Social Policies
#16Key Findings
With several areas of concern marring a generally effective policy approach, the Netherlands falls into the upper-middle ranks (rank 16) with regard to social policies. Its score on this measure has declined by 0.6 points relative to 2014.
The Dutch education system performs well, with spending allocated efficiently. However, inequalities tied to social background deepened during the pandemic. A post-pandemic program is aimed at addressing weaknesses across the system. Poverty rates are low, but income inequality has grown. Decentralization policies appear to be undermining anti-poverty programs.
The outbreak of COVID-19 exposed vulnerabilities in the healthcare system, which has focused on efficiency and cost containment in recent years. Care staff are underpaid. Vaccination rates are high. In a major scandal, many innocent families receiving childcare benefits were targeted by an automated fraud system and forced to pay back large amounts of money.
A new pension law simplifies rules and brings freelance workers into the system. A large share of the Dutch population is of migrant origin. Immigrants benefit from employment and labor market integration programs, but conditions are poor in refugee camps. Organized drug crime is an increasingly serious problem, leading to high-profile murders and influence in political and police circles.
The Dutch education system performs well, with spending allocated efficiently. However, inequalities tied to social background deepened during the pandemic. A post-pandemic program is aimed at addressing weaknesses across the system. Poverty rates are low, but income inequality has grown. Decentralization policies appear to be undermining anti-poverty programs.
The outbreak of COVID-19 exposed vulnerabilities in the healthcare system, which has focused on efficiency and cost containment in recent years. Care staff are underpaid. Vaccination rates are high. In a major scandal, many innocent families receiving childcare benefits were targeted by an automated fraud system and forced to pay back large amounts of money.
A new pension law simplifies rules and brings freelance workers into the system. A large share of the Dutch population is of migrant origin. Immigrants benefit from employment and labor market integration programs, but conditions are poor in refugee camps. Organized drug crime is an increasingly serious problem, leading to high-profile murders and influence in political and police circles.
Graph View
Graph View
To what extent does education policy deliver high-quality, equitable and efficient education and training?
10
9
9
Education policy fully achieves the criteria.
8
7
6
7
6
Education policy largely achieves the criteria.
5
4
3
4
3
Education policy partially achieves the criteria.
2
1
1
Education policy does not achieve the criteria at all.
The dominant theme for Dutch education over the last two years obviously was the response to COVID-19. The crisis exacerbated some structural weaknesses of the system and accelerated other developments. In 2019, the Dutch education system was performing strongly, with attainment somewhat exceeding the OECD average. Educational spending was below the OECD average, and was geared toward efficiency. Amidst lockdowns and other restrictions, the educational system remained resilient. The mix of autonomy and innovation in the Dutch educational system, combined with broad support for the social role of schools, resulted in a swift initial response to the coronavirus crisis. School closures were seen as a measure of last resort. Elementary schools reopened as soon as possible. For children of essential workers, schools and daycare centers never closed. At-risk children – particularly from vulnerable families or those at risk of domestic abuse – also returned to school quickly. Since the pedagogical environment in Dutch schools is not overly competitive, concerns about “missing material” were not as great as feared. Instead, quite quickly, attention shifted to “vulnerable children.”
However, this flexibility has a downside: inequality in education deepened during the COVID-19 crisis. This continued a trend seen over the last 10-15 years. Income, social status and migrant origin determine to a large extent the school outcome of children. A recent study states that PISA achievements are the worst among students whose parents have completed only lower levels of education, and/or among those who are from migrant families. Also, those children are more likely to follow lower education paths (vocational education as opposed to general or academic education).
These issues of inequity deepened during the pandemic. Schools differed substantially in the quality of online education. Families differed in their ability to offer support to children, material or otherwise (e.g., electronic devices, adequate internet access, a quiet place to study or parental assistance with homework assignments). In particular, single parents – mostly women – faced severe burdens. Here again, parents with higher levels of education and greater work autonomy, as well as two-parent households, were better able to home-school children as compared to single-parent households, parents with less education and parents with less flexible working environments. Innovations in curriculum and teaching have always been encouraged in Dutch schools, with only a few general requirements. This allowed schools to adapt quickly to the pandemic, without significant disruption. Most schools offer adequate digital-learning platforms – with smart boards being standard from the elementary to the higher education level, and many interactive elements in teaching. However, variation between schools is considerable. Some schools needed to be trained to make video recordings within a week, while others simply expanded their blended learning platforms to full-time use. Generally, the crisis accelerated the acquisition of ICT skills by teaching staff, including among older teachers who might have been more reluctant prior to the pandemic.
Still, an overall drop in the quality of teaching cannot be attributed entirely to the COVID-19 crisis. Elementary school pupils’ test results in basic skills are dropping, and falling behind the ambitions formulated in 2010. The share of students reaching basic math and reading skill levels is lower than expected. It seems that teaching writing poses organizational difficulties in the context of elementary education in the Netherlands. While elementary schools returned to in-person teaching after the first wave, secondary and post-secondary institutions struggled to provide at least first year students with a minimum amount of face-to-face education, never exceeding 30% of all study hours. This resulted in a significant rise in psychological issues among adolescents, due to the disturbance of school’s socialization role during the lockdowns. The quality of higher education in the Netherlands is guaranteed by mass entrance exams at age 11 and mass centralized exams for graduates. Both had to be skipped and/or adapted over extended periods of time and with more exemptions, due to the pandemic. Discussions about the pros and cons of these examinations have been fueled by this unintended experiment, particularly in the light of deepening inequality.
Vocational schools suffered the most deeply, and disadvantaged students suffered doubly. A strength of the Dutch education system – its practical orientation, with substantial workplace-learning components – turned into a liability during the COVID-19 crisis. It became increasingly difficult to arrange work-study places, as many businesses had to close and work from home became the norm for extended periods of time. This was true particularly for secondary vocational education programs, but also for higher professional education and some professionally oriented university studies. Due to the segregation of Dutch education, in which children from lower socioeconomic and migration backgrounds are overrepresented in vocational education, the disturbance of the learning-on-the-job model affected more vulnerable students to a greater extent. Combined with lower-quality housing and the loss of access to digital resources due to school closures, already vulnerable students experienced a disproportionate delay in their studies.
In the higher education sector, the general feeling is that hybrid forms of teaching will be here to stay. Many higher education institutions were already used to fewer contact hours and a relatively high share of independent project work. Small project groups were generally allowed to work together until the second lockdown. While the changes were rather minor for many students, the loss of social contact with fellow students, and the inability to undertake lab or practical work for some study programs, were significant impacts. Other programs, especially small-scale professional programs that relied on personal contact and supervision, had to make more drastic adjustments.
Many students experienced psychological issues as a result of the isolation, but also because they lost their part-time jobs and thus incomes. The extent to which this has led to study delays has yet to be estimated, and effects seem to vary widely both at the individual level and between programs and universities. The student loan system contributed to delays, stress and inequality and became unsustainable. The new government announced a plan to reverse it back to basic student financing.
Both at the higher vocational training and university levels, issues of skewed financing (favoring research in technical and natural sciences over social sciences and education in general), combined with an increased number of international students, have resulted in work pressures and quality issues. Academic staffers reportedly regularly work from one-quarter to one-third longer than their paid hours. The most overwork is in education. The demands of online education added to the strain. Structural problems that were not adequately addressed before the crisis also deepened due to the increased sick leave and higher workloads. The greatest concern before the crisis, the acute shortage of teachers, has yet to be resolved, in spite of salary increases, including designated bonuses for teachers at schools with many disadvantaged students. The gap in remuneration between elementary school teachers and high school teachers still remains, and is perceived as unfair by many. The government came up with a national plan for recovery. The plan is aimed at making up for the delays and at mitigating the inequalities. The National Education Program is aimed at turning the COVID-19-repair efforts into sustainable improvements across the education sector. The primary points of focus include the shortage of teachers and school administrators, improvements in quality and efforts to equalize opportunities, sustainable investment in knowledge structure through knowledge sharing and utilization, and local efforts to improve youths’ future prospects. However, the program has been widely criticized for being oriented only to the short term, and for failing to address structural issues. For example, school buildings are 40 years old on the average, and over 80% do not meet the requirements for clean air, but the financing for renovation is lagging behind. In addition, lots of private parties take part in the recovery efforts, which contributes further to a process of hidden privatization in public education. The number of private schools in the Netherlands is still negligible; however, other channels are gaining in importance: private “homework coaching,” additional payment for exclusive forms of education such as bilingual classes (English-Dutch), as well as many extracurricular activities, including language lessons, that take place at school during school time. Add to this a significant number of individual remedial teachers, coaches and mentors, many of them also privately paid, and you get an interesting landscape of inequality achieved through private means in public settings.
In the midst of COVID-19 concerns, the issue of freedom of education was prominent in 2021. Art. 23 of the constitution, which grants freedom of confessional education, came under attack, because some schools have actively promoted homophobia and have failed to create a safe environment for LGBTQ students. This was triggered by many cases of homophobia and intolerance in religious schools, both of Muslim and Christian affiliation. Advice provided by the Dutch Council of Education stressed the necessity to specify the mandatory portion of curriculum and the idea of democratic citizenship, stating that freedom of education has its limits.
Citations:
https://www.onderwijsraad.nl/publicaties/adviezen/2021/06/3/advies-nationaal-programma-onderwijs
https://www.onderwijsraad.nl/publicaties/adviezen/2021/10/05/grenzen-stellen-ruimte-laten
https://www.onderwijsraad.nl/publicaties/adviezen/2021/12/07/publiek-karakter-voorop
J. Scheerens et al., n.d., Visies op onderwijskwaliteit. Met illustratieve gegevens over de kwaliteit van het Nederlands primair en secundair onderwijs (www.nwo.nl/binaries/contents/documents/nwo/algemeen/documentation)
OECD, “Netherlands,” in Education at a Glance 2020 – Country note, EDUCATION AT A GLANCE (EAG) 2020 » © OECD 2020
Ministerie van OCW, Onderwijs in Cijfers oswincijfers.nl
Rapport Onderzoek Lerarentekort, PO Raad 2019
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2020/07/02/samen-sterk-voor-elk-kind-eindconclusiesmerel-
van-vroonhoven-juli-2020
https://didactiefonline.nl/artikel/behoud-het-centraal-examen
https://www.kennisnet.nl/artikel/6645/ict-in-het-onderwijs-de-kracht-van-ict-zit-in-verscheidenheid/
Scheefgroei inkomsten en prestaties universiteiten, Rathenau Instituut, 1 september 2017 (https://www.rathenau.nl/nl/nieuws/scheefgroei-inkomsten-en-prestaties-universiteiten, accessed 24 October 2017)
Ruim baan voor leraren, Advies Onderwijsraad, Den Haag, November 2018
https://www.curriculumcommissie.nl/actueel-berichten/samenhang-in-het-curriculum.-de-minister-heeft-de-verdiepende-studie-van-de-wetenschappelijke-curriculumcommissie-aangeboden-aan-de-tweede-kamer.
https://corona-teller.nl/geen-examen-in-2021-voor-vmboers-door-coronavirus/
https://www.poraad.nl/nieuws-en-achtergronden/het-schooladvies-was-nog-nooit-zo-belangrijk
https://www.iso.nl/2020/06/54-000-studenten-studieachterstand-door-corona/
https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/achtergrond/2018/30/gevolgen-leenstelsel-voor-instroom-hoger-onderwijs
https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2021/47/meer-personen-met-studieschuld-gemiddelde-studieschuld-gelijk-gebleven
https://nos.nl/artikel/2406848-24-4-miljard-euro-totale-studieschuld-loopt-op-door-corona
https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2021/20/geen-trendbreuk-in-studievoortgang-onder-leenstelsel
https://www.groene.nl/artikel/dit-is-een-verkapte-privatisering-van-het-publiek-bekostigde-onderwijs
Miriam Sijtsma, Katja Rusinovic en Jet Bussemaker (2021) De impact van de Coronacrisis op alleenstaande moeders, working paper Impact Corona. https://www.impactcorona.nl/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Covid_WP7_KL04.pdf
However, this flexibility has a downside: inequality in education deepened during the COVID-19 crisis. This continued a trend seen over the last 10-15 years. Income, social status and migrant origin determine to a large extent the school outcome of children. A recent study states that PISA achievements are the worst among students whose parents have completed only lower levels of education, and/or among those who are from migrant families. Also, those children are more likely to follow lower education paths (vocational education as opposed to general or academic education).
These issues of inequity deepened during the pandemic. Schools differed substantially in the quality of online education. Families differed in their ability to offer support to children, material or otherwise (e.g., electronic devices, adequate internet access, a quiet place to study or parental assistance with homework assignments). In particular, single parents – mostly women – faced severe burdens. Here again, parents with higher levels of education and greater work autonomy, as well as two-parent households, were better able to home-school children as compared to single-parent households, parents with less education and parents with less flexible working environments. Innovations in curriculum and teaching have always been encouraged in Dutch schools, with only a few general requirements. This allowed schools to adapt quickly to the pandemic, without significant disruption. Most schools offer adequate digital-learning platforms – with smart boards being standard from the elementary to the higher education level, and many interactive elements in teaching. However, variation between schools is considerable. Some schools needed to be trained to make video recordings within a week, while others simply expanded their blended learning platforms to full-time use. Generally, the crisis accelerated the acquisition of ICT skills by teaching staff, including among older teachers who might have been more reluctant prior to the pandemic.
Still, an overall drop in the quality of teaching cannot be attributed entirely to the COVID-19 crisis. Elementary school pupils’ test results in basic skills are dropping, and falling behind the ambitions formulated in 2010. The share of students reaching basic math and reading skill levels is lower than expected. It seems that teaching writing poses organizational difficulties in the context of elementary education in the Netherlands. While elementary schools returned to in-person teaching after the first wave, secondary and post-secondary institutions struggled to provide at least first year students with a minimum amount of face-to-face education, never exceeding 30% of all study hours. This resulted in a significant rise in psychological issues among adolescents, due to the disturbance of school’s socialization role during the lockdowns. The quality of higher education in the Netherlands is guaranteed by mass entrance exams at age 11 and mass centralized exams for graduates. Both had to be skipped and/or adapted over extended periods of time and with more exemptions, due to the pandemic. Discussions about the pros and cons of these examinations have been fueled by this unintended experiment, particularly in the light of deepening inequality.
Vocational schools suffered the most deeply, and disadvantaged students suffered doubly. A strength of the Dutch education system – its practical orientation, with substantial workplace-learning components – turned into a liability during the COVID-19 crisis. It became increasingly difficult to arrange work-study places, as many businesses had to close and work from home became the norm for extended periods of time. This was true particularly for secondary vocational education programs, but also for higher professional education and some professionally oriented university studies. Due to the segregation of Dutch education, in which children from lower socioeconomic and migration backgrounds are overrepresented in vocational education, the disturbance of the learning-on-the-job model affected more vulnerable students to a greater extent. Combined with lower-quality housing and the loss of access to digital resources due to school closures, already vulnerable students experienced a disproportionate delay in their studies.
In the higher education sector, the general feeling is that hybrid forms of teaching will be here to stay. Many higher education institutions were already used to fewer contact hours and a relatively high share of independent project work. Small project groups were generally allowed to work together until the second lockdown. While the changes were rather minor for many students, the loss of social contact with fellow students, and the inability to undertake lab or practical work for some study programs, were significant impacts. Other programs, especially small-scale professional programs that relied on personal contact and supervision, had to make more drastic adjustments.
Many students experienced psychological issues as a result of the isolation, but also because they lost their part-time jobs and thus incomes. The extent to which this has led to study delays has yet to be estimated, and effects seem to vary widely both at the individual level and between programs and universities. The student loan system contributed to delays, stress and inequality and became unsustainable. The new government announced a plan to reverse it back to basic student financing.
Both at the higher vocational training and university levels, issues of skewed financing (favoring research in technical and natural sciences over social sciences and education in general), combined with an increased number of international students, have resulted in work pressures and quality issues. Academic staffers reportedly regularly work from one-quarter to one-third longer than their paid hours. The most overwork is in education. The demands of online education added to the strain. Structural problems that were not adequately addressed before the crisis also deepened due to the increased sick leave and higher workloads. The greatest concern before the crisis, the acute shortage of teachers, has yet to be resolved, in spite of salary increases, including designated bonuses for teachers at schools with many disadvantaged students. The gap in remuneration between elementary school teachers and high school teachers still remains, and is perceived as unfair by many. The government came up with a national plan for recovery. The plan is aimed at making up for the delays and at mitigating the inequalities. The National Education Program is aimed at turning the COVID-19-repair efforts into sustainable improvements across the education sector. The primary points of focus include the shortage of teachers and school administrators, improvements in quality and efforts to equalize opportunities, sustainable investment in knowledge structure through knowledge sharing and utilization, and local efforts to improve youths’ future prospects. However, the program has been widely criticized for being oriented only to the short term, and for failing to address structural issues. For example, school buildings are 40 years old on the average, and over 80% do not meet the requirements for clean air, but the financing for renovation is lagging behind. In addition, lots of private parties take part in the recovery efforts, which contributes further to a process of hidden privatization in public education. The number of private schools in the Netherlands is still negligible; however, other channels are gaining in importance: private “homework coaching,” additional payment for exclusive forms of education such as bilingual classes (English-Dutch), as well as many extracurricular activities, including language lessons, that take place at school during school time. Add to this a significant number of individual remedial teachers, coaches and mentors, many of them also privately paid, and you get an interesting landscape of inequality achieved through private means in public settings.
In the midst of COVID-19 concerns, the issue of freedom of education was prominent in 2021. Art. 23 of the constitution, which grants freedom of confessional education, came under attack, because some schools have actively promoted homophobia and have failed to create a safe environment for LGBTQ students. This was triggered by many cases of homophobia and intolerance in religious schools, both of Muslim and Christian affiliation. Advice provided by the Dutch Council of Education stressed the necessity to specify the mandatory portion of curriculum and the idea of democratic citizenship, stating that freedom of education has its limits.
Citations:
https://www.onderwijsraad.nl/publicaties/adviezen/2021/06/3/advies-nationaal-programma-onderwijs
https://www.onderwijsraad.nl/publicaties/adviezen/2021/10/05/grenzen-stellen-ruimte-laten
https://www.onderwijsraad.nl/publicaties/adviezen/2021/12/07/publiek-karakter-voorop
J. Scheerens et al., n.d., Visies op onderwijskwaliteit. Met illustratieve gegevens over de kwaliteit van het Nederlands primair en secundair onderwijs (www.nwo.nl/binaries/contents/documents/nwo/algemeen/documentation)
OECD, “Netherlands,” in Education at a Glance 2020 – Country note, EDUCATION AT A GLANCE (EAG) 2020 » © OECD 2020
Ministerie van OCW, Onderwijs in Cijfers oswincijfers.nl
Rapport Onderzoek Lerarentekort, PO Raad 2019
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2020/07/02/samen-sterk-voor-elk-kind-eindconclusiesmerel-
van-vroonhoven-juli-2020
https://didactiefonline.nl/artikel/behoud-het-centraal-examen
https://www.kennisnet.nl/artikel/6645/ict-in-het-onderwijs-de-kracht-van-ict-zit-in-verscheidenheid/
Scheefgroei inkomsten en prestaties universiteiten, Rathenau Instituut, 1 september 2017 (https://www.rathenau.nl/nl/nieuws/scheefgroei-inkomsten-en-prestaties-universiteiten, accessed 24 October 2017)
Ruim baan voor leraren, Advies Onderwijsraad, Den Haag, November 2018
https://www.curriculumcommissie.nl/actueel-berichten/samenhang-in-het-curriculum.-de-minister-heeft-de-verdiepende-studie-van-de-wetenschappelijke-curriculumcommissie-aangeboden-aan-de-tweede-kamer.
https://corona-teller.nl/geen-examen-in-2021-voor-vmboers-door-coronavirus/
https://www.poraad.nl/nieuws-en-achtergronden/het-schooladvies-was-nog-nooit-zo-belangrijk
https://www.iso.nl/2020/06/54-000-studenten-studieachterstand-door-corona/
https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/achtergrond/2018/30/gevolgen-leenstelsel-voor-instroom-hoger-onderwijs
https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2021/47/meer-personen-met-studieschuld-gemiddelde-studieschuld-gelijk-gebleven
https://nos.nl/artikel/2406848-24-4-miljard-euro-totale-studieschuld-loopt-op-door-corona
https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2021/20/geen-trendbreuk-in-studievoortgang-onder-leenstelsel
https://www.groene.nl/artikel/dit-is-een-verkapte-privatisering-van-het-publiek-bekostigde-onderwijs
Miriam Sijtsma, Katja Rusinovic en Jet Bussemaker (2021) De impact van de Coronacrisis op alleenstaande moeders, working paper Impact Corona. https://www.impactcorona.nl/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Covid_WP7_KL04.pdf
Graph View
To what extent does social policy prevent exclusion and decoupling from society?
10
9
9
Policies very effectively enable societal inclusion and ensure equal opportunities.
8
7
6
7
6
For the most part, policies enable societal inclusion effectively and ensure equal opportunities.
5
4
3
4
3
For the most part, policies fail to prevent societal exclusion effectively and ensure equal opportunities.
2
1
1
Policies exacerbate unequal opportunities and exclusion from society.
Income inequality in the Netherlands produces a score of between 0.28 and 0.29 on the Gini Index, and has not changed significantly since 2007. Because the Gini index assesses only taxable incomes, it is likely that the degree of inequality is underestimated. The difference between the highest and lowest incomes has increased. This pattern is even more visible in the incomes of women. While the incomes of the highest-earning women increased significantly, particularly for younger women, only one-quarter of all women are in full-time employment. On average, personal incomes of men are much higher than those of women, though the gap is gradually closing for younger women. Women still constitute a slight majority of people living in poverty. Half of all people living at or under the poverty level have a migrant background.
The average age of first-time home buyers has increased due to precarious incomes, stricter loan regulations, increasing house prices and a shortage of new, affordable houses. During the COVID-19 crisis, house prices continued to rise. Prices of existing houses have gone up 20% in the last year alone. The gap between homeowners and people renting houses is widening and even long-term certainty of housing is gradually becoming a privilege of homeowners.
Young people entered the pandemic in a precarious situation. A combination of student debt, flexible employment, irregular incomes and rising housing prices has resulted in a situation in which young people are today living with their parents for longer than in previous generations. People working as independent contractors within low-wage sectors turned out to be a particularly vulnerable group, with little or no job protection. The Dutch labor market has become one of the most flexible in western Europe (WRR 2020). Before the Netherlands was confronted with COVID-19, there were 1.9 million people with flexible employment situations and more than 1.1 million self-employed workers. Many of these flex workers are employed in sectors that were hit particularly hard by the coronavirus crisis, such as the hotel and catering industry, tourism, transport, and culture. Overlapping with these precarious groups are labor migrants from southern and eastern Europe, who often work low-wage jobs on flexible contracts while living in inadequate housing.
Compared to other EU member states, the number of Dutch households at risk of social exclusion or poverty is still low, with around 6% of households at risk of falling below the poverty line (CBS 2019). The number of households under the poverty line remained stable in 2021, and no change is projected for 2022. The share of households at risk of poverty began decreasing in 2014, but this decline has since leveled out, and has remained stable. Energy-driven poverty, induced by the increase in gas prices, is not included in the data, and is still an issue in spite of a modest compensation package. Single-parent families, ethnic-minority families, migrants, divorcees and those dependent on social benefits are overrepresented in this poverty-exposed income bracket.
Income inequalities have not only grown, but are also passed on to the younger generations. The postal address of pupils has become a strong predictor of financial success in life. Income mobility has stagnated since the previous financial crisis, and the coronavirus crisis has made it only worse. Fully 53% of children in low-income families stay in this income bracket.
Municipal governments are largely responsible for poverty policy in the Netherlands. Given the budgetary side effects of other decentralization policies, there are clear signs that poverty policy, both in terms of quality and accessibility, is at risk of deteriorating. The COVID-19 crisis has exacerbated differences between municipalities, since relief measures were taken at the national level, and municipal governments had to alleviate extreme cases and provide support to all those who did not have access to the national compensation measures. By and large, due to the decentralized structure of social services, municipalities took on the task of supporting the most vulnerable. The adequacy and effectiveness of such measures varied across different municipalities, as measures were dependent upon municipalities’ capacities to identify and reach out to vulnerable groups, as well as the local economic structure, which varied widely. Naturally, some municipalities were hit harder than others, depending upon demographics and the prevalence of certain business activities. Access to social services remained problematic for groups with limited digital skills, particularly the elderly and people with mental and learning disabilities.
Since 2015, municipalities have been responsible for assisting people with disabilities in finding suitable work. The number of young people with disabilities who have a job has increased by 9%, but their incomes have on average worsened due to a combination of low earnings and benefit cuts. A study of 47 Dutch municipalities showed that few had plans for implementing the UN agreement on the rights of disabled people, let alone inclusive policies.
Citations:
https://nos.nl/artikel/2370259-kritisch-rapport-werken-naast-uitkering-leidt-tot-financiele-problemen
Gelijk goed van start, SER, January 2016 https://www.ser.nl/nl/actueel/nieuws/2010-2019/2016/20160121-gelijk-goed-van-sta rt.aspx
https://www.ser.nl/nl/adviezen/werken-zonder-armoede
https://www.ser.nl/nl/adviezen/kansrijke-start-kinderen
https://www.rekenkamer.nl/actueel/nieuws/2021/09/28/aanpak-arbeidsuitbuiting-door-inspectie-niet-effectief
CBS – Gestage toename vrouwen onder topverdieners – retrieved 8 november 2018 https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2018/45/gestage-toename-vrouwen-onder-topverdieners
https://decorrespondent.nl/10628/tienduizenden-gedupeerden-maar-geen-daders-zo-ontstond-de-tragedie-achter-de-toeslagenaffaire/3623624719792-130d655d
Jongeren zijn de dupe van crisisbeleid cabinet, Financieel Dagblad, August 30, 2019
Lukt het vluchtelingen om hier een baan te vinden? Dit zijn de cijfers, NOS, May 4, 2019
https://digitaal.scp.nl/emancipatiemonitor2018/neemt-het-loonverschil-tussen-mannen-en-vrouwen-af/
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2019/02/05/studieschuld-huizenmarkt-en-flexibele-contracten-houden-jongeren-langer-thuis-a3652927
https://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/financien/nieuws/coronasteun-verschilt-sterk-tussen-gemeenten.16777619.lynkx?
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2019/02/05/studieschuld-huizenmarkt-en-flexibele-contracten-houden-jongeren-langer-thuis-a3652927
Patricia van Echtelt, Klarita Sadiraj, Stella Hoff, Sander Muns, Kasia Karpinska, Djurre Das (WRR), Maroesjka Versantvoort, m.m.v. Lisa Putman,Eindevaluatie van de Participatiewet, SCP, november 2019
https://zorghulpatlas.nl/2019/11/01/vn-verdrag-handicap-werk-aan-de-winkel-voor-gemeenten/
CBS: Verschil hoogopgeleide en laagopgeleide wordt groter, NRC, August 16, 2019
https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/economie/opinie/column/5245397/column-cody-hochstenbach-overheid-huurders-wegwerproduct
https://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/financien/nieuws/coronasteun-verschilt-sterk-tussen-gemeenten.16777619.lynkx?
https://www.zonmw.nl/nl/actueel/nieuws/detail/item/sociale-gevolgen-corona-stilte-voor-de-storm/
The average age of first-time home buyers has increased due to precarious incomes, stricter loan regulations, increasing house prices and a shortage of new, affordable houses. During the COVID-19 crisis, house prices continued to rise. Prices of existing houses have gone up 20% in the last year alone. The gap between homeowners and people renting houses is widening and even long-term certainty of housing is gradually becoming a privilege of homeowners.
Young people entered the pandemic in a precarious situation. A combination of student debt, flexible employment, irregular incomes and rising housing prices has resulted in a situation in which young people are today living with their parents for longer than in previous generations. People working as independent contractors within low-wage sectors turned out to be a particularly vulnerable group, with little or no job protection. The Dutch labor market has become one of the most flexible in western Europe (WRR 2020). Before the Netherlands was confronted with COVID-19, there were 1.9 million people with flexible employment situations and more than 1.1 million self-employed workers. Many of these flex workers are employed in sectors that were hit particularly hard by the coronavirus crisis, such as the hotel and catering industry, tourism, transport, and culture. Overlapping with these precarious groups are labor migrants from southern and eastern Europe, who often work low-wage jobs on flexible contracts while living in inadequate housing.
Compared to other EU member states, the number of Dutch households at risk of social exclusion or poverty is still low, with around 6% of households at risk of falling below the poverty line (CBS 2019). The number of households under the poverty line remained stable in 2021, and no change is projected for 2022. The share of households at risk of poverty began decreasing in 2014, but this decline has since leveled out, and has remained stable. Energy-driven poverty, induced by the increase in gas prices, is not included in the data, and is still an issue in spite of a modest compensation package. Single-parent families, ethnic-minority families, migrants, divorcees and those dependent on social benefits are overrepresented in this poverty-exposed income bracket.
Income inequalities have not only grown, but are also passed on to the younger generations. The postal address of pupils has become a strong predictor of financial success in life. Income mobility has stagnated since the previous financial crisis, and the coronavirus crisis has made it only worse. Fully 53% of children in low-income families stay in this income bracket.
Municipal governments are largely responsible for poverty policy in the Netherlands. Given the budgetary side effects of other decentralization policies, there are clear signs that poverty policy, both in terms of quality and accessibility, is at risk of deteriorating. The COVID-19 crisis has exacerbated differences between municipalities, since relief measures were taken at the national level, and municipal governments had to alleviate extreme cases and provide support to all those who did not have access to the national compensation measures. By and large, due to the decentralized structure of social services, municipalities took on the task of supporting the most vulnerable. The adequacy and effectiveness of such measures varied across different municipalities, as measures were dependent upon municipalities’ capacities to identify and reach out to vulnerable groups, as well as the local economic structure, which varied widely. Naturally, some municipalities were hit harder than others, depending upon demographics and the prevalence of certain business activities. Access to social services remained problematic for groups with limited digital skills, particularly the elderly and people with mental and learning disabilities.
Since 2015, municipalities have been responsible for assisting people with disabilities in finding suitable work. The number of young people with disabilities who have a job has increased by 9%, but their incomes have on average worsened due to a combination of low earnings and benefit cuts. A study of 47 Dutch municipalities showed that few had plans for implementing the UN agreement on the rights of disabled people, let alone inclusive policies.
Citations:
https://nos.nl/artikel/2370259-kritisch-rapport-werken-naast-uitkering-leidt-tot-financiele-problemen
Gelijk goed van start, SER, January 2016 https://www.ser.nl/nl/actueel/nieuws/2010-2019/2016/20160121-gelijk-goed-van-sta rt.aspx
https://www.ser.nl/nl/adviezen/werken-zonder-armoede
https://www.ser.nl/nl/adviezen/kansrijke-start-kinderen
https://www.rekenkamer.nl/actueel/nieuws/2021/09/28/aanpak-arbeidsuitbuiting-door-inspectie-niet-effectief
CBS – Gestage toename vrouwen onder topverdieners – retrieved 8 november 2018 https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2018/45/gestage-toename-vrouwen-onder-topverdieners
https://decorrespondent.nl/10628/tienduizenden-gedupeerden-maar-geen-daders-zo-ontstond-de-tragedie-achter-de-toeslagenaffaire/3623624719792-130d655d
Jongeren zijn de dupe van crisisbeleid cabinet, Financieel Dagblad, August 30, 2019
Lukt het vluchtelingen om hier een baan te vinden? Dit zijn de cijfers, NOS, May 4, 2019
https://digitaal.scp.nl/emancipatiemonitor2018/neemt-het-loonverschil-tussen-mannen-en-vrouwen-af/
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2019/02/05/studieschuld-huizenmarkt-en-flexibele-contracten-houden-jongeren-langer-thuis-a3652927
https://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/financien/nieuws/coronasteun-verschilt-sterk-tussen-gemeenten.16777619.lynkx?
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2019/02/05/studieschuld-huizenmarkt-en-flexibele-contracten-houden-jongeren-langer-thuis-a3652927
Patricia van Echtelt, Klarita Sadiraj, Stella Hoff, Sander Muns, Kasia Karpinska, Djurre Das (WRR), Maroesjka Versantvoort, m.m.v. Lisa Putman,Eindevaluatie van de Participatiewet, SCP, november 2019
https://zorghulpatlas.nl/2019/11/01/vn-verdrag-handicap-werk-aan-de-winkel-voor-gemeenten/
CBS: Verschil hoogopgeleide en laagopgeleide wordt groter, NRC, August 16, 2019
https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/economie/opinie/column/5245397/column-cody-hochstenbach-overheid-huurders-wegwerproduct
https://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/financien/nieuws/coronasteun-verschilt-sterk-tussen-gemeenten.16777619.lynkx?
https://www.zonmw.nl/nl/actueel/nieuws/detail/item/sociale-gevolgen-corona-stilte-voor-de-storm/
Graph View
To what extent do health care policies provide high-quality, inclusive and cost-efficient health care?
10
9
9
Health care policy achieves the criteria fully.
8
7
6
7
6
Health care policy achieves the criteria largely.
5
4
3
4
3
Health care policy achieves the criteria partly.
2
1
1
Health care policy does not achieve the criteria at all.
In 2020, the Dutch hybrid healthcare system was subjected to the stress test of the COVID-19 pandemic. Both the vulnerabilities and the strengths became highly visible and gained importance. Never before has the healthcare system received so much attention and public scrutiny. Never before was the healthcare system the central driving force of all government policymaking for two years already. The healthcare system functioned in crisis mode, with priorities gradually shifting from homes for the elderly to the availability of intensive care beds, balancing COVID-19 treatment and general care. Mass vaccination was the key concern of 2021, with an extra mobilization for a booster campaign at the end of the year. Prevention tactics and long-term strategy for living with COVID-19 are yet to be developed.
On the positive side, the Netherlands performs well on key health indicators, such as life expectancy, self-reported health status and patient satisfaction. The system is generally inclusive: the number of citizens who forgo medical treatment due to affordability is the lowest in the OECD (5.8%). In addition, in spite of the many concerns in the sector, long-term elderly care is highly inclusive and affordable. The proportion of elderly people in long-term care centers is decreasing (115,000 people in 2019), however, due to the policy shift to extramural care, people in care today generally have relatively more serious health issues and needs. Since the increase of the copayment for nursing home care, many patients have delayed their admission to care homes. They rely longer on home care and as a result, the total cost of care has slightly decreased. The added burden of expenditure and efficiency issues, as well as the chronic shortage of staff, made elderly care homes a particularly vulnerable part of the healthcare system during the coronavirus pandemic. Many homes for the elderly were hit hard, with high numbers of deaths early in the pandemic. In addition, intramural care for the elderly relied heavily on volunteers and family members, and the burden of keeping basic operations going increased after the lockdown.
Prevention in the Netherlands is organized through general practitioners who act as gatekeepers to healthcare services. These GPs maintain a high level of trust among the Dutch population, which remained stable at around 95% during the pandemic. The general policy response to the system, however, effectively bypassed general practitioners, as the focus was on intensive-care units, hospital beds, ventilation devices and hospital staff. The shortage of general practitioners has become significant in some places, and structural solutions have not yet been found. Ongoing non-COVID-19-related care – which remained in the hands of general practitioners, but with limitations imposed by hospitals – has become problematic.
The focus on efficiency and cost containment in recent years has left the Netherlands with significant pressure on bed occupancy, a push to shorten the average hospital stay and a need to plan routine procedures tightly, with little room for contingencies. The challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic – an increased number of long-term intensive care and hospital stays, varying and unpredictable care outcomes, and little control over the number of patients requiring hospitalization – exposed the vulnerability of the system. Furthermore, nursing and care staff are notoriously underpaid, overworked and in high demand, which proved to be an impediment to flexibility and the expansion of care during COVID-19 without jeopardizing other necessary care. The various professional organizations (e.g., for specialists, intensive-care physicians, general practitioners, nurses and care workers) all have different and sometimes contrary stakes, both financial and organizational. Hygiene, prevention, testing and vaccination tasks are in the hands of the municipal healthcare services, which adds another dimension to the complex task of coordination. Vaccination programs are voluntary, but the coverage rate is quite high in the Netherlands. In recent years, a decline in the vaccination rate of children has prompted debate about mandatory vaccinations as an access requirement for childcare. Nonetheless, the Netherlands vaccination campaign has been largely successful. Unvaccinated groups are most typically found within migrant enclaves, religious groups and a group that chooses not to trust the government.
Citations:
Kiezen voor Houdbare Zorg. Mensen, middelen en maatschappelijk draagvlak (rapport nr. 104, WRR, 2021)
Factsheet Publieksonderzoek Hoe wil Nederland oud worden? 28 februari 2020 Dit onderzoek is een initatief van ActiZ,
branchevereniging van zorgorganisaties
Barometer Nedrlandse Gezondheidszorg 2019: Rentement stijgt ten koste van personeel, EY 2021
https://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/artikel/2375543-inspectie-situatie-in-jeugdpsychiatrie-onhoudbaar
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2021/12/16/bezuiniging-van-5-miljard-op-de-zorg-dat-is-te-kort-door-de-bocht-a4069274
https://www.cpb.nl/eigen-bijdragen-verpleeghuiszorg-effect-op-zorggebruik-gezondheid-en-financieel-risico
Gezond verstand, publieke kennisorganisaties in de gezondheidszorg, Rathenau Instituut, 6 september 2017
Van verschil naar potentieel. Een realistisch perspectief op de sociaaleconomische gezondheidsvershillen. WRR Policy Brief 7, August 2018
Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit, NZa: uitgaven langdurige zorg groeien sneller dan verwacht, 13-06-2019, https://www.nza.nl/actueel/nieuws/2019/06/13/nza-uitgaven-langdurige-zorg-groeien-sneller-dan-verwacht
Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit, Stand van de zorg 2018, (https://magazines.nza.nl/standvandezorg/2018/03/investeren-in-gezondheidswinst-voor-de-patient, consulted 6 November 2018)
https://www.lhv.nl/thema/praktijkzaken/huisartsentekorten/
https://www.dutchnews.nl/news/2019/04/health-covenant-heavily-influenced-by-food-and-alcohol-industry-say-experts/
https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/visualisaties/welvaart-in-coronatijd/gezondheid/
CBS: verschil hoogopgeleide en laagopgeleide wordt groter, NRC Next, 16 August 2019
https://www.nu.nl/economie/4368814/nza-weigerde-terecht-tarieven-per-zorgaanbieder-openbaar-maken.html ( november 2019)
Zorgen voor burgers: onderzoek naar knelpunten bij de toegang tot zorg, De Nationale Ombudsman, 14 mei, 2018
Engbersen, G., van Bochove, M., de Boom, J., el Farisi, B., Krouwel, A., van Lindert, J., Rusinovic, K., Snel, E., van Heck, L., van der Veen, H., & van Wensveen, P. (2021). De laag-vertrouwensamenleving: de maatschappelijke impact van COVID-19 in Amsterdam, Den Haag, Rotterdam & Nederland. Kenniswerkplaats Leefbare Wijken. https://www.eur.nl/essb/media/99176
On the positive side, the Netherlands performs well on key health indicators, such as life expectancy, self-reported health status and patient satisfaction. The system is generally inclusive: the number of citizens who forgo medical treatment due to affordability is the lowest in the OECD (5.8%). In addition, in spite of the many concerns in the sector, long-term elderly care is highly inclusive and affordable. The proportion of elderly people in long-term care centers is decreasing (115,000 people in 2019), however, due to the policy shift to extramural care, people in care today generally have relatively more serious health issues and needs. Since the increase of the copayment for nursing home care, many patients have delayed their admission to care homes. They rely longer on home care and as a result, the total cost of care has slightly decreased. The added burden of expenditure and efficiency issues, as well as the chronic shortage of staff, made elderly care homes a particularly vulnerable part of the healthcare system during the coronavirus pandemic. Many homes for the elderly were hit hard, with high numbers of deaths early in the pandemic. In addition, intramural care for the elderly relied heavily on volunteers and family members, and the burden of keeping basic operations going increased after the lockdown.
Prevention in the Netherlands is organized through general practitioners who act as gatekeepers to healthcare services. These GPs maintain a high level of trust among the Dutch population, which remained stable at around 95% during the pandemic. The general policy response to the system, however, effectively bypassed general practitioners, as the focus was on intensive-care units, hospital beds, ventilation devices and hospital staff. The shortage of general practitioners has become significant in some places, and structural solutions have not yet been found. Ongoing non-COVID-19-related care – which remained in the hands of general practitioners, but with limitations imposed by hospitals – has become problematic.
The focus on efficiency and cost containment in recent years has left the Netherlands with significant pressure on bed occupancy, a push to shorten the average hospital stay and a need to plan routine procedures tightly, with little room for contingencies. The challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic – an increased number of long-term intensive care and hospital stays, varying and unpredictable care outcomes, and little control over the number of patients requiring hospitalization – exposed the vulnerability of the system. Furthermore, nursing and care staff are notoriously underpaid, overworked and in high demand, which proved to be an impediment to flexibility and the expansion of care during COVID-19 without jeopardizing other necessary care. The various professional organizations (e.g., for specialists, intensive-care physicians, general practitioners, nurses and care workers) all have different and sometimes contrary stakes, both financial and organizational. Hygiene, prevention, testing and vaccination tasks are in the hands of the municipal healthcare services, which adds another dimension to the complex task of coordination. Vaccination programs are voluntary, but the coverage rate is quite high in the Netherlands. In recent years, a decline in the vaccination rate of children has prompted debate about mandatory vaccinations as an access requirement for childcare. Nonetheless, the Netherlands vaccination campaign has been largely successful. Unvaccinated groups are most typically found within migrant enclaves, religious groups and a group that chooses not to trust the government.
Citations:
Kiezen voor Houdbare Zorg. Mensen, middelen en maatschappelijk draagvlak (rapport nr. 104, WRR, 2021)
Factsheet Publieksonderzoek Hoe wil Nederland oud worden? 28 februari 2020 Dit onderzoek is een initatief van ActiZ,
branchevereniging van zorgorganisaties
Barometer Nedrlandse Gezondheidszorg 2019: Rentement stijgt ten koste van personeel, EY 2021
https://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/artikel/2375543-inspectie-situatie-in-jeugdpsychiatrie-onhoudbaar
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2021/12/16/bezuiniging-van-5-miljard-op-de-zorg-dat-is-te-kort-door-de-bocht-a4069274
https://www.cpb.nl/eigen-bijdragen-verpleeghuiszorg-effect-op-zorggebruik-gezondheid-en-financieel-risico
Gezond verstand, publieke kennisorganisaties in de gezondheidszorg, Rathenau Instituut, 6 september 2017
Van verschil naar potentieel. Een realistisch perspectief op de sociaaleconomische gezondheidsvershillen. WRR Policy Brief 7, August 2018
Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit, NZa: uitgaven langdurige zorg groeien sneller dan verwacht, 13-06-2019, https://www.nza.nl/actueel/nieuws/2019/06/13/nza-uitgaven-langdurige-zorg-groeien-sneller-dan-verwacht
Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit, Stand van de zorg 2018, (https://magazines.nza.nl/standvandezorg/2018/03/investeren-in-gezondheidswinst-voor-de-patient, consulted 6 November 2018)
https://www.lhv.nl/thema/praktijkzaken/huisartsentekorten/
https://www.dutchnews.nl/news/2019/04/health-covenant-heavily-influenced-by-food-and-alcohol-industry-say-experts/
https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/visualisaties/welvaart-in-coronatijd/gezondheid/
CBS: verschil hoogopgeleide en laagopgeleide wordt groter, NRC Next, 16 August 2019
https://www.nu.nl/economie/4368814/nza-weigerde-terecht-tarieven-per-zorgaanbieder-openbaar-maken.html ( november 2019)
Zorgen voor burgers: onderzoek naar knelpunten bij de toegang tot zorg, De Nationale Ombudsman, 14 mei, 2018
Engbersen, G., van Bochove, M., de Boom, J., el Farisi, B., Krouwel, A., van Lindert, J., Rusinovic, K., Snel, E., van Heck, L., van der Veen, H., & van Wensveen, P. (2021). De laag-vertrouwensamenleving: de maatschappelijke impact van COVID-19 in Amsterdam, Den Haag, Rotterdam & Nederland. Kenniswerkplaats Leefbare Wijken. https://www.eur.nl/essb/media/99176
Graph View
To what extent do family support policies enable women to combine parenting with participation in the labor market?
10
9
9
Family support policies effectively enable women to combine parenting with employment.
8
7
6
7
6
Family support policies provide some support for women who want to combine parenting and employment.
5
4
3
4
3
Family support policies provide only few opportunities for women who want to combine parenting and employment.
2
1
1
Family support policies force most women to opt for either parenting or employment.
By far the biggest scandal in 2021 was the childcare benefits tax scandal, which eventually led to the fall of the Rutte III government. Thousands of families fell victim to a rigid, automated tax system aimed at detecting fraud. As a result, many innocent families were forced to pay back large amounts of money to the state. This resulted in family tragedies, divorces, the loss of homes, mounting debts, children growing up in poverty and distress, and in some cases even out-of-home placement. Many victims still have not been fully compensated. The fallout of the scandal has influenced the whole Dutch welfare system, trust in government and the overall political climate.
Family policy in the Netherlands is formally characterized by the need to recognize a child’s best interest and to provide support for the family and the development of parenting skills. According to EU-28 data, the Dutch spend approximately 32% of GDP on social protections (healthcare, old age, housing, unemployment, family), but just 4% of this is spent on family costs (compared to an EU-28 average of 8%). Day care centers for young children are becoming a luxury item, as they are not directly subsidized and parents face a steep increase in costs based on higher contributions for higher taxable income. This situation was somewhat alleviated at the beginning of 2018, when community and commercial providers of childcare were subjected to the same quality criteria and the same financial regime. The childcare subsidy was significantly increased in 2019, with an additional increase slated for 2020. Nevertheless, the cost and availability of day care varies substantially, depending on local municipal policies. During the coronavirus crisis, families received some compensation for the period when childcare facilities were closed.
The government has established an extensive child protection system through its policy of municipal “close to home” youth and family centers, which are tasked with establishing a system of digital information related to parenting, education and healthcare. Nevertheless, parents complain of a lack of information about and access to youth and family centers. Local governments have in some cases violated decision-making privacy rules in the allocation of youth-care assistance. In recent years, there were several scandals involving the death of very young children due to parental abuse as a result of uncoordinated and/or belated interventions by youth-care organizations. In spite of some success in the recent years, violence has been seen to flare up again within a year and a half in 53% of the families that have received help. In response, the government is investing an additional €5 million in 2022 for regional and local efforts to tackle the problem.
The devolution of powers in youth healthcare to local governments in 2016 resulted in cases where necessary psychiatric care was withheld or significantly delayed due to a lack of financing. Vulnerable children were particularly hard hit by the decentralization and fragmentation of services, which led to longer waiting times. Other issues included travel to healthcare facilities and coordination between services. For the first time since decentralization in 2015, the number of children and young adults in youth care declined significantly, by 11,000. Notwithstanding, the total number of children in youth care remains high, and stands at approximately one in 10 children. Against the backdrop of a permanent shortage of funding at the municipal level, it is not clear whether preventive efforts are effective or parents are simply opting out of the system and choosing private providers instead. In 2019, a wave of care-provider bankruptcies gave further fuel to critics of the decentralization effort, particularly as it was combined with severe financial cuts. The government now instead recommends regional cooperation and some centralization. However, recent further cuts have exacerbated the situation. Short-term solutions at the municipal level cannot make up for the structural problems in the sector.
In practice, child support for families also is an instrument designed to improve parents’ labor market participation. Enabling a work-family balance is less of a guiding policy principle. The gap between professional women working longer hours and less educated women not participating in the labor market is growing. Almost two-thirds of mid-career women experience the combination of childcare tasks and work as difficult. Full-time female labor-force participation is hindered mainly by a high marginal effective tax burden on second earners, reflecting the withdrawal of social benefits according to family income. Consequently, in the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index 2017, the Netherlands ranked 32 out of 144 countries, having ranked 16 in 2016 and 9 out of 130 countries in 2008. The drop was largely due to the inclusion of top incomes in the calculations, which revealed a glaring absence of women in highly paid positions in the country. Other factors include unfavorable school times, a childcare system geared toward part-time work, and the volatility of financing for and poor access to care policies, particularly at the municipal level. For the first time, the number of full-time working women exceeded 1 million. The share of working women with only lower levels of education is still very low, at about 20%. Recently, the government announced plans to increase parental leave significantly, including paternal leave for fathers, in an effort to address these difficulties. The plan will be implemented in 2022.
The coronavirus crisis affected Dutch families in a number of crucial ways. First, the government chose to support businesses, without providing direct support to families. Alleviation efforts for families were organized at the municipal level, with varying degrees of success. Second, working families with children, particularly those with low incomes and a disadvantaged background, experienced an extra strain due to home schooling or the need to provide day care. Third, the situation with youth services worsened, leaving many families in distress, sometimes producing abuse and complex psychological issues as a result. Fourth, many students lost their part-time jobs, returned to live at home and experienced study delays, all of which added to the financial burden of families.
Citations:
https://www.nji.nl/nieuws/vijf-leden-hervormingstafel-stappen-op
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2021/12/16/kamerbrief-over-zevende-voortgangsrapportage-programma-geweld-hoort-nergens-thuis
https://www.ad.nl/politiek/langer-ouderschapsverlof-vanaf-2022
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/coronavirus-covid-19/onderwijs-en-kinderopvang/corona-kosten-kinderopvang-ouders
CBS: Dashboard arbeidsmarkt, https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/visualisaties/dashboard-arbeidsmarkt
http://www.cpb.nl/publicatie/ex-post-analyse-effect-kinderopvangtoeslag-op-arbeidsparticipatie
https://www.nu.nl/economie/4875062/aantal-fulltime-werkende-vrouwen-passeert-grens-van-miljoen.html
Een werkende combinatie deel 1, SER, October 2016 https://www.ser.nl/~/media/db_adviezen/2010_2019/2016/werkende-combinatie-deel1.ashx
84 procent van de thuiszitters is vrouw, 14 augustus 2019, https://www.kinderopvangtotaal.nl/84-procent-van-de-thuiszitters-is-vrouw/
World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report, 2018
Geen betere Cao Ziekenhuizen: vakbonden starten eind juni met acties, 6 juni 2019, Zorggids Nederland
Roeters, A., F Bucx, Kijk op kinderopvang, SCP, Den Haag, 28 augustus 2018
Gesprekken met gemeenten gaan alleen nog over geld, NRC Next, 13 mei 2019
Family policy in the Netherlands is formally characterized by the need to recognize a child’s best interest and to provide support for the family and the development of parenting skills. According to EU-28 data, the Dutch spend approximately 32% of GDP on social protections (healthcare, old age, housing, unemployment, family), but just 4% of this is spent on family costs (compared to an EU-28 average of 8%). Day care centers for young children are becoming a luxury item, as they are not directly subsidized and parents face a steep increase in costs based on higher contributions for higher taxable income. This situation was somewhat alleviated at the beginning of 2018, when community and commercial providers of childcare were subjected to the same quality criteria and the same financial regime. The childcare subsidy was significantly increased in 2019, with an additional increase slated for 2020. Nevertheless, the cost and availability of day care varies substantially, depending on local municipal policies. During the coronavirus crisis, families received some compensation for the period when childcare facilities were closed.
The government has established an extensive child protection system through its policy of municipal “close to home” youth and family centers, which are tasked with establishing a system of digital information related to parenting, education and healthcare. Nevertheless, parents complain of a lack of information about and access to youth and family centers. Local governments have in some cases violated decision-making privacy rules in the allocation of youth-care assistance. In recent years, there were several scandals involving the death of very young children due to parental abuse as a result of uncoordinated and/or belated interventions by youth-care organizations. In spite of some success in the recent years, violence has been seen to flare up again within a year and a half in 53% of the families that have received help. In response, the government is investing an additional €5 million in 2022 for regional and local efforts to tackle the problem.
The devolution of powers in youth healthcare to local governments in 2016 resulted in cases where necessary psychiatric care was withheld or significantly delayed due to a lack of financing. Vulnerable children were particularly hard hit by the decentralization and fragmentation of services, which led to longer waiting times. Other issues included travel to healthcare facilities and coordination between services. For the first time since decentralization in 2015, the number of children and young adults in youth care declined significantly, by 11,000. Notwithstanding, the total number of children in youth care remains high, and stands at approximately one in 10 children. Against the backdrop of a permanent shortage of funding at the municipal level, it is not clear whether preventive efforts are effective or parents are simply opting out of the system and choosing private providers instead. In 2019, a wave of care-provider bankruptcies gave further fuel to critics of the decentralization effort, particularly as it was combined with severe financial cuts. The government now instead recommends regional cooperation and some centralization. However, recent further cuts have exacerbated the situation. Short-term solutions at the municipal level cannot make up for the structural problems in the sector.
In practice, child support for families also is an instrument designed to improve parents’ labor market participation. Enabling a work-family balance is less of a guiding policy principle. The gap between professional women working longer hours and less educated women not participating in the labor market is growing. Almost two-thirds of mid-career women experience the combination of childcare tasks and work as difficult. Full-time female labor-force participation is hindered mainly by a high marginal effective tax burden on second earners, reflecting the withdrawal of social benefits according to family income. Consequently, in the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index 2017, the Netherlands ranked 32 out of 144 countries, having ranked 16 in 2016 and 9 out of 130 countries in 2008. The drop was largely due to the inclusion of top incomes in the calculations, which revealed a glaring absence of women in highly paid positions in the country. Other factors include unfavorable school times, a childcare system geared toward part-time work, and the volatility of financing for and poor access to care policies, particularly at the municipal level. For the first time, the number of full-time working women exceeded 1 million. The share of working women with only lower levels of education is still very low, at about 20%. Recently, the government announced plans to increase parental leave significantly, including paternal leave for fathers, in an effort to address these difficulties. The plan will be implemented in 2022.
The coronavirus crisis affected Dutch families in a number of crucial ways. First, the government chose to support businesses, without providing direct support to families. Alleviation efforts for families were organized at the municipal level, with varying degrees of success. Second, working families with children, particularly those with low incomes and a disadvantaged background, experienced an extra strain due to home schooling or the need to provide day care. Third, the situation with youth services worsened, leaving many families in distress, sometimes producing abuse and complex psychological issues as a result. Fourth, many students lost their part-time jobs, returned to live at home and experienced study delays, all of which added to the financial burden of families.
Citations:
https://www.nji.nl/nieuws/vijf-leden-hervormingstafel-stappen-op
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2021/12/16/kamerbrief-over-zevende-voortgangsrapportage-programma-geweld-hoort-nergens-thuis
https://www.ad.nl/politiek/langer-ouderschapsverlof-vanaf-2022
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/coronavirus-covid-19/onderwijs-en-kinderopvang/corona-kosten-kinderopvang-ouders
CBS: Dashboard arbeidsmarkt, https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/visualisaties/dashboard-arbeidsmarkt
http://www.cpb.nl/publicatie/ex-post-analyse-effect-kinderopvangtoeslag-op-arbeidsparticipatie
https://www.nu.nl/economie/4875062/aantal-fulltime-werkende-vrouwen-passeert-grens-van-miljoen.html
Een werkende combinatie deel 1, SER, October 2016 https://www.ser.nl/~/media/db_adviezen/2010_2019/2016/werkende-combinatie-deel1.ashx
84 procent van de thuiszitters is vrouw, 14 augustus 2019, https://www.kinderopvangtotaal.nl/84-procent-van-de-thuiszitters-is-vrouw/
World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report, 2018
Geen betere Cao Ziekenhuizen: vakbonden starten eind juni met acties, 6 juni 2019, Zorggids Nederland
Roeters, A., F Bucx, Kijk op kinderopvang, SCP, Den Haag, 28 augustus 2018
Gesprekken met gemeenten gaan alleen nog over geld, NRC Next, 13 mei 2019
Graph View
To what extent does pension policy realize goals of poverty prevention, intergenerational equity and fiscal sustainability?
10
9
9
Pension policy achieves the objectives fully.
8
7
6
7
6
Pension policy achieves the objectives largely.
5
4
3
4
3
Pension policy achieves the objectives partly.
2
1
1
Pension policy does not achieve the objectives at all.
The Dutch work fewer hours and retire later than people in other EU member states. The average pension age has increased from 61 years in 2007 to 64 years and 10 months in 2017. The proportion of people aged between 60 and 65 still active in the labor market has almost doubled since 2005. In 2020, 94,000 people retired, 30% more than in the previous two years. Also 6.8% of employees over 55 retired, as opposed to 5.5% in 2019. It is not clear whether these trends were influenced by the coronavirus crisis. The retirement age is still gradually increasing, but slower than before. In 2020, the average statutory pension retirement age of employees was 65 years and six months, in 2021 it increased to 66 years and four months, in 2022 it will increase another three months, and will reach 67 years in 2024. Afterward, the increase will be eight months for each year of longer life expectancy.
The Dutch pension system is based on three pillars. The first pillar is the basic, state-run old-age pension (AOW) that provides benefits for people 66 years old and older. Everyone under 66 who pays Dutch wage tax and/or income tax pays into the AOW system. The system may be considered a “pay-as-you-go” system. This pillar makes up only a limited part of the total old-age pension system. Because the current number of pensioners will double over the next few decades, the system is subject to considerable and increasing pressure. The second pillar consists of obligatory occupational pension schemes that supplement the AOW scheme. Both employees and employers are obliged to contribute. In this way, the pension scheme covers all employees of a given company and industry/sector. The third pillar comprises supplementary personal pension schemes that anyone can buy from insurance companies.
Many self-employed people (who number more than 1.2 million in the Netherlands) do not opt for a pension package, as this is not yet compulsory. Previously, self-employed people often had a short history in the conventional labor market that gave them some pension; however, most newly self-employed or freelance people today do not have any pension scheme whatsoever.
Although the system is considered the world’s best after those in Denmark and Australia, it – like most European systems – is vulnerable to demographic changes related to an aging population, as well as to disturbances in international financial markets. This is because pension funds, driven by the need to meet their growing financial obligations, are large players in stock markets. As of 2013, the government gradually increased the age of AOW pension eligibility to 66 by 2018, with a further increase to 67 by 2021. For supplementary pension schemes, the retirement age rose to 67 in 2014. During the review period, further increases in the retirement age were capped, and concessions were made for people engaged in physically demanding jobs. Due to the fact that the actual average retirement age is significantly lower that the legal level of 65, the average retirement age is continuing to rise.
Due to the very low interest-rate levels, pension-fund assets, although still enormous (totaling €660 billion or 193% of GDP), have not grown in proportion to the number of pensioners. The liquidity ratio of pension funds must be maintained at a minimum threshold of 105%. The time period given for recovery after failing to meet this threshold was increased by the Dutch central bank from three to a maximum of five years. Nevertheless, quite a few pension-insurance companies are at risk of having to lower their benefits. Interim framework bills for strengthening the governance of pension funds (e.g., requirements for the indexation of pension benefits, the inclusion of pensioners on governing boards, and the use of oversight commissions and comparative monitoring practices) were adopted by parliament in the summer of 2014. In 2022, some funds that have met the minimum threshold of 105% will be allowed to index pensions for the first time in 13 years.
A more definitive reform of the Dutch pension system was approved after a long “poldering” or stakeholder consultation process. Debate focused on the redistributive impacts (on the poor and rich, young and older, high and low education) and on the creation of more flexible pension schemes that give individuals more choice opportunities versus retaining collectively managed pension schemes. In 2019, the long-due retirement-plan agreement was finally signed, but was immediately called into question by the trade unions due to extremely low interest rates. Eventually, the new pension law was passed, and implementation is to begin after a delay in 2023. It involves simpler, more uniform rules, including for survivors’ pensions. A mandatory pension plan for freelance workers will contribute to diminishing the gap between contracted and flexible workers.
Citations:
Rijksoverhead, Pensioenakkoord: een toekomstbestendig pensioenstelsel, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/pensioen/toekomst-pensioenstelsel (visited 3 november 2019)
https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2021/15/meer-werknemers-met-pensioen-gegaan-in-2020
https://www.mercer.com/our-thinking/global-pension-index-2021.html
Pensioendilemma’s in tien grafieken, 18 maart 2019, https://fd.nl/economie-politiek/1293173/pensioendilemma-s-in-tien-grafieken
Pensioenlefftijd nederlanders voor het eerst beoven de 65 jaar, 17 augustus 2019, https://fd.nl/economie-politiek/1311155/pensioenleeftijd-nederlanders-voor-het-eerst-boven-de-65-jaar
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/pensioen/toekomst-pensioenstelsel
Centrale banken bederven het pensioensprookje, NRC Next, 21 June, 2019
SER, Naar een nieuw pensioenstelsel, Juni 2019
The Dutch pension system is based on three pillars. The first pillar is the basic, state-run old-age pension (AOW) that provides benefits for people 66 years old and older. Everyone under 66 who pays Dutch wage tax and/or income tax pays into the AOW system. The system may be considered a “pay-as-you-go” system. This pillar makes up only a limited part of the total old-age pension system. Because the current number of pensioners will double over the next few decades, the system is subject to considerable and increasing pressure. The second pillar consists of obligatory occupational pension schemes that supplement the AOW scheme. Both employees and employers are obliged to contribute. In this way, the pension scheme covers all employees of a given company and industry/sector. The third pillar comprises supplementary personal pension schemes that anyone can buy from insurance companies.
Many self-employed people (who number more than 1.2 million in the Netherlands) do not opt for a pension package, as this is not yet compulsory. Previously, self-employed people often had a short history in the conventional labor market that gave them some pension; however, most newly self-employed or freelance people today do not have any pension scheme whatsoever.
Although the system is considered the world’s best after those in Denmark and Australia, it – like most European systems – is vulnerable to demographic changes related to an aging population, as well as to disturbances in international financial markets. This is because pension funds, driven by the need to meet their growing financial obligations, are large players in stock markets. As of 2013, the government gradually increased the age of AOW pension eligibility to 66 by 2018, with a further increase to 67 by 2021. For supplementary pension schemes, the retirement age rose to 67 in 2014. During the review period, further increases in the retirement age were capped, and concessions were made for people engaged in physically demanding jobs. Due to the fact that the actual average retirement age is significantly lower that the legal level of 65, the average retirement age is continuing to rise.
Due to the very low interest-rate levels, pension-fund assets, although still enormous (totaling €660 billion or 193% of GDP), have not grown in proportion to the number of pensioners. The liquidity ratio of pension funds must be maintained at a minimum threshold of 105%. The time period given for recovery after failing to meet this threshold was increased by the Dutch central bank from three to a maximum of five years. Nevertheless, quite a few pension-insurance companies are at risk of having to lower their benefits. Interim framework bills for strengthening the governance of pension funds (e.g., requirements for the indexation of pension benefits, the inclusion of pensioners on governing boards, and the use of oversight commissions and comparative monitoring practices) were adopted by parliament in the summer of 2014. In 2022, some funds that have met the minimum threshold of 105% will be allowed to index pensions for the first time in 13 years.
A more definitive reform of the Dutch pension system was approved after a long “poldering” or stakeholder consultation process. Debate focused on the redistributive impacts (on the poor and rich, young and older, high and low education) and on the creation of more flexible pension schemes that give individuals more choice opportunities versus retaining collectively managed pension schemes. In 2019, the long-due retirement-plan agreement was finally signed, but was immediately called into question by the trade unions due to extremely low interest rates. Eventually, the new pension law was passed, and implementation is to begin after a delay in 2023. It involves simpler, more uniform rules, including for survivors’ pensions. A mandatory pension plan for freelance workers will contribute to diminishing the gap between contracted and flexible workers.
Citations:
Rijksoverhead, Pensioenakkoord: een toekomstbestendig pensioenstelsel, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/pensioen/toekomst-pensioenstelsel (visited 3 november 2019)
https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2021/15/meer-werknemers-met-pensioen-gegaan-in-2020
https://www.mercer.com/our-thinking/global-pension-index-2021.html
Pensioendilemma’s in tien grafieken, 18 maart 2019, https://fd.nl/economie-politiek/1293173/pensioendilemma-s-in-tien-grafieken
Pensioenlefftijd nederlanders voor het eerst beoven de 65 jaar, 17 augustus 2019, https://fd.nl/economie-politiek/1311155/pensioenleeftijd-nederlanders-voor-het-eerst-boven-de-65-jaar
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/pensioen/toekomst-pensioenstelsel
Centrale banken bederven het pensioensprookje, NRC Next, 21 June, 2019
SER, Naar een nieuw pensioenstelsel, Juni 2019
Graph View
How effectively do policies support the integration of migrants into society?
10
9
9
Cultural, education and social policies effectively support the integration of migrants into society.
8
7
6
7
6
Cultural, education and social policies seek to integrate migrants into society, but have failed to do so effectively.
5
4
3
4
3
Cultural, education and social policies do not focus on integrating migrants into society.
2
1
1
Cultural, education and social policies segregate migrant communities from the majority society.
The Netherlands is a sizable immigration-destination country, with a considerable integration task. In 2020, almost a quarter of Dutch population was of migrant origin, roughly half of them being second-generation migrants. The major cause of growth is asylum seeking. Three large groups of migrants can be distinguished in terms of policy issues and risk. The first group are people with a migration background, mostly of the second and third generations. The second group consists of new migrants, mostly refugees from various regions in the world. The third group includes migrants from Eastern Europe, predominantly seasonal workers. Each of these groups has their own issues and risks. The economic position of second- and third-generation migrants is gradually improving, although they still experience disproportionate discrimination within the labor market.
The proportion of school pupils in these groups assessed as being capable of entering the higher tiers of Dutch secondary education (HAVO or VWO) and the proportion actually receiving this level of education in year three of secondary school has risen more sharply than among schoolchildren with a native Dutch background. The in-depth analyses show that this improved educational position also leads to a better employment position, although a difference remains. On average, their employment rate after graduation is lower than among graduates with a native Dutch background. However, the higher the level of education achieved, the smaller the difference. As a result, the relative representation of migrants within crime statistics is still high, but has shown a decreasing trend over the last decade. The decrease is particularly strong for second-generation migrants. Women with a migrant background are doing significantly better than their male peers, both at school and at work.
Elections in March 2021 have triggered debate on the representation of minorities in political bodies. This explains the relative success of DENK, a Turkish minority party (2.0% of the vote), and the anti-discrimination party BIJ1 (previously Artikel 1, 0.8% of the vote).
In 2020, the Migrant Integration Policy Index ranked the country in a third tier, “Temporary integration – halfway favorable,” together with Germany, Italy, France and the United Kingdom. Asylum policy has been a point of concern. Efficiency and speed have been clearly been given a high priority in asylum decisions, and the use of algorithms has led to a significant number of arbitrary decisions. The system of refugee camps was not reformed after the crisis in 2015, which led to problems at the end of 2021 due to the influx of refugees from Afghanistan. People were placed in almost unacceptable accommodations. Eventually, the minister forced municipalities to accept large numbers of refugees without local consensus. A U.N. commission investigated Dutch policies and noted, inter alia, that detention is used much too often. Undocumented people also end up in such camps. Children, particularly girls, do not feel safe in family centers, and children still disappear under the radar.
In a 2018 representative public opinion poll on immigration and integration issues, 38% of respondents stated that immigration, integration and racism were the second-most important public concern, after healthcare. In view of occasional riots and disturbances at municipal council meetings on the location of refugee settlements, integration issues flared up again. National and local parties with anti-immigration agendas gained seats in municipal councils across the country, but never managed to repeat their success from 2017. Apart from the occasional provocation, they have not managed to initiate a substantial debate on the issue of integration. Although the dominant concern during the review period seemed to be over growing levels of income inequality, there are still widely shared concerns over growing polarization and radicalization on both sides of the political spectrum.
Since 2009, all non-EU nationals who migrate to the Netherlands have been required to learn Dutch and essential facts about Dutch history and society. The Civic Integration Abroad policy involves obligatory integration tests in the country of origin for family-reunion applicants. Refugees are expected to “deserve” their status in the Netherlands by taking language tests, and many refugees accumulate debt paying for obligatory language courses, which are also difficult to find and are often of unreliable quality. Migrants without refugee status are allowed to take a loan of up to €10,000 to pay for their integration, to be repaid within three years. The new law addresses many of these issues, but not all. Two improvements stand out. First, municipalities have recovered their coordination role, thereby putting an end to the lucrative language courses offered by all kinds of unmonitored organizations. Second, a great amount of flexibility has been added to the system, allowing for refugees to proceed more quickly to school or to higher level paid jobs, since they will be offered language lessons at a higher level. A downside is the punitive character of the system that has been preserved. Refugees are to pay a fine if they do not complete their program on time, which means that many of them may opt out for lower, “easier” language levels, which would be detrimental to their integration in the long run.
Compared to other countries, immigrants benefit from several measures targeting employment and labor market integration. Nevertheless, unemployment rates among non-Western migrants are three times as high (16%) as among Dutch-born citizens (under 4% at the end of 2018). The employment rate of refugees stagnated during the coronavirus crisis. In 2020, 44% of those who received refugee status in 2014 had a job. They usually work fewer hours than native Dutch persons, have flexible contracts and are overrepresented in low-end service jobs. More recent refugees seem to find work faster. Recent research shows that ethnic discrimination in the labor market is widespread and difficult to address. Muslim citizens self-report experiences with and perceptions of discrimination, as well as incidents of harassment and violence, at levels quite high by comparison with other European counties. Rampant discrimination, racism and Islamophobia in the police force were recently revealed by a series of whistleblowers in response to inadequate responses by top police officials. In 2021, a case against the police on ethnic profiling was lost. The national Monitor Discrimination reported a record number of complaints in 2020.
Another precarious group – East European migrants – was hit particularly hard by the pandemic. First off, virtually no integration programs exist for people coming from within the EU. In addition, many are seasonal workers with temporary “all-in” contracts by agencies that provide employment, housing and transportation, under conditions resembling human trafficking in many cases. A report by a special committee came up with a number of recommendations. Implementation of these has been slow and piecemeal, so far.
Citations:
Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015. Integration Policies: who benefits? (http://mipex.eu/sites/default/files/downloads/files/mipex_integration-policy_po licy-brief.pdf consulted 5 november 20190
Burgerperspectieven 2019|3, Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau (scp.nl, consulted November 2, 2019)
Nederlands Jeugdinstituut, Jeugdwerkloosheid, 29 oktober 2019
https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/publication/2021/15/asylum-and-integration-2021
https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2018/44/aantal-immigranten-en-emigranten-ook-in-2018-hoog
CBS, Jaarrapport integratie 2020 https://longreads.cbs.nl/integratie-2020/
https://www.ru.nl/fsw/@1331552/stem-geven-kiezers-migratieachtergrond/
https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/publicatie/2021/15/asiel-en-integratie-2021-cohortonderzoek-asielzoekers-en-statushouders
Migrantenkinderen verdienen minder, NRC Next, June 13, 2019
‘Moslimfobie, intimidatie bij politie – en de top kijkt weg’, NRC Next, July 13, 2019
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2021/09/22/rechtbank-marechaussee-mag-etnisch-profileren-bij-vreemdelingentoezicht-a4059212
https://stichtingcivic.nl/het-nieuwe-inburgeringsbeleid-een-hindernisbaan-van-sancties/
https://www.ser.nl/nl/thema/werkwijzer-vluchtelingen/feiten-en-cijfers/aantallen-herkomst
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2020/10/30/tweede-advies-aanjaagteam-bescherming-arbeidsmigranten
https://njcm.nl/actueel/vn-comite-onderzoekt-discriminatie-in-nederland/
The proportion of school pupils in these groups assessed as being capable of entering the higher tiers of Dutch secondary education (HAVO or VWO) and the proportion actually receiving this level of education in year three of secondary school has risen more sharply than among schoolchildren with a native Dutch background. The in-depth analyses show that this improved educational position also leads to a better employment position, although a difference remains. On average, their employment rate after graduation is lower than among graduates with a native Dutch background. However, the higher the level of education achieved, the smaller the difference. As a result, the relative representation of migrants within crime statistics is still high, but has shown a decreasing trend over the last decade. The decrease is particularly strong for second-generation migrants. Women with a migrant background are doing significantly better than their male peers, both at school and at work.
Elections in March 2021 have triggered debate on the representation of minorities in political bodies. This explains the relative success of DENK, a Turkish minority party (2.0% of the vote), and the anti-discrimination party BIJ1 (previously Artikel 1, 0.8% of the vote).
In 2020, the Migrant Integration Policy Index ranked the country in a third tier, “Temporary integration – halfway favorable,” together with Germany, Italy, France and the United Kingdom. Asylum policy has been a point of concern. Efficiency and speed have been clearly been given a high priority in asylum decisions, and the use of algorithms has led to a significant number of arbitrary decisions. The system of refugee camps was not reformed after the crisis in 2015, which led to problems at the end of 2021 due to the influx of refugees from Afghanistan. People were placed in almost unacceptable accommodations. Eventually, the minister forced municipalities to accept large numbers of refugees without local consensus. A U.N. commission investigated Dutch policies and noted, inter alia, that detention is used much too often. Undocumented people also end up in such camps. Children, particularly girls, do not feel safe in family centers, and children still disappear under the radar.
In a 2018 representative public opinion poll on immigration and integration issues, 38% of respondents stated that immigration, integration and racism were the second-most important public concern, after healthcare. In view of occasional riots and disturbances at municipal council meetings on the location of refugee settlements, integration issues flared up again. National and local parties with anti-immigration agendas gained seats in municipal councils across the country, but never managed to repeat their success from 2017. Apart from the occasional provocation, they have not managed to initiate a substantial debate on the issue of integration. Although the dominant concern during the review period seemed to be over growing levels of income inequality, there are still widely shared concerns over growing polarization and radicalization on both sides of the political spectrum.
Since 2009, all non-EU nationals who migrate to the Netherlands have been required to learn Dutch and essential facts about Dutch history and society. The Civic Integration Abroad policy involves obligatory integration tests in the country of origin for family-reunion applicants. Refugees are expected to “deserve” their status in the Netherlands by taking language tests, and many refugees accumulate debt paying for obligatory language courses, which are also difficult to find and are often of unreliable quality. Migrants without refugee status are allowed to take a loan of up to €10,000 to pay for their integration, to be repaid within three years. The new law addresses many of these issues, but not all. Two improvements stand out. First, municipalities have recovered their coordination role, thereby putting an end to the lucrative language courses offered by all kinds of unmonitored organizations. Second, a great amount of flexibility has been added to the system, allowing for refugees to proceed more quickly to school or to higher level paid jobs, since they will be offered language lessons at a higher level. A downside is the punitive character of the system that has been preserved. Refugees are to pay a fine if they do not complete their program on time, which means that many of them may opt out for lower, “easier” language levels, which would be detrimental to their integration in the long run.
Compared to other countries, immigrants benefit from several measures targeting employment and labor market integration. Nevertheless, unemployment rates among non-Western migrants are three times as high (16%) as among Dutch-born citizens (under 4% at the end of 2018). The employment rate of refugees stagnated during the coronavirus crisis. In 2020, 44% of those who received refugee status in 2014 had a job. They usually work fewer hours than native Dutch persons, have flexible contracts and are overrepresented in low-end service jobs. More recent refugees seem to find work faster. Recent research shows that ethnic discrimination in the labor market is widespread and difficult to address. Muslim citizens self-report experiences with and perceptions of discrimination, as well as incidents of harassment and violence, at levels quite high by comparison with other European counties. Rampant discrimination, racism and Islamophobia in the police force were recently revealed by a series of whistleblowers in response to inadequate responses by top police officials. In 2021, a case against the police on ethnic profiling was lost. The national Monitor Discrimination reported a record number of complaints in 2020.
Another precarious group – East European migrants – was hit particularly hard by the pandemic. First off, virtually no integration programs exist for people coming from within the EU. In addition, many are seasonal workers with temporary “all-in” contracts by agencies that provide employment, housing and transportation, under conditions resembling human trafficking in many cases. A report by a special committee came up with a number of recommendations. Implementation of these has been slow and piecemeal, so far.
Citations:
Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015. Integration Policies: who benefits? (http://mipex.eu/sites/default/files/downloads/files/mipex_integration-policy_po licy-brief.pdf consulted 5 november 20190
Burgerperspectieven 2019|3, Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau (scp.nl, consulted November 2, 2019)
Nederlands Jeugdinstituut, Jeugdwerkloosheid, 29 oktober 2019
https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/publication/2021/15/asylum-and-integration-2021
https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2018/44/aantal-immigranten-en-emigranten-ook-in-2018-hoog
CBS, Jaarrapport integratie 2020 https://longreads.cbs.nl/integratie-2020/
https://www.ru.nl/fsw/@1331552/stem-geven-kiezers-migratieachtergrond/
https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/publicatie/2021/15/asiel-en-integratie-2021-cohortonderzoek-asielzoekers-en-statushouders
Migrantenkinderen verdienen minder, NRC Next, June 13, 2019
‘Moslimfobie, intimidatie bij politie – en de top kijkt weg’, NRC Next, July 13, 2019
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2021/09/22/rechtbank-marechaussee-mag-etnisch-profileren-bij-vreemdelingentoezicht-a4059212
https://stichtingcivic.nl/het-nieuwe-inburgeringsbeleid-een-hindernisbaan-van-sancties/
https://www.ser.nl/nl/thema/werkwijzer-vluchtelingen/feiten-en-cijfers/aantallen-herkomst
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2020/10/30/tweede-advies-aanjaagteam-bescherming-arbeidsmigranten
https://njcm.nl/actueel/vn-comite-onderzoekt-discriminatie-in-nederland/
Graph View
How effectively does internal security policy protect citizens against security risks?
10
9
9
Internal security policy protects citizens against security risks very effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
Internal security policy protects citizens against security risks more or less effectively.
5
4
3
4
3
Internal security policy does not effectively protect citizens against security risks.
2
1
1
Internal security policy exacerbates the security risks.
Since 2010, opinion polling has shown that confidence in the police is consistently high and satisfaction regarding policing performance is fairly high (28% of those polled express that they are “very satisfied”). Research shows that this is independent of the actual conduct and performance of police officers. In the last 10 years, self-reported crime has consistently decreased. Crimes registered by police decreased by one-third, and the number of crimes as estimated by citizens decreased even more, by approximately 40%. At the same time, the percentage of resolved cases remains steady, at about 25%. A recent CBS report called this “the mystery of the disappearing crime.” However, this decline came to a grinding halt during the review period, with a rise in sexual offenses, probably related to human trafficking particularly of underage subjects. The types of crime reported shifted in 2020 from more “traditional” crime toward organized crime and digital/cybercrime.
Cybercrime rates have increased and the types of crimes have diversified – from harassment to organized attacks on vital public systems. Recent studies have concluded that the Dutch police lack the technical expertise to effectively tackle cybercrime. A new study warned in 2019 of the dangers of “digital dependency” and the possible resulting havoc. Since 2011, the Dutch government has been implementing an EU-coordinated National Cybersecurity Strategy that prioritizes prevention over detection. Regarding terrorism threats, the intelligence services (Nationale Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding, established 2004) appear able to prevent attacks. The Dutch Safety board concluded in a report from 2020 that the Netherlands’ approach to digital safety and security needs to change rapidly and fundamentally to prevent Dutch society from being disrupted by cyberattacks. The newly formed government included a cybersecurity paragraph, and for the first time has a designated minister for digitalization.
There is deep concern about the infiltration of organized crime into local politics, business and police forces, which has resulted in an unwanted seepage of the illegal economy into the formal economy, and has undermined the credibility of the public administration. Recently, a number of reports drew attention to the scale of illegal-drug production and distribution in the Netherlands and beyond. Synthetic drugs with an estimated street value of over €18 billion and marijuana production have become a structural part of Dutch economy, thereby creating a constant danger of spillover into the mainstream economy. In an attempt to tackle the problem, a number of municipalities have begun experimenting with the legalization of soft drugs. However, the issue is increasingly hard drugs. Over the last decade, the Netherlands, as has been made clear from recent court cases involving murders among criminals, has become a crucial distribution center for cocaine and synthetic drugs in Western Europe.
In the 2022 budget, an additional €524 million is allocated to enlarging police capacity and building social resilience. The police forces have indicated that this is not sufficient to bring about structural change.
Two recent attempts (one successful) to assassinate lawyers are considered to be extremely alarming, as they expose the true reach of organized crime and their very violent practices. The assassination of the investigative journalist Pieter R. de Vries was a shock, and revealed the alarming degree to which organized crime has infiltrated Dutch society. Other high-profile cases, such as a hostage situation in Amsterdam and violent robberies in broad daylight, have generated feelings of insecurity, even if overall levels of crime are down. The coronavirus crisis also led to the intimidation of scientists and politicians, thereby creating an overall feeling of an unsafe, more perilous and harsher society.
Members of the police rank and file are expressing decreasing confidence in their leaders, due to scandals related to racism, discrimination and bullying. Police spokespeople maintain that the citizenry’s confidence in the police forces remains high. Following debates about more aggressive standard police equipment, incidents of disproportionate police violence are growing, and the government has gone to great lengths not to sanction the perpetrators. The trend is a reason for concern.
The policies of the present government focus on cost reduction, and the centralization of the previously strictly municipal and regional police, judicial, and penitentiary systems. Recent reports indicate serious problems in implementing reforms, with police officers claiming severe loss of operational capacity. Meanwhile, there is profound discontent and unrest inside the Ministry of Justice and Safety. Judges, prosecutors, lawyers and other legal personnel have voiced public complaints about the “managerialization” of the judicial process and the resulting workload, which critics contend have led to “sloppy” trials and verdicts. Efforts to digitize the judicial process, intended to reduce costs, have resulted in a massive operational failure and a cost overrun of approximately €200 million. The coalition agreement announces more money for paying fees of social lawyers in an effort to help citizens (re)gain more access to legal procedures. But government policy is also attempting to relieve part of the burden on the judicial system by introducing intermediation procedures. The coronavirus crisis had significant influence on the way prevention, law enforcement and the court system functioned. During the lockdowns, some tasks were discontinued or significantly delayed. Particularly for prevention and youth detention centers, the delays were significant. The already overburdened courts started working online to prevent even further backlogs, inevitably impacting the quality of verdicts.
According to research for Transport & Logistiek Nederland, the police have been neglecting transportation crimes for years. Precise number of criminal activities are difficult to quantify, but it seems that organized crime uses transportation frequently and with a very low risk of being caught. The reasons are, again, shortage of personnel, insufficient funding and decentralization. One high-level administrator has characterized the situation as “organized crime facing an unorganized state.”
Environmental crime is also growing in impact and frequency. The Dutch court of audit concluded that the whole chain of response is not functioning well. Information and data on environmental crimes are insufficient and unreliable. What is needed is risk-oriented action, instead of sporadic reactions after the fact. The Dutch court of audit recommended making all the information on environmental hazards public, to increase transparency and to increase the pressure on companies to comply.
The overall picture from the safety and security, and judicial institutions of the Dutch government is one of increasing stress and challenge, lack of enforcement capacity, and an inadequate response to organized crime in the drug sector, human trafficking, ecological crime and cybercrime.
Citations:
L. van der Veer et al., Vertrouwen in de politie: trends en verklaringen, Politie en Wetenschap, Apeldoorn, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, 2013
https://www.parlementairemonitor.nl/9353000/1/j9vvij5epmj1ey0/vlnje0e06mzw
Cybersecuritymonitor 2020, CBS, https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/publicatie/2021/18/cybersecuritymonitor-2020
Handhaven in het duister: De aanpak van milieucriminaliteit en – overtredingen, deel 2, Algemene Rekenkamer 30.-06.2021
https://www.bureaubervoets.nl/portfolio/doorbraak-verzocht-transportcriminaliteit/
https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/news/2020/10/less-traditional-crime-more-cybercrime
Liquidatie van advocaat is ‘aanslag op rechtsttaat,” NRC, 18 september 2019
https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/strafzaak-peter-r.-de-vries
https://www.wrr.nl/onderwerpen/digitale-ontwrichting/nieuws/2019/09/09/digitale-ontwrichting
Veiligheidsmonitor, 2019 ((veiligheidsmonitor.nl, consulted 3 November 2019)
Jurien de Jong, Het Mysterie van verdwenen criminaliteit, Statistische Trends, CBS, Mei 2018, Den Haag
Tops, P. et al, Waar een klein land groot in kan zijn. Nederland en synthetische drugs in de afgelopen 50 jaar.The Hague 2018
https://www.tweedekamer.nl/debat_en_vergadering/uitgelicht/georganiseerde-criminaliteit-en-ondermijning
https://www.wodc.nl/actueel/nieuws/2021/05/03/bekostiging-van-politie-om-en-rechtspraak-onderzocht
Daling criminaliteitcijfers laatste halfjaar gestaakt, NOS, Jan. 17, 2019
Dutch police are being infiltrated by criminal gangs, report says, July 16, 2019
https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/nederland/artikel/5215875/kritiek-op-peperdure-politie-advocaten-zaak-mitch-henriquez
https://twnews.nl/nl-news/gebrekkig-materieel-en-achterstallig-onderhoud-wat-zijn-de-grootste-problemen-bij-defensie
https://www.wodc.nl/actueel/nieuws/2021/05/03/bekostiging-van-politie-om-en-rechtspraak-onderzocht
Fundamental intervention is needed to ensure Dutch digital safety and security, Dutch Safety Council, https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/19862/fundamental-intervention-is-needed-to-ensure-dutch-digital-safety-and
https://www.slachtofferhulp.nl/over-ons/jaarverslag/
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2021/03/03/deze-lui-deinzen-nergens-voor-terug-a4034051
https://www.ftm.nl/artikelen/de-onderschatting-van-de-cocainehandel?utm_source=linkedIn&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=CokeSlot&share=Q4NMfP6LrH9191wkcohz%2B0U5e8Ql5X7pX7Te%2B04IuOqJYq2L1vsCC%2FljpNL3RYQ%3D
https://criminaliteit-en-recht.nl/
Cybercrime rates have increased and the types of crimes have diversified – from harassment to organized attacks on vital public systems. Recent studies have concluded that the Dutch police lack the technical expertise to effectively tackle cybercrime. A new study warned in 2019 of the dangers of “digital dependency” and the possible resulting havoc. Since 2011, the Dutch government has been implementing an EU-coordinated National Cybersecurity Strategy that prioritizes prevention over detection. Regarding terrorism threats, the intelligence services (Nationale Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding, established 2004) appear able to prevent attacks. The Dutch Safety board concluded in a report from 2020 that the Netherlands’ approach to digital safety and security needs to change rapidly and fundamentally to prevent Dutch society from being disrupted by cyberattacks. The newly formed government included a cybersecurity paragraph, and for the first time has a designated minister for digitalization.
There is deep concern about the infiltration of organized crime into local politics, business and police forces, which has resulted in an unwanted seepage of the illegal economy into the formal economy, and has undermined the credibility of the public administration. Recently, a number of reports drew attention to the scale of illegal-drug production and distribution in the Netherlands and beyond. Synthetic drugs with an estimated street value of over €18 billion and marijuana production have become a structural part of Dutch economy, thereby creating a constant danger of spillover into the mainstream economy. In an attempt to tackle the problem, a number of municipalities have begun experimenting with the legalization of soft drugs. However, the issue is increasingly hard drugs. Over the last decade, the Netherlands, as has been made clear from recent court cases involving murders among criminals, has become a crucial distribution center for cocaine and synthetic drugs in Western Europe.
In the 2022 budget, an additional €524 million is allocated to enlarging police capacity and building social resilience. The police forces have indicated that this is not sufficient to bring about structural change.
Two recent attempts (one successful) to assassinate lawyers are considered to be extremely alarming, as they expose the true reach of organized crime and their very violent practices. The assassination of the investigative journalist Pieter R. de Vries was a shock, and revealed the alarming degree to which organized crime has infiltrated Dutch society. Other high-profile cases, such as a hostage situation in Amsterdam and violent robberies in broad daylight, have generated feelings of insecurity, even if overall levels of crime are down. The coronavirus crisis also led to the intimidation of scientists and politicians, thereby creating an overall feeling of an unsafe, more perilous and harsher society.
Members of the police rank and file are expressing decreasing confidence in their leaders, due to scandals related to racism, discrimination and bullying. Police spokespeople maintain that the citizenry’s confidence in the police forces remains high. Following debates about more aggressive standard police equipment, incidents of disproportionate police violence are growing, and the government has gone to great lengths not to sanction the perpetrators. The trend is a reason for concern.
The policies of the present government focus on cost reduction, and the centralization of the previously strictly municipal and regional police, judicial, and penitentiary systems. Recent reports indicate serious problems in implementing reforms, with police officers claiming severe loss of operational capacity. Meanwhile, there is profound discontent and unrest inside the Ministry of Justice and Safety. Judges, prosecutors, lawyers and other legal personnel have voiced public complaints about the “managerialization” of the judicial process and the resulting workload, which critics contend have led to “sloppy” trials and verdicts. Efforts to digitize the judicial process, intended to reduce costs, have resulted in a massive operational failure and a cost overrun of approximately €200 million. The coalition agreement announces more money for paying fees of social lawyers in an effort to help citizens (re)gain more access to legal procedures. But government policy is also attempting to relieve part of the burden on the judicial system by introducing intermediation procedures. The coronavirus crisis had significant influence on the way prevention, law enforcement and the court system functioned. During the lockdowns, some tasks were discontinued or significantly delayed. Particularly for prevention and youth detention centers, the delays were significant. The already overburdened courts started working online to prevent even further backlogs, inevitably impacting the quality of verdicts.
According to research for Transport & Logistiek Nederland, the police have been neglecting transportation crimes for years. Precise number of criminal activities are difficult to quantify, but it seems that organized crime uses transportation frequently and with a very low risk of being caught. The reasons are, again, shortage of personnel, insufficient funding and decentralization. One high-level administrator has characterized the situation as “organized crime facing an unorganized state.”
Environmental crime is also growing in impact and frequency. The Dutch court of audit concluded that the whole chain of response is not functioning well. Information and data on environmental crimes are insufficient and unreliable. What is needed is risk-oriented action, instead of sporadic reactions after the fact. The Dutch court of audit recommended making all the information on environmental hazards public, to increase transparency and to increase the pressure on companies to comply.
The overall picture from the safety and security, and judicial institutions of the Dutch government is one of increasing stress and challenge, lack of enforcement capacity, and an inadequate response to organized crime in the drug sector, human trafficking, ecological crime and cybercrime.
Citations:
L. van der Veer et al., Vertrouwen in de politie: trends en verklaringen, Politie en Wetenschap, Apeldoorn, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, 2013
https://www.parlementairemonitor.nl/9353000/1/j9vvij5epmj1ey0/vlnje0e06mzw
Cybersecuritymonitor 2020, CBS, https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/publicatie/2021/18/cybersecuritymonitor-2020
Handhaven in het duister: De aanpak van milieucriminaliteit en – overtredingen, deel 2, Algemene Rekenkamer 30.-06.2021
https://www.bureaubervoets.nl/portfolio/doorbraak-verzocht-transportcriminaliteit/
https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/news/2020/10/less-traditional-crime-more-cybercrime
Liquidatie van advocaat is ‘aanslag op rechtsttaat,” NRC, 18 september 2019
https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/strafzaak-peter-r.-de-vries
https://www.wrr.nl/onderwerpen/digitale-ontwrichting/nieuws/2019/09/09/digitale-ontwrichting
Veiligheidsmonitor, 2019 ((veiligheidsmonitor.nl, consulted 3 November 2019)
Jurien de Jong, Het Mysterie van verdwenen criminaliteit, Statistische Trends, CBS, Mei 2018, Den Haag
Tops, P. et al, Waar een klein land groot in kan zijn. Nederland en synthetische drugs in de afgelopen 50 jaar.The Hague 2018
https://www.tweedekamer.nl/debat_en_vergadering/uitgelicht/georganiseerde-criminaliteit-en-ondermijning
https://www.wodc.nl/actueel/nieuws/2021/05/03/bekostiging-van-politie-om-en-rechtspraak-onderzocht
Daling criminaliteitcijfers laatste halfjaar gestaakt, NOS, Jan. 17, 2019
Dutch police are being infiltrated by criminal gangs, report says, July 16, 2019
https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/nederland/artikel/5215875/kritiek-op-peperdure-politie-advocaten-zaak-mitch-henriquez
https://twnews.nl/nl-news/gebrekkig-materieel-en-achterstallig-onderhoud-wat-zijn-de-grootste-problemen-bij-defensie
https://www.wodc.nl/actueel/nieuws/2021/05/03/bekostiging-van-politie-om-en-rechtspraak-onderzocht
Fundamental intervention is needed to ensure Dutch digital safety and security, Dutch Safety Council, https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/19862/fundamental-intervention-is-needed-to-ensure-dutch-digital-safety-and
https://www.slachtofferhulp.nl/over-ons/jaarverslag/
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2021/03/03/deze-lui-deinzen-nergens-voor-terug-a4034051
https://www.ftm.nl/artikelen/de-onderschatting-van-de-cocainehandel?utm_source=linkedIn&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=CokeSlot&share=Q4NMfP6LrH9191wkcohz%2B0U5e8Ql5X7pX7Te%2B04IuOqJYq2L1vsCC%2FljpNL3RYQ%3D
https://criminaliteit-en-recht.nl/
Graph View
To what extent does the government demonstrate an active and coherent commitment to promoting equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries?
10
9
9
The government actively and coherently engages in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries. It frequently demonstrates initiative and responsibility, and acts as an agenda-setter.
8
7
6
7
6
The government actively engages in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries. However, some of its measures or policies lack coherence.
5
4
3
4
3
The government shows limited engagement in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries. Many of its measures or policies lack coherence.
2
1
1
The government does not contribute (and often undermines) efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in low- and middle-income countries.
The Netherlands ranks sixth in the Commitment to Development Index. It does best in trade (first place), development finance (seventh), and health (seventh). The components for which it has the most room for improvement are technology (rank 24), investment (18th), and security (16th). The development-aid budget was cut by the Rutte III cabinet, with the intention of adding expenditure for international conflict management and climate policy. In addition, costs for climate policy are allocated to development-aid budgets. The pattern of focusing on trade and the stimulation of Dutch business relations remains largely unchanged. The driving idea is that “economic and knowledge diplomacy” can forge a coalition between Dutch business-sector experts (in reproductive health, water management and food security/agriculture), and business and civil society associations in developing countries. Climate has been included as a key focus area, alongside poverty, migration and terrorism. The focus is on unstable regions close to Europe.
Human rights are still a priority for Dutch foreign policy. The new government’s coalition agreement stresses that future trade and investment treaties should include high standards of fair production, human rights, food safety, sustainable growth and climate. The budget is expected to rise and to be explicitly tied to the Sustainable Development Goals. The budget has been expanded by €500 million, mainly to participate in the COVAX program and to aid in climate adaptation and climate mitigation. In addition, different tranches of money were put toward alleviation of the coronavirus crisis in India and other countries. An additional €25 million was spent on vaccines in poor countries. Also, Afghanistan received about €10 million for humanitarian help.
Dutch immigration policy since 2015 has mimicked Denmark’s efforts, seeking to discourage refugees from coming to the Netherlands. The government did provide an additional €290 million for refugee relief in countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa, as a pivotal part of the Dutch refugee approach. All of this shows a pattern of declining commitment by the Dutch government to global policy frameworks and the fair global-trading system. Instead, the aspiration has been to link development aid to Dutch national economic and international security interests. Tellingly, in the new coalition government, the Department for Development Aid and International Trade has been rebaptized as the Department for International Trade and Development Aid. The international fight against terrorism has colored immigration policy for the last 20 years.
In spite of ample evidence of human trafficking and exploitation of workers, in some cases from poor regions within Europe, Dutch authorities have taken insufficient legal action against such crimes. Recent evidence about illegal pushbacks by Frontex also raises questions about Dutch support for the organization.
Citations:
Rijksoverheid, Beleidsnota Investeren in Perspectief, 2018
WRR (2010), Minder pretentie, meer ambitie. Ontwikkelingshulp die verschil maakt, Amsterdam University Press
Center for Global Development, Commitment to Development Index, 2021 (https://www.cgdev.org/commitment-development-index-2018, consulted 8 November 2019)
https://www.nlontwikkelingssamenwerking.nl
https://www.rekenkamer.nl/actueel/nieuws/2021/09/28/aanpak-arbeidsuitbuiting-door-inspectie-niet-effectief
Knoope, P. 20 jaar strijd tegen terrorisme bleek geldverslindend falen,14-07-2021 https://spectator.clingendael.org/en/node/5418
https://www.prakkendoliveira.nl/en/news/news-2021/eu-agency-frontex-charged-with-illegal-pushbacks
Human rights are still a priority for Dutch foreign policy. The new government’s coalition agreement stresses that future trade and investment treaties should include high standards of fair production, human rights, food safety, sustainable growth and climate. The budget is expected to rise and to be explicitly tied to the Sustainable Development Goals. The budget has been expanded by €500 million, mainly to participate in the COVAX program and to aid in climate adaptation and climate mitigation. In addition, different tranches of money were put toward alleviation of the coronavirus crisis in India and other countries. An additional €25 million was spent on vaccines in poor countries. Also, Afghanistan received about €10 million for humanitarian help.
Dutch immigration policy since 2015 has mimicked Denmark’s efforts, seeking to discourage refugees from coming to the Netherlands. The government did provide an additional €290 million for refugee relief in countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa, as a pivotal part of the Dutch refugee approach. All of this shows a pattern of declining commitment by the Dutch government to global policy frameworks and the fair global-trading system. Instead, the aspiration has been to link development aid to Dutch national economic and international security interests. Tellingly, in the new coalition government, the Department for Development Aid and International Trade has been rebaptized as the Department for International Trade and Development Aid. The international fight against terrorism has colored immigration policy for the last 20 years.
In spite of ample evidence of human trafficking and exploitation of workers, in some cases from poor regions within Europe, Dutch authorities have taken insufficient legal action against such crimes. Recent evidence about illegal pushbacks by Frontex also raises questions about Dutch support for the organization.
Citations:
Rijksoverheid, Beleidsnota Investeren in Perspectief, 2018
WRR (2010), Minder pretentie, meer ambitie. Ontwikkelingshulp die verschil maakt, Amsterdam University Press
Center for Global Development, Commitment to Development Index, 2021 (https://www.cgdev.org/commitment-development-index-2018, consulted 8 November 2019)
https://www.nlontwikkelingssamenwerking.nl
https://www.rekenkamer.nl/actueel/nieuws/2021/09/28/aanpak-arbeidsuitbuiting-door-inspectie-niet-effectief
Knoope, P. 20 jaar strijd tegen terrorisme bleek geldverslindend falen,14-07-2021 https://spectator.clingendael.org/en/node/5418
https://www.prakkendoliveira.nl/en/news/news-2021/eu-agency-frontex-charged-with-illegal-pushbacks