Quality of Democracy
#41Key Findings
As it drifts in an increasingly authoritarian direction, Turkey takes the SGI 2022’s bottom spot (rank 41) with regard to democracy quality. Its score on this measure has declined by 2.0 points relative to its 2014 level.
The country’s transition to a presidential system was imposed by decree. The ongoing restructuring of the public administration has increased uncertainty. Political parties rely on state subsidies. The election oversight board has not published information on parties’ accounts since 2015. Donations are rarely systematically recorded.
Most mainstream media companies, including the state-owned services, are directly or indirectly controlled by the government or self-censor. Journalists and media organizations critical of the government have faced threats, physical attacks and fines. Many journalists have been imprisoned. New fines and bandwidth restrictions have been imposed on internet sites.
The pandemic was used as a justification to ban anti-government demonstrations. Gender-based disparities and even violence is widespread. The LGBTQ+ community faces serious discrimination.
Judicial staff are still being dismissed or forcibly transferred. The risk of corruption is high particularly in the public procurement field, where frequent rule changes benefit figures close to the governing party.
The country’s transition to a presidential system was imposed by decree. The ongoing restructuring of the public administration has increased uncertainty. Political parties rely on state subsidies. The election oversight board has not published information on parties’ accounts since 2015. Donations are rarely systematically recorded.
Most mainstream media companies, including the state-owned services, are directly or indirectly controlled by the government or self-censor. Journalists and media organizations critical of the government have faced threats, physical attacks and fines. Many journalists have been imprisoned. New fines and bandwidth restrictions have been imposed on internet sites.
The pandemic was used as a justification to ban anti-government demonstrations. Gender-based disparities and even violence is widespread. The LGBTQ+ community faces serious discrimination.
Judicial staff are still being dismissed or forcibly transferred. The risk of corruption is high particularly in the public procurement field, where frequent rule changes benefit figures close to the governing party.
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How fair are procedures for registering candidates and parties?
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Legal regulations provide for a fair registration procedure for all elections; candidates and parties are not discriminated against.
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A few restrictions on election procedures discriminate against a small number of candidates and parties.
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Some unreasonable restrictions on election procedures exist that discriminate against many candidates and parties.
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Discriminating registration procedures for elections are widespread and prevent a large number of potential candidates or parties from participating.
The legal groundwork for fair and orderly elections and the prevention of discrimination against any party or candidate is provided for in the Turkish constitution, Law 298 on the basic principles of elections and the electoral registry, Law 2839 on deputies’ elections, and Law 2972 on local-administration elections. However, the relative freedom given to each political party’s central executive committee in determining party candidates (by Law 2820 on political parties, Article 37) renders the candidate-nomination process rather centralized, anti-democratic and exclusionary. The parliament weakened the centralization of political parties’ leadership to some extent in 2014 with the passage of a law permitting co-leadership structures. However, administrative courts and the Council of State stopped the co-mayoral practices of the HDP. The Supreme Board of Election (YSK) authorizes the final list of candidates for presidential, parliamentary, and local elections in accordance with the eligibility rules prescribed by the constitution (Articles 76 and 101), and the laws governing presidential elections, deputies’ elections and local-administration elections.
Eligibility criteria include a prescribed level of education (i.e., primary school for parliamentary and local elections, and higher education for presidential candidates), legal capacity, and the lack of a criminal record (e.g., having been sentenced to prison for certain crimes). Any citizen can object to presumptive candidates within the period announced by the YSK, which makes the final decision on any objections.
According to the constitutional amendments of 2017 (Article 101/3), political parties that either individually or as a coalition gained at least 5% of the total votes in the last parliamentary election can nominate a presidential candidate. In addition, independents can run as presidential candidates if they collect at least 100.000 signatures for which notarization is not required in the 2018 elections.
Citations:
Seçimlerin Temel Hükümleri ve Seçmen Kütükleri Hakkında Kanun İle Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun, 16 March 2018, http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2018/03/20180316-28.htm.
OSCE – ODIHR, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Republic of Turkey 24 June 2018, ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/397046?download=true
Eligibility criteria include a prescribed level of education (i.e., primary school for parliamentary and local elections, and higher education for presidential candidates), legal capacity, and the lack of a criminal record (e.g., having been sentenced to prison for certain crimes). Any citizen can object to presumptive candidates within the period announced by the YSK, which makes the final decision on any objections.
According to the constitutional amendments of 2017 (Article 101/3), political parties that either individually or as a coalition gained at least 5% of the total votes in the last parliamentary election can nominate a presidential candidate. In addition, independents can run as presidential candidates if they collect at least 100.000 signatures for which notarization is not required in the 2018 elections.
Citations:
Seçimlerin Temel Hükümleri ve Seçmen Kütükleri Hakkında Kanun İle Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun, 16 March 2018, http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2018/03/20180316-28.htm.
OSCE – ODIHR, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Republic of Turkey 24 June 2018, ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/397046?download=true
To what extent do candidates and parties have fair access to the media and other means of communication?
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All candidates and parties have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. All major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of the range of different political positions.
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Candidates and parties have largely equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. The major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of different political positions.
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Candidates and parties often do not have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. While the major media outlets represent a partisan political bias, the media system as a whole provides fair coverage of different political positions.
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Candidates and parties lack equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communications. The major media outlets are biased in favor of certain political groups or views and discriminate against others.
According to Law 3984 on the establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and Broadcasts, “equality of opportunity shall be established among political parties and democratic groups; broadcasts shall not be biased or partial; broadcasts shall not violate the principles of election bans which are determined at election times.” However, legislation regulating presidential elections and referendums does not ensure equal access for political parties and candidates to public and private media. The Supreme Board of Elections’ (SBE) ability to penalize those who violate electoral regulations was repealed under state of emergency decree (No. 687) issued in January 2017. The existence of this impunity mechanism facilitated several violations in the June 2018 elections that went unpenalized.
Currently, most mainstream media companies, including the state-owned radio and television company (TRT), are either directly or indirectly controlled by the government or self-censor. Several TRT channels regularly broadcast pro-government programming, and invite experts allied with the government party to appear on these programs. The mainstream (pro-government) TV channels and newspapers frequently use identical headlines. Privately owned media outlets face either judicial or financial investigations, and media freedom is thus being placed at risk in an unconstitutional manner.
During the 2019 campaigns for local-administration elections, the People’s Alliance (comprised of the AKP and MHP) received 61% of the airtime allotted for political parties by the state-run TRT 1 and TRT news outlets. These two channels broadcast a total of 77 hours of negative news targeting the Nation Alliance (comprised of the CHP and IYI parties) and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). The most notable recent event revealing the influence of the government in the media sector was the 2019 local elections. The state-run Anadolu Agency stopped publishing election results near midnight on 31 March 2019 when the CHP Istanbul mayoral candidate began to catch up with his AKP rival. After refraining from publishing updated figures for 13 hours, Anadolu Agency finally declared the CHP to be ahead in the Istanbul elections.
Citations:
Freedom House. “Freedom in the World 2020 Turkey.” 2020. https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2020.
Bianet. “State-Run AA declares CHP ahead in İstanbul elections After 13-Hour Silence,” 1 April 2019, http://bianet.org/english/politics/207014-state-run-aa-declares-chp-ahead-in-ist anbul-elections-after-13-hour-silence
Currently, most mainstream media companies, including the state-owned radio and television company (TRT), are either directly or indirectly controlled by the government or self-censor. Several TRT channels regularly broadcast pro-government programming, and invite experts allied with the government party to appear on these programs. The mainstream (pro-government) TV channels and newspapers frequently use identical headlines. Privately owned media outlets face either judicial or financial investigations, and media freedom is thus being placed at risk in an unconstitutional manner.
During the 2019 campaigns for local-administration elections, the People’s Alliance (comprised of the AKP and MHP) received 61% of the airtime allotted for political parties by the state-run TRT 1 and TRT news outlets. These two channels broadcast a total of 77 hours of negative news targeting the Nation Alliance (comprised of the CHP and IYI parties) and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). The most notable recent event revealing the influence of the government in the media sector was the 2019 local elections. The state-run Anadolu Agency stopped publishing election results near midnight on 31 March 2019 when the CHP Istanbul mayoral candidate began to catch up with his AKP rival. After refraining from publishing updated figures for 13 hours, Anadolu Agency finally declared the CHP to be ahead in the Istanbul elections.
Citations:
Freedom House. “Freedom in the World 2020 Turkey.” 2020. https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2020.
Bianet. “State-Run AA declares CHP ahead in İstanbul elections After 13-Hour Silence,” 1 April 2019, http://bianet.org/english/politics/207014-state-run-aa-declares-chp-ahead-in-ist anbul-elections-after-13-hour-silence
To what extent do all citizens have the opportunity to exercise their right of participation in national elections?
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All adult citizens can participate in national elections. All eligible voters are registered if they wish to be. There are no discriminations observable in the exercise of the right to vote. There are no disincentives to voting.
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The procedures for the registration of voters and voting are for the most part effective, impartial and nondiscriminatory. Citizens can appeal to courts if they feel being discriminated. Disincentives to voting generally do not constitute genuine obstacles.
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While the procedures for the registration of voters and voting are de jure non-discriminatory, isolated cases of discrimination occur in practice. For some citizens, disincentives to voting constitute significant obstacles.
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The procedures for the registration of voters or voting have systemic discriminatory effects. De facto, a substantial number of adult citizens are excluded from national elections.
All Turkish nationals over the age of 18 can exercise the right to vote (Constitution, Article 67). The Supreme Election Board (SEB) is the sole authority in the administration of Turkish elections (Law 298, Article 10). The General Directorate of the Electoral Registry, a part of the SBE, prepares, maintains, and renews the nationwide electoral registry.
The ban on military students and conscripts, and the blanket restriction on voting rights for prisoners are disproportionate and at odds with Turkey’s international obligations (e.g., Turkey’s OSCE commitments). About six million young people waiting to vote in November 2019 could not vote because early elections were held in June 2018. In 2008, the parliament passed a law allowing Turkish citizens who are not living or present in Turkey during elections to vote (Law 5749). The distance of polling stations from residents’ homes and the comparatively short voting period can be considered as potentially major obstacles to voting.
Turkey has a passive electoral registration system maintained by the SBE. Despite the recent revision of the national electoral registry based on an address-registration system, critics have noted that the number of registered voters and the number of eligible citizens registered in the address system do not match. Disabled voters sometimes face difficulties, as many polling stations lack appropriate access facilities.
Parliamentary and local elections are conducted by local election boards under the supervision of the SBE. These local boards verify election returns and conduct investigations of irregularities, complaints, and objections, with the national board providing a final check.
Citations:
OSCE – ODIHR, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Republic of Turkey 24 June 2018, ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/397046?download=true
The ban on military students and conscripts, and the blanket restriction on voting rights for prisoners are disproportionate and at odds with Turkey’s international obligations (e.g., Turkey’s OSCE commitments). About six million young people waiting to vote in November 2019 could not vote because early elections were held in June 2018. In 2008, the parliament passed a law allowing Turkish citizens who are not living or present in Turkey during elections to vote (Law 5749). The distance of polling stations from residents’ homes and the comparatively short voting period can be considered as potentially major obstacles to voting.
Turkey has a passive electoral registration system maintained by the SBE. Despite the recent revision of the national electoral registry based on an address-registration system, critics have noted that the number of registered voters and the number of eligible citizens registered in the address system do not match. Disabled voters sometimes face difficulties, as many polling stations lack appropriate access facilities.
Parliamentary and local elections are conducted by local election boards under the supervision of the SBE. These local boards verify election returns and conduct investigations of irregularities, complaints, and objections, with the national board providing a final check.
Citations:
OSCE – ODIHR, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Republic of Turkey 24 June 2018, ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/397046?download=true
To what extent is private and public party financing and electoral campaign financing transparent, effectively monitored and in case of infringement of rules subject to proportionate and dissuasive sanction?
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The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and provides for independent monitoring to that respect. Effective measures to prevent evasion are effectively in place and infringements subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.
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The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and provides for independent monitoring. Although infringements are subject to proportionate sanctions, some, although few, loopholes and options for circumvention still exist.
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The state provides that donations to political parties shall be published. Party financing is subject to some degree of independent monitoring but monitoring either proves regularly ineffective or proportionate sanctions in case of infringement do not follow.
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The rules for party and campaign financing do not effectively enforce the obligation to make the donations public. Party and campaign financing is neither monitored independently nor, in case of infringements, subject to proportionate sanctions.
Article 60 of Law 2820 requires political-party organs at every level to keep a membership register, a decision book, a register for incoming and outgoing documents, an income and expenditure book, and an inventory list. According to Article 73 of Law 2820, political parties must prepare yearly statements of revenues and expenditures, at both the party-headquarters and provincial levels. However, Turkish law does not regulate the financing of party or independent-candidate electoral campaigns. Presidential candidates’ campaign finances are regulated by Law 6271; these candidates can legally accept contributions and other aid only from natural persons having Turkish nationality. However, the Supreme Election Board (SEB) has allowed political parties to organize campaign activities and purchase advertisements for their candidates in a way unregulated by law. Thus, the state aid provided to the political parties can be used indirectly for presidential-campaign activities. The SEB has not published the accounts of Turkey’s main parties since 2015. Therefore, it is unknown how much money political parties spent on campaigning over the last two presidential elections. Excluding Erdoğan, presidential candidates collected TRY 32 million in donations from eligible people.
Turkish parties excessively rely on external resources, especially state subsidies, to survive. Generally speaking, more than 90% of parties’ income comes from state subsidies. The current law allows for public financing if a party has won at least 3% of the votes in the last election or has representatives in the parliament.
The cap on donations to political parties from private individuals is reviewed each year. In 2018, the limit was approximately TRY 72,900. However, donations are rarely properly and systematically recorded. For example, cash donations, in-kind contributions and expenditures on behalf of parties or candidates during elections are not recorded. The funds collected and expenditures made by elected representatives and party candidates (e.g., during election campaigning) are not included in party accounts. There is no legal ceiling on campaign spending. The finances of candidates in local and parliamentary elections are not regulated by law. Given these factors, the OSCE has noted that party and campaign finances are not well regulated in Turkey.
Party accounts published in the Official Gazette provide only general figures and potential infringements. The accuracy of the financial reports posted by political parties online needs to be examined. Pursuant to Article 69 of the constitution, Article 74 of Law 2820 stipulates that the Constitutional Court, with the assistance of the Court of Accounts, examines the accuracy of the information contained in a party’s final accounts and the legality of recorded revenues and expenditures based on the information at hand and documents provided. Only three out of approximately 800 auditors of the Court of Accounts are tasked with auditing party and campaign finances.
Citations:
OSCE – ODIHR, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Republic of Turkey 24 June 2018, ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/397046?download=true
Arslantaş, D., & Arslantaş, Ş. (2021). The evolution of the party model in Turkey: from cadre to cartel parties?. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 1-18.
OSCE – ODIHR, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Republic of Turkey 24 June 2018, ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/397046?download=true.
Ö. Faruk Gençkaya. 2018. “Financing of Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns in Turkey,” S. Sayarı, P. Ayan-Musil and Ö. Demirkol, Party Politics in Turkey: A Comparative Perspective (pp. 61-79), Routledge: London.
Turkish parties excessively rely on external resources, especially state subsidies, to survive. Generally speaking, more than 90% of parties’ income comes from state subsidies. The current law allows for public financing if a party has won at least 3% of the votes in the last election or has representatives in the parliament.
The cap on donations to political parties from private individuals is reviewed each year. In 2018, the limit was approximately TRY 72,900. However, donations are rarely properly and systematically recorded. For example, cash donations, in-kind contributions and expenditures on behalf of parties or candidates during elections are not recorded. The funds collected and expenditures made by elected representatives and party candidates (e.g., during election campaigning) are not included in party accounts. There is no legal ceiling on campaign spending. The finances of candidates in local and parliamentary elections are not regulated by law. Given these factors, the OSCE has noted that party and campaign finances are not well regulated in Turkey.
Party accounts published in the Official Gazette provide only general figures and potential infringements. The accuracy of the financial reports posted by political parties online needs to be examined. Pursuant to Article 69 of the constitution, Article 74 of Law 2820 stipulates that the Constitutional Court, with the assistance of the Court of Accounts, examines the accuracy of the information contained in a party’s final accounts and the legality of recorded revenues and expenditures based on the information at hand and documents provided. Only three out of approximately 800 auditors of the Court of Accounts are tasked with auditing party and campaign finances.
Citations:
OSCE – ODIHR, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Republic of Turkey 24 June 2018, ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/397046?download=true
Arslantaş, D., & Arslantaş, Ş. (2021). The evolution of the party model in Turkey: from cadre to cartel parties?. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 1-18.
OSCE – ODIHR, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Republic of Turkey 24 June 2018, ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/397046?download=true.
Ö. Faruk Gençkaya. 2018. “Financing of Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns in Turkey,” S. Sayarı, P. Ayan-Musil and Ö. Demirkol, Party Politics in Turkey: A Comparative Perspective (pp. 61-79), Routledge: London.
Do citizens have the opportunity to take binding political decisions when they want to do so?
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Citizens have the effective opportunity to actively propose and take binding decisions on issues of importance to them through popular initiatives and referendums. The set of eligible issues is extensive, and includes national, regional, and local issues.
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Citizens have the effective opportunity to take binding decisions on issues of importance to them through either popular initiatives or referendums. The set of eligible issues covers at least two levels of government.
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Citizens have the effective opportunity to vote on issues of importance to them through a legally binding measure. The set of eligible issues is limited to one level of government.
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Citizens have no effective opportunity to vote on issues of importance to them through a legally binding measure.
According to Article 67 of the constitution, all citizens over 18 years old have the right to take part in referendums. Referendums are held in accordance with the principles of free, equal, secret, and direct universal suffrage, with votes, counted publicly. In recent years, referendums were held to amend the 1982 constitution. Paragraph 3 of Article 175 of the constitution reads that, if the parliament adopts a draft constitutional amendment referred by the president by a two-thirds majority, the president may submit the law to a referendum. Laws related to constitutional amendments that are the subject of a referendum must be supported by more than half of the valid votes cast to be approved.
If a law on an amendment to the constitution is adopted by at least a three-fifths majority but less than a two-thirds majority of the total number of members of the Grand National Assembly, and is not sent back to the Assembly for reconsideration by the president, it is then published in the Official Gazette and submitted to a referendum. A law on a constitutional amendment adopted by a two-thirds majority in the Assembly may be submitted to a referendum either directly by the president, or if the president has vetoed it. A number of ICT-based participatory mechanisms are being promoted.
Popular decision-making is also possible at the local level. Law 5593 on municipalities (Article 76) enables city councils to implement policies for the benefit of the public. However, these units are not wholly effective, as they depend upon the goodwill of the local mayor, and some councils only exist on paper and have yet to be established in practice. Law 6360, in effect since 2014, has paved the way for more centralized decision-making processes, including in urban planning and on local matters.
Citations:
H. Yerlikaya. 2015. Kamu Politikalarının Oluşturulmasında Katılımcılık ve Bilgi ve İletişim Teknolojileri, Ankara
H. Akay. 2016. Yerel Yönetimlerde Katılımcı Mekanizmalar ve Süreçler, Istanbul: Türkiye Avrupa Vakfı.
If a law on an amendment to the constitution is adopted by at least a three-fifths majority but less than a two-thirds majority of the total number of members of the Grand National Assembly, and is not sent back to the Assembly for reconsideration by the president, it is then published in the Official Gazette and submitted to a referendum. A law on a constitutional amendment adopted by a two-thirds majority in the Assembly may be submitted to a referendum either directly by the president, or if the president has vetoed it. A number of ICT-based participatory mechanisms are being promoted.
Popular decision-making is also possible at the local level. Law 5593 on municipalities (Article 76) enables city councils to implement policies for the benefit of the public. However, these units are not wholly effective, as they depend upon the goodwill of the local mayor, and some councils only exist on paper and have yet to be established in practice. Law 6360, in effect since 2014, has paved the way for more centralized decision-making processes, including in urban planning and on local matters.
Citations:
H. Yerlikaya. 2015. Kamu Politikalarının Oluşturulmasında Katılımcılık ve Bilgi ve İletişim Teknolojileri, Ankara
H. Akay. 2016. Yerel Yönetimlerde Katılımcı Mekanizmalar ve Süreçler, Istanbul: Türkiye Avrupa Vakfı.
Graph View
To what extent are the media independent from government?
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Public and private media are independent from government influence; their independence is institutionally protected and fully respected by the incumbent government.
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The incumbent government largely respects the independence of media. However, there are occasional attempts to exert influence.
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The incumbent government seeks to ensure its political objectives indirectly by influencing the personnel policies, organizational framework or financial resources of public media, and/or the licensing regime/market access for private media.
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Major media outlets are frequently influenced by the incumbent government promoting its partisan political objectives. To ensure pro-government media reporting, governmental actors exert direct political pressure and violate existing rules of media regulation or change them to benefit their interests.
The constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and freedom of expression are rarely upheld in practice. The current legal framework governing the media is restrictive, and does not comply with EU standards. The government appoints the general director of the country’s public broadcaster, Turkish Radio, and Television (TRT). By doing that, it essentially exercises tutelage over the public-media organization’s administration. Several TRT channels regularly broadcast pro-government programs, and invite experts allied with the government party to appear on these programs.
Journalists and media organizations critical of the government have faced threats, physical attacks and fines. TV and radio channels have been closed. According to Turkey’s Journalists’ Union, 34 journalists and media workers were in prison as of the close of the review period. Some of the convicted journalists (e.g., Ahmet Altan and Nazlı Ilıcak) were detained during the 2016 to 2018 state of emergency and were released from jail for various reasons, but several were immediately detained again. Additionally, in 2019, monetary fines were imposed 57 times on a large number of radio and TV channels. A total of 24 programs were suspended.
In October 2019, the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTUK) announced it would silence any voice speaking out against the ongoing military operation in Turkey. The government seems to be taking further steps to undermine the already fragile media freedom. For instance, a new law passed in July 2020, the “Arrangement of Internet Publication and Combating Crimes Committed through These Publication” law, introduced heavy fines and bandwidth restrictions for content producers on the internet that do not comply with the regulations. This is widely perceived as a step toward silencing opposition programming on YouTube.
Citations:
Turkey’s Journalists’ Union. ’34 journalists jailed in Turkey. December 12, 2021. https://tgs.org.tr/arrested-jailed-journalists-turkey/
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en.
Journalists and media organizations critical of the government have faced threats, physical attacks and fines. TV and radio channels have been closed. According to Turkey’s Journalists’ Union, 34 journalists and media workers were in prison as of the close of the review period. Some of the convicted journalists (e.g., Ahmet Altan and Nazlı Ilıcak) were detained during the 2016 to 2018 state of emergency and were released from jail for various reasons, but several were immediately detained again. Additionally, in 2019, monetary fines were imposed 57 times on a large number of radio and TV channels. A total of 24 programs were suspended.
In October 2019, the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTUK) announced it would silence any voice speaking out against the ongoing military operation in Turkey. The government seems to be taking further steps to undermine the already fragile media freedom. For instance, a new law passed in July 2020, the “Arrangement of Internet Publication and Combating Crimes Committed through These Publication” law, introduced heavy fines and bandwidth restrictions for content producers on the internet that do not comply with the regulations. This is widely perceived as a step toward silencing opposition programming on YouTube.
Citations:
Turkey’s Journalists’ Union. ’34 journalists jailed in Turkey. December 12, 2021. https://tgs.org.tr/arrested-jailed-journalists-turkey/
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en.
To what extent are the media characterized by an ownership structure that ensures a pluralism of opinions?
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Diversified ownership structures characterize both the electronic and print media market, providing a well-balanced pluralism of opinions. Effective anti-monopoly policies and impartial, open public media guarantee a pluralism of opinions.
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Diversified ownership structures prevail in the electronic and print media market. Public media compensate for deficiencies or biases in private media reporting by representing a wider range of opinions.
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Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize either the electronic or the print media market. Important opinions are represented but there are no or only weak institutional guarantees against the predominance of certain opinions.
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Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize both the electronic and the print media market. Few companies dominate the media, most programs are biased, and there is evidence that certain opinions are not published or are marginalized.
The lack of transparency in media funding, the growing influence of political interests on editorial policies, the concentration of media ownership, the shrinking space for pluralism, the increasing restrictions on freedom of expression, and the lack of independence of regulatory authorities remain key concerns.
In recent years, Erdoğan and his party have tightened their control over the media. The process started with the takeover of the Cem Uzan-owned STAR TV by the Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF). This was followed by the takeover of Sabah, Takvim and a popular TV channel ATV by the TMSF; these were then sold to loyal businessmen in a procurement process. A landmark case was the sale of Doğan Group-owned Vatan and Milliyet to the pro-AKP Demirören family in 2011 with the help of loans from publicly owned banks.
Turkey Report, a media monitor, finds that there is a high level of risk with respect to three indicators of media pluralism (regulation, political independence and social inclusiveness) and a medium risk with regard to market plurality. On the other hand, free and independent media is one of the components of nongovernmental checks on governmental power.
While small-scale digital brands continue to provide alternative perspectives, they have not managed to achieve significant reach. Many showcase stories from international brands (e.g., BBC Turkish, DW and Euronews), as they have small staffs and are unable to generate much original content. Other perspectives are provided by foreign media outlets, such as the Russian-backed Sputnik and a new Turkish version of the (UK-based) Independent, which is financed and run by the Saudi Research and Marketing Group, which has close links to the Saudi royal family. Adopted in 2011, Law 6112 increased the maximum allowable foreign-ownership stake in media companies from 25% to 50%, with the condition that a single foreign investor cannot invest in more than two enterprises. Foreign companies still cannot be majority stakeholders in domestic media companies.
Citations:
Bianet Media Monitoring reports 2021 (first three-quarters), https://m.bianet.org/bianet/diger/117328-bia-media-monitoring-reports
Euronews. “Türkiye’de medyayı kim kontrol ediyor?” May 3, 2019. https://tr.euronews.com/2019/05/03/medya-sahipligi-turkiye-de-medyayi-kim-kontrol-ediyor-
In recent years, Erdoğan and his party have tightened their control over the media. The process started with the takeover of the Cem Uzan-owned STAR TV by the Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF). This was followed by the takeover of Sabah, Takvim and a popular TV channel ATV by the TMSF; these were then sold to loyal businessmen in a procurement process. A landmark case was the sale of Doğan Group-owned Vatan and Milliyet to the pro-AKP Demirören family in 2011 with the help of loans from publicly owned banks.
Turkey Report, a media monitor, finds that there is a high level of risk with respect to three indicators of media pluralism (regulation, political independence and social inclusiveness) and a medium risk with regard to market plurality. On the other hand, free and independent media is one of the components of nongovernmental checks on governmental power.
While small-scale digital brands continue to provide alternative perspectives, they have not managed to achieve significant reach. Many showcase stories from international brands (e.g., BBC Turkish, DW and Euronews), as they have small staffs and are unable to generate much original content. Other perspectives are provided by foreign media outlets, such as the Russian-backed Sputnik and a new Turkish version of the (UK-based) Independent, which is financed and run by the Saudi Research and Marketing Group, which has close links to the Saudi royal family. Adopted in 2011, Law 6112 increased the maximum allowable foreign-ownership stake in media companies from 25% to 50%, with the condition that a single foreign investor cannot invest in more than two enterprises. Foreign companies still cannot be majority stakeholders in domestic media companies.
Citations:
Bianet Media Monitoring reports 2021 (first three-quarters), https://m.bianet.org/bianet/diger/117328-bia-media-monitoring-reports
Euronews. “Türkiye’de medyayı kim kontrol ediyor?” May 3, 2019. https://tr.euronews.com/2019/05/03/medya-sahipligi-turkiye-de-medyayi-kim-kontrol-ediyor-
To what extent can citizens obtain official information?
10
9
9
Legal regulations guarantee free and easy access to official information, contain few, reasonable restrictions, and there are effective mechanisms of appeal and oversight enabling citizens to access information.
8
7
6
7
6
Access to official information is regulated by law. Most restrictions are justified, but access is sometimes complicated by bureaucratic procedures. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms permit citizens to enforce their right of access.
5
4
3
4
3
Access to official information is partially regulated by law, but complicated by bureaucratic procedures and some poorly justified restrictions. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms are often ineffective.
2
1
1
Access to official information is not regulated by law; there are many restrictions of access, bureaucratic procedures and no or ineffective mechanisms of enforcement.
Under the terms of Law 4982, citizens, non-citizens and foreign corporations have the right of access to government information. However, many public records are not included within the scope of the law, as there are exceptions for state secrets, intelligence information, individual privacy and communication privacy. There is no legislation governing state and trade secrets, thus preventing effective use of the access to information provisions. Most public offices have a department that deals with access to information requests. These requests can be made in person or electronically.
Access to information rights and complaint mechanisms are not used effectively. A total of 2,043,467 applications for information based on Law 4982 were submitted to public institutions in 2020. According to official information, 84.3% of requests resulted in the full provision of the requested information, 8.1% resulted in partial information or a negative response, and 7.0% were rejected. Of the rejected applications, 2,628 were taken to court on appeal. A total of 9,170 applications were found to concern state secrets or private issues. The government’s annual report on access to information requests does not include details about the subject of the applications.
The Board of Review for Access to Information, which is attached to the presidency, examines administrative decisions rendered under Law No. 4982 (articles 6 and 17). The board received a total of 1,159 objection applications in 2018. Of the applications, the board rejected 563 because the relevant public institutions had provided a proper response to the applicants. Meanwhile, 40 applications were accepted, 74 were partially accepted and 107 were procedurally accepted.
Additionally, following the abolishment of the Prime Minister’s Office in July 2018, the Prime Minister’s Communication Center (BİMER) was merged with the Presidential Communication Center (CİMER) on 10 July 2018. By 2020, the center had received around 6 million applications.
Citations:
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en
Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Başkanlığı, 2020 Yılı Bilgi Edinme Genel Raporu, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/bilgiedinme /2018_yili_degerlendirme_raporu.pdf
Cnntürk. “”CİMER’e 2020 yılında 6 milyona yakın başvuru yapıldı,” January 13, 2021.
https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/cimere-2020-yilinda-6-milyona-yakin-basvuru-yapildi
Access to information rights and complaint mechanisms are not used effectively. A total of 2,043,467 applications for information based on Law 4982 were submitted to public institutions in 2020. According to official information, 84.3% of requests resulted in the full provision of the requested information, 8.1% resulted in partial information or a negative response, and 7.0% were rejected. Of the rejected applications, 2,628 were taken to court on appeal. A total of 9,170 applications were found to concern state secrets or private issues. The government’s annual report on access to information requests does not include details about the subject of the applications.
The Board of Review for Access to Information, which is attached to the presidency, examines administrative decisions rendered under Law No. 4982 (articles 6 and 17). The board received a total of 1,159 objection applications in 2018. Of the applications, the board rejected 563 because the relevant public institutions had provided a proper response to the applicants. Meanwhile, 40 applications were accepted, 74 were partially accepted and 107 were procedurally accepted.
Additionally, following the abolishment of the Prime Minister’s Office in July 2018, the Prime Minister’s Communication Center (BİMER) was merged with the Presidential Communication Center (CİMER) on 10 July 2018. By 2020, the center had received around 6 million applications.
Citations:
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en
Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Başkanlığı, 2020 Yılı Bilgi Edinme Genel Raporu, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/bilgiedinme /2018_yili_degerlendirme_raporu.pdf
Cnntürk. “”CİMER’e 2020 yılında 6 milyona yakın başvuru yapıldı,” January 13, 2021.
https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/cimere-2020-yilinda-6-milyona-yakin-basvuru-yapildi
Graph View
To what extent does the state respect and protect civil rights and how effectively are citizens protected by courts against infringements of their rights?
10
9
9
All state institutions respect and effectively protect civil rights. Citizens are effectively protected by courts against infringements of their rights. Infringements present an extreme exception.
8
7
6
7
6
The state respects and protects rights, with few infringements. Courts provide protection.
5
4
3
4
3
Despite formal protection, frequent infringements of civil rights occur and court protection often proves ineffective.
2
1
1
State institutions respect civil rights only formally, and civil rights are frequently violated. Court protection is not effective.
While Article 10 of the constitution guarantees equality before the law, and Article 12 enshrines fundamental rights and freedoms, concerns over shortcomings in judicial proceedings remain, including limited access by defense attorneys to prosecution files, lengthy pretrial detentions, and excessively long and catch-all indictments.
Article 148 of the Turkish constitution states that anyone who believes his or her human or civil rights, as defined in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), has been infringed upon by a public authority has the right to apply to the Constitutional Court, after exhausting other administrative and judicial remedies. Individual applications must be filed within 30 days after the notification of the final proceeding that exhausts other legal remedies. Since September 2012, the Constitutional Court has accepted individual petitions, if the right to a fair trial has been violated. Between September 2012 and December 2020, a total of 295,038 individual applications were received and 257,108 applications were concluded by the court. However, the court found that in only 14,027 applications had at least one right been violated.
The European Court of Human Rights received a total of 9,104 cases against Turkey in 2020. Among the 6,520 cases in which a verdict was rendered, the court ruled that 95 of them had involved a violation of the law. Historically, Turkey is the country that has been most frequently condemned by the court for violating the freedoms of thought and expression, and ranks second after the Russian Federation on all issues. Additionally, according to the 2020 report of the OHAL Transactions Review Commission, which addressed issues related to the post-2016 coup attempt state of emergency, 112,310 out of 126,630 cases were brought to conclusion.
Citations:
Euronews. “AYM 257 bin bireysel başvurudan sadece 14 bin 765’ini esastan inceledi, yüzde 95 hak ihlali buldu “, January 17, 2021. https://tr.euronews.com/2021/01/17/aym-257-bin-bireysel-basvurudan-sadece-14-bin-765-ini-esastan-inceledi-yuzde-95-hak-ihlali
Adalet Bakanlığı. 2021. “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi 2020 Yılı İstatistikleri Değerlendirme Notu,” https://inhak.adalet.gov.tr/Resimler/Dokuman/10220211651521-%20Avrupa%20İnsan%20Hakları%20Mahkemesi%20(AİHM)%202020%20Yılı%20İstatistik%20Değerlendirme%20Notu.pdf
TRT Haber. “OHAL Komisyonu’ndan faaliyet raporu: Müracaatların yüzde 89’u sonuçlandırıldı,” February 5, 2021. https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/ohal-komisyonundan-faaliyet-raporu-muracaatlarin-yuzde-89u-sonuclandirildi-553942.html
Article 148 of the Turkish constitution states that anyone who believes his or her human or civil rights, as defined in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), has been infringed upon by a public authority has the right to apply to the Constitutional Court, after exhausting other administrative and judicial remedies. Individual applications must be filed within 30 days after the notification of the final proceeding that exhausts other legal remedies. Since September 2012, the Constitutional Court has accepted individual petitions, if the right to a fair trial has been violated. Between September 2012 and December 2020, a total of 295,038 individual applications were received and 257,108 applications were concluded by the court. However, the court found that in only 14,027 applications had at least one right been violated.
The European Court of Human Rights received a total of 9,104 cases against Turkey in 2020. Among the 6,520 cases in which a verdict was rendered, the court ruled that 95 of them had involved a violation of the law. Historically, Turkey is the country that has been most frequently condemned by the court for violating the freedoms of thought and expression, and ranks second after the Russian Federation on all issues. Additionally, according to the 2020 report of the OHAL Transactions Review Commission, which addressed issues related to the post-2016 coup attempt state of emergency, 112,310 out of 126,630 cases were brought to conclusion.
Citations:
Euronews. “AYM 257 bin bireysel başvurudan sadece 14 bin 765’ini esastan inceledi, yüzde 95 hak ihlali buldu “, January 17, 2021. https://tr.euronews.com/2021/01/17/aym-257-bin-bireysel-basvurudan-sadece-14-bin-765-ini-esastan-inceledi-yuzde-95-hak-ihlali
Adalet Bakanlığı. 2021. “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi 2020 Yılı İstatistikleri Değerlendirme Notu,” https://inhak.adalet.gov.tr/Resimler/Dokuman/10220211651521-%20Avrupa%20İnsan%20Hakları%20Mahkemesi%20(AİHM)%202020%20Yılı%20İstatistik%20Değerlendirme%20Notu.pdf
TRT Haber. “OHAL Komisyonu’ndan faaliyet raporu: Müracaatların yüzde 89’u sonuçlandırıldı,” February 5, 2021. https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/ohal-komisyonundan-faaliyet-raporu-muracaatlarin-yuzde-89u-sonuclandirildi-553942.html
To what extent does the state concede and protect political liberties?
10
9
9
All state institutions concede and effectively protect political liberties.
8
7
6
7
6
All state institutions for the most part concede and protect political liberties. There are only few infringements.
5
4
3
4
3
State institutions concede political liberties but infringements occur regularly in practice.
2
1
1
Political liberties are unsatisfactory codified and frequently violated.
On 24 October 2019, the parliament passed the first law proposal prepared by the Ministry of Justice with the participation of related parties, which addresses the objectives and targets defined in the 2019 Judicial Reform Strategy. The law introduces important regulations to strengthen the rule of law. A provision added to the Anti-Terror Law provides that statements of opinion, which do not exceed the limits of reporting or are made for criticism, should not constitute a crime. Also, the maximum periods of pretrial detention have been revised. The period of pretrial detention is limited to six months if the offense is not within the jurisdiction of the higher criminal court, and one year if the offense falls within the court’s jurisdiction. For some offenses (e.g., terrorism), this period can be six months to one year, which can be extended for an additional six months for adults, if justification is provided. The period of detention allowed for children is shorter.
Although it is technically against law, President Erdoğan and other AKP officials publicly comment on most political hearings. The constitutional amendment on parliamentary immunities adopted in May 2016 lifted immunity for a large number of deputies, and resulted in the detention and arrest of several HDP members of parliament, including the two party co-chairs in November 2016. The subsequent emergency rule saw the further arrest of thousands of HDP members as well as 16 HDP lawmakers. In the case of Selahattin Demirtaş, the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) co-chair and 2018 presidential candidate, who had been detained since 4 November 2016, the ECHR found Turkey guilty of stifling pluralism and limiting the freedom of political debate, and unanimously demanded that the Turkish government take all necessary measures to end the applicant’s pretrial detention.
The right to assemble and organize is largely restricted. During the period in question, the government largely exploited the pandemic to prevent mass gatherings. In particular, protests against the country’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention and against the trustee rector appointed to Boğaziçi University, as well as Workers Day gatherings, were banned by the governorships on the grounds of “public health.”
Citations:
Bianet. “Pandemi bahane: Eylem ve gösteri hakkı yok sayılıyor “. April 23, 2021. Accessed 4 April 2022. https://m.bianet.org/bianet/insan-haklari/242924-pandemi-bahane-eylem-ve-gosteri-hakki-yok-sayiliyor .
The Human Rights Watch, Turkey. 2021. https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/turkey
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021, Turkey Profile https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en
Although it is technically against law, President Erdoğan and other AKP officials publicly comment on most political hearings. The constitutional amendment on parliamentary immunities adopted in May 2016 lifted immunity for a large number of deputies, and resulted in the detention and arrest of several HDP members of parliament, including the two party co-chairs in November 2016. The subsequent emergency rule saw the further arrest of thousands of HDP members as well as 16 HDP lawmakers. In the case of Selahattin Demirtaş, the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) co-chair and 2018 presidential candidate, who had been detained since 4 November 2016, the ECHR found Turkey guilty of stifling pluralism and limiting the freedom of political debate, and unanimously demanded that the Turkish government take all necessary measures to end the applicant’s pretrial detention.
The right to assemble and organize is largely restricted. During the period in question, the government largely exploited the pandemic to prevent mass gatherings. In particular, protests against the country’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention and against the trustee rector appointed to Boğaziçi University, as well as Workers Day gatherings, were banned by the governorships on the grounds of “public health.”
Citations:
Bianet. “Pandemi bahane: Eylem ve gösteri hakkı yok sayılıyor “. April 23, 2021. Accessed 4 April 2022. https://m.bianet.org/bianet/insan-haklari/242924-pandemi-bahane-eylem-ve-gosteri-hakki-yok-sayiliyor .
The Human Rights Watch, Turkey. 2021. https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/turkey
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021, Turkey Profile https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en
How effectively does the state protect against different forms of discrimination?
10
9
9
State institutions effectively protect against and actively prevent discrimination. Cases of discrimination are extremely rare.
8
7
6
7
6
State anti-discrimination protections are moderately successful. Few cases of discrimination are observed.
5
4
3
4
3
State anti-discrimination efforts show limited success. Many cases of discrimination can be observed.
2
1
1
The state does not offer effective protection against discrimination. Discrimination is widespread in the public sector and in society.
While Article 10 of the constitution guarantees equality before the law, irrespective of language, race, sex, political opinion, or religion, the political reality in Turkey differs significantly from this constitutional ideal. Gender disparities still exist in areas such as decision-making, employment, education, and health outcomes. Gender-based violence is widespread. The Human Rights and Equality Institution of Turkey, which is in charge of applying anti-discrimination legislation, only finalized 43 decisions in 2020 out of 276 submitted. Moreover, Turkey has not signed Protocol 12 of the ECHR, which prohibits discrimination.
Hate crime legislation is not in line with international standards, and does not cover hate offenses based on sexual orientation. Turkey withdrew from the Council of Europe Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women, domestic violence, and gender-related violence despite widespread public reaction. Despite rising public awareness, the incidence of violence against women in Turkey has undergone a dramatic and rapid increase over the last decade. More specifically, while 80 women were killed in 2008, this number increased to 300 in 2020.
Hate speech and discrimination against LGBTQ+ communities, which do not have any legal protections, are major problems. During the 2021 Boğaziçi University protests over the appointment of a pro-government rector, President Erdoğan publicly denied the existence of LGBTQ+ individuals within Turkish society.
The use of Kurdish and some other languages in formal education contexts is gradually becoming more common. However, there are no anti-discrimination employment or social policy strategies or action plans in place.
Citations:
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en
Habertürk. “2020’nin kadın cinayetleri raporu,” January 2, 2021.
https://www.haberturk.com/2020-nin-kadin-cinayetleri-raporu-2924207
Euronews. “Erdoğan: LGBT, yok öyle bir şey, bu ülke millidir, manevidir,” February 3, 2021. https://tr.euronews.com/2021/02/03/erdogan-lgbt-yok-oyle-bir-sey-bu-ulke-millidir-manevidir
Hate crime legislation is not in line with international standards, and does not cover hate offenses based on sexual orientation. Turkey withdrew from the Council of Europe Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women, domestic violence, and gender-related violence despite widespread public reaction. Despite rising public awareness, the incidence of violence against women in Turkey has undergone a dramatic and rapid increase over the last decade. More specifically, while 80 women were killed in 2008, this number increased to 300 in 2020.
Hate speech and discrimination against LGBTQ+ communities, which do not have any legal protections, are major problems. During the 2021 Boğaziçi University protests over the appointment of a pro-government rector, President Erdoğan publicly denied the existence of LGBTQ+ individuals within Turkish society.
The use of Kurdish and some other languages in formal education contexts is gradually becoming more common. However, there are no anti-discrimination employment or social policy strategies or action plans in place.
Citations:
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en
Habertürk. “2020’nin kadın cinayetleri raporu,” January 2, 2021.
https://www.haberturk.com/2020-nin-kadin-cinayetleri-raporu-2924207
Euronews. “Erdoğan: LGBT, yok öyle bir şey, bu ülke millidir, manevidir,” February 3, 2021. https://tr.euronews.com/2021/02/03/erdogan-lgbt-yok-oyle-bir-sey-bu-ulke-millidir-manevidir
Graph View
To what extent do government and administration act on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions to provide legal certainty?
10
9
9
Government and administration act predictably, on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions. Legal regulations are consistent and transparent, ensuring legal certainty.
8
7
6
7
6
Government and administration rarely make unpredictable decisions. Legal regulations are consistent, but leave a large scope of discretion to the government or administration.
5
4
3
4
3
Government and administration sometimes make unpredictable decisions that go beyond given legal bases or do not conform to existing legal regulations. Some legal regulations are inconsistent and contradictory.
2
1
1
Government and administration often make unpredictable decisions that lack a legal basis or ignore existing legal regulations. Legal regulations are inconsistent, full of loopholes and contradict each other.
The transition to a presidential system of government was introduced by a series of decrees (i.e., state of emergency decrees and presidential decrees) rather than via legislation, as is required by the constitution. The restructuring of the public administration will take some time and increase uncertainty.
Following the state of emergency, and during the ongoing transition toward presidentialism, the absence of a law concerning general administrative procedures, which would provide citizens and businesses with greater legal certainty, complicates administrative procedures and exacerbates administrative burdens. The main factors affecting legal certainty in public administration are a lack of issue-specific regulations, the misinterpretation of regulations by administrative authorities (mainly on political grounds), and unconstitutional regulations that are adopted by parliament or issued by the executive.
In addition, the large number of amendments made to some basic laws under certain circumstances have led to a lack of consistency. High-profile prosecutions can follow unpredictable courses. For example, after prisoners associated with the clandestine Ergenekon network were released, they were called back for retrial. Legal, as well as judicial instruments, are sometimes used against government opponents, especially those in the media.
Citations:
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en
Following the state of emergency, and during the ongoing transition toward presidentialism, the absence of a law concerning general administrative procedures, which would provide citizens and businesses with greater legal certainty, complicates administrative procedures and exacerbates administrative burdens. The main factors affecting legal certainty in public administration are a lack of issue-specific regulations, the misinterpretation of regulations by administrative authorities (mainly on political grounds), and unconstitutional regulations that are adopted by parliament or issued by the executive.
In addition, the large number of amendments made to some basic laws under certain circumstances have led to a lack of consistency. High-profile prosecutions can follow unpredictable courses. For example, after prisoners associated with the clandestine Ergenekon network were released, they were called back for retrial. Legal, as well as judicial instruments, are sometimes used against government opponents, especially those in the media.
Citations:
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en
To what extent do independent courts control whether government and administration act in conformity with the law?
10
9
9
Independent courts effectively review executive action and ensure that the government and administration act in conformity with the law.
8
7
6
7
6
Independent courts usually manage to control whether the government and administration act in conformity with the law.
5
4
3
4
3
Courts are independent, but often fail to ensure legal compliance.
2
1
1
Courts are biased for or against the incumbent government and lack effective control.
Several articles in the Turkish constitution ensure that the government and public administration act in accordance with legal provisions and those citizens are protected from the state. Article 36 guarantees citizens the freedom to claim rights and Article 37 concedes the guarantee of lawful judgment.
However, judicial review has been seriously undermined in line with tightening authoritarianism in recent years. Most notably, the local courts sometimes do not implement the rulings of the Constitutional Court or the European Court of Human Rights, which are legally binding. This tends to occur following pressure placed by political authorities on the judiciary, as in the trials of the prominent political figures such as former CHP vice-chair Enis Berberoğlu and former HDP co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş.
Judicial staffers are still being dismissed or forcibly transferred. This risks engendering widespread self-censorship among judges and prosecutors. This may weaken the judiciary as a whole, while further undermining its independence and the separation of powers. No measures have been taken to restore legal guarantees, to ensure the independence of the judiciary from the executive, or to strengthen the independence of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors. No changes have been made to the institution of criminal judges of peace, which risks becoming a parallel system.
There is no human resources strategy in place for the judiciary, which struggles to perform its tasks effectively in the wake of a substantial reduction of personnel. The recruitment of a large number of inexperienced judges and prosecutors using fast-track procedures without adequate pre-service and in-service training has failed to remedy these concerns.
The Judicial Reform Strategy’s effort to improve the quality and the number of staffers has not so far created the intended result. The backlog persists. Large-scale dismissals, including over 3,968 judges and public prosecutors, for being Gülenists has increased the backlog of cases. As of June 2021, a total of 43,372 cases were still pending at the Constitutional Court, while 133,428 cases were pending in front of the Council of State. The Constitutional Court had finalized 257,108 cases out of 295,038 individual applications since September 2012. The number of judges and prosecutors totaled 21,979 in 2020.
Citations:
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en
However, judicial review has been seriously undermined in line with tightening authoritarianism in recent years. Most notably, the local courts sometimes do not implement the rulings of the Constitutional Court or the European Court of Human Rights, which are legally binding. This tends to occur following pressure placed by political authorities on the judiciary, as in the trials of the prominent political figures such as former CHP vice-chair Enis Berberoğlu and former HDP co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş.
Judicial staffers are still being dismissed or forcibly transferred. This risks engendering widespread self-censorship among judges and prosecutors. This may weaken the judiciary as a whole, while further undermining its independence and the separation of powers. No measures have been taken to restore legal guarantees, to ensure the independence of the judiciary from the executive, or to strengthen the independence of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors. No changes have been made to the institution of criminal judges of peace, which risks becoming a parallel system.
There is no human resources strategy in place for the judiciary, which struggles to perform its tasks effectively in the wake of a substantial reduction of personnel. The recruitment of a large number of inexperienced judges and prosecutors using fast-track procedures without adequate pre-service and in-service training has failed to remedy these concerns.
The Judicial Reform Strategy’s effort to improve the quality and the number of staffers has not so far created the intended result. The backlog persists. Large-scale dismissals, including over 3,968 judges and public prosecutors, for being Gülenists has increased the backlog of cases. As of June 2021, a total of 43,372 cases were still pending at the Constitutional Court, while 133,428 cases were pending in front of the Council of State. The Constitutional Court had finalized 257,108 cases out of 295,038 individual applications since September 2012. The number of judges and prosecutors totaled 21,979 in 2020.
Citations:
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en
To what extent does the process of appointing (supreme or constitutional court) justices guarantee the independence of the judiciary?
10
9
9
Justices are appointed in a cooperative appointment process with special majority requirements.
8
7
6
7
6
Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies with special majority requirements or in a cooperative selection process without special majority requirements.
5
4
3
4
3
Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies without special majority requirements.
2
1
1
All judges are appointed exclusively by a single body irrespective of other institutions.
To be appointed to the Constitutional Court, a candidate must be either a member of the teaching staff of an institution of higher education, senior administrative officer, lawyer, first-degree judge, or Constitutional Court rapporteur who has served at least five years; be over the age of 45; have completed higher education, and have worked for at least 20 years. Constitutional Court members serve 12-year terms and cannot be re-elected. The appointment of Constitutional Court judges does not take place based on general liberal-democratic standards, such as cooperative appointment and special majority regulations. The Constitutional Court has 17 members, as outlined by Article 146 of the 2010 constitutional referendum, whose members are nominated or elected from other higher courts by the country’s president, the parliament, and professional groups. Under current conditions, this creates opportunities for the president and his political network to directly influence the executive, the parliament, and the judiciary. In addition, the armed forces continue to wield influence over the civilian judiciary, as two military judges are members of the Constitutional Court.
Following the 2017 constitutional amendments, four members of the new Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK) were appointed directly by the president, and seven members were elected by parliament. The rest of the seats are appointed by the minister of justice and the deputy minister, who is directly connected to the president. The HSK does not offer adequate safeguards for the independence of the judiciary, and indeed considerably increases political influence over the judiciary.
Ahmet Şık, an opposition member of parliament, disclosed the list of 90 prosecutors and judges who have worked within the ranks of the AKP. Each year, large-scale transfers occur among judges and prosecutors. With the main decree in 2020 alone, a total of 4,726 judges and prosecutors were relocated. The government often takes this occasion to punish judges and prosecutors who resist political pressures.
Citations:
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en
Cumhuriyet. “Hâkim ve savcı olarak atanan AKP’lilerin listesi ortaya çıktı,” February 18, 2019. https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/hakim-ve-savci-olarak-atanan-akplilerin-listesi-ortaya-cikti-1254227
Bloomberght. “4 bin 726 hakim ve savcının görev yeri değişti,” June 17, 2020. https://www.bloomberght.com/4-bin-726-hakim-ve-savcinin-gorev-yeri-degisti-2258170
Following the 2017 constitutional amendments, four members of the new Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK) were appointed directly by the president, and seven members were elected by parliament. The rest of the seats are appointed by the minister of justice and the deputy minister, who is directly connected to the president. The HSK does not offer adequate safeguards for the independence of the judiciary, and indeed considerably increases political influence over the judiciary.
Ahmet Şık, an opposition member of parliament, disclosed the list of 90 prosecutors and judges who have worked within the ranks of the AKP. Each year, large-scale transfers occur among judges and prosecutors. With the main decree in 2020 alone, a total of 4,726 judges and prosecutors were relocated. The government often takes this occasion to punish judges and prosecutors who resist political pressures.
Citations:
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en
Cumhuriyet. “Hâkim ve savcı olarak atanan AKP’lilerin listesi ortaya çıktı,” February 18, 2019. https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/hakim-ve-savci-olarak-atanan-akplilerin-listesi-ortaya-cikti-1254227
Bloomberght. “4 bin 726 hakim ve savcının görev yeri değişti,” June 17, 2020. https://www.bloomberght.com/4-bin-726-hakim-ve-savcinin-gorev-yeri-degisti-2258170
To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?
10
9
9
Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
8
7
6
7
6
Most integrity mechanisms function effectively and provide disincentives for public officeholders willing to abuse their positions.
5
4
3
4
3
Some integrity mechanisms function, but do not effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
2
1
1
Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.
Turkey is a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, and the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and Civil Law Convention on Corruption. The UNCAC and the Council of Europe conventions are not effectively used. Turkey is a member of GRECO, but its recommendations are not fully implemented. Turkey’s authorities do not have an established track record of successfully prosecuting high-level corruption. Turkey needs to adopt an anti-corruption strategy that reflects the political will to address corruption effectively, and which is underpinned by a credible and realistic action plan.
Both the legal framework and the institutional structure continue to allow undue executive influence in the investigation and prosecution of high-profile corruption cases. These need to be improved in line with international standards. The limited amount of accountability and transparency at public institutions remain a matter of concern. The absence of a robust anti-corruption strategy and action plan is a sign of the lack of political will to tackle corruption decisively.
Law No. 657 on Civil Servants and Law No. 5393 on Municipalities, among other laws, include principles and rules of integrity. The asset-declaration system was established in 1990 by Law No. 3628 on Asset Disclosure and Fighting Bribery and Corruption. All public officials (legislative, executive and judicial, including nationally and locally elected officials) must disclose their assets within one month of taking office, and must renew their declaration every five years. However, these declarations are not made public unless there is an administrative or judicial investigation.
The Regulation on Procedure and Basis of Application of the Civil Servants Ethical Behavior Principles defines civil service restrictions, conflicts of interest, and incompatibilities. The Council of Ethics for Public Officials, which was attached to the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey in July 2018, lacks the power to enforce its decisions through disciplinary measures. Codes of ethics do not exist for military personnel or academics. Legal loopholes (e.g., regarding disclosure of gifts, financial interests and holdings, and foreign travel paid for by outside sources) in the code of ethics for parliamentarians remain in place.
There is a high risk of corruption in public procurement. Companies are recommended to use a specialized public procurement due to diligence tool to mitigate corruption risks related to public procurement in Turkey. Procurement legislation has been amended 191 times since 2002. The changes mainly serve the interests of party-affiliated businessmen. This group, which is called “beşli çete” (gang of five) among the opposition circles, were expected to receive public procurement contracts worth $150 billion worth.
Turkey’s Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) is the main service unit of the Ministry of Finance within the scope of Law No. 5549 on Prevention of Laundering Proceeds of Crime and Financing of Terrorism. In 2019, a total of 203,786 requests were submitted to MASAK. Of these, 20,850 requests were related to the financing of terrorism, of which 98% were related to the financing of the FETO/PYD organization. Criminal complaints were filed against 220 people. Assets worth TRY 9 million, belonging to 1,149 people, were confiscated due to illegal betting.
Citations:
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en
Sözcü. “Alfabede harf kalmadı ihale yasası yine değişiyor,” October 5, 2021. https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2021/ekonomi/alfabede-harf-kalmadi-ihale-yasasi-yine-degisiyor-6687658/
Bianet. “Yandaş şirketlerin aldığı ihaleler 2020 bütçesinden fazla,” September 7, 2020. https://m.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/230414-yandas-sirketlerin-aldigi-ihaleler-2020-butcesinden-fazla
Hürriyet. “MASAK’a 203 bin 786 şüpheli işlem bildirildi,” July 28, 2020. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/masaka-203-bin-786-supheli-islem-bildirildi-41574274
Both the legal framework and the institutional structure continue to allow undue executive influence in the investigation and prosecution of high-profile corruption cases. These need to be improved in line with international standards. The limited amount of accountability and transparency at public institutions remain a matter of concern. The absence of a robust anti-corruption strategy and action plan is a sign of the lack of political will to tackle corruption decisively.
Law No. 657 on Civil Servants and Law No. 5393 on Municipalities, among other laws, include principles and rules of integrity. The asset-declaration system was established in 1990 by Law No. 3628 on Asset Disclosure and Fighting Bribery and Corruption. All public officials (legislative, executive and judicial, including nationally and locally elected officials) must disclose their assets within one month of taking office, and must renew their declaration every five years. However, these declarations are not made public unless there is an administrative or judicial investigation.
The Regulation on Procedure and Basis of Application of the Civil Servants Ethical Behavior Principles defines civil service restrictions, conflicts of interest, and incompatibilities. The Council of Ethics for Public Officials, which was attached to the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey in July 2018, lacks the power to enforce its decisions through disciplinary measures. Codes of ethics do not exist for military personnel or academics. Legal loopholes (e.g., regarding disclosure of gifts, financial interests and holdings, and foreign travel paid for by outside sources) in the code of ethics for parliamentarians remain in place.
There is a high risk of corruption in public procurement. Companies are recommended to use a specialized public procurement due to diligence tool to mitigate corruption risks related to public procurement in Turkey. Procurement legislation has been amended 191 times since 2002. The changes mainly serve the interests of party-affiliated businessmen. This group, which is called “beşli çete” (gang of five) among the opposition circles, were expected to receive public procurement contracts worth $150 billion worth.
Turkey’s Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) is the main service unit of the Ministry of Finance within the scope of Law No. 5549 on Prevention of Laundering Proceeds of Crime and Financing of Terrorism. In 2019, a total of 203,786 requests were submitted to MASAK. Of these, 20,850 requests were related to the financing of terrorism, of which 98% were related to the financing of the FETO/PYD organization. Criminal complaints were filed against 220 people. Assets worth TRY 9 million, belonging to 1,149 people, were confiscated due to illegal betting.
Citations:
European Commission. “Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document.” October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en
Sözcü. “Alfabede harf kalmadı ihale yasası yine değişiyor,” October 5, 2021. https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2021/ekonomi/alfabede-harf-kalmadi-ihale-yasasi-yine-degisiyor-6687658/
Bianet. “Yandaş şirketlerin aldığı ihaleler 2020 bütçesinden fazla,” September 7, 2020. https://m.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/230414-yandas-sirketlerin-aldigi-ihaleler-2020-butcesinden-fazla
Hürriyet. “MASAK’a 203 bin 786 şüpheli işlem bildirildi,” July 28, 2020. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/masaka-203-bin-786-supheli-islem-bildirildi-41574274