goal commitments seriously. All this means that some stakeholders venue-shop outside the mainstream polder model to increase their influence on government policy. Therefore, a side effect of the reviving “polder” tradition within a more fragmented political landscape may be the emergence of an extensive network of professional lobbyists with a dense network of contacts within political parties and with single members of parliament and cabinet ministers. Lobbyists are known to influence party platforms before elections, and even the cabinet formation process itself. There are signs that business lobbies have achieved clear successes. Another criticism of the poldering process is that it leads to sluggish policymaking, creating a “musical chairs” process in which the responsibilities of government, business and influential civil society or non-governmental organizations remain blurred, undermining effective decision-making. The recent revival may owe more to the fact that none of the Rutte cabinets have been able to rely on solid parliamentary support than to any renewed vigor on the part of business, labor unions and civil society associations.
Since 2011, national departments involved in developing new policies and legislative projects have been able to use the internet to consult with citizens, thereby avoiding some of the “usual suspects” problems associated with the traditional “poldering” process. The extent to which this has been successful remains unclear. During the coronavirus lockdowns, a temporary law on digital consultation and decision-making (Tijdelijke wet voor digitale beraadslaging en besluitvorming) ensured continuity. New permanent legislation on the subject is in the making.
Citations:
Your citations
Internetconsultatie nieuwe wet – en regelbegeving (Rijksoverheid, accessed 8 November 2019)
A.van Roessel, De Groene Amsterdammer, 13 March 2019. Polderen (groen.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)
Rathenau Instituut, Bas et al., 28 June, 2021. Digitaal democratisch, maar hoe? Discussienota over functionele Eisen aan digitale beraadslaging en besluitvorming
R. Hoppe (2022), When power hosts knowledge. A Political theory of policy formulation, in B. Guy Peters and G. Fontaine (eds.), Handbook of Research on Policy Design (to be published)
Hoge Raad der Nederlanden. 2019. 2019 Highlighted; Brief Review of 2019. The Hague.(jaarverslaghogeraad.nl)
Financieel Dagblad, Knoop’ 31 aug 2021. Haagse draaideurdiscussie ontvlamt na ‘opportunistische’ overstap Van Nieuwenhuizen
Nieuwsuur, Jonker, June 18, 2021. Hoe het kabinet meer naar de bedrijvenlobby luisterde dan naar de eigen ambtenaren.
C. Braun, Aan tafel op het Malieveld Rutte III en de omgang met het maatschappelijk middenveld, in Montesqieu Instituut, 2021. ‘Niet stoffig, toch?’ Terugblik op het kabinet Rutte III. Den Haag, 83-94
In spite of its apparent revival, this mode of politics and policymaking is contested. Trade unions have suffered due to an erosion of representativeness and increasing fragmentation, although employers’ associations have been less affected. Professional associations of teachers, nurses and others also suffer from a representation deficit; their constituencies frequently show their disaffection with policy agreements concluded by their leadership. This has resulted in many public demonstrations near government buildings in The Hague. Another criticism is that results may be politically pre-cooked depending on who is invited to sit at the negotiation table. For example, in the negotiations over the climate agreement, this criticism applied to the discussions on energy and health issues, in which the results allegedly strongly reflected the interests of the energy and pharmaceutical industries. Even the High Council of State issued a warning that agreements reached in the polder model are too often presented by the government to parliament as a fait accompli. They also too often lead to very broad platform legislation that specifies future goals and indicates a budget, but leaves implementation commitments and legal implications wide open. Green NGOs dissatisfied with the influence they have been able to exert through the polder model, and who have watched one delay after another in the implementation of environmental pollution policy, have successfully turned to the judiciary to force government to finally take its climate goal commitments seriously. All this means that some stakeholders venue-shop outside the mainstream polder model to increase their influence on government policy. Therefore, a side effect of the reviving “polder” tradition within a more fragmented political landscape may be the emergence of an extensive network of professional lobbyists with a dense network of contacts within political parties and with single members of parliament and cabinet ministers. Lobbyists are known to influence party platforms before elections, and even the cabinet formation process itself. There are signs that business lobbies have achieved clear successes. Another criticism of the poldering process is that it leads to sluggish policymaking, creating a “musical chairs” process in which the responsibilities of government, business and influential civil society or non-governmental organizations remain blurred, undermining effective decision-making. The recent revival may owe more to the fact that none of the Rutte cabinets have been able to rely on solid parliamentary support than to any renewed vigor on the part of business, labor unions and civil society associations.
Since 2011, national departments involved in developing new policies and legislative projects have been able to use the internet to consult with citizens, thereby avoiding some of the “usual suspects” problems associated with the traditional “poldering” process. The extent to which this has been successful remains unclear. During the coronavirus lockdowns, a temporary law on digital consultation and decision-making (Tijdelijke wet voor digitale beraadslaging en besluitvorming) ensured continuity. New permanent legislation on the subject is in the making.
Citations:
Your citations
Internetconsultatie nieuwe wet – en regelbegeving (Rijksoverheid, accessed 8 November 2019)
A.van Roessel, De Groene Amsterdammer, 13 March 2019. Polderen (groen.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)
Rathenau Instituut, Bas et al., 28 June, 2021. Digitaal democratisch, maar hoe? Discussienota over functionele Eisen aan digitale beraadslaging en besluitvorming
R. Hoppe (2022), When power hosts knowledge. A Political theory of policy formulation, in B. Guy Peters and G. Fontaine (eds.), Handbook of Research on Policy Design (to be published)
Hoge Raad der Nederlanden. 2019. 2019 Highlighted; Brief Review of 2019. The Hague.(jaarverslaghogeraad.nl)
Financieel Dagblad, Knoop’ 31 aug 2021. Haagse draaideurdiscussie ontvlamt na ‘opportunistische’ overstap Van Nieuwenhuizen
Nieuwsuur, Jonker, June 18, 2021. Hoe het kabinet meer naar de bedrijvenlobby luisterde dan naar de eigen ambtenaren.
C. Braun, Aan tafel op het Malieveld Rutte III en de omgang met het maatschappelijk middenveld, in Montesqieu Instituut, 2021. ‘Niet stoffig, toch?’ Terugblik op het kabinet Rutte III. Den Haag, 83-94
Graph View
To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?
10
9
9
Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
8
7
6
7
6
Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
5
4
3
4
3
Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
2
1
1
Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
The Informatie Rijksoverheid service responds to frequently asked questions by citizens over the internet, telephone and email. In the age of “mediacracy,” the government has sought to make policy communication more coherent, relying on the National Information Service (Rijksvoorlichtingsdienst, RVD), which is formally a part of the prime minister’s Department for General Affairs, and whose Director General is present at Council of Ministers meetings and is responsible for communicating policies and the prime minister’s affairs to the media. The government has streamlined and coordinated its external communications at the line-ministry level.
Another effort to engage in centralized, coherent communication has involved replacing departmentally run televised information campaigns with a unified, thematic approach (e.g., safety). These efforts to have government speak with “one mouth” appear to have been fairly successful. For example, the information communicated by the government regarding the downing of a passenger plane with 196 Dutch passengers over Ukraine on 17 July 2014 and its aftermath was timely, adequate and demonstrated respect for the victims and the emotions and needs of their families. Another example is the long series of press conferences by the prime minister and the minister of public health during the coronavirus crisis, which were still being held as of the time of writing (January 2022).
The continuous technological innovation in information and communication technologies has led policy communication to adapt to the new possibilities. New developments are focused on responding more directly to citizen questions, exploring new modes of behavioral change, and utilizing internet-based citizen participation and communication channels in policymaking. Moreover, algorithms are being used by the tax agencies, and in the delivery of public services to citizens. For example, in 2011 the Dutch government decided to participate in the global Open Government Partnership. But in 2017 the Dutch government was criticized for structurally misleading and insufficient communication on issues of animal disease and food safety due to prioritizing agricultural interests over public health. In the coronavirus crisis, priorities were turned around, with public health issues taking priority over economic, social and cultural dimensions. In general, government communication occurs in an increasingly challenging media environment in which competition, polarization, trolling and “fake news” represent major challenges. In 2019, in response to repeated criticism that the language used in official communications was unclear, the government decided to create an “Instant Clarity Brigade” (Direct Duidelijk Brigade) to assist departmental policymakers in writing more understandable proposals, rules and decrees (Jip-en-Janneke taal). Considerable criticism was voiced about the increasing and abundant use of communication experts – estimates ran as high as 800 such experts in 2020 – in government, compared to the ongoing loss of expertise in the civil service and the insufficient use of experts in (government-sponsored) think tanks. In journalistic and academic circles, the feeling was that the thin line between government communication and information and propaganda defending government policies is becoming more and more blurred.
In 2020-21, policy communication had only one focus: coronavirus crisis management. The Dutch communication experts followed a complex strategy of communication. One theme was shifting between two communicative registers: that of communicating order in the crisis through informing and instructing, based on expert knowledge; and another that focused on showing empathy with those nudged into compliance, with this taking place through listening, interpreting and narrating. A second theme was openness about the government’s “dilemma” logic – that is, sharing with the public the government’s efforts to balance often contradictory considerations and assumptions in its policy decisions. The major contradiction here was between the public health considerations and the values of the medical profession advocates and the values predicated on economic, social, cultural and psychic well-being held by those who advocated putting a higher priority on keeping the economy and society running. After initial successes and a rally-around-the-flag effect, the strategy gradually fell apart, as it ran up against the public’s tolerance for sustained uncertainty associated with “broken promises” and repeated delays of a clear exit. The clarity of policy communication also declined due to the political competition in the March 2021 election campaign; not to mention strong polarization later in the pandemic around stricter measures (evening/night curfew, strict lockdown periods) and stronger efforts to persuade people to comply with recommendations (for vaccination, use of a coronavirus pass as condition for access to hospitality sector establishments and larger cultural and sports events). The polarization went beyond the logic of crisis management itself, and became highly political when stricter measures and nudges were interpreted as anti-constitutional and as infringing on personal and civic liberties.
Citations:
G. Rijnja and M. Bakker, Reikende handen: communiceren in ongewisse tijden, in: V. Wijkheid and M. van Duin, eds., 2021.Lessen uit de coronacrisis: het jaar 2020, Den Haag: Boom Bestuurskunde, 217-231
Trouw, Omtzigt,October 8, 2021. Stop liever geld in doordacht beleid dan een leger aan voorlichter.
Nationale Ombudsman,5 April 2016.Het verdwijnen van de blauwe envelop. Een onderzoek naar de digitalisering van het berichtenverkeer met de Belastingdienst. (zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)
overheidsexpertise.nl/communicatie (overheidsexpertise.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)
NRC Next, 24 October 2019. De Direct Duidelijk Brigade moet teksten overheid weer begrijpelijk maken.
Another effort to engage in centralized, coherent communication has involved replacing departmentally run televised information campaigns with a unified, thematic approach (e.g., safety). These efforts to have government speak with “one mouth” appear to have been fairly successful. For example, the information communicated by the government regarding the downing of a passenger plane with 196 Dutch passengers over Ukraine on 17 July 2014 and its aftermath was timely, adequate and demonstrated respect for the victims and the emotions and needs of their families. Another example is the long series of press conferences by the prime minister and the minister of public health during the coronavirus crisis, which were still being held as of the time of writing (January 2022).
The continuous technological innovation in information and communication technologies has led policy communication to adapt to the new possibilities. New developments are focused on responding more directly to citizen questions, exploring new modes of behavioral change, and utilizing internet-based citizen participation and communication channels in policymaking. Moreover, algorithms are being used by the tax agencies, and in the delivery of public services to citizens. For example, in 2011 the Dutch government decided to participate in the global Open Government Partnership. But in 2017 the Dutch government was criticized for structurally misleading and insufficient communication on issues of animal disease and food safety due to prioritizing agricultural interests over public health. In the coronavirus crisis, priorities were turned around, with public health issues taking priority over economic, social and cultural dimensions. In general, government communication occurs in an increasingly challenging media environment in which competition, polarization, trolling and “fake news” represent major challenges. In 2019, in response to repeated criticism that the language used in official communications was unclear, the government decided to create an “Instant Clarity Brigade” (Direct Duidelijk Brigade) to assist departmental policymakers in writing more understandable proposals, rules and decrees (Jip-en-Janneke taal). Considerable criticism was voiced about the increasing and abundant use of communication experts – estimates ran as high as 800 such experts in 2020 – in government, compared to the ongoing loss of expertise in the civil service and the insufficient use of experts in (government-sponsored) think tanks. In journalistic and academic circles, the feeling was that the thin line between government communication and information and propaganda defending government policies is becoming more and more blurred.
In 2020-21, policy communication had only one focus: coronavirus crisis management. The Dutch communication experts followed a complex strategy of communication. One theme was shifting between two communicative registers: that of communicating order in the crisis through informing and instructing, based on expert knowledge; and another that focused on showing empathy with those nudged into compliance, with this taking place through listening, interpreting and narrating. A second theme was openness about the government’s “dilemma” logic – that is, sharing with the public the government’s efforts to balance often contradictory considerations and assumptions in its policy decisions. The major contradiction here was between the public health considerations and the values of the medical profession advocates and the values predicated on economic, social, cultural and psychic well-being held by those who advocated putting a higher priority on keeping the economy and society running. After initial successes and a rally-around-the-flag effect, the strategy gradually fell apart, as it ran up against the public’s tolerance for sustained uncertainty associated with “broken promises” and repeated delays of a clear exit. The clarity of policy communication also declined due to the political competition in the March 2021 election campaign; not to mention strong polarization later in the pandemic around stricter measures (evening/night curfew, strict lockdown periods) and stronger efforts to persuade people to comply with recommendations (for vaccination, use of a coronavirus pass as condition for access to hospitality sector establishments and larger cultural and sports events). The polarization went beyond the logic of crisis management itself, and became highly political when stricter measures and nudges were interpreted as anti-constitutional and as infringing on personal and civic liberties.
Citations:
G. Rijnja and M. Bakker, Reikende handen: communiceren in ongewisse tijden, in: V. Wijkheid and M. van Duin, eds., 2021.Lessen uit de coronacrisis: het jaar 2020, Den Haag: Boom Bestuurskunde, 217-231
Trouw, Omtzigt,October 8, 2021. Stop liever geld in doordacht beleid dan een leger aan voorlichter.
Nationale Ombudsman,5 April 2016.Het verdwijnen van de blauwe envelop. Een onderzoek naar de digitalisering van het berichtenverkeer met de Belastingdienst. (zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)
overheidsexpertise.nl/communicatie (overheidsexpertise.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)
NRC Next, 24 October 2019. De Direct Duidelijk Brigade moet teksten overheid weer begrijpelijk maken.
Graph View
To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?
10
9
9
The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
5
4
3
4
3
The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
2
1
1
The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
In its first year, the Rutte III cabinet realized five of its 36 officially announced legislative initiatives; two of which simply involved abolishing (consultative referendum, fiscal reduction for home-owners) existing laws. In its second year, two of its big initiatives, a pension agreement and a climate agreement, were achieved. Then came the pandemic, which generated 19 emergency laws. All in all, out of 363 proposed original new bills (minus approvals of EU legislation, treaties and technical “repair” laws), a total of 186 (51%) had been adopted by January 2021; as of the time of writing 23 bills were awaiting approval in the First Chamber. However, in its overall assessment of government performance, including goals achievement, in 2018 – 2019, the General Audit Chamber, in an especially pessimistic annual report, found most departmental reports inadequate owing to “bad memory” and inadequate records. For the first time, it also identified illegal expenditures.
Ineffective policy shows up in virtually all policy areas and departments. In international comparisons the Netherlands scores low with regard to generating sustainable energy and building new houses, and very high with regard to the emissions of nitrogen. The education system produces inequality among students; economic inequalities are increasing; infrastructure maintenance (roads, bridges) is overdue; there is a tremendous backlog in the exams for driving licenses; substantial amounts of cocaine and synthetic drugs are imported or produced; the percentage of physically and mentally challenged workers in paid jobs is among the lowest in Europe; and the coronavirus-era track-and-trace, testing and vaccination programs all suffered from organizational barriers and personnel shortages.
No doubt the most shocking and politically impactful case of policy failure was the childcare benefits system as implemented by the tax authorities. Tens of thousands of families (often of non-Dutch descent) were considered to have acted fraudulently on flimsy evidence, illegally placed on fraud lists without being informed about it, and “lawfully” subjected to recovery regimes that pushed them into poverty for a long time. In many cases, this led psychological problems, divorce and even loss of custody of children. Any proportionality between the size and severity of violations and the degree of punishment was completely disregarded. This is no longer denied even in parliament, which is partly to blame because of over-hasty and sloppy legislative initiatives pushing for zero tolerance on social benefits fraud. Ironically, parliament’s insistence on fast and across-the-board compensation for the victims has turned into an implementation nightmare itself. (The Rutte IV cabinet has a special deputy minister to clear up the mess.) Even legal appeals fell on deaf ears for many years, as the High Court systematically followed the tax authorities’ stricter-than-strict interpretation of the law. This scandal evolved between 2009-2020 and, demonstrating poor policy feedback mechanisms, was only documented by the Van Dam Parliamentary Investigative Commission in the autumn of 2020. After publication of this report (“Unprecedented Injustice”), only two politicians (among many more) directly responsible for the tax authorities’ conduct in the recent past immediately ended their (national) political career. On 15 January 2021, the Rutte III cabinet collectively and symbolically stepped down, but in fact continued on as a caretaker government to deal with urgent coronavirus matters, prepare national elections in March 2021 and govern the country during the cabinet formation process that would last a record number of days from 17 March 2021 until 10 January 2022.
Citations:
M. Chavannes, 25 September 2019. Wij hebben een mooi klimaatakkoord. Wat niet betekent dat we het gaan uitvoeren. (decorrespondent, accessed 3 November 2019)
Algemene Rekenkamer, Verantwoordingsdag. Toespraak President van de Algemene Rekenkamer, 15 May 2019 (Rijksoverheid, accessed 3 November 2019)
De Correspondent, 26 October 2019. De CO-2 heffing die nooit werd geïnd.
B. van den Braak, 2021. Bescheiden ambities en smalle marges. De wetgevingsoogst van Rutte III, in Montesquieu Instituut, ‘Niet zo stoffig, toch?’ Terugblik op het kabinet Rutte III, 105-108
Bernard ter Haar, blog published 23 April, 2021. De Nederlandse overheid heeft deze eeuw nog niets substantieels tot stand gebracht.
De Correspondent, Jesse Frederik, January 15, 2021. De tragedie achter de toeslagenaffaire
RTL Nieuws, March 5, 2021 Toeslagenschandaal veel groter
NOS Nieuws, November 29, 2021.Duizenden in financiële problemen gebracht door zwarte lijst Belastingdienst.
Volkskrant, Witteman, August 20, 2021. Vermorzeld in de raderen van de Belastingdienst
NRC-H., van den Bunt, March 16 2021.Catshuisregeling betekent weer systeemfalen.
Ineffective policy shows up in virtually all policy areas and departments. In international comparisons the Netherlands scores low with regard to generating sustainable energy and building new houses, and very high with regard to the emissions of nitrogen. The education system produces inequality among students; economic inequalities are increasing; infrastructure maintenance (roads, bridges) is overdue; there is a tremendous backlog in the exams for driving licenses; substantial amounts of cocaine and synthetic drugs are imported or produced; the percentage of physically and mentally challenged workers in paid jobs is among the lowest in Europe; and the coronavirus-era track-and-trace, testing and vaccination programs all suffered from organizational barriers and personnel shortages.
No doubt the most shocking and politically impactful case of policy failure was the childcare benefits system as implemented by the tax authorities. Tens of thousands of families (often of non-Dutch descent) were considered to have acted fraudulently on flimsy evidence, illegally placed on fraud lists without being informed about it, and “lawfully” subjected to recovery regimes that pushed them into poverty for a long time. In many cases, this led psychological problems, divorce and even loss of custody of children. Any proportionality between the size and severity of violations and the degree of punishment was completely disregarded. This is no longer denied even in parliament, which is partly to blame because of over-hasty and sloppy legislative initiatives pushing for zero tolerance on social benefits fraud. Ironically, parliament’s insistence on fast and across-the-board compensation for the victims has turned into an implementation nightmare itself. (The Rutte IV cabinet has a special deputy minister to clear up the mess.) Even legal appeals fell on deaf ears for many years, as the High Court systematically followed the tax authorities’ stricter-than-strict interpretation of the law. This scandal evolved between 2009-2020 and, demonstrating poor policy feedback mechanisms, was only documented by the Van Dam Parliamentary Investigative Commission in the autumn of 2020. After publication of this report (“Unprecedented Injustice”), only two politicians (among many more) directly responsible for the tax authorities’ conduct in the recent past immediately ended their (national) political career. On 15 January 2021, the Rutte III cabinet collectively and symbolically stepped down, but in fact continued on as a caretaker government to deal with urgent coronavirus matters, prepare national elections in March 2021 and govern the country during the cabinet formation process that would last a record number of days from 17 March 2021 until 10 January 2022.
Citations:
M. Chavannes, 25 September 2019. Wij hebben een mooi klimaatakkoord. Wat niet betekent dat we het gaan uitvoeren. (decorrespondent, accessed 3 November 2019)
Algemene Rekenkamer, Verantwoordingsdag. Toespraak President van de Algemene Rekenkamer, 15 May 2019 (Rijksoverheid, accessed 3 November 2019)
De Correspondent, 26 October 2019. De CO-2 heffing die nooit werd geïnd.
B. van den Braak, 2021. Bescheiden ambities en smalle marges. De wetgevingsoogst van Rutte III, in Montesquieu Instituut, ‘Niet zo stoffig, toch?’ Terugblik op het kabinet Rutte III, 105-108
Bernard ter Haar, blog published 23 April, 2021. De Nederlandse overheid heeft deze eeuw nog niets substantieels tot stand gebracht.
De Correspondent, Jesse Frederik, January 15, 2021. De tragedie achter de toeslagenaffaire
RTL Nieuws, March 5, 2021 Toeslagenschandaal veel groter
NOS Nieuws, November 29, 2021.Duizenden in financiële problemen gebracht door zwarte lijst Belastingdienst.
Volkskrant, Witteman, August 20, 2021. Vermorzeld in de raderen van de Belastingdienst
NRC-H., van den Bunt, March 16 2021.Catshuisregeling betekent weer systeemfalen.
To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?
10
9
9
The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
8
7
6
7
6
The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
5
4
3
4
3
The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
2
1
1
The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
Dutch ministers’ hands are tied by party discipline; government/coalition agreements (which they have to sign in person during an inaugural meeting of the new Council of Ministers); ministerial responsibility to the States General; and the dense consultation and negotiation processes taking place within their own departments, other departments in the interdepartmental administrative “front gates” and ministerial committees. Ministers have strong incentives to represent their ministerial interests, which do not necessarily directly reflect government coalition policy. The record-long formation period for the Rutte IV government, which nevertheless consists of the same four coalition partners (VVD, CDA, CU, and D66) as Rutte III, resulted in a government agreement that is more than 50 pages long – a “delivery by forceps” according to one spokesperson. Thus, structural cleavages (along left-right, “good” populism versus anti-populism, immigration and ethical issues) and the legacy of distrust between the coalition partners from the previous Rutte III experiences will lead to considerable intra-cabinet tensions, and thus opportunities for individual ministers to highlight their party-political affiliation and downplay the government agreement. This tendency may be stronger than usual since the new cabinet promised to change the traditional “governing culture” (bestuurscultuur) in which the coalition or cabinet agreement was politically sacrosanct.
Citations:
R.B. Andeweg & G.A. Irwin (2014), Governance and Politics of The Netherlands. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 140-163
NOS Nieuws, December 13 2021, Akkoord nieuw kabinet: “Het had soms iets van een tangverlossing.’
NRC, de Witt Wijnen, December 16, 2021. Elke partij kan eigen winstpunten noemen.
Volkskrant, Sitalsing, April 22, 2021. De ‘nieuwe bestuurscultuur’ waar je nu zoveel over hoort, is geen modegril, maar noodzaak
Citations:
R.B. Andeweg & G.A. Irwin (2014), Governance and Politics of The Netherlands. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 140-163
NOS Nieuws, December 13 2021, Akkoord nieuw kabinet: “Het had soms iets van een tangverlossing.’
NRC, de Witt Wijnen, December 16, 2021. Elke partij kan eigen winstpunten noemen.
Volkskrant, Sitalsing, April 22, 2021. De ‘nieuwe bestuurscultuur’ waar je nu zoveel over hoort, is geen modegril, maar noodzaak
How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
5
4
3
4
3
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
2
1
1
The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
Given the Prime Minister Office’s lack of capacity to coordinate and follow up on policy proposal and bills, systematic monitoring of line ministries’ implementation activities is scarcely possible. The child benefits policy catastrophe shows this clearly: Although the child benefit system was a bill designed by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, its implementation was entrusted to the tax authorities (in the role of allocator of tax benefits), formally part of the Ministry of Finance. When the first alarming signs of the affair became public, neither the minister of social affairs nor the prime minister were sufficiently well-informed or felt responsible to intervene. Even legal appeals fell on deaf ears in the Supreme Court, and an alarming report by the Ombudsman was neglected. Non-intervention on other departments’ turf and a hard division between policymaking/legislation and implementation practice hamper and complicate monitoring.
Since 2013 to 2014, General Audit Chamber studies have focused on salient and financially relevant policy issues on departmental domains. In 2012, the General Audit Chamber reported that just 50% of governmental policy initiatives were evaluated. Most of these evaluations incorrectly were considered effectiveness studies. Hence, parliament remains largely ill-informed about the success of governmental goals and objectives. In 2017, the audit chamber launched a website for monitoring ministerial compliance of its recommendations. Three out of five recommendations made by the audit chamber were complied with, according to ministerial self-reports. In 2019, policy failures were signaled with regard to sustainability targets, nitrogen emissions policy for agriculture and building activities, and toxic risks policy for soil and paints. Eventually, judging by the new coalition agreement, these failures appear today to be leading to remedial action.
Citations:
R.B. Andeweg & G.A. Irwin (2014), Governance and Politics of The Netherlands. Houdmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 188, 198-203
Teller Report, November 23 2021. Weekers warned Asscher about allowance affair: “If only I had persisted’
Algemene Rekenkamer, 2021. Voortgangsmeter aanbevelingen
Since 2013 to 2014, General Audit Chamber studies have focused on salient and financially relevant policy issues on departmental domains. In 2012, the General Audit Chamber reported that just 50% of governmental policy initiatives were evaluated. Most of these evaluations incorrectly were considered effectiveness studies. Hence, parliament remains largely ill-informed about the success of governmental goals and objectives. In 2017, the audit chamber launched a website for monitoring ministerial compliance of its recommendations. Three out of five recommendations made by the audit chamber were complied with, according to ministerial self-reports. In 2019, policy failures were signaled with regard to sustainability targets, nitrogen emissions policy for agriculture and building activities, and toxic risks policy for soil and paints. Eventually, judging by the new coalition agreement, these failures appear today to be leading to remedial action.
Citations:
R.B. Andeweg & G.A. Irwin (2014), Governance and Politics of The Netherlands. Houdmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 188, 198-203
Teller Report, November 23 2021. Weekers warned Asscher about allowance affair: “If only I had persisted’
Algemene Rekenkamer, 2021. Voortgangsmeter aanbevelingen
How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
8
7
6
7
6
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
5
4
3
4
3
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
2
1
1
The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
The many implementation failures and low level of policy effectiveness are generally considered to have resulted from the cuts imposed under the austerity policies of the previous Rutte governments. Inspectorates tasked with monitoring policy implementation practices by QANGOs and bureaucracies have also had their work impaired by the legacy of strict austerity measures. A 2016 evaluation study of the national Framework Law on Agencies/Bureaucracies had insufficient scope, according to members of parliament: too many agencies are exempted from (full) monitoring directives, while annual reports are delivered too late or are incomplete. Hence, the government and parliament lack adequate oversight over the dozens of billions of euros of expenses managed by bodies (QUANGOs) at some distance from the central government. In 2019, the Inspection Council (Inspectieraad) judged that the current legal structure and limited influence exerted by ministerial oversight result from a neglect of implementation problems and a predominantly efficiency-focused inspection approach. Inspectorates in sectors like building, education, healthcare, environment, labor conditions and even some water management regions are now considered impotent due to understaffing, underfinancing and overburdened staffs. A similar situation is evident in the consumer and privacy protection field, especially with regard to the digitalization of citizen registrations and the accessibility of online-only government services.
Citations:
Inspectieraad, 2019. Reflecties op de staat van het toezicht, Den Haag (Rijksoverheid, accessed 2 November 2019)
Evaluatie Kaderwet zelfstandige bestuursorganen, Kamerstuk 33 147, nr. 5, Verslag van een schriftelijk overleg, 20 September 2018
A. Pelizza and R. Hoppe, Birth of a failure. Media debates and digital infrastructure and the organization of governance, in Administration & Society, 2015
NOS Nieuws, n.d., 2021. Milieuovertredingen weinig gecontroleerd; vaak niet bestraft
De Groene Amsterdammer, Estra and Staal, 21 November 2021. Onderzoek: Omgevingsdiensten handhaven niet. ‘Bel de pers’.
Groene Amsterdammer, Peek and Woutersen, 29 September 2021. Investico: Inspectie pakt uitbuiting niet aan. Voor de tweede keer slachtoffer.
Citations:
Inspectieraad, 2019. Reflecties op de staat van het toezicht, Den Haag (Rijksoverheid, accessed 2 November 2019)
Evaluatie Kaderwet zelfstandige bestuursorganen, Kamerstuk 33 147, nr. 5, Verslag van een schriftelijk overleg, 20 September 2018
A. Pelizza and R. Hoppe, Birth of a failure. Media debates and digital infrastructure and the organization of governance, in Administration & Society, 2015
NOS Nieuws, n.d., 2021. Milieuovertredingen weinig gecontroleerd; vaak niet bestraft
De Groene Amsterdammer, Estra and Staal, 21 November 2021. Onderzoek: Omgevingsdiensten handhaven niet. ‘Bel de pers’.
Groene Amsterdammer, Peek and Woutersen, 29 September 2021. Investico: Inspectie pakt uitbuiting niet aan. Voor de tweede keer slachtoffer.
To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
8
7
6
7
6
The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
2
1
1
The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
Since 2010, the national government has devolved a significant number of implementation tasks to subnational governments. Subnational governments, which are positioned closer to citizens, are presumed to be more effective in delivering localized social and healthcare policy responses. However, local governments did not receive commensurate financial compensation for their additional activities, as “tailor-made” policies were intended to involve savings for the national budget. The more complicated interadministration relations and multilevel governance structures have made government and administrative responsibilities fuzzier, and policy performance harder to evaluate. According to data published by the Association of Local Governments (VNG), nearly half of such government entities are not financially resilient. Provincial and local audit chambers do what they can, but the amount and scope of decentralized tasks is simply too large for their capacity at this moment. Policy implementation in the fields of policing, youth care and care for the elderly in particular are increasingly sources of complaints by citizens and professionals, and thus becoming matters of grave concern.
Citations:
VNG, De wondere wereld van de gemeentefinanciëen, 2014 (eng.nl, consulted 9 November 2016)
Financieel Dagblad, 26 February 2019. Gemeenten in zwaar weer door verplichte sociale uitgaven.
VNG, 23 November 2021. Financiële weerbaarheid bij veel gemeenten onder de maat
NRC-H, Engelaar, April 30, 2021. Stop de fictie van ‘lokaal maatwerk’
Citations:
VNG, De wondere wereld van de gemeentefinanciëen, 2014 (eng.nl, consulted 9 November 2016)
Financieel Dagblad, 26 February 2019. Gemeenten in zwaar weer door verplichte sociale uitgaven.
VNG, 23 November 2021. Financiële weerbaarheid bij veel gemeenten onder de maat
NRC-H, Engelaar, April 30, 2021. Stop de fictie van ‘lokaal maatwerk’
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
2
1
1
The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
Dutch local governments are hybrids of “autonomous” and “co-government” forms. Typically, starting in 2016, the Local Government Fund (Gemeentefonds) budget has decreased and/or increased in step with the national government’s budget. Local autonomy is defined mostly negatively as pertaining to those tasks left to local discretion because they are not explicitly designated as national policy competencies. Co-government is financially and materially constrained in rather extensive detail by the elaborate set of indicators specified in the Local Government Fund (Gemeentefonds). Increasingly, the Dutch national government uses administrative and financial tools to steer and influence local policymaking. Some would go so far as to claim that these tools, jointly, violate the European Charter for Local Government in having created a culture of quality control and accountability that paralyzes local governments by reducing their policy flexibility to near zero. This is due in part to popular and political opinion that in a small country like the Netherlands local policymaking, levels of local-service delivery and local taxes ought to be equal everywhere. The transfer of policy competencies in many domains of care imply that local discretion has formally increased, sometimes resulting in different treatment of similar cases by local governments in different parts of the country. In 2021 the Dutch Association of Local Governments (VNG) offered a moderately positive evaluation regarding its increasing share in the national budget. But it also went so far as to publish a critical analysis of what it called an erosion of local government and democracy and, overturning the present constitutional three-level structure of inter-administrative relations (Huis van Thorbecke), advocated a radically innovative design for a Law on Decentralized Government.
Citations:
Hans Keman and Jaap Woldendorp (2010), „The Netherlands: Centralized – more than less!‟, in: Jürgen Dieringer and Roland Sturm (hrsg.), Regional Governance in EU-Staaten, Verlag Barbara Budrich: 269-286.
VNG-reactie op de Rijksbegroting 2019, Bijzondere Ledenbrief, (vng.nl., consulted 1 November 2018)
VNG, February, 2021. Manifest. Het roer om. Naar nieuwe verhoudingen in het openbaar en decentraal bestuur,
VNG, September 2021. VNG-reactie op de Rijksbegroting 2022. Bijzondere ledenbrief.
Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksaangelegenheden, Staat van het bestuur 2020: groeiende zorgen over decentrale democratie en het lokaal bestuur. (kennisopenbaarbestuur.nl)
Citations:
Hans Keman and Jaap Woldendorp (2010), „The Netherlands: Centralized – more than less!‟, in: Jürgen Dieringer and Roland Sturm (hrsg.), Regional Governance in EU-Staaten, Verlag Barbara Budrich: 269-286.
VNG-reactie op de Rijksbegroting 2019, Bijzondere Ledenbrief, (vng.nl., consulted 1 November 2018)
VNG, February, 2021. Manifest. Het roer om. Naar nieuwe verhoudingen in het openbaar en decentraal bestuur,
VNG, September 2021. VNG-reactie op de Rijksbegroting 2022. Bijzondere ledenbrief.
Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksaangelegenheden, Staat van het bestuur 2020: groeiende zorgen over decentrale democratie en het lokaal bestuur. (kennisopenbaarbestuur.nl)
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?
10
9
9
Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
2
1
1
Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
National standards are implicit in the nationwide local-government fund model, which allocates a share of national tax revenues to the roughly 360 local governments on the basis of numerous variables. This funding today comprises 86% of local-government budgets. Local governments themselves also try to meet mutually agreed-upon standards. Several studies by local audit chambers have involved comparisons and benchmarks for particular kinds of services. Local governments have been organizing voluntary peer reviews of each other’s executive capacities. In 2009, the Association of Dutch Local Governments established the Quality Institute of Dutch Local Governments (Kwaliteitsinstituut Nederlandse Gemeenten, KING, renamed VNG Realisatie B.V.). As part of a knowledge platform (Waarstaatjegemeente.nl), the Association of Dutch Local Governments produces a comparative report on the status of local governments that collects relevant policy evaluations and assists local governments in their information management. Nevertheless, due to the implementation of ill-considered decentralization plans, including funding cutbacks, it is likely that the uniformity of national standards in the delivery of municipal services has somewhat diminished. Instead of strict output equality, official discourse now refers to “situational equality.” This development is counteracted by increasing cooperation by municipalities in transboundary tasks (e.g., garbage collection and treatment, youth care, care for the elderly, but also regional energy and innovation policy). Cooperation agreements for such transboundary tasks escape normal democratic control by local councils, and have reached numbers and degrees of intensity that give rise to concerns about the scope and quality of local democracy.
Citations:
A. Korsten, 2004. Visiteren van gemeentebesturen, Bestuurwetenschappen, 1-15, VNG Uitgeverij
P. Meurs, Maatwerk en willekeur. Een pleidooi voor situationele gelijkheid, Raad voor Volksgezondheid en Samenleving, 28 January, 2016
Waarstaatjegemeente.nl, 2021
Raad voor het Openbaar Bestuur, Van den Berg et al., May 11 2021. Perspectief op interbestuurlijke samenwerking: Beelden van het rijk en decentrale overheden kwanitatief vergeleken.
Citations:
A. Korsten, 2004. Visiteren van gemeentebesturen, Bestuurwetenschappen, 1-15, VNG Uitgeverij
P. Meurs, Maatwerk en willekeur. Een pleidooi voor situationele gelijkheid, Raad voor Volksgezondheid en Samenleving, 28 January, 2016
Waarstaatjegemeente.nl, 2021
Raad voor het Openbaar Bestuur, Van den Berg et al., May 11 2021. Perspectief op interbestuurlijke samenwerking: Beelden van het rijk en decentrale overheden kwanitatief vergeleken.
To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?
10
9
9
Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
8
7
6
7
6
Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
5
4
3
4
3
Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
2
1
1
Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
The government frequently formulates policy goals that are more far-reaching than can realistically be achieved in practice. For example, virtually none of the coronavirus policies could or can be implemented with the existing contingents of nurses, care workers, police officers and their assistants. Realistically speaking, enforcement of coronavirus policies rests on moral appeals to firms and citizens and nudging them to obey the rules (regarding social distancing, wearing masks, etcetera), paired with small-scale law-enforcement activities. The same could be argued about traffic control; enforcing anti-pollution and environmental rules for firms; and drugs, food and sustainability rules for consumers.
Paradoxically, generally weak rule enforcement leads to overreaction and harsh rule enforcement in other cases. The child benefit affairs could come about only because of a policy of zero tolerance for social benefits fraud, which was deemed necessary to guarantee citizens’ solidarity and willingness to pay taxes. Another example is the use of regulatory enforcement by administrative bodies (rather than legal prosecution by legal authorities) to counter the efforts of criminal organizations to penetrate the formal economy and government administrations. Attention has been focused on illegal-drug production, traffic (notably in harbor cities, but also in the relatively empty rural areas of the country’s south and east), transportation and trade, as well as on human trafficking (women, refugees). Special police teams, mayors of larger cities, national and local public prosecutors, and fiscal detectives collaborate (not very successfully) in detecting drug and human trafficking gangs. Through the use of ordinary administrative laws, authorities “harass” drug and human traffickers to such an extent that they close down their business or, more frequently, relocate. Studies trying to estimate the effectiveness of such methods have been methodologically contested and are thus inconclusive. It is in connection to illegal drugs and human trafficking that mayors of larger cities and sometimes small, rural villages become “crime fighters.”
Citations:
Trouw, 31 August 2019. Niet alleen in Amsterdam zijn drugs een probleem.
De Correspondent, 26 October 2019. De CO-2 heffing die nooit werd geïnd.
NRC-H, Meeus, December 4, 2021 Minder hijgerigheid, meer tegendruk: ambtenaren en de komst van Rutte IV
Inspectie Justitie en Veiligheid, 18-05-2021. Jaarbericht 2020: Grote druk op uitvoeringsorganisaties
Tweede Kamer, 25 February, 2021. Eindrapport onderzoek uitvoeringsorganisaties overhandigd. (‘Klem tussen balie en beleid’.)
Paradoxically, generally weak rule enforcement leads to overreaction and harsh rule enforcement in other cases. The child benefit affairs could come about only because of a policy of zero tolerance for social benefits fraud, which was deemed necessary to guarantee citizens’ solidarity and willingness to pay taxes. Another example is the use of regulatory enforcement by administrative bodies (rather than legal prosecution by legal authorities) to counter the efforts of criminal organizations to penetrate the formal economy and government administrations. Attention has been focused on illegal-drug production, traffic (notably in harbor cities, but also in the relatively empty rural areas of the country’s south and east), transportation and trade, as well as on human trafficking (women, refugees). Special police teams, mayors of larger cities, national and local public prosecutors, and fiscal detectives collaborate (not very successfully) in detecting drug and human trafficking gangs. Through the use of ordinary administrative laws, authorities “harass” drug and human traffickers to such an extent that they close down their business or, more frequently, relocate. Studies trying to estimate the effectiveness of such methods have been methodologically contested and are thus inconclusive. It is in connection to illegal drugs and human trafficking that mayors of larger cities and sometimes small, rural villages become “crime fighters.”
Citations:
Trouw, 31 August 2019. Niet alleen in Amsterdam zijn drugs een probleem.
De Correspondent, 26 October 2019. De CO-2 heffing die nooit werd geïnd.
NRC-H, Meeus, December 4, 2021 Minder hijgerigheid, meer tegendruk: ambtenaren en de komst van Rutte IV
Inspectie Justitie en Veiligheid, 18-05-2021. Jaarbericht 2020: Grote druk op uitvoeringsorganisaties
Tweede Kamer, 25 February, 2021. Eindrapport onderzoek uitvoeringsorganisaties overhandigd. (‘Klem tussen balie en beleid’.)
Graph View
To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?
10
9
9
The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
8
7
6
7
6
In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
2
1
1
The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
Government reform has been on and off the agenda for at least 40 years, but there has been no substantial reform of the original government structure, which dates back to the 1848 constitution, “Thorbecke’s house.” The Council of State, which is the highest court of appeal in administrative law, is still part of the executive, not the judiciary. A brief experiment with consultative referendums was nipped in the bud early in the Rutte III cabinet rule. The Netherlands is one of the last countries in Europe in which mayors are appointed by the national government. In spring 2013, the Rutte II government largely withdrew its drastic plans to further reduce the number of local and municipal governments. Given the Dutch citizens’ relatively high level of trust in national institutions, it could be argued there was no need for reforms. But in 2021, as a response to the child benefit scandal and many other signs of policy failure, the general public’s levels of trust in politics and politicians suddenly dropped dramatically.
For years there had been a negative political mood, manifesting in typical expressions of unease like “I am OK, but the country is going down the drain,” by “angry” or “worried” citizens who feel they are not being “listened to,” are “not visible,” or are “forgotten,” “orphaned,” no longer “at home” and “threatened in their identity.” Some analysts framed this as the emergence of a psychological-populist political culture, exploited by both right-wing populist (PVV, FvD, JA91) and identitarian parties (Bij1, DENK) and human interest and lifestyle-based media. Dozens of political opinion leaders, scientists and even high-level civil servants stepped forward with analyses of how and why the political system structurally fails to be responsive, is averse to learning from failure, avoids deep political conflicts and, generally, lacks sufficient learning capacity. In these analyses two major points stand out. First, parliament has lost its capacity and interest in careful co-legislation; and in its role of holding the executive to account it lacks information about policy impacts on the life world of citizens. Second, in the executive, control over implementation has shifted to experts in process management, financial control and performance measurement. In other words, the bureaucracy’s ethos is no longer anchored in the concept of “public value and service for citizens” but rather in “correct rule compliance” and “cost-efficiency in the service delivery process.”
The first signs of trouble in this area came in a 2018 report by the Remkes Commission, which advocated state reforms rebalancing the demands of democracy and the rule of law. Among its 83 recommendations, the report advocated for the direct election of politicians tasked with forming new cabinets, the introduction of a binding corrective referendum process, the establishment of a Constitutional Court tasked with assessing the constitutionality of parliamentary laws, and procedures that would give voters greater influence over who is elected to parliament. The commission also called for a new political culture that would accept less detailed government coalition agreements, and would be more willing to consider the possibility of minority governments or governing through shifting majorities. In the 2021 coalition agreement, finally, in a first section entitled “strengthening of democracy and the rule of law” (versterking van de democratische rechtsorde), many of these recommendations are embraced as to-be-elaborated intentions and promises by the Rutte IV cabinet.
Citations:
Gemeentelijke en provinciale herindelingen in Nederland (home.kpn.nl/pagklein/gemhis.html, consulted 27 October 2014)
Staatscommissie parlementair stelsel (die. Remkes), December 2018. Lage drempels, hoge dijken.Democratie en rechtsstaat in balans, Amsterdam: Boom
De Groen Amsterdammer, van der Hoeven, March 10, 2021. Is de publieke zaak nog in goede handen? ‘We moeten zaken simpeler willem huden.’
R. Bekker, March 2020. Dat had niet zo gemoeten.Fouten en fallen van de overheid onder het vergrootglas. Boombestuurskunde
J. Bussemaker, 2021. Ministerie van verbeelding. Idealen en de politieke praktijk, Uitgeverij Balans
NRC, de Witt Wijnen, January 15, 2021. Meer transparantie, altertere ambtenaren
Montesquieu Instituut, van den Berg en Kok, August 30, 2021. Onbehagen bestrijden? Meer rechtsstaat, minder emotiecultuur.
NRC, 22 November, 2021. Wantrouwen gaat niet over samenleving maar over politiek.
Coalitieakkoord, December 15, 2021. ‘Omzien naar elkaar, en vooruitkijken naar de toekomst’
For years there had been a negative political mood, manifesting in typical expressions of unease like “I am OK, but the country is going down the drain,” by “angry” or “worried” citizens who feel they are not being “listened to,” are “not visible,” or are “forgotten,” “orphaned,” no longer “at home” and “threatened in their identity.” Some analysts framed this as the emergence of a psychological-populist political culture, exploited by both right-wing populist (PVV, FvD, JA91) and identitarian parties (Bij1, DENK) and human interest and lifestyle-based media. Dozens of political opinion leaders, scientists and even high-level civil servants stepped forward with analyses of how and why the political system structurally fails to be responsive, is averse to learning from failure, avoids deep political conflicts and, generally, lacks sufficient learning capacity. In these analyses two major points stand out. First, parliament has lost its capacity and interest in careful co-legislation; and in its role of holding the executive to account it lacks information about policy impacts on the life world of citizens. Second, in the executive, control over implementation has shifted to experts in process management, financial control and performance measurement. In other words, the bureaucracy’s ethos is no longer anchored in the concept of “public value and service for citizens” but rather in “correct rule compliance” and “cost-efficiency in the service delivery process.”
The first signs of trouble in this area came in a 2018 report by the Remkes Commission, which advocated state reforms rebalancing the demands of democracy and the rule of law. Among its 83 recommendations, the report advocated for the direct election of politicians tasked with forming new cabinets, the introduction of a binding corrective referendum process, the establishment of a Constitutional Court tasked with assessing the constitutionality of parliamentary laws, and procedures that would give voters greater influence over who is elected to parliament. The commission also called for a new political culture that would accept less detailed government coalition agreements, and would be more willing to consider the possibility of minority governments or governing through shifting majorities. In the 2021 coalition agreement, finally, in a first section entitled “strengthening of democracy and the rule of law” (versterking van de democratische rechtsorde), many of these recommendations are embraced as to-be-elaborated intentions and promises by the Rutte IV cabinet.
Citations:
Gemeentelijke en provinciale herindelingen in Nederland (home.kpn.nl/pagklein/gemhis.html, consulted 27 October 2014)
Staatscommissie parlementair stelsel (die. Remkes), December 2018. Lage drempels, hoge dijken.Democratie en rechtsstaat in balans, Amsterdam: Boom
De Groen Amsterdammer, van der Hoeven, March 10, 2021. Is de publieke zaak nog in goede handen? ‘We moeten zaken simpeler willem huden.’
R. Bekker, March 2020. Dat had niet zo gemoeten.Fouten en fallen van de overheid onder het vergrootglas. Boombestuurskunde
J. Bussemaker, 2021. Ministerie van verbeelding. Idealen en de politieke praktijk, Uitgeverij Balans
NRC, de Witt Wijnen, January 15, 2021. Meer transparantie, altertere ambtenaren
Montesquieu Instituut, van den Berg en Kok, August 30, 2021. Onbehagen bestrijden? Meer rechtsstaat, minder emotiecultuur.
NRC, 22 November, 2021. Wantrouwen gaat niet over samenleving maar over politiek.
Coalitieakkoord, December 15, 2021. ‘Omzien naar elkaar, en vooruitkijken naar de toekomst’
To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?
10
9
9
The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
2
1
1
The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
The Netherlands has been a long-time protagonist in all forms of international cooperation since the Second World War. However, research has shown that since the late 1970s, 60% of EU directives have been delayed (sometimes by years) before being transposed into Dutch law. Although popular support for the EU never fell below 60% in Eurobarometer studies, the present-day popular attitude to international affairs is marked by reluctance, indifference or rejection. This has had an impact on internal and foreign policy, as indicated by the Dutch shift toward assimilationism in integration and immigration policies; the decline in popular support and subsequent lowering of the 1%-of-government-spending-norm for development aid; the government’s continued message that the country is an “unfairly” treated net contributor to EU finances; and the rejection of the EU referendum and the rejection of the EU treaty with Ukraine in a non-binding referendum.
The change in attitudes has also negatively affected government participation and influence in international coordination of policy and other reforms. Since 2003, the Dutch States General have been more involved in preparing EU-related policy, but largely through the lens of subsidiarity and proportionality – that is, in the role of guarding Dutch sovereignty. Although the number of civil servants with legal, economic and administrative expertise at the EU level has undoubtedly increased due to their participation in EU consultative procedures, no new structural adjustments in departmental policy and legislative preparation have been implemented. At present, a political mood of “Dutch interests first” translates into a political attitude of unwillingness to adapt domestic political and policy infrastructure to international, particularly EU, trends and developments (beyond what has already been achieved). Nevertheless, Dutch ministers do play important roles in the coordination of financial policies at the EU level. The present vice-president of the European Commission, Frans Timmermans, is a former Dutch minister. Indeed, it is only since the beginning of the banking and financial crisis that the need for better coordination of international policymaking by the Dutch government has led to some reforms in the architecture of policy formulation. The sheer number of EU top-level meetings between national leaders forces the Dutch prime minister to act as a minister of general and European affairs, with heavy support from the minister of finance. In tandem, they put the brakes on the Stability and Growth pact for a coordinated European approach to economic reforms and mitigation of the economic impacts of the coronavirus crisis. At of the time of writing, the Dutch were the only country to have not yet filed a national plan for reforms as a condition for gaining access to SGP funds.
But regarding the EU. there is change in the air. The December 2021 coalition agreement states that from now on, the Dutch government intends to play a leading role in making the EU more ready for decisive action, and in making it economically stronger, greener and more secure. This implies more willingness to implement EU directives swiftly and to cooperate on issues like climate, migration, security, trade and tax evasion. Tellingly, the Dutch government is considerably increasing its national defense budget, and supports EU military cooperation and a potential European security council. To date, information about EU policies and decisions have typically reached citizens not through governmental information services, but only through the media and the Dutch parliament through a large number of fragmented channels. As part of a new Europe Law, the government intends to structurally inform citizens and parliament more transparently about EU decision-making and the impacts and value-added associated with EU policies.
Globally, the Netherlands, ranking 11th out of 165 countries, is doing fairly well in achieving its own Sustainable Development Goals. The bad news is that its spillover score ranks 159th out of 165, meaning that it hardly has any positive spillover effects on other countries or parts of the world on dimensions like environmental and social impacts embodied in trade, economy, finance and security. Especially in the areas of the economy and finance, the country contributes to corporate tax evasion, financial secrecy and profit shifting; it also plays a small but substantial role in weapons exports.
Citations:
R.B. Andeweg & G.A. Irwin, Governance and Politics of The Netherlands (2014). Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 220-228 regarding coordination viz-a-viz the EU and 251-272 for Foreign Policy in general.
Instituut Clingendaal, Europa NU,22 december 2021. Europese Commissie wil brievenbusfirma’s aanpakken, Nederland onder de loep
Coalitieakkoord, December 15, 2021. ‘Omzien naae elkaar, vooruitkijken naar de toekomst.
Sustainable Development Report 2021 – SDG Index
The change in attitudes has also negatively affected government participation and influence in international coordination of policy and other reforms. Since 2003, the Dutch States General have been more involved in preparing EU-related policy, but largely through the lens of subsidiarity and proportionality – that is, in the role of guarding Dutch sovereignty. Although the number of civil servants with legal, economic and administrative expertise at the EU level has undoubtedly increased due to their participation in EU consultative procedures, no new structural adjustments in departmental policy and legislative preparation have been implemented. At present, a political mood of “Dutch interests first” translates into a political attitude of unwillingness to adapt domestic political and policy infrastructure to international, particularly EU, trends and developments (beyond what has already been achieved). Nevertheless, Dutch ministers do play important roles in the coordination of financial policies at the EU level. The present vice-president of the European Commission, Frans Timmermans, is a former Dutch minister. Indeed, it is only since the beginning of the banking and financial crisis that the need for better coordination of international policymaking by the Dutch government has led to some reforms in the architecture of policy formulation. The sheer number of EU top-level meetings between national leaders forces the Dutch prime minister to act as a minister of general and European affairs, with heavy support from the minister of finance. In tandem, they put the brakes on the Stability and Growth pact for a coordinated European approach to economic reforms and mitigation of the economic impacts of the coronavirus crisis. At of the time of writing, the Dutch were the only country to have not yet filed a national plan for reforms as a condition for gaining access to SGP funds.
But regarding the EU. there is change in the air. The December 2021 coalition agreement states that from now on, the Dutch government intends to play a leading role in making the EU more ready for decisive action, and in making it economically stronger, greener and more secure. This implies more willingness to implement EU directives swiftly and to cooperate on issues like climate, migration, security, trade and tax evasion. Tellingly, the Dutch government is considerably increasing its national defense budget, and supports EU military cooperation and a potential European security council. To date, information about EU policies and decisions have typically reached citizens not through governmental information services, but only through the media and the Dutch parliament through a large number of fragmented channels. As part of a new Europe Law, the government intends to structurally inform citizens and parliament more transparently about EU decision-making and the impacts and value-added associated with EU policies.
Globally, the Netherlands, ranking 11th out of 165 countries, is doing fairly well in achieving its own Sustainable Development Goals. The bad news is that its spillover score ranks 159th out of 165, meaning that it hardly has any positive spillover effects on other countries or parts of the world on dimensions like environmental and social impacts embodied in trade, economy, finance and security. Especially in the areas of the economy and finance, the country contributes to corporate tax evasion, financial secrecy and profit shifting; it also plays a small but substantial role in weapons exports.
Citations:
R.B. Andeweg & G.A. Irwin, Governance and Politics of The Netherlands (2014). Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 220-228 regarding coordination viz-a-viz the EU and 251-272 for Foreign Policy in general.
Instituut Clingendaal, Europa NU,22 december 2021. Europese Commissie wil brievenbusfirma’s aanpakken, Nederland onder de loep
Coalitieakkoord, December 15, 2021. ‘Omzien naae elkaar, vooruitkijken naar de toekomst.
Sustainable Development Report 2021 – SDG Index
Graph View
To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?
10
9
9
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
5
4
3
4
3
The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
2
1
1
There is no monitoring.
There have only been two visible changes in the institutional practices of the Dutch government at the national level. One is that the monarch was stripped of participation in cabinet-formation processes in 2012; the second chamber or senate now formally directs that process; in practice it is in the hands of the largest political party after elections. The effect on government formation was mixed, with a historically rapid formation in 2012 and two coalition formation processes of record-setting length in 2017 and 2021. The second change was the informal adaptation to lower levels of parliamentary support on the part of the Rutte I and II governments. Informal coordination processes between government ministers, and all members of the senate and second chamber have become crucial for governing at the national level. Following provincial elections in 2019, this also applied to the Rutte III and will apply to the Rutte IV cabinet. However, in 2019, the Council of State warned that there was a risk of subjecting parliamentary legislation to the outcomes of poldering practices that effectively give too much power to organized and vested stakeholder interests (e.g., in the context of the big agreements on housing, pensions and climate).
Two open organizational-reform crises have emerged in recent times that threaten citizens’ well-being in the long run. The first is the underfunded, understaffed and ill-considered transfer of policy responsibility to municipal and local governments within important domains such as youth care, healthcare and senior-citizen care. Strikingly, in 2020-21, many critical studies and reports signaled strong “peripheral discontents” in the northern, eastern and southern areas of the country; many citizens living in those parts of the country feel unheard, unseen and neglected. They frequently organize demonstrations in the political capital, The Hague. A task-driven (as opposed to a problem-driven) national politics and policy hampers the development of more appropriate regional and local policy responses. Regional and local governments now demand a long-overdue overhaul of interadministrative relations between national, provincial and local government and water boards. Practical problems and tensions crystallize in the now often politically contested role of mayors.
Second, there is a looming reform crisis in the justice and policing system, which undermines the government’s task of protecting citizens’ security. The reform of the policing system from regional or local bodies into a single big national organization is stagnating; police officers have mounted strikes based on wage and working-condition issues; and the top echelon of the police leadership is in disarray. The digitalization of the justice system and the reduction in the number of courts, in addition to imposed cutbacks, has wreaked havoc within the judicial branch of government. There is a crisis in the relations between the political and the bureaucratic elements, given that the Department of Justice and Security, later renamed according to its true order of priorities, Security and Justice, is supposed to provide political guidance to both of these reform movements. The subordination and instrumentalization of law to policy and the securitization of the judiciary is evident in the fact that under the Rutte IV cabinet, the top echelon of the department no longer consists of top-level legal specialists; instead, the department is run by specialists in political science and public administration.
Citations:
NRC-Handelsblad, 11 April 2019. Raad van State: parlement maakt zichzelf machteloos door akkoorden.
NOS Nieuws, September 1, 2021. Vorige informateur (Tjeenk Eillink) voelt ‘plaatsvervangende schaamte’ voor impasse formatie
Raad van State, 25 November 2021, Verzoek om voorlichting over interbestuurlijke verhoudingen
Van den Berg and Kok, 14 September 2021. Regionaal Maatschappelijk Onbehagen. Naar een rechtsstatelijk antwoord op perifeer ressentiment. (in opdracht van LNV)
Boogers et al., January 2021. Teveel van het goede? De staat van het burgemeesterambt anno 2020.
Two open organizational-reform crises have emerged in recent times that threaten citizens’ well-being in the long run. The first is the underfunded, understaffed and ill-considered transfer of policy responsibility to municipal and local governments within important domains such as youth care, healthcare and senior-citizen care. Strikingly, in 2020-21, many critical studies and reports signaled strong “peripheral discontents” in the northern, eastern and southern areas of the country; many citizens living in those parts of the country feel unheard, unseen and neglected. They frequently organize demonstrations in the political capital, The Hague. A task-driven (as opposed to a problem-driven) national politics and policy hampers the development of more appropriate regional and local policy responses. Regional and local governments now demand a long-overdue overhaul of interadministrative relations between national, provincial and local government and water boards. Practical problems and tensions crystallize in the now often politically contested role of mayors.
Second, there is a looming reform crisis in the justice and policing system, which undermines the government’s task of protecting citizens’ security. The reform of the policing system from regional or local bodies into a single big national organization is stagnating; police officers have mounted strikes based on wage and working-condition issues; and the top echelon of the police leadership is in disarray. The digitalization of the justice system and the reduction in the number of courts, in addition to imposed cutbacks, has wreaked havoc within the judicial branch of government. There is a crisis in the relations between the political and the bureaucratic elements, given that the Department of Justice and Security, later renamed according to its true order of priorities, Security and Justice, is supposed to provide political guidance to both of these reform movements. The subordination and instrumentalization of law to policy and the securitization of the judiciary is evident in the fact that under the Rutte IV cabinet, the top echelon of the department no longer consists of top-level legal specialists; instead, the department is run by specialists in political science and public administration.
Citations:
NRC-Handelsblad, 11 April 2019. Raad van State: parlement maakt zichzelf machteloos door akkoorden.
NOS Nieuws, September 1, 2021. Vorige informateur (Tjeenk Eillink) voelt ‘plaatsvervangende schaamte’ voor impasse formatie
Raad van State, 25 November 2021, Verzoek om voorlichting over interbestuurlijke verhoudingen
Van den Berg and Kok, 14 September 2021. Regionaal Maatschappelijk Onbehagen. Naar een rechtsstatelijk antwoord op perifeer ressentiment. (in opdracht van LNV)
Boogers et al., January 2021. Teveel van het goede? De staat van het burgemeesterambt anno 2020.
To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?
10
9
9
The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
8
7
6
7
6
The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
2
1
1
The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
No major changes have taken place in strategic arrangements or capacities beyond what has already been mentioned regarding externally driven policy coordination in fiscal and economic matters. Generally, strategic capacity is rather weak. Due to the long period of austerity, which came to an end only in 2019, strategic capacities have not been strengthened. This became clear for all to see following the government’s steering problems during the pandemic. Experiments in participatory budgeting and local democracy may to some extent harness citizen knowledge and expertise, and serve as a countervailing power to local government bodies. A hesitantly more pro-EU policy mood may also result in some institutional reform over the mid-term.
But this is going to take a lot of effort and, probably, time. Although institutional arrangements are monitored regularly (for instance, by the Scientific Council of the Government on citizen self-reliance, the Council for Public Administration on local democracy and administrative effectiveness, annual reports by the national Council of State on politically salient issues, and regular reports on citizens’ perceptions of well-being by the Socio-Cultural Planning Agency), recommendations and plans often receive little follow-up due to a lack of political will. It has been plausibly argued that the weak link between critical self-monitoring and political action is due to a systematically biased self-image among the country’s leading politicians, civil servants and intellectuals: Every failure is disparaged as an “incident” or “accident” in a normally smoothly run, exemplary country. In the typically pragmatic and technocratic style of policymaking characteristic for the country since the 1990s, this leads to muddling through rather than reform and institutional change. Policymakers routinely ask: “How can we do things better?” instead of “Are we doing the right things?”
Citations:
VPRO, 26 December 2021. Mathieu Segers: de voorbeeldrol die Nederland zich aanmeet, is heel vaak misplaatst
De Correspondent, Chavannes, 27 December 2020. De overheid werd een bedrijft mensen onverdiend wantrouwt. Alleen Kamer en kabinet kunnen die denkfout herstellen.
But this is going to take a lot of effort and, probably, time. Although institutional arrangements are monitored regularly (for instance, by the Scientific Council of the Government on citizen self-reliance, the Council for Public Administration on local democracy and administrative effectiveness, annual reports by the national Council of State on politically salient issues, and regular reports on citizens’ perceptions of well-being by the Socio-Cultural Planning Agency), recommendations and plans often receive little follow-up due to a lack of political will. It has been plausibly argued that the weak link between critical self-monitoring and political action is due to a systematically biased self-image among the country’s leading politicians, civil servants and intellectuals: Every failure is disparaged as an “incident” or “accident” in a normally smoothly run, exemplary country. In the typically pragmatic and technocratic style of policymaking characteristic for the country since the 1990s, this leads to muddling through rather than reform and institutional change. Policymakers routinely ask: “How can we do things better?” instead of “Are we doing the right things?”
Citations:
VPRO, 26 December 2021. Mathieu Segers: de voorbeeldrol die Nederland zich aanmeet, is heel vaak misplaatst
De Correspondent, Chavannes, 27 December 2020. De overheid werd een bedrijft mensen onverdiend wantrouwt. Alleen Kamer en kabinet kunnen die denkfout herstellen.