Executive Accountability
#41Key Findings
With oversight mechanisms having been significantly weakened in recent years, Turkey takes the SGI 2022’s lowest position (rank 41) with regard to executive accountability. Its score on this measure has declined by 1.4 points relative to 2014.
The government does not adequately inform citizens about the content development of policy. News coverage and debates are mainly one-sided in the pro-government media, while self-censorship is common in the neutral media. Voices critical of the government are fined. Pro-government oligarchs own a number of media organizations. Opposition journalists are frequently threatened and attacked.
The presidential system has centralized power in the hands of the executive and significantly undermined the parliament’s legislative and oversight functions. The audit court reports to parliament but is not accountable to it. The ombuds office does not react to widespread infringements of rights. The data protection authority began operations fairly recently.
Parties are centralized. An ideological divide hampers cooperation between secular and Islamic trade unions. The government has created a network of loyal civil society groups. Protests by environmental groups are regularly suppressed and are subject to criminal investigation.
The government does not adequately inform citizens about the content development of policy. News coverage and debates are mainly one-sided in the pro-government media, while self-censorship is common in the neutral media. Voices critical of the government are fined. Pro-government oligarchs own a number of media organizations. Opposition journalists are frequently threatened and attacked.
The presidential system has centralized power in the hands of the executive and significantly undermined the parliament’s legislative and oversight functions. The audit court reports to parliament but is not accountable to it. The ombuds office does not react to widespread infringements of rights. The data protection authority began operations fairly recently.
Parties are centralized. An ideological divide hampers cooperation between secular and Islamic trade unions. The government has created a network of loyal civil society groups. Protests by environmental groups are regularly suppressed and are subject to criminal investigation.
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To what extent are citizens informed of public policies?
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Most citizens are well-informed of a broad range of public policies.
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Many citizens are well-informed of individual public policies.
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Few citizens are well-informed of public policies; most citizens have only a rudimental knowledge of public policies.
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Most citizens are not aware of public policies.
With the exception of communiques from the Ministry of Finance and the central bank, the government does not adequately inform citizens about the content and development of government policy. The head of government, ministers and other high government officials highlight success stories and policies, but do not offer follow-up details. Decisions, information and reports are posted on governmental websites, but are not presented in such a way as to adequately inform the public.
Social media does enable some feedback on governmental processes, but is used by politicians to propagate disinformation. The government passed a regulation that imposes serious penalties on broadcasters that criticize the government via social media. The public is increasingly less likely to be aware of political developments beyond the information provided via channels belonging to pro-government media outlets.
Citations:
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en
Alat, B. 2018. “Türkiye’de İl Belediye Web Sitelerinin İşlevselliği Üzerine Bir Araştırma,” Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 28(1), 93-114.
Social media does enable some feedback on governmental processes, but is used by politicians to propagate disinformation. The government passed a regulation that imposes serious penalties on broadcasters that criticize the government via social media. The public is increasingly less likely to be aware of political developments beyond the information provided via channels belonging to pro-government media outlets.
Citations:
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en
Alat, B. 2018. “Türkiye’de İl Belediye Web Sitelerinin İşlevselliği Üzerine Bir Araştırma,” Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 28(1), 93-114.
Does the government publish data and information in a way that strengthens citizens’ capacity to hold the government accountable?
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The government publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
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The government most of the time publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
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The government publishes data in a limited and not timely or user-friendly way.
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The government publishes (almost) no relevant data.
The Open Government Partnership (OGP) Steering Committee designated the government of Turkey as inactive on 21 September 2016. Due to Turkey’s failure to meet the requirements, Turkey’s participation in the OGP ended in September 2017.
As part of its fight against corruption, Turkey prepared an Action Plan 2012 – 2013 that included launching four web portals (i.e., for transparency, expenditure, electronic procurement, and regulations), identifying areas at risk of corruption, developing relevant measures, minimizing bureaucratic obstacles, and promoting integrity, transparency and accountability.
The credibility and validity of data provided by public institutions have recently been substantially shaken. TURKSTAT, for instance, changed its calculation of GDP in 2016, which made the tracing of time-series data impossible. In calculating GDP, TURKSTAT changed the base year to 2008, when the Turkish economy experienced significant improvement. Similarly, political pressure has been put on authorized institutions to manipulate figures, with the results becoming more evident in recent years. One public survey reveals that TURKSTAT is the least trusted institution in the country, with a trust rate of 22.8%.
Citations:
Open Government Partnership. “Turkey (Withdrawn).” July 06, 2020. https://www.opengovpartnership.org/turkey-withdrawn/.
Eğilmez, M. (2016). GSYH hesaplaması değişti, kişi başına gelirimiz arttı.
http://www.mahfiegilmez.com/2016/12/gsyh-hesaplamas-degisti-kisi-basna.html
Gazeteduvar. “Anket: Diyanet’e, Merkez’e TÜİK’e güvensizlik yüzde 50’nin üzerinde,” December 14, 2021. https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/anket-diyanete-merkeze-tuike-guvensizlik-yuzde-50nin-uzerinde-galeri-1545414
As part of its fight against corruption, Turkey prepared an Action Plan 2012 – 2013 that included launching four web portals (i.e., for transparency, expenditure, electronic procurement, and regulations), identifying areas at risk of corruption, developing relevant measures, minimizing bureaucratic obstacles, and promoting integrity, transparency and accountability.
The credibility and validity of data provided by public institutions have recently been substantially shaken. TURKSTAT, for instance, changed its calculation of GDP in 2016, which made the tracing of time-series data impossible. In calculating GDP, TURKSTAT changed the base year to 2008, when the Turkish economy experienced significant improvement. Similarly, political pressure has been put on authorized institutions to manipulate figures, with the results becoming more evident in recent years. One public survey reveals that TURKSTAT is the least trusted institution in the country, with a trust rate of 22.8%.
Citations:
Open Government Partnership. “Turkey (Withdrawn).” July 06, 2020. https://www.opengovpartnership.org/turkey-withdrawn/.
Eğilmez, M. (2016). GSYH hesaplaması değişti, kişi başına gelirimiz arttı.
http://www.mahfiegilmez.com/2016/12/gsyh-hesaplamas-degisti-kisi-basna.html
Gazeteduvar. “Anket: Diyanet’e, Merkez’e TÜİK’e güvensizlik yüzde 50’nin üzerinde,” December 14, 2021. https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/anket-diyanete-merkeze-tuike-guvensizlik-yuzde-50nin-uzerinde-galeri-1545414
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Do members of parliament have adequate personnel and structural resources to monitor government activity effectively?
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring all government activity effectively.
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring a government’s major activities.
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
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The resources provided to the members of parliament are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
The administrative organization of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) consists of departments that support the Speaker’s Office. The conditions of appointment of the administrators and officers are regulated by law (Law 6253, 1 December 2011). The administrative organization (including the research services department and the library and archives services department) is responsible for providing information as well as bureaucratic and technical support to the plenary, the bureau, committees, party groups, and deputies; informing committees about bills and other legislative documents and assisting in the preparation of committee reports; preparing draft bills in accordance with deputy requests; providing information and documents to committees and deputies; coordinating relations and legislative information between the Assembly and the general secretary of the president, and other public institutions; organizing relations with the media and public; and providing documentation, archive, and publishing services (Article 3, Law 6253).
The new presidential system has centralized power in the hands of the executive and significantly undermined the parliament’s legislative and oversight functions. Since the 2018 general elections, parliament has been dominated by a bloc consisting of President Erdogan’s AKP and its de facto coalition partner, the MHP. Although the budget of the Assembly is part of the annual state budget, it is debated and voted on as a separate spending unit. The Assembly prepares its budget without negotiation or consultation with the government; however, it does follow the guidelines of the Ministry of Finance.
Citations:
Ö.F. Gençkaya. 2020. “The Grand National Assembly of Turkey: A Decline in Legislative Capacity,” I. Khmelko et al (eds) Legislative Decline in the 21st Century (pp. 82-93). Routledge: New York.
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en
The new presidential system has centralized power in the hands of the executive and significantly undermined the parliament’s legislative and oversight functions. Since the 2018 general elections, parliament has been dominated by a bloc consisting of President Erdogan’s AKP and its de facto coalition partner, the MHP. Although the budget of the Assembly is part of the annual state budget, it is debated and voted on as a separate spending unit. The Assembly prepares its budget without negotiation or consultation with the government; however, it does follow the guidelines of the Ministry of Finance.
Citations:
Ö.F. Gençkaya. 2020. “The Grand National Assembly of Turkey: A Decline in Legislative Capacity,” I. Khmelko et al (eds) Legislative Decline in the 21st Century (pp. 82-93). Routledge: New York.
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en
Are parliamentary committees able to ask for government documents?
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Parliamentary committees may ask for most or all government documents; they are normally delivered in full and within an appropriate time frame.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are slightly limited; some important documents are not delivered or are delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are considerably limited; most important documents are not delivered or delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
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Parliamentary committees may not request government documents.
According to the Rules of Procedure (Article 62), the speakership of the TBMM may invite the vice-president, ministers, and deputy ministers, and senior public officials to provide information at the plenary, as described by Article 119 of the constitution (state of emergency). Parliamentary commissions may directly communicate with any ministry and request information from a ministry relevant to the commission’s work (Article 41). However, there is no available data for all parliamentary committees on how frequently they request such information – orally or in writing.
The major problem lies again in the effectiveness of the legislators in obtaining documents. Since legislators are aware that such inquiries are not an effective way of putting pressure on the government, given that the new presidential system has centralized power in the hands of the executive, the power is not widely used.
Citations:
Ş. İba. 2017. Parlamento Hukuku, Ankara: Turhan Yayınevi
Ö.F. Gençkaya. 2020. “The Grand National Assembly of Turkey: A Decline in Legislative Capacity,” I. Khmelko et al (eds) Legislative Decline in the 21st Century (pp. 82-93). Routledge: New York.
The major problem lies again in the effectiveness of the legislators in obtaining documents. Since legislators are aware that such inquiries are not an effective way of putting pressure on the government, given that the new presidential system has centralized power in the hands of the executive, the power is not widely used.
Citations:
Ş. İba. 2017. Parlamento Hukuku, Ankara: Turhan Yayınevi
Ö.F. Gençkaya. 2020. “The Grand National Assembly of Turkey: A Decline in Legislative Capacity,” I. Khmelko et al (eds) Legislative Decline in the 21st Century (pp. 82-93). Routledge: New York.
Are parliamentary committees able to summon ministers for hearings?
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Parliamentary committees may summon ministers. Ministers regularly follow invitations and are obliged to answer questions.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are slightly limited; ministers occasionally refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are considerably limited; ministers frequently refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
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Parliamentary committees may not summon ministers.
Ministers can attend committee meetings as a representative of the government without invitation and may talk on the subject matter at hand (Rules of Procedure, Article 29, 30, and 31). However, ministers may also delegate a senior civil servant to be his or her representative at a committee meeting. If relevant, the committee may ask a minister to explain a government position, but he or she is not required to comply with this invitation if there is no legal obligation (Article 62). While parliamentary committees are not able to summon ministers for hearings, the responsible minister may voluntarily decide to participate in a meeting. Normally, the committees are briefed by high-ranking ministerial bureaucrats. In the new presidential system, the ministers will always be present at the Planning and Budget Committee when the previous year’s final accounts and the following year’s draft budget are discussed. They also attend the budgetary debates in the plenary. An inquiry by one of the opposition deputies revealed that written questions are one of the most important elements of the current oversight mechanism, but almost no question was answered within the legal time limit.
During the review period, corruption scandals, mayoral resignations, economic instability, and regional affairs (e.g., Turkey’s involvement in the war in Syria, the massive movement of refugees from neighboring countries into Turkey, and Kurdish developments in and outside of Turkey) were highly visible. None of the government’s senior executives took responsibility for or allowed for an independent parliamentary investigation into these issues. Instead, the government – including the president as both head of the executive and chairman of the governing party – demonstrated a lack of accountability vis-à-vis parliament.
Citations:
Gazeteduvar. “17 bakana soru: Kimi link verdi, kimi adres gösterdi,” October 18, 2021. https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/17-bakana-soru-kimi-link-verdi-kimi-adres-gosterdi-haber-1538759
During the review period, corruption scandals, mayoral resignations, economic instability, and regional affairs (e.g., Turkey’s involvement in the war in Syria, the massive movement of refugees from neighboring countries into Turkey, and Kurdish developments in and outside of Turkey) were highly visible. None of the government’s senior executives took responsibility for or allowed for an independent parliamentary investigation into these issues. Instead, the government – including the president as both head of the executive and chairman of the governing party – demonstrated a lack of accountability vis-à-vis parliament.
Citations:
Gazeteduvar. “17 bakana soru: Kimi link verdi, kimi adres gösterdi,” October 18, 2021. https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/17-bakana-soru-kimi-link-verdi-kimi-adres-gosterdi-haber-1538759
Are parliamentary committees able to summon experts for committee meetings?
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Parliamentary committees may summon experts.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are slightly limited.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are considerably limited.
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Parliamentary committees may not summon experts.
According to the parliamentary rules of procedure, committees are legally able to summon experts from non-governmental organizations, universities, or the bureaucracy to provide testimony without limitation (Rules of Procedure, Article 29 and 30). There is no available data relating to parliamentary committees’ summoning of experts since the 2018 legislative elections.
Citations:
Ö.F. Gençkaya. 2020. “The Grand National Assembly of Turkey: A Decline in Legislative Capacity,” I. Khmelko et al (eds) Legislative Decline in the 21st Century (pp. 82-93). Routledge: New York.
Citations:
Ö.F. Gençkaya. 2020. “The Grand National Assembly of Turkey: A Decline in Legislative Capacity,” I. Khmelko et al (eds) Legislative Decline in the 21st Century (pp. 82-93). Routledge: New York.
Are the task areas and structures of parliamentary committees suited to monitor ministries effectively?
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The match between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are well-suited to the effective monitoring of ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are largely suited to the monitoring ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are partially suited to the monitoring of ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are not at all suited to the monitoring of ministries.
Under the Turkish presidential system, the number of ministries has been reduced to 16. Although advocates of the new system argued that the system would run more efficiently, the alignment of ministries (or rather the presidency and its new executive structure) and parliamentary committees is likely to create frictions in policymaking.
There are 18 standing committees in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), which are generally established in parallel with the structure of the ministries. The exceptional committees include the Petition Commission and the Human Rights Investigation Commission. Except for committees established by special laws, the jurisdiction of each committee is not expressly defined by the Rules of Procedure. Therefore, some committees have overlapping tasks. Committees examine draft bills and may also supervise ministry activities indirectly.
The State Economic Enterprises Commission does not audit ministries but plays an important role in monitoring developments within their administration. The distribution of the workload of these committees is uneven. The Planning and Budget Commission is the most overloaded group, as every bill possesses some financial aspect.
Citations:
Ö.F. Gençkaya. 2020. “The Grand National Assembly of Turkey: A Decline in Legislative Capacity,” I. Khmelko et al (eds) Legislative Decline in the 21st Century (pp. 82-93). Routledge: New York.
Ş. İba. 2017. Parlamento Hukuku, Ankara: Turhan Yayınevi
There are 18 standing committees in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), which are generally established in parallel with the structure of the ministries. The exceptional committees include the Petition Commission and the Human Rights Investigation Commission. Except for committees established by special laws, the jurisdiction of each committee is not expressly defined by the Rules of Procedure. Therefore, some committees have overlapping tasks. Committees examine draft bills and may also supervise ministry activities indirectly.
The State Economic Enterprises Commission does not audit ministries but plays an important role in monitoring developments within their administration. The distribution of the workload of these committees is uneven. The Planning and Budget Commission is the most overloaded group, as every bill possesses some financial aspect.
Citations:
Ö.F. Gençkaya. 2020. “The Grand National Assembly of Turkey: A Decline in Legislative Capacity,” I. Khmelko et al (eds) Legislative Decline in the 21st Century (pp. 82-93). Routledge: New York.
Ş. İba. 2017. Parlamento Hukuku, Ankara: Turhan Yayınevi
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To what extent do media in your country analyze the rationale and impact of public policies?
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A clear majority of mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies.
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About one-half of the mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies. The rest produces a mix of infotainment and quality information content.
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A clear minority of mass media brands focuses on high-quality information content analyzing public policies. Several mass media brands produce superficial infotainment content only.
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All mass media brands are dominated by superficial infotainment content.
A media-ownership structure based on industrial conglomerates (the so-called Mediterranean or polarized pluralist media model), the government’s clear-cut differentiation between pro and anti-government media, and the increasingly polarized public discourse make it difficult for journalists to provide substantial information to the public. News coverage and debates are mainly one-sided in the pro-government media, while self-censorship is common in the mainstream, neutral media. Media ownership, and direct and indirect government intervention in private media outlets and journalism obscure the objective analyses of government policies.
Broadcasts by the state-owned TRT heavily support the ruling party. RTUK (Radio and Television Supreme Council) as an oversight organization is neither independent nor impartial. During the review period, RTUK imposed harsh monetary penalties on voices critical of the government, while largely ignoring regulatory violations by pro-government channels. The rapid closure of OLAY TV in less than a month – as a result of government pressure – was the latest example of the limits of media freedom.
In this context, the free and independent media is a key nongovernmental check on governmental power. While small-scale digital brands continue to provide alternative perspectives, they have not managed to achieve significant reach. Many showcase stories from international brands (e.g., BBC Turkish, DW, and Euronews), as they lack the staff to generate substantial original content. Other perspectives are provided by foreign media outlets, such as the Russian-backed Sputnik and a new Turkish version of the (UK-based) Independent, which is financed and run by the Saudi Research and Marketing Group, which has close links to the Saudi royal family.
The strengthening of a few pro-government oligarchs in the media sector has further curtailed media freedom. In 2020, monetary fines were imposed in 57 cases on a large number of radio and TV channels. In addition, 24 programs were suspended. In October 2019, RTUK announced that it would silence any voice opposing the ongoing military operation in Turkey. The government seems to be taking further steps to undermine the already fragile state of media freedom. For instance, a new law passed in July 2020 (“Arrangement of Internet Publication and Combating Crimes Committed through These Publication”) introduced heavy fines and the potential of bandwidth restrictions for online content producers that do not comply with regulations. This was widely perceived as a step toward eliminating opposition programming on YouTube. In addition, opposition journalists including Levent Gültekin and Erk Acarer have been frequently threated and even physically attacked.
Citations:
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en
Freedom House. “Freedom in the World 2020 Turkey.” 2020. https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2020.
Broadcasts by the state-owned TRT heavily support the ruling party. RTUK (Radio and Television Supreme Council) as an oversight organization is neither independent nor impartial. During the review period, RTUK imposed harsh monetary penalties on voices critical of the government, while largely ignoring regulatory violations by pro-government channels. The rapid closure of OLAY TV in less than a month – as a result of government pressure – was the latest example of the limits of media freedom.
In this context, the free and independent media is a key nongovernmental check on governmental power. While small-scale digital brands continue to provide alternative perspectives, they have not managed to achieve significant reach. Many showcase stories from international brands (e.g., BBC Turkish, DW, and Euronews), as they lack the staff to generate substantial original content. Other perspectives are provided by foreign media outlets, such as the Russian-backed Sputnik and a new Turkish version of the (UK-based) Independent, which is financed and run by the Saudi Research and Marketing Group, which has close links to the Saudi royal family.
The strengthening of a few pro-government oligarchs in the media sector has further curtailed media freedom. In 2020, monetary fines were imposed in 57 cases on a large number of radio and TV channels. In addition, 24 programs were suspended. In October 2019, RTUK announced that it would silence any voice opposing the ongoing military operation in Turkey. The government seems to be taking further steps to undermine the already fragile state of media freedom. For instance, a new law passed in July 2020 (“Arrangement of Internet Publication and Combating Crimes Committed through These Publication”) introduced heavy fines and the potential of bandwidth restrictions for online content producers that do not comply with regulations. This was widely perceived as a step toward eliminating opposition programming on YouTube. In addition, opposition journalists including Levent Gültekin and Erk Acarer have been frequently threated and even physically attacked.
Citations:
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en
Freedom House. “Freedom in the World 2020 Turkey.” 2020. https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2020.
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How inclusive and open are the major parties in their internal decision-making processes?
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The party allows all party members and supporters to participate in its decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and agendas of issues are open.
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The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, all party members have the opportunity to participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are rather open.
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The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, a number of elected delegates participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are largely controlled by the party leadership.
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A number of party leaders participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are fully controlled and drafted by the party leadership.
The centralized structure of the Political Parties Law (Law 2820) does not encourage intra-party democracy. The right to dismiss local party organizations (Articles 19 and 20), and party members (Article 53), provides party leaders with unlimited powers and thus undermines internal party democracy.
As a general tendency, membership issues, party congresses and executive boards are not democratically managed in most political parties. Nomination processes are dominated by a few party elites or directly by the will of party leaders. Since no wings or cliques are tolerated within parties, in case of serious disagreements, either the party’s leaders tend to expel their adversaries, or opposition groups establish new parties on their own. The ultimate result of this tendency is “party inflation.”
Within the AKP, Erdoğan has no rivals for power. Following the AKP’s 2019 losses in some municipal elections, for instance, some of the party’s leading members, including former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, former Minister of Economy Ali Babacan and some current deputies resigned from the party after disciplinary proceedings were initiated. The CHP, on the other hand, introduced some amendments to its party statute that will enable the party assembly to delegate the selection of candidates to the central executive committee. However, that party’s 2018 presidential candidate, Muharrem İnce, established a new party, Memleket Partisi, after he lost a close leadership race to Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. The MHP traditionally has a strong leader and a centralized structure. The absence of democracy within the party led to the formation of the IYI Party by figures such as Meral Akşener and Koray Aydın. Among mainstream parties, the HDP respects intra-party democracy more than others by incorporating its multi-cultural voter base into the party cadres.
Citations:
Kabasakal, M. (2014). Factors influencing intra-party democracy and membership rights: The case of Turkey. Party Politics, 20(5), 700-711.
Birgün. “CHP’de yönetmelik değişikliği: PM aday belirleme yetkisini MYK’ye devredebilecek,” 4 September 2019, https://www.birgun.net/haber/chp-de-yonetmelik-degisikligi-pm-aday-belirleme-yet kisini-myk-ye-devredebilecek-267223
As a general tendency, membership issues, party congresses and executive boards are not democratically managed in most political parties. Nomination processes are dominated by a few party elites or directly by the will of party leaders. Since no wings or cliques are tolerated within parties, in case of serious disagreements, either the party’s leaders tend to expel their adversaries, or opposition groups establish new parties on their own. The ultimate result of this tendency is “party inflation.”
Within the AKP, Erdoğan has no rivals for power. Following the AKP’s 2019 losses in some municipal elections, for instance, some of the party’s leading members, including former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, former Minister of Economy Ali Babacan and some current deputies resigned from the party after disciplinary proceedings were initiated. The CHP, on the other hand, introduced some amendments to its party statute that will enable the party assembly to delegate the selection of candidates to the central executive committee. However, that party’s 2018 presidential candidate, Muharrem İnce, established a new party, Memleket Partisi, after he lost a close leadership race to Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. The MHP traditionally has a strong leader and a centralized structure. The absence of democracy within the party led to the formation of the IYI Party by figures such as Meral Akşener and Koray Aydın. Among mainstream parties, the HDP respects intra-party democracy more than others by incorporating its multi-cultural voter base into the party cadres.
Citations:
Kabasakal, M. (2014). Factors influencing intra-party democracy and membership rights: The case of Turkey. Party Politics, 20(5), 700-711.
Birgün. “CHP’de yönetmelik değişikliği: PM aday belirleme yetkisini MYK’ye devredebilecek,” 4 September 2019, https://www.birgun.net/haber/chp-de-yonetmelik-degisikligi-pm-aday-belirleme-yet kisini-myk-ye-devredebilecek-267223
To what extent are economic interest associations (e.g., employers, industry, labor) capable of formulating relevant policies?
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Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) is the most influential business association in Turkey, representing more than 1.2 million enterprises and members of various industry and business chambers. The Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), affiliated with TOBB University in Ankara, provides extensive surveys in various fields. The pro-Western, Istanbul-centric Turkish Industrialists’ and Entrepreneurs’ Association (TÜSİAD) and the conservative, Anatolian-centric Independent Industrialists’ and Entrepreneurs’ Association (MÜSİAD), also have R&D units and sponsor reports on political reforms, education, healthcare, security, and migration.
Among labor unions, the ideological split between secular unions such as the Confederation of Public Workers’ Unions (KESK) and the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey (DİSK) and the more conservative-Islamic Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions (Hak-İş) tends to prevent common action. In many instances, this has led the government to offer wage increases that are well below real inflation rates.
Citations:
Şahin, A., & Söylemez, A. (2017). Sendikalara Yönelik Politikaların Belirlenmesinde Sendikaların Rolü Ve 6356 Sayılı Sendikalar Kanunu. Sosyal Ekonomik Araştırmalar Dergisi, 17, 135-144.
Among labor unions, the ideological split between secular unions such as the Confederation of Public Workers’ Unions (KESK) and the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey (DİSK) and the more conservative-Islamic Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions (Hak-İş) tends to prevent common action. In many instances, this has led the government to offer wage increases that are well below real inflation rates.
Citations:
Şahin, A., & Söylemez, A. (2017). Sendikalara Yönelik Politikaların Belirlenmesinde Sendikaların Rolü Ve 6356 Sayılı Sendikalar Kanunu. Sosyal Ekonomik Araştırmalar Dergisi, 17, 135-144.
To what extent are non-economic interest associations capable of formulating relevant policies?
10
9
9
Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
2
1
1
Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
During its tenure in power, the government has created its own set of loyal civil society groups. One such group is TÜRGEV, a foundation led by President Erdoğan’s son, which has gained political influence in the executive and has expanded its financial resources. A pro-government research establishment, SETA, conducts research projects on current political, economic and social issues, with the goal of providing policy recommendations. Similarly, KADEM (Women and Democracy Association) was founded with the patronage of Erdoğan’s family members and is used as a social policy instrument.
Local and global environmental pressure groups such as Greenpeace have increasingly demonstrated against dam and hydroelectric-energy projects throughout Turkey, but their protests are regularly suppressed by the security forces and subject to criminal investigation. The Turkish Foundation for Combating Soil Erosion for Reforestation and the Protection of Natural Habitat (TEMA) has remained the most well-established environmental organization in Turkey, with 500,000 volunteers.
Various resources, especially land allocation and financial support, have been provided by municipalities to foundations that support the government. Although Ensar Vaqf and other religious foundations have been in the public spotlight due to child abuse scandals, the government has continued to support these organizations. However, most pro-government organizations’ resources were cut off, especially after the opposition captured the Istanbul and Ankara metropolitan municipalities in the 2019 local polls.
Citations:
TEMA. https://www.tema.org.tr/hakkimizda/kurumsal/kurulus-oykumuz
Cumhuriyet. “AKP’nin çocuk istismaları ile sınavı… Erdoğan Ensar ve Adıyaman Gerger ile yüzleşecek mi? February 20, 2018. https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/akpnin-cocuk-istismarlari-ile-sinavi-erdogan-ensar-ve-adiyaman-gerger-ile-de-yuzlesecek-mi-930278
Local and global environmental pressure groups such as Greenpeace have increasingly demonstrated against dam and hydroelectric-energy projects throughout Turkey, but their protests are regularly suppressed by the security forces and subject to criminal investigation. The Turkish Foundation for Combating Soil Erosion for Reforestation and the Protection of Natural Habitat (TEMA) has remained the most well-established environmental organization in Turkey, with 500,000 volunteers.
Various resources, especially land allocation and financial support, have been provided by municipalities to foundations that support the government. Although Ensar Vaqf and other religious foundations have been in the public spotlight due to child abuse scandals, the government has continued to support these organizations. However, most pro-government organizations’ resources were cut off, especially after the opposition captured the Istanbul and Ankara metropolitan municipalities in the 2019 local polls.
Citations:
TEMA. https://www.tema.org.tr/hakkimizda/kurumsal/kurulus-oykumuz
Cumhuriyet. “AKP’nin çocuk istismaları ile sınavı… Erdoğan Ensar ve Adıyaman Gerger ile yüzleşecek mi? February 20, 2018. https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/akpnin-cocuk-istismarlari-ile-sinavi-erdogan-ensar-ve-adiyaman-gerger-ile-de-yuzlesecek-mi-930278
Graph View
Does there exist an independent and effective audit office?
10
9
9
There exists an effective and independent audit office.
8
7
6
7
6
There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is slightly limited.
5
4
3
4
3
There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
2
1
1
There does not exist an independent and effective audit office.
According to Article 160 of the constitution, the Turkish Court of Accounts (TCA) is charged on behalf of the Grand National Assembly with auditing all accounts related to revenues, expenditures, and properties of government departments that are financed by the general or subsidiary budgets. The court’s auditing capacity was limited by Law 6085 in 2010, but the Constitutional Court annulled Article 79 regulating how the TCA would audit the accounts of public institutions. In December 2012, the Constitutional Court also annulled the provision limiting performance auditing. Currently, the TCA has three functions: auditing, financial trials, and reporting. It conducts regulatory audits and performance audits. It provides for an exhaustive audit mandate and gives the TCA full discretion in discharging its responsibilities. As of February 2020, the TCA had 1,874 staff members including 830 auditors.
The TCA’s 2019-2023 Strategic Plan foresees the development of greater risk-based audit and human resources capacities. The TCA reports to – but is not accountable to – parliament. Four audit reports are sent to the parliament each year, including the External Audit General Evaluation Report, the Accountability General Evaluation Report, the Financial Statistics Evaluation Report, and the Report on State, which was considered only during budget deliberations in the parliament. The reports of the TCA are considered only by the parliament. Parliament elects the TCA president and its members. Candidates must be graduates of universities or higher education institutions of law, political science, economics or administrative sciences who have served at least 16 years in public service.
Auditors are selected from a pool of university graduates in the same fields through a series of written and oral examinations. If a criminal act is found during the audits and investigations, the relevant auditor notifies the president of the TCA immediately. If a public criminal case is required, the chief prosecutor of the TCA sends the documents either to the relevant public authority or to the chief public prosecutor of the republic (the country’s top prosecutors). A TCA report can be taken as the basis for a trial, but is shared only with those involved, and is not disclosed to the public.
There are credible concerns concerning the fiscal discipline, transparency and accountability of the Turkey Wealth Fund (TWF), which is now directly affiliated with the president and is not fully subject to direct audit by the TCA. The law allows only a limited number of the companies within the TWF to be audited by the TCA. What is more worrisome is that the audit is conducted by auditors appointed by the president, who is also the chairman of the TWF. Moreover, the transition to the presidential system further undermined the accountability of agencies, as well as internal control and auditing, since various institutions’ roles and responsibilities have not yet been clarified. Finally, given that TCA reports are only considered by the parliament during the deliberations on the budget in December, the TCA was not in a position to monitor the government’s financial actions during the pandemic.
Citations:
Sayıştay. 2020. https://www.sayistay.gov.tr/files/952_Say%C4%B1%C5%9Ftay%202020%20Y%C4%B1l%C4%B1%20Faaliyet%20Raporu_compressed.pdf
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en
The TCA’s 2019-2023 Strategic Plan foresees the development of greater risk-based audit and human resources capacities. The TCA reports to – but is not accountable to – parliament. Four audit reports are sent to the parliament each year, including the External Audit General Evaluation Report, the Accountability General Evaluation Report, the Financial Statistics Evaluation Report, and the Report on State, which was considered only during budget deliberations in the parliament. The reports of the TCA are considered only by the parliament. Parliament elects the TCA president and its members. Candidates must be graduates of universities or higher education institutions of law, political science, economics or administrative sciences who have served at least 16 years in public service.
Auditors are selected from a pool of university graduates in the same fields through a series of written and oral examinations. If a criminal act is found during the audits and investigations, the relevant auditor notifies the president of the TCA immediately. If a public criminal case is required, the chief prosecutor of the TCA sends the documents either to the relevant public authority or to the chief public prosecutor of the republic (the country’s top prosecutors). A TCA report can be taken as the basis for a trial, but is shared only with those involved, and is not disclosed to the public.
There are credible concerns concerning the fiscal discipline, transparency and accountability of the Turkey Wealth Fund (TWF), which is now directly affiliated with the president and is not fully subject to direct audit by the TCA. The law allows only a limited number of the companies within the TWF to be audited by the TCA. What is more worrisome is that the audit is conducted by auditors appointed by the president, who is also the chairman of the TWF. Moreover, the transition to the presidential system further undermined the accountability of agencies, as well as internal control and auditing, since various institutions’ roles and responsibilities have not yet been clarified. Finally, given that TCA reports are only considered by the parliament during the deliberations on the budget in December, the TCA was not in a position to monitor the government’s financial actions during the pandemic.
Citations:
Sayıştay. 2020. https://www.sayistay.gov.tr/files/952_Say%C4%B1%C5%9Ftay%202020%20Y%C4%B1l%C4%B1%20Faaliyet%20Raporu_compressed.pdf
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en
Does there exist an independent and effective ombuds office?
10
9
9
There exists an effective and independent ombuds office.
8
7
6
7
6
There exists an effective and independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is slightly limited.
5
4
3
4
3
There exists an independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is considerably limited.
2
1
1
There does not exist an effective and independent ombuds office.
A law establishing a Turkish ombuds office, called the Public Monitoring Institution (KDK), was adopted in June 2012 and went into force in December 2012. The office is located within the Parliamentary Speaker’s Office and is accountable to parliament. The ombudsman reviews lawsuits and administrative appeals (from the perspective of human rights and the rule of law) and ensures that the public administration is held accountable. In 2020 alone, the institution received 90,209 new applications and concluded 91,100 cases. Among them, the highest number of applications was relating to Local Administrations (10.86%), followed by the Ministry of Justice (10.60%), and the Social Security Institution (8.62%). According to the KDK itself, two main obstacles hamper the efficacy of its work. First, the degree of compliance with its decisions has been low, with only 20% of its released decisions having been obeyed by public administrative bodies. Second, under the current law, the KDK cannot conduct inquiries on its initiative. The EU Commission indicates that despite the KDK’s increasing workload, the institution does not react to widespread infringements of fundamental rights. It also lacks ex officio powers to open investigations relating to cases requiring legal remedies.
Citations:
Ombusmanlık. 2020. 2019 Yıllık Raporu. https://www.ombudsman.gov.tr/kdk-pdf/2019_yili_yillik_rapor/2019_yili_yillik_rapor.pdf
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en
Citations:
Ombusmanlık. 2020. 2019 Yıllık Raporu. https://www.ombudsman.gov.tr/kdk-pdf/2019_yili_yillik_rapor/2019_yili_yillik_rapor.pdf
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en
Is there an independent authority in place that effectively holds government offices accountable for handling issues of data protection and privacy?
10
9
9
An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
8
7
6
7
6
An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is slightly limited.
5
4
3
4
3
A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are strongly limited.
2
1
1
There is no effective and independent data protection office.
Before 2016, Turkey had no specific legislation mandating oversight of personal data protection. In April 2014, the Constitutional Court ruled that new regulations must be made to protect personal data, which is often used for marketing purposes. In 2016, Turkey ratified the Council of Europe Convention 108 on the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data and its additional protocol dated 1981. The Personal Data Protection Authority is now operational and its nine-member board has been appointed. Of the nine members, five of them are appointed by the legislature and four by the president. Law No. 6698 on Protection of Personal Data dated 2016 does not fully conform to the EU acquis, especially relating to the powers of the Data Protection Authority, the balancing of data protection with the right to freedom of expression and information.
Turkey has not signed the 2018 protocol amending the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Council of Europe, CETS No 223). The lack of harmonization with the EU acquis hinders possible cooperation with Eurojust and Europol. The EU Commission (2020) has raised concerns regarding the exceptions for law enforcement and the independence of the Data Protection Authority.
Citations:
KVKK. “100 Soruda Kişisel Verilerin Korunması Kanunu.” https://www.kvkk.gov.tr/SharedFolderServer/CMSFiles/7d5b0a2f-e0ea-41e0-bf0b-bc9e43dfb57a.pdf.
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en
Turkey has not signed the 2018 protocol amending the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Council of Europe, CETS No 223). The lack of harmonization with the EU acquis hinders possible cooperation with Eurojust and Europol. The EU Commission (2020) has raised concerns regarding the exceptions for law enforcement and the independence of the Data Protection Authority.
Citations:
KVKK. “100 Soruda Kişisel Verilerin Korunması Kanunu.” https://www.kvkk.gov.tr/SharedFolderServer/CMSFiles/7d5b0a2f-e0ea-41e0-bf0b-bc9e43dfb57a.pdf.
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en