Executive Capacity
#7Key Findings
With its well-established central government procedures, the United Kingdom scores well in international comparison (rank 7) with regard to executive capacity. Its score on this measure has improved by 0.3 points relative to its 2014 level.
The disarray of the Brexit preparation process has receded, with governing procedures returning effectively to normal. The Cabinet Office plays the primary policy coordination role, guided by the prime minister. Several cross-departmental coordination units were set up during the pandemic. Informal coordination is an important aspect of policy development.
RIAs are frequently if not systematically performed. However, implementation was patchy during the Brexit process. Social partners are not formally engaged in the policymaking processes, but are often consulted. The conclusion of Brexit has improved the coherence of communication overall, though messaging around the pandemic-era parties held by Prime Minister Johnson was shambolic.
Parliamentary majorities tend to facilitate the implementation of government objectives. The collective responsibility of ministers promotes discipline. The devolved administration structure leads to significant variation in standards across the UK. Monitoring shortcomings have been exposed in a number of agencies in recent years. The government is seeking to establish a new post-EU international profile.
The disarray of the Brexit preparation process has receded, with governing procedures returning effectively to normal. The Cabinet Office plays the primary policy coordination role, guided by the prime minister. Several cross-departmental coordination units were set up during the pandemic. Informal coordination is an important aspect of policy development.
RIAs are frequently if not systematically performed. However, implementation was patchy during the Brexit process. Social partners are not formally engaged in the policymaking processes, but are often consulted. The conclusion of Brexit has improved the coherence of communication overall, though messaging around the pandemic-era parties held by Prime Minister Johnson was shambolic.
Parliamentary majorities tend to facilitate the implementation of government objectives. The collective responsibility of ministers promotes discipline. The devolved administration structure leads to significant variation in standards across the UK. Monitoring shortcomings have been exposed in a number of agencies in recent years. The government is seeking to establish a new post-EU international profile.
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How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?
10
9
9
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
8
7
6
7
6
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
5
4
3
4
3
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
2
1
1
In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
Although the United Kingdom has one of the most centralized political systems and is one of the long-established liberal democracies in the world, the resources directly available to the prime minister are relatively limited compared with those available to other heads of government. Formally, there is no prime ministerial department to provide strategic planning or advice, although the Cabinet Office provides an important coordinating role across government and its head, the cabinet secretary, attends cabinet meetings. The cabinet secretary is also the head of the civil service, after the two roles were separated under the 2010 – 2015 coalition government. In 2014, the post of chief executive of the civil service was created with the incumbent becoming a permanent secretary of the Cabinet Office in 2015. The departure of the incumbent CEO in April 2020 saw the role modified to chief operation officer, with a remit to lead efficiency drives across government. The Cabinet Office also houses the National Security Adviser and a centralized COVID-19 taskforce, with both offices led by top-ranked civil servants (permanent secretaries).
The governance of the Cabinet Office includes a board charged with the strategic and operational leadership of the department, on which eight of the 17 members are external, non-executive directors from diverse backgrounds. For strategic coordination across government, the key body is the Economic and Domestic Affairs Secretariat (EDS), established in summer 2015. Generally, the Civil Service has undergone substantial modernization and professionalization over the past decade. As the 2021 Cabinet Office annual report notes, its remit has “expanded from our traditional secretariat work to a much wider role at the center, coordinating delivery and driving change across government.”
At a political level, a special advisory unit has supported all recent prime ministers. Special advisers and civil servants staff these advisory units. The remit of the Number 10 Policy Unit is defined by the prime minister but tends to focus on strategic political and policy decisions. In 2021, the prime minister set up a new delivery unit, headed by Michael Barber (who had previously fulfilled a similar role during the Blair administration), to ramp-up policy implementation, replacing the Implementation Unit set up by David Cameron.
However, these structures in some cases diminished the executive’s ability for strategic planning, especially in the case of policy disunity in cabinet. Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his (then) chief special adviser, Dominic Cummings, quickly adopted a strategy that combined opacity with confrontation, alleging that Parliament worked against “the people.” Without a majority in the House of Commons and without a public strategy for the government, this resulted in what many observers considered to be close to a constitutional crisis.
After Johnson won a substantial majority in the 2019 general election, the conflicts diminished initially. When Cummings was forced to leave, there was a substantial drop in headline grabbing initiatives and a return to normal civil service consultations. Latterly, a series of revelations about the conduct of staff in number 10 Downing Street have cast doubt on the effectiveness of the machinery for government strategy, highlighting the important role of the prime minster in setting the tone.
Citations:
https://civilservicelearning.civilservice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/twelve_actions_report_web_accessible.pdf
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/whitehall-monitor-2021_1.pdf
The governance of the Cabinet Office includes a board charged with the strategic and operational leadership of the department, on which eight of the 17 members are external, non-executive directors from diverse backgrounds. For strategic coordination across government, the key body is the Economic and Domestic Affairs Secretariat (EDS), established in summer 2015. Generally, the Civil Service has undergone substantial modernization and professionalization over the past decade. As the 2021 Cabinet Office annual report notes, its remit has “expanded from our traditional secretariat work to a much wider role at the center, coordinating delivery and driving change across government.”
At a political level, a special advisory unit has supported all recent prime ministers. Special advisers and civil servants staff these advisory units. The remit of the Number 10 Policy Unit is defined by the prime minister but tends to focus on strategic political and policy decisions. In 2021, the prime minister set up a new delivery unit, headed by Michael Barber (who had previously fulfilled a similar role during the Blair administration), to ramp-up policy implementation, replacing the Implementation Unit set up by David Cameron.
However, these structures in some cases diminished the executive’s ability for strategic planning, especially in the case of policy disunity in cabinet. Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his (then) chief special adviser, Dominic Cummings, quickly adopted a strategy that combined opacity with confrontation, alleging that Parliament worked against “the people.” Without a majority in the House of Commons and without a public strategy for the government, this resulted in what many observers considered to be close to a constitutional crisis.
After Johnson won a substantial majority in the 2019 general election, the conflicts diminished initially. When Cummings was forced to leave, there was a substantial drop in headline grabbing initiatives and a return to normal civil service consultations. Latterly, a series of revelations about the conduct of staff in number 10 Downing Street have cast doubt on the effectiveness of the machinery for government strategy, highlighting the important role of the prime minster in setting the tone.
Citations:
https://civilservicelearning.civilservice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/twelve_actions_report_web_accessible.pdf
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/whitehall-monitor-2021_1.pdf
Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?
10
9
9
In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
8
7
6
7
6
For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
2
1
1
The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
Non-governmental academic experts played an important role in conducting independent reviews of central government policy or strategy during the post-1997 Labour governments. They have worked on the economics of climate change (Sir Nicholas Stern), the future of the pension system (Lord Turner), a review of health trends (Sir Derek Wanless) and fuel poverty (Sir John Hills). Established academics have also served in decision-making bodies such, as the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England since 1997 when the Bank of England was made independent of government. These academics have thus been given substantial influence over core decisions. Most government departments solicit external studies on policy-relevant issues and are supported in doing so by a new Cabinet Office team called Launchpad. The reports are subject to normal procurement rules, typically with a restricted call for tenders.
The coalition government (2010 – 2015) altered the political orientation of the experts consulted by government. A further shift in practice was due to the commitment to what is known as open policymaking (OPM), under which policymakers are called on to actively seek broader inputs into the policymaking process. The traditionally strong influence of think tanks has continued, but those of the left-leaning variety (e.g., the Institute for Public Policy Research and Policy Network) have been replaced by more conservative-minded ones (e.g., the Resolution Foundation and the Center for Policy Studies). The interactions are transparent but occur at various stages of the policymaking process and are often initiated by the think tanks themselves. The emphasis on OPM can be regarded as a change in approach, emphasizing not only evidence-based policymaking, but also helping to identify more appropriate policy solutions. A “what works” team in the Cabinet Office facilitates this process and government departments publish details about their areas of research interest. The Government Office for Science is a unit dedicated to bringing scientific evidence to bear on decision-making. In November 2018, five new business councils, covering major export-sector clusters, were established to advise on how to create the best business conditions in the United Kingdom after Brexit.
There are also many informal channels through which government consults or is briefed by individual academics who have expertise in specific areas. These channels are often more influential than more formal consultation processes. Civil servants are routinely involved in academic events, and benefit from professional policy training and the Trial Advice Panel. The Trial Advice Panel, which consists of experts from within government and academics, supports civil servants to design experimental and quasi-experimental assessments for programs and interventions.
In the negotiation of the EU withdrawal agreement, informal links proliferated, including with think tanks, business interests and academia, but the fundamental political choices were not obviously influenced by expert advice. Attempts by former adviser to the prime minister Dominic Cummings to recruit “weirdos and misfits” to Number 10 jobs in order to increase the diversity of approaches beyond normal civil service areas did not succeed and ended after his dismissal. During the pandemic, the government relied extensively on expert scientific knowledge channeled through the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE), a body with many sub-divisions that brings together a range of relevant skills, and works closely with the government’s chief scientific officer and chief medical officer. Nevertheless, criticisms have been voiced about some of the SAGE advice.
Citations:
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/government-office-for-science/about
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/jan/02/dominic-cummings-calls-for-weirdos-and-misfits-for-no-10-jobs
The coalition government (2010 – 2015) altered the political orientation of the experts consulted by government. A further shift in practice was due to the commitment to what is known as open policymaking (OPM), under which policymakers are called on to actively seek broader inputs into the policymaking process. The traditionally strong influence of think tanks has continued, but those of the left-leaning variety (e.g., the Institute for Public Policy Research and Policy Network) have been replaced by more conservative-minded ones (e.g., the Resolution Foundation and the Center for Policy Studies). The interactions are transparent but occur at various stages of the policymaking process and are often initiated by the think tanks themselves. The emphasis on OPM can be regarded as a change in approach, emphasizing not only evidence-based policymaking, but also helping to identify more appropriate policy solutions. A “what works” team in the Cabinet Office facilitates this process and government departments publish details about their areas of research interest. The Government Office for Science is a unit dedicated to bringing scientific evidence to bear on decision-making. In November 2018, five new business councils, covering major export-sector clusters, were established to advise on how to create the best business conditions in the United Kingdom after Brexit.
There are also many informal channels through which government consults or is briefed by individual academics who have expertise in specific areas. These channels are often more influential than more formal consultation processes. Civil servants are routinely involved in academic events, and benefit from professional policy training and the Trial Advice Panel. The Trial Advice Panel, which consists of experts from within government and academics, supports civil servants to design experimental and quasi-experimental assessments for programs and interventions.
In the negotiation of the EU withdrawal agreement, informal links proliferated, including with think tanks, business interests and academia, but the fundamental political choices were not obviously influenced by expert advice. Attempts by former adviser to the prime minister Dominic Cummings to recruit “weirdos and misfits” to Number 10 jobs in order to increase the diversity of approaches beyond normal civil service areas did not succeed and ended after his dismissal. During the pandemic, the government relied extensively on expert scientific knowledge channeled through the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE), a body with many sub-divisions that brings together a range of relevant skills, and works closely with the government’s chief scientific officer and chief medical officer. Nevertheless, criticisms have been voiced about some of the SAGE advice.
Citations:
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/government-office-for-science/about
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/jan/02/dominic-cummings-calls-for-weirdos-and-misfits-for-no-10-jobs
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Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?
10
9
9
The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
5
4
3
4
3
The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
2
1
1
The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
The primary coordinating role is undertaken by the Cabinet Office, which has expertise in all areas of government since Cabinet Office officials commonly worked in other departments before. According to its website, the Cabinet Office has over 2,000 staff, is responsible for the National Security Council and is central to “making government work better.” The Cabinet Office’s Economic and Domestic Secretariat is responsible for coordinating policy advice to the prime minister and the cabinet, and the attached Parliamentary Business and Legislation (PBL) Secretariat provides advice on legislation and supervises progress made by bill drafting teams. Implementation task forces were replaced in a reform in mid-2020 by new cabinet committees for “operations” that coordinate the delivery of policy.
The power of the prime minister to recast cabinet committees is matched by the scope for civil servants to be reassigned to reflect the latest legislative priorities, ensuring effective oversight of line ministries.
The power of the prime minister to recast cabinet committees is matched by the scope for civil servants to be reassigned to reflect the latest legislative priorities, ensuring effective oversight of line ministries.
To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?
10
9
9
There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
5
4
3
4
3
Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
2
1
1
Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
The Cabinet Office is at the center of policymaking. Since the May 2015 general election, all line ministries are required to prepare single departmental plans (SDP), building on a process already launched during the previous coalition government. As explained by John Manzoni, the chief executive of the civil service appointed in October 2014, these SDPs are intended to bring together inputs and outputs, clarify tradeoffs, and to identify where departments and the cross-departmental functions need to work together to deliver the required outcomes.
Line ministries’ policymaking is subject to intense scrutiny by the Cabinet Office, while the cost implications of line ministries’ policy proposals are controlled by the Treasury.
The creation of implementation taskforces, working alongside cabinet committees, is intended to strengthen the central oversight of policy proposals.
Nevertheless, coordination mechanisms were not able to resolve the political tensions around Brexit. Since the United Kingdom left the European Union, things have returned to the previous state, with a strong role for the Cabinet Office, which has been led since the autumn of 2020 by Cabinet Secretary Simon Case, “a trusted member” of the prime minister’s “inner circle.”
Citations:
https://www.ft.com/content/670d1f85-5173-44dc-aedb-170c6b0f0713
Line ministries’ policymaking is subject to intense scrutiny by the Cabinet Office, while the cost implications of line ministries’ policy proposals are controlled by the Treasury.
The creation of implementation taskforces, working alongside cabinet committees, is intended to strengthen the central oversight of policy proposals.
Nevertheless, coordination mechanisms were not able to resolve the political tensions around Brexit. Since the United Kingdom left the European Union, things have returned to the previous state, with a strong role for the Cabinet Office, which has been led since the autumn of 2020 by Cabinet Secretary Simon Case, “a trusted member” of the prime minister’s “inner circle.”
Citations:
https://www.ft.com/content/670d1f85-5173-44dc-aedb-170c6b0f0713
How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?
10
9
9
The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
8
7
6
7
6
Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
5
4
3
4
3
There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
2
1
1
There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
The composition and terms of reference of cabinet committees are decided by the prime minister. The minister for the Cabinet Office generally also has an influential role, chairing 10 and sitting on all but two cabinet committees under the May government. The creation of implementation taskforces alongside conventional committees led to a net increase in committee numbers. After the change of prime minister in the summer of 2016, two noteworthy innovations were the establishment of the European Union Exit and Trade Committee, and the Economy and Industrial Strategy Cabinet Committee, both of which were chaired by the prime minister. Additionally, a committee on social reform was created. However, leaks from cabinet ministers suggested that key decisions on Brexit were not adequately shared outside the prime minister’s inner circle.
When Johnson succeeded May as prime minister, he radically altered the mix of committees, reducing them to just six, three of which were largely focused on concluding Brexit, the over-riding priority of his government. This exemplifies the UK government’s tendency to reconfigure committees rapidly in response to shifts in political priorities, demonstrating the flexibility of the system, as it quickly did when Brexit was completed.
In response to the pandemic, new configurations were again created, with three new committees set up, while another was created to deal with the challenges of the UK approach to Afghanistan. At the time of writing, there were 20 committees listed on the government website. In some cases (e.g., for Global Britain or COVID-19), there are separate strategy and operations committees.
Cabinet committees reduce the burden on the cabinet by enabling collective decisions to be taken by a smaller group of ministers. Since the Conservative government of Edward Heath (1970 – 1974), it has become an established norm that decisions settled in cabinet committees are not questioned in full cabinet unless the committee chair or the prime minister decide to do so.
Citations:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/720421/2018-06-27_DUP_CC_Transparency_Return__October_to_March__FINAL.pdf
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-cabinet-committees-system-and-list-of-cabinet-committees
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/whitehall-monitor/whitehall-explained/cabinet-committees
When Johnson succeeded May as prime minister, he radically altered the mix of committees, reducing them to just six, three of which were largely focused on concluding Brexit, the over-riding priority of his government. This exemplifies the UK government’s tendency to reconfigure committees rapidly in response to shifts in political priorities, demonstrating the flexibility of the system, as it quickly did when Brexit was completed.
In response to the pandemic, new configurations were again created, with three new committees set up, while another was created to deal with the challenges of the UK approach to Afghanistan. At the time of writing, there were 20 committees listed on the government website. In some cases (e.g., for Global Britain or COVID-19), there are separate strategy and operations committees.
Cabinet committees reduce the burden on the cabinet by enabling collective decisions to be taken by a smaller group of ministers. Since the Conservative government of Edward Heath (1970 – 1974), it has become an established norm that decisions settled in cabinet committees are not questioned in full cabinet unless the committee chair or the prime minister decide to do so.
Citations:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/720421/2018-06-27_DUP_CC_Transparency_Return__October_to_March__FINAL.pdf
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-cabinet-committees-system-and-list-of-cabinet-committees
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/whitehall-monitor/whitehall-explained/cabinet-committees
How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?
10
9
9
Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
8
7
6
7
6
Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
5
4
3
4
3
There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
2
1
1
There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
The interministerial coordination of policy proposals is an official civil service goal. Single Departmental Plans (SDPs) set out departmental objectives and how these will be achieved. SDPs highlight areas of cross-departmental working, including where departments are working together to deliver shared objectives and are overseen by the Cabinet Office and the Prime Minister’s Office. There are also some cross-departmental bodies established in response to the identification of specific objectives, such as the Work and Health Unit set up to improve the employability of disabled or ill people.
There were concerns that the workload required to deliver Brexit would undermine coordination within government. But, as expected, since the formal conclusion of the process, there has largely been a reversion to the usual procedures. Plans put forward by former adviser to the prime minister Dominic Cummings for a major reform of the civil service were not pursued further after he left Downing Street.
Several new coordination units, cutting across departments, were created in 2020 in response to the pandemic, testifying to a capacity to change means of coordination rapidly.
There were concerns that the workload required to deliver Brexit would undermine coordination within government. But, as expected, since the formal conclusion of the process, there has largely been a reversion to the usual procedures. Plans put forward by former adviser to the prime minister Dominic Cummings for a major reform of the civil service were not pursued further after he left Downing Street.
Several new coordination units, cutting across departments, were created in 2020 in response to the pandemic, testifying to a capacity to change means of coordination rapidly.
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
10
9
9
Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
8
7
6
7
6
In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
2
1
1
Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Informal coordination was a hallmark of the Labour governments under Tony Blair (1997 – 2007). However, informal coordination was reduced during the Labour government of Gordon Brown (2007 – 2010) and largely abolished under the coalition government (2010 – 2015), because of the need to avoid tensions within the coalition.
Having returned to one-party government in May 2015, it was expected that informal forms of coordination would become more common again. Yet, the divisions within the governing Conservative Party, namely among senior ministers and party factions, over the United Kingdom’s future relations with the European Union complicated informal coordination to a point of more or less open sabotage, which finally led to the collapse of the May government. The rift within the Conservative Party even widened under May’s successor Boris Johnson, before being largely settled after the general election victory in December 2019.
Cabinet committee discussions are regularly preceded or accompanied by bilateral meetings of relevant ministers supported by senior officials across government. These discussions are often chaired by the chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, a senior member of the Cabinet with no departmental role, or by other senior ministers. The proximity of ministries, the executive and Parliament in SW1 (the post code for the part of the London Borough of Westminster where so many institutions of governance are located) facilitates a range of informal interactions. Moreover, there are informal networks of special advisers to ministers, which can help broker deals between ministers.
Although there are formal mechanisms for coordinating issues affecting the governments of the four constituent nations of the United Kingdom, the position of the central government as the voice for the United Kingdom as a whole as well as for England (and sometimes also Wales) can cause tensions, especially in view of the relative size (population and economy) of England compared with the other three nations. Differing rules and timing for COVID-19 restrictions on travel, though not diverging all that much, illustrate the potential complexities.
Citations:
Collaborative Civil Service: https://civilservice.blog.gov.uk/2016/04/28/a-model-for-a-more-collaborative-civil service-the-estate-strategy-in-action/
Having returned to one-party government in May 2015, it was expected that informal forms of coordination would become more common again. Yet, the divisions within the governing Conservative Party, namely among senior ministers and party factions, over the United Kingdom’s future relations with the European Union complicated informal coordination to a point of more or less open sabotage, which finally led to the collapse of the May government. The rift within the Conservative Party even widened under May’s successor Boris Johnson, before being largely settled after the general election victory in December 2019.
Cabinet committee discussions are regularly preceded or accompanied by bilateral meetings of relevant ministers supported by senior officials across government. These discussions are often chaired by the chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, a senior member of the Cabinet with no departmental role, or by other senior ministers. The proximity of ministries, the executive and Parliament in SW1 (the post code for the part of the London Borough of Westminster where so many institutions of governance are located) facilitates a range of informal interactions. Moreover, there are informal networks of special advisers to ministers, which can help broker deals between ministers.
Although there are formal mechanisms for coordinating issues affecting the governments of the four constituent nations of the United Kingdom, the position of the central government as the voice for the United Kingdom as a whole as well as for England (and sometimes also Wales) can cause tensions, especially in view of the relative size (population and economy) of England compared with the other three nations. Differing rules and timing for COVID-19 restrictions on travel, though not diverging all that much, illustrate the potential complexities.
Citations:
Collaborative Civil Service: https://civilservice.blog.gov.uk/2016/04/28/a-model-for-a-more-collaborative-civil service-the-estate-strategy-in-action/
How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?
10
9
9
The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
8
7
6
7
6
The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
5
4
3
4
3
The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
2
1
1
The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
The Government Digital Service (GDS), established in 2012, established standards for new digital services and promotes the government’s digital-by-default approach. GDS is also responsible for providing common technologies and services to departments for their digital services (e.g., the gov.uk platform, and cross-government payments and notifications services). All government departments now have digital technology teams, which in some departments are also responsible for internal IT services for officials. Publishing all government digital material on the single gov.uk platform (at UK level, covering England, but separately for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) has been a valuable consolidation.
An assessment in 2017 by Daniel Thornton of the Institute for Government provided qualified support to government efforts to achieve more digital coordination. A report by the Public Accounts Committee on the progress of the government’s Verify program (intended to ease digital access for citizens by simplifying verification of their identity) was scathing about the failures of implementation and lack of progress. Comprehensive digitalization of NHS data remains a major challenge, but was given a significant impetus by the pandemic, including the creation of effective platforms for booking vaccinations and recording test results.
During the coronavirus pandemic, digital technology greatly facilitated effective responses by all parts of government to the crisis. While many new services were delivered in record time and the work of central government continued with only minor problems, there were a number of high-profile failures, not least abortive first attempts to establish a contact-tracing app. There were also problems with algorithms used to calibrate school exam results based mainly on teacher assessments. These arose first in Scotland, which has an earlier exam timetable, making it all the more inexplicable that lessons were not learned when it came to a similar exercise in England.
As the GDS enters its second decade, the service has set out a number of ambitions, not the least of which is to create a single online identity to overcome what has been described in a blog article as systems “designed, developed and operated in departmental silos, with a focus only on meeting each department’s needs.”
Citations:
Alex Allan review: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/589946/2017-01-18_-_Better_Information_for_Better_Government.pdf
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/head-of-ddat-final.pdf
https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/public-accounts-committee/news-parliament-2017/accessing-public-services-through-verify-report-published-17-19/
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/whitehall-monitor-2021_1.pdf
https://www.bing.com/search?q=uk+government+digital+transformation+strategy&FORM=QSRE8
An assessment in 2017 by Daniel Thornton of the Institute for Government provided qualified support to government efforts to achieve more digital coordination. A report by the Public Accounts Committee on the progress of the government’s Verify program (intended to ease digital access for citizens by simplifying verification of their identity) was scathing about the failures of implementation and lack of progress. Comprehensive digitalization of NHS data remains a major challenge, but was given a significant impetus by the pandemic, including the creation of effective platforms for booking vaccinations and recording test results.
During the coronavirus pandemic, digital technology greatly facilitated effective responses by all parts of government to the crisis. While many new services were delivered in record time and the work of central government continued with only minor problems, there were a number of high-profile failures, not least abortive first attempts to establish a contact-tracing app. There were also problems with algorithms used to calibrate school exam results based mainly on teacher assessments. These arose first in Scotland, which has an earlier exam timetable, making it all the more inexplicable that lessons were not learned when it came to a similar exercise in England.
As the GDS enters its second decade, the service has set out a number of ambitions, not the least of which is to create a single online identity to overcome what has been described in a blog article as systems “designed, developed and operated in departmental silos, with a focus only on meeting each department’s needs.”
Citations:
Alex Allan review: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/589946/2017-01-18_-_Better_Information_for_Better_Government.pdf
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/head-of-ddat-final.pdf
https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/public-accounts-committee/news-parliament-2017/accessing-public-services-through-verify-report-published-17-19/
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/whitehall-monitor-2021_1.pdf
https://www.bing.com/search?q=uk+government+digital+transformation+strategy&FORM=QSRE8
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To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?
10
9
9
RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
8
7
6
7
6
RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
5
4
3
4
3
RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
2
1
1
RIA are not applied or do not exist.
The reduction of regulation costs has been a long-standing policy goal of successive governments and is closely monitored by the Better Regulation Executive, set up in 2005 and charged with overseeing the Better Regulation Framework (updated periodically). Successive governments have refined this approach while maintaining its broad thrust. Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIAs) have to be prepared for all legislation, which affects businesses, charities and voluntary bodies, to assess the benefits and burdens of the planned measure. The number of RIAs carried out has fallen from a peak of 664 in 2011 to an average of 175 in each of the three years preceding the pandemic, and just 100 in 2020 and 85 in 2021, according to legislation.co.uk. Over the years, the largest number of RIAs were for the departments responsible for business, transport and the environment.
Academic research has questioned the value of these assessments since their results are not systematically integrated into the decision-making process, but they are certainly applied. The threshold for conducting a full RIA has been raised from effects exceeding £1 million to £5 million in 2018, but this is expected only to reduce the number of RIAs by 7%. RIAs are followed up after five years to verify their findings, with independent oversight. Each ministry has a better regulation unit and the formal process is scrutinized by the independent Regulatory Policy Committee
While this is good overall practice, implementation was particularly patchy during the politically charged Brexit process, with the government resisting pressure to make all the relevant documentation public in a timely manner. Some elaboration is provided by the Institute for Government. Notwithstanding this exceptional period, RIAs are taken seriously. There are extensive manuals and guidance for officials contemplating policy initiatives. Provisions also exist for taking into account impacts of UK-wide legislation on the devolved administrations.
A consultation launched in July solicited input on how “the UK can reshape its approach to regulation and seize new opportunities from Brexit with its newfound regulatory freedom.” Legislation is expected to follow in 2022.
Citations:
Dunlop, Claire A. et al. 2012: The many uses of regulatory impact assessment: A meta- analysis of EU and UK cases, in: Regulation & Governance Vol. 6 23-45.
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/no-deal-brexit-uk-preparations
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/841245/EU_Withdrawal_Agreement_Bill_Impact_Assessment.pdf
https://www.oecd.org/regreform/Proportionality-and-threshhold-tests-RIA.pdf
Academic research has questioned the value of these assessments since their results are not systematically integrated into the decision-making process, but they are certainly applied. The threshold for conducting a full RIA has been raised from effects exceeding £1 million to £5 million in 2018, but this is expected only to reduce the number of RIAs by 7%. RIAs are followed up after five years to verify their findings, with independent oversight. Each ministry has a better regulation unit and the formal process is scrutinized by the independent Regulatory Policy Committee
While this is good overall practice, implementation was particularly patchy during the politically charged Brexit process, with the government resisting pressure to make all the relevant documentation public in a timely manner. Some elaboration is provided by the Institute for Government. Notwithstanding this exceptional period, RIAs are taken seriously. There are extensive manuals and guidance for officials contemplating policy initiatives. Provisions also exist for taking into account impacts of UK-wide legislation on the devolved administrations.
A consultation launched in July solicited input on how “the UK can reshape its approach to regulation and seize new opportunities from Brexit with its newfound regulatory freedom.” Legislation is expected to follow in 2022.
Citations:
Dunlop, Claire A. et al. 2012: The many uses of regulatory impact assessment: A meta- analysis of EU and UK cases, in: Regulation & Governance Vol. 6 23-45.
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/no-deal-brexit-uk-preparations
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/841245/EU_Withdrawal_Agreement_Bill_Impact_Assessment.pdf
https://www.oecd.org/regreform/Proportionality-and-threshhold-tests-RIA.pdf
Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?
10
9
9
RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
8
7
6
7
6
The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
5
4
3
4
3
The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
2
1
1
RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
The Regulatory Policy Committee (RPC), a body established in 2009 and independent since 2012, is responsible for quality evaluation and impact assessment. The RPC provides feedback to the Reducing Regulation Committee, a sub-committee of the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs, on the quality of the analysis and evidence presented. The RPC does not actively solicit input from outside the government department concerned, but is open to submissions from other stakeholders on the impacts of proposed regulation. Transparency and guidance is provided on the government website (gov.uk) detailing how to contact the RPC. The government invites direct comment on the process in an effort to engage citizens and, perhaps more importantly, businesses. To reduce regulatory costs for businesses, the government committed to a Business Impact Target. There is a one-in-three-out principle for new regulations, with information regularly updated online.
That these principles can, however, be overridden for political expediency, if the government wishes, was demonstrated during the planning and execution of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union. However, in relation to COVID-19, impact assessments were regularly undertaken ranging from the overall impact of the Coronavirus Bill, prior to its enactment, to more detailed assessments of specific measures.
Citations:
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/regulatory-policy-committee/about#rpc-guidance-and-training
That these principles can, however, be overridden for political expediency, if the government wishes, was demonstrated during the planning and execution of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union. However, in relation to COVID-19, impact assessments were regularly undertaken ranging from the overall impact of the Coronavirus Bill, prior to its enactment, to more detailed assessments of specific measures.
Citations:
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/regulatory-policy-committee/about#rpc-guidance-and-training
Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?
10
9
9
Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
8
7
6
7
6
Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
5
4
3
4
3
Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
2
1
1
Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
In the United Kingdom, the whole RIA process aims to provide support for sustainable policymaking. The assessment is based on a wide range of different indicators, including social, environmental and ecological. However, economic indicators seem to be the most important. The assessments analyze the impact of regulation over several time periods (i.e., short, medium and long-term), and they attempt to take into account external shocks and irregular developments. There is a sustainable development impact test to complete for all relevant policy proposals.
Citations:
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/sustainable-development-impact-test
Citations:
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/sustainable-development-impact-test
To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?
10
9
9
Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
2
1
1
Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
Evidenced-based decision-making is deeply rooted in the United Kingdom’s tradition of firm and efficient legislation, and ex post evaluations are as vital a part of public policymaking as impact and sustainability checks. The OECD ranks the United Kingdom second among its 40 members for its approach. Specialist analytical functions have recently been brought together to form the Analysis Function, further strengthening their role in policymaking and service delivery. Analytical approaches to evaluation are set out by the Magenta Book and the Green Book, supported by the Cross-Government Evaluation Group coordinated by HM Treasury. More recently the Behavioral Insights Team (formerly a team within the Cabinet Office, but now an independent entity) and the What Works Network (coordinated by the Cabinet Office) promote the increased use of evaluation methods, especially randomized controlled trials.
The notion here is to make government more efficient, and so to quickly identify and overcome unnecessary regulatory hurdles. In 2011, the previous coalition government launched the “Red Tape Challenge,” encouraging citizens to report unhelpful or burdensome legislation that could be cut or reformed. However, the main focus of the United Kingdom’s commitment to ex post evaluation is surely on facilitating business.
The Regulatory Policy Committee (RPC) assesses the quality of the government’s RIA analyses and further examines all published ex post evaluation. If the RPC submits a recommendation to the government, it is expected to be implemented into law. Further, businesses can directly address the RPC if they disagree with or feel disadvantaged by a specific governmental regulatory assessment.
Citations:
OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021
The notion here is to make government more efficient, and so to quickly identify and overcome unnecessary regulatory hurdles. In 2011, the previous coalition government launched the “Red Tape Challenge,” encouraging citizens to report unhelpful or burdensome legislation that could be cut or reformed. However, the main focus of the United Kingdom’s commitment to ex post evaluation is surely on facilitating business.
The Regulatory Policy Committee (RPC) assesses the quality of the government’s RIA analyses and further examines all published ex post evaluation. If the RPC submits a recommendation to the government, it is expected to be implemented into law. Further, businesses can directly address the RPC if they disagree with or feel disadvantaged by a specific governmental regulatory assessment.
Citations:
OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021
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Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?
10
9
9
The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
8
7
6
7
6
The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
2
1
1
The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
The United Kingdom had a weaker tradition, compared to many other EU member states, of systematically incorporating civil society organizations into the decision-making process. Nevertheless, a significant effort has been made since 2010 to make government more open and, in 2019, a new action plan for open government was published. The plan sets out eight commitments in the areas of influencing policymaking, transparency on publicly owned resources and access to data.
Previous changes led to a substantial increase in policymaking transparency and included systematic efforts to consult a range of actors. However, the extent to which social partners are formally engaged in the policymaking process continues to be less than in many other western European countries. The 2010 – 2015 coalition government established a “compact” to govern civil society engagement in policymaking in England, under the auspices of a (junior) minister for civil society. Civil society is also listed as one of the responsibilities of the minister for the Cabinet Office. The United Kingdom was a founding member of the Open Government Partnership and, as a member of the partnership, is committed to producing a national action plan to engage with civil society. The current plan detailed a range of commitments. According to a recent self-assessment, some three-quarters of these commitments have already been achieved or are underway, though 27% of these commitments are behind schedule. Impact assessments are one means by which consultation has been enhanced, with drafts circulated to stakeholders before being finalized. Feedback on these drafts is considered before decisions are taken on whether or not to proceed with the policy change under review.
In 2014, some 650 public consultation processes took place, all described on the government website (gov.uk) and this increased further in 2018 when 767 were conducted. In addition, a range of advisory boards solicit input into the policymaking process in areas such as migration and social security. However, a concern (expressed to the reviewer by a former minister for the Cabinet Office) is that the follow-up to many consultations is limited. Given the pluralist nature of the UK system of interest groups and associations, it can also be difficult to identify which organization would be competent and legitimized to speak on a certain issue.
The United Kingdom’s fifth National Action Plan for Open Government 2021 – 2023, covering the period up to the end of 2023 has been announced. Quoting from the announcement, its “commitments build on themes from previous plans. They reflect priority areas identified through the co-creation process with civil society and active citizens, using the Open Government Network as the primary engagement mechanism.”
Citations:
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/compact-the-agreement-between-government-and-the-voluntary-community-sector
https://openpolicy.blog.gov.uk/about/
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/668970/Final_mid-term_self_assessment_report_NAP_2016-18.pdf
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-national-action-plan-for-open-government-2019-2021
Previous changes led to a substantial increase in policymaking transparency and included systematic efforts to consult a range of actors. However, the extent to which social partners are formally engaged in the policymaking process continues to be less than in many other western European countries. The 2010 – 2015 coalition government established a “compact” to govern civil society engagement in policymaking in England, under the auspices of a (junior) minister for civil society. Civil society is also listed as one of the responsibilities of the minister for the Cabinet Office. The United Kingdom was a founding member of the Open Government Partnership and, as a member of the partnership, is committed to producing a national action plan to engage with civil society. The current plan detailed a range of commitments. According to a recent self-assessment, some three-quarters of these commitments have already been achieved or are underway, though 27% of these commitments are behind schedule. Impact assessments are one means by which consultation has been enhanced, with drafts circulated to stakeholders before being finalized. Feedback on these drafts is considered before decisions are taken on whether or not to proceed with the policy change under review.
In 2014, some 650 public consultation processes took place, all described on the government website (gov.uk) and this increased further in 2018 when 767 were conducted. In addition, a range of advisory boards solicit input into the policymaking process in areas such as migration and social security. However, a concern (expressed to the reviewer by a former minister for the Cabinet Office) is that the follow-up to many consultations is limited. Given the pluralist nature of the UK system of interest groups and associations, it can also be difficult to identify which organization would be competent and legitimized to speak on a certain issue.
The United Kingdom’s fifth National Action Plan for Open Government 2021 – 2023, covering the period up to the end of 2023 has been announced. Quoting from the announcement, its “commitments build on themes from previous plans. They reflect priority areas identified through the co-creation process with civil society and active citizens, using the Open Government Network as the primary engagement mechanism.”
Citations:
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/compact-the-agreement-between-government-and-the-voluntary-community-sector
https://openpolicy.blog.gov.uk/about/
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/668970/Final_mid-term_self_assessment_report_NAP_2016-18.pdf
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-national-action-plan-for-open-government-2019-2021
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To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?
10
9
9
Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
8
7
6
7
6
Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
5
4
3
4
3
Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
2
1
1
Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
Compared with the culture of secrecy of earlier decades, government has become much more open in the United Kingdom in recent years. This is due to a combination of the Freedom of Information Act passed by a Tony Blair-led Labour government, and a willingness to use the internet to increase transparency and open up government. The government website (gov.uk) provides extensive information on government services and activities, and has been redesigned to be more user friendly. It is also a single gateway website, which aims to facilitate greater coherence in line with the government communications plan.
On international measures, such as the Open Data Index or OECD government assessments, the United Kingdom scores well and there is clearly a strong push from within the administration to enhance communication, for example, with a strategic communications plan and a single communications budget.
However, while the mechanisms of communication were laudable, communication proved to be difficult in the period between the Brexit referendum and the completion of the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union. As with so many facets of governance, the settlement of Brexit resulted in a return to more coherent communication. On the whole, messages around the pandemic have been both clear and informative for the public, despite some differences of emphasis between the departments responsible, especially those covering healthcare, on the one side, and business and the economy, on the other. However, more could have been done to highlight why, despite claims to be following the science, governments (in this instance, of all four nations of the United Kingdom) took certain decisions.
Communication around the many charges leveled against Number 10 about parties has been shambolic.
Citations:
OPM Approach: https://openpolicy.blog.gov.uk/ is an open site with short articles on the OPM approach https://gcs.civilservice.gov.uk/communications-plan/
On international measures, such as the Open Data Index or OECD government assessments, the United Kingdom scores well and there is clearly a strong push from within the administration to enhance communication, for example, with a strategic communications plan and a single communications budget.
However, while the mechanisms of communication were laudable, communication proved to be difficult in the period between the Brexit referendum and the completion of the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union. As with so many facets of governance, the settlement of Brexit resulted in a return to more coherent communication. On the whole, messages around the pandemic have been both clear and informative for the public, despite some differences of emphasis between the departments responsible, especially those covering healthcare, on the one side, and business and the economy, on the other. However, more could have been done to highlight why, despite claims to be following the science, governments (in this instance, of all four nations of the United Kingdom) took certain decisions.
Communication around the many charges leveled against Number 10 about parties has been shambolic.
Citations:
OPM Approach: https://openpolicy.blog.gov.uk/ is an open site with short articles on the OPM approach https://gcs.civilservice.gov.uk/communications-plan/
Graph View
To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?
10
9
9
The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
5
4
3
4
3
The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
2
1
1
The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
The United Kingdom’s political system is highly centralized. For example, there are no “veto players” outside of the central government who could challenge or undermine the government’s core policy objectives. There is no written constitution or Constitutional Court, although the Supreme Court can challenge government decisions directly and effectively. There is provision for judicial review, something the government is currently trying to limit given its extensive use in recent years. The devolution of certain powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland has meant that some national policy goals are subject to decisions at the subnational level over which the central government has only limited powers. In particular, the influence of the Scottish Parliament, based in Holyrood, increased substantially following the close outcome of the Scottish referendum and the massive gains made by the Scottish National Party across Scotland in recent UK general elections.
Persistent problems in the National Health Service have had to be addressed by resort to emergency funding. Meanwhile, disputes over some issues – such as a third runway at Heathrow or the (slow) construction of HS2, a high-speed rail-link between London and northern England – have been affected by the impact that the issue would have on individual ministers’ parliamentary constituencies. The government has also struggled to introduce major welfare reforms, notably Universal Credit. The Institute for Government (IfG) in 2018 noted an increase in the number of major projects for which delivery is “in doubt” or “unachievable” compared to five years earlier. In the IfG’s 2022 Whitehall Monitor, it identifies positive responses to the pandemic, noting, for example, that “the government could quickly develop and roll out large new digital services.” But the report also draws attention to failings in public procurement from having departed from normal processes and from the many “political problems facing the government, which are already proving a distraction from its agenda.” Arguably, these difficulties suggest that, although the power conferred to the prime minister is often an advantage in implementation, it can be a disadvantage if the incumbent is beleaguered.
On the whole, UK governments are able to achieve what they set out to do, because the electoral system is geared to generating parliamentary majorities, which facilitate the implementation of government objectives. Nevertheless, and especially when the government’s majority is small, difficulties can arise in achieving policy objectives because of intra-party factionalism and parliamentary party rebellions. Even under the exceptional coalition government between 2010 and 2015, Premier Minister David Cameron often had more trouble controlling his own party’s right-wing than dealing with the demands of the junior coalition partner, the Liberal Democrats. After the general election in 2017 in which May lost her absolute majority and was forced into a “confidence-and-supply” arrangement with the Northern Irish unionist DUP, challenges in implementation became only too evident – and even more so after she was replaced by Boris Johnson who eventually withdrew the whip from no fewer than 21 Conservative members of parliament. The UK government was without a majority in the House of Commons for weeks, which in this traditionally parliament-focused system meant a de facto standstill of almost all government action.
The conclusion to draw is that in the relatively rare circumstances of a hung parliament, the UK government will struggle to implement policies. In the exceptional circumstances of 2019, the difficulties were exacerbated, but were soon resolved by a return to majority government.
During much of the pandemic, the devolved governments and, to a lesser extent, of the metropolitan areas exhibited an increased self-assuredness in implementing their own preferences in their areas of competence. In these areas of competence, the UK government was responsible only for England. However, in other areas of competence the UK government was able to implement several key policy responses to the pandemic effectively.
Citations:
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/Whitehall%20Monitor%202019%20WEB1.pdf
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publications/whitehall-monitor-2022
Persistent problems in the National Health Service have had to be addressed by resort to emergency funding. Meanwhile, disputes over some issues – such as a third runway at Heathrow or the (slow) construction of HS2, a high-speed rail-link between London and northern England – have been affected by the impact that the issue would have on individual ministers’ parliamentary constituencies. The government has also struggled to introduce major welfare reforms, notably Universal Credit. The Institute for Government (IfG) in 2018 noted an increase in the number of major projects for which delivery is “in doubt” or “unachievable” compared to five years earlier. In the IfG’s 2022 Whitehall Monitor, it identifies positive responses to the pandemic, noting, for example, that “the government could quickly develop and roll out large new digital services.” But the report also draws attention to failings in public procurement from having departed from normal processes and from the many “political problems facing the government, which are already proving a distraction from its agenda.” Arguably, these difficulties suggest that, although the power conferred to the prime minister is often an advantage in implementation, it can be a disadvantage if the incumbent is beleaguered.
On the whole, UK governments are able to achieve what they set out to do, because the electoral system is geared to generating parliamentary majorities, which facilitate the implementation of government objectives. Nevertheless, and especially when the government’s majority is small, difficulties can arise in achieving policy objectives because of intra-party factionalism and parliamentary party rebellions. Even under the exceptional coalition government between 2010 and 2015, Premier Minister David Cameron often had more trouble controlling his own party’s right-wing than dealing with the demands of the junior coalition partner, the Liberal Democrats. After the general election in 2017 in which May lost her absolute majority and was forced into a “confidence-and-supply” arrangement with the Northern Irish unionist DUP, challenges in implementation became only too evident – and even more so after she was replaced by Boris Johnson who eventually withdrew the whip from no fewer than 21 Conservative members of parliament. The UK government was without a majority in the House of Commons for weeks, which in this traditionally parliament-focused system meant a de facto standstill of almost all government action.
The conclusion to draw is that in the relatively rare circumstances of a hung parliament, the UK government will struggle to implement policies. In the exceptional circumstances of 2019, the difficulties were exacerbated, but were soon resolved by a return to majority government.
During much of the pandemic, the devolved governments and, to a lesser extent, of the metropolitan areas exhibited an increased self-assuredness in implementing their own preferences in their areas of competence. In these areas of competence, the UK government was responsible only for England. However, in other areas of competence the UK government was able to implement several key policy responses to the pandemic effectively.
Citations:
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/Whitehall%20Monitor%202019%20WEB1.pdf
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publications/whitehall-monitor-2022
To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?
10
9
9
The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
8
7
6
7
6
The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
5
4
3
4
3
The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
2
1
1
The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
The prime minister has traditionally had more or less absolute power to appoint (and fire) ministers. Prime ministers use this power of patronage to earn the loyalty of backbench members of parliament and to ensure that ministers stick to the government agenda. The prime minister is also able to reshape the machinery of government, such as the remit and composition of ministries and cabinet committees.
Despite occasional leaks, the collective responsibility of cabinet is a well-entrenched doctrine, with standards of behavior are set out in the Ministerial Code. The prime minister’s power is partly dependent on the incumbent’s political strength, and calculations by their party and potential rivals as to their future electoral success (which is directly linked to their own job security). Party whips also play a key role in passing legislation and thus in supporting the government, and any members of parliament with strong political ambitions have to be wary of being branded as mavericks. However, this label has become significantly less stigmatized over the past couple of years and Conservative members of parliament elected recently, especially the 2019 newcomers, many from what were previously Labour constituencies and with less experience of Parliament because of the long period of lockdown, are sometimes considered to be more prone to rebellion.
Following the 2016 referendum, several ministers publicly dissented from the government line on Brexit, with some ministers even resigning from the cabinet, while others used leaks and briefings to undermine the prime minister. As with other questions on executive capacity, the particular circumstances of Brexit being implemented by a minority government were unusually difficult. The ensuing disputes within the cabinet blocked Theresa May’s key policies and finally collapsed her government. Her successor, Boris Johnson, who was a central figure in sabotaging Theresa May’s premiership, has – after the clear victory in the 2019 general election – managed to reinstate the discipline he himself helped undermine.
During the pandemic and in the development of policies for recovery from it, there has been little sign of ministerial dissent. Moreover, the government was able to push through unpopular tax increases, despite these being at odds with manifesto commitments. Yet, several policies at the heart of the Conservative program – leveling-up being a prime example – have been postponed while attention was focused on the pandemic and are only now being taken forward.
Despite occasional leaks, the collective responsibility of cabinet is a well-entrenched doctrine, with standards of behavior are set out in the Ministerial Code. The prime minister’s power is partly dependent on the incumbent’s political strength, and calculations by their party and potential rivals as to their future electoral success (which is directly linked to their own job security). Party whips also play a key role in passing legislation and thus in supporting the government, and any members of parliament with strong political ambitions have to be wary of being branded as mavericks. However, this label has become significantly less stigmatized over the past couple of years and Conservative members of parliament elected recently, especially the 2019 newcomers, many from what were previously Labour constituencies and with less experience of Parliament because of the long period of lockdown, are sometimes considered to be more prone to rebellion.
Following the 2016 referendum, several ministers publicly dissented from the government line on Brexit, with some ministers even resigning from the cabinet, while others used leaks and briefings to undermine the prime minister. As with other questions on executive capacity, the particular circumstances of Brexit being implemented by a minority government were unusually difficult. The ensuing disputes within the cabinet blocked Theresa May’s key policies and finally collapsed her government. Her successor, Boris Johnson, who was a central figure in sabotaging Theresa May’s premiership, has – after the clear victory in the 2019 general election – managed to reinstate the discipline he himself helped undermine.
During the pandemic and in the development of policies for recovery from it, there has been little sign of ministerial dissent. Moreover, the government was able to push through unpopular tax increases, despite these being at odds with manifesto commitments. Yet, several policies at the heart of the Conservative program – leveling-up being a prime example – have been postponed while attention was focused on the pandemic and are only now being taken forward.
How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
5
4
3
4
3
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
2
1
1
The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
The tight integration between the Prime Minister’s Office and the Cabinet Office enables prime ministers to be effective in determining the strategic direction of the government. Through Treasury Approval Point processes, the Treasury has long had an important monitoring role, which goes beyond the role of finance ministries in other countries. Decision-making is concentrated in strategic units and in informal meetings. Ministers have to reveal their preferences in cabinet meetings, cabinet committees and bilateral meetings with the prime minister or chancellor. Consequently, monitoring is relatively easy for the core executive, also by means of the single department plans.
Some recent initiatives have reinforced central oversight, including the merger of the Major Projects Authority and Infrastructure UK into the Infrastructure and Projects Authority, which reports to both the Cabinet Office and HM Treasury. There are implementation task forces set up at ministerial level to drive delivery in a focused set of priority areas and an implementation unit in the Cabinet Office, which works on behalf of the prime minister to track the delivery of priority policies and the wider government program. It intervenes where delivery or operational performance is at risk, or progress is unclear in order to strengthen implementation capability across the civil service. The Financial Management Reform launched in 2014 has been evaluated as a success by the Institute for Government.
The Department for Exiting the European Union oversaw departments’ progress toward implementing the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union. The department identified individual workstreams that needed to be taken forward, and worked closely with departments and other parts of central government to monitor delivery in these areas. On January 31, when Brexit took effect, the department was dissolved.
In a similar way, the government was able to set up new taskforces or inter-departmental initiatives related to the pandemic. For vaccines, this was an undeniable success, whereas test and trace had a more checkered history. But the point remains that implementation is closely monitored.
Citations:
Whitehall’s Financial Management Reform: https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/IfG_FMR_Cima_briefing_paper_WEB_2.pdf
Some recent initiatives have reinforced central oversight, including the merger of the Major Projects Authority and Infrastructure UK into the Infrastructure and Projects Authority, which reports to both the Cabinet Office and HM Treasury. There are implementation task forces set up at ministerial level to drive delivery in a focused set of priority areas and an implementation unit in the Cabinet Office, which works on behalf of the prime minister to track the delivery of priority policies and the wider government program. It intervenes where delivery or operational performance is at risk, or progress is unclear in order to strengthen implementation capability across the civil service. The Financial Management Reform launched in 2014 has been evaluated as a success by the Institute for Government.
The Department for Exiting the European Union oversaw departments’ progress toward implementing the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union. The department identified individual workstreams that needed to be taken forward, and worked closely with departments and other parts of central government to monitor delivery in these areas. On January 31, when Brexit took effect, the department was dissolved.
In a similar way, the government was able to set up new taskforces or inter-departmental initiatives related to the pandemic. For vaccines, this was an undeniable success, whereas test and trace had a more checkered history. But the point remains that implementation is closely monitored.
Citations:
Whitehall’s Financial Management Reform: https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/IfG_FMR_Cima_briefing_paper_WEB_2.pdf
How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
8
7
6
7
6
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
5
4
3
4
3
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
2
1
1
The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
The United Kingdom was an early adopter of delegating civil service work to executive agencies in order to improve performance and reduce costs, which has been going on since the early 1990s under the Next Steps Program. There is, moreover, an expectation that the departmental minister takes responsibility for any agencies that the ministry oversees but no expectation that the minister will have to resign if problems arise in an agency. The ongoing Civil Service Reform also seeks to introduce new instruments of performance control and individual accountability, for example, through guidance, such as Managing Public Money. The Cabinet Office has recently revised its guidance on public-service reviews and issued a code of good practice for partnerships between departments and arm’s length bodies. The government’s July 2021 declaration on governance reform sets out plans for a fresh look at policy delivery, including the roles of agencies.
Nevertheless, problems have arisen. After repeated criticism, the UK Border Agency, which is responsible for the entry and management of foreign nationals, was taken back into the Home Office to improve transparency and political accountability. It still attracts some negative headlines, and there are evident stresses arising from the management of prisons by private contractors and the failings in dealing with cross-channel migration. Several child-abuse scandals revealed shortcomings in the monitoring of local-level entities, including local childcare, youth and police services. Further, the horrible fire at Grenfell Tower in June 2017 (which caused upward of 70 deaths) exposed major failings in British construction supervision. To some extent, quality control bodies – for example, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary for the police – provide safeguards through setting standards.
Some public agencies have been heavily criticized. For example, the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee has been very critical of HM Revenue and Customs, the tax collection agency, while the CEO of the education standards agency (OFQUAL) was obliged to resign over problems in implementing grading of pupils in the summer of 2020. Public Health England – only created in 2012 – was abolished in October 2021 as a result of perceived inadequacies.
In its 2022 Whitehall Monitor, the Institute for Government asserts that problems with arms-length bodies (ALBs) partly stem from ongoing and largely unresolved questions about how ALBs should be used and what sort of relationship they should have with ministers.
Citations:
Elston, Thomas 2011: Developments in UK executive agencies: re-examining the disaggregation – re-aggregation thesis, Paper presented to the Governance of Public Sector Organisations study group at the 33 rd Annual Conference of the European Group for Public Administration, Bucharest, 7th – 10th September 2011.
Tailored Reviews: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/570290/Tailored_Review_Guidance_v1.1_Nov_2016.pdf
Code of Good Practice: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/partnerships-with-arms-length-bodies-code-of-good-practice
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/declaration-on-government-reform/declaration-on-government-reform
Nevertheless, problems have arisen. After repeated criticism, the UK Border Agency, which is responsible for the entry and management of foreign nationals, was taken back into the Home Office to improve transparency and political accountability. It still attracts some negative headlines, and there are evident stresses arising from the management of prisons by private contractors and the failings in dealing with cross-channel migration. Several child-abuse scandals revealed shortcomings in the monitoring of local-level entities, including local childcare, youth and police services. Further, the horrible fire at Grenfell Tower in June 2017 (which caused upward of 70 deaths) exposed major failings in British construction supervision. To some extent, quality control bodies – for example, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary for the police – provide safeguards through setting standards.
Some public agencies have been heavily criticized. For example, the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee has been very critical of HM Revenue and Customs, the tax collection agency, while the CEO of the education standards agency (OFQUAL) was obliged to resign over problems in implementing grading of pupils in the summer of 2020. Public Health England – only created in 2012 – was abolished in October 2021 as a result of perceived inadequacies.
In its 2022 Whitehall Monitor, the Institute for Government asserts that problems with arms-length bodies (ALBs) partly stem from ongoing and largely unresolved questions about how ALBs should be used and what sort of relationship they should have with ministers.
Citations:
Elston, Thomas 2011: Developments in UK executive agencies: re-examining the disaggregation – re-aggregation thesis, Paper presented to the Governance of Public Sector Organisations study group at the 33 rd Annual Conference of the European Group for Public Administration, Bucharest, 7th – 10th September 2011.
Tailored Reviews: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/570290/Tailored_Review_Guidance_v1.1_Nov_2016.pdf
Code of Good Practice: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/partnerships-with-arms-length-bodies-code-of-good-practice
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/declaration-on-government-reform/declaration-on-government-reform
To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
8
7
6
7
6
The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
2
1
1
The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
Within the United Kingdom, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have devolved governments, which have responsibility for major public services, such as healthcare and education. England has more limited devolved government as a result of the relatively recent establishment of metro and city mayors, and local authorities in England have responsibility for a more limited range of public services, including schools. The central government exercises tight control over the finances of the devolved governments and local authorities in England. The bulk of local authority revenue in England comes from central government grants, even the rate of property tax is controlled centrally. As a result, local authorities were among the hardest hit by government spending cuts during the 2010s. Social care is an especially problematic area, but local authorities are also highly constrained in dealing with basic services, such as filling potholes in roads. Increased task funding for subnational governments has been announced in more recent annual budgets, but it does not go far enough to offset funding gaps.
Given the absence of a written constitution, there is no mechanism to govern the allocation of funds to finance these devolved tasks. As such, any decisions about funding are subject to political and administrative negotiations through formula-based need assessments. Agreements such as the “Barnett Formula” for Scotland, Wales and England provide some stability of funding, while for historical reasons Northern Ireland has a distinctive form of financing. However, despite their recent reaffirmation, these agreements could change if a future government decides that fiscal consolidation requires severe spending cuts.
The Scotland Act 2012 gave the Scottish government new taxation and borrowing powers. After the close outcome of the Scottish independence referendum and as a result of the Smith Commission’s report, the new Conservative government announced the devolution of further tax powers – including income-tax powers – to the Scottish Parliament. The details of additional borrowing powers for the Scottish Parliament were laid down in the Scotland Act 2016, which allows the Scottish government to borrow £450 million a year for infrastructure investment, such as on schools and hospitals, up to a total of £3 billion.
The National Assembly of Wales has far less fiscal discretion, but central government has agreed that further borrowing powers should also be devolved to the Welsh Assembly and agreed on a fiscal framework. A new settlement for the Northern Ireland Assembly has also been under discussion for some time. However, after the Northern Irish parties were unable to form an executive after the regional election in 2017, the province had an extended period of renewed direct control of Westminster. A quid pro quo for the Northern Irish DUP’s support for the May government was extra funding for the province.
The growing number of devolved administrations in England has led to the rise of several assertive new political actors (e.g., the Greater Manchester Combined Authority and the Liverpool City Region Combined Authority), whose fiscal relation to the central state is expected to become a major political topic as the government seeks to implement its “leveling-up” agenda. However, central government funding for local governments was one of the areas most heavily cut during the years of public spending retrenchment. The cumulative effect of these cuts has been considerable, with many councils obliged to run down already slender reserves, and a number of local governments have struggled to maintain even statutory services. Notably, special measures were imposed on the Conservative-run Northamptonshire County Council – in effect a declaration of the council’s insolvency. After the pandemic, a need for fiscal restrictions is likely to create tensions with devolved and regional entities, which have managed to raise their profile during the crisis.
Citations:
Scully, Roger/Jones Richard Wyn 2011: 7. Territorial politics in post-Devolution Britain, in: Heffernan, Richard et al.: Developments in British Politics 9, Basingstoke and New York
Smith Commission Report: http://www.smith-commission.scot/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/The_Smith_Commission_Report-1.pdf
Regions and Nations Factsheets, Autumn Statement 2021: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1036523/Regions_and_Nations_Factsheets.pdf
Given the absence of a written constitution, there is no mechanism to govern the allocation of funds to finance these devolved tasks. As such, any decisions about funding are subject to political and administrative negotiations through formula-based need assessments. Agreements such as the “Barnett Formula” for Scotland, Wales and England provide some stability of funding, while for historical reasons Northern Ireland has a distinctive form of financing. However, despite their recent reaffirmation, these agreements could change if a future government decides that fiscal consolidation requires severe spending cuts.
The Scotland Act 2012 gave the Scottish government new taxation and borrowing powers. After the close outcome of the Scottish independence referendum and as a result of the Smith Commission’s report, the new Conservative government announced the devolution of further tax powers – including income-tax powers – to the Scottish Parliament. The details of additional borrowing powers for the Scottish Parliament were laid down in the Scotland Act 2016, which allows the Scottish government to borrow £450 million a year for infrastructure investment, such as on schools and hospitals, up to a total of £3 billion.
The National Assembly of Wales has far less fiscal discretion, but central government has agreed that further borrowing powers should also be devolved to the Welsh Assembly and agreed on a fiscal framework. A new settlement for the Northern Ireland Assembly has also been under discussion for some time. However, after the Northern Irish parties were unable to form an executive after the regional election in 2017, the province had an extended period of renewed direct control of Westminster. A quid pro quo for the Northern Irish DUP’s support for the May government was extra funding for the province.
The growing number of devolved administrations in England has led to the rise of several assertive new political actors (e.g., the Greater Manchester Combined Authority and the Liverpool City Region Combined Authority), whose fiscal relation to the central state is expected to become a major political topic as the government seeks to implement its “leveling-up” agenda. However, central government funding for local governments was one of the areas most heavily cut during the years of public spending retrenchment. The cumulative effect of these cuts has been considerable, with many councils obliged to run down already slender reserves, and a number of local governments have struggled to maintain even statutory services. Notably, special measures were imposed on the Conservative-run Northamptonshire County Council – in effect a declaration of the council’s insolvency. After the pandemic, a need for fiscal restrictions is likely to create tensions with devolved and regional entities, which have managed to raise their profile during the crisis.
Citations:
Scully, Roger/Jones Richard Wyn 2011: 7. Territorial politics in post-Devolution Britain, in: Heffernan, Richard et al.: Developments in British Politics 9, Basingstoke and New York
Smith Commission Report: http://www.smith-commission.scot/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/The_Smith_Commission_Report-1.pdf
Regions and Nations Factsheets, Autumn Statement 2021: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1036523/Regions_and_Nations_Factsheets.pdf
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
2
1
1
The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
A distinction must be made between local authorities of England, on the one hand, and the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly of Wales and the Northern Ireland Assembly, on the other hand. The latter have devolved governments enjoying considerable autonomy from central government, in contrast to the strong restrictions on local authorities in England. Nevertheless, more power was given to local authorities in England by the 2011 Localism Act, which substantially increased local authorities’ decision-making and spending powers over, for example, healthcare, skills training, transport, employment support, physical infrastructure investment and housing. In addition, the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016, in what can be seen as a limited push toward English devolution, established directly elected mayors for combined local authorities in England and Wales, so-called metro mayors. Eight elections for metro mayors were held in 2017 alone.
The devolved parliaments in Scotland and Northern Ireland decided against the creation of directly elected mayors in their respective regions. The establishment of a directly elected mayor in England or Wales normally follows a local referendum, although neither Leicester nor Liverpool held a popular vote and in one case (Torbay, in May 2019) the mayoralty was abolished following a referendum. These plebiscites more often than not rejected proposals to install mayors. In 2021, 15 cities had directly elected mayors, including London. However, there are also nine so-called metro mayors, who are the chairs of “mayoral combined authorities,” for instance in the Greater Manchester Area and the West Midlands; the latest being in West Yorkshire, elected in May 2021.
The political weight of these subsidiary authorities varies markedly and the substance of mayoral offices in the traditionally centralized political system of England is hard to measure. The number of mayors is clearly increasing and they now cover 41% of the population, much of it in the nine metropolitan areas. Numerically, though, they remain a small proportion of all English subnational government jurisdictions.
Some further powers were shifted to the devolved administrations and they undoubtedly took advantage of these (and existing) powers in differentiating their responses to the pandemic. Scotland has gained increased tax powers. The 2017 Scottish Budget set out new income-tax bands. The New Welsh Land Transaction Tax was introduced on 1 April 2018. The return of powers from the European Union will lead to a significant increase in the decision-making powers of the Scottish and Welsh governments, and the restored Northern Ireland executive after a long political hiatus between 2017 and 2020. The Scottish Parliament and the Scottish government have become major political actors, especially through the Scotland Act 2016. Although the powers of the Scottish Parliament are revocable by central government, they should be considered permanent for political reasons.
The Welsh and Northern Irish parliaments have considerable autonomy, granted for instance in the Wales Bill. However, these powers differ in degree from those held by the Scottish Parliament, although new financial powers are being devolved, such as the proposed introduction of a Northern Ireland rate for corporation tax. Even if some decisions by the Scottish government have antagonized central government, the central government has not intervened. With the current Scottish government planning for a second referendum on independence, the central government will likely be even more cautious not to do so.
Citations:
Guide to Localism Act: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/5959/1896534.pdf
House of Commons Briefing paper SN05000 2016 – Directly elected mayors: http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN05000
The devolved parliaments in Scotland and Northern Ireland decided against the creation of directly elected mayors in their respective regions. The establishment of a directly elected mayor in England or Wales normally follows a local referendum, although neither Leicester nor Liverpool held a popular vote and in one case (Torbay, in May 2019) the mayoralty was abolished following a referendum. These plebiscites more often than not rejected proposals to install mayors. In 2021, 15 cities had directly elected mayors, including London. However, there are also nine so-called metro mayors, who are the chairs of “mayoral combined authorities,” for instance in the Greater Manchester Area and the West Midlands; the latest being in West Yorkshire, elected in May 2021.
The political weight of these subsidiary authorities varies markedly and the substance of mayoral offices in the traditionally centralized political system of England is hard to measure. The number of mayors is clearly increasing and they now cover 41% of the population, much of it in the nine metropolitan areas. Numerically, though, they remain a small proportion of all English subnational government jurisdictions.
Some further powers were shifted to the devolved administrations and they undoubtedly took advantage of these (and existing) powers in differentiating their responses to the pandemic. Scotland has gained increased tax powers. The 2017 Scottish Budget set out new income-tax bands. The New Welsh Land Transaction Tax was introduced on 1 April 2018. The return of powers from the European Union will lead to a significant increase in the decision-making powers of the Scottish and Welsh governments, and the restored Northern Ireland executive after a long political hiatus between 2017 and 2020. The Scottish Parliament and the Scottish government have become major political actors, especially through the Scotland Act 2016. Although the powers of the Scottish Parliament are revocable by central government, they should be considered permanent for political reasons.
The Welsh and Northern Irish parliaments have considerable autonomy, granted for instance in the Wales Bill. However, these powers differ in degree from those held by the Scottish Parliament, although new financial powers are being devolved, such as the proposed introduction of a Northern Ireland rate for corporation tax. Even if some decisions by the Scottish government have antagonized central government, the central government has not intervened. With the current Scottish government planning for a second referendum on independence, the central government will likely be even more cautious not to do so.
Citations:
Guide to Localism Act: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/5959/1896534.pdf
House of Commons Briefing paper SN05000 2016 – Directly elected mayors: http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN05000
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?
10
9
9
Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
2
1
1
Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
Because of the constitutional position of the devolved administrations, there are significant policy areas, such as education, health and social care where there is no UK-wide standard – by design. In England, there are supposed to be national standards for service delivery by local authorities or the parallel networks of agencies for specific policies such as the trusts running healthcare, but recent scandals have shown that implementation can be unsatisfactory and thus that there can be “postcode lotteries” in standards. Recently, the Care Quality Commission, a body charged with overseeing the quality of health and social care, was criticized for a lack of transparency. A subsequent report by the National Audit Office found that, while there had been considerable improvements, shortcomings still needed to be addressed.
Although central government has the capacity to set standards, it does not always do enough to “watch the watchers.” Similar factors apply in Wales, Scotland and Norther Ireland. All members of the civil service are pledged to a range of codes (such as the Civil Service Code, the Directory of Civil Service Guidance) to ensure national standards in performance, conduct and delivery. The central government has encouraged local authorities to set up regional standards boards. This is in line with the Localism Act 2011, which changed the powers and scrutiny of local government in England. The ongoing Civil Service Reform, which started in 2012, established a new range of national standards, especially in skills, accountability, transparency and diversity, as recorded in the New Public Appointments Governance Code.
An agreement on common standards was reached between central government and the devolved administrations in October 2017 regarding powers returning from Brussels. It was announced on 13 January 2022 that an agreement had been reached on relations between all of the United Kingdom’s governments. It will be a three-tiered structure and will formalize a new council, chaired by the prime minister, made up of the heads of the devolved governments.
Citations:
HM Government 2012: The Civil Service Reform Plan: http://resources.civilservice.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Civil-Service-Reform-Plan-acc-final.pdf
https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Capacity-and-capability-to-regulate-the-quality-and-safety-of-health-and-adult-social-care.pdf
Although central government has the capacity to set standards, it does not always do enough to “watch the watchers.” Similar factors apply in Wales, Scotland and Norther Ireland. All members of the civil service are pledged to a range of codes (such as the Civil Service Code, the Directory of Civil Service Guidance) to ensure national standards in performance, conduct and delivery. The central government has encouraged local authorities to set up regional standards boards. This is in line with the Localism Act 2011, which changed the powers and scrutiny of local government in England. The ongoing Civil Service Reform, which started in 2012, established a new range of national standards, especially in skills, accountability, transparency and diversity, as recorded in the New Public Appointments Governance Code.
An agreement on common standards was reached between central government and the devolved administrations in October 2017 regarding powers returning from Brussels. It was announced on 13 January 2022 that an agreement had been reached on relations between all of the United Kingdom’s governments. It will be a three-tiered structure and will formalize a new council, chaired by the prime minister, made up of the heads of the devolved governments.
Citations:
HM Government 2012: The Civil Service Reform Plan: http://resources.civilservice.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Civil-Service-Reform-Plan-acc-final.pdf
https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Capacity-and-capability-to-regulate-the-quality-and-safety-of-health-and-adult-social-care.pdf
To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?
10
9
9
Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
8
7
6
7
6
Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
5
4
3
4
3
Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
2
1
1
Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
The implementation, execution and control of regulations in the United Kingdom is the task of the civil service and statutory regulatory bodies. Many of the latter are set up on a statutory basis, either as non-departmental public bodies that report to parliament or as non-ministerial government departments, ensuring that they are at arms-length from government and ministers. There are also a number of non-governmental regulators for different industry sectors, some of which are voluntary and some of which are placed on a statutory footing either through legislation or a Royal Charter.
The civil service (also known as “Whitehall” for its historic location in London) is a highly centralized and powerful bureaucratic body that abides by very strict codes of conduct, and generally provides an indispensable and loyal service to the UK government.
Like many other countries, key industries in the United Kingdom – the City of London, with its concentration of financial and business services, is a notable example – are able to lobby against unwelcome regulation more forcefully than other businesses or civil society.
The civil service (also known as “Whitehall” for its historic location in London) is a highly centralized and powerful bureaucratic body that abides by very strict codes of conduct, and generally provides an indispensable and loyal service to the UK government.
Like many other countries, key industries in the United Kingdom – the City of London, with its concentration of financial and business services, is a notable example – are able to lobby against unwelcome regulation more forcefully than other businesses or civil society.
Graph View
To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?
10
9
9
The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
8
7
6
7
6
In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
2
1
1
The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
The organization of ministries in the United Kingdom is a prerogative of the prime minister, and traditionally the precise division of tasks between ministries apart from the classic portfolios of foreign policy, defense, the Treasury, and the Home Office has been subject to considerable change. There is some evidence for international and supranational developments playing an important role in these decisions on UK government structures, a clear example being the creation of the Department of Energy and Climate Change, with an explicit remit to engage in international action to mitigate climate change, although was subsequently subsumed within new ministries following the change in prime minister in 2016. New cabinet committees have been set up (and subsequently terminated), such as a committee on Syrian refugees in 2015 and more recently on dealing with Afghanistan after the 2021 takeover by the Taliban. There have also been developments leading to new cross-departmental structures. The establishment of the National Security Council was a response to security-related issues, while the creation of a cross-governmental joint energy unit was motivated by the Ukraine crisis.
The United Kingdom has in some areas been an early, and sometimes enthusiastic, proponent of norms and practices that have been championed by international bodies, including those overseeing financial stability and transparency in government. The Open Data Charter and the Open Government Partnership (in which the United Kingdom plays an active role) were agreed under the United Kingdom’s G7 presidency. The United Kingdom is an acknowledged leader in open government and ranked first out of 115 countries in the 2016 Open Data Barometer. Considerable effort was put into the preparation of COP26, held in Glasgow in 2021, with the effort headed by a cabinet minister.
Prior to Brexit, ministries and cabinet committees were reconfigured and efforts made to develop trade policy capability, because government had to respond to the expanding UK role in international trade. The revived Ministry for International Trade was one such reconfiguration. On the other hand, the Johnson government is eager to distance itself from many of the United Kingdom’s previous relationships with the European Union to emphasize its independence.
The United Kingdom has in some areas been an early, and sometimes enthusiastic, proponent of norms and practices that have been championed by international bodies, including those overseeing financial stability and transparency in government. The Open Data Charter and the Open Government Partnership (in which the United Kingdom plays an active role) were agreed under the United Kingdom’s G7 presidency. The United Kingdom is an acknowledged leader in open government and ranked first out of 115 countries in the 2016 Open Data Barometer. Considerable effort was put into the preparation of COP26, held in Glasgow in 2021, with the effort headed by a cabinet minister.
Prior to Brexit, ministries and cabinet committees were reconfigured and efforts made to develop trade policy capability, because government had to respond to the expanding UK role in international trade. The revived Ministry for International Trade was one such reconfiguration. On the other hand, the Johnson government is eager to distance itself from many of the United Kingdom’s previous relationships with the European Union to emphasize its independence.
To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?
10
9
9
The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
2
1
1
The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
The United Kingdom has long played a leading role in coordinating international initiatives and the country’s imperial legacy has contributed to its active stance on international commitments. It has led global responses in recent years, for example, in efforts to eradicate poverty in Africa, coordinate the EU response to the Ebola outbreak, promote reform in the financial sector, and combat climate change and corruption.
As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, the United Kingdom is very active in the United Nations in security matters and also plays a prominent role in NATO. Government structures, such as the National Security Council, ensure consistency. It led the way in supporting the Rohingya in October 2017. It also supported initiatives to raise the lending capacity of the IMF, enabling it to boost support for low-income members badly affected by the pandemic
Following the decision to leave the European Union, the United Kingdom had to rethink its role in the world, especially among its European neighbors. While the Johnson government has emphasized its independence vis-a-vis its European partner countries by treating them somewhat robustly, it has played up its “Global Britain” profile by putting resources into COP26, the COVAX initiative and increasing funding for the WHO during the pandemic. Prime Minister Johnson hosted the Gavi donor conference (which secured pledges for vaccine funding for poorer countries) held in London in June 2020. Following the Carbis Bay G7 meeting chaired by the United Kingdom in July 2021, the United Kingdom undertook to donate 100 million vaccine doses by the summer of 2022.
Citations:
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-begins-donating-millions-of-covid-19-vaccines-overseas
As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, the United Kingdom is very active in the United Nations in security matters and also plays a prominent role in NATO. Government structures, such as the National Security Council, ensure consistency. It led the way in supporting the Rohingya in October 2017. It also supported initiatives to raise the lending capacity of the IMF, enabling it to boost support for low-income members badly affected by the pandemic
Following the decision to leave the European Union, the United Kingdom had to rethink its role in the world, especially among its European neighbors. While the Johnson government has emphasized its independence vis-a-vis its European partner countries by treating them somewhat robustly, it has played up its “Global Britain” profile by putting resources into COP26, the COVAX initiative and increasing funding for the WHO during the pandemic. Prime Minister Johnson hosted the Gavi donor conference (which secured pledges for vaccine funding for poorer countries) held in London in June 2020. Following the Carbis Bay G7 meeting chaired by the United Kingdom in July 2021, the United Kingdom undertook to donate 100 million vaccine doses by the summer of 2022.
Citations:
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-begins-donating-millions-of-covid-19-vaccines-overseas
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To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?
10
9
9
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
5
4
3
4
3
The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
2
1
1
There is no monitoring.
Flexibility and informal meetings are a key feature of the government system, enabling it to respond in a way uniquely tailored to the situation at hand that has always been valued highly and is an essential constituent of prime ministerial government in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the Cabinet Office in particular has a remit to monitor the government’s functioning and does so through a range of mechanisms, which have been reinforced by recent civil service reforms, particularly civil service management procedures. A key change introduced in 2016 was the introduction of wide-ranging “single departmental plans,” replacing the use of business plans. After a spending review in 2020, a new instrument – outcome delivery plans (ODPs) – was introduced. ODPs set out each government department’s revised priority outcomes, the department’s strategy for achieving them and the metrics that will be used to track performance. In addition, the recasting of cabinet committees saw the creation of “operations” as well as policy groupings, replacing the implementation task forces set up in 2015 innovation. Regular assessments of progress are undertaken by the Civil Service Board chaired by the cabinet secretary and there is a so-called shadow civil service board composed of less senior civil servants. The latter is charged with assessing specific projects and advising senior management, and is also expected to provide different perspectives and views on papers that are forwarded to the Civil Service Board.
In response to critiques from select committees and the Institute for Government (IfG), the government revised its guidance on the machinery of government, placing greater emphasis on the importance of senior leadership and accountability, although the IfG’s 2022 Whitehall Monitor raises concerns about the ambiguity over whether ministers or civil servants are ultimately accountable.
This self-monitoring has been bolstered by a renewed commitment to open government and the public release of data. Executive monitoring is complemented by media scrutiny, parliamentary committees, various policy-specific statutory bodies and independent organizations, such as the Institute for Government. The Institute of Government stated that its task of monitoring central government was facilitated by the availability of data, “the fact we can produce this report supports that.” The dissemination of good audit practices has been encouraged by the publication of internal audit standards and there are periodic reviews of areas of governance concern, recent examples being an audit of race disparities and a review of national security capabilities.
Citations:
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/civil-service/about/our-governance#civil-service-board https://civilservice.blog.gov.uk/2015/07/29/clarifying-our-priorities-single-departmental-plans/ https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cabinet-committees-and-implementation-taskforces-membership-list
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/641252/PSAIS_1_April_2017.pdf
In response to critiques from select committees and the Institute for Government (IfG), the government revised its guidance on the machinery of government, placing greater emphasis on the importance of senior leadership and accountability, although the IfG’s 2022 Whitehall Monitor raises concerns about the ambiguity over whether ministers or civil servants are ultimately accountable.
This self-monitoring has been bolstered by a renewed commitment to open government and the public release of data. Executive monitoring is complemented by media scrutiny, parliamentary committees, various policy-specific statutory bodies and independent organizations, such as the Institute for Government. The Institute of Government stated that its task of monitoring central government was facilitated by the availability of data, “the fact we can produce this report supports that.” The dissemination of good audit practices has been encouraged by the publication of internal audit standards and there are periodic reviews of areas of governance concern, recent examples being an audit of race disparities and a review of national security capabilities.
Citations:
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/civil-service/about/our-governance#civil-service-board https://civilservice.blog.gov.uk/2015/07/29/clarifying-our-priorities-single-departmental-plans/ https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cabinet-committees-and-implementation-taskforces-membership-list
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/641252/PSAIS_1_April_2017.pdf
To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?
10
9
9
The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
8
7
6
7
6
The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
2
1
1
The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
As mentioned above, the organizational flexibility of both the core executive and the distribution of tasks to specific ministries is a core characteristic of the UK system of government. Cabinet reorganizations and new institutional arrangements have often been the prime minister’s weapon of choice to improve government performance. However, such reorganization can also be motivated by intra-party politics or public pressure, and it is difficult to evaluate the success of specific measures in enhancing the strategic capacity of the government. Recent civil service reforms have also served to enhance strategic capacity, while various open data initiatives have increased government transparency. More generally, the government is exploiting digital technology opportunities right across the functions of government.
Very substantial changes in governance do occur. Recent examples include the restoration of the Bank of England’s lead role in financial supervision and an alteration to the basis of financial regulation. Both of these examples followed evidence of the ineffectiveness of the preceding model, and shifts in the balance between state, market and external agencies in the delivery of public goods.
Changes in institutional arrangements, such as ministries or the focus of cabinet committees, were among the approaches taken to try to resolve the many difficulties in implementing Brexit. After the 2019 general election victory and the return of majority government, institutional flexibility was demonstrated by, for example, merging the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Department of International Development. A key manifesto commitment – “leveling-up” – is expected to be fleshed out in 2022 and was already given impetus by broadening the remit of the Ministry for Housing into the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities. Cross-departmental coordination will be part of this development.
Very substantial changes in governance do occur. Recent examples include the restoration of the Bank of England’s lead role in financial supervision and an alteration to the basis of financial regulation. Both of these examples followed evidence of the ineffectiveness of the preceding model, and shifts in the balance between state, market and external agencies in the delivery of public goods.
Changes in institutional arrangements, such as ministries or the focus of cabinet committees, were among the approaches taken to try to resolve the many difficulties in implementing Brexit. After the 2019 general election victory and the return of majority government, institutional flexibility was demonstrated by, for example, merging the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Department of International Development. A key manifesto commitment – “leveling-up” – is expected to be fleshed out in 2022 and was already given impetus by broadening the remit of the Ministry for Housing into the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities. Cross-departmental coordination will be part of this development.